Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Robert Neill Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright). Although I will not be supporting the hon. and learned Lady’s amendments, I have great respect for the intellectual rigour that she brought on Scots law and its application in this case. I say the same about the points made by my right hon. and learned Friend in relation to his amendments 54 and 55. I hope the Minister will think seriously about how we deal with that issue—I am sure he will, because serious points have been raised. In a nutshell, I agree with the proposition that while Parliament can, of course, legislate to do whatever it likes in domestic law, the simple fact is that one cannot legislate away international law obligations or treaty obligations, and it would be misleading to pretend otherwise.

I now turn to the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). I am sorry that he is not in his place, because I have to say that, with every respect, I profoundly differ from his characterisation of pyjama injunctions by a foreign court. Respectfully, I would argue that that characterisation is both inaccurate and rather unworthy. As was observed by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, it is perfectly normal for interim injunctions to be issued at difficult hours when the test for them is met, so we should not say that that is unusual. Arguments can be legitimately made about the way in which the rule 39 procedure in the Strasbourg Court works, but let us make them on the basis of an accurate construction of what the Court is about, rather than otherwise.

[Danny Kruger (Devizes) (Con)]

I have great respect for the argument that my hon. Friend is making, and I defer to his experience and knowledge on this issue. I am genuinely interested in his view: he has described a judge in the UK issuing an injunction late at night in the event of what, in normal circumstances, would be an individual situation. Does he really think it is comparable to describe in the same terms the act of a Court that is genuinely in another country and a judge who is anonymous and does not publish the rationale for their opinion, which calls a halt—with the support of the Government, it must be said—to the policy of the British Government, enacting a law passed in Parliament? Surely there is a difference, both of degree and of nature, between the two cases.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I think my hon. Friend needs to bear in mind that the application that was made to Strasbourg was also about the circumstances of an individual case, so that is no different.

There is a legitimate criticism—one that I have voiced in the past—about the procedure adopted in Strasbourg for these applications in two areas: first, the anonymity of the judge, and secondly, the failure to state reasons. From our point of view, that would not be acceptable, but the answer is not to throw out the whole of the judicial and treaty baby with the bathwater. Thanks to the Brighton declaration that was signed by my noble and learned Friend Lord Clarke of Nottingham, it is possible to make reforms following dialogue between member states, the Council of Ministers and the judiciary of the Court. I am pleased to say that after pressure from the United Kingdom—perfectly properly—the Court itself has indicated that it will to consult on reforms to its procedure, which can only be a good thing. That is what I think the balanced position is on that issue.

[Sir Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

In fact, further than that, there are already proposed reforms to the interim procedure, which will come into place this year and crucially will remove the anonymity provisions and allow contracting parties such as the UK to make the argument, as I believe applies in this case, that there is not an imminent risk of irreparable damage. We can fly people back from Rwanda, and that is the argument we need to keep making.

[Sir Robert Neill]

My right hon. and learned Friend is entirely correct, and he and I would probably have very happily argued the UK’s case in Strasbourg on those grounds, so let us be realistic about what we are fighting against. With respect, a bit of an Aunt Sally has been set up because steps are already being taken to deal with the objectionable matters relating to rule 39s, but the principle of them is not itself objectionable.

Secondly, with respect, the characterisation of a “foreign court” is not helpful in these circumstances, because it implies something alien, which it is not the case for international law as a concept or for the Court itself. The fact that it happens to meet in a different place from the UK is inevitable because it has to meet somewhere. We should bear in mind that not only was the UK one of the driving powers behind the creation of the convention in the first place, behind the Court itself and behind much of the jurisprudence of the Court, but the UK does actually have shared ownership of the Court, along with all the other member states.

That is demonstrated not just in the treaty, but in practical ways. For example, the British members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe—Members of this House and the other place—have a role in the appointment of the judges of the Court. My right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) and I served at one time on the sub-committee of the Assembly that dealt with that process, and I like to think that we did so diligently, so there is involvement in that process. A British judge always sits on the Court and is a member of the Court. Judge Tim Eicke, the current judge, is a very distinguished international lawyer, and we are very lucky to have him. Two of the recent registrars of the Court, who run its administration, have been British lawyers, and British lawyers appear regularly in cases before the Court.

This is not an alien body; it is a Court of which we have joint ownership. It is our Court, along with that of all the other member states of the convention, and it is wrong to mischaracterise it as something alien. Certainly, in all international matters, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam said, it operates on a different plane, but the tone of comments about its alienness is, with respect, both inaccurate and somewhat offensive. It is also unnecessary for the purposes of this Bill anyway, and that is the point I want to come on to in relation to rule 39.

The amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark are otiose. They are unnecessary and, frankly, would make a difficult situation worse. As a matter of law, an interim measure under rule 39 is an indication made to the Government of the member state. It is not made to the courts of the member state; it is conveyed to the Government of the member state concerned. Therefore, it is for the members of the Government of the member state—the Ministers—to decide what to do about it.

I personally take the view that we should be very loth indeed to ignore the findings of the Court on an interim matter. As the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West rightly said, it runs the risk of putting us in breach of our international law obligation in that regard. However, the truth is that it is a political decision that the Ministers can take. So what the Bill in its current formulation states is actually no more than a statement of the law as it stands, and we probably do not need clause 5 in the Bill. I am not going to die in a ditch over that, because it is simply stating what the law is already, but, equally, there is absolutely no need for the amendments from my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark to put bells and whistles on otioseness, if I can put it that way.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am loth to interrupt my hon. Friend as he is describing not so much the separation of powers as the desiccation of power. However, on the specific point he made about his reticence or reluctance not to abide by the advice of the Court—he said Ministers could do that, but he would not—would he on that basis not have done what the noble Lord Cameron did as Prime Minister when he resisted the overtures from the Court to give prisoners votes?

[Sir Robert Neill]

I would make two points about that. In fact, I supported the noble Lord Cameron in that regard because it was a political decision. It is also worth looking at the practical politics. Although we were for a period of time at variance with the Court, no harm was done to the polity of the United Kingdom in that regard. No harm was done to the interests of the United Kingdom and no terrible international consequence for us flowed from it. I think the Court got it wrong on that occasion, and one of the problems is that there is no appeal system in the Strasbourg Court, so we have to wait until some future decision goes a different way. I think many of us take the view that, in reality, the Court as currently constituted in Strasbourg—it is perhaps less activist, if I may say so, than its predecessors—might well have found differently in the prisoner voting case. However, the fact was that UK Ministers took the decision, and they did what was right in the UK, which was supported by those in all parts of the House, and no harm was done. So the idea that some terrible consequence will flow for the UK because of the ability to seek rule 39 interim measures is just misplaced.

[Sir William Cash]

Would my hon. Friend reflect on this fact about prisoner voting? I discussed the matter with the noble Lord Cameron when he was Prime Minister at the time, but it was regarded by the noble Lord Clarke of Nottingham as a “particular political policy”—I think those were the words he used. How would my hon. Friend describe the issue of illegal migration? Would he not regard that as a particular but very important political policy?

[Sir Robert Neill]

That is why, as it happens, I will not vote against this Bill, because although I have some misgivings, there is a legitimate concern that needs to be dealt with in relation to illegal boats. However, the simple fact is that that is not a reason for the blanket derogation, or the blanket removal of ECHR protections, that is proposed in a series of amendments. That is the difference. My hon. Friend and I are at one, but sometimes a mixture of politics and law arises in these matters. The point I am making is that, frankly, if any Government want to take the political risk of ignoring an interim measure, they can do so under our law as it stands. It happens that they effectively did so on prisoner voting, so they could do that now if they wanted to. I am not going to advise on that, because one has to be very wary not to come to views that may very often not be fact-specific when individual decisions are made.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I do not want to prolong the discussion about prisoner voting, but like my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), I remember having conversations about it inside Government. I think it would be fairer to describe the situation as one in which the UK did not at any point refuse to comply with the judgment, would it not? We have perhaps adopted a more Augustinian approach to compliance: we just have not quite got around to it yet.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I think that is right. As I recall, the UK Government put a motion before this House, which the House rejected. So we had a perfectly legitimate legal argument that we had taken steps to comply, and Parliament, as it was entitled to, decided otherwise. That is why the whole of my argument with the amendments from my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark is that they are an Aunt Sally—a complete red herring compared with the real issues we are concerned with—and I urge hon. Members on both sides of the Committee to reject them.

Finally, I had misgivings about this Bill, and I spoke about that on Second Reading. I said that it stayed acceptable—just—and I maintain that position. My right hon. Friend quoted the noble Lord Sandhurst, a very distinguished lawyer in the other place. I should say that he is a personal friend of mine. The noble Lord Sandhurst is chair of the research committee of the Society of Conservative Lawyers, and I happen to chair the executive committee of the society. Lord Sandhurst and Harry Gillow, a fellow member of the society, published a very useful pamphlet about the impact of this Bill, and they have updated it in the light of these amendments. Their conclusion, with respect, is that

“the Bill goes as far as reasonably possible without risking collapse of the Rwanda scheme as a whole”.

They go on to say in their pamphlet that the Bill as drafted represents the best chance of success for the migration and economic development partnership with Rwanda. So they are on the same side of the argument as me and say that the amendments proposed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark take it over the line in terms of being able to deliver the partnership scheme and risk collapsing the whole scheme. It was ironic that my right hon. Friend talked about blowing up the Bill because the truth is that his amendments will blow up the deal with Rwanda, because the Rwandans have made it abundantly clear that anything that breaches international law will be unacceptable to them and they would withdraw from the agreement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Seely]

My hon. Friend has made a valuable point, and one that I was about to come on to. Why do some people in this country and some political groups, generally on the left, idealise international courts as if they were fonts of Olympian wisdom when, in my view, many of their judgments are highly political and highly tendentious? They seem to me to constitute an exercise in studied disrespect for the English common law, which I consider to be one of the great wonders of human civilisation and achievement, along with monotheism and one or two other things. We seem to be allowing the international courts to overrule those extraordinary achievements—all these great judges from on high, who do not come from traditional judicial systems anywhere near as strong or as noble as ours.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I have been agreeing with the basic thrust that it is the Bill or nothing, but may I gently say something to my hon. Friend about the European Court of Human Rights? If he looks carefully at its case law, he will see that British common law traditions have, in fact, had a significant impact on the jurisprudence of that Court. It does not follow the pure civil law system of the continent, as those who have served on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe will know. It has actually moved to a hybrid system, largely because of the influence of British jurists.

[Bob Seely]

My hon. Friend has made an excellent point. He is, of course, an eminent lawyer, and I, frankly am not. [Hon. Members: “There is still time!”] I am tempted to say, “I will stop digging.”

My hon. Friend is right in saying that we have had an influence, but I understand from what I have seen and read that there has also been the influence of a far more rationalist system on our own common law, and I do not consider the impact on EU law and casework on our system to have been entirely beneficial and entirely helpful.