Explosive Ordnance Disposal Community

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Wednesday 11th December 2024 Westminster Hall

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Dowd. Having read my Order Paper over coffee, may I offer you my congratulations on your appointment to Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee? It is an extremely responsible post in which we all have utter confidence that you will do very well. Good luck, Sir.

[Peter Dowd (in the Chair)]

Thank you.

[Mr Francois]

Perhaps I should begin by declaring a personal family interest in this subject. My late father, Stoker First Class Reginald Francois, served on a minesweeper named HMS Bressay from 1943 until the second world war ended, so he was involved in bomb disposal of a sort. Perhaps more accurately it was mine disposal, but nevertheless he personally faced a threat from large explosive devices, albeit in a maritime context. As his son, I am proud to speak on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition on this very important subject this morning.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) on securing this important debate and, if I may say so, for introducing it so ably. She made a very knowledgeable contribution, no doubt drawing on her own military experience. In particular, she illustrated the challenge posed to the international community by the sheer scale of this problem around the world.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) spoke powerfully about the threat from terrorist bombs in Northern Ireland, which is a subject to which I would like to return. The hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Calvin Bailey)—an RAF veteran, if I may call him that—also addressed the international scale of the challenge. Last but not least, I am supported by our shadow Defence Parliamentary Private Secretary this morning, my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East (David Reed), who as a former Royal Marine, like the Minister, understands quite a lot about the subject.

I would like to begin my own contribution with a historical perspective on bomb disposal operations in the British armed forces, before moving on to address both military and, increasingly, civilian operations in this crucial field of activity, right up to the present day. Bomb disposal, or, to give it its more formal title, explosive ordnance disposal—EOD for short—can be traced back for over a century. During the first world war, squads of men were assembled to help deal with unexploded bombs left after raids on London and the south east by German zeppelin bombers and their Gotha Giant aircraft counterparts—a bombing campaign that was very well summarised by Neil Hanson in his book “First Blitz”.

In addition, with the advent of truly industrialised warfare in the first world war, teams of engineers were needed to dispose of unexploded munitions, particularly high explosive shells that had fallen among the allied trenches on the western front but failed to detonate. Even at that time, this was highly skilled and extremely dangerous work—a characteristic that has remained true right through to the present day.

By the time of the second world war, although the need for bomb disposal on the battlefield was undiminished, with the advent of the mass bombing of civilian targets, the need for bomb disposal on the home front expanded accordingly. This led to a high death toll among those brave enough to undertake the task of dealing with unexploded bombs—or UXBs, as they were characterised at that time. Juliet Gardiner, in her book entitled simply “The Blitz”, describes the losses in the following terms, which I think are quite evocative:

“Sometimes a UXB might embed itself a few feet in the ground, or fall into a static water tank or a gasometer but many penetrated deep below the surface and were difficult to get at. The defusers’ survival would have depended on staying one step ahead of German technology, since as soon as they learnt how one time delay mechanism worked, it would be replaced by another. By the end of 1940, 123 officers and men of the bomb disposal squads had been killed and 67 wounded. The deaths did not cease with the end of the war, as UXB’s continued to be uncovered. By 1947, 490 had been killed in the battle to extract these great torpid iron pigs from their holes and render them harmless.”

The need for EOD workers continued as a facet of British military operations since the end of the second world war, right up to the present day. For instance, dealing with both republican and so-called loyalist bombs was a key facet of Operation Banner, the British Army’s campaign to support the civil authorities during the period of the troubles in Northern Ireland. A number of bomb disposal officers were killed and many were wounded during the course of the troubles, as the hon. Member for Strangford rightly reminded us.

The scale of the task that they were up against was well summarised by Desmond Hamill in his book “Pig in the Middle” about the British Army’s role in Northern Ireland. He summarised the challenge as follows:

“Over the years the Provisionals have become expert at designing and manufacturing booby-traps. Only the week before, a bomb disposal sergeant had been killed by a bomb within a bomb in County Fermanagh. It had been packed into a milk churn, and when the sergeant had cleared the timing device and was lifting it out, a detonator underneath set off the second bomb which exploded.”

As the author went on to explain:

“The bombs were often very simple and very deadly. The components were readily available—a few pounds of explosives, a detonator, a battery and a couple of feet of wire. The triggering device could either be a plate buried in the ground or even a clothes peg.”

As the Minister will be well aware, hundreds of thousands of British soldiers served on Operation Banner during the troubles. Hundreds were killed, not just in bomb disposal, and many thousands were maimed or had life-changing injuries, from both republican and so-called loyalist terrorism. Perhaps when he sums up, the Minister could say a few words about why the Government still intend to abolish the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, which will leave many Northern Ireland veterans open, yet again, to an endless cycle of reinvestigation, much of it politically motivated at the hands of Sinn Féin. Our veterans, who faced the threat of terrorist bombs every day of their service in Northern Ireland, really do deserve better than this from their Government.

Let me turn to the Falklands. Diffusing unexploded bombs is not just a challenge on land, as pointed out by Lord Ashcroft in his book “Falklands War Heroes”. During the 1982 Falklands war, chief marine engineering mechanic Michael Townsend was awarded the distinguished service medal for his role in assisting with the disposal of two bombs that had hit his ship, HMS Argonaut. The principal bomb disposal task with which he assisted was undertaken by Staff Sergeant Jim Prescott and Warrant Officer Second Class John Phillips, both of the Royal Engineers.

Assisted by Townsend and several of the crew, the two bomb disposal experts succeeded in disarming and disposing both Argentinian bombs that had landed on the Argonaut. Unfortunately, however, Staff Sergeant Prescott, from 49 Squadron Royal Engineers, was killed two days later while attempting a similar task with two further unexploded bombs that had landed on HMS Argonaut’s sister ship, HMS Antelope. His colleague WO2 Phillips was badly injured, losing one of his arms in the latter attempt. I mention that particular example not just to pay tribute to the extreme bravery of all three men involved, one of whom sadly lost his life, but also to point out that dealing with ordnance of this type is not purely confined to the land domain.

UK Air and Missile Defences

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Wednesday 27th November 2024 Westminster Hall

[Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered UK air and missile defences.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I am pleased to have secured this debate to highlight a critical weakness in our national defences. I am sure it will come as no surprise to hon. Members that I say this, but I sincerely believe that outside this place, and even among many of our colleagues, it is not appreciated that the diversity of the threat we now face from air attack, and the lack of our defences against it, is at its most serious in decades.

This debate is about defences against conventional air and missile threats, not nuclear threats—for that we maintain our continuous at-sea strategic nuclear deterrent. The world is more unstable today than at any point since the cold war, but sadly, despite a changing threat environment, I fear our defences have not been adapted quickly enough to deter or protect against it. The House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee’s report published in September, which analysed the lessons we can learn from Ukraine, laid out in stark terms the significant weaknesses in European defences. Key among them is the fact that our air and missile defences are, frankly, inadequate. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine not only brought conventional warfare back to mainland Europe, but has shown in stark terms the importance of credible and robust air and missile defences.

Nearly 12,000 missiles have been launched against Ukraine by Russia since February 2022. About 80% of them have been intercepted, thanks to different air defence systems protecting military and civilian infrastructure, but that still means that thousands of missiles have impacted, often to devastating effect. Earlier this month, over the course of just one week, Russia used more than 800 guided aerial bombs, about 460 attack drones and more than 20 missiles of various types against Ukraine.

During the cold war NATO’s air defences were a largely static system arrayed in belts around a unidirectional and well-defined threat of manned aircraft from the Soviet Union, but today’s environment is less predictable. The range of air and missile threats is larger and the threat can come from any direction. Indeed, according to reports from earlier this year, NATO states can provide less than 5% of the air defence capacity deemed necessary to protect allies in central and eastern Europe against a full-scale attack.

Unlike Ukraine, the UK has some obvious geographical protection from attacks by ground-based short-range missiles and drones, but two significant and concerning reports over recent days show once again that there is no cause for complacency. First, Russia is now prepared to use intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missiles against targets in Ukraine. This is the first successful use of that type of missile with conventional warheads in combat. They are harder to intercept and represent a significant escalation. The second concerning report in recent days relates to the presence of unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles around three RAF bases—Lakenheath, Mildenhall and Feltwell—between 20 and 22 November and overnight on 25 November. I do not expect the Minister to go into too much detail about that recent incident or about what counter-measures are in place at our bases, but both reports show that short-range and long-range threats to the UK are very real, very diverse, and we need to be able to defend ourselves against them.

If we look at events in the middle east, we can also see the diversity of short to long-range aerial threats. Israel has faced rocket, drone and ballistic missile attacks from Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. In October, Iran launched almost 200 ballistic missiles against Israel following its previous attack involving 300 missiles and drones in April, but, unlike the UK, Israel has a sophisticated and multi-layered air and missile defence system to counter wide-ranging aerial threats. The Iron Dome intercepts short-range rockets of the type fired by Hamas and Hezbollah. David’s Sling can intercept medium to long-range rockets, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, and Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 can intercept long-range ballistic missiles. Recently, we saw the deployment of US THAAD—terminal high altitude area defence—batteries to bolster defences against ballistic missile threats.

The UK’s current air defence capabilities against such threats are primarily made up of Sea Viper on Type 45 destroyers, utilising Aster missiles, Sky Sabre ground-based air defence, and quick reaction alert Typhoon fighter jets. Typhoons on quick reaction alert at Coningsby and Lossiemouth can intercept potential hostile airborne threats, including aircraft and UAVs. The Sky Sabre ground-based air defence system can intercept multiple cruise missiles, aircraft and UAVs up to 25 km away. However, there are only about six Sky Sabre systems in service with the British Army, and at least two are deployed overseas, to the Falkland Islands and Poland. Clearly, many more such systems would be needed to provide sufficient cover to a larger number of critical military and civilian national infrastructure sites across the UK.

I know the business case for more Sky Sabre launchers has been approved, but orders have not yet been made. Bizarrely, no business case has been made for ordering more missiles for Sky Sabre, despite such orders taking longer to fulfil. Crucially, Sky Sabre cannot defend against ballistic or hypersonic missile threats—it was not designed to do so. The only defence the UK currently has against ballistic missiles is Sea Viper, which utilises Aster 30 missiles on our six Type 45 destroyers. Sea Viper can currently track potential threats at ranges of up to 250 miles, and eliminate them within about 70 miles.

I know that Sea Viper is being upgraded over the next decade, with initial operation capability in 2028. That is very welcome, but given that we have only a few Type 45s in service at any one time, the coverage that they can provide in defence of homeland targets against ballistic missile threats is limited. To defend London against ballistic missile threats, a Type 45 destroyer would have to be permanently moored in the Thames estuary, which would mean that it could not do anything else. In particular, it would be unavailable for its primary role of protecting one of our aircraft carriers from air and missile threats. That alone makes the case that some form of new or upgraded ground-based air defence system that provides protection against threats, including ballistic and hypersonic missiles, is needed.

To consider only the military critical national infrastructure that would be vulnerable to air attack and would need adequate protection, we have the three main Royal Navy operating bases at Portsmouth, Devonport and Clyde; seven RAF bases, including Lossiemouth, Marham and Coningsby; and the major Army garrisons. We have radar sites, ammunition depots, and overseas sites, including the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which are in range of Iranian ballistic missiles, unlike sites in the UK. Major defence industrial sites would also presumably be at risk. Then there is a plethora of significant civilian infrastructure that could be targeted, including nuclear power stations, large transport hubs, industrial sites and Government buildings. We know tragically from the war in Ukraine that Russia has no compunction about hitting civilian targets such as hospitals, shopping centres or concentrations of housing, purely to terrorise the civilian population and degrade national morale.

The previous Government’s integrated and defence reviews slowly started to acknowledge the threat from air attack. The 2023 Defence Command Paper described the threat as being

“at its most acute for over thirty years”.

Clearly, the resources have not yet been put into upscaling equipment and filling the gaps in capability that we need to counter that.

Other European countries have been taking the issue seriously and placing orders. In the past decade, France and Italy have jointly developed the medium-range SAMP/T air defence system, which can intercept ballistic missiles, drones, fighter jets and other targets. In September, France ordered eight new SAMP/T NG systems, capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles. The first ones will enter service in 2026. Italy also ordered 10 of these new systems, which will utilise upgraded Aster 30 missiles.

Many European countries already utilise the American Patriot air defence system. To bolster that, existing operators Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and Sweden are procuring 1,000 additional Patriot missiles between them. Poland has signed contracts worth £4 billion with UK industry to deliver the NAREW next-generation air defence system. Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France and Hungary are jointly buying around 1,500 Mistral short-range air defence—SHORAD—missiles. Latvia and Estonia are jointly procuring IRIS-T for medium-range interception, and Finland has ordered the David’s Sling system.

To fill capability gaps and ensure interoperability, we should be working with our European NATO partners on joint procurement. The Government have said that the UK is engaging with the European Sky Shield initiative, which seeks to establish a ground-based integrated European air defence system with anti-ballistic missile capability. There are clearly different views across Europe about which systems it should comprise to ensure not only interoperability but to develop and maintain Europe’s defence industrial base.

I am aware that the UK signed a letter of intent to launch the integrated air and missile DIAMOND initiative in October, alongside six allies: France, Germany, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Sweden. That is clearly welcome, as it shows the seriousness with which the threat is recognised, but there is no clear timetable of key milestones associated with the DIAMOND initiative. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide an update.

It is not just our ability to take down hostile airborne threats that we must consider; there is also our ability to detect them in the first place. It is no secret that we have only a limited number of fixed and mobile land-based radars on UK soil, which would probably be among the first targets vulnerable to air attack. The previous Government’s early retirement of E-3 Sentry left a capability gap in airborne early warning and control, which has only been compounded by delays in the E-7 Wedgetail programme.

Airborne early warning and control will be crucial in monitoring the western and south-western coasts of the UK, where ground-based radar is limited, to detect potential submarine-launched threats. We also need to take seriously the potential for radar evasion along the east coast, particularly by UAVs or projectiles passing through wind farms. The Government are actively working on deconflicting windfarms and existing air defence surveillance systems. I would be grateful if the Minister could speak briefly about that.

Ministers will be acutely aware of everything I have said but, as I said at the start of the debate, I do not think many of our colleagues, including across Government outside the Ministry of Defence, appreciate the scale or seriousness of the issue. The defence analyst Francis Tusa has compared the current situation with that found by General Frederick Pile in 1937 when he was appointed commander of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Division. General Pile highlighted the severe lack of anti-aircraft batteries to defend civilian and military locations. His analysis led to an increase in personnel in anti-aircraft roles and the mass production of anti-aircraft artillery.

Our armed forces are among the best and most capable in the world but, unfortunately, the defence they can provide today against significant airborne threats to the homeland, such as missile attack, is very limited. We have highly capable equipment but not enough of it to protect the significant amount of critical infrastructure across the length and breadth of the country, and to defend troops deployed on operations overseas. Principally, that is because we spent most of the previous few decades focused on expeditionary overseas missions rather than active homeland defence. We have been too slow to adapt to the changing threat picture.

The lack of active homeland defence is fundamentally a strategic failure. I hope the ongoing strategic defence review will deem it such and outline how it can be urgently addressed. The first responsibility of our Government is to protect our people and defend our freedom. I fear that further delay in outlining the action we are going to take and, crucially, the budget to deliver it, brings only greater risk of catastrophic failure in fulfilling that fundamental responsibility.

Addressing that capability gap needs to be an urgent political, funding and industrial priority for Government. I hope the Minister feels that this debate helps her demonstrate the political support in Parliament for tackling it.

[Peter Dowd (in the Chair)]

Order. I remind Members to bob if they wish to be called in the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

Last week, the Secretary of State made a statement that dealt with withdrawing six capabilities. It would, in fact, save some money—£150 million over two years and £500 million over five years—but the primary purpose is to ensure that we do not continue to spend money on capability that will not actually provide modern defence. It is a rationalisation. It is fairly clear that with some of those announcements, it was just necessary to get on and make the decision. As the hon. Gentleman will see in the new year, a path will be set out to 2.5% in the spring, along with the SDR, which I think is the right way of doing it. We are committed to it and we will get there. That, I think, answers the point that the hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr Campbell), who is no longer in his place, and the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) made about getting to 2.5%.

This has been a timely and excellent debate across the Chamber. If the aim of my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham was to show that there is support across the House, he has succeeded. It will be clear to anyone who reads the debate that there is no real distinction between the concerns that we all have across the parties. As we were reminded last week by Russia’s reckless and escalatory use of an intermediate-range ballistic missile, which my hon. Friend and others mentioned, the global air and missile threat is advancing, proliferating and converging.

Given the increasingly volatile and contested threat environment, we must ensure that we have the capability and capacity to counter threats in the most appropriate way. In this uncertain future, as the hon. Member for South Suffolk said, deterrence—not only of the nuclear kind—will form the main line of defence. We have to ensure that we provide the right level of deterrence through the joint effort of land, sea and air power. To do so, we must properly consider the range of threats, from the low-cost drones that we see affecting the UK today to the strategic long-range weapons that Russia threatens to use.

This might be an opportune moment to deal with the points that hon. Members made about the drone situation. Obviously we are aware of recent reports of drones flying in the constituency of the hon. Member for West Suffolk and elsewhere. Protection of our personnel and bases is our highest priority. We employ multi-layered and credible force protection measures. I will not say here precisely what has been employed and where; for security reasons, I will not go into specifics, but the Chamber can be assured that we are taking steps. We are aware of what is going on and are doing our best to deal with it.

The House will be aware that through the Civil Aviation Authority, aerodromes in the UK are protected under the Air Navigation Order 2016 by uncrewed air system flight restriction zones. We will be making sure that anybody we manage to catch engaging in such behaviour is shown the full force of the law for their illegal activities. That is about all that I can say at present. Obviously, the Chamber would not expect me to go into too many details, but we are fully dealing with the matter.

As my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham says, our geography makes the threats facing the UK different from those facing many of our allies. Solutions preferred by some will therefore not necessarily be suitable for us. However, our geography should not and does not make us complacent. We have to continue to look at how the UK can meet her own NATO commitments, provide defence and deterrence and protect the UK homeland, but we must also ensure that we become increasingly interoperable with our NATO allies.

Let me be clear that although the threat is evolving, the UK is not defenceless. We have a very broad range of capabilities contributing towards our integrated air and missile defence approach. As my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham and the hon. Member for West Suffolk said, we have Typhoon aircraft on alert 24 hours a day. The Navy has proved the effectiveness of the Type 45 against various air threats. Although it is right that we do not predetermine the outcome of the strategic defence review, the Chamber can be clear that a key part of it will be to look at how we can deal with preparedness against air and missile threats.

It would be wrong to suggest, however, that the Government are therefore not taking any action. We have recognised the vital importance of integrated air and missile defence, which is why we are not just passively reviewing our own capabilities but actively leading the way internationally with initiatives such as DIAMOND, which the hon. Member for West Suffolk did indeed initiate during his time in office. It aims to improve air defence integration across Europe, boost interoperability and strengthen NATO integrated air and missile defence. It is all very well for us all to procure different missiles, but if we do not work together, one ends up with holes and gaps. There is a good argument for ensuring that we can join up whatever systems there are to boost overall defence for Europe. That is what DIAMOND seeks to do.

That is all going on now, and it should put us in a better position to understand how to go forward and spend the money wisely on the right things, not the wrong things. The Secretary of State announced at the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers last month that the UK will lead on some of that work. The UK has also launched the NATO multinational procurement initiative on defensive and offensive missile capabilities to mobilise the Euro-Atlantic defence industry in support of Ukraine. We still have to double down on supporting Ukraine and ensure that we boost it as best we can to defend it against the appalling aggression that it faces.

Boosting industrial capacity is another key part of the debate. It is a certainty in our strategic way forward. We have boosted the money that we will be spending. Members present will recall that at the recent Budget we got an extra £2.9 billion for defence over the next year. There is no way that all Government Departments are as happy with their settlement from the Treasury as the Ministry of Defence is. That is a down payment on the support that we need.

We have to do more to improve co-operation in Europe. We are boosting bilateral engagement, for example. Last month, the UK and Germany signed the landmark Trinity House agreement. We committed to improve and enhance bilateral defence co-operation with a shared objective of sustaining effective deterrence against would-be aggressors by sharing plans on integration of capabilities, taking more steps together to procure the right kind of equipment, supporting implementation of NATO-agreed common standards, and ultimately working towards the vision of a peaceful and stable Euro-Atlantic area by having sufficient deterrence to prevent any aggression.

We also work closely with France. Co-operation in the field of defence capability and equipment is a vital pillar of the Lancaster House treaty. We intend to ensure that that gets a boost and works better and faster towards improving our defence co-operation in areas such as integrated air and missile defence. We have a substantial range of equipment and capabilities across all domains, and we continue to work closely with the French and the Germans.

One of my hon. Friends—I cannot quite recall which—suggested that we need to focus much more on boosting our relationship with Europe and with the EU. We are also doing that—

[Peter Dowd (in the Chair)]

Order. Sorry, Minister, but I want to give the Member in charge the opportunity to wind up. You have a minute left.

[Maria Eagle]

Thank you, Mr Dowd. All the screens are showing different times. I am perfectly happy to conclude my remarks.

Oral Answers to Questions

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

The hon. Gentleman probably just heard me answer the previous two questions. There are hundreds of thousands of applications, many of which are duplicates, and many of which are from people who have no eligibility under ARAP whatsoever. ARAP is a very tightly bound scheme. It is not the same as the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme or other mechanisms where each case might be judged on its merits. There is a list of people who worked with the British armed forces in Afghanistan, so our focus must be on finding the people on that list and bringing them out. We are doing so quickly.

The hon. Gentleman says that it has been nearly a year. That is correct, Mr Speaker, but it is not as if we can just wander around in Afghanistan and find these people. It is not straightforward. A lot of them are undocumented. He may want to speak to some of the charities that are working on this, as I know that some of his colleagues on the Back Benches do. When I spoke to them last week, they realised that the situation was exactly as I have said: it is not easy; people do not have documents; and we are working fast to get people out. We think we have found of way of doing so quicker, and we will be getting on with it now.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

11. What plans he has to restructure Defence Business Services.

[The Minister for Defence Procurement (Jeremy Quin)]

The hon. Gentleman has raised this with me on more than one occasion previously. I know that it matters greatly to his constituents. As announced back in 2016, Defence Business Services will consolidate its north-west estate into a single location. Last year, a thorough multi-criteria decision analysis was undertaken, which considered a number of locations and recommended consolidation in Blackpool. The full business case is being considered within the approvals process. I expect to make an announcement soon, and will write to the Members representing the constituencies affected.

[Peter Dowd]

I thank the Minister for Defence Procurement for his answer, and for procuring some continuity in the Government, against the odds, by remaining in his post during this crucial time. Will he consider bringing the hubs in Liverpool and Manchester into the Defence Business Services workplace programme solution to avoid compulsory redundancies?

[Jeremy Quin]

What I can say is that in locating to Blackpool, as was recommended, we will do our utmost to avoid compulsory redundancies. There is a good working relationship at a local level with the trade unions, which are doing well to represent their members. There is an absolute expectation on our part that we will maximise the ability to work flexibly, with things such as deferred moves and everything else we can do to support our employees. This move was designed not to cut posts, but as an estate rationalisation scheme. That is at the back and the front of our minds, and we will work with the trade unions and our employees to ensure as few redundancies as can possibly be managed.