Nusrat Ghani
Main Page: Nusrat Ghani (Conservative - Sussex Weald)Department Debates - View all Nusrat Ghani's debates with the Ministry of Justice
Wednesday 29th October 2025
(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Sentencing Bill 2024-26 View all Sentencing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 29 October 2025 - large print - (29 Oct 2025)
Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 2—Re-sentencing those serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must make arrangements for, and relating to, the re-sentencing of all prisoners serving IPP sentences within 18 months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed.
(2) Those arrangements must include arrangements relating to the establishment of a committee to provide advice regarding the discharge of the Lord Chancellor’s duty under subsection (1).
(3) The committee established by virtue of subsection (2) must include a judge nominated by the Lord Chief Justice.
(4) A court that imposed an IPP sentence has the power to re-sentence the prisoner in relation to the original offence.
(5) But the court may not impose a sentence that is a heavier penalty than the sentence that was imposed for the original offence.
(6) In relation to the exercise of the power in subsection (4)—
(a) that power is to be treated as a power to re-sentence under the Sentencing Code (see section 402(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020);
(b) the Code applies for the purposes of this section (and, accordingly, it does not matter that a person serving an IPP sentence was convicted of an offence before 1 December 2020).
(7) In this section—
‘IPP sentence’ means a sentence of imprisonment or detention in a young offender institution for public protection under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 or a sentence of detention for public protection under section 226 of that Act (including such a sentence of imprisonment or detention passed as a result of section 219 or 221 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);
‘original offence’ means the offence in relation to which the IPP sentence was imposed.
(8) This section comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
This new clause would implement the recommendation of the Justice Committee’s 2022 Report that there should be a resentencing exercise in relation to all IPP sentenced individuals, and to establish a time-limited expert committee, including a member of the judiciary, to advise on the practical implementation of such an exercise.
New clause 3—Use of funds raised through income reduction orders—
“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the potential benefits and costs of directing the funds raised from income reduction orders into a fund that provides support for victims.
(2) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment under subsection (1) before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake an assessment of the potential benefits of using the monies raised through income reduction orders to fund support for victims.
New clause 4—Probation caseloads—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, before laying regulations to commence the provisions in this Act, establish maximum caseload limits for probation officers supervising individuals subject to—
(a) licence conditions;
(b) community orders; or
(c) any other form of court-imposed supervision by the probation service.
(2) The Secretary of State must, each year, lay before Parliament a report on compliance with the caseload limits set under this section.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to set maximum caseloads for probation before implementation of the Act, and to report annually on compliance.
New clause 5—Access to rehabilitation and support services—
“(1) The probation service must ensure all individuals subject to licence conditions, community orders, or other court-imposed supervision have access to—
(a) NHS mental health and substance misuse services,
(b) education, training and employment support, and
(c) approved behaviour change or offender behaviour programmes.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, each year, a report on the availability and use of the services provided under subsection (1).”
This new clause would require the probation service to ensure people under its supervision can access mental health and substance misuse services; education, training and support; and approved behaviour change or offender management programmes, and to report annually on the availability and uptake of those services.
New clause 6—Digital systems for tracking offender progress—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passing of this Act, undertake an assessment of the benefits and costs of implementing a digital sentence management system for prisoners and individuals who are subject to supervision by the probation service.
(2) The assessment must consider the following potential functions of a sentence management system—
(a) tracking offender progress,
(b) providing for the sharing of information between the courts, probation service, and other relevant agencies, subject to the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018,
(c) monitoring compliance with rehabilitation programmes, and
(d) any other functions that the Secretary of State deems appropriate.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake an assessment of implementing a digital sentence management system for prisoners and individuals subject to supervision by the probation service.
New clause 7—Specialist teams for high-risk or complex offenders—
“(1) The probation service must undertake an assessment of the potential benefits of establishing specialist probation teams to supervise—
(a) high-risk offenders,
(b) offenders with complex mental health needs,
(c) offenders with substance misuse needs, and
(d) young offenders who are transitioning to adult supervision.
(2) The assessment must consider the potential benefits of specialist probation teams having lower average caseloads per probation officer.
(3) The assessment must consider the potential arrangements for specialist probation teams accessing support from other relevant agencies.
(4) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment under this section before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the probation service to assess the potential benefits of establishing specialist probation teams to supervise offenders who are high-risk; have complex mental health or substance misuse needs; and young offenders transitioning to adult supervision.
New clause 8—Domestic abuse aggravated offences—
“(1) A court must treat an offence committed in England and Wales as domestic abuse aggravated, if—
(a) the offender and the victim are personally connected to each other; and
(b) the offence involves behaviour which constitutes domestic abuse.
(2) In this section—
‘domestic abuse’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and
‘personally connected’ has the meaning given by section 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”
This new clause would require a court to treat a domestic abuse offence as aggravated.
New clause 9—Rehabilitative programmes for offences relating to violence against women and girls—
“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the potential benefits of creating mandatory rehabilitative programmes about women and girls, for individuals sentenced for—
(a) assault;
(b) battery; or
(c) actual bodily harm
when the victim is a woman or girl.
(2) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment under this section before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the potential benefits of creating mandatory rehabilitative programmes about women and girls, for individuals sentenced for certain offences.
New clause 10—Screening for traumatic brain injuries—
“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the potential costs and benefits of screening all prisoners for traumatic brain injuries at the start of their custodial sentence.
(2) The assessment should consider—
(a) how screening for traumatic brain injuries could inform the management of a prisoner’s sentence,
(b) the health services and rehabilitation programmes available for prisoners with traumatic brain injuries, and
(c) any other matters that the Secretary of State deems appropriate.
(3) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment made under this section before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the potential benefits of introducing standardised screening for traumatic brain injuries for prisoners starting a custodial sentence.
New clause 11—Suspension of driving licences during bail for driving related offences—
“(1) This section applies where an individual has been granted bail in respect of one of the following offences—
(a) dangerous or careless driving;
(b) drink driving; or
(c) drug driving.
(2) The court may suspend the driving licence of the individual, pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings.”
This new clause would allow the court to suspend the driving licence of an individual charged for certain driving offences, pending the outcome of the trial.
New clause 12—Access to rehabilitation programmes and education for individuals held on remand—
“(1) Where an individual is held in custodial remand pending sentencing, the probation service must provide access to the same rehabilitative programmes that are available to prisoners after sentencing.
(2) Where an individual is held in custodial demand pending trial, the probation service must provide access to the same—
(a) education;
(b) therapy; and
(c) any other support that the probation service deems appropriate,
that is available to prisoners after sentencing.”
This new clause would allow prisoners held on remand to access rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support before the start of their sentence.
New clause 14—Under-18 anonymity for cases involving serious crime—
“(1) This section applies where a person (‘P’) aged under 18—
(a) has been convicted of an offence; and
(b) will receive a custodial sentence of four or more years.
(2) Where this section applies, prior to delivering sentencing remarks, the court must lift any reporting restrictions identifying P.
(3) This section applies notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter IV of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.”
This new clause would require reporting restrictions to be lifted at the point of sentencing for young offenders who have received a sentence of four or more years.
New clause 15—Court transcripts of sentencing remarks—
“(1) All transcripts of sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court must be published within two sitting days of being delivered.
(2) All published sentencing remarks must be made freely available, including online.”
This new clause would require all sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court to be published and made available to all.
New clause 16—Sexual offences: Offender Personality Disorder Pathway—
“(1) The Prison Rules 1999 are amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 20 (Health services), after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
‘(1A) Provision under subsection (1) must include access, for all eligible prisoners serving custodial sentences for sexual offences, to services provided under the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway.’”
This new clause would require the Government to provide access to the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway to all eligible prisoners serving sentences for sexual offences.
New clause 17—Sexual offences: chemical suppression—
“Within one year of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report on how most effectively to introduce mandatory chemical suppression for certain individuals serving sentences for sexual offences, with appropriate legal and clinical safeguards.”
This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on mandatory chemical suppression for certain sex offenders.
New clause 18—Sentencing Council: abolition—
“(1) The Sentencing Council (established under section 118 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) is abolished.
(2) The Secretary of State may prepare—
(a) sentencing guidelines which may be general in nature or limited to a particular offence, particular category of offence or particular category of offender;
(b) sentencing guidelines about the discharge of a court's duty under section 73 of the Sentencing Code (reduction in sentences for guilty pleas); and
(c) sentencing guidelines about the application of any rule of law as to the totality of sentences.
(3) The Secretary of State may prepare sentencing guidelines about any other matter.
(4) When developing sentencing guidelines, the Secretary of State must—
(a) promote understanding of, and public confidence in, the sentencing and criminal justice system;
(b) consult Parliament on all draft guidelines; and
(c) publish the reasons for proposing any guidelines that could result in an offender receiving a shorter sentence than that set out in an Act of Parliament.
(5) The Secretary of State may report, from time to time, on the impact of sentencing guidelines on sentencing practice.
(6) The Secretary of State must monitor—
(a) the application of the sentencing guidelines; and
(b) the impact on victims of sentencing decisions.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.”
This new clause would abolish the Sentencing Council, give the Secretary of State the power to publish Sentencing guidelines, and impose various requirements linked to consultation and monitoring.
New clause 19—Whole life order: murder of a police or prison officer—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 21 (Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc), in sub-paragraph (2)(c), after ‘duty,’, insert ‘or if the motivation for the murder was connected to the police officer or prison officer’s current or former duties,’”
This new clause would expand the circumstances in which it is appropriate to apply a whole life order for murdering a prison or police officer, to include murder motivated by the victim’s current or former duties.
New clause 20—Child cruelty offences: notification and offender management requirements—
“(1) A person (‘relevant offender’) is subject to the notification requirements of subsections (2) and (3) for the period set out in subsection (4) if the relevant offender is convicted of an offence listed in subsection (6).
(2) A relevant offender must notify to the police within the three days of the time of their conviction or their release from custody, and annually thereafter, providing—
(a) the relevant offender’s date of birth;
(b) their national insurance number;
(c) their name on the notification date and, where using one or more other names on that date, each of those names;
(d) their place of residence on the date of notification;
(e) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which, at the time the notification is given, they regularly reside or stay; and
(f) any information that may be prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State.
(3) A relevant offender must notify to the police, within the period of three days beginning with the event occurring, about—
(a) their use of a name which has not been notified to the police under subsection (2);
(b) a change to their place or residence; and
(c) any other prescribed change of circumstances as defined in regulations made under this section.
(4) The dates of discharge from notification requirements under this section are the same as those set out in Section 88B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
(5) The information required by subsections (2) and (3), once received, must be—
(a) monitored regularly by the police and probation service; and
(b) retained for the purposes of offender management.
(6) The relevant offences are—
(a) causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult, or allowing them to suffer serious harm (section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004);
(b) child cruelty, neglect and violence (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933);
(c) infanticide (section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938);
(d) exposing children whereby life is endangered (section 27 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861);
(e) an offence under sections 4, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 or 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1860, if the victim is under the age of 16;
(f) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—
(i) female genital mutilation (section 1);
(ii) assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia (section 2);
(iii) assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl's genitalia (section 3); and
(g) cruelty to children (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933).”
This new clause would create notification requirements for people convicted of child cruelty, analogous to the Sex Offenders Register. Their information and personal details would be kept on record by the police for the purposes of offender management, with the aim of reducing the risk to children from future offences.
New clause 21—Lifetime driving ban for death by dangerous driving—
“(1) This section applies where a person is convicted of an offence under section 1 the Road Traffic Act 1988.
(2) Where this section applies, notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 1 of Part 8 of the Sentencing Code (Driving disqualification), the driver must be banned from driving for life.”
This new clause would mean that anyone who causes death by dangerous driving would be banned from driving for life.
New clause 22—Review of sentence following a change in law—
“(1) Where a person is serving or subject to a sentence imposed for an offence, and—
(a) the offence has been abolished, or
(b) there has been a change in the law which materially alters the sentence that would be imposed for the same offence following that change in the law,
that person may apply to the sentencing court, or to such other court as may be prescribed, for a review of the sentence.
(2) On such an application, the court may—
(a) quash the sentence and resentence the person in accordance with the existing law; or
(b) make such other order as necessary in the interests of justice.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the procedure and eligibility criteria for applications under this section.”
This new clause would allow a person still serving a sentence under a law that has changed to seek review or resentencing in line with the existing law.
New clause 23—Review of the impact of a change in the law on unspent convictions—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report reviewing—
(a) the effect of changes in the criminal law, whether legislative or judicial, on those serving sentences for offences that would attract a different sentence following the subsequent changes to the criminal law; and
(b) the adequacy of existing mechanisms for addressing any perceived injustice arising from such changes.
(2) The Secretary of State must thereafter lay a further report under subsection (1) every three years.
(3) A report made under this section must include—
(a) recommendations for legislative or administrative steps to prevent any instances of injustice arising from changes in the law; and
(b) data on the number of persons serving sentences in the scenario set out in subsection (1)(a) and, of those, the number who remain imprisoned.”
This new clause would create a statutory duty for the Government to review, on a recurring basis, how changes to the law affect those already convicted or sentenced.
New clause 24—Deportation of foreign criminals: European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018—
“(1) Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) At the start of subsection (5), insert ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7A of the European Union Withdrawal Act 2018 and Article 2 of the Windsor Framework,’.”
This new clause would seek to disapply section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended under the Windsor Framework) to the deportation of foreign criminals, with the aim of preventing the courts from disapplying those provisions to Northern Ireland if they are deemed incompatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
New clause 25—Electronic monitoring: oversight—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In Part 14 of Schedule 9, in paragraph 31 (Electronic monitoring: person responsible for monitoring), after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
‘(3) Regulations under this section must ensure that—
(a) electronic monitoring is overseen by the Probation Service;
(b) the fitting of necessary apparatus for the purposes of electronic monitoring may only be undertaken by those in the employment of an organisation with responsibility for delivering electronic monitoring; and
(c) the fitting of necessary apparatus may not be undertaken by an employee of HM Prison and Probation Service unless the responsibility for the delivery of electronic monitoring is held solely by HM Prison and Probation Service.’”
This new clause would ensure that the probation service oversees electronic monitoring, and that prison officers would not be responsible for fitting tags unless tagging contracts are brought into the public sector.
New clause 26—Unpaid work requirements: community work—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 9 (Restriction on imposing unpaid work requirement), after sub-paragraph (1)(b) insert—
‘(c) that the unpaid work is work undertaken for a non-profit organisation, social enterprise, voluntary organisation or local authority.’”
This new clause would prohibit private sector involvement in unpaid work as part of a community sentence.
New clause 27—Probation capacity: independent report—
“(1) Within three months of the passage of this Act, a report must be published and laid before Parliament by HM Inspectorate of Probation (‘the Inspectorate’) determining whether there is adequate capacity in the Probation Service to meet provisions of this Act anticipated to increase levels of demand on the Probation Service.
(2) If the report under subsection (1) determines that the capacity of the Probation Service is inadequate, provisions of this Act anticipated to increase levels of demand on the Probation Service may not come into force until a further report determines that the Probation Service has adequate capacity.
(3) Following a report under subsection (1), the Inspectorate must publish and lay before Parliament a further report, no less than once every twelve months, determining whether there is adequate capacity in the Probation Service.
(4) If a report under subsections (1) or (3) determines that the capacity of the Probation Service is inadequate, the Inspectorate may direct that a prioritisation framework must be issued to the areas in which the capacity concerns apply, in order to provide local services with guidance about which activities to deprioritise.
(5) The Secretary of State must, within two weeks of the laying of a report under subsections (1) or (3) with a finding of inadequate capacity, make a statement to Parliament setting out how probation capacity will be increased to an adequate level.”
This new clause would ensure that the provisions of this Bill likely to increase demand on the Probation Service cannot be implemented until HM Inspectorate of Probation determines that there is adequate capacity to address those demands, and would enable the Inspectorate to trigger the issuing of a prioritisation framework to help local areas to identify which activities to deprioritise.
New clause 28—Management of offenders: devolution to Wales—
“(1) Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) In Paragraph 175 (Prisons and offender management)—
(a) omit sub-paragraph (2); and
(b) in sub-paragraph (3), omit ‘probation’
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.”
This new clause seeks to devolve probation services and offender management to Wales, by removing it from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act 2006.
New clause 29—Foreign criminals: risk assessments prior to deportation—
“(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 32 (Automatic deportation) insert—
‘32A Deportation following stalking offences: risk assessments
(1) This section applies where a foreign criminal—
(a) has been convicted of an offence under sections 2A or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or section 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001; and
(b) is subject to a deportation order under this Act.
(2) Where this section applies, prior to deportation, a risk assessment must be prepared to assess the likelihood after deportation of the foreign criminal—
(a) committing an offence which, were it to be committed in England or Wales, would constitute a further offence under sections 2A or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or section 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001; or
(b) contacting or seeking to contact the victim of the offence for which the foreign criminal was convicted in England or Wales.
(3) A risk assessment prepared under this section must be shared, subject to the requirements of the Data Protection Act 2018, with the relevant authorities in the country to which the foreign criminal will be deported.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.’”
This new clause would require the preparation of a risk assessment for any foreign criminal being deported after a stalking conviction, and for the assessment to be shared with the authorities in the country to which the offender is returning.
New clause 30—Foreign criminals: potential stalking offences following deportation—
“(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 32 (Automatic deportation) insert—
‘32A Potential stalking offences following deportation
(1) This section applies where the conditions in subsections (2) and (3) apply.
(2) Condition 1 is that a foreign criminal—
(a) has been convicted of an offence under sections 2A or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or section 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001; and
(b) is subject to a deportation order under this Act.
(3) Condition 2 is that they have—
(a) committed an offence which, were it to be committed in England or Wales, would constitute a further offence under sections 2A or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or section 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001; or
(b) they have contacted or sought to contact the victim of the offence for which the foreign criminal was convicted in England or Wales.
(4) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to the relevant authorities, setting out—
(a) a police point of contact in the country to which the offender is returning;
(b) steps to protect and safeguard the victim in the UK; and
(c) any other matters that the Secretary of State deems appropriate.’”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance in dealing with foreign criminals who have been deported after a stalking conviction, and who seek to continue to stalk the victim.
New clause 31—Exclusion from automatic release following fixed-term recall for specified serious offences—
“(1) An offender shall not be eligible for automatic release following a fixed-term recall where they have been convicted of any of the following offences—
(a) rape;
(b) assault by penetration;
(c) rape of a child under 13;
(d) assault of a child under 13 by penetration;
(e) inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity;
(f) paying for the sexual services of a child aged under 13;
(g) kidnapping or false imprisonment with the intention of committing a sexual offence;
(h) creating or possessing indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children;
(i) grievous bodily harm (under section 18 or section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861);
(j) grooming (under section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003);
(k) stalking (under section 2A or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997);
(l) causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult (under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004); or
(m) causing death by dangerous driving (under section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988).
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person shall also be ineligible for release following a fixed-term recall if they have been convicted of an attempt, conspiracy, or incitement to commit any of the offences listed in subsection (1).
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations add or remove offences from the list in subsection (1).”
This new clause would mean offenders who had committed certain serious offences would not be eligible for automatic release following a fixed term recall.
New clause 32—Powers of the probation service to impose and vary conditions of supervision—
“(1) Where an offender is—
(a) subject to a community order, a suspended sentence order, or a period of probation supervision; and
(b) required to reside at a specified address as a condition of that order or supervision,
the Probation Service may, in accordance with this section, direct that the offender reside at an alternative address.
(2) A direction under subsection (1) may be given where—
(a) it is necessary to protect another person (including a partner, former partner, or family member) from risk of harm;
(b) it is necessary for the effective management or rehabilitation of the offender; or
(c) it is otherwise in the interests of justice.
(3) Where the probation service has made a direction under subsection (1), it may recommend or determine other terms of supervision, including—
(a) restrictions on contact or association with specified individuals;
(b) requirements relating to participation in programmes addressing offending behaviour; or
(c) curfew or exclusion requirements, subject to approval by the sentencing court.
(4) Where a direction or variation made under this section materially alters the conditions imposed by the sentencing court, the probation service must—
(a) notify the court and the offender as soon as possible; and
(b) seek confirmation by the sentencing court of the varied terms within 14 days.
(5) Any direction or variation made under this section shall have effect as if imposed by the sentencing court, until it has been confirmed, revoked, or amended by the court.
(6) In this section, “the probation service” includes any person or body authorised to supervise offenders under the Offender Management Act 2007.”
This new clause would give the probation service the power to change the residence requirement of an individual subject to supervision in certain circumstances, and to make other changes to the terms of supervision, subject to confirmation by the sentencing court.
New clause 33—Mandatory dependent support orders upon sentencing—
“(1) Where an offender is known to have dependents who rely on them for financial or other material support, the court shall, at the time of sentencing, inquire into the circumstances and reasonable needs of those dependents.
(2) In addition to any sentence imposed, the court must make an order requiring the offender to make periodic payments or other contributions towards the maintenance and welfare of their dependents (‘dependent support order’), unless the court determines that such an order would be manifestly unjust or impracticable.
(3) The amount, frequency, and method of payment made under subsection (2) shall be determined by the court having regard to—
(a) the offender’s financial means, earning capacity, and assets;
(b) the reasonable living costs and needs of the dependents; and
(c) any other relevant circumstances.
(4) The court may direct that payments be made—
(a) through a designated collection authority; or
(b) directly to the dependent’s guardian, caregiver, or other appointed representative.
(5) An order made under this section shall remain in effect—
(a) for such time as specified by the court; or
(b) until it is varied or discharged by the court on application by any interested party.
(6) A failure to comply with an order made under this section shall constitute a breach of the sentence.”
This new clause would create a power for a sentencing court to require an offender to make periodic payments or other contributions towards the maintenance and welfare of their dependents.
New clause 34—10-year driving ban for death by dangerous or careless driving and related offences—
“(1) This section applies where a person is convicted of an offence under sections 1, 2B, 3ZB, 3ZC or 3A of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
(2) Where this section applies, notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 1 of Part 8 of the Sentencing Code (Driving disqualification), the driver must be banned from driving for 10 years.”
This new clause would mean that anyone who causes death by dangerous or careless driving (or related offences) would be banned from driving for ten years.
New clause 35—Causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate driving: statutory aggravating factor—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 3A, insert—
‘3B Causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless of inconsiderate driving: aggravating factor for sentencing
In considering the seriousness of any offence committed under sections 1, 1A, 2B, 2C, 3ZB, 3ZC, 3ZS or 3A for the purposes of sentencing, the court must treat failure to—
(a) stop at the scene of the accident;
(b) call the emergency services; or
(c) administer first aid, where it is possible to do so;
as an aggravating factor, and state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”
This new clause would create statutory aggravating factors, for the purposes of sentencing, of failure to stop, call the emergency services, or administer first aid where it is possible to do so, in cases of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless of inconsiderate driving.
New clause 36—Earned progression for prisoner release—
“(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 244, after subsection (4), insert—
‘(5) The duty to release under subsection (1) is subject to the prisoner demonstrating compliance with the earned progression scheme during the course of their custodial sentence.
(6) The Secretary of State must issue regulations, under section 267 (alteration by order of the relevant proportion of sentence) setting a higher requisite custodial period for prisoners who have not demonstrated compliance with the earned progression scheme during their sentence.
(7) In this section, ‘the earned progression scheme’ must include—
(a) compliance with prison rules;
(b) engagement in purposeful activity;
(c) attendance at any required work, education, treatment or training obligations, where these are available; and
(d) any other factors that the Secretary of State deems appropriate.
(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide further guidance to prisons on the operation of the earned progression scheme.’”
This new clause seeks to implement the recommendation of the independent review on sentencing for the release of prisoners at the one third point of their sentence to be subject to their compliance with an earned progression scheme.
New clause 38—Sentencing Council—
“(1) The Sentencing Council of England and Wales is abolished.”
New clause 39—Deportation of foreign criminals—
“(1) A foreign criminal who has been sentenced to—
(a) a custodial sentence of at least 6 months; or
(b) a community sentence of at least 6 months,
must be the subject of an immediate deportation order, subject to subsection (2) below.
(2) The Secretary of State may determine, in exceptional cases, that a deportation order under subsection (1) does not apply.
(3) In this section, ‘foreign criminal’ means a person who—
(a) is not a British citizen or an Irish citizen, and
(b) is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence.”
This new clause would apply an automatic deportation order to foreign criminals sentenced to at least six months’ imprisonment or a six month community sentence.
New clause 40—Criminal cases review—
“(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 36 (Reviews of sentencing), insert—
‘Part IVB
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW (PUBLIC PETITION)
36A Scope of this Part
(1) A case to which this Part applies may be referred to the Court of Appeal under section 2 below.
(2) Subject to Rules of Court, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under section 36B shall be exercised by the criminal division of the Court, and references to the Court of Appeal in this Part shall be construed as references to that division.
(3) This Part applies to any case—
(a) of a description specified in an order under this section; or
(b) in which sentence is passed on a person—
(i) for an offence triable only on indictment; or
(ii) for an offence of a description specified in an order under this section.
(4) The Secretary of State may by order provide that this section shall apply to any case of a description specified in the order or to any case in which sentence is passed on a person for an offence triable either way of a description specified in the order.
(5) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(6) In this Part, ‘sentence’ has the same meaning as in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, except that it does not include an interim hospital order under Part III of the Mental Health Act 1983, and ‘sentencing’ shall be construed accordingly.
(7) In its application to Northern Ireland, this section shall have effect subject to the modifications set out in subsections (8) to (11).
(8) Subsection (2) shall not apply to Northern Ireland.
(9) In this section—
‘offence triable only on indictment’ means an offence punishable only on conviction on indictment;
‘offence triable either way’ means an offence punishable on conviction on indictment or on summary conviction; and
any reference in subsection (4) to the Secretary of State must be construed as a reference to the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.
(10) For subsection (5), in Northern Ireland an order under subsection (4) shall be a statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (and not a statutory instrument), and any such order shall be subject to negative resolution (within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954).
(11) References in subsection (6) to the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and Part III of the Mental Health Act 1983 shall be respectively construed as references to Part I of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 and Part III of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986.
36B Criminal cases review (public petition)
(1) If it appears to any adult British citizen aged 18 or over—
(a) that the sentencing of a person in a proceeding in the Crown Court (‘the person sentenced’) has been unduly lenient or unduly harsh; and
(b) that the case is one to which section 36A applies,
that British citizen (‘the petitioner’) may refer the case to the Criminal Cases Review Commission (‘the Commission’) for it to review the sentencing of the person sentenced, in accordance with section 36C below, and if the Commission refers the case to the Court of Appeal, upon such a reference the Court of Appeal may—
(a) quash any sentence passed on the person sentenced; and
(b) in place of it pass such sentence as they think appropriate for the case and as the lower court had power to pass when dealing with the person sentenced,
provided that the petitioner has filed the reference with the Commission in writing, signed by at least 500 signatures (‘the co-petitioners’) including his own.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations stipulate the information and form that the petitioner must provide when filing the reference.
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above, the condition specified in paragraph (a) of that subsection may be satisfied whether or not it appears that the judge—
(a) erred in law as to his powers of sentencing; or
(b) failed to comply with a mandatory sentence requirement under section 399(b) or (c) of the Sentencing Code.
(4) For the purposes of this Part, any two or more sentences are to be treated as passed in the same proceeding if they would be so treated for the purposes of section 11 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
(5) Where a reference under this section relates to a minimum term order made under section 321 of the Sentencing Code, the Court of Appeal shall not, in deciding what order under that section is appropriate for the case, make any allowance for the fact that the person to whom it relates is being sentenced for a second time.
(6) No judge shall sit as a member of the Court of Appeal on the hearing of, or shall determine any application in proceedings incidental or preliminary to, a reference under this section of a sentence passed by himself.
(7) Where the Court of Appeal has concluded its review of a case referred to it under this section, and given its judgment thereon, the Court of Appeal, the petitioner or the person sentenced may refer a point of law involved in any sentence passed on the person sentenced to the Supreme Court for its opinion, and the Supreme Court shall consider the point and give its opinion on it accordingly, and either remit the case to the Court of Appeal to be dealt with or itself deal with the case.
(8) A reference under subsection (6) shall be made only with the leave of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court and leave shall not be granted unless it is certified by the Court of Appeal that the point of law is of general public importance and it appears to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be) that the point is one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.
(9) For the purpose of dealing with a case under this section, the Supreme Court may exercise any powers of the Court of Appeal.
(10) In the application of this section to Northern Ireland—
(a) subsection (2)(b) shall read as if for the words after ‘failed to’ there were substituted ‘impose a sentence required by—
(i) Article 70(2) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004,
(ii) paragraph 2(4) or (5) of Schedule 2 to the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006,
(iii) Article 13 or 14 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, or
(iv) section 7(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015’.
(b) the references to sections 11 and 35(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 shall be read as references to sections 10(2) and 33(1) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980, respectively; and
(c) the reference in subsection (3A) to a minimum term order made under section 321 of the Sentencing Code shall be read as a reference to an order under Article 5(1) of the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001.
36C The Commission
(1) The Commission under section 36B is the same body as that established under section 8 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 and the provisions of section 8 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 shall apply to the role of the Commission under this Part.
(2) Sections 9, 10, and 12A to 25 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 shall apply to this Part.
(3) The Commission must review all cases referred to it within 8 weeks of receiving any such referral and must, within that time, make its decision.
(4) If the Commission decides that the case should be referred to the Court of Appeal by reason of an unduly harsh sentence then, immediately upon receipt of the referral, the Court of Appeal must make an order that the person sentenced be released on temporary licence (‘ROTL’) until further order of the court, and the Court of Appeal must also determine suitable bail conditions, if any and the person sentenced must remain ROTL until the Court of Appeal has determined the referral.’”
This new clause would allow any British citizen to refer a sentence to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, for the Commission to review the sentence and consider whether to refer it to the Court of Appeal.
New clause 41—Sentencing statistics: duty to publish—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, direct His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS) to record and retain, in relation to all offenders convicted and sentenced in the Crown Court or Magistrates’ courts, the offender’s—
(a) country of birth
(b) nationality,
(c) ethnicity,
(d) immigration status, and
(e) the offence(s) for which they were sentenced.
(2) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for the data recorded under subsection (1) to be published and laid before Parliament—
(a) within twelve months of the passing of this Act, and
(b) annually thereafter.”
This new clause would require the Government to record and publish statistics on convicted offenders’ birthplace, nationality, ethnicity and immigration status.
New clause 42—Crown Court sitting days for the delivery of sentencing—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, undertake an assessment of the potential merits of removing the cap on sittings day in the Crown Court in so far as it applies to sentencing hearings.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the assessment made under subsection (1) before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake an assessment of the potential merits of removing the cap on sittings days in the Crown Court in so far as it applies to sentencing hearings.
New clause 43—Expiry—
“This Act expires at the end of the period of two years beginning with the day on which it is passed.”
This new clause is a sunset clause, meaning the Act would cease to have effect after two years.
Amendment 5, page 1, line 4, leave out clause 1.
Amendment 32, in clause 1, page 1, line 14, after “months” insert
“before any credit is given for a guilty plea”.
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences before credit is given for a guilty plea.
Amendment 35, page 1, line 17, after “order” insert
“with the maximum operational period”.
This amendment would mean that all suspended sentences given in place of immediate custody would be suspended for the maximum period.
Amendment 33, page 3, line 9, after “individual” insert “or the public”.
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would not apply where the court was of the opinion that not imposing an immediate custodial sentence would put the public (as well as an individual) at significant risk of harm.
Amendment 34, page 3, line 9, leave out “significant”.
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would not apply where the risk of harm applies, removing the requirement for the harm to be significant.
Amendment 14, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) Where a court has passed a suspended sentence under this section, it must also require the offender to be subject to an electronic monitoring requirement for the duration of the sentence.”
This amendment would require offenders (under the age of 21) given suspended sentences to be subject to electronic monitoring.
Amendment 15, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is not a British citizen or an Irish citizen.”
Amendment 16, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender—
(a) has been convicted of three or more other offences in the 12 months leading to the conviction for which a suspended sentence would otherwise have been passed (the ‘current offence’);
(b) has been convicted of 10 or more offences prior to the current offence;
(c) has been convicted of the same offence as the current offence on three or more previous occasions;
(d) is convicted of an offence (the current offence) with a mandatory minimum custodial sentence;
(e) has previously received a suspended sentence order or a custodial sentence for the same offence as the current offence;
(f) has breached a suspended sentence order or orders on three or more occasions, either by breaching community requirements or committing a further offence;
(g) has a history of poor compliance with court orders, according to a written or oral statement from a probation officer;
(h) at the time of the current offence, was—
(i) subject to a supervision order; or
(ii) on licence, or subject to supervision, under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (release, licences, supervision and recall).
(i) is convicted of an offence eligible for consideration under the Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme under sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; or
(j) is being sentenced for three or more offences concurrently.”
This amendment would prevent suspended sentences from being passed in a range of circumstances.
Amendment 17, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of an offence—
(a) under section 1 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018 or section 89 (1) of the Police Act 1996; or
(b) aggravated by section 68A of the Sentencing Act 2020 (assaults on those providing a public service etc).”
Amendment 18, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of an offence involving a firearm or ammunition, including but not limited to the Firearms Act 1968 and the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006.”
Amendment 19, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of a burglary offence.”
Amendment 20, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of an offence involving possession of or threatening with an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon,”
Amendment 21, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of a terrorism offence.”
Amendment 22, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of an offence under section 6(1) or (2) of the Bail Act 1976 (failure to surrender to custody).”
Amendment 36, page 4, line 4, after “months” insert
“before any credit is given for a guilty plea”.
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences before credit is given for a guilty plea.
Amendment 39, page 4, line 7, after “order” insert
“with the maximum operational period”.
This amendment would mean that all suspended sentences given in place of immediate custody would be suspended for the maximum period.
Amendment 37, page 5, line 20, after “individual” insert “or the public”.
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would not apply where the court was of the opinion that not imposing an immediate custodial sentence would put the public (as well as an individual) at significant risk of harm.
Amendment 38, page 5, line 20, leave out “significant”.
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would not apply where the risk of harm applies, removing the requirement for the harm to be significant.
Amendment 23, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) Where a court has passed a suspended sentence under this section, it must also require the offender to be subject to an electronic monitoring requirement for the duration of the sentence.”
This amendment would require offenders (aged 21 or over) given suspended sentences to be subject to electronic monitoring.
Amendment 24, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is not a British citizen or an Irish citizen.”
Amendment 25, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender—
(a) has been convicted of three or more other offences in the 12 months leading to the conviction for which a suspended sentence would otherwise have been passed (the ‘current offence’);
(b) has been convicted of 10 or more offences prior to the current offence;
(c) has been convicted of the same offence as the current offence on three or more previous occasions;
(d) is convicted of an offence (the current offence) with a mandatory minimum custodial sentence;
(e) has previously received a suspended sentence order or a custodial sentence for the same offence as the current offence;
(f) has breached a suspended sentence order or orders on three or more occasions, either by breaching community requirements or committing a further offence;
(g) has a history of poor compliance with court orders, according to a written or oral statement from a probation officer;
(h) at the time of the current offence, was—
(i) subject to a supervision order; or
(ii) on licence, or subject to supervision, under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (release, licences, supervision and recall).
(i) is convicted of an offence eligible for consideration under the Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme under sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; or
(j) is being sentenced for three or more offences concurrently.”
This amendment would prevent suspended sentences from being passed in a range of circumstances.
Amendment 26, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of an offence—
(c) under section 1 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018 or section 89 (1) of the Police Act 1996; or
(d) aggravated by section 68A of the Sentencing Act 2020 (assaults on those providing a public service etc).”
Amendment 27, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of an offence involving a firearm or ammunition, including but not limited to the Firearms Act 1968 and the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006.”
Amendment 28, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of a burglary offence.”
Amendment 29, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of an offence involving possession of or threatening with an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon,”.
Amendment 30, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of a terrorism offence.”
Amendment 31, page 5, line 21, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender is convicted of an offence under section 6(1) or (2) of the Bail Act 1976 (failure to surrender to custody).”
Amendment 6, page 6, line 28, leave out clause 2.
Amendment 1, in clause 4, page 14, line 10, after “(including victims of crime” insert
“, ensuring their protection from further physical or psychological harm”.
This amendment would amend the statutory purposes of sentencing to incorporate safeguarding victims from further physical or psychological harm.
Amendment 9, page 36, line 9, leave out clauses 18 and 19.
Amendment 7, page 37, line 9, leave out clause 20.
Amendment 11, page 47, leave out lines 16 to 19.
This amendment would leave out the Bill's provision to give probation officers more discretion in relation to licence conditions
Amendment 2, in clause 24, page 49, line 14, at end insert—
“(10) The Secretary of State must, before laying regulations commencing subsection (4) of this section, undertake an assessment of the potential effects of a driving prohibition condition on a person’s ability to attend—
(a) employment,
(b) education, or
(c) a rehabilitation programme.
(11) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report of the assessment carried out under subsection (10) including recommendations on—
(a) offender rehabilitation,
(b) offender reintegration, and
(c) any other matters that the Secretary deems appropriate.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State, before commencing the driving prohibition provisions in the Bill, to publish a report on their potential effects on the ability of ex-offenders to attend employment, education and rehabilitation providers.
Amendment 3, page 49, line 14, at end insert—
“(10) The Secretary of State must, before laying regulations commencing subsection (7) of this section, undertake and publish an assessment of the potential effects of a restriction zone condition on a person’s ability to attend—
(a) employment,
(b) education, or
(c) a rehabilitation programme.
(11) The court may provide for exemptions in a restriction zone condition to allow a person to attend employment, education or a rehabilitation programme.
(12) A probation officer may vary a restriction zone condition imposed by the court to allow a person to attend employment, education or a rehabilitation programme.
(13) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, each year, a report on—
(a) the number of people subject to a restriction zone condition,
(b) the number of cases where a restriction zone condition has included an exemption or modification to allow a person to attend employment, education or a rehabilitation programme, and
(c) evidence on the effects of restriction zone conditions on reoffending and rehabilitation.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State, before implementing the relevant provisions, to assess the potential effects of a restriction zone condition on an ex-offender’s ability to attend education, employment or a rehabilitation programme. It would allow for exemptions to restriction zone conditions, and require an annual report on their use and effectiveness.
Amendment 12, page 66, line 34, leave out clause 36.
Amendment 13, page 68, line 8, leave out clause 37.
Amendment 4, page 68, line 24, leave out clause 38.
Mr Bedford
In September 2024, my constituents and, indeed, the country were left shocked by the senseless killing of Braunstone Town resident Bhim Kohli. Mr Kohli, a well-respected and decent man, was just walking through Franklin park as he usually did, accompanied by his dog Rocky, when he was targeted and assaulted to death by a 14-year-old boy, egged on by a 12-year-old girl.
Since this horrific event, I have been working with Mr Kohli’s daughter Susan, and I pay tribute to the Kohli family for the dignified manner in which they have dealt with the emotional and tragic aftermath of such a horrific incident. Susan is not looking for retribution; she is simply looking to promote justice for the families of victims, who at the moment do not feel that the justice system works for them. I pay tribute to Susan, who I know is sitting at home, alongside Rocky, watching today’s debate.
I have tabled new clauses 1 and 14 in memory of Mr Kohli, and I would like hon. Members across the House to support them. They would place greater responsibility on child offenders and the parents of child offenders. New clause 1 would require the Secretary of State to undertake an assessment of the effectiveness and use of parental orders throughout the justice system. For hon. Members who do not know, parental orders are measures that either require parents of child offenders to pay for their children’s crimes, or force them to attend parenting classes. Yet, despite those powers being on the statute book, they are rarely used. In fact, the Ministry of Justice confirmed that their use has decreased from over 1,000 in 2010 to just 27 in recent years. That is woefully inadequate.
These measures are designed not to punish, but to support; to help families restore discipline and stability; and to prevent the next crime before it happens. Susan put it to me that if the parents of the two individuals in this case were placed under parental orders, they would perhaps appreciate the damage and impact that their negligent behaviour has caused. The fact that one of the parents recently asked for their child’s tag to be removed so that they could go on a family holiday is shameful.
New clause 14 would bring an end to anonymity protections for young offenders who commit the most heinous and serious crimes. I believe in deterrence, and I believe that when an individual commits an act so vile and abhorrent, the full weight of justice must be felt, including being named publicly. The boy—15 years old by the time of the trial—should not be shielded. Our judicial system should not protect those who have shown such disregard for human life; they should be named, just as Axel Rudakubana was following a court order, and as Mohammed Umar Khan was last week.
New clause 14 is simple: if an individual under the age of 18 commits a serious crime, they will be named—no ifs, no buts. In my eyes, if someone is old enough to commit such an appalling crime, they are old enough to face the full consequences of their actions.
Mr Bedford
I could not agree more. My hon. Friend mentions the rumours that the Government are planning to lower the voting age, and it would seem contradictory to have two ages of responsibility.
I will turn now to new clause 18, tabled my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan). It is shocking that the girl who was with the 14-year-old boy, and who egged him on to commit the assault—quite literally to kill a man—did not receive a custodial sentence. Sentencing guidelines make it nearly impossible for individuals of that age to receive a custodial sentence. But what can we in this House do about that? The answer is “very little” because we have an unelected and unaccountable quango determining sentencing guidelines, rather than democratically elected Members in this place. That is wrong and must change.
We must abolish the Sentencing Council and restore democratic accountability to our judicial system to promote equality before the law and ensure that serious crimes are treated with the tough punishment that they deserve, irrespective of a defendant’s sob story. Crime is crime. That is why I also support new clauses 17 and 19, which would ensure tough sentences for those who commit sexual abuse or murder.
I also support new clause 21, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), which would deliver a powerful message: someone who takes a life through dangerous or reckless driving should forfeit the privilege of driving. It would prioritise public safety and provide justice for families who have lost loved ones, like my constituent Emma Johnson who lost her parents to the actions of a careless driver.
I sincerely hope that the Government support the amendments. We in this place must ensure that justice is done and seen to be done.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Does the Chair of the Justice Committee wish to make a speech?
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
I have only a couple of sentences, Madam Deputy Speaker.
To remind the Minister, in last week’s Committee, my new clause—which is effectively new clause 26 today—represented the views of a number of organisations, including the National Association of Probation Officers, recalling the problems that we faced with privatisation, particularly in relation to community service and unpaid work. In London in 2013, the supervision of unpaid work was privatised to Serco, and it was a catastrophic failure in providing both effective work and security for the community overall. It left a stain on the old process of managing community work. That was reflected when the previous Government totally privatised probation, which then had to be brought back in-house.
New clause 26 simply asks for an assurance from the Government that, although we will want to engage with voluntary organisations, charities and non-profit bodies, we will not seek the privatisation of community service and unpaid work, in particular the placement of former prisoners in work in which they could be exploited.
John McDonnell
I can only draw on the experience that my hon. Friend and I had when Serco was in charge, which was about profiteering and reducing costs, largely through a reduction in staff. He might recall that on occasion we had reports that community service volunteers were turning up, and the tools were not available for them to do their work. There was a lack of supervision, and in a few instances we discovered that some of the vehicles that they used had been forced into and were unsafe.
We do not want to go back to that profiteering. That is why an assurance that this provision will be managed and orientated by the state, using non-profit-making voluntary organisations and charities, would reassure those professionals who have unfortunately experienced the privatisation that has taken place in the past, to the detriment of us all.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 19, and other new clauses tabled in my name and those of Opposition Members. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire (Mr Bedford) for opening the debate. He has drawn attention to an important issue, and something I often ponder. I am aware that many powers are available to tackle the involvement of parents in offending, but I never get the sense that they are working as well as we would want them to. My hon. Friend’s new clause would help us to get to the bottom of that.
It is a privilege to take part in this debate on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition, and to have a further opportunity to do what I can to make clear to Labour Members the enormous negative impact on victims that the Bill will have. The Bill will fundamentally change how we deliver justice for victims of serious violent and sexual crimes in this country. The official Opposition tabled amendments and new clauses in Committee, but we did not get to undertake line-by-line scrutiny in a proper Bill Committee. I suspect that that is because the Government know that the reality of the Bill is so damning that they fear an outright rebellion of their MPs if they cannot continue the pretence about what it does and does not do. Nevertheless, we attempted to provide a limited and more acceptable reform of the early release measures to exclude sexual and serious violence offenders. Labour MPs rejected that, and we are now left only with a new clause to remove those measures entirely.
Why do we persist? Because the consequences if we do not are dire. The Government have said time and again that no person who has committed what they describe as the “most serious” offences would be released earlier, but we know that to be completely false. The change in automatic release rules applies to all standard determinate sentences, and to every person who is on one.
I reiterate that the independent Library briefing note confirms that these releases will be automatic. More than 60% of offenders sentenced to prison for rape receive standard determinate sentences, as do more than 90% of those convicted of child grooming offences. Around half of individuals imprisoned for attempted murder are also given standard determinate sentences. Each year, hundreds of people convicted of child rape or sexual assault, including offences involving victims aged under 13, serve those types of sentences. In total, more than 6,000 offenders are sent to prison annually for serious violent sexual offences, and they will get out of prison earlier under the Bill.
I do not know in how many ways I can explain that to Members to overcome the briefing that it is not true, which is happening outside the Chamber. I have no choice but to take Members through the numbers. I have in front of me the sentencing data for those convicted of the rape of a female aged 16 or over. In total, 590 men on average are sent to prison for that offence every year. One hundred and ninety-seven of them would be excluded from the early release measures because they were given extended determinate sentences or life sentences, but 393 would not. That is 393 rapists—the vast majority—being sent to prison every year who will be let out of prison earlier. That is without including those guilty of the rape of children, many of whom will also be let out of prison earlier.
Many Members have spoken about terrible cases of causing death by dangerous driving. Glenn and Becky Youens from Justice for Victims campaign in memory of their daughter, Violet-Grace, who was killed at four years old by a drug dealer going at 80 mph in a 30 mph zone. The drug dealer fled the scene then returned, stepping over her as she lay injured on the pavement, to get to their drugs. Are we seriously going to tell people such as Glenn and Becky that those perpetrators can get out of prison earlier in future? Because that is what will happen. Every year, 169 offenders on average are sent to prison for causing death by dangerous driving. Some 163 of them are given a standard determinate sentence and will get out of jail earlier as a result of the Bill, and some of them will serve only a third of their sentence.
I have pages of examples. Out of 228 offenders sent to prison every year for sexual grooming, 211 serve standard determinate sentences, and under the Bill, 196 will serve only a third of their sentence. Out of 475 people sent to prison every year for stalking, 458 serve standard determinate sentences, and under the Bill, 427 will serve only a third of their sentence. Out of 576 offenders sent to prison every year for the offence of sexual activity involving a child under 16, 502 will get out of prison earlier because of the Bill, and 269 of them will serve only a third of their sentence.
This morning, the Home Secretary said that she was glad that the “vile child sex offender”, as she described him, Hadush Kebatu, is off our streets. She is right to welcome that. Kebatu was convicted of sexual assault offences against women and girls. What do the measures proposed by the former Justice Secretary, who is now Home Secretary, mean in relation to other vile child sex offenders who have been sent to prison for the same offences? I can tell the House that under the Bill, two thirds of the offenders sent to prison for similar sexual assault offences will have to serve only a third of their sentence. The Government celebrate removing those offenders from the streets, while at the same time legislating to put them back on the streets.
It is shameful that Labour Members, with their majority, voted against our amendments and new clauses to remove the early release measures in specific circumstances. Our new clause to remove the measures entirely remains before the House, even if we will not get the opportunity to vote on it today.
New clause 19 seeks to address a clear gap in the law that I believe the majority of Members across the House would agree must be closed. At present, our sentencing framework requires that a whole life order be imposed on anyone convicted of murdering a police or prison officer while that officer is carrying out their duties. That provision acts as both a deterrent and a guarantee of justice for those who risk their lives in confronting dangerous offenders, yet a recent court case has created a precedent that that measure will not be applied if the prison or police officer is not actively on duty at the time of their murder.
I want to describe to the House the disturbing events surrounding the murder of former prison officer Lenny Scott, who was killed by a violent offender he had once supervised. Mr Scott was working as a prison officer at HMP Altcourse in Liverpool. In 2020, Elias Morgan offered him a bribe to keep it to himself that a phone had been found in Morgan’s cell. The vast majority of prison officers do an excellent job and follow the rules, but the House will be aware of examples of corruption in our prison service. Mr Scott could have taken that bribe—he almost certainly knew that Morgan was capable of violent offences and was involved in organised crime—and forgotten his duties and responsibilities, but he did not. He refused the bribe. He was then subjected to death threats by Morgan.
It is a matter of public record that Mr Scott’s time as a prison officer was not unblemished, but when it comes to the question of courage, sheer guts and bravery, refusing to be cowed by a violent thug, and refusing to take the easy way out, Mr Scott was an exemplar, not just to prison officers but to all of us. But Morgan made good on his threats, waiting for years, until 2024, to murder Mr Scott in cold blood. It was a carefully planned murder. Lancashire police found evidence that the month before the murder, Morgan was scoping out locations linked to Mr Scott. He drove close to Mr Scott’s home in Prescot in Merseyside, a gym in the Speke area of Liverpool where Mr Scott sometimes trained, and a gym on Peel Road in Skelmersdale, where the shooting would later take place. Morgan gunned down Mr Scott as he was leaving the gym, shooting him six times. Mr Scott did not stand a chance.
In 2013, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May—the former Prime Minister and right hon. Member for Maidenhead—announced that we would change the law so that the murder of a police officer or a prison officer would result in a whole life order. Speaking at the time in relation to police officers, she said:
“We ask police officers to keep us safe by confronting and stopping violent criminals for us. We ask you to take the risks so that we don’t have to…We are clear: life should mean life for anyone convicted of murdering a police officer.”
As prison officers carry out similar duties, the measures rightly included them.
However, the sentencing for Mr Scott’s murder has made it clear that the courts have not understood the will of Parliament, because Morgan was not given a whole life order. He was given a life sentence with a minimum tariff. It is true to say that his sentenceis longer than most, at 45 years, but Morgan was 35 when he was convicted, so it is not inconceivable that he could get out one day. I do not believe that Parliament intended for criminals like him to ever get out. I was shocked at that outcome; it had not occurred to me that the measure would not apply. I was very familiar with the measure in relation to police officers, following my own time as a volunteer police officer, so my initial reaction was to believe that it must not have been applied to prison officers, and I raised that in the House.
Linsey Farnsworth
I thank my hon. Friend, the Chair of the Select Committee. I greatly trust and rely on his opinion. It is essential that rehabilitative work is available to all in prisons, as I will go on to talk about in a little more detail.
On my second point, structured rehabilitation during custody prepares individuals for life after release. As the earned progression model stands, the emphasis on rehabilitation begins largely during the intensive supervision stage. While I welcome the focus and measures in the Bill to tackle the root causes of crime, we should not wait until release from custody to begin that important work. Too often, individuals return upon release to the same environments, the same pressures and the same risks that contributed to their offending in the first place. Why wait, when we can intervene when they are most reachable? We literally have a captive audience. If people leave custody having already engaged in structured rehabilitation, they are more likely to respond positively to supervision and less likely to reoffend. That in turn reduces pressure on the Probation Service, which is also already under immense strain.
To summarise, the model proposed by new clause 36 is fair and proportionate, actively rewarding good behaviour while existing provisions in the Bill punish bad behaviour. Those who engage constructively while in custody through an earned progression scheme may be released as early as a third in. Those who break the rules will serve more days. Meanwhile, those who neither engage positively nor breach rules will see no change in their release date. That ensures that rehabilitation, positive behaviour, purposeful activity and steps towards reintegration are actively incentivised and baked in to the earned progression model from the start.
Having said that, I understand that practicalities have to be considered in implementing this positive requirements scheme, if it is to be successful. Years of neglect by the previous Government have left our prison system overstretched and under-resourced. On 4 February, the Justice Committee heard evidence from Clinks, the Prison Reform Trust, Women in Prison, and Nacro. We were told during that session that only 50% of prisoners are engaged in education or work, which is often part-time and not rehabilitative. That is due to staffing shortages, overcrowding and limited resources and facilities. In essence, we have inherited prisons that cannot offer the programmes people need and access to purposeful activity is highly inconsistent.
I recognise the immense scale of the challenge in getting the prison system to a place where the proposals in my new clause can be implemented fairly, effectively and with the necessary resources across the country. While I do not expect the Government to accept my new clause today, I strongly urge the Minister to commit to incorporating positive requirements on purposeful activity in the earned progression model as soon as conditions allow. This incremental approach is in line with the position that David Gauke outlined in his review.
He said:
“This Review holds the view that, as prison capacity eases and fuller regimes become possible, compliance requirements for earned release should become more demanding.”
Only by doing this will we truly future-proof our prisons, help people to turn their backs on crime, and ensure, unlike the last Government, that we always have places in our prisons for the most dangerous offenders.
Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I want to put it on the record that there has unfortunately been a blip on today’s version of the Sentencing Bill’s amendment paper. While I did put my name to several new clauses, I did not put my name to amendments 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34 or 35.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I thank the hon. Member for giving me notice of her point of order. I know that House staff would wish to apologise for the error. She has put the facts on the record, so it will now be clear which measures she actually supported, and those to which her name was added in error.
Third Reading