Defence Procurement

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

This is probably not the time for a discussion about anti-collision systems, which I know is a subject the hon. Gentleman has raised recently and no doubt will want to raise again. Hon. Members must understand the distinction, however, between failures of the procurement process and the difficult prioritisation of spending decisions. The latter is the responsibility of Ministers and cannot be derogated or laid off on to any other organisation; Ministers have to make those difficult prioritisation decisions, and we then have to hope for an organisation that can execute them efficiently. Today, we are essentially talking about the execution part of the process.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I commend the Defence Secretary for the practical decision he has announced today and congratulate him on the progress he has already made in tackling the long-running problems of defence acquisition, not least in empowering the front-line commands, reducing the number of changes to requirements and upskilling the MOD as a customer. The entity he has described is indeed DE&S plus operating as a practical rather than simply a theoretical option. It is essential that those dealing with industry can do so with the same sorts of terms and conditions as those that industry enjoys, and this is a way of giving them that opportunity. I ask him, however, not to abandon entirely the possibility of a GoCo in the long term and to put those measures on the statute book so that a future Government, of whatever colour, could decide to take the model further.

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There is a long history of failure in defence procurement by Governments of both main parties going back decades. We now have to construct a model that works. As I just said to the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), the former Defence Secretary, we can do a lot within the public sector in DE&S plus, but we cannot make the culture change that some people think is necessary. It is right and proper that we do what we can in the public sector to make DE&S, as a public sector body, as high a bar as we can for a private sector challenger to have to match and exceed, but we should not be afraid, once we have done our internal reform work, to allow the private sector to make proposals again to see whether it could deliver yet more value for money for the taxpayer. That is, after all, our principal responsibility.

Defence Reform Bill

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Thomas Docherty]

On new clause 6, we have all heard, in the Defence Committee and elsewhere, that the biggest disincentive to joining the reserves, of whichever service, is getting time off work. These are the words of the Secretary of State’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt):

“a lot of reservists find it difficult to get time off for deployment or training courses”.—[Official Report, 23 April 2013; Vol. 561, c. 273WH.]

I am sorry that she is not in her place today. Perhaps she is training. [Interruption.] She is away on a course and we wish her all the best. Even the Secretary of State’s PPS has acknowledged that this is a huge challenge.

The White Paper sets out an ambitious goal of increasing the annual training requirement to 40 days, and I think Members on all sides of the House recognise the importance of that. I hope the Secretary of State will support new clause 6—his Liberal Democrat colleagues will, for reasons I will explain in a moment—because it seeks to provide a simple way to address that goal: reservists would receive an additional two weeks unpaid leave from their employer, provided that their firms had more than 50 employees. The hon. Member for Northampton South (Mr Binley) made the point that we have to careful about the impact on small and medium-sized enterprises, and it is right that we provide protection to smaller companies. The proposal is sensible and measured, because reservists will receive their military pay at no cost to their employer. In the rare cases of resistance from an employer, we propose that complaints are referred to an employment tribunal for arbitration.

I must confess that I am confident that the Liberal Democrats will vote for new clause 6 because the idea was originally developed by them and was passed at their party conference only seven weeks ago. I suspect that the former Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), has had a large hand in writing their defence policy, and that, in the regrettable and unforeseen event of there being a Division, he will vote for the new clause.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I admire the hon. Gentleman’s enthusiasm for the proceedings of the Liberal Democrat conference—I only wish I shared it. I confirm my party’s support for the idea of two weeks’ military training and, although I do not purport to speak for them, I am sure many Conservative Members take the same view. The difficulty with legislating for that now in the manner the hon. Gentleman is suggesting is that there is a serious cost implication: he is proposing that military pay will be provided for that period of time. I dearly hope that this Government or a future Government will at some point be able to find the resources, but a gargantuan effort has been made to balance the Ministry of Defence’s books and the resources are not there. I know the Labour party has a bit of form on making unfunded commitments, but it would be irresponsible to legislate on this when we do not have the funds to pay for it.

[Thomas Docherty]

I am genuinely baffled. I do not know where the hon. Gentleman was before he came into the Chamber, but reservists already receive pay when they are on training. This proposal is not about additional training time; it is about meeting requirements for the training they have to undertake. If his only concern is about the funding element, I can reassure him that there is no additional spending cost. It actually—[Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman stops chuntering for one second, I will finish. There will be no cost to the business and no additional cost to the Ministry of Defence, because it is already providing pay for that training period. Having given him that reassurance, I look forward to his confirming that Liberal Democrats will support us in the Lobby, in the unfortunate event that we cannot just adopt the proposal as a whole and someone calls a vote.

I am conscious that many others wish to speak; I will therefore finish with this thought. This Parliament is sovereign. It is up to us to send a clear signal that we want to support our armed forces, whether they be regular or reserves, on land, on sea or in the air. It is crucial that we provide a robust target for the MOD to do what it should be doing and ensuring that we have an adequate number of regulars and reserves to meet the aspirations that we all have for them.

Aircraft Carriers and UK Shipbuilding

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Wednesday 6th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, because his question has prompted me to acknowledge that my statement was made today in response to media stories which had created speculation that needed to be dealt with. I apologise to the Opposition for having to make the statement on an Opposition supply day.

I am obviously not responsible for the statement made by BAE Systems, but the company’s judgment, on the basis of value for money, is that the Clyde is the best place in which to build the Type 26 global combat ship, and the MOD concurs with that judgment.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

This is a sad day for Portsmouth, given its proud heritage of supporting the Navy, and the decision has been a bitter pill for the workers there and elsewhere to swallow. We owe them all our thanks. However, was there not a certain inevitability about the coming of a day on which these painful judgments would have to be made? Oversupply of naval shipbuilding capacity is a problem with which successive Governments have had to deal, and the TOBA gave BAE Systems the opportunity to make a commercial judgment. Will the Secretary of State confirm that the judgment was commercial rather than political? While I can see the elegance of placing the OPV contract on the Clyde, will other British shipyards get the opportunity to bid for this? It is a small enough job that plenty of them would be able to handle.

[Mr Hammond]

No, the contract will be placed under the overall umbrella of the terms of business agreement we have with BAE Systems, and, as I made clear in my announcement, we are effectively ordering the OPVs to soak up money we would have been paying in any case to have these yards standing idle, and in doing so significantly de-risking the start-up of the Type 26 programme by making sure the skills base remains in place in Glasgow.

I share my hon. Friend’s view, however, that there is a certain inevitability about the announcement we have made today. Governments have put off the moment, and the carrier order represented a pretty massive 130,000-tonne postponement of the moment, but we cannot alter the inevitable fact that we do not have a large enough Navy to sustain a multi-yard shipbuilding industry in the UK.

Oral Answers to Questions

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

We engage with all stakeholders. It is vital, as we restructure, that we take local authorities with us. Our record across the country has been very positive in that respect.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I agreed with much of the Minister’s reply about the European Defence Council meeting in December. However, when do the Government expect to announce the review of Britain’s membership of the European Defence Agency? Given that we have rightly criticised other European nations for a lack of defence effort, would it not be perverse to turn our back on one of the few practical ways of doing something about it?

[Dr Murrison]

The European Defence Agency has its merits. We have been perfectly up front about that. However, it also has its problems. This country has been helpful in guiding the EDA as it evolves and we are keeping the matter under review. Our experience is that that approach has been effective in procuring the change that is needed in the way the EDA operates and in the efficiency with which it operates. We will continue in that light.

Operation Herrick

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman and can tell him that not only those who voted against the operation but those who fully supported it are pleased that we are now drawing down and bringing our combat commitment to an end. He is absolutely right that the draw-down period is a critical phase of the operation with its own risks. One reason for the decision to change the rotation pattern is the importance of maintaining relationships with key Afghans as we have fewer of those relationships. Historically, we have been mentoring and partnering at battalion and company level, but we will not be doing that any more, so we will have fewer relationships with the Afghans. It is important for our own force protection and situational awareness that we maintain and build those relationships.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

May I thank the Secretary of State for his statement, the logic of which is straightforward? Having spoken socially to some of those who will deploy this October, I think it was widely anticipated that they would serve longer. Perhaps they were warned off, to use the Secretary of State’s expression.

Getting out of Afghanistan safely and steadily requires a great deal of meticulous planning. Does the Secretary of State agree that those who are prone to saying occasionally in the media that we should pack up and get out now are rather missing the point? In the months it would take to rip up the existing plan and devise another one properly, we would probably have got back on to the timeline for the existing plan.

Scottish Referendum (Trident)

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Davidson]

That almost brings on a song, but I will resist the temptation, Mr Bone—perhaps later.

The vessels are, therefore, in entirely the wrong position, with the longest possible sailing time to get to the areas where they would be required. All the military experts to whom we have spoken indicated that it would make sense to have the vessels on the east coast—in Rosyth, or perhaps up near Aberdeen, particularly if, like the Norwegian navy, there were 70 vessels. To be fair, some of those vessels in the Norwegian navy are very small, but it would make sense to have them close to areas that have, say, the oil rigs and so on. However, that cannot be done if the main driver of a policy is the need to guarantee as many jobs as possible in Faslane. It is not militarily rational to say that the entire Scottish navy, such as it would be, would be based in Faslane. That could mean the loss of any jobs concerned with naval matters in Rosyth, which is much easier for those in Faslane to accept than those in Rosyth. The statement that we had from the SNP shop steward and councillor about being willing to accept job losses possibly refers to Rosyth—that is how it has been interpreted in Rosyth.

We also need clarity from the Scottish Government and the SNP about the extent to which headquarters staff could be accommodated sensibly at Faslane. We have had meetings with people in the military who say that it does not make sense to have all the headquarters staff based far away from the seat of Government. We assume, in a separate Scotland, that Helensburgh would not be the seat of Government. It would be Edinburgh, and in those circumstances, it would be appropriate to have a substantial number of headquarters staff situated in Edinburgh, in the same way as the Ministry of Defence is very close to the seat of power here in Westminster. That would further reduce the number of jobs that might be available.

When we get to breaking up the armed forces of the United Kingdom, my understanding is that everyone presently would be given the opportunity to serve with either the Scottish navy, the Scottish air force or the Scottish army. The Scots Guards, for example, if it is to be brought back as a Scottish regiment, might have to be based somewhere. Some of those might be able to go into Faslane, but at present we do not have those answers, and we must seek them.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

Surely serving members of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force or the Army are committed to the Crown and would remain members of the UK armed forces. A Scottish army, navy or air force might be offering them a job, but it should not be assumed that the British Army, Navy or Air Force would automatically be ready to let them all go.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I congratulate the Committee, both on its inquiry and its report and on the manner in which its Chairman introduced its report, in which the prospects of relocating the nuclear deterrent to another base somewhere else in the UK are referred to as

“highly problematic, very expensive, and fraught with political difficulties.”

If memory serves me correctly, that phrase was part of my brief when I gave evidence to the Committee. The civil service was on fine form that day in preparing that brief, giving such a masterly understatement of what this would entail.

Anyone who has visited Faslane—I guess that most hon. Members in this Chamber will have done so at some point—will see that if we were establishing facilities of the sort that we have there, nature could scarcely have provided a more perfect setting in which to do so. Indeed, anyone who goes there will be struck by the tranquillity of it all, which is, of course, the legacy of the nuclear deterrent’s having been there for 50 years and little other development having taken place. When we say cheerfully that there are alternatives to which we could now turn—

--- Later in debate ---

On resuming—

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I was making the point before the Division that Faslane is ideally suited to its purpose. Back in the 1950s, alternative sites were investigated, including Falmouth, which has one of the largest harbours in the world, and Milford Haven, but we cannot turn back the clock and consider how Falmouth and Milford Haven were 50 years ago. The fact is that a great deal of development has happened in both since, and some of it is completely incompatible with a nuclear facility.

If another site were chosen, the cost would not be simply the massive cost of making a nuclear installation. My colleague the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff) also gave evidence to the Committee, pointing out that making a site meet the standards for nuclear safety and hardening it in defence terms would multiply costs far above the requirements of normal construction. On top of all that would be compensation, restoration and all sorts of other attendant costs from nearby facilities and developments.

That was what led me to tell the Committee that the costs would be gargantuan. I think that they are basically unquantifiable—in all honesty, I have no idea what they would be—but if we are going to spend about £25 billion on the capital costs of renewing Trident, I would not be in the least surprised to see the same sum spent all over again if anybody were seriously to undertake the fraught project of relocation to another site. In a practical sense, it is all quite unnecessary, and it would take an enormous length of time. I do not see anything incredible about the estimates of 20 years.

If it does come about, and if the United Kingdom elects a Government in 2015 who wish to go ahead with the nuclear deterrent for a further generation, it would be one of the biggest items—if not the single biggest—on the table in the negotiation that would have to take place between London and Edinburgh in the aftermath of a referendum vote for independence. The Scottish Government would likely take the view, “This will all have to be paid for by the United Kingdom Government.” I would not expect them to write cheques for it. However, if the residual UK Government found themselves facing a massive bill of many billions of pounds for relocating the nuclear deterrent, they would have that many billions fewer in their back pocket for discussing the rest of the things on the table.

That brings us to the critical point that we have not heard from the proposers of Scottish independence what the defence policy of an independent Scotland would be. The United Kingdom, even denuded of 8.5% of its population and taxpayers, would continue to have global interests, which its armed forces are there to defend. It would continue to have a broad spectrum of capability with which to defend those interests, and it would continue to have the critical mass necessary to sustain a variety of equipment fleets, but the defence force of an independent Scotland would have neither those global interests nor that global reach.

Most critically, Scotland would not have the sheer mass with which it could possibly hope to sustain fleets of warships or fighter jets. We have heard that Faslane would continue to host submarines. What on earth would an independent Scottish force want with submarines? The purpose of submarines is to protect the nuclear deterrent, the aircraft carriers and warships. If Scotland is not going to have any of those things, why the dickens would it need any submarines at all?

The truth of the matter is that an independent Scotland would need defence forces. It would be about homeland security. If Scotland was forward-leaning in its global interests, it would perhaps be willing, like the Republic of Ireland, to volunteer troops to international peacekeeping operations. However, that is very different from taking the existing United Kingdom armed forces and slicing 8.5% from them.

[Mr Robathan]

Does my hon. Friend therefore agree with John Swinney’s assumption in this not very secret document that the defence budget of an independent Scotland would have to be a great deal reduced in proportion to what it is now as a percentage of the UK defence budget?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I am certain that the defence budget would be much smaller, given the other aspirations articulated for an independent Scotland, but I am absolutely clear that a force proportionate to the size of the population and the economy would not have fast jets; what on earth would it do with them? That will leave questions in a lot of mouths. It would not have warships. It would not have submarines. It would need offshore patrol vessels, some sort of aerial offshore patrol and helicopters, but it would not need the spectrum of things that the United Kingdom armed forces have. It would be a different beast altogether.

The fact of the matter is that Faslane, in its entirety, taking the nuclear deterrent, the non-nuclear submarines and the entire supply and support chain, is Scotland’s largest single employment site. As far as I can see, there would be virtually nothing there if we took the site away from Faslane. There would be a small requirement for a navy, but that would be a strange place to put it, as we heard earlier. The constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute (Mr Reid) would therefore be looking at ruination. Work such as that on the future of Barrow and elsewhere would need to be done.

No one should be in any doubt that this issue is a massive part of the independence debate. The consequences for Scotland need to be assessed and analysed carefully, and the headache presented to a UK Government who wished to continue the nuclear deterrent would be immense. Finally, we should not assume that Scottish independence is to be equated with the SNP ruling for ever in Edinburgh. It might well be that an election would return a Scottish Government of a completely different political hue, and some of the issues would then start looking very different.

Deployment to Mali

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I do not accept the last part of the hon. Gentleman’s question, but I of course accept that, for there to be a sustainable peaceful situation in Mali over the longer term, there will have to a political solution to the tensions that exist between the north and the south of the country—tensions that, frankly, were created by a colonial map drawer and were pretty predictable when one looks at the ethnic and religious make-up of that country. But the fact that the regional powers are prepared to deploy in support of the Malian army is something that we should very much celebrate and support. Let there be a regional solution to the short-term problems in Mali, and by all means let us be active and forward-leaning in our support for a long-term political solution to the problem.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I strongly support the Defence Secretary’s announcement today, which I believe to be well judged in every particular. I welcome the fact that other countries in the EU recognise the threat to all of our security that would be represented by ungoverned space in that part of the world, and their willingness to join in this training mission. So long as we are being guaranteed that there is no question of our moving into a combat role, I do not think we should view these or any subsequent requests for practical help as mission creep. We should be willing to make a long-term contribution in west Africa, building up regional capacity so that on future occasions western troops will not be required to move in.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend and I agree with the sentiments that he expressed. The Prime Minister has made it clear that we have no intention of entering a combat role in Mali. The French have taken the lead and supporting them is the sensible and the right thing to do.

Armed Forces Redundancies

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

As I have already said, I do not believe that this will affect current operations in Afghanistan. We have of course consulted the service chiefs and—particularly on this tranche—members from the Army personnel branch. I am very conscious that behind every person who may be affected there is not just a service number, but a serviceman or woman and potentially a family. We realise that, which is why we are trying to do this as fairly and practically as possible, given that we understand that it is a difficult process.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

Will the Minister confirm that the painful decisions taken in and since the strategic defence and security review aim to balance savings across manpower, equipment and support? Is it not incumbent on anyone opposing this round of redundancies to say where else they would make the savings in defence or come up with an additional defence budget?

[Mr Francois]

Yes and yes.

Nuclear Deterrent

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

The UK must decide by the middle of 2016—just three years from now—whether to proceed with a like-for-like replacement of the Trident nuclear deterrent. I do not believe we need a further generation of nuclear weapons based on the scale we thought we needed in 1980 at the height of the cold war, and I do not believe we can afford to have one. I do not believe that national security assessment and strategy suggest we need it, or that our defence posture can stand it—our posture would become lop-sided if we were to commit to another generation on the same scale. In addition, I believe that the opportunity cost of committing so much money and manpower, and such a large proportion of our equipment budget, would have a malign effect on our general military capability.

In 1980, at the height of the cold war, we had a known nuclear adversary—the Soviet Union. It had British targets in its target set, and we had Soviet targets in our target set. There was a logic—I do not say that I necessarily subscribe to it hook, line and sinker—to having continuous at-sea deterrence, because we had a known adversary. Today’s circumstances are very different. At that time, we computed that the only way to fulfil the classic definition of deterrence—to put into one’s adversary’s mind the certainty that we were capable of inflicting damage that would be unacceptable to him—was to maintain the capability of overcoming Moscow’s nuclear defences and being able to flatten that city. Moscow was where the Soviet elite hung out and the only things that they valued, and to which they considered damage would be unacceptable, were themselves and their regime. The Russia of the 21st century, for all its imperfections, is very different. It is perfectly possible to deter modern Russia from a nuclear attack on us by a variety of other means, and there are other ways of inflicting on them damage that they would consider unacceptable.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Why then have the Russians recently upgraded their anti-ballistic missile protection in and around Moscow?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I did not say that they would be willing to see Moscow flattened—most certainly they would not. I am saying that there are other ways of inflicting damage on Russia that it would consider unacceptable.

I mentioned that there will be a vast opportunity cost to be paid if we decide to commit these funds, which, let us refresh our memories, in today’s money will be approximately £25 billion to £30 billion on the capital investment in a further generation of submarines. On top of that, we have to factor in the running costs of a nuclear deterrent on this scale for 30 or more years of through-life costs—more than £3 billion a year in today’s money. Beginning to total that out and factoring in decommissioning at the end, we are talking about an expenditure of more than £100 billion. We need to look closely at whether that is justified in the context of the size of our defence budget, and what we are able to make available for other forms of defence and security in an increasingly dangerous and changing world.

[Mr Jenkin]

My hon. Friend has started to talk about 20, 30, 40 years ahead. Would he like to describe the strategic context in which we might be operating a nuclear deterrent in 20, 30, 40 years’ time, or indeed find ourselves operating without one? What is it going to be like then?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

The truth of the matter is that none of us knows. If we retain a nuclear deterrent of any description and any scale, it is an insurance policy against the unknown. I am saying that the current nuclear deterrent is scaled specifically to overcome the threat that we believed the Soviet Union posed in 1980. As we look to an unknown future over the course of this century, we have to decide what proportion of our defence spend and effort should go into this one part of our defence livery, and the opportunity cost of doing that.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if we move to some form of cruise missile-based nuclear weapons system, that would be destabilising internationally and positively dangerous?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I am waiting for the Trident alternatives review, which is being conducted by the Cabinet Office and is looking at exactly those sorts of issues. When it reports, I look forward to coming back and debating them with the hon. Gentleman. As a considered study of exactly these sorts of issues is nearing its conclusion at the moment, the time to debate those details will be when the report has been published.

I want to look at the pressures that will face Defence Ministers in the years when the large capital expenditure that I have described would have to be spent. In the same period of time, we will have to put the joint strike fighter aircraft on to the two new aircraft carriers and build the Type 26 frigate. Whatever the next generation of remotely piloted air systems and whoever we do that with, it will fall in the same time frame. Bearing in mind that HMS Ocean is due to leave service in 2018, any future generation of amphibious shipping will have to be paid for in exactly that time frame; and whatever we equip the Army with for the 21st century—it has been the poor relation in the equipment budget for many years—and bearing in mind how little seems to be left of the original future rapid effect system, as conceived by the previous Government, again, it will fall in that time frame. If we decide to give the nuclear deterrent a bye and think it has some magic claim on the money, an opportunity cost will have to be paid across the rest of our defence systems.

I listened to my hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall (Sheryll Murray) talking quite rightly about the part that Plymouth plays in the nuclear deterrent, but I put it to her and my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile) that if we commit all our money to one system, the opportunity cost will be felt above all else by the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy might fight—and win—to keep the nuclear deterrent on its current scale, but the price will be paid in the scale of the conventional surface Navy, which, in my view, is already trying to do far too much with far too little.

The UK has a sensible range of military capabilities at the moment, and with that we can take part in international operations. We have global interests and ambitions, and uniquely we have the will to use military power when we need to in pursuit of those interests. Ours is still the fourth largest defence budget in the world. Our place on the top table does not depend on our being a nuclear power; we are there in our own right, and besides which any change to the line-up of the UN Security Council would require the UK’s assent, which we could simply withhold.

We must make a contribution to disarmament. That is an obligation we have under the non-proliferation treaty. We must wait and see whether the Trident alternatives review can find another system that offers us a way of sustaining a credible deterrent. It would not have the same capability, but there might be a way of doing something at a lesser cost. We should keep an open mind about trying to do that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to see the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) back in his place. He put the case extremely well on behalf of Barrow-in-Furness for the current policy remaining in place and being renewed. I welcome the fact that we are having this debate, and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) on securing it. We have been brothers in arms on defence, one way or another, for quite a long time. He has really distinguished himself on these issues, and I congratulate him on encouraging the Backbench Business Committee to hold this debate. His position is in the ascendancy and it speaks to his intellectual depth and courage that he is prepared to put his ideas to the test in the Chamber. I also want to congratulate the former Minister of State for the Armed Forces, my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), on his contribution to starting, and initially leading, the review of the alternatives to Trident. We owe it to ourselves to think rather more deeply about this matter than we have done in the past.

It was interesting to hear the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman) explaining how the Labour party had moved to its present position. Those on the Opposition Front Bench are no longer allowed to think about this issue, because the politics of 1983 were so appallingly scarring. Labour Front-Benchers are now frozen in a position in which any sense of doubt about the continuation of the present policy would be seen as politically catastrophic, and they are not allowed to go there. The only expressions of doubt that we will hear today will come from the old stagers of the 1980s who fought and lost the battles on disarmament at the time. I believe that it was quite proper that they lost those arguments.

We are now in a completely new era, and we owe it to ourselves to review the policy properly, and as openly as we can. That review is now being carried out under the leadership of the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and it will report to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, but I am concerned that there has been no undertaking to publish it, and that there will therefore be no opportunity for us to examine the costings.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

If my hon. Friend studies the coalition mid-term review document that was published last week, he will see that, for the first time, there is an explicit commitment to publish the review. I understand that the review will be concluded in March, and that publication will probably be in May.

[Mr Blunt]

I am delighted to be corrected on that point.

This is the hub of the issue. We are being invited to engage in an insurance policy that is going to last about 40 years and cost between 5% and 6% of our defence budget. Will that insurance policy ever be cashed in? My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) would probably suggest that it is being cashed in all the time, owing to the fact that it exists. In that sense, the deterrence is eternal.

We need to get into the minds of the likely decision makers who might attack British interests in a way that would engage the use of our deterrent. We also need to get into the minds of our leaders who might then have to contemplate the use of the deterrent in response. There has been a change in the debate on how states conduct these affairs. The question of whether it would be a matter for the International Criminal Court if a leader chose to eviscerate millions of wholly innocent people in pursuit of their state’s policy is one that ought to engage us, particularly as we no longer live in a bipolar world consisting of one alliance taking a position against a competing ideology. The world has changed.

I do not pretend to have an answer to this question, but I want the House to have as much data as possible so that we can begin to make as informed a decision as possible. It is the position of the Government—and, I believe, of those on the Opposition Front Bench—that paying a premium of 5% to 6% of the defence budget for the 40 next years would be worth it because of what it would buy. Well, would 10% or 15% be worth it? How solid are the figures of 5% to 6%? Why should that cost be coming out of the defence budget, given the cost of the equipment that is going to the soldiers, sailors and airmen who are carrying out the other tasks that we ask them to undertake? Should the cost be found from outside the main defence vote?

Oral Answers to Questions

Nick Harvey Excerpts

Monday 14th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robathan]

We work in close co-operation with the Americans and other ISAF allies, and we have a sensible trajectory to withdraw all our combat troops by the end of next year. We are already not involved in the face-to-face operations in which we were involved two years’ ago, and we are witnessing a thankful reduction in our casualties. We do not intend to bring our troops out early. We think that that would be a great disadvantage to peace in Afghanistan.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

May I ask my right hon. Friend about the process of packing up and getting our kit out of Afghanistan and bringing it home? How long will that take? When will it begin and finish? How many troops will be tied up in that logistical task rather than the combat task? How much kit are we going to leave behind?

[Mr Speaker]

That was three or four questions. I shall indulge the former Minister—he is a knighted one, I note—but I know that the Minister will provide a pithy reply.