Scottish Referendum (Trident)

Ian Davidson Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Ian Davidson (Glasgow South West) (Lab/Co-op)]

This debate is about the consequences of separation. Independence would mean the separation of the United Kingdom armed forces into a Scottish section and a United Kingdom section. The Select Committee on Scottish Affairs therefore felt that it was important that we thoroughly explored what the consequences of separation would be for the people of Scotland.

As Members will no doubt be aware, we have been conducting a number of inquiries, partly about procedure but now mainly on issues of substance. It is our view that the people of Scotland must have put in front of them the full information about the consequences of separation. I am therefore particularly grateful for this debate, because Trident is obviously one of the most important single issues that will play a part in the dialogue after separation, should it happen.

The theme of our approach is taken from the words of Blair Jenkins, leader of the Yes Scotland campaign, who said in a Committee hearing:

“I think that in any referendum the onus is on the side of the campaign that is proposing a change to make the case for change. I have always accepted in this referendum that there is a fair onus, if you like, on the yes campaign to make the case for change.”

The Committee agrees. We believe that those arguing for separation must make the case for change by putting all the facts before the people of Scotland.

[Sandra Osborne (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) (Lab)]

I thoroughly agree with what my hon. Friend is saying, but does he not agree that it is extraordinarily complacent of the Ministry of Defence not to even consider the issue or be prepared to discuss it at all?

[Mr Davidson]

The Committee has made it clear that we believe that both sides in this debate—the Government and the various Ministries and those arguing for separation—should indicate much more openly than they have been willing to until now exactly how they intend to respond to various initiatives. In this case, having examined the matter in our report, we believe that the initiative now passes to those arguing for separation.

Our report is entitled “Days or decades?” because we believe that nuclear Trident could effectively be terminated in either days or decades. The onus now lies on the Scottish National party to clarify which it prefers. We had a meeting with shop stewards from Coulport and Faslane this morning; Martin McCurley, Jim Conroy and Richie Calder are all here in the Public Gallery. I name them so that their management will know that they have actually turned up here.

[Mr Peter Bone (in the Chair)]

Order. The hon. Member should not be doing that, as he well knows.

[Mr Davidson]

Neither I should. The shop stewards said to us this morning that they have 50 years of security from the United Kingdom for those employed at Faslane and Coulport. They outlined to us that they understand that they might get answers from those seeking separation in November, after the publication of a White Paper, or maybe earlier, but they have not been promised any clear, categorical assurances before that time.

[Lindsay Roy (Glenrothes) (Lab)]

Is it not the case that it is about the security not just of existing jobs but of additional jobs over the next few years, as the new submarines are based there?

[Mr Davidson]

Indeed. That is a very valuable point. At the moment, 6,700 jobs are based at Faslane and Coulport. Under the existing United Kingdom Government proposals, which I understand are supported by all parties, that number would rise to 8,200 in the fairly near future. We have the opportunity to balance 50 years of security of employment and job growth with the United Kingdom on one hand and the great unknown of separation on the other.

[Mr Iain McKenzie (Inverclyde) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern about the devastating impact that the loss of those jobs would have on the communities from which employees come, such as Helensburgh, Clydebank and Inverclyde?

[Mr Davidson]

Indeed. Some 6,700 jobs would be lost. To be fair, many are naval jobs in uniform. Presumably many of those people would be relocated elsewhere, and therefore would not be directly made redundant, but the other jobs would obviously be lost if Faslane and Coulport were closed, as would all the support jobs in the community. It has been estimated that up to 11,000 jobs could be lost. The information that I have seen makes that figure higher; it suggests a multiplier of roughly 2.5 plus the additional jobs, or potentially about 19,000 jobs lost in the Faslane and Coulport area, which will clearly have a horrendous impact. It has not been made obvious what would replace those jobs or what alternative naval facilities would be provided there.

[Mrs Eleanor Laing (Epping Forest) (Con)]

Before the hon. Gentleman moves on, does he share my concern and consider it to be extraordinary that the gentlemen who appeared before the Select Committee this morning have been seeking answers from the Scottish Government to perfectly reasonable questions, and that the Scottish Government, despite the fact that they have been considering separation for Scotland for decades, have refused to give any answers to those questions for at least another eight months? Does he agree that it is extraordinary that after decades of plans, it will take another eight months even to consider answering important questions?

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[Mr Davidson]

My understanding is that the SNP has existed for some 80 years. It seems somewhat incredible that it has not thought through its plans for how separation would affect the armed forces in Scotland as a whole and Faslane and Coulport in particular, although it is fair to point out that one of the shop stewards at Coulport, in an e-mail exchange with the convenor of shop stewards at Rosyth, said of closure:

“I’d sacrifice for the better of the country.”

That was from an SNP councillor who is also a shop steward at Coulport, Mr Christopher McEleny. In his view, the sacrifice of those jobs would be worth it in the interests of Scotland. To be fair, he said that he did not think it would actually happen, although whether he meant Coulport jobs or Rosyth jobs is not entirely clear, but he was prepared to sacrifice a lot of other people’s jobs in the interests of separation.

The report is worth summarising quickly before I move on to other comments. It is our view, from the evidence that we heard, that nuclear weapons in Scotland could be disarmed within days and removed within months. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I am glad to hear Scottish Nationalist Members cheering that. If they accept that analysis, it means that there will not be any dispute about the fundamentals; it will then be a question of political will.

We as a Committee have accepted the analysis of the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament that, with the co-operation of the Royal Navy and the UK Government, the process of disarming within days and removal within months could be both speedy and safe. Of course there would be consequences. We understand that it is likely to mean the unilateral nuclear disarmament of the United Kingdom, which I notice SNP Members have also cheered, because the construction of facilities elsewhere would take up to 25 years or so.

An insistence upon the speediest possible removal of nuclear weapons from a separate Scotland would obviously have consequences for other negotiations taking place at about the time of separation. Trident is the elephant in the room. It is likely to be the single most expensive item under discussion, and would spill over into all the rest of the dialogue, debate and discussion. The hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), a former Defence Minister, whose presence in the Chamber today we welcome, gave us clear and explicit evidence of that. The conclusion of our summary, therefore, was that we wanted the UK Government and the Scottish Government to come clean with people in Scotland as quickly as possible about the consequences of separation and the removal of Trident. The onus now lies on the SNP and the Scottish Government to tell us the timetable that they intend to apply.

[Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on his contribution so far. As he is aware, Trident is one of the systems based at Faslane. There are different views, which the Committee has no doubt heard, of how many jobs are directly reliant on Trident, but we also have seven Astute class submarines, eight Sandown class minehunters and the administrative headquarters at Faslane. Has he had any indication from the Scottish Government which parts they would wish realistically to retain?

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[Mr Davidson]

The key word is “realistically”. We have not had any estimates from the Scottish Government that we regard as solid; we have had to search around. On the point about the number of jobs directly involved with Trident, the UK Government have made it absolutely clear that, on the solid trade union principle of “one out, all out”, if the Trident missile-firing submarines were removed from Faslane, everything else would go—the Trafalgar submarines, the Astute submarines and the headquarters. Within the United Kingdom, the intention is not only for 50 years of secure employment, but for Faslane and Coulport to become a centre of excellence for submarines for the entire United Kingdom. The new Trafalgar boats would therefore be moved there as and when, as well as the training facilities scattered throughout a number of locations in the United Kingdom, so that everything connected with submarines would be on the west coast of Scotland. That is why the number of jobs involved would go up from 6,700 to 8,200 over a period. It is security and growth with the United Kingdom and the great unknown with separation.

To return to the question of removing the nuclear deterrent from Scotland, the statements made so far have the merit of clarity: the SNP wants to remove Trident. Alex Salmond, the First Minister, has said that he wants a written constitution that includes

“an explicit ban on nuclear weapons being based on Scottish territory”.

Interestingly, that does not include a ban on nuclear weapons visiting Scottish territory. The SNP might well intend Scotland to be similar to Norway and Denmark, which have a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and therefore allow nuclear weapons in their waters and on their soil while pretending that they are not. No doubt we will get clarification on that in due course.

The key issue for us is, what are the parameters? Our role as a Committee is to provide information and evidence to the people of Scotland to inform their decisions. If the nuclear weapons are to be removed, we wished to establish the parameters within which that could be done. At one end of the range, according to the CND, it could be done quickly; at the other end, it would require 20 to 25 years to build alternative facilities. Somewhere within there, in the event of a separation decision, will come the solution. People in Scotland, in particular those employed at Faslane and Coulport, deserve to be told now which of those alternatives is favoured by the SNP; it is then the responsibility of the UK Government to respond. The Committee does not accept that it is reasonable for the UK Government not to say anything in such circumstances, but we understand that the first step has to be taken by the SNP, the forces of darkness in the Scottish Government.

The CND, from its evidence, clearly believes that the missiles can be disabled within days. Apparently, there is a fuse thing that can be pulled out, which effectively disables the missiles and means that they will not work any more. Those to whom I cannot refer will no doubt tell me that it is much more complicated than that, but that is the gist. There seemed to be general agreement that those fuses I pulled out could be put in the boot of my car—for the interest of the population, a Vauxhall Vectra, which is not a particularly specialist vehicle—and driven down to England, therefore being removed from Scotland. In such circumstances, the missiles would not work so, within eight days, the missiles could be disarmed, defused, defanged or whatever simile is wished. It would then take eight weeks for the warheads to be removed from the submarines—basically, a big hand comes down, grabs them up and puts them down. Again, the process is a bit more complicated, but that is the gist. Believe it or not, that takes people eight weeks. It is then anticipated that the removal of the nuclear weapons from Scotland would take two years—a figure based on the existing timetable for the replacement of the missiles, because they regularly get lifted out of the submarines in Coulport, with the warheads taken off to be polished or whatever, to be recycled and come back up.

The weapons, therefore, could realistically be removed from Scotland within two years. The subsequent disarming and so on would be a longer process, but that would take place in England; that would be the remaining United Kingdom’s position. No one has come forward to say that that timetable is not viable, feasible or safe. It comes down to a question of political will. The Scottish Government could not do that on their own, however, and they would require technical assistance from the Royal Navy and the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston and elsewhere, but if there was co-operation, it could be achieved. That is one parameter: the weapons could be removed within that time scale.

The other parameter, if the United Kingdom wishes to retain a nuclear, at-sea deterrent, relates to the need to construct alternative facilities elsewhere in the United Kingdom or to base the missiles abroad in some way. Some who came to see us suggested that the missiles, warheads or boats could be based in France or the United States. The responses we have had, however, indicate that that is not as realistic as was once anticipated, so we are setting that option aside. We therefore want to focus on the other parameter, which is the replacement of Faslane.

Nuclear weapons require three functions: support facilities, docking, including loading, and maintenance. A number of alternative locations have been looked at: Devonport, Barrow, Milford Haven and a number of others. Opinion varies about the amount of work necessary for a relocation. One argument is that the facilities could be split. Faslane and Coulport are clearly separate facilities, but they are obviously proximate. The question is whether to have a 20-mile gap and so on, or more. It has been generally accepted that that could be done, but planning requirements are much more stringent now and our evidence indicated that 20 to 25 years is the most realistic estimate of how long it would take the United Kingdom to build replacement facilities, and there is an issue of whether it would want to do that. The political and economic costs of relocating Trident would be huge, and some of the arguments suggest that part of those costs would be borne by a separate Scottish Government. The cost of relocation would be imposed on the United Kingdom by a separate Scottish Government, and the United Kingdom’s view is that it would be reasonable for the Scottish Government to pay at least part, if not all, of those costs.

I expect that that view would not be shared by the Scottish Government, but it would become part of the discussion and debate, and part of the argument. My understanding is that the view on both sides is that nothing is settled until everything is settled, so other lines of the separation budget could not be agreed without this issue also being agreed. Everything would have to be settled together.

[Michael Connarty (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab)]

The Select Committee took evidence on relocation, and perhaps its Chair could enlighten me on exactly where and by whom that relocation would take place. The document, “Trident: Nowhere to Go”, analysed every option and historical document going back 30 years when planning was less stringent, and concluded that there was no alternative to Faslane anywhere in English waters. It would be useful to know why the Committee thought there was a possibility of relocation in England.

[Mr Davidson]

The Committee took the view that there was a possibility of relocation elsewhere in the United Kingdom, not just in England. Locations in Wales were also mentioned. Francis Tusa, editor of Defence Analysis, was perhaps most optimistic about how to do that. He pointed out helpfully that the loading facility at Coulport, which unloads nuclear weapons and so on, is a floating dock. By definition, it floats, so it could presumably be moved, and the facility would not require complete rebuilding in the way that those of us who had not realised that a floating dock floated had assumed. The matter might not be as difficult as it appears, but we are not experts, and it might turn out that that cannot be done, in which case the parameter would change, but it is clear that if it were relocated that would take 20 to 25 years.

[Katy Clark]

I am incredibly interested in what my hon. Friend is saying. My understanding is that one difficulty is storage, because at the moment a hill or a mountain is used. One proposal seems to be to rebuild such a mountain elsewhere in England or Wales. Did the Committee receive evidence on that ?

[Mr Davidson]

We visited the storage facility, which is indeed built into the side of a hill, but, with respect, it is not the only hill in the United Kingdom. There are hills and mountains in quite a lot of locations in the United Kingdom. The search for hills is not the main constraint, and several locations were identified.

The matter can be split into different parts. One is the submarines, and we believe that their maintenance could probably be done in places such as Devonport, where there are enough bays and so on. The warhead element is slightly more complex and there are two issues. One is loading and a floating dock; the other is storage. There is storage at Coulport, but I understand—we were not told much—that weapons are not held there for an enormously long time. They are polished and whatever at Aldermaston, then moved to the hill, which is rather Hobbit-like, and then loaded on to submarines. They are not kept there for an enormously long time. It would be possible to store them at Aldermaston or elsewhere, although the journey would be longer and less convenient in many ways and perhaps less safe, but that would be for the Ministry of Defence and the UK Government to determine.

Our view was that that could be done. It would take a long time and it would be expensive. Professor Walker of St Andrews university helpfully said, “Don’t ask me to put a figure on it. I have no idea at all, but certainly it would be billions of pounds.” Francis Tusa thought it would be much less and said, “I have seen reports that it would cost £50 million. No, it wouldn’t. It would cost much less.” The then Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for North Devon, pointed out that a recent upgrade of the facilities at Faslane had cost £3.5 billion. That was just for an upgrade, so presumably the cost of replacing it would be much higher. We then come back to the extent to which that would form a major part of the dialogue between the Scottish and UK Governments after a separation decision.

I have touched on France and the United States. The other alternative we looked at was maintaining a United Kingdom base in a separate Scotland, similar to the Holy Loch base that the United States had, and the United Kingdom’s sovereign territory in Cyprus. That would have to be negotiated in the spirit of the Edinburgh agreement, which would require best endeavours on both sides.

The matter is not as straightforward as it seems because obviously not just the base would have to be secure. Access and so on would have to be secure, and a substantial amount of water would have to be UK sovereign territory, at least during the period when submarines were leaving. There could be an interesting situation if the Scottish Government instructed Strathclyde police to beat back protestors from outside a UK-owned and maintained Faslane base. The situation could be quite complicated, and not one that the Scottish Government would want.

If a Scottish Government wanted to join NATO, they would have to be part of a nuclear alliance. The compromises that that might involve have not been fully explored. The United Kingdom and Scottish Governments must be much clearer about such matters, particularly the relationship with NATO. The Scottish Government have indicated that they are enthusiastic about the concept of joint air bases with the RAF and the Scottish air force sharing facilities. The Ministry of Defence and others have said that there is an issue of control, and if the UK Government wanted to bomb somewhere that the Scottish Government did not want them to bomb, would they have a sovereign right to do so, or would the Scottish Government be able to block the runway?

Joint and shared bases are complicated, and even more so if there were any suggestion that that would be applied to a nuclear base. We took the view that that was a dead end, and that a shared base on Scottish territory or a UK sovereign base on Scottish territory were not runners. We will wait to hear from the Ministry of Defence and the Government in due course, when the Scottish National party has made its proposals.

[Mrs Laing]

Has the hon. Gentleman had any indication from NATO that if a separate Scotland took action to eject an important part of NATO, such as Trident, from Scottish shores it would be welcome in NATO? Has he had any indication from NATO that a Scottish state behaving in that way would be welcome in NATO?

[Mr Davidson]

I must confess that NATO has not communicated with me directly on that matter. They might very well listen to me, and I have noticed a number of clicks on my phone, but it has not so far spoken in quite that way. I thank the hon. Lady for drawing my attention to that point—I must monitor my phone more closely. I am sure that NATO will be listening to this debate and, no doubt, waiting—as are the work force in Faslane and Coulport—to hear what the SNP has to say about all this. [Interruption.] There was a mumble from a sedentary position by one of the SNP Members. Would they like to clarify that? No—I thought not.

The alternative provision for Faslane and Coulport has not been made clear. In the resolution that was passed at the SNP conference recently, there was the proposal—indeed, the commitment—that the SNP in a Scottish Government would seek to have submarines. However, the SNP has also said that it would not wish to have any nuclear submarines, so the question comes up of what sort of submarines it would have. Ireland, New Zealand and Iceland all have no submarines. Denmark has just decided to decommission its submarines. The Norwegians have six diesel-electric submarines. If the Scottish navy were to have diesel-electric submarines, two main issues come up: first, where would they be built, and secondly, within what time scale?

Some of us went along to see the BAE Systems shipyard staff and management, and when we suggested to them that they could turn their hand to building submarines, they laughed, because they thought that the idea was so ludicrous. Other experts said to us that any submarines built in the Clyde yards would be the most expensive submarines in the world, ever, on the basis that they were a one-off—whether there were four or six. They said that the yards were not equipped to build submarines, and it would require starting completely from scratch. The style of building submarines is, apparently, from the inside out, and for ships, it is the from the outside in. The technologies are different. Of course, it could be done—with the appropriate amount of money and political will, Hall’s of Broxburn could build submarines—but that is not to say that it would be financially or economically viable. Anything could be done with enough will, commitment and finance.

We have to assume that the diesel-electric submarines would be bought from the main supplier, which is Germany. Therefore, we would have the Scottish navy being equipped with U-boats at a cost that is undetermined and to a timetable that is equally unclear. We have no idea when U-boats from Germany would be able to arrive in Scotland to provide jobs in maintenance at Faslane or Coulport. Of course, we would then have circumstances in which there was a huge gap between the departure of the submarines from the Royal Navy and the arrival of the submarines from Germany, unless the SNP completely abandoned its commitment to remove the submarines from the Clyde as speedily as possible. It is possible to see a compromise being reached, which would require the SNP to undertake a U-turn on its commitment to remove the submarines as quickly as possible. That is the only way in which we could see any possibility of submarine jobs being retained.

The SNP has also said that it wants to have ships at Faslane, which is not unreasonable. It is unclear as yet what ships it desires to have, how the Scottish navy would be broken up, and, at the moment, whether any Scottish naval vessels would be put anywhere other than Faslane. As those familiar with Scottish geography will be aware, Faslane is almost in ideally the wrong place for a navy that would face any threat from the north and east, because it is in the south-west. If people know Argyll, anything coming out of the Clyde would have to sail round the bottom of Argyll—for those who are technically minded, that is the south of Argyll.

[Mr Alan Reid (Argyll and Bute) (LD)]

I think the Mull of Kintyre is the correct technical expression.

[Mr Davidson]

That almost brings on a song, but I will resist the temptation, Mr Bone—perhaps later.

The vessels are, therefore, in entirely the wrong position, with the longest possible sailing time to get to the areas where they would be required. All the military experts to whom we have spoken indicated that it would make sense to have the vessels on the east coast—in Rosyth, or perhaps up near Aberdeen, particularly if, like the Norwegian navy, there were 70 vessels. To be fair, some of those vessels in the Norwegian navy are very small, but it would make sense to have them close to areas that have, say, the oil rigs and so on. However, that cannot be done if the main driver of a policy is the need to guarantee as many jobs as possible in Faslane. It is not militarily rational to say that the entire Scottish navy, such as it would be, would be based in Faslane. That could mean the loss of any jobs concerned with naval matters in Rosyth, which is much easier for those in Faslane to accept than those in Rosyth. The statement that we had from the SNP shop steward and councillor about being willing to accept job losses possibly refers to Rosyth—that is how it has been interpreted in Rosyth.

We also need clarity from the Scottish Government and the SNP about the extent to which headquarters staff could be accommodated sensibly at Faslane. We have had meetings with people in the military who say that it does not make sense to have all the headquarters staff based far away from the seat of Government. We assume, in a separate Scotland, that Helensburgh would not be the seat of Government. It would be Edinburgh, and in those circumstances, it would be appropriate to have a substantial number of headquarters staff situated in Edinburgh, in the same way as the Ministry of Defence is very close to the seat of power here in Westminster. That would further reduce the number of jobs that might be available.

When we get to breaking up the armed forces of the United Kingdom, my understanding is that everyone presently would be given the opportunity to serve with either the Scottish navy, the Scottish air force or the Scottish army. The Scots Guards, for example, if it is to be brought back as a Scottish regiment, might have to be based somewhere. Some of those might be able to go into Faslane, but at present we do not have those answers, and we must seek them.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

Surely serving members of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force or the Army are committed to the Crown and would remain members of the UK armed forces. A Scottish army, navy or air force might be offering them a job, but it should not be assumed that the British Army, Navy or Air Force would automatically be ready to let them all go.

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[Mr Davidson]

We have not yet got to the detail of that. It is another issue that we have to explore. Our understanding is that the policy of the SNP is to resurrect all the Scottish regiments. We are not entirely clear as yet how far back that goes. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders is, I think, presently destined to become a platoon for Japanese tourists at Edinburgh castle, because it will solely be a display regiment. It is unclear whether the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders will be resurrected as a regiment—as well as all the separate regiments going back, presumably, to the date of their foundation—as is whether the plans apply only to 1945 onwards, or any other date chosen at random.

Our understanding is that no one who wishes to serve with the Scottish armed forces will be refused—that is the policy of the Scottish Government as we understand it; if that is wrong, I wait to hear my SNP colleagues correct me—and that would of course include large numbers of Fijians, who have provided the Royal Scots with one of the best seven-a-side rugby teams in the country. I have watched them on a number of occasions. Fijians play a valuable part in the Scottish regiments. Presumably, as members of Scottish regiments, they will be entitled to remain part of the Scottish armed forces. Scots in the Navy could be scattered all around the world. The position will be similar for Scots in the Air Force. As I understand it, they will be entitled to join the Scottish armed forces. Then there is the question of matching up needs and so on, which will be an intricate exercise. Again, I presume that will be settled in the spirit of co-operation that we are being promised.

However, what we must have spelt out by the Scottish Government as early as possible is a statement of their intentions—their negotiating position. I, for one, agree with the shop stewards who met us this morning—I cannot mention their present location. They indicated that they regard it as unacceptable that they have to wait potentially until November to be told what their future is. That is simply not acceptable. Even if there are 6,700 jobs being created on the Clyde—I very much doubt that; all the figures that we have had suggest that the figure will be much less—the job of an infantryman who has been relocated from the Scots Guards to Faslane is not the same job as is held at the moment by a fully trained engineer working on nuclear submarines. One job might balance the other in simply numerical terms, but they are not necessarily the same people, unless the intention is to conscript the engineering work force into the Scots Guards, in which case they would match up. The Scottish Government need to be clear about how these things will operate in practice.

This is the first of a series of debates that the Scottish Affairs Committee intends to hold on separation, the consequences of separation and the need for the Scottish people as a whole to have as much information as possible available to them before they cast their vote.

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[Michael Connarty (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure, Mr Bone, to speak under your chairmanship, which I have done a number of times in other venues in meetings of the all-party parliamentary group on human trafficking.

I said earlier that I have been against nuclear weapons in the UK since Polaris was brought to the Clyde. It was the great contamination of our nation—I mean the United Kingdom rather than just Scotland. I was deeply distressed by the comments of the hon. Member for Angus (Mr Weir), who indicated that as long as the SNP could get it out of Scotland, Trident would then be someone else’s decision. I would still be campaigning against it wherever it was to be relocated, and I would argue strongly against it being relocated anywhere within the UK.

Quite simply, I support the “Terminating Trident”—or banning the bomb, as we used to call it—part of the subject matter of this debate. Most of the wonderful songs written about that came from the Labour movement, not the Scottish National party, which was a minuscule organisation in Scotland at the time, because it was focused, as always, on breaking up the United Kingdom and separating Scotland from the UK. It was never part of the movement that was clearly committed to organising against the bomb. I went on the marches and I visited the peace camps. I did not see any Scottish National party members there; I saw members of the Labour movement in Scotland arguing for a better future with no nuclear weapons anywhere in the UK.

We are debating not just what happens to those pieces of metal, and the international motions and structures we sign up to that enable us to use such weapons, whether under someone else’s banner or not, but what happens to the people. “Ban the bomb but don’t dump the people”—that was always the statement made at demonstrations outside the gates of Faslane and Coulport. It was never about getting rid of the people who were inside doing the job that the nation had asked them to do, using the skills that they had been trained in and were proud to serve their country with. Unfortunately, that is the unanswered question, which was asked by the Chair of the Scottish Affairs Committee.

If we are to have such a monumental change in the structure of the defence budget, after what would be the much greater, more cataclysmic decision to separate Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom—Scotland would be leaving 92% of the UK behind and becoming some wee country that would not be a significant player in the world—we must think about how we can deal with that. That is the problem for the SNP Government, who, by the way, as I keep having to repeat, were elected by 24% of the people of Scotland. The structure of the electoral system set up by those under Donald Dewar, who thought that by helping their Liberal comrades they would enable Labour to form an alliance with the Liberals in Scotland, actually advantaged the Scottish National party and gave it a majority. The Labour party, because it had done such an abysmal job in Scotland and lost the faith of the Scottish people, got about half the SNP’s percentage at the election. None the less, a party cannot have a landslide victory when only 24% of the people vote for it. It is a fix that happens because of electoral arithmetic, and it has nothing to do with popular support. If there were some sea change among the people in Scotland, we would have to consider what to do with the bomb.

The Chair of the Scottish Affairs Committee said that he has been assured that the fuses could be removed from missiles within eight days. I have recently read a great deal about the nuclear weapons stores of the world, particularly in the US, and learned about the process by which chemicals in the fuse heat up and then trigger the missiles. The people in the States who researched and created those chemical fuses are now all dead. The fuses deteriorate and do not necessarily react 30 or 40 years after they were made. Believe it or not, the US has not yet found a way of synthesising the products that would allow the replacement of those fuses, so we could have a redundant nuclear network throughout the world, including in the UK, within the next decade. Therefore, defusing the missiles might not take eight days; it could be very much quicker than that.

[Mr Davidson]

Is my hon. Friend saying that the professional advice that I received that it would be safe for me to have the fuses in the back of my Vauxhall Vectra was incorrect?

[Michael Connarty]

I advise my hon. Friend not to put the chemicals that are contained in the nuclear fuses in the back of his Vectra. In fact, I would not put them in the back of anything that was not a nuclear bomb store. The fuses might not set off a nuclear weapon, but they might blow his Vectra back to the future.

Eight months for removing the warheads is correct. They are kept separate and can be detached and taken somewhere else. As for it taking up to 25 years to relocate the facilities, all the analyses now available publicly in the “Nowhere to Go” document by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament show that there is nowhere for the weapons to be relocated. There was nowhere all those years ago that was thought to be isolated and secure enough to install the nuclear weapons. Now, given the population changes in the conurbations around those areas, it is unlikely that anywhere would allow those weapons to be installed. The question of relocating them, therefore, could not be resolved unless there was some sort of dictatorship of Government on the people in the UK. Certainly, the idea of putting them in Wales or Northern Ireland would cause a massive uprising.

Should we even be thinking about moving the weapons somewhere else? It is a fantasy to think that in the event of a nuclear conflagration, Scotland would be safer having them somewhere else that was not Faslane or Coulport. Do we really think that an enemy of the UK would not want to bomb the establishments based in my constituency in Grangemouth, where the North sea oil and gas comes in, just because we put the weapons somewhere else? What are we going to do? Are we going to paint CND signs on the tops of all the buildings in Scotland? Let me own up to something. When I was leader of a council, we actually did put CND signs on our vans. Somebody pointed out that we should have put them on the roof because they could not be seen on the side of the vans, but we were young and foolish then. I have learned now that it is a nonsense to say that we are not part of the UK because we do not have the bomb any more and that if there were a conflagration we would be safe. I thought that the SNP Government and Alex Salmond, who is just about my age, had also grown up.

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[Pete Wishart]

I think the hon. Lady knows exactly why we are not taking our place on the Committee. We will not take up that place as long as the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Mr Davidson) remains in the Chair. Given the way our female member of the Committee was treated, we will not take up that place. The place is available, and we will come back to it, but not as long as the hon. Gentleman is in the Chair.

[Mr Davidson]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Davidson]

With the leave of this House, this has been a very good debate. There has been a very good turnout. I am particularly happy that the Select Committee report seems to have been universally welcomed. That will certainly gladden the members of the Committee and, indeed, the staff who worked with us in its preparation. I particularly enjoyed the fierce attack on the Scottish Affairs Committee that was made by one of the separatists at the same time as they were welcoming the report—no problem there, then.

It is only fair at this stage to make it absolutely clear that the proposal that “The Referendum on Separation for Scotland” would be the wording of the heading for our series of reports was unanimously agreed by the Committee in a meeting at which the SNP was present. The SNP member of the Committee did agree that wording. She subsequently got a row from her colleagues and then produced a press statement, which led to her being rebuked for misbehaviour by the other members of the Committee, but she did agree that wording. It was alleged that we were too hard in rebuking her. Let me make it clear that there were 14 witnesses in that Committee, not one of whom corroborates the version of events given by the SNP. It is worth while just making that point clear.

I will move on, and I hope that the SNP will also move on from the politics of smear and character assassination and stop trying to play the man and not the ball. I am glad that for at least some of the SNP’s contribution, Members engaged in the debate and were prepared to argue on the issues, because I think that the discussions that we have had today have moved the debate forward quite considerably. I think that there is recognition on all sides that the parameters that we have spelt out in our report are universally accepted—that that is the area that the debate will focus on in terms of timing. We have had a clear indication from the SNP about its position in relation to those. It has not been absolutely explicit, but nor, to be fair, have the UK Government yet.

It seems to me that we are now in a position in which, having established, as a result of this report and subsequent discussions, what the alternatives are on timing, we are also pretty clear on where one of the parameters is in terms of jobs. The shop stewards told us earlier today about the 50 years of job security with the United Kingdom. There are 6,700 jobs, rising to 8,200 jobs, with the UK. But with separation, the position is unknown. In those circumstances, we as a Committee will be, on both this occasion and others, drawing attention to what appears to be a complete vacuum of policy from the SNP on the question of defence. That cannot continue. We owe it not only to the people of Scotland, who are going to vote in about October 2014, but to the work force, who require warning of what might happen to their jobs and the ability to plan. We cannot surprise them with a decision one day that something is going to happen the next. If they wish to leave their employment, as a result of cuts coming down the road, to seek a job elsewhere, they need time to prepare. Their children are at school. They need to start deciding whether it is desirable or necessary to find a job somewhere else. Family ties will be disrupted by job losses.

I want to close by saying to the Government that I hope they will also do as much as they can to clarify the position. I saw one of the other Defence Ministers here earlier. I hope that both Ministers will take account of the report we produced on separation shutting shipyards and be clear about their intentions for placing orders for the Type 26 between now and the referendum. If they cannot be clear, or if they wish to say that no orders will be placed before the referendum, they need to indicate what will be done to ensure that yards remain open between now and then. The yards engaged in building aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy are fast running out of work and might not be there to build the Type 26, even if Scotland remains within the United Kingdom, unless they are given fill-in work.

The question is what will happen not only to Faslane and Coulport, which we have heard about today, but to Scotland’s shipyards and, as we intend to show in other reports that the Committee will produce shortly, every other industrial site in Scotland that is connected to defence. All those questions require answering. I hope that I and other members of the Committee and its staff can bring out reports in the future that will be greeted with universal acclaim similar to that which greeted this report, and that we will have similarly fruitful debates.

We are moving towards one of the major decisions to be taken in the life of every Scot here and elsewhere. Full debate is essential. If the separatists wish to have an open debate, they must provide answers. The Committee has identified the areas that require clarification; it is now up to them to fill the gaps. Thank you, Mr Rosindell.

Question put and agreed to.