Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Neil O'Brien Excerpts

Friday 16th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

I rise to speak to amendments 18, 30, 31, 17 and 32, which stand in my name.

I will start with amendment 18. Many moral arguments on the need for the Bill have been proposed both inside and outside this place. Some of those arguments have addressed the desire for greater control at the end of life, but the vast majority have focused on the prevention of irreversible suffering. The principle of bodily autonomy—which I strongly support in the context of full decision-making capacity, with certain important caveats—is used to justify the rights that the Bill will grant. However, let us put aside the debate surrounding the Bill and focus on the text of the clauses, which is the task that we face on Report.

The provisions are silent on suffering, silent on control and silent on all but a terminal illness with a prognosis of fewer than six months. If the principle is that we must prevent irreversible suffering, all those suffering irreversibly should be able to seek physician-assisted suicide. If the principle is that we should give people control—another level of expression of bodily autonomy—all adults who truly and freely consent with full decision-making capacity should be able to seek physician-assisted suicide. If those principles are circumscribed to an arbitrary definition of “terminal illness”, the inexorable conclusion must be that those patients’ suffering or autonomy are more important than those of others, or that their lives have less value. We have seen that position subtly imported into this debate. When requesting an assisted death is not framed as suicide because some perceive it as understandable, the underlying argument is, “If you’re terminally ill, of course you want to die—that’s understandable.”

We must ensure that we do not, by accident or otherwise, enshrine in our statute book value judgments on the worth of the lives of the terminally ill or on the protections that they should enjoy like everyone else. I tabled amendment 18 to expand the scope of the Bill as much as I can to reduce the discrimination inherent within it. The maximum I could do was to remove the six-month restriction, but I wish the amendment could go further. I know that some Members will wince at this provision, but I ask them to ask themselves what the principles and values in the Bill are, how they are being applied and whether they are being applied equally. I believe that the Bill as drafted is incoherent and discriminatory. My amendment would introduce some moral clarity to the Bill. If we do not do so, the courts will.

I turn to amendments 30 and 31. If we are to rely on the principle of autonomy to authorise physician-assisted suicide for terminal illness, the expressed choice must be true and free. Autonomy needs help, though. A true and free choice needs to be informed; a true and free choice cannot be made under coercion; a true and free choice requires decision-making capacity. I believe that, if we are to rely on the principle of autonomy for the most grave of decisions, there needs to actually be a choice. In the absence of relevant and available palliative care options, where is the choice? How can we rely on autonomy in the absence of choice? The prospect of people choosing physician-assisted suicide not because it meets their needs, but because their needs are unmet owing to a failure in the provision of palliative care, is a moral outrage. My amendments 30 and 31 would ensure that that does not happen.

[Neil O’Brien (Harborough, Oadby and Wigston) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Dr Spencer]

I am sorry but I really cannot, given the time restrictions.

Amendment 17 pertains to the test of decision-making capacity. In English and Welsh law, we use the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to define capacity, and I believe it is right that the functional test of capacity is used in this Bill. We have common law tests of capacity in some circumstances, which arose before we had the Mental Capacity Act. However, the decision to end one’s own life was not permitted in the early case law leading up to that Act. There is no jurisprudence background or guidance. These capacity tests have not been done before. This test needs a bit more of a framework of support.

Amendment 17 lays out the minimum information that needs to be understood as part of the functional test of capacity. Critically, that would include information about the current treatment options, about doing nothing and about proceeding under this legislation. It would make clear that physician-assisted suicide is not a medical treatment, but a personal choice about life and death. Without amendment 17, this Bill will fundamentally undermine the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors do not prescribe death, and this Bill must make that clear.

I turn finally to my amendment 32. There has been some discussion about the inadequacies of the decision-making capacity test as gatekeeper. In effect, there may be circumstances in which, despite having capacity, the person is otherwise recognised as vulnerable. That is how our courts operate. The impact of depression or personality disorder on decision-making capacity can be subtle and elusive. I know, as I used to be a consultant liaison psychiatrist and did research in the area of decision-making capacity. This is tricky stuff to do, especially in the context of a request for an intervention, rather than a refusal.

We should have trained psychiatrists at an early stage assessing capacity. They are expert at picking up these subtle cues and all the other stuff that is going on. A request for physician-assisted suicide should not be taken in isolation, and that needs to be understood and supported. We need someone who knows how to use the Mental Health Act, because if a doctor is doing the assessment, and they have a patient in front of them with a mental disorder, expressing a desire to end their life, they need to make sure that that patient gets the right and appropriate treatment. That may well be using the Mental Health Act. We need to make sure that this happens; I hope it would happen as part of the process as usual, but there is no safeguard in the Bill to make sure that it does. Psychiatrists turning up on the panel at the end is not good enough; they need to be there from the start.

Finally, there are broader issues about the interaction with protections to save life, article 2, and a doctor’s duties. I will cover those in the debate on the second grouping, along with the incredible importance of the Bill’s interaction with the suicide prevention strategy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 87, which stands in my name, and in support of various amendments tabled by other Members and also signed by me.

Prior to this legislation being laid before the House, I had not held strong feelings about the issue of assisted dying. I listened carefully to the arguments on both sides, including those of the many constituents who wrote to me on the issue, before deciding to vote against the Bill on Second Reading. I made my mind up very late in the day. I continue to be appreciative and respectful of the reasons why people are in favour, but, for me, the fundamental question was whether we were putting vulnerable people at risk by passing this legislation. I resolved that, on balance, we were.

The lead Member, the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater), was keen to reflect the balance of opinion across the House, as well as within parties, in the make-up of the Bill Committee, and I was happy to volunteer as the sole Liberal Democrat “no” voter, as a service to my party and to the House. It was a privilege to serve on the Committee, and I wish to put on the record my admiration and respect to all Members, Ministers, Chairs and House staff who served alongside me, and my thanks to the many witnesses who gave oral and written evidence on which we came to rely.

I regret to say, however, that my experience in Committee has only hardened my opposition to the Bill. My opposition is not rooted in a fundamental objection to the principle of assisted dying, but in the approach taken to framing the legislation.

Amendment 87 seeks to tighten up the arrangement around the first declaration, to rule out the possibility of “doctor shopping”. In oral evidence we heard from the chief medical officer, Professor Sir Chris Whitty, that a diagnosis of terminal illness and a prognosis of life expectancy cannot always be made with a high degree of accuracy and that a degree of professional judgment is required on behalf of the co-ordinating doctor, which can result in differences of diagnosis and prognosis.

That was backed up by the Royal College of Physicians this week, whose spokesperson was quoted in The Times saying that it is “extremely hard to tell” if somebody has only six months left to live. My amendment seeks to establish whether the patient has already sought and been refused permission to seek an assisted death so that the co-ordinating doctor can consider the reasons for the first refusal and whether the patient’s circumstances have materially changed since that time.

[Neil O’Brien]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Sarah Olney]

I will not; I am sorry.

The amendment would help to inform the clinical judgment that will need to be made in each individual case and discourage patients from applying to multiple doctors for an assessment.

I am proud to support amendment 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford (Daniel Francis), which would disapply the presumption in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 that a person has capacity unless the opposite is established. There was a great deal of debate in Committee about the efficacy of the Mental Capacity Act and whether its provisions were sufficient to establish an individual’s capacity to make an informed decision about whether to seek an assisted death. The hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford spoke compellingly in Committee about his experiences of how the Act is not always applied effectively. I am glad that the whole House has had an opportunity to hear him today.

The Royal College of Psychiatrists cited the insufficiency of the Mental Capacity Act as one of its nine reasons for opposing the Bill earlier in the week. It said:

“The Mental Capacity Act was created to safeguard and support people who do not have the capacity to make decisions about their care or treatment or matters like finances. Should the Bill become law in England and Wales, implications for both the Mental Capacity Act and Mental Health Act need to be considered.”

I also support new clauses 1 and 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), which would prohibit health professionals from raising the subject of assisted dying with a patient. It is my personal belief that people’s rights to pain relief and palliative care towards a natural end should be prioritised above an assisted dying pathway, and that that should be made available only as the result of a specific request. It is particularly important that young people under the age of 18 should not be thinking about assisted dying as an alternative to continued treatment or palliative care.

I was disappointed that during Committee my proposed amendments to safeguard people suffering from eating disorders were rejected. Eating disorders are primarily a mental health condition but have an obvious physical impact, and there is a severe risk that the physical impact of an eating disorder can be diagnosed as a terminal illness, when in fact eating disorders are always treatable. We cannot allow vulnerable sufferers from eating disorders to elect for an assisted death when there remains the possibility of a full recovery and the chance of a happy and fulfilling future. That is why I support amendment 14, in the name of the hon. Member for Bradford West (Naz Shah), who was such an articulate member of the Bill Committee. I was glad to hear that the lead Member, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, will adopt that amendment; I look forward to seeing the further drafting.

I also support amendment 16, tabled by the hon. Member for Vauxhall and Camberwell Green (Florence Eshalomi). I welcome the lead Member’s new clause 10, which extends the right to refuse to participate in assisted dying to any person, but it is important also to extend that right to organisations such as hospices and care homes. Assisted dying undermines those institutions’ mission and purpose, and they should have the right to refuse to provide it on their premises if they do not wish to participate in it.

Finally, I will speak in favour of amendment 22, tabled by the name of the hon. Member for Shipley (Anna Dixon). There is insufficient provision in the legislation to identify and seek to ameliorate mental health conditions or other factors that may lead people to seek a premature end to their life, which they would not seek if those factors were addressed. Every time a person seeks to end their life prematurely is deeply regrettable, and we have a duty to explore whether preventable factors could be addressed before a request for assisted dying is granted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

As I said, I recognise that the Bill is of greater significance than a typical private Member’s Bill, but it has been delivered through the normal procedures of the House, and it is for the House as a whole to make those changes.

[Neil O'Brien]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Sir John Hayes]

rose—

[Dr Mullan]

Not on that point.

We may wish to reflect on how we might change our approach to Bills like this one in the future, given the significant dissatisfaction that has been expressed with the manner in which it has been considered, even though it has been done in the ordinary way. But we are where we are.

As on Second Reading, this debate has been a balancing exercise. The promoter of the Bill and others have appropriately reminded us all of the very difficult and tragic experiences faced by the terminally ill and their families, but I respectfully say to the hon. Member for Spen Valley that we should be cautious in saying that opponents of the Bill are happy with the status quo, and I know that she would not have meant to suggest that.

[Neil O'Brien]

I am one of those people who is against the Bill, not in principle but for the reasons set out brilliantly by many articulate Labour Members. When my constituents ask what I think about this, I have no way of telling them; there is no way for me to get into the nuance of my position on it, because there has been no time to have a proper debate, and so many Members will now be unable to say a single thing about this totally transformative Bill.

[Dr Mullan]

My hon. Friend has added his concerns to those of others about the manner in which the debate has been conducted, but I reiterate that this has been done in the ordinary manner in terms of the Speaker’s discretion and the Standing Orders of the House.

Opponents of the Bill are concerned that it will lead to a different set of unacceptable circumstances for different people; it is not that they are happy with how things are at the moment. All MPs have talked about people they care deeply about and how to help them. Whether they referred to disabled people, young people or the terminally ill, MPs have been speaking out in support of or against amendments, out of concern and compassion.

I may be tempting fate in saying that we might find consensus on advertising restrictions, but outside of that, Members have undoubtedly expressed a variety of strong views on others’ amendments. It may be that Members vote consistently in line with whether they were originally for or against assisted dying, but other Members who are supportive of the Bill in principle are voting for restrictive amendments because they think that they are necessary. That is because this is a complex moral, legal and societal matter. I understand that Members are considering their votes with a degree of uncertainty.

There should be no shame at all in Members’ admitting that they will be daunted by the sheer number of potential changes to the Bill, not to mention the decisions from the Speaker on those we are going to vote on or the challenge of deciding how to vote on each of them, either today or on a future day.