Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting)

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you today, Ms McVey. We recommence our consideration of the small pots part of the Bill. I thank all Members for their engagement during the sittings last week.

Clause 27 is fundamental. It allows regulations to be made to create an authorisation and supervisory framework for pension schemes to become authorised consolidators. This framework will allow master trusts to apply to the Pensions Regulator to become authorised, on the basis that they meet certain conditions and standards, including the value for money test we discussed at length last Thursday.

The clause also ensures ongoing oversight. If a scheme no longer meets the standards, regulations can enable the Pensions Regulator to step in to require the trustees to take prescribed steps and, ultimately, to withdraw authorisation if necessary. That ensures better outcomes, not just fewer pension pots. The clause represents a vital safeguard in the small pots framework.

Clause 28 provides a definition of a “consolidator scheme” and “consolidator arrangement”. A “consolidator scheme” can either be an authorised master trust or a Financial Conduct Authority-regulated pension scheme that appears on a designated list published by the FCA. A “consolidator arrangement” refers to a specific part of the scheme that is intended to receive small pots.

This reflects the structure of pension providers that operate in the UK. Some pension providers offer multiple arrangements within their scheme whereas others may have a single arrangement or offering. The clause caters for both scenarios to ensure that regulators can focus on the particular arrangements that will require authorisation.

To simplify: in practice, all schemes will be authorised by specific arrangement, but there will be some occasions where schemes may only have a single arrangement so the whole scheme will be authorised. By having at least one authorised arrangement, schemes or providers will be authorised consolidators.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

This is a very uncontentious and highly technical part of the Bill. We have no objections to any of these provisions and so will be supporting them.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, I echo that this is a direction of travel that we welcome. The vast majority of the proposals that are before us today are uncontentious. They follow the correct direction of travel in growth and change that we want to see in our pensions system in the United Kingdom.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Further provision about contents of small pots regulations

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 29 will make the small pot consolidation framework work in practice, through allowing the small pots regulations to cover a range of operational, administrative, data protection and consumer protection matters. It enables the Pensions Regulator to charge a fee for authorisation and gives applicants the right to appeal if their application is refused. Regulations will be able to require trustees and scheme managers to maintain and improve records, and they will protect members from high transfer fees. The clause enables the delegation of functions and powers to the Pensions Regulator, the FCA and the small pots data platform operator. It ensures that data protection and privacy obligations are respected, while allowing necessary data processing to support the scheme’s efficient operation.

The clause will allow the Government to amend existing legislation to support the small pots consolidation framework. Examples of uses of the power include giving the Pensions Ombudsman new powers to investigate member complaints, and ensuring that the small pots data platform is properly funded through the general levy. Pensions law is complex and technical, and needs to evolve with time, so the Government need the flexibility to respond to those changes and regulators’ operational experience without having to table a new Bill every time.

The Bill clearly sets out the multiple default consolidator framework. With targeted amendments, the clause will allow us to fine-tune the framework over time, ensuring operational effectiveness. Any use of so-called Henry VIII powers will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The clause is essential for the practicality, reliability and integrity of the small pots consolidation framework to ensure it is fit for purpose now and for the future.

The Government amendments to the clause are purely technical drafting improvements. Amendment 36 clarifies that appeal rights for schemes are not limited solely to decisions regarding an application for authorisation, so one could appeal on other grounds. Amendment 37 provides further clarity on the liability framework that will be established to ensure that members are protected. It makes it clear that the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme can be made responsible for paying compensation to an individual who has suffered a loss as a result of a breach of the small pots regulations. Amendments 38 to 40 take account of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, which was passed by Parliament subsequent to the introduction of this Bill. The amendments do not alter the policy, and I ask the Committee to support them.

[Mark Garnier]

Again, this is all very technical and rather dry.

[Torsten Bell]

It’s very exciting!

[Mark Garnier]

Perhaps it is exciting for those who enjoy dry reading. We in the Opposition have no objections.

Amendment 36 agreed to.

Amendments made: 37, in clause 29, page 27, line 30, leave out—

“a relevant person, other than the FCA,”

and insert—

“the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme”.

This amendment ensures that the FCA cannot be required to pay compensation under small pots regulations.

Amendment 38, in clause 29, page 27, line 39, leave out “Subject to subsection (4),”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.

Amendment 39, in clause 29, page 28, line 3, leave out subsection (4).

This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.

Amendment 40, in clause 29, page 28, leave out lines 8 and 9.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.

Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Enforcement by the Pensions Regulator

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 41.

Clause 31 stand part.

Government amendment 42.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 30 seeks to ensure that the rules and conditions set by the regulations are, in practice, followed. These regulations can allow the Pensions Regulator to issue three types of notices: a compliance notice, requiring a person to take specific steps to comply; a third-party compliance notice, directing someone to ensure another party’s compliance; and a penalty notice, imposing a financial penalty for non-compliance or a breach of the regulations. If a scheme fails to comply with the regulations or with a notice issued under them, the Pensions Regulator can impose a financial penalty capped at £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 in other cases. The clause also enables regulations to provide for appeals to the first-tier or upper tribunal, ensuring procedural fairness and accountability. All those are standard approaches to pensions legislation.

Clause 31 gives the Treasury the power to make regulations to enable the FCA to monitor and enforce compliance with the small pots consolidation framework for contract-based schemes. It ensures that the FCA can act decisively to protect consumers and uphold the integrity of the system. Clauses 30 and 31 ensure consistent standards across the pensions market as we look to enforce these measures. Any regulations made under clause 31 must go through the affirmative procedure, ensuring parliamentary oversight.

Amendments 41 and 42 seek to clarify the definition of the term “FCA regulated” when referring to an authorised person in the context of the legislation. The amendments seek to provide greater clarity by ensuring harmony and removing any ambiguity between clause 30(1) and clauses 31 and 34. They ensure that the Pensions Regulator is not inadvertently prevented from regulating a trustee of a pension scheme solely because that trustee is also regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in a separate capacity. The amendments are purely technical clarifications, and I ask the Committee to support them. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

Again, I have no real comments, apart from to ask the Minister, perhaps when winding up, if he could explain how the Government came to the penalty levels of £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 for others. It would be useful to understand what the thinking was behind that.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

My question was not dissimilar to the shadow Minister’s question on the amounts of the penalties—£10,000 for an individual and £100,000 in any other case. There is no delegated authority to raise it beyond those levels. There is an ability to set the amounts, provided they do not go above those. Would the process have to be in primary legislation should the Government wish to raise it above those levels? I am not generally in favour of a level of delegated authority, but if we end up in a situation where inflation is out of control, £10,000 may not seem a significant amount for an individual and £100,000 may not seem significant for a larger organisation. They may not be enough to prevent people or create the level of disincentive we wish to see. Have the Government looked at whether £10,000 and £100,000 are the right amounts?

On the clarification about FCA regulation, and the fact that if somebody is FCA regulated in another capacity, it may stop them from being subject to this, it is absolutely sensible that the Government have tabled the amendments. I am happy to support the changes and the clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

The clause provides the flexibility, as I have just said, to increase or decrease the threshold without requiring new primary legislation, enabling the Government to move quickly and efficiently as developments—whether it be wage growth or changes in contribution patterns—change our pensions landscape. Under the clause, any change to the pot limit must always be approved by Parliament through the affirmative procedure, something that we also discussed last week.

The Government are committed to engaging with industry and consumer groups to ensure any adjustments are evidence-based and informed by the relevant data at the time, enabling us to consider wider impacts such as market competition. Under clause 32, the Secretary of State must undertake public consultation, publish details of the proposed amendments and the reasons for making the proposal, and consider any representations made—putting flesh on the bones on the kind of review that would take place, as we have just discussed.

New clause 36 seeks to introduce a new provision to the Bill, which would establish a “pot follows member” model for pension consolidation. The new clause proposes that, on changing employment, an individual’s pension pot would automatically transfer into their new workplace’s pension scheme. This proposal is not aligned with the Government’s established policy direction, and it would present significant practical and operational challenges, although I recognise that that approach has been discussed extensively over the last 20 years. The approach taken in the Bill has been shaped through extensive engagement and formal consultation with industry, regulators and consumer groups. As part of that policy development work, largely under the last Government, they and we carefully considered the “pot follows member” approach, including its potential benefits and risks. Our impact assessment shows that the multiple default consolidator solution in the Bill is projected to deliver greater net benefits. The evidence in the impact assessment supports our view that that route offers the best value for savers and for the system as a whole.

New clause 36 would require a fundamental overhaul of the current framework that the Bill seeks to introduce. It is not consistent with the rest of the Bill. It would introduce a parallel mechanism that risks duplicating effort, creating confusion and undermining the coherence of the consolidation system. Two of its main downsides are significant administrative barriers for employers, if employees choose to opt out, and the risk that pots are transferred into schemes that offer poor value for money—or, at least, poorer value for money than the ones they are sitting in before they move between employers. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest not to press new clause 36.

Clause 33 makes it clear that the small dormant pots consolidation measures in this chapter apply equally to pension schemes run by or on behalf of the Crown and to Crown employees, as we have discussed previously. Clause 34 provides clear definitions for key terms used throughout the small pots legislation to ensure clarity and consistency of interpretation, and clause 35 provides a definition of what constitutes a pension pot. That might be thought to be straightforward, but for the purposes of small pots consolidation we want to provide clarity on the accurate identification and treatment of individual pension pots. To provide an example, if someone is enrolled into the same pension scheme through more than one job and the scheme keeps the accounts separate, each is treated as a separate pension pot so that they can be consolidated together.

As Members will be aware, the Pensions Regulator oversees the trust-based schemes and the Financial Conduct Authority oversees contract-based schemes. Clause 36 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to ensure that the FCA has the powers required to support the small pots consolidation framework through the existing financial regulatory system. This is a vital enabling provision to provide the FCA with the necessary statutory powers to regulate contract-based schemes that wish to act as authorised consolidators in the years ahead. It allows the FCA to make rules requiring pension providers to notify them if they intend to act as a consolidator pension scheme, and it allows the FCA to maintain a list of consolidator schemes and to apply appropriate regulatory standards to them.

More broadly, clause 36 ensures that members of FCA-regulated pension schemes benefit from the same level of protection, transparency and accountability as those in the trust-based system, while also avoiding regulatory gaps and ensuring that all consolidator schemes, regardless of their structure or legal framework, are subject to robust oversight.

Consistent with my arguments on clause 36, clause 37 repeals unused provisions of the Pensions Act 2014 related to automatic transfers, also known as “pot follows member”. This is tidying up the statute book. It was the previous Government who initially legislated for “pot follows member”, but they then decided that that was not the policy they wished to pursue and moved away from it between 2014 and 2024. The amendment recognises that and makes sure we do not have powers on the statute book that confuse the situation.

Finally, Government amendment 43 is a minor and technical amendment necessitated by the repeal of schedule 17 to the Pensions Act 2014 by clause 37(1)(b) of the Bill. The amendment is necessary to update the statute book and clarify a reference in section 256 of the Pensions Act 2004, which otherwise would have been unclear and was making hon. Members nervous. The amendment does not alter policy, and I ask the Committee to support it. I commend clauses 32 to 37 to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I will speak to our new clause 36. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; I will come to those in a minute. The Government dropped plans for the lifetime provider or “pot for life” model, which would have allowed individuals to direct all workplace pension contributions into a single, personally chosen pension pot throughout their career. That was first proposed by the Conservative Government. Although we appreciate that the initial lifetime pot model has not had support from the current Government or, to be fair, from the industry, we believe there is much merit in exploring a model that would allow for pensions to follow individuals between jobs. The new clause would ensure that fragmented small pots are not left as workers move between jobs. By changing our current proposals from a lifetime pot to a magnetic pot proposal where the pot follows the individual, we hope we can bring down some of the administrative costs of the initial lifetime pot proposal.

Our new clause 36 will provide for a pension pot that would follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider. This approach could reduce fragmentation while retaining the advantages of employer oversight and collective governance. This would have similarities with the Australian system, where a person can staple to their first chosen pension provider so that it follows them from job to job. That helps to reduce the administrative burden on individuals and the number of small pots, and that can reduce costs for consumers and help the overall consolidation of the market. These changes have been backed by some in the industry, including Hargreaves Lansdown, which has said that having a single pot would simplify someone’s pension investment, bringing transparency and clarity. It has said that for those who move jobs frequently, a single pension pot would be invaluable.

The Minister made a couple of points. The first was about the substantial overhaul of the system to be able to deliver reform. Although I appreciate that this may be outside the scope of the Bill, we should not worry about substantial overhauls to make things better for people who are saving for their retirement. It is incredibly important that we get this right. Just because it is a lot of work does not necessarily mean it is a bad thing to do, so I urge him to think about it.

The Minister made a very important point: somebody could move from one job to another and find that their pension moves from a fund that offers good value for money and is performing well to a fund that is performing worse. But exactly the opposite is also the case. If somebody frequently changes jobs, the law of averages and statistics means that over their lifetime they will get the average rate, which means they do not get stuck in one or the other. One would cancel the other out—it is a maths problem.

The Minister has made his points. This is not something we want to press, but we feel very strongly that the Treasury and Treasury Ministers should think very carefully about it, because, as I say, hard work is not a reason not to do the right thing. There is much more support from the industry for the magnetic pot rather than the lifetime pot, which stays with one provider.

[Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. As a proud Englishman, it is not often that I admit the Australians are better than us at something. I am talking not about cricket, but about the immensely important issue of pensions adequacy. The Australians do it better, and what underpins their success is the super stapling model, a system that fundamentally changes how savers interact with their pensions. That is why our new clause 36 seeks to follow in Australian footsteps by establishing a model that would automatically amalgamate pension pots through an individual’s working life. Although I recognise and commend the Government’s work on small pot consolidation, I believe that real engagement and adequacy benefit lies in moving towards a lifetime pension pot model. It is a bolder, more engaging and more adequate model that would benefit pension funds and savers alike.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

It was self-professed weak patriotism. But the hon. Gentleman is completely right to raise the adequacy issue, which is obviously the role of the Pensions Commission, launched in July, to take forward. He and several others are also right to say that making things easier for savers is a really important objective. That is what the pensions dashboard aims to do in the coming years as well.

Let me make a set of reflections directly on the question being raised. To be clear, the policy in 2014 was “pot follows member”. That is also the policy within new clause 36. The policy being more supported here is a lifetime pot, which is a different policy. The “pot follows member” is still that the employer chooses the pension scheme and the pot moves to the new employer’s scheme as the employee goes, so it is still an employer-to-a-single-scheme model. The lifetime provider model, also advocated by many in the industry but never part of Government policy—it was not in the 2014 Act—is that each individual holds a pension pot, and, on joining an employer, provides the details of that scheme to the employer, and the employer then pays to multiple pension schemes whenever it does its PAYE.

The comments I made refer to the “pot follows member” approach. There is a consensus across the industry that that is not the right way to go; I totally hear the points made in favour of a lifetime provider model. That is not the approach being taken forward by this Bill, but it needs to be kept under review in the longer term. I give hon. Members the reassurance that I will continue to do that.

[Mark Garnier]

I think the Minister has got this the wrong way round. It was the lifetime pot, which was being paid into as people went around, that the industry did not like, because that was administratively quite difficult. The stapled pot—stapled to the lapel, or whatever, to be dragged around like the Australian one—is what we are proposing this time round, which is the new version that the industry does agree with. I think the Minister might have got his notes upside down.

[Torsten Bell]

Never! No. We should clarify what we mean by “industry”: in a lifetime provider model, employers take on a significantly greater administrative burden, because they have to engage with potentially every pension scheme in the country. Admittedly, we are limiting the number of those in future, but still, that is what employers find burdensome about a lifetime provider model. That was the preferred model of the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) when he was Chancellor, but it was never actioned as Government policy.

As I said before, the 2014 Act was about “pot follows member”—for good reason, to try to address the small pots worry. I hope that that at least reassures the hon. Gentleman that my notes were the right way up.

--- Later in debate ---

Other amendments are more general, ensuring that the legal wiring works between different parts of the legislation, improving legal language or removing any language that is unnecessary. I commend these technical amendments to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I would like to speak to the wider clause before coming to our amendments. It is important to get on the record that this is a very bad clause. The Minister mentioned asset allocation, and this measure, which is known as mandation, has gone down incredibly badly with the pensions industry.

Mandation risks undermining the core obligation of trustees, which is to act in the best interests of savers. Pension savings reflect decades of work and are not an abstract figure on a balance sheet—they are the hope of a secure future for millions of people. Trustees and fund managers bear a legal responsibility to protect and grow these savings, investing wisely where the best opportunities may be found. Their role is not to follow political direction but to uphold the trust placed in them and the fiduciary duty they owe, which is the foundation of confidence in the pension system.

As has been said in multiple responses to the Bill, clause 38 as currently written undermines the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment. When trustees select investments, they must find the safest and strongest options for beneficiaries. Can we even be confident that the Government will be able to provide a pipeline of investment opportunities? Pension funds could end up being forced to fight against each other for a selection of low-performing assets. If these powers are used, it changes accountability. If mandated investments fail, is it the trustees or the Government who should answer for those losses? Savers deserve clarity about who ultimately protects their hard-earned pension pots.

It has been said that this merely provides the powers to do mandation and does not necessarily force firms to do this, but I will come to that later. Our amendment 275 highlights the fact that there is a political party, whose Members are not in attendance here, which has already said that if it gets into government—and, let’s face it, it has a fighting chance—it will mandate pension funds to invest in the UK water industry in order to support the Government renationalising the UK water industry.

I would like to highlight some of the issues that have been raised. The Pensions Management Institute has said:

“this provision sets a dangerous precedence for Government interference in the fiduciary duty of trustees to act in members’ best financial interests.”

Pensions UK has said:

“this ambition is subject to fiduciary duties and is dependent on supporting actions by Government, namely that there will need to be a strong pipeline of investable UK assets. Without this, schemes will be competing against each other for the same assets, which risks asset bubbles and poor value for money.”

The Investment Association has said:

“It comes with significant risks for members in the form of capital being poorly allocated if political preferences take priority over member needs. Any resulting poor investment outcomes will be borne by the member. By creating the risk of political interference in capital allocation, the power undermines the UK’s global reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment”.

Which? has said that this measure

“may result in schemes making worse or riskier investment decisions that may not be in the best long-term financial interests of savers.”

Aviva has said:

“as currently drafted in Section 28C, the power in the Bill goes far beyond this policy intent and the scope of the Accord, with very limited constraints on how, and under what circumstances, the requirements could be introduced.”

The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has said:

“We are concerned about the introduction of investment mandation powers, and potential interference of those powers—or their threatened use—with trustees’ fiduciary duties.”

Unison has said:

“We have significant concerns about these clauses. Fiduciaries are best placed to set the correct balance between asset classes, and equities have liquidity, governance, transparency of pricing, equality of treatment between investors, and other advantages for pension funds.”

Finally, the Association of British Insurers said:

“A mandation reserve power would undermine trust in the pension system and create a risk of political interference in capital allocation, which would undermine the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment.”

I understand that this is a reserve power of mandation, but it sets a very bad precedent, so we will oppose the clause.

[The Chair]

Do you wish to speak to the specific, technical amendments?

[Mark Garnier]

We have no objection to the technical amendments, but we will oppose the whole clause.

[Steve Darling]

We have no issue with the technical amendments. However, for us the crucial issue in the Bill is driving an environment of positive investment, and a system in the United Kingdom that individual investors—as in, would-be pensioners—can believe in.

The mandation element causes concern. As has been alluded to, there are assumptions that Ministers are reasonable people; however, we do not have to look that far across the Atlantic ocean to see politicians behaving unreasonably. It concerns us as Liberal Democrats that giving powers in the Bill without clear management of them is potentially a step too far. While the Minister, and other Ministers in the current Government, may be reasonable, who knows what is coming down the line in a very turbulent political system?

We therefore continue to have grave concerns around mandation, and look forward to hearing what assurances the Minister is able to give. The key outcome for us is making sure that there is a stable pensions system in which people can have confidence, because confidence is crucial for driving the positive investment that I am sure everybody in this room wants to see.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I offer reassurance, as we will shortly come to the end of the amendments for substantive debate.

This group of amendments deals with the main scale default arrangement, along with the scale test and penalties. The MSDA is the pool of investments against which scale will be assessed. As I mentioned, the definition of that is obviously central to the effective enforcement of the scale requirements.

Key among these amendments are Government amendments 72 and 91, which set out some of the details of the MSDA for master trusts and group personal pensions, including that it can be used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and that the assets held within it are those of members who have not chosen how they are invested. Regulations will be made that cover other matters, including the meaning of “common investment strategy”. The details we set out in these amendments reflect the invaluable input we received from pension providers and regulatory bodies.

The remaining amendments in the group relating to the MSDA largely clarify how it fits into the wider approval requirements in the new sections 28A and 28B.

Moving on to scale, Government amendments 69 and 85 clarify the circumstances in which assets held by connected master trusts and group personal pension schemes, or where the same provider runs a GPP and master trust, can count towards the scale test. This is to ensure that, where appropriate, assets managed under a common investment strategy where there is a family connection between the master trust and GPP scheme, and where they are used for the same purpose, can be added together to achieve the £25 billion requirement.

Government amendment 71 ensures that the provisions governing penalties are consistent between the TPR and the FCA. Government amendment 90 ensures that regulations can provide for appeals to the tribunal in respect of penalties under regulations under new section 28C(9)(c).

Amendment 63 agreed to.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 250, in clause 38, page 37, line 12, at end insert

“or

(c) the relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 251, in clause 38, page 37, line 16, at end insert—

“(3A) A relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement if the Trust can demonstrate that it provides specialist or innovative services.

(3B) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for a definition of ‘specialist or innovative services’ for the purposes of this section.”

Amendment 252, in clause 38, page 39, line 11, at end insert

“or

(c) the relevant GPP meets the innovation exemption requirement.”

Amendment 253, in clause 38, page 39, line 15, at end insert—

“(3A) A relevant GPP meets the innovation exemption requirement if the Trust can demonstrate that it provides specialist or innovative services.

(3B) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for a definition of ‘specialist or innovative services’ for the purposes of this section.”

Amendments 250, 251, 252 and 253 create an innovation exemption for pension funds that provide specialist or innovative services, as part of the new entrants clause.

[Mark Garnier]

The Bill sets a minimum asset threshold of £25 billion for workplace pension schemes to operate as megafunds by 2030. This is not, in itself, particularly controversial, and we are all fully aware of the arguments about scale being effective when running pension funds. The requirement is intended to drive consolidation, improve economies of scale and boost investment in UK assets, but there is concern that such a high threshold could disadvantage boutique or niche funds or new entrants into the market that provide specialist services to cater for financially literate members who prefer a more tailored approach to their pension management. For example, Hargreaves Lansdown has highlighted that its £5 billion fund serves members who value investment autonomy and expertise. The risk is that the policy could reduce competition, limit consumer choice and stifle innovation by making it harder for smaller, specialist providers to operate or enter the market

Clause 38 provides little detail of the meaning of the “ability to innovate” and how “strong potential for growth” will be measured, but it is essential that the Bill provides a credible route to support innovation. If we tie the pensions market up by restricting it to a handful of large providers focused on back-book integration and building scale, there will be less space for innovation aimed at pension member engagement. The benefit of the existing market is that its diversity provides choice and creates competition, and competition is an important part of this. Smaller schemes are chosen by employers for specific reasons. If we lose that diversity and essentially create a handful of the same scheme propositions, employers and members will lose out on this benefit.

Realistically, it will be extremely challenging for new entrants to the market to have a chance of building the required scale. Our amendments create an innovation exemption for pension funds that provide specialist or innovative services as part of the new entrants clause. This will allow boutique or niche providers to continue operating if they demonstrate diversity in the market or serve a specific member need, even if they do not meet the £25 billion threshold.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Amendments 250 to 253, as well as Government amendment 113, which we will discuss later, clarify the word “innovation” and look at how best to define it. There are two different approaches from the Government and the Opposition to what innovation means. I raised the issue of defining innovation on Second Reading, so I am glad that both parties are trying to clarify it here, but I am not entirely happy with the way in which the Government have chosen to do so.

When we come to Government amendment 113, I do not feel that the chosen definition of “innovative products” is necessarily right. There could be a way of working that is innovative not in the product but in the way people access the product. For example, some of the challenger banks that we have had coming up are not necessarily providing innovative products, but they provide innovative ways to access those products, and in some cases, their pitch is that they provide a better interface for people to use. I think there is potentially a niche in the market for innovative services rather than innovative products. Government amendment 113 perhaps ties too much to products, although it depends on what the definition of “products” is.

Obviously regulations will come in behind this that define “innovative”, but I think the pitch made by the Opposition for the addition of “or specialist” is helpful. “Innovative” suggests that it may be something new, whereas there could be specialist services that are not of that size but are specific to certain groups of people who value the service they are receiving, one that is very specific to their circumstances, and who would prefer that operation to keep running and to keep having access to it because of the specialist service that is provided.

I am concerned about Government amendment 113. My views are perhaps closer to the Conservatives’ amendment, but thinking particularly about services rather than the products, and the way in which the services are provided to people and the fact that there could be innovation in that respect. Also, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said, there could be particular niche areas that do not need to be that size in order to provide a truly excellent service to perhaps a small group of people. It depends on how the Government define “innovative” and what the regulations may look like this, but I am inclined to support the Conservatives’ amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

I am not entirely happy with the Minister’s comments. I am slightly surprised, and I thought he might have listened a bit more carefully. We absolutely understand the economies of scale. A large, £25 billion pension fund can do amazing things. We are 100% behind that. We have not disagreed with that at all. However, I somehow feel myself listening to the Minister and hearing the reverse of the arguments we were making as we tried to allow new-entrant banks into the market after the financial crisis.

Those of a certain age—and the Minister turned 43 the other day, so he will remember the financial crisis—know that the problem was that a few very big banks were spreading the contagion. I remember being on the Treasury Committee and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards after the financial crisis, when we were trying to sort out Labour’s previous mess, and not a single ab initio banking licence had been issued for 100 years. The only way that companies could get into the banking market—as Virgin and Metro were doing—was by buying dormant banking licences. I remember having long conversations—successfully, as it turned out—in order to try to allow companies such as Starling into the market. I think that Starling received the first ab initio banking licence for 100 years.

Having learned over the past 10 or 15 years about the effects of having large scale only, we are now having an argument about potentially stifling the pensions equivalent of companies such as Starling, Metro, Revolut and other innovators coming into the pensions market. I was hoping that from debating the amendments I could be convinced that the Minister would take away the thinking behind what we have come up with: that innovation should be good, and that there should permanently be new, fresh blood coming through. However, I do not think that he has got it. I was not going to push the amendments to a vote, but I now feel motivated to do so.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to make a brief comment about the definition of “specialist”. I appreciate the Minister’s clarification about the default products provided, but there could be a sensible definition of “specialist” that included, for example, that if providers can demonstrate that over 75% of their members engage in the management of their pension fund every year, that would be a very specialist and well-liked service. I understand that the scale is incredibly important. However, if a provider can demonstrate that level of engagement in its pension scheme, because of its innovative product or service, I think it would be sensible to look at the scale requirements, even if that provider does not yet meet them.

The Opposition have kindly left it up to the Minister and the Government to define what “specialist” would be, so I will support the Opposition amendments on that matter. However, when we come to Government amendment 113, I will require some clarification from the Minister about the definition of “products”.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 10

Ayes: 6

Noes: 8

[Mark Garnier]

On a point of order, Ms McVey. Might it be easier, for brevity, if we vote on amendments 251 to 253 together?

[The Chair]

The amendments are consequential on amendment 250, so I cannot do that. I will now suspend the sitting while we consider how and whether to meet the hon. Gentleman’s request.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I will be brief. The link between the definition of a main scale default arrangement and the common investment strategy is key to ensuring that the scale requirements apply to the correct elements of a pension scheme. Amendments 70 and 84 provide more detail on how the power to define a common investment strategy may be used to provide further information on the Government’s meaning when referring to that term.

Amendment 97 removes the “common investment strategy” element from the definition of default funds to avoid confusion with how that term is used in the main scale default arrangement approval in new sections 28A and 28B. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 70 agreed to.

Amendments made: 71 in clause 38, page 38, leave out lines 32 to 38 and insert—

“(d) permitting the Authority to impose, on a person who fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (c), a penalty determined in accordance with the regulations that does not exceed £100,000;”.

This amendment ensures that the penalties language used in section 28A is consistent with that used in new section 28B.

Amendment 72, in clause 38, page 39, leave out lines 1 to 4 and insert—

“(12) In this section ‘main scale default arrangement’ means an arrangement—

(a) that is used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and

(b) subject to which assets of any one of those schemes must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held.”

This amendment defines “main scale default arrangement” for the purposes of new section 28A.

Amendment 73, in clause 38, page 39, line 7, leave out “relevant”.

This amendment removes an unnecessary tag.

Amendment 74, in clause 38, page 39, line 10, after “requirement” insert—

“by reference to the main scale default arrangement”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 75, in clause 38, page 39, line 12, after “requirement” insert—

“by reference to a main scale default arrangement”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 76, in clause 38, page 39, line 16, leave out “subsection (6)” and insert “subsections (5) and (6)”.

This amendment adds a further cross reference to new section 28B(4).

Amendment 77, in clause 38, page 39, line 17, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 78, in clause 38, page 39, line 18, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 79, in clause 38, page 39, line 20, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 80, in clause 38, page 39, line 24, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 81, in clause 38, page 39, line 27, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 82, in clause 38, page 39, line 27, leave out—

“one (and only one) relevant”

and insert “a qualifying relevant”.

This amendment corrects a reference to a relevant Master Trust in new section 28B(4)(c) to take account of new section 28B(8).

Amendment 83, in clause 38, page 39, line 30, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 84, in clause 38, page 39, leave out lines 38 and 39 and insert—

“(b) what it means for assets of a pension scheme to be managed under a ‘common investment strategy’ (including in particular provision defining that expression by reference to whether or how far the assets relating to each member of the scheme are allocated in the same proportion to the same investments).”

This amendment provides more detail as to how the power to define “common investment strategy” may be used.

Amendment 85, in clause 38, page 40, line 3, leave out from “(4)” to end of line 6 and insert—

“(a) a group personal pension scheme is ‘qualifying’ in relation to the GPP if the provider of the GPP is also the provider of the group personal pension scheme;

(b) a relevant Master Trust is ‘qualifying’ in relation to the GPP if the provider of the GPP is also the scheme funder or the scheme strategist in relation to the relevant Master Trust (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Pension Schemes Act 2017).”

This amendment clarifies the circumstances in which assets held by connected Master Trusts and group personal pension schemes can be counted for the purposes of the application of the scale test to a group personal pension scheme.

Amendment 86, in clause 38, page 40, line 19, leave out “relevant Master Trust or”.

This amendment removes an unnecessary reference to a relevant Master Trust.

Amendment 87, in clause 38, page 40, line 25, leave out—

“managers of the GPP that their”

and insert—

“provider of the GPP that its”.

This amendment replaces a reference to the “managers” of a GPP with “provider” (reflecting normal usage in relation to personal pension schemes).

Amendment 88, in clause 38, page 40, line 27, leave out “the managers” and insert “the provider”.

This amendment replaces a reference to the “managers” of a GPP with “provider” (reflecting normal usage in relation to personal pension schemes).

Amendment 89, in clause 38, page 40, line 35, leave out—

“considered by the Authority to have failed”

and insert “who fails”.

This amendment ensures consistency with the new language in section 28A.

Amendment 90, in clause 38, page 40, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) providing for the making of a reference to the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal in respect of the issue of a penalty notice or the amount of a penalty.”

This amendment ensures that regulations can make provision for appeals to the Tribunal in respect of penalties under regulations under new section 28C(9)(c).

Amendment 91, in clause 38, page 40, line 42, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 41 and insert—

“(12) In this section ‘main scale default arrangement’ means an arrangement—

(a) that is used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and

(b) subject to which assets of any one of those schemes must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held.” —(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment defines “main scale default arrangement” for the purposes of new section 28B.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 248, in clause 38, page 41, line 4, leave out from beginning to end of line 9 on page 43.

This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 275, in clause 38, page 41, line 31, at end insert—

“(5A) A description of asset prescribed under subsection (4) may not be securities in any UK water company.”

This amendment would ensure that the prescribed percentage of asset allocation would not include assets in the water sector and fund trustees will not be compelled to allocate scheme assets to the water sector.

Amendment 249, in clause 38, page 45, line 3, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 on page 46.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 248.

New clause 4—Establishment of targeted investment vehicles for pension funds—

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the establishment or facilitation of one or more investment vehicles through which pension schemes may invest for targeted social or economic benefit.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify the descriptions of targeted social or economic benefit to which the investment vehicles are to contribute, which may include, but are not limited to, investment in—

(a) projects that revitalise high street areas;

(b) initiatives demonstrating social benefit;

(c) affordable or social housing development.

(3) The regulations must make provision for—

(a) the types of pension schemes eligible to participate in such investment vehicles;

(b) the governance, oversight, and reporting requirements for the investment vehicles and participating pension schemes;

(c) the means by which the contribution of such investments to targeted social or economic benefit is measured and reported;

(d) the roles and responsibilities of statutory bodies, including the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority, in authorising, regulating, or supervising such investment vehicles and the participation of pension schemes within them.

(4) The regulations may—

(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes, investment vehicles, or targeted social or economic benefits;

(b) provide for the pooling of assets from multiple pension schemes within such vehicles;

(c) require pension scheme trustees or managers to have regard to the availability and suitability of investment vehicles when formulating investment strategies, where consistent with—

(i) their fiduciary duties, and

(ii) the long-term value for money for members.

(5) In this Chapter, ‘pension scheme’ has the same meaning as in section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”

This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to establish investment funds to encourage investment in areas such as high streets, social housing and investments with clear social benefits.

[Mark Garnier]

Amendments 248 and 249 talk about removing mandation—something I spoke about when we debated clause 38, so I will not cover those amendments other than to say that it is something we feel strongly about. Amendment 275 concerns mandation with regard to the water industry. It comes as a result of an announcement from the leader of Reform about potentially using pension fund money to invest in Thames Water, and part of Reform’s manifesto talked about nationalising the water industry, but using pension fund money to own 50% of those holdings. To a certain extent, that is performative because we are talking about a specific sector. This amendment specifically talks about the water companies, but it could be carried forward to any other potentially nationalised sector.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bedford]

I will come on to some of those points later, so I will address them then.

[Mark Garnier]

This is rather strange, because I wanted to intervene on the intervention, but I hope that my hon. Friend will come on to the various other things that we have proposed. For example, we have proposed looking at the Maxwell rules, which are driving the incentive of pension fund trustees to invest in gilts because of the implications of volatile markets for balance sheets. We are trying to look at the wider regulation that is driving certain behaviour, and I hope that my hon. Friend will raise that in due course. We are 100% behind the Bill—not every single part of it, although the thrust is very good—but, as my hon. Friend will mention, there are areas that could be changed to achieve its aims.

[Mr Bedford]

I hope to address some of those points.

The Government are willing to take investment decisions out of the hands of pension fund trustees to force investments into projects that may be politically convenient for them, but may potentially lead to financial loss for members. They are directing investment on the backs of ordinary UK savers. When people save into a pension scheme, they are entrusting their future security to a system that is working supposedly for them and not for political gain. To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Hendon, rather than coercing trustees to follow conditions set by Ministers, would it not be better to create the right economic conditions to make trustees want to invest in the UK?

The last Conservative Government, through their Mansion House reforms and the work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash, brought in active commitment from the pension fund trustees who want to invest. We did not need to mandate that, and the Government should learn from that approach. Amendment 248 will preserve the fiduciary duty, but continue the trajectory to increase pension fund investment in the UK.