Transitional State Pension Arrangements for Women

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 24th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Vara]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments. If I am allowed to make some progress, I will talk about transitional arrangements and what we are doing.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Vara]

I will give way later, but I wish to make some progress.

There has been much debate about this issue, and we have had several debates about it in recent weeks. It comes down to two fundamental issues. First, there have been calls to undo the 2011 pension changes. The cost of that would be more than £30 billion. Secondly, there are calls by some to go even further and unravel the 1995 pension reforms.

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[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

In common with others, I regret that much of the debate from the Dispatch Box was focused on fixing the blame rather than fixing the problem, but at least the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) put forward a six-pack of options, which he rightly asked the Government to consider. Let us remember that the salient point about the motion is that it

“calls on the Government to bring forward proposals for transitional arrangements for women adversely affected by the acceleration of the increase in the state pension age.”

That is logical, reasonable and compelling, which is why the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) is prepared to support it. I ask some of his hon. Friends to join him in supporting it, not least those who valiantly fought over Equitable Life and called on the taxpayer to restore Equitable Life members to some position of equivalence. If they were prepared to fight for the Equitable Members Action Group and were indignant over Equitable Life, they should not be indifferent to the WASPI women and what they face. We should respond to them with justice.

It is not just a matter of a breach of trust and a breach of contract, because there is also the question of moral hazard. If Parliament says, “We can be quite capricious with the state pension”, we send out a signal to all the private pension providers that they can do what they want, that politicians will be in no place to reprimand them and that the regulator will not be able to interfere. We send out a very dangerous signal, too, to those younger people who were encouraged to have confidence and show responsibility in their pension planning. We send out a signal to them that what happened to their mothers shows that even when provision for pensions is made, people do not get what they thought they were going to get. It says that the pensions rules can be changed, so younger people will ask why bother with them—just see what they get when they get there.

We should not offer the mixture of conceit and deceit that we heard from some Conservative Members. We were told by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Huw Merriman) that the matter is settled and therefore cannot be touched. When was it settled? It was settled by Parliament in 2011, and he argued that it was the settled will of Parliament, which cannot be touched. These are the same people who tell us about parliamentary sovereignty and how one Parliament cannot bind another. They tell us that they want to stand up to the EU all over the place, but they are of course hiding behind a completely false explanation of EU rules and EU requirements in defence of this injustice.

This is an intentional injustice that has been visited on these women. It is not just, as the hon. Member for Sherwood (Mark Spencer) tried to tell us, that a line has to be drawn somewhere. These are not just haphazard victims of a drive-by cut in the name of austerity; they have been carefully selected and calculated as the victims. Why? These women have been used to inequality and injustice all their lives; they have been on the receiving end of inequality in respect of gender pay gaps and denial of access to second pensions at a time when their male colleagues were given access to them. The aim now seems to be, “Let’s give them one more twist of injustice in the name of equalisation as they come to the end of their working lives.” That is an absolutely travesty; it offers people stone for bread. This Parliament should be doing better than that.

As for the “settled will”, legislation that is currently going through Parliament will change legislation that was passed in the last Parliament. The Financial Services Act 2012 and the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 were passed in the last Parliament, and they are being changed by legislation that is going through the House now. The Enterprise Bill is changing legislation that was passed in the last Parliament. The Trade Union Bill is changing legislation that was passed in the last Parliament. Yesterday we debated the Welfare Reform and Work Bill, which, of course, is also changing legislation that was passed in the last Parliament. The Government can change legislation to introduce cuts, but they cannot change legislation to bring justice to people.

We should compare the present position with the position in 2011. What we have now are pension freedoms, and a tax windfall for the Treasury. The Government should bear in mind the new fiscal ambit that comes with those pension freedoms, and use it to introduce pension justice—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I call the shadow Minister.

Transitional State Pension Arrangements for Women

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2016 Westminster Hall

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hanson. I commend the hon. Member for Warrington North (Helen Jones) for introducing the debate so strongly on behalf of the Petitions Committee. I join other hon. Members in praising WASPI for the great effort it has put into this petition. I know that the campaign will continue well beyond today, which has to be encouraged. Despite some of what WASPI has heard today, it can take great encouragement from many of the points raised on both sides of this room.

All hon. Members have said that this issue represents a breach of trust, or a breach of contract, and we need to address it in those terms. Parliament, in particular, needs to understand that we cannot see this just as a DWP issue, or just as an issue for Ministers; it is a test of this Parliament. We cannot say that the previous Parliament passed this and that there is nothing we can do about it, as some Members seemed to imply—they seemed to suggest, “Well, this legislation was passed in 2011, and we can’t really pass new legislation.”

In the main Chamber today other hon. Members are considering the Second Reading of a Bill that will change two pieces of legislation that went through in 2012 and 2013 and will significantly change the governance furniture on financial services and the Bank of England. If those key pieces of Government legislation from the previous Parliament have to be overhauled and changed now, there is absolutely no reason why the same cannot be done for the Pensions Act 2011, particularly on this glaring issue, when even the Minister who steered the legislation through the House says that he did not understand it and was not well advised. An hon. Member talked about the fog created around this petition, but it seems that the fog was actually in the DWP in 2011. Parliament was lured into that fog on the basis that there was nothing we could do about it and that the one transitional adjustment that could be made was being made—that was the adjustment that cost £1.1 billion a year. The Government rejected the other proposals.

When people talk about the new state pension costing £30 billion, that was the total quantum identified as, in effect, the saving from the change. We need to remember how the argument about that £30 billion has been reversed and misargued today. Let us remember that, when we had those debates and discussions back then, we did not have the pension freedoms on the horizon. I take the point raised by the right hon. Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) that it should not be used as an answer to the problem faced by these women born in the 1950s, but—let us face it—the Government now have a tax windfall from the pension freedoms. Money is coming in to the Government well ahead of time, and that was not available back in 2011.

Similarly, the Government have moved to introduce a number of other benefit savings, and the welfare cap has produced even more savings. In the autumn statement, of course, £17 billion was suddenly found down the back of the Treasury and Office for Budget Responsibility sofa. Clearly, money that people thought was not there when this issue was debated in 2011 might now be there, and it is our duty to raise that issue.

This Parliament will see a lot of centenary landmarks of the struggle for votes for women. Will the message from this Parliament to this group of women be that they have to take the hit for equality, and for deficit reduction, by having their pension rights absolutely scrambled? If we tolerate that, it will be an intentional injustice. They will not just be passing, accidental casualties; it will be deliberate and targeted, and not just by Ministers. This Parliament will have conspired and connived in it, which is why we have to change it and why the campaign must continue.

[Mr David Hanson (in the Chair)]

Order. I intend to call the Minister at 7.18 pm.

State Pension Age (Women)

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Thursday 7th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Barbara Keeley]

rose—

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

rose—

[Richard Graham]

Hold on a moment—let me finish what I am saying.

Were the intention simply to change all the arrangements for women born in the 1950s and go back to the original proposal, that would, I believe—the Minister might want to put a more detailed figure on it—cost the taxpayer about £10 billion. Yesterday we had the shadow Work and Pensions Secretary, the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith), calling for changes to universal credit that were not costed and for which he offered no alternative in terms of where the money would come from. Today we have a proposed transitional arrangement that might cost £10 billion, but its detail has not been spelled out, and neither has its exact cost or how it would be paid for.

I believe that it is incumbent on all of us as MPs partly to represent the emotional feelings of our constituents, as has been done very well by a number of Members today, but also to reflect on the reality, the cost and the implications of what is being proposed, which remains an open question.

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[Yasmin Qureshi]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. It is typical of this Government’s approach to such things.

[Mark Durkan]

My hon. Friend may recall that a further transitional arrangement was proposed when the Bill went through in 2011. In October 2011, an arrangement was proposed that would have meant nobody had to wait more than a year, rather than up to 18 months, to reach their pension age. It would have cost £10 billion over 10 years, and it would have meant having a common state pension age in 2022. That was proposed, but the Government rejected it.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention, which I hope has helped the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins).

As I have said, I am very happy to pen a very detailed plan to help such ladies, but if I write it, I would like the Government to promise to implement it. Perhaps the Government will give me an assurance that, when I come up with suggestions about how to deal with various problems, they will say, “Yes, you are right: the hon. Member for Bolton South East has come up with a solution, and we will actually implement what she says.” Will the Minister make me such a promise?

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[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

It was a privilege to hear the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mhairi Black) move the motion, and it was an honour for me to join her in approaching the Backbench Business Committee to request the debate. There have been some powerful contributions from a number of Members who have campaigned on this issue in this and, indeed, the last Parliament.

We have heard much reference to the former Minister Steve Webb, and to what he has recently said. The question that now arises is this: if the Minister himself was subject to some misunderstanding or misapprehension—if he was in some way misled or misinformed—was the House in turn misled and misinformed in 2011, when he made various statements about impact assessments both in the Chamber and in Committee?

I often hear in the House about the principle that one Parliament cannot bind its successor. We are talking about an issue, and a choice, for this Parliament. Those who were not here in 2011 but are here now cannot wash their hands of this and say, “It is nothing to do with us.” This is a choice for us. The fact is that if the Minister was not fully aware of the facts by the time the Bill had completed its passage, other Members were not either, and the people who are directly affected by these changes certainly were not. Given that they are now so active and animated through the WASPI campaign, it is clear that if they had been aware of the facts much earlier, they would have been active much earlier.

It is insulting for Conservative Members to suggest that perhaps people had been informed and simply did not know, and if they did not know they should have known. These women have demonstrated that had they known about the position, they would have done something about it, both in terms of their personal circumstances and in terms of the public policy challenges that they would have issued. Conservative Members also came out with the nonsense that there was no alternative: that they were seeking transitional arrangements leading to pension equality, but none had been proposed. We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) about the “hard shoulder” arrangements that had been introduced in other countries. Moreover, as I pointed out in an intervention earlier, additional transitional measures were proposed during the Bill’s passage in 2011, but were voted down by the Government.

In May 2011, during a debate in Westminster Hall, I said that if the Minister did not indicate that he would revise the proposals in the Bill because the women involved were an unintended anomaly, those women would have no choice but to conclude that they had been calculated as the victims of an intentional injustice—a drive-by hit on their pension rights. That is how things stand. If we fail to pass this motion, we will be saying that those women are an acceptable casualty on the way to equality, and we cannot accept invidious treatment in the name of equality.

Welfare Cap

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 16th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

As someone who voted against the welfare cap when it was introduced and whenever it was reset, I am happy that the Government are trying to relax the original level of that cap. During the Budget statement in July, the Chancellor revised the welfare cap figures that he announced in the spring. He reduced that cap over four financial years by £46 billion, to include changes to tax credits and some of the other changes to universal credit that have been mentioned, and for that reason we would have opposed the measure.

As we have heard, the welfare cap is a fairly political argument. It has its origin in the opposition of Labour Members to the benefit cap in the Welfare Reform Act 2012, and they came under some pressure for that. At one point, the then Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), announced that he would do better than a benefits cap and introduce a welfare cap on the overall budget. We could see the lights go on for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who decided, “That will do nicely. We’ll go for a welfare cap as well.” He proceeded to set up his working group to consider that, on the basis, he said, that annually managed expenditure is not managed but needs to be in future. That is how the welfare cap was introduced, and that is why the then Opposition were trapped into voting for it, whereas some of the smaller parties—and some Labour Back Benchers—felt free to vote against it.

When the welfare cap was introduced it was bubble-wrapped as a neutral budgetary tool, but many of us recognised that it would end up being brandished as a weapon for cuts, and that is exactly how the Chancellor used it this year in the July Budget. Of course, he was forced to revise his propositions on tax credits by a combination of opposition from right hon. and hon. Members right across the House. In fairness, some Government Members did not just vote against the measures but spoke against them too, making valid and pointed arguments about just some of the difficulties caused by the Chancellor’s plans. It is good that, with the range of consideration and argument outside and inside this House and in the other place, that the Chancellor had to revise his position. That is now reflected in the adjusted proposals for the welfare cap.

The Chancellor, in his autumn statement, made it clear that he will still get to the quantum of cuts he wants to achieve. The issue is how far the welfare cap will, in itself, be used as an instrument for forcing some of those cuts. We have also yet to hear from Ministers exactly how they are going to get to that quantum. Will they need to table amendments to the Welfare Reform and Work Bill currently going through Parliament to deliver the cuts within the time the Chancellor has projected, or do they feel that they will be able to arrive at the same cuts using existing legislation? There are powers of regulation under the 2012 Act and provisions in the Bill, not least the sweeping provisions in clauses 13 and 14 that could see significant benefits—universal credit, employment and support allowance, and the work-related activity group—disappear or be very heavily eroded. If the Government still intend to arrive at the quantum of £12 billion of cuts in terms of the welfare cap, how do they propose to deliver it?

That matters in the context of Northern Ireland. If the cuts are to be delivered under existing legislation or the Bill, the fact that direct rule powers are in the hands of Department for Work and Pensions and Northern Ireland Office Ministers means that the cuts will be put through under the sunset clause which will be exercised here up until the end of the next calendar year. We have the right to ask: what future cuts will go through under existing legislation and the Bill, and what would require further reductions in future?

We did not get clarification on welfare measures during the passage of the Scotland Bill, or on other occasions when we have asked Ministers about this more informally. Will the Minister clarify whether the welfare spending that can be undertaken by the Scottish Government of £2.7 billion—the last figure I heard—will count as part of the UK welfare cap, or is that absolutely outside the UK welfare cap? Is that a precedent for other factors? Ministers have been unable to address that point.

In welcoming the Government’s position today, I take no comfort from it. Their original intent to use the welfare cap as a cuts weapon is still there. I want clarification on their plans for the Bill. Will they table amendments to achieve further cuts, or do they believe that they can achieve the full £12 billion as the clauses currently stand?

Assisted Dying (No. 2) Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Friday 11th September 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

We have heard many compassionate and compelling words today, and the voice of conscience has come through on both sides of the debate, just as it has come through on both sides of the correspondence we have all received from our constituents. I will be opposing the Bill. Some of the constituents who have written to me have suggested that I am being Church-whipped. I am no more Church-whipped in opposing this Bill’s Second Reading than I was when I voted for the Second and Third Readings of the marriage equality Bill.

Like all Members, I come here today as a conscientious legislator dealing with difficult issues. I acknowledge the sincerity of the Members proposing the Bill, but as a legislator I cannot satisfy myself that the compassion with which it has been proposed is adequate to allow it to pass. I am not convinced by the so-called safeguards that it is claimed to have, and I do not believe that it would be enough to rely on codes of practice that might or might not be introduced in future.

In that regard I am moved by what I have heard directly from many medical professionals. We have been privileged to hear today from Members with medical experience and insights about some of the difficulties that they see arising from the Bill. They are concerned about not only the professional compromises that would be created, but the pernicious conditioning effect that would result. Many Members have rightly raised concerns about incidents of coercion arising in the discharge of this legislation, but there are also concerns about the wider conditioning effect, and many medical professionals have voiced those to me. They are concerned that it would affect their relationship not only with patients, but with colleagues and other professionals, because of the quandaries and difficulties that would arise.

I am also not convinced by people making the case for the Bill by focusing on what would not be covered by it. I cannot take from them the assurance that the Bill draws a line and could not be used to take us on a travelator towards more legislation. If the compelling cases which motivated Members to propose the Bill would not be covered by it, I find it hard to see how those same cases would not be used to take us on a further journey, so I accept the slippery slope argument.

It has been suggested that relying on the prosecution guidance as adequate would be a dereliction of duty on our part as legislators, but let us remember that those who are proposing the Bill would still be relying on the guidance for all the cases that fall outside the scope of the Bill. If it is okay for people to rely on that guidance for cases that fall outside the scope of the Bill, why would it be wrong for those of us who oppose the Bill to rely on it as well for people in that situation?

I do not claim that we have moral superiority over anyone in the decisions that we take today, but as legislators we are compelled to make those choices. I know that the choice I make as a legislator might not be the choice I would make as a terminally ill patient, or as someone who receives a strong and emotional request from a loved one who is terminally ill, or as a juror if a prosecution took place at some time; I must make the decision today as a legislator. That is why I must vote against what I regard as poor and dangerous legislation.

The Hague Abduction Convention

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 10th March 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

It is a pleasure to meet under your chairmanship at this stage of the afternoon, Sir David.

The subject of the debate is The Hague abduction convention, which is more fully known as The Hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. It dates back to 1980 and has force in UK law under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985. Many of us, as MPs, will have come across the convention, perhaps from a number of different angles depending on constituents’ experiences. Such experiences can be brought to us either directly or by families whose members want to use the convention to try to ensure the restoration of a parent’s due and wanted relationship with a child, or by constituents or their families who feel that their family has been affected by a case taken under the convention in which their circumstances, or how events unfolded, have not been fully understood or appreciated.

The purpose of the debate is not to pretend that any of us in such cases, or in the general balance or mix of cases that we get, should look at the subject from the perspective of one interest or another, whether that of the parent who has custody of a child or that of the parent who is seeking custody under the convention. The real reason for proposing the topic for debate occurred to me in the light of experience. Some of that experience relates to a particular case; some relates to a few other cases in recent years in my constituency and in the wider area of north-west Northern Ireland.

--- Later in debate ---

On resuming—

[Mark Durkan]

As I was saying before the Division, I was prompted to introduce the debate by a number of issues and observations that have arisen from cases that have been shared with me by Foyle Women’s Aid—not all relate directly to people in my constituency, but all those involved have been using the support of Foyle Women’s Aid—and from some other cases.

I stress that at no point will I be questioning specific decisions in specific cases, nor will I be naming any of the people involved in the cases. That is partly because of the sensitivity of a current case, which I suppose has most prompted me to raise the issue. Just this week, a woman has had to return to Australia with her child, who was born in my constituency, on the basis of decisions that have been made following a case taken under The Hague convention.

I stress that I am not trying to involve the Minister in anything that would rightfully be within the purview of the devolved Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. Perhaps more importantly, I assure Ministers not just here, but in Northern Ireland, that in no way am I trying to second-guess any decision by any judge of the Northern Ireland courts. I want to be very clear that the Lord Chief Justice should have no concern with any of the aspects of the debate that I will raise here today. I do not believe that Members should use any forum of the House to try to second-guess or overturn decisions of judges or the courts.

Rather, the issues I want to raise today are about whether we as legislators need to give more consideration to The Hague convention as it stands, whether the 1985 Act is sufficient and whether additional light needs to be shed on the issue, given all the experience and understanding we now have in relation to the changes to family life and our understanding of it. There is also greater internationalisation of life now and far more complicated trans-jurisdictional arrangements are in place. Also, a more acute understanding has arisen as to the limited regard that different aspects of the law have had for key principles such as the best interests of the child. There is also the question whether the law is duly responsive to any evidence or allegations that arise about conditions of abuse that might have affected a child or that might affect a partner.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

The hon. Gentleman has raised an important issue. A parent whose child has been abducted will be aware that their access to legal aid is restricted. Given the vulnerability of all the parties involved, does he agree that it is vital to ensure that they all have the assurance that they will be represented fairly?

[Mark Durkan]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that point. Legal aid is a key issue for anyone involved at either end of cases such as these, whether they want to bring a case to have their child restored to their custody or they find themselves accused and become a defendant in such a case. The question of legal aid, and the restrictions on it, is particularly acute. Although Ministers have, perhaps understandably, changed position on some elements of legal aid because of more specious cases or cases in which people were testing any sort of claim culture connected to accidents, the fact is that, for a parent, a case about their child is a matter not of calculated choice, but of the emotional imperatives that come with being a parent.

It is important that people should have as much recourse to legal aid as possible, and the decisions around legal aid should be duly sensitised to such situations. Certainly, in a recent case that I know of, a woman has found herself facing a case of child abduction, and on being told to take a child who was born in Northern Ireland back to Australia she found herself in precisely the position whereby she was weakened, so I know this can come on either side of such cases. I am sure that the Minister would be sensitive in all such situations, although we are talking in this case not particularly about one side or another, but about the balance of justice, which goes to the heart of the legal aid questions.

I want to return to the points that particularly concern me, which arise from decisions made recently. I am not concerned because the court made those decisions, but a question arises for legislators and for the Government as the transposing signatory to The Hague convention as to whether we are perhaps leaving courts in a position where they have to take decisions on fairly narrow grounds in fairly shady light, sometimes having to disregard evidence that people try to bring forward in relation to either abuse against them that they allege took place at the hands of the other parent or where they say they have evidence of ill treatment or questionable treatment by the other parent of the child.

It seems that the courts tend to set a very high threshold in relation to consideration of any such evidence, and also then say that it would not be for them to determine anyway, but would be for the court in another jurisdiction if the child was to be returned to that other jurisdiction. It seems that in child abduction cases the courts and the legal profession find themselves almost adopting a standard akin to the rules of the road. For instance, in car accident cases it is automatically presumed that if a person has driven into the back of another car, the liability lies with that person. It does not matter about any other circumstances or conditions; the court does not want to know. It is straightforward.

I hear such a message from people who have handled a number of cases, and the woman who has this week had to return to Australia felt that she was in such a situation. The evidence that she had been raising and pursuing was essentially set aside. That is not because the court did not want to know or because judges wanted to be insensitive to that, but that is not how the law stands and it is not how the law tests such things. Essentially, for the court, the real issue was to decide where the jurisdiction on the matter should rest, and the court has basically said that any of the other issues would be for a court in Australia to decide. That point does not stand alone.

The mother obviously appealed the decision that was made in respect of her and her two and a half-year-old child, but she had to give undertakings. On losing the appeal, she had to sign the following:

“The Appellant agrees not to institute, encourage or pursue any criminal proceedings whether in Northern Ireland or Australia, against the Respondent in respect of any of the allegations made against the Respondent in the course of the Hague Convention proceedings.”

Here we have The Hague convention being operated and brokered via the courts on the basis that, even if there is evidence that could give rise to possible criminal proceedings, as part of the discharge of a case under The Hague convention such evidence is not to be pursued.

As a legislator, I believe that that goes against the grain and the spirit of much of what we have heard from the Government in recent times about more responsive and alert reactions to evidence that arises in different family circumstances.

In this particular case, issues did arise around whether the child was exposed to risk. I do not want to go into any of the particulars of that, but the determination seemed to be that that was not a matter on which the courts would or could hear anything. Again, to my mind, that is inconsistent with the very clear standards that we hear ringing right across all the political institutions in recent times: in relation to the position of children, every effort will be made to ensure that the best interests of the child are fully considered and addressed.

In relation to how such cases are addressed, it seems to be very hard for anyone to find out whether anybody has the role of advocating the best interests of the child. It is not clear that the court is in a position to hear or take the evidence. Perhaps we need to apply some of the yardsticks developed under the Modern Slavery Bill, which states that in some instances there will be a child advocacy service whose responsibilities will be particularly to speak to and address everything on the basis of the best interests of the child. Perhaps that should be applied here.

I hope that the Minister and his Department, and his colleagues in other Departments, because I know this cuts across various Departments, will take the spirit of what has been said on so many other fronts and make sure that it also informs how we go forward with The Hague convention, in terms of how we address it as legislators, how the Government address their role as a signatory and how they take forward their discussion with other Governments in modernising The Hague convention and the various memorandums of understanding that go with that, so that none of what we are saying in relation to child abuse and domestic violence—violence against women or anything else—runs out when it comes to the very important and vexed issue of The Hague convention.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 4th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Damian Green]

A lot of the debate was about the nomenclature—the thought that we were asking people to prove their innocence. I have just explained the effect of the new clause: if a new fact emerges that on its own shows the person could not have committed the offence or that an offence may not have been committed, that would entitle that person to compensation. Throughout this debate people have recognised that it is not simply a question of being declared innocent that requires a miscarriage of justice to be called.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Further to that point, will the Minister explain how it would be different for someone to prove they did not commit an offence, as opposed to someone being expected to prove their innocence? What is the difference in terms of the burden of proof?

[Damian Green]

The point is that nobody has to prove that they are innocent. We are not requiring them to do that. There requires there to be evidence that shows that they could not have committed the offence because they were somewhere else, for example, or because there is new DNA evidence or the offence has not been committed. That is the material difference between the two.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Green]

The hon. Gentleman may disagree, but he will have his chance to contribute to the debate.

We are seeking to provide greater clarity, which is why we are unwilling to accept the Lords amendment. We have listened to those who consider that the express reference to the concept of innocence is problematic. That is what lies at the heart of this change. Our amendment in lieu is intended to take this concern into account by removing what has been until now the controversial aspect of this clause: the use of the word “innocent”. I hope that removing the express reference to innocence will make our respect for the presumption of innocence clear, and I hope I can allay the concerns expressed by hon. Members.

We remain strongly committed to ensuring that compensation is paid only to those who genuinely warrant it, however. In our view compensation should be paid only to applicants where it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that they did not commit the offence. We believe that this change takes into account the points made in the House of Lords, which we have carefully considered. As Lord Phillips said in that debate, the primary objective of section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which this clause would amend, is to provide redress to an applicant who has been convicted when he or she was in fact innocent. He also considered that its second and subsidiary objective was to ensure that an applicant whose conviction had been quashed but who had in fact committed the offence charged should not be compensated. Our proposed test goes a long way towards achieving both of those objectives. We consider that, while the definition of a miscarriage of justice for which we are seeking to legislate is drawn narrowly, it nevertheless provides for a range of circumstances in which compensation should rightly be paid to help people who need to rebuild their lives after suffering great injustices.

Throughout our debates, much has been said about the views of the European Court of Human Rights on compensation for a miscarriage of justice, and I am again grateful to Lord Phillips, who commented on this so succinctly during the debate on Report in the Lords. He stated:

“In substance, whatever interpretation is given to miscarriage of justice, something more than quashing a conviction is properly required”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 January 2014; Vol. 751, c. 680.]

This much can be gleaned from the four most recent decisions of the European Court on this issue. Today, our business is to determine precisely what that “something more” is. We believe that the definition we are now providing in our amendment will make it easier for applicants to assess whether they should apply for compensation, and will make decisions on eligibility easier for the applicant to understand and less likely to be the subject of legal challenge, as my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) made clear a moment ago.

[Mark Durkan]

Surely the Government’s amendment would not make it easier for the applicant to decide. Would not the Lords amendment make it easier to decide?

[Damian Green]

No; my difference with the Lords amendment is that it would leave applicants less clear about what to do. This would result in a large number of cases backing up in the courts waiting for judges to interpret what Parliament meant by the legislation, just as there are at the moment. The purpose of my proposal today is twofold: first, to meet the reasonable objections that have been raised about the original Government proposal; secondly, to provide greater clarity so that the House can speak with as clear a voice as possible in these difficult areas and not leave the field open to judicial interpretation, which can take a long time and which provides uncertainty for applicants.

I am aware that, in both Houses, there has been a misconception that applicants would somehow be required to prove that they did not commit the offence before compensation could be considered. I can categorically say that that is not the case. Applicants do not have to prove anything under the existing criteria, and nor would they have to do so in future under this proposal. Applicants need only rely on information that is already available to them as a result of their appeal process.

The test provided for in the Bill on its introduction was one that Labour was perfectly content to operate while it was in office. I hope that the new definition, which attempts to address the concerns that have been raised, will therefore have the support of the Opposition. I hope that they will now reconsider their position so that the Bill, and the many important measures it contains, can swiftly secure Royal Assent.

--- Later in debate ---

[John McDonnell]

In my view, the Government’s test is faulty. I am not convinced of the need for this additional test anyway. At least the House of Lords edges towards some greater level of fairness. I would rather give up on this attempt to redefine.

The hon. Member for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti) raised the case of Barry George. There has always been an ability in our system for the court awarding compensation to take into account whether the person contributed towards their plight. That has an effect on compensation levels or even whether compensation is awarded at all. By seeking to arrive at some definition in legislation, we are digging ourselves into a very complicated and costly hole, and that cost will be on the individuals who are desperately trying to ensure that they get some compensation for the ill that they have experienced as a result of the state’s failure to live up to a proper process. Additionally, it will be extremely costly for the state. As a result of the weakness in the definition proposed by the Government, we will see case after case being dragged through the English courts and then the European courts. In trying to remedy some form of perceived ill, we will create greater damage to those who have suffered enough.

In addition, the process that is under way at the moment risks making a laughing stock of the Government. As we have heard today, there will be arguments over the difference between “do not commit” and innocence, between “conclusively” and “beyond all reasonable doubt”. The lawyers will make a fortune. I plead for a common-sense approach. The compensation arrangements at the moment are not absolutely perfect, but at least we have managed to secure some compensation for those cases that have been quashed as a result of the state’s failure, and this is about the state’s failure to act accordingly.

There are many other cases. Susan May recently passed away, unfortunately, but her case is still being pursued to demonstrate her innocence, and I think that, rather than it being proved in the long run that the evidential base was the problem, it will be demonstrated that police processes were not adhered to and it will be another case that is eventually quashed. I hope that the Criminal Cases Review Commission will posthumously provide some proof that she should never have been taken through the courts, but again, the case has been dragged out over years, demonstrating how difficult it is, even when trying to prove the failure of due process, to secure not just a decision but any compensation. The new process will make it even harder to get compensation, drag the decision-making processes out for even longer and prove to be basically unfair.

I support the Lords amendment, because at least it moves us a little further forward, although I think even it will be open to significant challenge in the courts.

[Mark Durkan]

I rise to support Lords amendment 112 and oppose the Government’s amendment in lieu. The Minister told us that the Government were moving to allay the concerns raised by the use of the word “innocence” and its abuse in the Bill as originally drafted. Of course, many of us argued that the wording used in the original Bill changed all the normal presumptions about innocence under the rule of law and that it was tilting things to say that because someone had not proved their innocence they could remain guilty, even though they had been released on a quashed conviction. We were concerned not just about the word “innocence” but about the fact that the burden of proof would be reloaded for cases subject to review on the basis of new evidence that could lead to a quashed conviction. We were concerned that the question of compensation would be tested by altering the burden of proof so that new evidence had to prove someone’s innocence. The onus was being put on that person and their legal team to show the strength of the evidence.

The Government’s response to the Lords’ fairly reasonable and measured amendment is to say that they have solved the problem of innocence by using the term “did not commit” about the offence. The Minister was asked again and again to tell us the difference. A brand of soup—I cannot remember which—used to be advertised by the slogan, “The difference is in the thickness.” We are being told that there is a big difference and the Minister is emphasising its importance, but he cannot explain, specify, spell out or measure in any way the difference between whether someone can show that the evidence proves that they are innocent of an offence or whether they can show that it proves that they did not commit the offence. Even some of the interventions from the Government Back Benches seemed to rest more on whether there was evidence that an offence had been committed than on whether there was evidence that the person had actually committed the offence.

There are cases, of course, in which we know that gross and horrible offences have been committed, but that is very different from saying that that proves that a person who was charged and convicted of that offence has committed it. At other times, offences that might or might not have been committed are subject to questions and conjecture. We might consider our experiences in this House, as we might be thrown into the spotlight of public judgment about whether or not we did something. If we consider “did not commit” and “innocent” in that context, we might start to tease out some of the differences.

If as MPs we were arrested on the basis of some allegation, the fact that we were not charged and nothing more happened would show that we were innocent, but would other people necessarily say that it proved that no offence had been committed and nothing had happened? Things might be different; there can be a difference between “innocent” and “did not commit”. As the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) said, it is hard to prove a negative. We know from recent events of major publicity and political import in which allegations were made that someone had spoken to and treated police officers in a particular way, leading to consequences and all sorts of sweeping media and public judgments—although thankfully not court judgments—that that person was put in the position of having to prove a negative. They were asked to prove that they did not say what they were meant to have said and that they did not behave in the way that they were meant to have behaved.

We need to think not only about the hard and serious cases when we consider miscarriages of justice in this jurisdiction; some of the questions about the difference between “innocent” and “did not commit” can be asked closer to home about cases that do not necessarily reach the criminal courts. If we are conscious about language and the standards, judgments and measure of such things, it might help us and make us a wee bit more sensitive about how we word things as legislators.

The Lords amendment is designed, I believe, to meet the problem that the Government were seeking to address in the Bill. The Government said that they did not want to create a situation whereby the quashing of a conviction led either to the automatic fact of compensation or to the automatic assumption or expectation of compensation. They felt that some other test or qualification was needed. That was what the Government decided; it might not have been the starting point for some of us who have campaigned on miscarriages of justice cases such as those of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four. Long after the latter conviction was overturned, I worked with Gerry Conlon and his mother to try to ensure that there was an apology that fully vindicated them and voiced their innocence, because many people in the system and the media were still trying to hide behind the pretence that it was a technical quashing of the conviction but that the conviction itself was due and proper. For them, the issue is not compensation but the absolute assertion of innocence. That was why offence was taken at the use and abuse of the term “innocence” in the original Bill, but that was not the only issue. The burden of proof was altered and an attempt was made to allow in the system for someone who had been convicted and imprisoned for a long period not to be entitled to compensation, because they could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that they did not commit the offence or their innocence.

Lord Pannick’s amendment accepts the Government's premise that there needs to be a definition and bases that definition on many issues that have been tested in other cases, including, as we have heard from the Minister, the Adams case. Based on the working and practical use of the law, the Lords amendment is wise and considered in its suggestion that a new or newly discovered fact should show conclusively that the evidence against the person at trial is so undermined that no conviction could possibly be based on it. That is not a hard test, as it does not open up things to conjecture. It basically allows courts to do what many appeal courts and more senior courts often have to do in considering the material evidence that would have been in front of a lower court and to make a judgment on that basis.

The Lords amendment would simply allow someone, after their conviction has been quashed, to pursue compensation on the basis that the quality of the new evidence shows that there would not have been a conviction in the first place. By refusing that, the Government are basically seeking to return to a situation in which the courts, the police and the prosecution service could be seen as part of a nexus of pursuing and achieving a miscarriage of justice. The beauty of the Lords amendment is that it would clearly take the lower court out of the frame, because it states that had the lower court known about such evidence, it would never have achieved the conviction.

Shrewsbury 24 (Release of Papers)

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Thursday 23rd January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I am most grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Hon. Members should accept that the question whether the remaining papers that have not been released to the National Archives should be revealed is a pertinent one. In debating, as we are, the issues surrounding the cases, particularly two of the cases, it is highly relevant to question whether the papers should be revealed.

Before I was interrupted, I was quoting Mr Justice Mais, the trial judge. He went on to tell the six people before him:

“Some of you were clearly determined to strike terror in the hearts of those who continued to work.”

That was a very serious crime indeed. Furthermore, the case went to appeal and, to quote The Times editorial of 20 December 1974, the Court of Appeal judge said:

“There was at each site a terrifying display by pickets of force and violence actually committed or threatened against buildings, plant and equipment; at some sites, if not at others, acts of personal violence and threats of violence to the person were committed and made. Persons working on the sites and residents near by were put in fear.”

That should not be tolerated in our country, and it should not be supported by Opposition Members.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

The hon. Gentleman has quoted the Court of Appeal judge. He was the same judge on whose verdict the hon. Gentleman relied for many years in resisting the case for a new inquiry into Bloody Sunday and so on. Is he confident that his reliance on Widgery today—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. In interventions as well as speeches, hon. Members will stick to the matter before us. [Interruption.] Order. The hon. Gentleman may make his point, but he must refer to the matter before us, from which he was straying very considerably.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Kawczynski]

As I have said repeatedly, both sides of the argument have to be taken into consideration. I felt it appropriate to come here today, as the Member representing Shrewsbury, to outline some of the things that leading members of my community have stated. Clearly, there are other perspectives. I hope the Minister will explain, if he is not going to release the documents, why he will not do so.

[Mark Durkan]

rose—

[Daniel Kawczynski]

I am not going to give way, because I am going to end my remarks. Clearly, we can see tremendous passion from the Opposition for this issue to be resolved.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Simon Hughes]

I apologise to you, Mr Speaker, to the Minister and to colleagues because I had to slip out briefly at the beginning of this debate, albeit for what I hope are appropriate reasons. I had to meet a press deadline to pay tribute to one of our party members—not a parliamentarian, but a man called Stan Hardy who had been a great campaigner on these sorts of issues. He died last Thursday at the ripe old age of 93. Not just Liberal Democrats or liberals but Labour and Conservative colleagues in London and beyond recognised Stan as a doughty campaigner for civil liberties as well as for the rights of the under-privileged.

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) on these sorts of issues, and I join my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) in paying tribute to his doughty campaigning throughout all the time he and I have been together in the place—now more than 30 years in both our cases. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment, supported by his hon. Friends, is designed to deal with a wrong in this Bill that I hope we can remedy.

There is a difference between amendment 95, tabled by the hon. Member for Islington North, and amendment 184, tabled by the hon. Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis) and me. We argue for our amendment in our own right, but also on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Amendment 95 would amend clause 143, taking out from line 26 the words

“the person was innocent of the offence”

and inserting the words

“no reasonable court properly directed as to the law, could convict on the evidence now to be considered.”

The Joint Committee’s collective view was that we would do better to remove clause 143 as a whole—exactly the issue for which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) argued. I have been here long enough to remember and to have supported numerous campaigns to deal with miscarriages of justice, many of them very unpopular for the reasons we have all identified. Having looked at the issue again, I honestly believe that the removal of the clause would be the better way to deal with the problem. There are technical problems with amendment 95, so I strongly commend to the Minister the amendment to remove clause 143.

Finally, I shall not press the Joint Committee’s amendment to a vote, but we feel strongly about this issue as a Committee. I am sure the Minister knows that we will listen respectfully to what he says, but I hope he can be helpful and confirm that the principle of the Government’s proposal—that the provision should apply

“if and only if the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person was innocent”—

will be changed because that is not the test that should be applied to deal with miscarriages of justice.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

I, too, rise to speak to amendment 95, to which my name is attached, along with that of the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn).

As the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes)and others have said, the history of serious cases of miscarriages of justice should bear very heavily indeed on all Members. I include in that the cases that were fought, promoted and championed against very difficult headwinds here in Parliament by Members of all parties. I recall Conservative Members like the late John Biggs-Davison and others championing those cases alongside Labour and Liberal MPs—but little thanks did they get for it from sections of the media and others.

My own predecessors and party colleagues in Parliament fought on those issues at that time. I remember working in John Hume’s office writing all sorts of letters to the Home Office. Of course, we were told that new facts and new evidence did not qualify as new facts and new evidence. Perhaps that issue still applies to clause 143. Even if amendment 95 were accepted, the question of what counts as a

“new or newly discovered fact”

still arises, although I hope that the wording of the amendment, which would provide that

“no reasonable court properly directed as to the law, could convict on the evidence now to be considered”,

would help. There were historical arguments about whether new evidence was indeed a new fact or a material consideration, and I would not want to legislate to produce more circular arguments or obfuscations like that for the future.

Clause 143 is pernicious. It seeks completely to reload the basic, long-standing presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It basically provides qualification of the notion of a miscarriage of justice, suggesting that when someone has suffered what most people would call a miscarriage of justice and when their conviction has, on subsequent judicial appraisal of relevant evidence, been overturned, they should still not be able to proclaim their innocence. There is an insinuation that if they were previously convicted, they are innocent and entitled to compensation as innocent only where they can prove that they are innocent “beyond reasonable doubt”.

For the people affected, many of their convictions will have taken place many years previously and they will be in no position to marshal all the evidence that could necessarily prove their innocence beyond what someone would call a reasonable doubt. Nobody has to meet that criterion at their proper and due initial trial, so why should anybody have to do that to receive compensation after a conviction has been overturned? Compensation is not the only issue here because it is not the monetary value that motivates the fundamental objections to this proposal.

Before I became a Member in 2005, I worked on the cases of the Guildford Four and the Maguire Seven when they still needed and wanted a full and proper proclamation of their innocence, not least because many sections of the media and others were retelling the slur that these people had somehow secured just a technical acquittal. Their conviction was quashed, but the insinuation remained that they were not really innocent. That problem arose from issues surrounding compensation and other factors.

I recall being asked by Gerry Conlon, a friend of mine and one of the Guildford Four, if I could get a direct and clear statement of apology and a proclamation of the innocence not just of himself but of his late father, Giuseppe Conlon. I was also asked the same by Sarah Conlon, Gerry’s mother and Giuseppe’s widow. It was plain that Gerry Conlon wanted that clear proclamation of their innocence for his mother, that his mother wanted it for Gerry, and, of course, that they both wanted it for Giuseppe.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Blunt]

To be fair to the Attorney-General, that is precisely what he said. He thought it would be perfectly possible to address these issues. He raised objections to the House. I happen not to agree with or believe them, but he said that it should be possible to address the issues being raised. Unless Members are prepared to stand up in the House and say that they oppose humanists being allowed to carry out marriages in principle and explain to me and the rest of the country what their reasons are, we owe it to humanists to do our damndest during the passage of the Bill to enable them to enjoy the ability to marry under their belief system with the same rights that we give to others.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Earlier in my political life I was Minister of Finance and Personnel in the Northern Ireland Executive, and in that capacity, bizarrely, I had responsibility for the Office of Law Reform and for registration. I worked to bring forward measures that were about changing how civil registration and civil law on marriage related to the different religions in Northern Ireland, because it related very differently. Unlike what the hon. Member for Banbury (Sir Tony Baldry) said in his description of the law on marriage in England, which was that it is entirely related to premises or property, the situation in Northern Ireland meant that for Catholics, as long as a marriage was conducted by an episcopally-ordained priest—it did not matter where—the state recognised it. For the Church of Ireland, only the premises mattered.

Under powers that came from the old position of Lord Lieutenant General in Ireland from the 17th century, I had to sign if a new Church of Ireland church was created. There was a wonderful vellum scroll and illuminated manuscript—so much so that I was able to tell my wife that I felt like a lay bishop in the Church of Ireland. For Presbyterians it was different again: the persons were recognised, for the conduct of marriage, within the geography of a given presbytery, and marriage was not confined to a particular building or anything else.

We brought forward measures to try to equalise things, and in many ways we borrowed from changes made in Scotland. Some of the Churches were shaky on it at the time, but the smaller Protestant Churches were glad of our changes, because many that could conduct marriages on their premises only if a civil registrar was also present to verify it, were then able to conduct them under their own auspices and integrity of their rites and rituals.

At that time I made it clear to my officials that if demand emerged in relation to humanists or another belief system, we would have to address that. It did not emerge during the debates at the time, but I support the principle of it. I have said about other aspects of the Bill that all equality should be equal; the problem that some of us have with this Bill is that it is not equal in all cases in its central thrust of extending equality to same-sex couples. I supported the Bill on Second Reading and continue to support it, but I appeal to colleagues to stop jumping and hopping about here and there on the issue of when they want equality, and when they support and respect belief systems.

I have no problem with this Bill or any other measure respecting the belief system of humanism, and ensuring that people can achieve that. That is happening with legislation in the south of Ireland. I represent a border constituency. I am a Catholic who is part of a cross-border diocese. As a result of the Civil Registration (Amendment) Bill which passed the Oireachtas, later this year and certainly next year humanist marriages will be conducted in Ireland just over the border from my constituency. Just as many people who are married in church go over the border for those weddings, so too will people from my city for humanist weddings. I therefore have no principled opposition to new clause 15.

The legislation in Ireland gives the registrar general the capacity to recognise a secular body, which can in turn appoint people who would be registered to solemnise marriages. Like new clause 15, the Irish measure defines a secular body as one that must exist for at least five years and as a charity. The body cannot have profit making as one of its purposes. The legislation also describes such a body as

“an organised group of people who have secular, ethical and humanist beliefs in common.”

The Irish Attorney-General felt that that term would cover against any allegation that the provision was so specific that it related to one existing organisation only—the Humanist Association of Ireland. The Irish Attorney-General therefore found a way around—there is a specific and clear definition, but it is not open to the challenge that it is exclusively defined, which seems to be what the UK Attorney-General was saying. Those who support the principle of new clause 15 might want to look at the Irish wording as things progress.

It is right that hon. Members should be accommodating of a belief system that is not properly recognised in our marriage system and that they want such a belief system to be recognised in the Bill, but they should think about the speed with which they rejected emblematic, conscience amendments yesterday. People with other distinct belief systems feel a wee bit under threat and are concerned about slippery slopes. There was an attempt yesterday to make a concession and offer comfort by recognising such belief systems, but hon. Members decided they would not do so. Today, there is an opportunity to accommodate another belief system. Many hon. Members who rejected the accommodation of people’s belief systems yesterday back today’s proposal. I wish they would have supported both measures.

[Greg Mulholland]

As ever, the hon. Gentleman brings an interesting perspective from his experience. Regardless of the many different views—it is important to say that there are not just two views—it is incredibly disappointing that the Government, despite saying they would engage and listen, have accepted not a single amendment in Committee or on the Floor of the House. I am afraid that that is not an appropriate way in which to make a big change of this nature. Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern?

[Mark Durkan]

I absolutely share the hon. Gentleman’s concern. That will be one of the difficulties. The fewer amendments that are accepted in the House, the bigger the excuse for the other place to take longer, and to go more deeply and more wide ranging with amendments. People should be able to see that the House has given the Bill due consideration and added to it in a number of respects. If people wanted belt-and-braces protections in the Bill, and apps and widgets, to make them feel more secure and comfortable, why not give them? We should want people to feel more comfortable with the passage of the Bill, no matter what their reservations about its provenance. That is why I support amendments that make more people, such as humanists, feel included in the equality that the Bill extends.

Hon. Members should remember that we had a choice yesterday on civil partnerships for opposite-sex couples. The issue was ducked. We were told that the matter could be complicated and that there could be a review. I would like the people who supported that measure to feel included in the effort to extend equality in the Bill. I hope that that happens if the matter is raised in the other place. I do not believe that this will be the last the House sees of the Bill. The Bill will come back to us, because people are saying that we are being selective in adding to the Bill and widening its scope.

Some hon. Members argued against the civil partnerships amendments yesterday even though they support the principle of equality in civil partnerships. They argued that such a measure was not germane to the Bill, and that it took us beyond the Bill’s scope. However, the same people want an extension for humanist marriage—I agree with them—even though other hon. Members say that there is a risk and that it could raise far more complicated issues. The Attorney-General and the Government are not the only ones who must answer questions as to the inconsistency or strength of their argument. I have noted a lot of inconsistency in the House on how far we go to respect belief systems.