(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn at least four occasions over the past 18 months the Minister has told the public, the media, MPs and Members of the House of Lords that judges had full discretion, notwithstanding the four changes that he has agreed to make over the past 18 months. He cannot be right on all four occasions. Let me tell him what the House of Lords did, pursuant to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It put on the face of the Bill the balancing exercise that a judge should undertake, balancing on the one hand the public interest in the open and fair administration of justice and the public interest in making sure that there was no damage to our national security as a consequence of material being disclosed. In Committee the right hon. and learned Gentleman tried to tie the hands of that balancing exercise. In a new report last week from which I quoted, the Joint Committee said that he tried to do the very same thing. He is again arguing today why he is right and all the members of the Joint Committee are wrong.
I will give way to the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, then I will make some progress.
Does the right hon. Gentleman not appreciate that the bald choice that he is trying to make between national security and the administration of justice certainly applies when one is considering a public interest immunity certificate, because that removes the evidence completely from the consideration of the courts in the interests of national security? But the Wiley test that he referred to just does not apply when one is dealing with closed material procedures because there is a perfectly good argument—the right hon. Gentleman may not accept it—that the administration of justice is better served by at least the judge hearing all the evidence than the evidence being completely withdrawn and not being able to be taken into account at all.
That is exactly what the Supreme Court said in the al-Rawi case: that a judge has at his—I am afraid it mostly is “his”—disposal a number of tools to deal with issues that are sensitive and would create problems for national security. If an application for public interest immunity is made and the certificate is signed by a Minister, the judge will go through a number of loops. He will consider on an application ex parte whether, for example, it is possible to have a fair hearing using anonymity. He will decide whether it is possible to have a fair hearing with confidentiality rings. Imperfect as it is, it is one of the ways in which he will reach a conclusion after balancing the public interest in holding an open and fair administration of justice and the public interest and harm to our national security from disclosure. He does that anyway.
The problem that the Supreme Court recognised in its finding on al-Rawi is that at present the judge does not have the option of a CMP unless we give him that option. That is what the Bill seeks to do. We have explicitly stated in the Bill that there should be a balancing exercise by the judge. In Committee the Ministers tried to limit that. There is no balancing now. All a judge has to consider is whether the procedure is fair and effective, rather than a balance of what is in the public interest.
I am quoting what the Joint Committee said in its report last week, which the Minister finds so objectionable. After his amendments in Committee were defeated by one vote—the Lib Dems voted with Labour—the Joint Committee said that
“there is nothing in the Government’s revised clause 6”—
[Interruption]. The Minister might mutter, but the Committee said that
“there is nothing in the Government’s revised clause 6 which replaces it with anything requiring the court to balance the degree of harm to the interests of national security on the one hand against the public interest in the fair and open administration of justice on the other.”
For us, this is a failing. The test applied at the gateway is very important.
I will in just a second. I am sorry not to give way to the Chairman of the Committee at the moment, but I will before I finish.
I think I have made my point that people are grasping at the straws that keen human rights lawyers have presented to the critics of CMP, and trying to bring in a process to prevent them from happening. That would be the effect of most of the amendments. We have accepted the spirit of the JCHR’s amendments, and we have addressed the questions on unintended consequences.
Let us consider amendment 30 and the Wiley balance. I have just mentioned the unfettered discretion that we are giving to judges. Should we add to that discretion a confinement so that a judge would have to apply what is known as the Wiley balance, which is used in PII? I will not repeat the arguments used by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee and, I think, the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles. PII is not the same.
The amendment that the Opposition have been persuaded to table is not actually about the Wiley balance. Whoever drafted it has realised that that would not be quite good enough for their purposes, so they have altered it by adding the words “fair” and “open”. I do not understand how, having decided that national security would be at risk and that that would be relevant to the issues, and that such a measure would be necessary for the fair administration of justice, someone might then decide that they preferred open justice and that the evidence should be given in public anyway. That is a complete non sequitur, in a way. It would be slightly absurd to do that. It would be like saying to the judge, “If you agreed with the Green party and were against the policies in the Bill in the first place, you can now throw everything out anyway because you need to consider whether you would prefer open justice, after those three conditions have been satisfied.” That would be a slight non sequitur, and it is also a bit deceptive—not deliberately; I am not accusing anyone of acting improperly—to describe this proposal as the Wiley balance. It is the Wiley balance with bits added, which some ingenious lawyer has come up with to try to put a spoke in the wheels.
My right hon. Friend rightly says that in PII, because people do not like excluding all the evidence, there is a perfectly legitimate argument about how much we can gist and how much can be redacted, and then it can be put into the open court. But everything that does not get there is entirely left out; it is not available to claimant, judge, lawyers or anybody else. In a CMP, exactly the same thing can be done, because the judge will be required to consider how much we can gist, how much we can redact, and what can be shared with the defendant. The only difference is that in a CMP, the evidence, including, as my right hon. Friend said, some things that might be absolutely key to the case that cannot unfortunately be disclosed, can be considered by the judge. PII shuts out all that which is not possible to gist. With a CMP, there can be all the gisting and redaction that one wants, but all the evidence is considered.
As a Minister who signed a PII certificate in the Matrix Churchill case and was vindicated by the Scott inquiry for having done so, may I say, yes, of course, some things can be permitted through PII? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister said, the real issues that would damage national security cannot be considered either by the judge or by anyone else. My right hon. and learned Friend perhaps does not appreciate that even when closed procedures may be approved by the court, once special advocates have been appointed, if the special advocates, having had access to the secret material, put forward a convincing case to the judge that some of that need not continue to be held under closed procedures but can be held in open court, the judge, if so persuaded, is perfectly free to do so. The special advocates themselves, unlike their clients, can put forward that argument, and have done so in immigration cases, and that point has not been mentioned in this debate so far.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for that intervention but I am afraid that that response does not give me the comfort it obviously gives him.
In conclusion let me say a few words about new clause 2. Although I judge that the House is not with me on amendments 1 to 7, new clause 2—which will be taken as part of the same group—looks at how we can try to restrict the number of cases where CMPs are used. Proposed subsection (1) concerns circumstances in which the liberty of the individual is at stake. Ministers have confirmed recently to the Bill Committee that CMPs could be used in habeas corpus cases where an individual seeks to challenge their detention by the state. Although such cases may not be common, the current Bill would leave us in a position whereby an individual losing their habeas corpus claim could, as a result of a CMP, remain imprisoned without knowing why. Subsection (1) of new clause 2 seeks to rule out such a possibility by ensuring that a CMP will not be available
“where the outcome could result in, contribute to, or impede efforts to challenge the imprisonment; or continued detention of a party, whether in the UK or overseas.”
Subsection (2)(a) of new clause 2 aims to ensure that a CMP cannot be used by the Government to cover up some of the most serious international crimes—for example where genocide or torture are at issue. That is fairly straightforward, as there is clear public interest in those proceedings taking place in as open and even-handed way as possible, and the use of a CMP would be entirely at odds with that aim.
Finally, subsection (2)(b) aims to ensure that material will not be withheld in a CMP where doing so may result in the wrongful imprisonment or death of an individual, whether in the UK or overseas. For example, that could apply where an individual potentially faces capital charges on the basis of “evidence” extracted under torture, as with Binyam Mohamed.
I will now conclude my speech, but let me say that an awful lot of people are watching the House tonight. Although I accept that my words are the minority view in this Chamber, huge numbers of people are deeply concerned about the direction in which closed material proceedings would take us. I hope that hon. Members will be mindful of that when the matter is put to a vote.
The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) does no service to the causes in which she believes by the extraordinary exaggeration of her remarks, although she is not the only one. I noticed, for example, that Shami Chakrabarti—who really ought to know better—referred to:
“Government arguments for morphing British courts into shadowy Soviet-style commissions”,
and that Amnesty International said that the system could come
“straight from the pages of a Kafka novel”.
The hon. Lady must try to rely on facts and not on rhetoric. For example, we have the constant use of the phrase “secret courts” but there are to be no secret courts. We are talking about cases in which the vast majority of evidence will be heard in open session. If closed material procedures do apply, they will apply usually to a very modest part of the total evidence. Thousands of civil cases are brought each year and estimates for how many cases would be affected by CMPs are somewhere between seven and 15 a year. The idea that we are transforming our society into one in which civil liberties are not recognised does not bear credence.
I have been somewhat amused by the extraordinary affection that has grown over the past 15 years for public interest immunity certificates. As I mentioned earlier, I signed one of those and I remember hearing howls of execration from the Labour Benches at the time and from the whole civil liberties movement. We were told that public interest immunity certificates were going to send innocent people to jail and do all sorts of terrible things that were incompatible with a free society. Well, we have moved on. Those who denigrated PIIs now see them as a way of preserving our liberties against evil Governments, intelligence agencies and the like.
Let us consider the views of those who have had greatest involvement in such matters, and remind the House what has been said by two people when comparing PIIs with closed material procedures. Lord Carlile, formerly a Liberal Democrat Member of this House and independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, said:
“CMP hearings, with special advocates representing the interests of the individual litigant concerned, are fairer and more searching than the significantly more secretive PII hearings process.”
Lord Justice Woolf, in addition to other remarks that have been cited, said he thought Lord Carlile was right and that
“in most situations that are covered by the Bill the result will be preferable to both sides”—
that is crucial; it will be preferable not just to the Government or the defendants, but to the plaintiff as well—
“if the closed hearing procedure is adopted rather than PII, because PII has the very unfortunate effect that you cannot rely on the material that is in issue, whereas both the claimant and the Government”—
not just the Government; the claimant as well—
“may want to rely on that material. That is a good reason for having the closed-hearing procedure.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 July 2012; Vol. 738, c. 1189.]
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman clarify whether that is the same Lord Carlile who argued endlessly in defence and justification of 90-days pre-charge detention?
I have no idea whether it is the same one or not; that will be a matter for Lord Carlile to deal with. He has served this country extremely well in these sensitive areas, and the hon. Gentleman should take account of that.
The whole problem is that the critics of these measures fail to take into account two things. First, although there can of course be qualifications under PII, including redactions and witnesses giving their evidence behind a screen, the core of the secret material cannot be revealed to the plaintiff without it being revealed to the whole world. It is not just a question of the plaintiff hearing it. Those of us who are privileged to serve on the Intelligence and Security Committee have seen examples of the intelligence material that would have had to be revealed if certain cases had not been settled at huge cost to the taxpayer.
In response to a comment by the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), I must point out that this is not just a question of the identity of an individual agent or officer being revealed. It goes far beyond that, because that person could be protected by a screen or by being given anonymity in court in some other way. It is also a question of evidence involving operating methods, for example. The material could reveal how the intelligence agencies quite lawfully obtain their evidence.
It is worth reminding those who are going to vote against the Government how thankful we are that there have been no further terrorist outrages in this country since the 7/7 bombings. In every year since then, major terrorist plots have been prevented by the work of the intelligence agencies, and much of that work relied on obtaining highly sensitive information, sometimes from individuals who were not intelligence officers but who came from the very organisations and communities in which the plots were being hatched. If the methods by which such information is obtained cannot be kept secret, no one should come to the House saying how much they regret some future terrorist incident if that incident has taken place because the agencies have been prevented from getting the support and co-operation that they need.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
I want to make one other point, if I may.
The other element that critics of the Bill do not take into account is that much of the information we are talking about can relate to misunderstandings on the part of the terrorists or criminals, who sometimes do not realise when their conversations are being listened to or when their property has been entered under lawful warrants and information obtained. They do not realise how stupid some of the precautions are that they take to protect their evil plans. That kind of information cannot be released in court. The plaintiff might be an innocent person, but if the information is released in court, it becomes available to the whole world, including the terrorist organisations and criminals themselves.
I am moved by the impassioned nature of my right hon. and learned Friend’s response to this matter. He is quite right; this is a serious matter and no one doubts that. Is it not strange, however, that some of the information that we are accused of passing on comes from the American court system? We have been held accountable by American intelligence for that as though it were a fault on our part. If the Americans are able to maintain their tradition of an open court system, why should we not do so?
I know the case that my hon. Friend is referring to, but that is not really the point at issue. The point is that when intelligence agencies, including the British ones, share information with their friends and allies from other countries, they do so on the strict condition that that information will not enter the public domain without their permission. This is not so much a question of whether the information in a particular document might be harmful; it is a principle, and that principle must not be breached.
I am conscious of the time, and I want to make a few more points, if my hon. Friend will forgive me.
This point goes to the heart of what Lord Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice, has said. The plaintiffs themselves will sometimes benefit from the arrangements, as well as the Government who are defending the case. I can think of current cases, some of which are controversial, in which information given to the judge about the activities of the intelligence agencies some years ago could well help the plaintiff as well as the Government.
Furthermore, if it was suggested that a particular closed material procedure had been drawn too widely to include information that did not need to be protected, the benefit of the special advocate system is that if the advocate was doing their job properly, they would raise the matter with the judge. If the judge was satisfied that the breadth of the closed material procedure needed to be reduced, the evidence in question could be heard in open court.
My right hon. and learned Friend makes a powerful point regarding the interests of the plaintiff. If a PII certificate were to be utilised in such circumstances, the plaintiff would have no chance of taking advantage of any conduct on the part of the intelligence agencies and others that could result in his action being successful.
My right hon. and learned Friend is right.
That leads me to my final point, which goes to the heart of the Opposition’s amendment. It concerns the so-called Wiley balancing act, in which a judgment must be made on whether national security is more important than the administration of justice. Of course that is relevant for PII, because that is the absolute choice that has to be made in those circumstances, but the whole point of closed material procedures—unlike PII—is that the evidence will be available to the judge. The administration of justice cannot but be helped if the judge has access to all the relevant information. So the Wiley balancing act is simply not relevant in such cases. The judge must be satisfied that there is a risk to national security, and he will have the last word on that. At that point, a closed material procedure will be granted, and that is the least bad option. We do not argue that CMPs are a good option, that they are desirable or that they are ideal. They are far from that, but they are better than the alternatives and, sometimes in this imperfect world, this is the only responsible way to behave.
I shall try to be brief, as I know that other Members wish to speak. It is a pleasure to follow my colleague, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). I am sure that it was music to the Minister’s ears to hear a speech from his own Benches in support of the Bill. I know that he welcomes the fact that there have been a number of speeches from the Opposition Benches, of which this is another, that are broadly in support of the Bill.
There are two fundamental arguments in favour of the direction that the Government are taking. The first is the need to deal with the present inability of the security and intelligence agencies to defend themselves against civil claims. That point has been debated over the past few hours. My right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) did the House a great service by reminding us that we are talking not about bits of paper, but about human sources of intelligence. We are talking about human beings, and the agencies have a fundamental responsibility to protect the lives of those people. Even in the course of protecting their own interests, they can do nothing to undermine the safety and security of those people. Those are vital obligations to human beings, not to scraps of paper with information written on them. The idea that any serious judge would grant closed material proceedings in relation to intelligence that might prove embarrassing or slightly awkward for an agency is preposterous. This is all about highly sensitive intelligence, about sources and about methods.
The second element that makes the legislation imperative is the need to make the agencies themselves more accountable. I do not want to see a PII one-way street that allows an agency to hide material completely or to settle out of court. If intelligence exists that there has been wrongdoing in the agencies, I want that evidence to be considered by the judge and to be weighed in the balance when conclusions are reached.
Reflecting on the debates on these matters, I believe that it should be possible to close the gap between the Front Benches on the ability of the judge to choose the appropriate route to take. I think I heard the Minister say earlier that, even at this late stage, he was prepared to go away and give further consideration to that issue. If there are further opportunities to do so, I hope that he and my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) will reach consensus on this point. The Minister has come some way towards that by tabling amendment 47, and that is helpful. The court must now be satisfied that the Secretary of State has considered whether to make an application for PII, and that goes some way in the right direction. I encourage him and my right hon. Friend to try to close what remains of the gap between them. As far as I am concerned, the last resort should be the PII. I cannot agree with the hierarchy set out by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). I want less secrecy and there is less secrecy through closed material proceedings.
On the Wiley test and the substantive difference that clearly still exists between the two Front Benches, I urge further and fresh consideration, if that is possible. I am not a lawyer, as may be evident to anyone who has ever heard me speak on these matters, but if the decision is whether the material should be in or out, then a test of open justice is a fair test, and that is the test that applies in PII. However, if the decision is about closed material proceedings, then, frankly, that is a decision about whether the material is fully in or not fully in. If a judge can see it but others cannot, and if the merits of a particular piece of intelligence can be weighed by the judge, clearly that is a more difficult and complex judgment. It therefore does not surprise me, as a non-lawyer, to know that a different test from the Wiley test may need to be applied.
Amendment 30, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting, sets the bar too high, but I encourage further consideration wherever possible. There are various stages to the closed material procedure. There has to be consideration on whether to enter the process in the first place, and on whether the process should end. Therefore, there has to be an appropriate test and further thought on it, but I think that my right hon. Friend sets the bar too high.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI suppose we should take the welcome. We should take it from someone who never got a freeze, let alone a cut, who never protected our rebate but who gave it away, and who told us that we were going to be marginalised, isolated and picking fights in an empty room. But I welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s welcome. Thank you. I did not quite get a thank you, but I will give him a thank you for the non-thank you.
The right hon. Gentleman asked a lot of questions. Let me go through them. On agriculture, he asked whether there was more to do on reducing the budget, given that it represented only 1% of European industry. Yes, there is, although we have taken some steps forward. The common agricultural policy budget pillar one goes from €320 billion to €277 billion, which is a significant change. In terms of what grew in the budget that can help to deliver growth and jobs, we have the Connecting Europe Facility, which is about energy, transport and broadband networks. That goes from €8 billion in the last seven-year period to €19 billion in this period, so I do not think it is entirely fair to say that the right things were not increased or that the right things were not cut. I said in my statement that I was disappointed that we did not go further on the central bureaucracy.
We did have a discussion on north Africa and Mali. The right hon. Gentleman is wrong to say that the European development fund will go down; it will go up by €1 billion. On Mali, there was very little time left at the end of the marathon Council to discuss those issues, but I took the opportunity to praise the French President for the brave action that the French have taken, to offer our strong support, and to say that we would contribute by training troops from west African nations. I have spoken to the Nigerian President, who is in London today, about that issue. Most of all, however, a political strategy is needed alongside the military efforts.
On the gap between ceilings and payments, the gap is between €960 billion on commitments and €908.4 billion on payments. That is just over 5%, which is not untypical, given the experience of recent years. The European Commission thought that that gap was deliverable, so I think that answers that question. On EU-US trade, I spoke to President Obama about half an hour ago, and I think we are making progress. I will continue strongly to push and support that measure. On the issue of how we use the European Union to encourage growth, one of the greatest things we can do is to complete the single market in digital, in energy and in services, and it is this Government, working with allies, who are delivering precisely that.
On the overall deal, there is a real need to ensure that the European Parliament supports it. We are often challenged about the friends we have in Europe, but I would challenge the right hon. Gentleman about his friends there. What is he going to say to his friends in the Party of European Socialists who are condemning this deal, condemning the British action and saying that we should not be constraining European spending? Will he confirm today that Labour MEPs will be voting for this budget? Answer? The head moved a little bit. While he is at it, is it not time to confirm whether his party will back an in/out referendum? Labour’s claim is that the greatest problem is uncertainty, but what could be more uncertain than not knowing whether you are for it or against it? Any progress? It is not a day for answers, but it is a day for celebrating the fact that we have cut the budget for the first time in history.
The Prime Minister has been successful in winning the most important reform of the EU budget since Margaret Thatcher in Fontainebleau in 1984. Does my right hon. Friend agree that his achievement, and the success last week of a most acceptable reform of the common fisheries policy, demonstrates how many of the United Kingdom’s objectives can be achieved by serious and professional negotiation with our allies? Does he accept also that our objectives—for example, the working time directive—can be achieved, as he did with the EU budget and as the United Kingdom did with the CFP, by working with the close allies we have on so many of these subjects?
I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend, and it is worth paying tribute to Baroness Thatcher, because what makes the British rebate different from the other rebates is that it does not have to be renewed in each seven-year term: it is there as part of the architecture of the budget, and unless you are foolish enough to give some of it away, which the last Government did, it is there and can only be amended by unanimity.
I agree with what my right hon. and learned Friend says about working with allies, but I would also say this, which is relevant to what Margaret Thatcher achieved at Fontainebleau: everyone in the European Union has got to understand that you are prepared to say no if you do not get what you want.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the right hon. Gentleman for his response. I think there is genuine cross-party agreement, not just on our response to this dreadful event but about the thinking that needs to be done on how to tackle these problems in the future, and I welcome what he has said. He is right to say this was premeditated murder, and he is right to say we need to understand the nature of the threat and learn the lessons of the past.
Turning to his individual questions, on the British Government’s work with the companies involved, all the major companies have been contacted across the region. All of them have put in place procedures for heightened security. Crucially, we have asked all of them to update their consular information. When these events happen, one of the first things that needs to be done is to try to be absolutely clear about who is employed, who is contracted, and who is in the country and who is not.
I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that we are not seeking a combat role in Mali. We believe that we should be supporting the French, who have taken emergency action to stop Mali being overtaken by what is effectively an al-Qaeda-backed group of rebels. Our help for the French will be discussed again at the National Security Council tomorrow. We have lent them two C-17s. We propose to continue with that, and will be looking at other transport and surveillance assets that we can let the French use to help them in what they are doing.
The right hon. Gentleman is right to say that the answer on the security front is to train up African soldiers, and that they should play the lead role. Some African soldiers are already in Mali from west African states, and others will be arriving soon. On who should have the co-ordinating role, ECOWAS has been encouraged to take the lead, and there is also the backing of a UN resolution that was secured before Christmas.
The right hon. Gentleman is also correct to say that what we are dealing with are distinct organisations in different countries, some of them more connected to al-Qaeda than others. I think that we need to make sure that we deal with each one individually, while recognising that there are some commonalities. We are trying to break up these problems and deal with them individually, rather than pose one global response to the challenge. As I tried to say in my statement, we need to show patience and intelligence as well as toughness and resolution.
In terms of what the Government need to do to step up our contacts with the region, the point was well made. We have had National Security Council discussions on the Sahel and I have appointed my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Mr O'Brien) as my envoy to the region. There is obviously a huge amount of French influence on the region and we have been less well represented. I do not want us to try to track or double up with other allies on this, but we should be working together, and that is what we are focused on.
In terms of the African Union and ECOWAS, we should be helping to build their capacity for the future. The right hon. Gentleman was also right to raise the point about Libyan weapons. The British Government have stepped up our engagement with Libya at all levels to help with the challenge of security and removing so many weapons from their society. In terms of what he said about stepping up our development, diplomatic and other resources in the region, that is very much something we need to consider.
Finally, I think that the right hon. Gentleman’s point about the Arab spring being a long-term benefit for the region, despite the difficulties that the move to democracy can sometimes engender, is correct. I think it is wrong to believe that vicious, dictatorial regimes such as Gaddafi’s somehow made our world safer; they did not. That is not just in terms of people living in Lockerbie, because we still have the problems of Gaddafi-supplied Semtex in Northern Ireland and all the terrorism that was engendered by his regime.
May I pay tribute to the Prime Minister for the sober and realistic way in which he has treated this crisis and for his strategy for the future? I suggest that the strategy needs two essential ingredients. First, we must work with the natural leaders of north Africa and west Africa. Nigeria, which he mentioned, and Algeria not only will be decisive in this crisis, but share a common interest in defeating international terrorism. Secondly, does he agree that we need to work to isolate the jihadi terrorists from the other insurgents in Mali and other countries who have local grievances? That suggests the need for a political strategy, not merely a military one.
My right hon. and learned Friend sets out extremely well the twin aims of working with African leaders and isolating the terrorists. If we look at the case of Somalia, which is a badly broken and fractured state that is trying to recover from years of civil war, terrorism and other abuses, we will see that the international community is demonstrating working with African leaders and trying to disengage terrorists from other organisations. That is the way forward to try patiently to rebuild those countries.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the right hon. Gentleman for his support and his words. He is right that there is no justification for this hostage-taking and we will continue to do everything we can to hunt the people down who were responsible for this and other such terrorist outrages. I will take his questions in turn.
First, it is vital that the families get all the support possible. Police liaison officers are attached to each family and can keep them updated with any additional or new information. BP is obviously doing everything it can to provide support as well. BP has made an important statement this morning, which sets out what it has done to repatriate BP staff from Algeria. Three flights left Algeria yesterday, carrying a total of 11 BP employees. We are providing a back-up service to ensure that if there are gaps in what BP is able to do we can fill them.
The right hon. Gentleman’s second question on the security of other installations is vital. We are co-ordinating urgently with British and western oil companies in the region about their security in the light of this incident. All installations in Algeria are on a state of high alert and additional security measures will be put in place where necessary. We have also taken precautions to ensure the security of diplomatic posts in the region, and have given them advice.
The right hon. Gentleman mentions travel advice. That is an important issue. We continue to advise against all but essential travel to Algeria. We also advise against all but essential travel to areas within 450 km of the Mali and Niger borders, and within 100 km of the Mauritanian border. The travel advice has been updated to read:
“A serious terrorist attack has taken place near the town of In Amenas near the Algerian border with Libya… The Algerian security forces have subsequently conducted operations in the area.”
It remains a very dangerous, uncertain and fluid situation.
The motives and precise identity of the terrorists are always difficult to determine at such an early stage. What we know is that the terrorist threat in the Sahel comes from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which aspires to establish Islamic law across the Sahel and northern Africa, and to attack western interests in the region and, frankly, wherever it can.
The right hon. Gentleman rightly asked about the growth of the threat from this part of the world. It is growing and is rightly a focus for us and other countries. Just as we have reduced the scale of the al-Qaeda threat in parts of the world, including in Pakistan and Afghanistan, so the threat has grown in other parts of the world. We need to be equally concerned about that and equally focused on it.
I hope that I have answered the right hon. Gentleman’s questions. There is a great need for not just Britain but other countries to give a priority to understanding better and working better with the countries in this region. The Government held a National Security Council meeting quite recently on this area and I have appointed my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Mr O’Brien) to be a special envoy to the region. The region obviously has a great French influence and many contacts with France, but we believe that it is important in our own national interest to thicken and improve our contacts with these countries. We must do that as part of the lessons to be learned from this exercise.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his questions and the way in which he put them. It is difficult to answer further questions, particularly on numbers, but I will keep the House and the country updated.
The Prime Minister will recall Churchill’s remark that north Africa is the “soft underbelly” of Europe. Does he agree that that is true today, and that al-Qaeda-inspired or directed terrorism is as much of a threat to the people of this country and of Europe as to the unfortunate people who live in that region? Given that the United Kingdom traditionally has not had a strong presence in this part of north Africa, will the Prime Minister agree that there is a powerful case for a much stronger political, diplomatic and intelligence effort in the region, as part of a co-ordinated strategy with our European and American allies, and the wider international community?
My right hon. and learned Friend is right in both regards. Those who believe that there is a terrorist, extremist al-Qaeda problem in parts of north Africa, but that it is a problem for those places and we can somehow back off and ignore it are profoundly wrong. This is a problem for those places and for us. We need to be absolutely clear about that, particularly in our support of the French action in Mali, where it is vital that we do not allow an al-Qaeda-sponsored regime to take over the entire country. He is also right that we need to give proper priority in our strategic thinking and our strategic defence reviews to this area of the world. The Government are now doing that, but I am sure that there is more work that we need to do.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe practical effect of the Bill is exactly as my hon. Friend recommends, although it may have been drafted with a few too many provisos and provisions because of the deep suspicion with which these things are regarded. Essentially, however, we do not think that Norwich Pharmacal should apply to intelligence material provided in confidence to the British security services.
I will not take too long on this because the argument is perfectly straightforward, but I want to tell the House that these are not false fears. Over the past year, we have picked up concerns from human agents. They have always been concerned about the degree to which their relationships can be protected, of course, but they are now becoming really concerned about disclosure to the British courts. Sir Daniel Bethlehem, a former legal adviser to the Foreign Office, told the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the flow of intelligence from the United States was being limited. He said that he did not want to exaggerate, but the point was that the trust of the United States had been weakened and that trust needed to be restored.[Official Report, 8 January 2013, Vol. 556, c. 3MC.]
Arguments tend to break out as to whether agents have any reason to be fearful, but that is not totally the point. As long as, as a result of hearing about the extraordinary process called Norwich Pharmacal, other intelligence agencies and our agents think that there is always a risk of disclosure by the British courts, the damage is done. To follow the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), what on earth are we running that risk for?
In support of what my right hon. and learned Friend has just said, I should say that the Intelligence and Security Committee has taken extensive evidence on the matter in both the United Kingdom and Washington in respect of the likelihood or actuality of damage to very important information that prevents or might prevent terrorist incidents in the United Kingdom. We are satisfied that my right hon. and learned Friend’s point is entirely valid and that the House should take it into account.
I close my case, as they say; there is no need for me to carry on addressing the House about Norwich Pharmacal. We wait to hear what points might be raised about it.
I move on to part 1 of the Bill, to which I think the House should have much more regard. It deals with the important issue of parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence agencies. I suggest to both sides of the House that if we wish to be reassured about the accountability of our security services and really try to guarantee to ourselves that they are not misbehaving, we should look to stronger parliamentary oversight as well as to more accountability to the courts.
It is time to put the Intelligence and Security Committee, chaired by my right hon. and learned Friend, on a much stronger footing and to enhance its independence to strengthen the valuable work it has done so far. We have to give Parliament more effective oversight of the intelligence and security agencies.
The ISC operates within arrangements established by Parliament in 1994, but the nature of the Committee’s work has changed dramatically. In the past 18 years, particularly since 9/11, the public profile, budgets and operational demands on the agencies have all significantly increased, but there has been no change in the statutory arrangements for oversight. In the past, the ISC has overseen operational matters but has done so relatively infrequently and generally at the direct invitation of the Prime Minister. The ISC has no statutory powers to oversee such matters. Its statutory remit is also limited to oversight of the security and intelligence agencies, although it has long heard evidence from the wider intelligence community.
At the moment, the Prime Minister receives its report and appoints its members. Currently, the heads of the security and intelligence agencies are permitted, in certain circumstances, to withhold information from it. We can certainly improve on that. We need to give the ISC greater teeth to ensure that we can continue to have confidence in those who oversee the agencies on our behalf.
The Bill provides that the ISC will in future be able to oversee the agencies’ operations, within appropriate constraints. The Committee will also in future report to Parliament, as well as the Prime Minister. Its members will be appointed by Parliament, after nomination by the Prime Minister. The power to withhold information from the ISC will move from the agency heads to the Secretary of State responsible for that agency—a Minister accountable to the House. It will be a parliamentary Committee. We are greatly strengthening our powers to hold accountable those who do such vital work for our country.
I have the greatest respect for the Wright Committee and we will consider the matter further, although I am not instantly attracted by that proposal. We are moving to a situation in which the Chairman of the ISC will be elected by the Committee and the Committee itself will be elected by the whole House from a list approved first by the Prime Minister. On reflection, I think that the problem with a system whereby the House could elect whoever it liked, subject to a prime ministerial veto, is that it would be an Exocet that was hugely embarrassing to use. It is not impossible—I hope that it is not too fanciful—to envisage a case where the security services have satisfied the Prime Minister that there is some problem with a particular Member of this House of which the wider world is completely unaware. [Interruption.] That is not unknown; I am sure that it has happened in the experience of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). The idea that the Prime Minister must suddenly issue a veto on the result of an election carried out in this House is probably a step too far, and I think that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Chairman of the ISC, agreed with me when we discussed this very matter not too long ago.
My right hon. and learned Friend nods his head in approval.
The arrangements that we are proposing for a stronger Committee will in some cases be underpinned by a memorandum of understanding between the Government and the Committee. The MOU will set out the arrangements at a level of detail far beyond that which need be put in this Bill. We have reached the stage of discussing the terms of that MOU with the Committee. I have had some extremely constructive discussions with my right hon. and learned Friend and other members of the Committee about the Bill. We will bring forward other amendments if necessary to make clear the ISC’s increased connection to Parliament and provide it with some statutory immunities to assist in this work.
I apologise for the length of time that I have taken in introducing the Bill, but I have given way generously. It is the kind of Bill where there should not be serious argument about the principle, but the details are extremely important in a country which has high regard to the rule of law and does not to want to risk abuse of process in any proper case. That is why I commend its Second Reading to the House. To reject it and stay with the status quo would be to continue a quite intolerable situation that is not only unacceptable to the agencies, which cannot defend their reputations, but should be unacceptable to the taxpayer, who has to pay for some of these settlements, and to any citizen who wants a judge to have the chance to make a judgment on the issues.
In my opinion, for all the reasons I have given, the Bill strengthens the accountability of our intelligence agencies and GCHQ to the courts and to this House. It supports our belief in justice, the rule of law and the liberal, democratic principles that underpin this country. I trust that the House will therefore be content to give it a Second Reading.
As Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I will concentrate my comments on the proposed reforms of the ISC in part 1 of the Bill.
It is easy for me and the Committee to welcome part 1, because 95% of it is exactly what we recommended to the Government many months ago. We pay tribute to them for being willing to accept such a radical change in the powers relating to independent oversight in the United Kingdom. The system has been imperfect since 1994, as has been commented on in the past. I can say with confidence that if the proposals in part 1 are implemented, the United Kingdom will have a system of independent intelligence oversight with the powers that are necessary to make it effective. It will be one of the most powerful systems of independent oversight in the western world.
It is worth remembering for a moment why independent oversight is crucial in an open society. Our intelligence agencies have and need to have powers which, if used by other citizens, would be a breach of the criminal law. Given that situation, the agencies are the first to acknowledge that it is essential in a parliamentary democracy for there to be not only Government accountability, but accountability to Parliament and the public. The agencies use some £2 billion of resources. That is a lot of money and it has to be justified, particularly in difficult times.
From time to time, it will be necessary, as it has been in the past, to criticise the agencies when something foolish, unwise or unacceptable takes place. However, the agencies also appreciate that the power of genuine, independent oversight means that they can be defended if, as happens occasionally, they are unfairly criticised or attacked and cannot defend themselves. For obvious reasons, if the Government try to defend them, there is seen to be a potential conflict of interests. That does not apply in the case of genuine, independent oversight. For example, in the 7/7 bombings inquiry, the Intelligence and Security Committee was able to point to some of the unfair accusations that were being made.
What are the reforms that are crucial in transforming the role of independent oversight in the United Kingdom? First, until now—including as I speak—the Intelligence and Security Committee has been a committee of parliamentarians, but not a Committee of Parliament. That is going to change. For the first time, the last word on whether the proposed members of the Committee are acceptable will be with the House of Commons and the House of Lords. As has been said, the Chairman of the Committee will in future be appointed not by the Prime Minister, as I was, but by the Committee itself.
The Committee will report to Parliament. At the moment, it reports to the Prime Minister and only through the Prime Minister do its reports reach this place. Some redactions will, of course, be necessary. There will be occasions, as there have been in the past, when the ISC reports on such sensitive matters that it will, in practice, report only to the Prime Minister because the material overwhelmingly cannot come into the public domain. Nevertheless, for the first time, we will have a parliamentary Committee that is parliamentary in the sense of other Committees, except where the need for the respect of secret information continues to require some differences of treatment.
The second major change is in relation to operations. I will differ slightly from my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister without Portfolio in saying that the extent to which the Intelligence and Security Committee has already been involved, through agreement with the agencies, in looking at operations and sensitive material is not exceptional or occasional, but substantial. Nevertheless, there has been no statutory basis to it. That is crucial, because operations are what the agencies are about to a considerable degree and are where parliamentary and public concern can be most manifest. It is profoundly unsatisfactory that, until now, there has been no meaningful statutory role for the Committee in relation to operations.
I point out to my right hon. and learned Friend that that situation means that refusal is possible and is too easy in circumstances where embarrassment is involved. I can think of at least one case in which I feel that that happened during my time on the Committee.
I agree with my right hon. Friend. There has to be an ultimate right for the Prime Minister to decline to allow the Committee to receive certain information. However, until now, the agencies have been able to exercise that power. To be fair to them, they have rarely, if ever, tried to do so.
On operations, the statutory basis is crucial. The Committee has accepted that our oversight of operations should be retrospective. We do not wish to interfere in ongoing operations. That would be unreasonable and would put an intolerable burden on the agencies. As long as the oversight is retrospective and there is a significant national interest—we will have debates over what that phrase means—I believe that there is a sound basis.
Thirdly, until now, the Intelligence and Security Committee has been able only to request information from the agencies, not require it. To be fair to the agencies, they have not, for all practical purposes, ever refused us information, but they have been in control of the information that has been provided. Real problems have emerged over the years. On some occasions, it has been found, subsequent to the publication of a report, that important documents had simply not been made available to the Committee. That may not have been done in bad faith, but the consequence was embarrassment for the agencies and for the system of independent oversight. That cannot be allowed to continue.
We have also found that when the agencies have responded to a requirement of the courts, the resources and the time that they have devoted to finding every relevant document have been slightly greater than for a Committee that can only request information and not require it. That is going to change. I pay tribute to the agencies for accepting the need to make this change. The Committee will now have the power to require information from the agencies, including information on operations, subject to one or two important safeguards.
I come now to the crucial difference. Until now, the problem has been that although the agencies hold vast amounts of information on any given subject, we do not expect them, when we request information, to fill several forklift trucks with information and dump it at our offices. That would be absurd, and we will not expect that when we require information in the future. However, until now, the agencies have done the editing themselves. Even if it is done entirely in good faith, that does not enable the Committee to be confident that it has seen all the information that it would wish to see before it brings forward its proposals.
We have proposed that we will appoint additional staff—assistants to the Committee, who will be our employees and be answerable to us—who will go to the agencies when we require information on a particular subject from them and discuss all the information, including the raw material, that they have in their files. I pay tribute again to the Government and the agencies for agreeing to that. I hope that there will be a process of agreement and discussion, but at the end of the day, it will be our staff who decide which parts of the available material the Committee is likely to want to see. We, Parliament and the public will therefore be able to have confidence that the decision will be taken by the Committee itself, not by the agencies, however much they would be trying to do their best in good faith.
That is an enormous culture change for MI6, MI5 and GCHQ to accept. For the first time in their history they will be not just providing information to people who are not employees of the agencies or part of the Government—we are not part of the Government, and in future we will be part of Parliament—but allowing them to come into their offices, see material and discuss what the ISC would like to evaluate. I pay tribute to the agencies for accepting that. Of course they have some reservations and concerns, and a memorandum of understanding is being discussed. It is referred to in the Bill and will be published in due course. It will explain in greater detail how the system will work on a day-to-day basis. We may have to review it in a year or two in the light of experience.
I pay tribute also to both Her Majesty’s Government and Her Majesty’s Opposition, because such a change is not just a potential rod for the back of the agencies but will occasionally create problems for the Government of the day. Both Front-Bench teams know that the Bill will mean that intelligence oversight will have the teeth that it has not had in the past, because it will be on a statutory basis and include the real powers that I have described. That is why I and the Committee feel confident in saying that we will have a tougher, more effective and more reliable system of oversight than we have ever had in our history or than can currently be found in almost any country in the western world or globally.
I pay tribute to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his leadership of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I do not think we would have quite such robust proposals had it not been for his work.
May I remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman of one small point? As the Bill is drafted, it would prevent the Committee from examining ongoing operations. If the Government were to ask us to consider a matter that was ongoing and not retrospective, that would be forbidden. The Bill therefore needs to be amended on that point.
I must first reciprocate the right hon. Lady’s compliment. She has made an enormous and much-respected contribution to the Committee’s work.
The right hon. Lady raises an important point. Of course we accept that our oversight of operations must be retrospective and on matters of significant national interest. However, there have been circumstances in which the Prime Minister of the day has invited the Committee to examine an ongoing operation on some specific matter. In addition, there are sometimes occasions when, because of leaks and press awareness, an ongoing operation becomes a matter of public discussion and debate. There must be flexibility in the Bill to allow the Committee to examine such matters. The House should feel confident that, although we wish a number of improvements to be made in Committee, we are entering a new phase of intelligence oversight.
I want to say a few words about part 2 of the Bill. A number of my right hon. and hon. Friends who serve on the Committee will undoubtedly wish to speak about it as well. It goes without saying that closed material proceedings are not very satisfactory, but in the imperfect world in which we live, the choice is sometimes between good solutions and bad solutions but more often between bad solutions and worse solutions. As has been said, public interest immunity is not a feasible alternative. The £2 million settlement that was made just a couple of weeks ago was a case to which intelligence material would have been central if it had gone to court. There could not have been PII, because that would have excluded all the material. That leaves us to introduce a system that, as the former Lord Chief Justice Lord Woolf has said, is certainly preferable to PII. I say to hon. Members who still have their doubts that the system is not perfect, but it is a lot better than the one we have at the moment. That is why it is in the national interest to support the Bill.
Having served on the Intelligence and Security Committee for more than a decade after it was first established, I warmly welcome the action of Ministers in introducing these new provisions. I have some slight reservations about improvements that are needed, but the measure is a good indication of the importance that the Government attach to the effective oversight of intelligence.
Much of my time on the Committee was deeply rewarding, and gave me a great deal of respect for the people who work in our intelligence services or assist them. Sometimes, however, it was like drilling into hard rock, and the drill had not got through the rock by the time I left the Committee. There were still many areas where the Committee did not have the information that it ought to have had to make the right kinds of judgment.
The value of the Committee rests only partly on its reports, which it makes to the Prime Minister. In future, it will make reports to Parliament. There has been reference to an annual report: the Committee makes numerous reports on different matters, and occasionally it has to make a report exclusively to the Prime Minister because none of the content can be revealed, so provision is made for that. The Committee’s value also rests on the fact that it gives confidence to the House and to colleagues that there are people who have enough access to know whether there is likely to be incompetence, illegality or unacceptable behaviour going on. The Committee provides reassurance that if that were the case, it would challenge it. To do so, it needs depth of knowledge, which means being aware of what is going on operationally.
Some of the definitions in the Bill are capable of benign use, but could also be put to hostile use, and could be used to restrict information. I do not think that that is the intention, but they could be improved significantly. The right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) made a point about ongoing operations, and I think that that is a limiting provision. When does an operation end? Many of our operations against terrorism are ongoing for as long as we think there is a threat, but we have to know what is happening. If we look back to the period leading up to the Finucane murder, for example, it would have been wrong, if the ISC had existed then, for it not to have had some understanding of the relationship between the Security Service and military units such as the force research unit and the basis on which information might be released by agencies and get into the hands of paramilitary organisations. The Committee needs that level of understanding to meet the test I described, so the wording needs to be adapted. It would be wrong, and a terrible mistake, if the Committee knew who was serving as agents and what handlers were finding in particular cases at particular times. That information should be kept as narrowly as possible, but allowing understanding of the operation, why it is being conducted and on what lines is significant.
My right hon. Friend may like to know that part of the intention of the reforms is to ensure that we receive regular—probably quarterly— reports on the spectrum of agency activity, including operations, subject to retrospection and significant national interest. That gives us a broader awareness of the totality of agencies’ activities than has been possible in the past.
That is very helpful. There is a success story here: the Committee is still building the relationships necessary to give the confidence I described earlier. I pay tribute to those who have been involved in this on the Committee side as well as on the Government side. There will be occasions, as there have been in the past, when the public fear that power within the intelligence sphere is being used inappropriately or, indeed, not effectively. A democratically elected body must therefore be able to provide reassurance that if something goes wrong it will know about it and try to do something about it.
The other part of the Bill deals with closed proceedings, which are also closely related to intelligence. I emphasise that we are discussing civil proceedings, not prosecutions. Closed material proceedings are unwelcome, but it is difficult to see an alternative. They are necessary to protect the operational effectiveness of intelligence services, including the secrecy of sources. The control principle of foreign intelligence is fundamental to intelligence operations: people do not give away their country’s intelligence unless they know it will not be misused.
That is not a one-way process—other nations sometimes forget the control principle. I recall a rendition case in which our US allies did not observe the principle. Indeed, the Committee reported on it because the intelligence was provided on the basis that action would not be taken, yet it was used to provide the basis for an action. That was an example of the control principle not being applied, but we must apply it; otherwise, we will not gather the intelligence we need to protect our citizens.
I pay tribute to the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which the Justice Committee decided was doing the work and should be allowed to get on with it. Boundary lines between our two Committees are often drawn, but the Joint Committee’s excellent work contributed hugely to their lordships making the Bill more acceptable to those of us who come at it from a more liberal standpoint. Their lordships made it quite clear that although the Executive apply for closed material proceedings, the judge decides.
The original subsection (2) of clause 11, which would have allowed the extension of closed material proceedings into other areas, was removed by a welcome Government amendment. Their lordships passed an amendment on considering alternatives such as public interest immunity and a strict necessity test. The amendment appeared to be desirable, although my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) today indicated that it could lead to some cumbersome processes, so it will be appropriate for the Committee to look a little more closely at it.
A court will be required to balance national security with fairness, transparency and the need for open justice. The amendment that was unsuccessfully proposed to bring that process continuously into closed material proceedings was unrealistic—it is pretty difficult to satisfy foreign allies that we will apply the control principle if the question is being reopened in proceedings daily. The Government have indicated that they will accept the provision under which either side will be able to invoke closed material proceedings. I find it hard to envisage the circumstances in which a plaintiff would do so, but equality of arms requires that provision. I do not know why the Government resist the amendment proposing an annual report on the use of closed material proceedings—a fairly simple requirement—but perhaps such proceedings will not be so frequent and only a biennial report will be necessary.
As a result of proceedings in the other place we are now close to achieving a reasonably satisfactory balance in using difficult and unwelcome powers to ensure that information can be put before a court. None of us would want to have to use the process, but without it we will not be able to decide cases on the evidence available.
Another matter with which the Bill deals is the more general application of the Norwich Pharmacal principle to intelligence, on which the Government are right to act. I note the Intelligence and Security Committee’s suggestion, which the Justice Committee can look at, on how we limit its application so that we more specifically refer to foreign intelligence and the control principle or information that would impair the effectiveness of our security operations. The Government must act to defend our ability to acquire intelligence from elsewhere.
Further improvements might be possible to make it clear that a gisting process can work in cases where the special advocate realises that he cannot effectively challenge or assess evidence without more information that is in the possession of only the plaintiff. We must find some way of resolving that. We cannot allow the present position to continue, but we must get the Bill into the best state possible.
A defence lawyer has the role of challenging the evidence, but I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman’s point later.
The Bill is, in the words of Lord David Pannick, a leading barrister—indeed, he is the Government’s leading barrister of choice—“unnecessary, unfair and unbalanced”. He said it is unnecessary because we already have the public interest immunity system.
My right hon. Friend has chosen to quote Lord Pannick, but in the debate in the House of Lords on 11 July, he also said:
“I recognise that there may well be a need in some exceptional cases for a…closed material procedure, but…this should be a last rather than a first resort.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 July 2012; Vol. 738, c. 1176.]
If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I have run out of injury time.
If a case involves sensitive information, the Secretary of State asks the judge’s permission to keep documents away from the court. The judge examines the evidence and makes a decision that balances national security with the interests of justice. Under the PII system, evidence can be shown in an edited form, and witnesses, whether spies or special forces or whoever, can speak from behind screens. Suspects can be given the gist of the case against them, and the court can sit in open session or in camera. All those operations are possible under the PII system, which has served British justice well for decades, not just against the current threat of terrorism, but against the Soviet threat, which in many ways was much more professional, and the previous Irish terrorist threat. The proof of the PII system is that no Government, including this one, can point to a single court judgment that has undermined national security—not one judgment.
We do not know that, and that is the problem with the current system. I would accept my hon. Friend’s argument if we had a system in which such issues could be properly tried, or at least tried in some second-best scenario; I accept that closed material proceedings are very much a second best to the principles of open justice in which my hon. Friend and I believe. However, we will never know—we will never be privy to whether the British state infringed principles of justice and international convention when it came to unlawful rendition.
I reassure my hon. Friend that once the current police inquiries are complete, the intention of the Intelligence and Security Committee is to continue our investigation, which we had already started, of the allegations about United Kingdom complicity in Libyan rendition and to publish our conclusions to the extent that we can.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend, and commend him and his Committee for their work in that area. It is something that I would like to know more about, as would many people in this House and outside. Sadly, the Gibson inquiry had to be terminated, or postponed, because of ongoing criminal proceedings. I very much believe that wrongdoing should be exposed, but, as has been pointed out, in the case of this civil proceeding we do not, and will not, know the precise merits or otherwise of the claim that was made against the British Government.
Much has been made of the views of Mr David Anderson QC, the Government’s independent reviewer on terrorism. I will spare his blushes. It is absolutely right to say that he, like me, is very much a reluctant convert to the limited use of closed material proceedings in certain cases where national security is very much at the heart of the claim. He makes the very important point that in referrals made by Her Majesty’s Government, we must put our trust in our judiciary to come to fair and balanced decisions on the material before them and to apply fairness not only to the Government but to claimants, because these questions apply equally to both parties in any such case.
Their lordships’ amendment to clause 6 opens up the limited discretion in the clause as originally drafted. I welcome that. It is wrong to say that there was no discretion before, but it was limited. They have expanded that discretion by the use of the word “may”. It is a much wider discretion than many of us in criminal practice have got used to. For example, in the sort of discretion that sentencing judges have in dealing with mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, the word used is very bald. “May” cannot put it any more simply. The amendment is very significant, and the fact that the Government have rightly accepted it eases many of the concerns that I and others had about the extent of the power of Ministers, in effect, to limit the court’s ability to disagree with a reference from Ministers.
That is the trigger, but it does not end there. The hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) said that a blanket then comes down on the use of closed material proceedings. I have great respect for him, but I do not think he is right. It is not a question of a blanket coming down, because the judge has a duty to look at each individual piece of evidence to determine whether it should be the subject of open proceedings or closed material proceedings. The judge will retain that important check and balance in looking at the evidence.
We need to put firmly to bed the notion that closed material proceedings are a silver bullet that will allow the Government always to be able to win—to successfully defend—these cases, because they most certainly are not. The recent decision by SIAC which had the effect of allowing the release of Abu Qatada is a notable example of that. CMPs were used in that case. The result was perhaps not popular in many quarters, but it is an example of the court being able to cope with the second-best solution and to reach an outcome that was, on a neutral interpretation, a fair one. CMPs can be a way for claimants to ensure that all the issues they want to see raised are properly considered by the court as part of the case.
Public interest immunity has been prayed in aid as a substitute for the process, but it is not; its function is different. PII relates to the extent and quality of disclosure, which occurs at a different stage from the fact-finding process itself. Material that is successfully subject to a PII certificate remains undisclosed to the party seeking it. There is no gisting or anything else. Redaction of documents may well happen, but that still means that the material sought by the party who wishes to see it remains undisclosed. PII has a practical effect, whether it is on the continuation of a prosecution in a criminal context or, as in this context, the continuation of a defence in a civil case. The choice for those at the receiving end is either to disclose the material or to stop the case. That means, as we have already discussed, that cases in which genuine allegations of wrongdoing are made will never properly be dealt with by the court. It is the justice gap that has been spoken about not just in this place but by eminent Members of the other place, most notably Lord Woolf, Lord Mackay and Lady Manningham-Buller, who all support the use of closed material proceedings in restricted circumstances.
As other Members have said, there is nothing groundbreaking about the use of closed material proceedings in English law. They have been used for some years, in both SIAC and the regime of terrorism prevention and investigation measures, and in a way, as I have said, that cannot be regarded as resulting in manifest unfairness or injustice.
I would welcome clear and continued assurances from Ministers that, if future consideration is ever given to further extending the use of closed material procedures to other areas of law, it is this House that will deal with the issue and that there will be strong grounds to justify any further extension before we allow it to happen.
We live in an imperfect world. It is a troubled world where sometimes grim reality invades noble principle. This Bill is an exemplar of that, which is why I support its Second Reading.
The Bill has implications for liberty, security and justice. The fact that those are serious matters has been reflected in the number of reasoned and considered contributions that we have heard today. We have heard 22 speeches, in addition to those from the Front Benches, many of which have been informed by Members’ experience in government and on the Intelligence and Security Committee. The whole House welcomes those contributions. In particular, I would like to mention those made by the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind); the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis); and the Chair of the Treasury Select Committee, the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), as well as those made by several former senior Ministers, including my right hon. Friends the Members for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and for Knowsley (Mr Howarth). The leader of the Welsh nationalists, the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), also made one of his usual considered contributions.
The Bill has already been the subject of considerable debate in the other place, where many Members were able to draw on their considerable experience to scrutinise it and suggest improvements. We in this House are grateful for their efforts and the improvements that have been made. In particular, I want to pay tribute to the work of my noble Friends Baroness Smith and Lord Beecham. I am also pleased that the Minister without Portfolio said today that the Government would not seek to overturn some of the amendments made during the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords, and I look forward to hearing further details from the Minister in Committee as to why they disagree with certain others.
The matters in the Bill are sensitive and complex, and the Opposition will work with the Government to reach consensus, wherever possible, based on the evidence available. The introduction of closed material proceedings is undoubtedly the most controversial part of this legislation, and the Opposition accept that there are rare occasions when their use will be necessary. We cannot continue to accept a situation in which the Government are forced to settle claims because they are unable to adduce evidence without compromising vital national security evidence.
In the other place, the noble Baroness Manningham-Buller spoke passionately about the need for the security services to be able to protect their standing in the eyes of the public and for dedicated security staff not to have their reputation traduced because there was no mechanism for challenging allegations. However, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) explained earlier, we had serious concerns about the scope of closed material proceedings as proposed in the Green Paper and again in the Bill as it was first presented to the Lords. We are pleased that the Government have listened to the strength of feeling expressed in the other place and by the Opposition, and that they have now indicated they will not seek to overturn all the Lords amendments. As I said earlier, we look forward to the debate in Committee.
The Bill also introduces limits on the courts’ ability to demand the release of information, following on from the principles developed in the case of Norwich Pharmacal. That case established the principle that an innocent third party could be forced to disclose information to enable an action to be taken against another party. In the case of Binyam Mohamed, this principle was extended to cover issues of national security. We know that the then Foreign Secretary stated that the release of such information was likely to cause real damage to both national security and international relations. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism, David Anderson, QC, has now presented several examples where evidence has not been freely given to the United Kingdom because of the danger of its being released into the public domain. Several members of the Intelligence and Security Committee have raised this and confirmed that it is a problem, too.
I think there is an acceptance on both sides of the House, although not by all Members on either side, that this situation is unacceptable. The Opposition accept there is a pressing need to reassert the control principle, to ensure that foreign Governments can be confident that any information passed to the UK Government will remain in the hands of the Executive. We will therefore support the Government in their attempts to prevent the disclosure of information under the Norwich Pharmacal principles where the information is sensitive, and where its release might compromise our relations with foreign allies. The Opposition have concerns, however, about the breadth of the current definition of sensitive information and we hope to persuade the Government in Committee that the control principle can be protected within a narrower definition.
Finally, let me return to part 1. Although it is perhaps not as controversial as part 2, it is equally important, strengthening both the oversight and the public standing of the security services—aims behind which the whole House can unite. In emphasising why public support is so important to the security agencies, I refer again to the noble Baroness Manningham-Buller who drew on her own considerable experience to say in the other place:
“The support of members of the public is necessary not only in terms of general support for the organ of government but because, to do their work the agencies require that support every day of the week. They need the public to join them as recruits…they need them as sources of information, and they need them to help in whatever way possible...Therefore, when we talk about public opinion, the services require the help of the public to do their job and, in my experience, they get it.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 9 July 2012; Vol. 738, c. 932-33.]
Like the noble Baroness, the Opposition believe that public support for the security agencies will be enhanced by greater openness and scrutiny. For this reason, the Opposition support the Government in what they are attempting to do in strengthening the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Indeed, we would like to see the Government be far bolder in recasting the role of the ISC to improve public understanding and scrutiny.
Let me deal with two further issues. One is about the Bill’s wording in respect of ongoing oversight, and I am sure we will spend some time in Committee looking at whether that wording is correct. The second is the call for further resources to allow the ISC to take on these additional roles. We also hope that we will be able to work with the Government in Committee to extend the Bill’s provisions in three ways.
First, we would like to see annual public hearings with the head of each security agency. In the US, such hearings are a well-established part of the congressional oversight of the security agencies, and perform a vital role in educating the public about the work the intelligence services carry out. I do not see why the same role could not be performed in the UK.
The hon. Lady and the House may be interested to know that the ISC has decided—it has the agreement of both the Government and the agencies—to hold its first public hearing, probably some time in the early part of next year. If it is seen to be successful, it should indeed become a regular event.
I am grateful to the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee for giving us that information. It seems very positive that the first item on our shopping list is going to happen.
Ah! Secondly, we would like to see the ISC hold pre-appointment hearings for the agency heads. The Labour Government pioneered such hearings for other public appointments, including permanent secretaries, and we now feel it is right to extend these hearings to security agencies.
Thirdly, we would like to see the ISC operate under the protection of parliamentary privilege and be able to take evidence under oath. The Opposition believe that the only way to guarantee parliamentary privilege is to make the ISC a Select Committee. To confer parliamentary privilege by means of an Act of Parliament would make it subject to legal challenge. That is unacceptable, particularly as witnesses might divulge sensitive information to the Committee, believing it to be subject to privilege, only for that to be overruled by the courts.
We accept that there would be practical problems in the creation of the ISC as a Select Committee, and that foremost among them is the need for its members to be vetted and approved. We hope to work with the Government to find a solution to that problem during the Bill’s Committee stage.
In the other place, the Government’s further reasons for opposing the creation of the Select Committee were unconvincing. Lord Taylor’s arguments seemed to focus on the difference between statute and Standing Orders. If the ISC were recast as a Select Committee, the rules and procedures needed to safeguard the special nature of its proceedings would be determined by Standing Order. If it were created as a new type of quasi-parliamentary entity, its rules would be enshrined in statute. The Minister said that that extra protection was essential, as a Standing Order could be amended by a single vote in the House. The implication seemed to be that that would enable the rules to be altered on a whim.
I think that it does Parliament a great disservice to suggest that either House might make such a serious decision without proper consideration. On the basis of my experience of pushing for the modernisation of Parliament and for reform of its sitting hours, I can say that I have found it extremely reluctant to alter any of its Standing Orders without very good reason and evidence; and I hope that the Minister has been convinced by the serious nature of today’s debate, and the series of debates in the other place, that it cannot possibly be said that Parliament does not afford these matters the full seriousness that they deserve.
Let me finally reiterate the Opposition’s support for the aims that the Government are pursuing. We think that the Bill is far better as a result of the amendments made in the other place. In Committee, we will work to extend the provisions of part 1 to protect the amendments to part 2 that were made in the other place, and to restrict the definition of sensitive information. I look forward to working with the Minister. I know how seriously he takes the views of other Members, and I hope that we shall be able to reach a consensus on the best way to proceed.
(11 years, 12 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman is entirely right that Lord Justice Leveson is not recommending statutory regulation of the press. He wants to take steps so that we avoid statutory regulation of the press—I fully respect that. But in answer to his point, the system Lord Justice Leveson recommends is not a compulsory system. It does not guarantee that everyone takes part; it is still a voluntary system. Where we are in complete agreement is that Lord Justice Leveson does not want statutory regulation—neither do I. Lord Justice Leveson wants strong, independent regulation—that is what I want. He sets out the principles of strong, independent regulation—that is what we have got to put in place, and that is what the press should start to put in place straight away.
The central requirement is a press complaints procedure that will not only be fully independent, but will restore public confidence. I ask the Prime Minister to look very objectively at whether an Act of Parliament would indeed enhance that credibility. I refer him in particular to paragraph 72 of the executive summary of the report, where Lord Leveson states that an Act of Parliament would
“reassure the public that the basic requirements of independence and effectiveness were met and continued to be met”.
I believe that that is a very powerful argument, and I ask my right hon. Friend to consider it with all force.
My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right—paragraphs 70, 71 and 72 are the absolutely key paragraphs of the report. But let me explain why I have misgivings about leaping straight to that conclusion. Once we start writing a piece of legislation that backs up an independent regulator, we have to write into that legislation what is its composition, what are its powers, what is its make-up, and we find pretty soon—I would worry—that we have a piece of law that really is a piece of press regulatory law. Now, that is an enormous step for us in this House of Commons to take, and we have to think about it very carefully before we leap into this new approach.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberOf course the Labour party does not like to be reminded that it has been converted from a party of the people to a party of the peerage. What did Labour Members do when they had the opportunity? They voted for the idea of reform but not for the means to deliver it. They delivered lofty speeches about the need to give the people a say about how to elect the legislators in the other place, but they would not even tell us how many days they wanted in the timetable motion to make that lofty rhetoric a reality.
I think the history books will judge the Labour party very unkindly indeed. When they had the opportunity to translate the great work of Robin Cook and of the right hon. Member for Blackburn into reality and finally had it within their grasp to be the friends of reform, they turned into miserable little party point-scoring politicians instead.
The Deputy Prime Minister will be aware that his noble Friend Lord Steel has introduced an alternative reform of the House of Lords measure that commands wide support in the other House as well as in this House. As the right hon. Gentleman will be aware, that measure would remove the hereditary peers, impose a retirement requirement, thereby bringing down the size of the other House, and ensure that those who have been convicted of offences cannot continue to sit in that legislature. Will he give some indication of whether the Government would support that proposal? Otherwise, he will throw away an important and serious opportunity to modernise the upper House. It might not be what he would ideally wish, but it is all he is likely to get.
I would like to correct the right hon. and learned Gentleman on one point: the Steel Bill would not remove hereditary peers. It would do three things, to be precise. It would extend the, in effect, voluntary retirement scheme that is in place in the other place, which I think has led to the spectacular result of two of its Members choosing to do that. Having seen the coverage of the views of some Members of the other place who are from my party, I can think of one or two whom I hope would take early retirement, but there would not be a mass cull in the way that the right hon. and learned Gentleman implies.
Another provision relates to crooks, but let us remember that that means future, not existing, crooks, who would—hey presto!—not be allowed to sit in the other Chamber. Also, any peer who did not attend once, not even for a few minutes to sign on for their £300 tax-free daily allowance, would be disallowed. I am afraid that any scrutiny of that Bill shows that it would barely trim at the margins the size of the House of Lords, so by its own reckoning it would not do what it purports it would do, which is dramatically to reduce the size of the House of Lords. While I have a great deal of respect for the considerable time and effort that Lord Steel has put into this, my view remains that there is no surrogate for democracy.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberIn the modern history of parliamentary reform, there have been a number of noble milestones: the extension of the franchise in the 19th century, and to women voters in the 20th; the Parliament Act 1911, which gave primacy to this Chamber; and the expulsion of hereditary Members from the House of Lords. Those were all radical measures, and they were welcome and serious. I very much regret to say that the Bill that the Deputy Prime Minister has introduced does not come into that category.
The Bill is a puny measure. It is unwelcome and it will do far more harm than good to our constitutional structures and to the good government of this country. I say that because, essentially, two things will happen. First, the Bill will lead to the departure—the expulsion—of the vast majority of Cross Bencher and specialist Members of the upper House. We have been extremely well served by several hundred of our most distinguished citizens—industrialists, trade unionists, academics, diplomats, churchmen of many faiths, leading members of the armed forces—all of whom have carried out the task of revision, and only a small fraction of them can remain under these provisions. What are we to replace them by? Essentially, it will be a sham democratic Chamber, consisting overwhelmingly of Members who would rather be in this Chamber and who will be elected under a party list system that is an insult to the electorate.
I believe that this Bill needs to be opposed. I do not normally oppose measures introduced by the Government of whom I am one of the strongest supporters, but this Bill has to be opposed, because, essentially, what it is designed to do will damage the fabric of our government. I say that both to my hon. Friends who, like me, are perhaps willing to go along with an appointed House of Lords, and to other hon. Members who want a genuinely elected system that will continue to attract the brightest and the best to serve in the upper House.
I was not impressed when my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister mentioned that Lesotho provided the only example of a House appointed like our own. He must be aware that, for example, Canada has an entirely appointed senate, and that the Federal Republic of Germany has an upper House which is not elected by the people but appointed by the states—
There are no hereditaries in Germany.
By all means, let us get rid of the hereditaries. That can be done extremely easily, by a very small Bill that would hardly be opposed by anyone.
Is not the reason the Bill fails so miserably that it reflects an obsession with the form rather than the function of the other place?
My hon. Friend is right and he brings me to my next point, which is that if the Deputy Prime Minister really believes in a democratic upper House, why is he not providing for one in the Bill? What he is providing is form, not substance. The very name of the revised Chamber will continue to be “the House of Lords”. Not a senate, it will be the House of Lords, even though every Lord will have been expelled from it over a period of years.
When it comes to the proposed powers, the Deputy Prime Minister spends his time trying to reassure this House that the powers of the new elected, democratic Chamber will be—will have to be—exactly the same as those the appointed House has now. What possible justification is there for that, if he believes in an elected, democratic upper House? He is a Liberal Democrat; does he not remember the history of his own party? Does he not remember that the Parliament Act 1911 was passed because, until then, apart from on taxation matters, there was an equal right of veto in both Houses, and Asquith and his colleagues argued correctly that an unelected House could not have a veto on the business of Parliament? If the second Chamber is now to be elected, on what ground does he seek to justify his proposals—other than a desire to be all things to all people?
That is the sad problem with the Liberal Democrats: they always wish to be all things to all people—to go for the middle way. I am reminded of a remark I once heard, which I thought was rather good: if Christopher Columbus had been a Liberal Democrat, he probably would have been content with discovering the mid-Atlantic. [Laughter.]
What public interest will be served by the Bill in its current form? Does my right hon. Friend really believe that, compared with all these distinguished men and women from all over the country who serve in the House of Lords now, most of whom will not be able to continue to serve, a party list of candidates will result in more cerebral debate, more enlightened debate and more able contributions to the revision of legislation? Does he actually believe that and does he seriously want us to accept that, or does he recognise that that cannot, in fact, be the case?
I am greatly appreciating, as, I am sure, are all Members, the brilliance of my right hon. and learned Friend’s speech. Does he share my view that, as for Members of the European Parliament, Assembly Members in Wales and Members of the Scottish Parliament, the process of election can only empower this group, so that they start to throw their weight around even more?
Yes, but what worries me is the prospect of ending up with a party list system which, as we know from the experience of the European Parliament, has no legitimacy with the electorate, is not regarded as a way of electing people to represent their interests, and has been entirely discredited, regardless of the view one takes of the European Union as a whole. For that system of all systems to be chosen for the purpose of deciding membership of the upper House is totally incomprehensible to me, never mind entirely regrettable.
I say specifically to the Deputy Prime Minister, because clearly it is his party that is behind the Bill, and perhaps the only party that would care much if the Bill never saw the light of day, that if he wants to eliminate the defect he rightly referred to of the continuing presence of hereditary peers in the House of Lords, that can be done very easily by means of a simple legislative measure. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to get rid of the extraordinary nonsense that we have almost 1,000 peers, that can be done by a compulsory retirement age. If he wants an opportunity to deal with the other anomalies in the House of Lords, he does not need to go down this road. The only argument for going down this road is if he believes in a democratic upper House which, by its very nature, will then share primacy with this House of Commons. Let him, if he wants that, admit that, rather than try to conceal that fact behind words that do not carry conviction.
I take no pleasure in not being able to support the Government and the coalition, in which I am a very strong believer, but it would be unworthy of anyone to argue that a constitutional measure which will have a profound impact on the well-being of this country and of our political system should in any way be influenced by its impact, if it were to be defeated, on other legislative proposals.
I have not voted against my party on a three-line Whip for a very long time. I last did so in the 1970s. I do not know what effect it will have this time on my future ministerial career. All I can say is that the last time I did it, in the 1970s, two years later Margaret Thatcher appointed me to her Government. So my right hon. and hon. Friends should be of good heart and vote as they believe, and that means voting against the Bill and against the programme motion.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe shadow Chancellor is intervening from a sedentary position. No one would like to see him in the dock of a courtroom more than me, but the job here is to get on with it, find the answers, and put them into law.
Let me now deal with the questions that the Leader of the Opposition asked about the European Union. He asked some very specific questions, including one about Russia and Syria. At the weekend, following some very hard negotiation by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, all parties agreed on transition by mutual consent. We now need to implement the policy, and all the P5 members need to do that.
The right hon. Gentleman talked about taking responsibility on the economy. When is Labour going to take responsibility for the twin crises: the crisis of the deficit and the crisis of failed banking regulation? He asked what we had done to protect the single market. If he looks at the summit conclusions, he will see that it says very specifically that the single market and its integrity must be protected. On whether the eurozone funds are sufficient, frankly, I think he is right to ask that question. We continually say it is very important that the firewall—the bazookas—are big enough.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s description of recent events, I think he probably ought to give up the hokey-cokey and stick to the Rubik’s cube. But let me tell him this: I am not going to take any lectures from a group of people who gave up the rebate and got nothing in return, who gave up our social chapter opt-out and got nothing in return, and who took us into the bail-out funds when we were not even part of the euro. Those are the people who say that the European Union has not got too much power and that they would join the euro if they were in power for long enough. The right hon. Gentleman likes to tell us endlessly about standing up to vested interests, but the fact is that he will never stand up to two big vested interests: the trade unions and Brussels.
While there is wide agreement in Britain as to the need for reforms in our relationship with the EU, does the Prime Minister agree that the worst possible moment to try to start negotiating with 26 other countries is when all the member states are, quite rightly, preoccupied with the very future of the eurozone and the potential of its collapse? Does the Prime Minister also agree that as the UK is fully protected by the statutory requirement for a referendum if there are any further proposals for the transfer of powers to Brussels, it must be the right policy to establish a link between any negotiations which we wish to begin, and the new treaty that would be required to have unanimous conset if the eurozone 17 wish to achieve a fiscal and banking union?
My right hon. and learned Friend has set out the situation very well. It is worth saying, as I said in my statement, that everyone has to recognise that the short-term firefighting is the EU’s urgent and immediate priority, but my point is that we are safeguarded through the referendum lock in respect of further powers being transferred. However, we must think about how Europe is developing, make sure we make the most of the opportunities, and then think about how to seek the consent of the British people.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf by that the right hon. Gentleman means, “Should we join the euro and just go along with everything that is suggested?”— [Interruption.] Well, that is what would follow, and I do not accept that for a moment. Britain can play a strong role in the EU, but where there are things we do not want to join, such as the Schengen no-borders agreement and the single currency, Britain should stay outside them.
In terms of our relations with the rest of the world, the Government have done a huge amount to increase our relations with China and India, as trade flows in the last few years show: in the last two years, exports to China up 72%, exports to India up 93% and exports to Russia up 109%. We are making a difference where it counts.
The Prime Minister referred to the part of the G20 declaration headed
“Intensifying the fight against corruption”,
which endorsed the
“denial of entry to our countries of corrupt officials, and those who corrupt them”.
As these measures were inspired by the tragic case of Sergei Magnitsky, who died in a Russian prison having exposed massive corruption by Russian state officials, is it not ironic that the next chair of the G20 will be Russia, and that President Putin will be chairing the next conference, in St Petersburg? Will my right hon. Friend encourage President Putin, who presumably endorsed this declaration, to ensure that those responsible for the death of Magnitsky and this massive corruption are brought to justice before President Putin chairs that conference a year from now?
My right hon. and learned Friend makes an important point. The section of the communiqué about corruption is indeed important, and all the countries that have signed up to it should make sure that they put it in place. One of the strengths of the G20 is that, because it is not bringing together countries that necessarily share all the same democratic or human rights values, it is an opportunity to try to push some of those agendas with colleagues sitting round the table.