I believe that one of the impact assessments gave a figure of seven, whereas the press reports I read over the weekend mentioned one of 15. For those reasons, it is important to attach great weight to the conditions to which David Anderson refers. We would not wish, inadvertently, to see more cases than the Government say they expect to be reaching a CMP.
It seems to me that we do not know how many of these cases there will be, because we do not know what effect the new process will have. This is becoming a popular jurisdiction and the number of cases is slowly climbing, because no defence is offered to people’s claims and they are being awarded quite large sums of money. Once it is possible for the Government to defend themselves, people will, presumably, think more clearly about the substance of their allegations before bringing claims, and we just do not know how many we will have.
May I adopt the Minister’s arguments in support of our sunset clause, which we will be debating later? He cannot predict the number of cases, which is why we think a sunset clause is appropriate.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that clarity, which shows the advantages of being nice to Liberal Democrats. In case any of his colleagues have any doubt about the advice given, I have the report with me and will remind them of what the Joint Committee said just last week on the Government’s manoeuvres upstairs in Committee.
Given that in Committee the Minister unpicked the Lords changes to the Bill, amendments 26 to 40 are designed to emulate the same improvements as were made in the other place. Our amendments seek to put in place appropriate checks and balances on the use of CMPs. We do not underestimate the difficulties in reconciling the issues of justice and security as contained in the Bill’s title, but this is difficult and not impossible. By putting appropriate measures in place, we believe that the use of CMPs could be made proportionate to the scale of the problem they are intended to address. As has been said, our position is backed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, whose most recent report systematically goes through the changes made in Committee by the Government and is consistent with the Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and with the views of the House of Lords.
So here we are once again, trying at a late stage in proceedings to bring some balance to the proposals in front of us. Our amendments address four main areas: judicial balancing both outside and inside proceedings, the use of CMPs as a last resort and equality of arms. I shall deal first with judicial balancing.
We have consistently agreed with David Anderson when he said that
“the decision to trigger a CMP must be for the court, not the Government.”
The original bill, as published, included no substantial role for the judge. I accept that this has been moved on since then, but some of the progress made in the other place has now been undone. Despite claims to the contrary, the Bill does not give a judge the proper discretion to decide between whether to hold proceedings in the open or to move proceedings behind closed doors. The Government chose to remove the Lords amendments that put in place a proper judicial balancing of these competing interests—the so-called Wiley balance.
Last week’s report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights is very powerful on this issue. I pay tribute to the Chair of the Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis), for all its hard work on this. In its report—Liberal Democrat colleagues will be keen to hear this—the Committee says that
“there is nothing in the Government’s revised clause 6 which replaces it with anything requiring the court to balance the degree of harm to the interests of national security on the one hand against the public interest in the fair and open administration of justice on the other.”
I must have misheard the right hon. Gentleman. He seems to think his amendment widens the discretion of the judge. It actually narrows it. The Bill as it stands says that the judge may hold a closed session after the three conditions are satisfied, which are mainly the fair and effective administration of justice. We have now reached the situation where critics are so nervous about what the judge may do that they want to lay down additional tests that the judge must put to himself before he makes a judgment one way or another. Lord Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice, this morning made it clear that the judge now has complete discretion to decide what to do, and it is the critics who are so worried that there might be closed material proceedings that they are trying to put in extra tests to try to put the judge off. As the right hon. Gentleman’s amendments narrow the judge’s discretion, he might at least put his case the right way round. As the Bill stands, the judge has a pretty unfettered discretion.
On at least four occasions over the past 18 months the Minister has told the public, the media, MPs and Members of the House of Lords that judges had full discretion, notwithstanding the four changes that he has agreed to make over the past 18 months. He cannot be right on all four occasions. Let me tell him what the House of Lords did, pursuant to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It put on the face of the Bill the balancing exercise that a judge should undertake, balancing on the one hand the public interest in the open and fair administration of justice and the public interest in making sure that there was no damage to our national security as a consequence of material being disclosed. In Committee the right hon. and learned Gentleman tried to tie the hands of that balancing exercise. In a new report last week from which I quoted, the Joint Committee said that he tried to do the very same thing. He is again arguing today why he is right and all the members of the Joint Committee are wrong.
I really must make progress; there will be time for hon. Members to contribute after I have finished.
David Anderson, the Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has himself said that
“the court’s power to order a CMP should be exercisable only if, for reasons of national security connected with disclosure, the just resolution of a case cannot be obtained by other procedural means (including not only PII but other established means such as confidentiality rings and hearings in camera).”
We should not legislate in a way that means that CMPs will replace tried and tested methods for dealing with sensitive material in open proceedings if those methods will do the job. Only if it is deemed, after consideration by a judge, that those tried and tested measures cannot be employed in a way that would allow important evidence to be used in a public court, would the option of a CMP be considered. The Bill as it stands does not allow for this. Our amendments would not, as some have argued, including the Minister on Second Reading, mean that a full and lengthy PII exercise had to be undertaken before a CMP could even be considered. On the contrary, the key word in all this is “considered”. Our amendments would deliver this. I hope that the House will support that as part of our efforts to maintain as much as possible of the precious traditions of openness in our justice system.
Some have interpreted the Government amendments tabled at the eleventh hour last week as delivering what we and others have asked for. They will lead to a Minister—in other words, one of the parties in the civil action or judicial review—considering the use of PII and the judge having to take their conclusion into consideration when deciding whether to grant a CMP. In our view, this is not an appropriate check and balance, and we will therefore look to amend the Bill accordingly.
Amendment 38 deals with the Wiley judicial balance within the CMP. The Government’s argument for resisting this is the same as their reason for resisting full judicial balancing on the decision on whether to order a closed proceeding in the first place. We are not persuaded of their arguments in that circumstance. We believe that this is another key component of judicial balancing and a crucial check and balance.
Our amendments also deal with the equality of arms. On Second Reading, the Minister said:
“We will also accept that any party, not just the Government, should be able to ask for a closed material procedure.”—[Official Report, 18 December 2012; Vol. 555, c. 722.]
We welcomed that statement. After all, equality of arms is backed by the JCHR and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC. However, following the changes that the Government made in Committee, we now know that their idea of equality of arms is very different from everyone else’s. The JCHR report published last week is highly critical of what was done to the Bill in Committee. It says:
“in our view the Government’s amendment enabling all parties to proceedings to apply for a CMP does not provide for equality of arms in litigation because it would unfairly favour the Secretary of State”.
In short, it is a two-tier equality of arms—or, in the real world, an inequality of arms. Our amendment would restore proper equality of arms. I am pleased that the Government have decided to support us and have signed our amendment.
Some have said that the debates at this late stage are nothing more than angels dancing on the head of a pin. I disagree. There remain some fundamental differences, chiefly about judicial balancing and last resort, about which we are still concerned. I hope that colleagues in all parts of the House will support, in particular, amendments 30 and 31. We will first need to vote on amendment 26, which is a paving amendment that would ensure that the Bill contained the proper checks and balances that it needs without having to rely on the other place—with Lib Dem support, I hasten to add—to make sure that there is equilibrium in the great balancing act that we face between our national security and the rights of individuals.
I rise early in the debate because I want to speak to the Government amendments that stand in my name. I have already added my name to two Opposition amendments. As we do not have a great deal of time to discuss some quite complex issues, it will be helpful to set out what those issues are so that we do not have so many interventions when the person who is being intervened on is agreeing with the person making the intervention, as happened several times to the Opposition spokesman.
I think that an ordinary, intelligent person from the outside world who is listening to this debate would be rather baffled as to what is causing us so much concern. It has seemed to me for some time that we are in complete agreement on policy and there is no disagreement between us on the principles of the very great need to protect national security and the equally great need to protect the rule of law, the principles of British justice and all the values that we seek to uphold. We have spent the entire time trying to work out a process for reconciling those principles.
The Opposition spokesman entirely agreed with the interventions by the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) and my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who both put forward the principle that we must find some way of trying these cases properly so that everybody knows that there is justice and that a judge has been able to reach a conclusion on the merits or otherwise of the allegations made. Nobody has yet got up to say otherwise. The real critics of this Bill—I do not think that they are Members of this House—say that, somehow, it is a lesser evil to keep paying out millions of pounds in order to not extend the principle of closed proceedings further than it already exists in British law. The idea seems to be, “What a pity. We hope that none of the millions will go to bad causes,” although I do not think that that argument has an advocate in this place.
What we are doing—we have been having this debate for months—is discussing amendments that would underline the fact that this is a judge-made decision, made with proper discretion and taking the right things into account, and that closed material proceedings will be used only in a very small number of cases that would give rise to issues of national security if they were held in open court.
I shall start giving way in a moment and will do so at least as frequently as my opponent, the right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan).
I will not use my own words to make the general case for the measure. I think I am in agreement with the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats and, I hope, my own party, or at least the bulk of it—that is sometimes the least certain proposition one can make in British politics these days. A collection of people whom I admire wrote to The Times a few months ago:
“In national security matters our legal system relies upon a procedure known as public interest immunity. Under PII, evidence which is deemed to be national security sensitive is excluded from the courtroom. The judge may not take it into account when coming to his or her judgment.
This procedure is resulting in a damaging gap in the rule of law. To protect national security evidence from open disclosure the Government is forced to try to agree substantial settlements with claimants who have not had the opportunity to prove their case. Civil damages claims made against the security services are not therefore being scrutinised by a judge in a court.
It was to resolve a similar problem that previous Governments introduced Closed Material Procedures (CMPs) in immigration and control order cases, and courts have ordered them by consent in the past.
CMPs are not ideal, but they are a better option where the alternative is no justice at all. The Special Advocates who operate within them are more effective than they admit…and the Government loses cases in these hearings.
We believe the Government is right therefore to extend the availability of CMPs to other civil courts. This will ensure that the security and intelligence agencies can defend themselves against allegations made against them, that claimants are given the greatest opportunity to prove their case, and that concerned citizens will have the benefit of a final judgment on whether serious allegations have foundation.”
That puts the general case impeccably. One of the signatories was Lord Reid, the former Home Secretary, which is not too surprising given that most Opposition Members who are former Ministers with experience of dealing with these matters are pretty supportive of the Government and have been throughout, particularly those who are still up to date because they are on the Intelligence and Security Committee. Another signatory was Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who was a Conservative Lord Chancellor many years ago, but who was the most independent Lord Chancellor I can recall. He is an impeccable lawyer and a man whom no one could accuse of not having regard to the rule of law.
I stress that the former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, whose name has entered the fray again today, is a great defender of personal liberties who invented, I think, the whole concept of judicial review by which Governments are now held to account better by the courts for ministerial decisions. I have great respect for his opinion and today—this is my final quote before I start to give way—he has written:
“What is important is that the operation of…CMPs should be under the complete control of a judge. That the Government has now given him that control is to be welcomed. The Bill now ensures that we will retain our standards of general justice, while also putting an end to the blindfolding of judges in this small number of cases.”
I think that we all agree. There may be some rare exceptions from the ultra-liberal end of the left or the right, but by and large practically everybody in this House agrees with that case. What we are arguing about now is the fact that every time we table an amendment, further amendments are tabled in order to make it more practically difficult ever to have a CMP. The lawyers who are persuading various groups to table those amendments and who are drafting them for them actually think that the law as it stands is perfectly satisfactory, but they keep trying to invent fresh conditions, tests and processes to get in the way of CMPs.
The Litvinenko inquest is proceeding under the old law. I gave in to all the lobbyists who said that none of this should ever apply to inquests. In inquests, secrecy must therefore remain the order of the day so far as the coroner, the family and everyone else is concerned once a PII has been applied for and granted. I do not think that that should apply to civil claims, but people will no doubt try to persuade me that it should.
I thank the Minister for giving way and for the way in which he is trying to present a not very strong case. If we have a Security Service, it must be accountable, and if we have a criminal law process, it must be open. The process that is being introduced and previous processes end up, in effect, with people being criminalised in secret without knowing the full case against them. Does he not accept that there is a danger in the process that he is presenting?
The Bill most emphatically does not apply to the criminal process. I would be against any evidence of which the offender was not aware being given in a criminal case. That gets us into the control order problem, which is that sometimes there is no evidence in a case, but responsible people are terrified of the prospect of the person being left at liberty because we cannot prosecute. However, that is for another day. I do not believe that there can be a criminal case with secret evidence. I quite agree about that.
In civil cases, I would prefer there to be open evidence all the time. I particularly agree with the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) that the security services must be accountable to the courts and to Parliament wherever possible. At the moment, they are not accountable to the courts, because all the material that the Government want to bring in their defence cannot be given in open court. By definition, this is not evidence about our being involved in torture, rendition or anything like that. We deny that we are and most of the allegations are not that we have done such things, but that we have been complicit in another agency doing them. The evidence that we are talking about is evidence that the security services and their lawyers believe would enable them to defend the action and refute the allegations. At the moment, because we cannot hear such evidence in closed proceedings and because it cannot be heard in open court, it is not heard at all. We just offer no defence and pay out. If we have this procedure, it will make the services more accountable to the courts.
The other half of the Bill greatly strengthens the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I approve of, by making it a proper Committee of this House and by strengthening its powers. I agree with the hon. Member for Islington North that we must reassure the public that we are defending our values by the most reputable methods and that we are respecting human rights. There must therefore be accountability to the courts and to Parliament.
My right hon. and learned Friend has come against the rock of the special advocates. They have looked at this business and rejected it universally. They are the ones who are supposed to carry these court cases through and they do not like the proposal. I do not like it and, as this debate progresses, I think we will find that many more Members of this House do not like it either.
I thought we were doing all right with this Bill until the special advocates came out with their remarkable evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I agree that that got me into a lot of trouble. I do not understand why they take that ferocious view. As I have demonstrated before with plenty of quotations, they do win cases. One would think that they are powerless, but they do succeed. The judges accord to special advocates much more power of persuasion than they seem to accord to themselves, because judges want to have a special advocate to help them test the evidence when they are reaching their conclusion.
Of course, special advocates act on behalf of the claimants, as do most of the people who make these objections. I am not accusing them, because their motives are the highest and most honourable, but they have got into a frame of mind where they think that anything that is not advantageous to the claimant must be bad. Even at the height of my enthusiasm for human rights and the rule of law, I cannot get myself into that position. Claimants should be obliged to prove their case and I believe that special advocates are the most effective means that we have of testing the Government’s case on behalf of claimants.
The Minister made the excellent point that none of this would apply to criminal cases in which somebody’s liberty could be at risk, which is important. It is clear that there will not be closed information in such cases. Will he confirm whether civil habeas corpus cases will be covered? Could there be closed proceedings in such cases, which could affect somebody’s liberty?
May I reiterate what the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Sir Richard Shepherd) said? If special advocates, who are independent people and fully aware of cases such as those in question, are expressing reservations and think the provision is wrong, should the Government not take notice of that?
We have taken notice of it, but I do not understand why special advocates seem to be taking up the arguments of people who say that we should never allow anybody to consider the evidence in question. I never thought that PIIs were a perfect process, but the critics have suddenly decided they are now that we have brought forward CMPs. If there is a PII, the judge cannot take account of such evidence, claimants and the defence cannot use it, and the lawyers do not know about it. That is held up to me as a superior position to the one we are putting forward, which will mean that the judge can consider that evidence.
Will the Minister tell us in broad terms what concessions he has made since the Bill was conceived, and whether there are any further concessions that he can make to address any concerns?
I was about to move on to that point, having made the general case. Every time I make concessions, they are pocketed and there is a fresh set of demands. I have known that to happen before, but never on the same scale as with this Bill. I will try to explain that when I get on to the matter.
I see that the Minister is about to get some advice from behind him on habeas corpus cases. The advice we have received is that they are regarded as civil actions, and that habeas corpus could therefore be at risk in future.
The Minister should not get carried away with the idea that everybody supports the change. Some parties, such as the Green party, do not. That will not surprise him, but the Liberal Democrat conference did not support it, either. It talked about it as a serious risk to public trust and confidence. Many people out there do not support the change or think it is necessary, and I have yet to hear any real argument as to why it is.
I respect the hon. Lady’s sincerity, and she represents those who are against the whole policy. I have met such people outside—to use a flippant phrase, some of my best friends are human rights lawyers, and I have met people who say that the whole idea of CMPs is so bad that it is a lesser evil to keep paying money to the ever-mounting number of people coming forward. That is a judgment for the House to make, but the three political parties do not contain many members who agree with that, and I do not think the public agree with it. I would prefer to see a judge test the evidence and come to a conclusion.
I will move on, but I will remember who I have not given way to.
I have been given advice on civil habeas corpus cases, and I will read it to the House. It says, “We can’t envisage any such cases.” I find that inconclusive, so I will make further inquiries. The question bowled me middle-stump, so I have some sympathy with the unfortunate lawyer in the Box who has had to decide what on earth we can say, and I think we ought to be allowed to go away and consider the matter.
On the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) made, Lord Woolf mentioned in his letter this morning that before the Committee stage, and again last week, the Government have tabled a lot of significant amendments that, in our opinion, meet every practical objection that has been made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Opposition, my colleagues in the Liberal Democrats and my noble Friends, who defeated us several times. We accepted quite a lot of those defeats, which were improvements to the Bill.
I have tabled four more amendments today and added my name to two Opposition amendments. I considered the point about equality of arms; I think it is slightly overdone but Government Members have added their names to two Opposition amendments so that any party to the proceedings can apply for a declaration that there should be closed material procedure.
Let me remind hon. Members where we have got to. There has been enormous movement since the Green Paper, and quite a big movement while the Bill has proceeded through the House. The court may grant such an application and order a CMP if it—
I welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s comments. Will he tell the House whether there is a clear and understood definition of the term “national security”?
There is no definition, because all attempts to define it have got one into worse difficulties.
It is possible to exclude evidence from a case altogether under the existing public interest immunity procedure; the Bill does not touch that. The present PII law will be completely unaffected by the Bill, so people could still go for a PII. One is obviously being actively sought at the moment in the Litvinenko inquest, although I know that only from what I read in the press. That kind of exclusion could be claimed on the ground of damage to international relations, if the Government of some third-party state would be upset if certain evidence were to be published. That goes beyond questions of national security and into total secrecy, allowing the Minister to withdraw the whole blasted thing from the proceedings and not letting even the judge use it. That measure goes much wider. Such exclusions on wider grounds happened under the previous Government.
We are sticking to national security, however, and judges, using the completely unfettered discretion that we are now giving them, will no doubt have regard to what I say. What we have in mind are things that would cause damage to national security, by which we mean the safety of our citizens, our attempts to counter terrorism, and threats to international order among the wider public. I can assure the House that I am not in favour of excluding ministerial pigs’ ears. I am sure that the previous Government made more of them than we did, but I do not believe that that sort of thing should be put away in closed proceedings under any Government.
Is not national security rather like reasonable doubt—two well understood English words, as a judge advised the jury in a trial the other week?
I will in just a second. I am sorry not to give way to the Chairman of the Committee at the moment, but I will before I finish.
I think I have made my point that people are grasping at the straws that keen human rights lawyers have presented to the critics of CMP, and trying to bring in a process to prevent them from happening. That would be the effect of most of the amendments. We have accepted the spirit of the JCHR’s amendments, and we have addressed the questions on unintended consequences.
Let us consider amendment 30 and the Wiley balance. I have just mentioned the unfettered discretion that we are giving to judges. Should we add to that discretion a confinement so that a judge would have to apply what is known as the Wiley balance, which is used in PII? I will not repeat the arguments used by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee and, I think, the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles. PII is not the same.
The amendment that the Opposition have been persuaded to table is not actually about the Wiley balance. Whoever drafted it has realised that that would not be quite good enough for their purposes, so they have altered it by adding the words “fair” and “open”. I do not understand how, having decided that national security would be at risk and that that would be relevant to the issues, and that such a measure would be necessary for the fair administration of justice, someone might then decide that they preferred open justice and that the evidence should be given in public anyway. That is a complete non sequitur, in a way. It would be slightly absurd to do that. It would be like saying to the judge, “If you agreed with the Green party and were against the policies in the Bill in the first place, you can now throw everything out anyway because you need to consider whether you would prefer open justice, after those three conditions have been satisfied.” That would be a slight non sequitur, and it is also a bit deceptive—not deliberately; I am not accusing anyone of acting improperly—to describe this proposal as the Wiley balance. It is the Wiley balance with bits added, which some ingenious lawyer has come up with to try to put a spoke in the wheels.
I am very grateful indeed, in the circumstances, to the Minister for giving way. Did I hear him correctly? Perhaps I will give him the opportunity to correct the suggestion, which I think he pretty much made a moment ago, that the remaining opposition to the Bill has been got up by a few human rights lawyers. Will he explain, which he has still failed to do, why the only people who really understand the system—the people who have experience both of PII and CMPs; that is, the special advocates—have concluded absolutely clearly and unequivocally:
“The introduction of such a sweeping power could only be justified by the most compelling reasons and, in our view, none exists.”?
I do not think that I would conceivably use the language that my hon. Friend tries to attribute to me. Human rights Members are fervently opposed to the whole idea of CMP. They are extremely able lawyers and draftsmen. I am left in wonder and admiration at their ingenuity in producing an endless procession of amendments, so that every time their principles are adopted by the Government in amendments at various stages, a fresh set of amendments is tabled introducing new concepts that are designed to elaborate on the process. That is enough praise for my opponents, but it is ingenious.
We are not putting in the Wiley test, because we have three perfectly effective tests and complete discretion for the judge anyway. The Wiley test is used for PII, which is a quite different process that tries to exclude the evidence entirely from the judge, the claimant, the lawyers and everybody. PII is an application for total silence. We do not need to put the test in for that.
Amendment 31 is more difficult, as it requires that a CMP may be used only as a last resort. The circumstances I have described are getting pretty near to the last resort. We expect only a handful of cases, because we do not think our intelligence agencies will be sued very often. They are strictly enjoined to follow the principles of human rights, and not to connive at torture and everything else, but we do not know, and the conditions we have applied make it clear that we will only ever have CMPs in national security cases, unless a future Government try to relax them.
The trouble is that the last resort argument will undoubtedly be used for going through the whole PII process before starting on CMPs, and there are some people who want to do that. They say that they do not like the fact that the Secretary of State has to consider an application for PII. They want the Secretary of State to go through the whole process. They do not like the fact that the court has other tests for going to a CMP. They want the court to go through the whole PII process before it gets there. Why? Because it could take months or years. The Guantanamo Bay cases had hundreds of thousands of documents—it is a very elaborate process.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
I will in just a second.
There is a serious risk, in our opinion and in the opinion of those who have considered the drafting, that it will introduce a huge, expensive and discouraging process. David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has described this sort of clause as requiring the court to bang its head against a brick wall. I think the Lords Constitution Committee also said that it did not want full PII. The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), who led for the Opposition, said this:
“None of us wants exhaustive PII or a Minister tied up for a year exhaustively going through paperwork, if it were obvious to all concerned that it was not needed”.––[Official Report, Justice and Security (Lords) Public Bill Committee, 5 February 2013; c. 167.]
We are resisting amendment 31 because we think ingenious lawyers will use the argument that we have to settle down to a few years of process and paperwork to satisfy the requirement exhaustively to consider every other possible way of trying the case.
Does the Minister accept that good judges will throw out frivolous applications by ingenious lawyers? If he is concerned about judges spending too much time considering documents, why does Government amendment 47 put the same obligation on the Secretary of State to consider PII, which we are seeking to put on the judge? All we are asking is that the judge considers PII, and the Government amendment requires the Secretary of State to consider it. Rather than the defendant in a claim having to consider, why not the judge?
Let us not make this a competition about which of us most trusts British judges to make reasonably sensible decisions. I have just described how we have put the whole thing in the hands of the judge, and I think that the right hon. Gentleman agrees that a British judge will instinctively want an open hearing and will have to be persuaded to go closed, and he will only do so as a last resort—to use a colloquial term—because his or her preference will be for open justice. There would have to be a very compelling reason for going closed.
On a wider point, has my right hon. and learned Friend thought how much comfort this will give to their cause, in the world of propaganda, when CMPs are used against terrorists?
I have, but with the greatest respect to my hon. Friend’s expertise in this area, I must say that one of the things that most troubles me, as the Minister enthusiastically in charge of the Bill, is not just the need to save the money or the irritation of being unable to defend claims, but the considerable damage done to the reputation of our security services because they are unable to defend themselves. The House always insists on being persuaded that the security forces abide by human rights and do not go in for malpractice or unlawful rendition and so on, but their inability to defend themselves against allegations that they have done so is undoubtedly used by our enemies against our security services, and they are very conscious of it—as are our allies and those with whom we co-operate in the security field.
In order to avoid losing the thread—as far as there is one—of the Opposition’s amendment, I will make some progress.
Amendment 38 would allow the court to order the disclosure of sensitive material, notwithstanding the damage that would be caused to national security, even if the CMP would have been fair without the disclosure. That would make the Bill completely ineffective from the point of view of the main policy, on which we are all agreed, and would give the courts the sort of power that prompted our allies’ concerns following the Binyam Mohamed case. It would seem to allow the judge to look at some material, determine that it was national security-sensitive but then say that there were wider considerations and disclose it anyway. Of course, if such a disclosure was ordered, the Government would have to withdraw from the case and seek to avoid further disclosure in claims for damages.
I must conclude. I apologise to those distinguished Members to whom I have not given way.
I remind Members of the extraordinarily important objectives that we have for the Bill and which the Government’s amendments support. I do not think that the Opposition wish to destroy the policy of the Bill, but they have tabled amendments that would have that effect. The Bill will ensure that the increasing number of civil claims brought against the Government alleging British involvement in kidnap and torture are for the first time fully examined by the courts and that the agencies are better held to account for their actions both by Parliament, through the Intelligence and Security Committee, and in the courts.
The Bill will enable us to reassure the Heads of State of our closest intelligence-sharing partners that we will keep their secrets. The fact that we cannot do this at the moment has already led to the US putting measures in place restricting intelligence exchange and has seriously undermined confidence among our key allies. As I have already mentioned, the Bill will also stop us having to make unnecessary payouts to people who have not proved their case and reduce the risk of British taxpayers’ money being used to finance terrorism.
We have revised the Bill as far as we can. We all agree on the rule of law and with the principles of justice in this country, but I invite the House to apply a modicum of common sense and a sense of national security to its considerations. We have debated this endlessly. Never can a Government have been quite so responsive to the points put to them, and I fear that I must resist the further pressure.
It is a pleasure, and it is certainly a challenge, to follow the Minister without Portfolio.
On Second Reading, I welcomed the improvements that had been made by the House of Lords, but expressed the view that more significant improvements were required. I hoped that the Bill would be amended in Committee to make it compatible with the basic requirements of the rule of law, fairness and open justice, which, of course, the whole House would wish to endorse. Regrettably, however, the amendments made by the Government in Committee have removed or watered down many of the improvements made in the other place.
In an earlier report on the Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the honour of chairing, considered carefully whether the Government’s amendments gave effect to its recommendations. In its second report, published last week, it reached the clear conclusion that they did not, and recommended further amendments. The day after we agreed our report, the Government tabled further amendments. I think—I choose my words carefully—that that was regrettable. We would have liked to scrutinise those amendments properly. The Minister, however, told the Daily Mail that the Government had now met every sensible legal objection that there could be to the Bill. I welcome some of the latest Government amendments, as does my Committee, but I must add that they meet only one of the seven main concerns expressed by the Committee in the report published last week.
Let me deal first with equality of arms in the ability to apply for a CMP. We welcome and support the Government’s amendment, which is the only one that gives effect to a recommendation in last week’s report. If we are to have CMPs in civil proceedings, it is vital for individuals such as torture victims who are bringing cases against the Government to have the same opportunity as the Government to apply for them, but how does the Minister propose to ensure that such claimants are aware that a CMP might help their case? Can he reassure us that special advocates will be appointed whenever the Government apply for sensitive national security material to be excluded from a case on grounds of public interest immunity, and also that those advocates will be able to communicate to excluded parties the fact that a CMP might help their case? I think that those are both very important questions.
Let me now deal with judicial balancing at the “gateway”—the so-called Wiley balance, which has already been discussed a great deal today. I support the amendment proposed by the shadow Justice Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan). In fact, I shall be supporting quite a few of his amendments, not because of any party loyalty but because he is supporting my Committee’s recommendations.
The Government’s amendments removed from the Bill the Wiley balance between the degree of harm to national security on the one hand and the public interest in the fair and open administration of justice on the other. That important safeguard had been inserted by the House of Lords, following a recommendation from my Committee. As the Committee explained in its report, the purpose of our recommended amendment inserting the Wiley balance was to ensure that the court considered the public interest in the fair and open administration of justice.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s point. These are very important issues, and the Committee was cognisant of them.
To return to the point I was making, that purpose is not served if the Bill does not contain any express requirement that the court conduct such a balancing exercise before deciding whether to allow a CMP to be used. By deleting the Government’s new condition that it is in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice in the proceedings to make a declaration and reinstating the Wiley balance as a precondition for a CMP, the amendment would restore a crucial safeguard for open justice.
On last resort, I support the amendment tabled by the shadow Secretary of State for Justice, which would give effect to my Committee’s recommendation. The Committee, in its report last week, explained why it does not accept the Government’s reasons for removing the “last resort” amendments made by the House of Lords, which are based on a misunderstanding of the effect of the provisions. The Government’s commitment to ensuring that CMPs are available only in those cases where they are necessary is most welcome. However, in order to give effect to that intention the Bill must be amended so as to reinstate the condition that the court is satisfied that a fair determination of the issues in the proceedings is not possible by any other means.
The requirement that the court consider whether a claim for PII could have been made must also be reinstated. The Government’s latest amendment, which requires the court to consider whether the party applying for a CMP considered applying for PII, does not go far enough, because it does not require the court itself to consider whether PII is a suitable alternative to a CMP.
As I have already argued, that sounds as though it is demanding that both the Secretary of State and the court go through the full process of PII before even getting on to applying for a CMP. From what the hon. Gentleman is saying, it sounds as though that is exactly what the Committee is contemplating, but how can that be justifiable when all the people concerned in some of these cases will rapidly come to the conclusion that they are wasting time, money and effort on a totally unnecessary exercise and it would obviously be more sensible to go into a CMP and consider the nature of the evidence?
The hon. Gentleman, as ever, speaks with passion on these issues and I respect his point of view. I was a lawyer a long time ago and I understand how important it is to have open justice, but it is also important to get the balance right.
Amendment 30 is about the Wiley balance. I have some difficulty with the amendment because I feel that the Wiley balance is perfectly appropriate for PII, because it is used to decide whether to include or exclude material and whether or not there should be an open hearing. It strikes me that in relation to closed material proceedings there is a more complex and nuanced decision to make which contains different factors. I am keen that we get a balance and that we get the balance right, but I am convinced that the Wiley balance is one that we can simply transpose into the new legislation and that it will be effective.
Amendments 34 and 37 are about whether every other method has to be exhausted before we can get to a closed material proceeding. I am disappointed that there is not more agreement across the House on this. We all want to see whether cases can be dealt with in another way, because closed material proceedings should be the absolute minimum—an irreducible core, as I put it, of cases. I wonder whether the determination could be made by the Secretary of State, having considered whether PII would be suitable, and whether there could be some mechanism for the court to exercise a scrutiny function on whether the Secretary of State’s consideration had been more than cursory.
There will be concerns if the Secretary of State just ticks a box and says, “I’ve considered PII, in my bath”—as the hon. Member for Chichester said—rather than going through a proper process. I would like to see, whether or not we end up in ping-pong with the Lords, something in the Bill that says that the court has to take a proper look at the Secretary of State’s consideration of PII. That would not be exhaustive, but would have some substance to it. I ask the Minister to consider taking that into account.
The judge will have to be satisfied that the Secretary of State has considered the matter. He will not take that as just having thought about it in the bath; that is not how the judge will test whether the Secretary of State has seriously considered it. The judge has such a wide discretion that he could decide that in the fair and effective administration of justice, for some peculiar reason the case should be PII; he should not be listening to a CMP application. That would be one reason for using his discretion. Having listened to the two principal advocates of these further tests, I think they are advocating that the court and the Secretary of State should go through the whole process of PII first. That is not what the Opposition intend, but that is what their amendments would do. The Government have met the right hon. Lady’s case perfectly satisfactorily in the Bill.
I hear what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says. He has been very inventive and creative in trying to table amendments, and it would not be beyond him to put something in the Bill that reassured people that there was a proper check on whether the Secretary of State had properly considered whether other methods could be used. I leave him to reflect on that.
Amendment 70 seeks to add inquests to the Bill. It originates from my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) and he will speak to it with his depth of knowledge, experience and appreciation of the issue, and I simply say that I will support him on it 100%.
It is important in a justice system for people to have sufficient notification of the circumstance to be able to give instructions, but at the moment the bar is set a little high, because there may well be circumstances in which the gisting goes right to the heart of national security. Therefore, by giving a gist that is wide enough to enable instructions to be given, the national security case is given away. Again I wonder whether something could be included about there being a presumption in favour of gisting that could be subject to rebuttal in circumstances that merited it. I would feel more reassured if there were something along those lines. The process adopted so far has been an attempt to try to get some agreement and consensus on these issues. It is difficult to do so, but the issues at stake are so important, both for our national security and for the integrity of our justice system, that we need to keep trying to see whether, on a couple of those issues, even at this stage, there is room for a little more movement to get us to a better place.
The hon. Lady is of course right, but let me come to the point that I was driving towards, which is that none of the systems that we are talking about is perfect. PII clearly has weaknesses. Everyone who has spoken has said something to that effect, and the hon. Lady was particularly correct about that; there are weaknesses to PII. We should not accept that that is the perfect outcome either.
My right hon. Friend rightly says that in PII, because people do not like excluding all the evidence, there is a perfectly legitimate argument about how much we can gist and how much can be redacted, and then it can be put into the open court. But everything that does not get there is entirely left out; it is not available to claimant, judge, lawyers or anybody else. In a CMP, exactly the same thing can be done, because the judge will be required to consider how much we can gist, how much we can redact, and what can be shared with the defendant. The only difference is that in a CMP, the evidence, including, as my right hon. Friend said, some things that might be absolutely key to the case that cannot unfortunately be disclosed, can be considered by the judge. PII shuts out all that which is not possible to gist. With a CMP, there can be all the gisting and redaction that one wants, but all the evidence is considered.
None of us wants to see Ministers’ time sucked up for a year reading documents and signing them. That would not be in anybody’s interests.
Why do we believe in the concept of last resort? The Government have an advantage in these cases because they know what the evidence is and the other party does not. That is why we want more balanced processes to be tried first. That changes slightly if the other party has applied for the CMP. To take the case that I advanced earlier of an ex-employee who knows of a document, we should probably say that a CMP would be the preferred option for them, rather than allowing the Government to keep something away. We want a slight bias away from the Government—not a huge bias, but a slight one—to make up for their advantage of being able to see all the documents.
On the hon. Gentleman’s point about the last resort, I am grateful that both the Labour party spokesman and the Liberals who have spoken so far have agreed with what we have said. We do not want a statutory provision that requires people to go through immense procedures to eliminate every other way of dealing with a case. Unfortunately, there are later Opposition amendments that would have that effect. It is very late in the day. In conversational terms, we are all agreed that closed proceedings are a last resort. We want closed proceedings only when national safety is in danger and where there is no other sensible way of trying the case. I will go away and consider the matter, but we are rather late in the proceedings. Of course, the rules of the court still have to be made and it may be possible to address the matter there. In practice, there is not much between us, because judges and lawyers will not want to go into closed proceedings other than as a last resort. What we do not want is to introduce a process that involves months of time and vast sums of money, the intention of which is really to stop anybody taking on a closed procedure at all.
I thank the Minister for saying that he will look more carefully at the matter. However late in the day it is, we would be grateful for any changes he could make that might take us in the direction of what has been suggested by the JCHR and others.
While the Minister is in the mood for looking at other issues, can he be absolutely clear about confidentiality rings? This matter was raised earlier, so I will not go into it. As was discussed in Committee, there is a change in the wording that has led to the impression that the test is about the material rather than the disclosure. I hope that it will be made very clear that there is no sense in which that would apply to confidentiality rings. I believe that Opposition amendment 28 is intended to explore that issue.
I look forward to supporting any of the amendments that would take us towards the proposals of the JCHR. I look forward to amendment 1 being debated and for any opportunity to test the will of the House on that issue.
I was surprised to see amendment 70 and I look forward to the explanation from the right hon. Members for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) and for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears). I am pleased that, owing to the influence of the Liberal Democrats, inquests were taken out of scope after being included in the original proposals. It is important, particularly at an inquest, that the family knows the grounds for the conclusion. It would be very unsatisfactory for people who had lost a loved one to be told, “We cannot tell you why it happened.” I am pleased that inquests are not included. I am surprised that there is a move to put them back in. I had hoped to ask the shadow Secretary of State whether he supported that move, but I suspect that I can guess the answer.
Amendments 39 and 40 relate to gisting. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West (Mike Crockart) and I tabled similar proposals in Committee. I find it hard to see why there would be many cases in which a judge would not want a gist to be made available. We want that to happen. I understand that there may be cases in extremis where no gist would be possible. It would be helpful if the Minister made it clear that it is the intention that judges should always gist to the maximum extent possible. As long as that is said in this place, I think that we will be able to make progress.
I think that it is the same as the right hon. Gentleman’s alternative would be in a criminal case for which the evidence needed to convict somebody could not be gathered. If one cannot gain that evidence, one cannot proceed. It is important that that applies when people are being deprived of their liberty. I made the same argument when we were getting rid of control orders. One must try to provide the evidence that is needed to convict people. Failing that, I do not like the idea that people are simply held for many years, with very little freedom. I believe that control orders had 23-hour curfews. That is an extreme infringement of liberty. I know that we are not discussing criminal issues principally, but there are many cases in the criminal system in which the police are sure that somebody is guilty, but they cannot find evidence that may be used in court. None of us would want to see such cases proceed and the same should apply to any other serious deprivation of liberty.
I look forward to the votes. It is not clear to me exactly which matters we will have the opportunity to vote on. I will stand by all the votes that I cast in Committee, where we came very close to changing the Bill, but never quite close enough. I think that we won one vote on a new clause being read a Second time, but the decision was reversed immediately afterwards by the Chairman’s casting vote. I hope that we will change the provisions either so that we do not have these proceedings, which would be my ideal, or we at least move them closer to the proposals of the JCHR. I accept that we should not keep every word of what the Joint Committee suggested and that tweaks could be made. I hope that the Minister will consider that at the point at which he confirms the position on habeas corpus and my other questions.
I may have misheard, but the hon. Gentleman is not rejecting closed material proceedings altogether, is he? He would be the first person in the debate who has gone that far if that is what he is saying. He suggests that he might vote against clause 6. Two Members from smaller parties have tabled an amendment that would delete that clause. That would take us right back to square one after we have spent the last three hours agreeing that there are cases in which national security requires there to be closed proceedings.
I am sure that the Minister will be aware that I and my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West did press for a vote in Committee to remove clause 6. Sadly, it was defeated.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s responses on habeas corpus and the other points that I have made because what he says may well affect what happens, and liberty is a very important principle.
My hon. Friend knows me well enough to know that I do not dismiss critics of the Bill. I listen to them carefully; I just happen to disagree with them. The same applies to my hon. Friend: I listen carefully to what he says on this issue. Sometimes we agree and sometimes we disagree, and I sense that we will disagree on this. I am making a plea for further attempts to achieve consensus, but I am making it clear that if there is no consensus then I think that my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting is setting the bar too high.
On inquests, I am sorry that the Minister did not take an intervention from me earlier. I would be delighted to take an intervention from him at any stage in the next couple of minutes. I am grateful to Members who supported my amendment 70, which would make closed material proceedings available for inquests as well as civil proceedings. We just need an explanation from the Minister on why the Bill proposes CMPs for civil cases, but does not propose them for inquests. That was in the original plan. He knows that senior members of the Government and senior judges think it is nonsense and inconsistent to have one and not the other.
I think we have had this exchange before. The explanation is simple. The Government were faced, in Parliament and from all the lobbies, with overwhelming opposition to extending CMPs to inquests. We have said throughout today’s proceedings that we have been trying to concede as far as possible, and that if people did not want to trust coroners with these powers and the ability to take into account this information, we decided it was impossible to maintain it, particularly after recent controversy regarding coroners and inquests. All kinds of unlikely organisations were seen to be believing that we were closing down inquests, getting rid of juries and so on, so I am afraid that we took the line of least resistance. The result is that total secrecy and silence will continue to be the case in inquests whenever national security is involved.
The purpose of tabling amendment 70 —again, I am grateful for the support of hon. Members—was not that I thought I would win the day. Clearly, the Minister is not going to support it. I tabled the amendment to encourage him, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire) who is sitting next to him and anybody else who is listening. This issue will come back and either his Government or preferably a Government that I support, will have to deal with it.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. If CMPs are to be available in civil proceedings, they should certainly be available in inquests. There are difficulties concerning families and bereaved relatives, but in the end this about a search for the truth. If there is information and intelligence that reveals the cause of a death, the coroner should know it, even if it has to be kept as secret intelligence.
The Minister himself made the perfect argument today. He went on the radio at lunchtime and made the argument about the limitations of having to have just PII, rather than CMPs. What was the example he gave? The Litvinenko inquest. There are more than 30 historic inquests in Northern Ireland waiting to be resolved. Whether the deaths involved the Army or the police, all of those issues will be there. There will other inquests in future that will bring national security issues into play.
The right hon. Gentleman has been very patient in listening to the whole debate. All the people who are more liberal than we are and who are denouncing CMPs, are defending the existing law. What is at the moment in controversy at the Litvinenko inquest is that what they are saying is superior to admitting the evidence and having it heard and determined by the judge. One has to bring in the present inquests or inquests will never have this material, because such a fantastic volume of opposition was excited by the proposal when we first put it forward.
I accept that the Minister felt under enormous pressure to make that concession. Anybody who doubts the minds of coroners and senior judges in relation to the test that will be applied need only look at the coroner in the Litvinenko inquest, Sir Robert Owen, and the comments he made last week. He said clearly:
“I intend to conduct this inquest with the greatest degree of openness and transparency”—
and that he would give the Foreign Secretary’s request for a PII certificate—
“the most stringent and critical examination”.
We ought to trust the coroner and the judges.
In the end, the search for justice is a search for the truth. A secret court is one where information and intelligence is either not considered at all, or where the Government and their agencies cave in and make a settlement where no case has been heard—that is secret justice. Closed material proceedings are not perfection, but we are not dealing with perfection; we are dealing with a difficult issue in a small number of cases. However, we are more likely to get closer to the truth if the judge has seen the relevant information than if nobody has seen it at all.
With the leave of the House, I will respond on behalf of the Government. I will briefly address the comments of those Members who have, with great passion and sincerity, opposed the whole policy of the Bill; who think that closed procedures should not be permitted and are simply incompatible with our standards of justice; and who plainly wish things to stay as they are. They include the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), and even the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) got very near to that at one point, rather to my alarm.
I share the exasperation expressed by many Members who are more supportive of the Bill that much of the opposition to it is based on the idea that the present law does not call for amendment and that what happens now is satisfactory. Three or four Members expressed the exasperation I sometimes feel in these debates, because a growing number of people who seem to be more liberal than me, at least on this point, think that PII certificates are the ideal way of handling these cases. Most of the people who have tried to argue that point with me outside the Chamber, I am quite sure, would not have defended the PII certificate system 12 months ago and instead would have attacked it.
As we—the Bill’s defenders—have repeatedly pointed out, the whole point of PII is to exclude from anybody’s use in a case the evidence that is sensitive. Of course, one can gist and redact such as one can, but what one leaves out is anything that obviously threatens national security, which is the very information that everyone says ought to be heard. I do not accept all those allegations. I would like the civil courts to be able to decide some more of those allegations. To those who, like the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion, are convinced that our security services have been torturing and mistreating people and that we are trying to suppress all kinds of outrageous allegations, I can only say that if we stay with the law as it is, none of that will ever appear in a court before a judge.
The problem at the moment is that where a Government wish to bring forward their records and witnesses to try to answer these claims, there is no closed material procedure in civil proceedings to enable them to do so. We used to think that the court did that out of its own volition, but I am afraid that there have been rulings making it quite clear that that is for Parliament to decide. I will not repeat what people said a few moments ago. The absolutism of the people on the ultra-liberal wing is quite extraordinary. They are demanding silence. They are demanding no judgment from a judge. They wish things to stay as they are. I ask them to reflect on the deeply unsatisfactory nature of that. It is not true that there are other countries where one can do that.
I do not think—I am open to correction—that there is any jurisdiction in the world in which someone is trying to create a procedure whereby one can bring in highly sensitive evidence of this kind in a civil claim against the Government. Somebody calmly said that the Americans allow that. I can assure them that the Americans are extremely alarmed about the fact that we are giving those powers to our judges and wish to be reassured that national security will be protected. As has been said, they are already reducing their co-operation with us, and they will reduce it further if they think that we are opening some kind of sieve in their information. Where they issue a certificate of state security it is not challengeable. People are bringing actions in our courts claiming that we are sometimes complicit with what they say American agencies have done because they cannot bring those actions in America. They come here under Norwich Pharmacal trying to get documents from us to support action in other countries because they think we have the only courts in the world where they might be able to get hold of American intelligence material—and to do so for other people. So in supporting our approach in principle, the Government, the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats are demonstrating how committed we all are to the rule of law, human rights and the wish to be accountable to our courts. We think that we can contrive a process that does secure national security and does respect the interests of our allies while allowing a judge to consider all the relevant evidence and give a judgment.
My next point will be the final one I make on this, because I realise that the right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) has to wind up the debate. I still hope that we get the widest possible all-party support on this important constitutional matter, and I think that the Liberals are with us. Nobody in this House has given views that are contrary to the interests of justice or anything of that kind, but we are almost quibbling about rather important amendments; we are talking about how we can best frame our response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights and so on without actually compromising the process and making it unworkable.
I had the formidable support of the Ministers in the former Government who were responsible for these matters at various times and in various ways: the right hon. Members for Blackburn (Mr Straw), for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) and for Knowsley (Mr Howarth). I think that the latter was right in saying that I am probably the most liberal of the five of us on most issues that come before this House. I spent my time opposing the right hon. Members when I was in opposition and they still have not persuaded me that 90 days’ detention without charge was remotely justifiable—we sat up all night arguing about that. The fact is that we are moving to resolve a serious problem, and the Labour party should give careful consideration to whether they press these measures.
I am asked by Labour Members and by others whether there is any further that we can go. I have already described the number of amendments that we have made, and the huge discretion and control that we have now given to the judge. I have indicated that we will have a look at the rules of court. I cannot be persuaded that putting “as a last resort” in the Bill is not risky. The Wiley balancing test as it is on the amendment paper is not the Wiley balancing test but a stronger version of that test, and it has been argued about interminably. It is totally unsuitable for a closed proceeding; it is designed as a stiff test when one is proposing to take all the evidence out of consideration altogether.
I urge restraint on the Opposition, who claim to wish to be in government one day—needless to say, I regard that proposition with dread. If they take some of these objections to bizarre lengths when there is complete agreement on principle between us, I can say only that were they to succeed, they would regret it. I also think that, for the reputation of our security services, for the reputation of our justice system and for the confidence of our allies, it would be very helpful if we had the support of the bulk of the three major parties. I have tried to explain why people of utmost sincerity who take the more purist view are actually living in a dream world. We will do better in holding our agents to account by having this Bill.
With the leave of the House, Mr Deputy Speaker, may I repeat what I said almost four hours ago by citing the words of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation? As I said, the Opposition accept that there is
“a small but indeterminate category of national security-related claims, both for judicial review of executive decisions and for civil damages, in respect of which it is preferable that the option of a CMP—for all its inadequacies—should exist.”
That is our position and we are not seeking to exclude part 2 from the Bill—to be fair to the Minister, he did not suggest that we were.
I just remind the Minister that when the Green Paper was published, many on both sides of the House thought that it was perfectly adequate. When the draft Bill was first published, some on both sides of the House thought that it was adequate. We did not think that, and we pushed for improvements. When the Bill was published, before it went to the House of Lords last June, many on both sides of the House, including the Minister, thought that it was perfect and in need of no amendment. The Bill has been changed on three or four occasions in a number of areas, not least by the changes made in the House of Lords. The other place sought to put into the Bill some of the recommendations made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Not all of its recommendations were put into amendments standing in the names of Cross Benchers, including Lord Pannick, but some were—the ones thought to be important in order to secure the checks and balances required in this Bill.
I remind the Minister that Labour Front Benchers have on no occasion sought to remove part 2 from the Bill. He will know, as he has been in this game far, far longer than I have, that we could well have won votes in the House of Lords to remove part 2, but we appreciate the important challenge the Government face. As the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee and colleagues on both sides of the House have put it, “How do we get the balance with our wish to make sure that our citizens are as safe as possible, bearing in mind the huge heroic work that our security services do, relying on intelligence from other countries?” The Opposition accept the control principle and always have done, and we will debate that after the votes at 8 pm. Nobody who has spoken today in favour of our amendments has tried to caricature the people against them as not being concerned about civil liberties and human rights. To be fair, those against our amendments have not tried to caricature our position as being against, or not understanding the importance of, national security.
The hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), who represented the Liberal Democrats in Committee, made a speech today, and I think he indicated that he will be supporting our amendments at 8 pm. I pray in aid the fact that it is not just Opposition Members wishing to press these amendments, as I will shortly. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its most recent report last week, confirmed that it was unhappy with the shredding of the Lords amendments in Committee. The special advocates also agree with our amendments, as does the House of Lords. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and the former Director of Public Prosecutions also believe that our amendments strike the right balance between national security and ensuring that individuals are able to hold the Executive to account.
During the debate, my view—the Opposition’s view—has been characterised as considering PII perfect and a utopian panacea for some of the challenges we face, but I have not said that. I deliberately took some time to pray in aid the Supreme Court decision in al-Rawi, when the court said, to paraphrase, that it would like the additional tool of CMPs and suggested that it would like Parliament to give it that ability. That is what I am seeking to do.
I say to the Minister without Portfolio that the danger lies is some of the comments made by others, who gave the impression that CMPs are often preferable to PIIs and that rather than being the exception—a point made by a number of colleagues on the Government Benches—they would become the default position. That is where he must be careful. A number of Members on both sides of the House have said that PII is rubbish, that it is not the answer and that CMPs are far preferable, and they have asked why a judge would not opt for a CMP. We are simply seeking to put in the Bill the amendments passed by huge majorities in the House of Lords on the recommendation of the JCHR to ensure that a judge understands that he must consider the other options before he decides to go for a CMP.
I know that the Minister without Portfolio did not mean it when he said that every time he makes a concession, ingenious lawyers move fresh amendments; our fresh amendment would have become stale by now, as it is four months old. I would like to press to a vote amendment 26, which is a paving amendment for amendment 31 to make CMPs a last resort, and amendment 30, which is the gateway for the Wiley balancing test for maximum judicial discretion.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The House proceeded to a Division.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 6—Review of sections 6 to 11.
New clause 4—Expiry and renewal—
‘(1) Sections 6 to 12 of this Act expire at the end of the period of one year beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
(2) The Secretary of State may, by order made by statutory instrument, provide that sections 6 to 12 of this Act are not to expire at the time when they would otherwise expire under subsection (1) or in accordance with an order under this subsection but are to continue in force after that time for a period not exceeding one year.
(3) An order under this section may not be made unless a draft of it has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.’.
New clause 9—Recording of data relating to closed proceedings—
‘(1) Rules of court relating to closed material proceedings under this Act, and applications for them, must make provision—
(a) ensuring that key data is centrally recorded for all proceedings, including—
(i) the duration of open hearings and closed hearings; and
(ii) the number of witnesses heard in closed proceedings and the nature of those witnesses; and
(iii) the length of a closed judgment; and
(iv) whether the claimant, defendant and/or intervener applied for closed material proceedings; and
(v) whether the claimant, defendant and/or intervener contested the application for closed proceedings; and
(b) ensuring that centrally recorded data is available to the independent person appointed by the Secretary of State to review the operation of the provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006.’.
Government amendments 49 and 51 to 54.
The last debate was about the principles of closed material proceedings; we now turn to a new group of amendments relating to additional reviewing mechanisms for the CMP provisions—in particular, Government new clauses 5 and 6 and associated consequential amendments.
In Committee I said that I was prepared to listen further to concerns expressed about transparency and particularly about ensuring that the new provisions did not make CMP commonplace. I undertook to table amendments on that matter. I have considered the issue carefully and decided to adopt the view of the Constitution Committee. I therefore intend to bring forward annual reporting and a review of the CMP provisions to be conducted five years after Royal Assent.
Given the often lengthy nature of litigation, we believe that the frequency set out in the amendments allows for regular but meaningful reporting and for a review to be informed by enough cases to provide for substantiated conclusions and reasoned recommendations where necessary. We believe that an annual report is the most proportionate approach, as it is anticipated that CMPs will be used infrequently.
The consequence is that there is likely to be little to report on a basis more regular than once a year. Annual reports will not, however, be the only way in which facts relating to cases involving CMPs will be made public during the reporting period. The Government have made an amendment in the Lords to ensure that when an application is made under clause 6(1), that must be reported to the other parties in the proceedings. There are already mechanisms through which the courts publish their open judgments.
The reports will focus on court procedures, as CMPs are a procedural option for the courts and not related to the use of Executive powers. The new clauses list the matters of key concern to be included in the annual reports such as the number of CMP applications and who they are made by; how many CMPs are granted and how many revoked; and how many judgments, both open and closed, are published with respect to the determination of section 6 proceedings. That would include judgments made on the substantive trial and regarding the outcome of the application for a CMP declaration. The new clauses would also cover proceedings deemed to be section 6 proceedings, such as the application process for a declaration and the review of Norwich Pharmacal certification.
In addition to an annual reporting requirement, the Government seek to introduce a provision for a comprehensive review after five years. In line with other legislation, such as the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, it requires the appointment of a reviewer and does not specify the remit of the review except to indicate that it covers the operation of closed material proceedings. That type of review of CMPs would be different from other reviews, in that it would concern not the operation of the Secretary of State’s powers but rather the operation of court processes. That means that the reviewer will have to take care not to review judicial decisions regarding the operation of court processes or the fair running of individual cases.
I am grateful for the fact that the Government have been responsive to the arguments made on these issues. However, I also support the proposal that there should be a renewal mechanism—a better process than a sunset clause. When the Minister addresses that point, will he reflect on the fact that we have given ourselves the chance in the past of having an annual report and annual confirmation or otherwise of terrorist legislation in Northern Ireland and other legislation in respect of which there are ongoing cases that last a long time?
I am pleased to engage in that debate. I will come to it when I address the amendments tabled by the Opposition. At this early stage, I should say that in essence it is a question of the assurance provided to external partners as well as the operation of the courts themselves. I hear the point that the right hon. Gentleman makes, but I hope he accepts that the proposal for an annual review or, in effect, an annual sunset clause in the first instance and then an annual renewal thereafter, does not leave a great deal of time for litigation, which is likely to span several years because of its nature and complexity. I am sure that we will hear more from the Opposition about why they have sought to advance this time period over anything else. There is a principle at stake as regards the assurance that we are seeking to provide through this mechanism. We have gone for the option of five-yearly reporting, with a proper examination of the operation of the Bill, to enable Parliament to be properly informed. It will then be for Parliament to consider what further steps may or may not be appropriate at that point.
We would expect such a review to take into account the views of special advocates, among others. We want to ensure that it will involve a proper examination of the operation of CMPs to consider efficiency, trends and types of cases, analysing the numbers provided in the annual reports to reflect on how CMPs are being used.
How many CMPs does my hon. Friend anticipate there being in any one year?
Our latest estimate in October was that about 20 cases would fall within the scope of these proceedings, and the regulatory impact assessment indicates up to 15 cases annually. The point is to ensure that there is annual reporting of the forthcoming CMP applications and judgments so that Parliament is regularly updated. We will get a better sense of the situation on an annual basis than if we went for quarterly reporting. That would be too short a period given the nature of litigation and the length of time that these cases are likely to take to go through the courts.
Let me deal with the Opposition new clauses tabled by the right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) and the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter).
Before I do so, I will of course give way to my hon. Friend. We debated this issue in Committee, and I hope that he will reflect on the changes that the Government are making in the light of a number of representations that he made there.
I thank the Minister for tabling the two amendments that reflect what we discussed in Committee, where he a made commitment that he has followed through on. I have a question about new clause 6. He spoke about a five-yearly review, but that will be after only one period of five years. If that review were to say that further studies would be needed and that the system was still taking time to bed in, would there be the prospect of having further five-yearly reviews as the process continued?
A five-yearly review with, in essence, each Parliament having the opportunity to examine the operation of CMPs is appropriate. As my hon. Friend will know from our previous debates on, for example, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, my view has been that that time period or cycle gives sufficient time to enable a proper consideration of the operation of the process. The right period is five years—in essence, once a Parliament so that each Parliament can consider what may or may not be appropriate at that point.
New clause 4 provides that the new CMP provisions would expire only a year after Royal Assent unless a statutory instrument extending the provisions for a further year was laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House. The Government believe that the new clause would largely negate the benefit of the provisions in part 2 and that it is disproportionate. The negative impact of what would amount in the first year to a sunset clause could be very serious. As I have said, we know that litigation can be lengthy, lasting a number of months and usually more than a year, while document-heavy cases can last for several years. Creating the possibility that CMPs would cease to be available halfway through the progression of a case where the judge had already decided that a CMP was in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice in the proceedings would, in our view, undermine the judge’s discretion.
I think that the House is in basic agreement that CMPs should be available as a tool to the judge and that the judge should have discretion on whether to use one or not. In exercising that discretion, the judge will consider whether or not he agrees with the Secretary of State’s assessment of damage to national security and how the case should be fairly run. Even once a judge has decided that a CMP should form part of the procedures in the case, each piece of material will be assessed to decide whether it should go into the CMP, be withheld entirely or be redacted, summarised or disclosed. The judge can also decide at any point to revoke a CMP and, indeed, must consider doing so after the disclosure exercise if he feels it is no longer in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice in the case. Parliament has already decided to provide four CMPs in at least 14 settings, so we do not believe that we are introducing an entirely new concept.
I understand the origin of the new clause. In essence, it is about the provision for annual renewal of control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act repealed and replaced. The 2005 Act was passed under a greatly accelerated parliamentary timetable, with only limited opportunity for debate. By contrast, the Green Paper provided a full consultation and it is fair to say that the Bill has been through parliamentary scrutiny in the other place and this House. It is also worth underlining that the Bill’s provisions relate to the procedures of the court, rather than the exercise of controls by the Executive. I note that in the preceding debate the right hon. Member for Tooting said that we are in a “very different context”.
The circumstances in which CMPs could be used are limited to national security-sensitive cases and for hearings in the High Court, Court of Appeal, Court of Session and Supreme Court. As I have said, the judge has the discretion to determine whether a CMP is appropriate.
This problem is not likely to go away. Claimants should have the continued ability to bring claims against the Government and matters should be scrutinised by the courts, as opposed to a return to the current system, where in some circumstances justice is simply not possible. We will continue to be faced with the unpalatable dilemma of either damaging national security or potentially paying out significant sums of money.
I should also make clear that, although the Opposition’s proposed new clause applies to clauses 6 to 12, it would also affect the reviews of certificates issued by the Secretary of State under the Norwich Pharmacal clauses. Such proceedings are deemed to be section 6 proceedings because the case needs to be heard in CMP in order to ensure that its outcome is not prejudiced by having already publicly disclosed the very information with which the proceedings are concerned. Therefore, the effect of the proposed new clauses would be also to disrupt the Norwich Pharmacal clauses, which are intended to bring clarity and reassurance to intelligence-sharing partners.
International partners have expressed concerns about the Government’s ability to defend themselves and protect national security in cases where claimants make allegations against the state and its defence rests on national security material. We risk undermining the confidence of partners who share such information with us if they feel that we do not have in place secure processes to protect their material while defending Government actions.
I understand the Minister’s arguments. May I make two other points? I do not seek to defend the exact wording of new clause 4, but the argument that one cannot change something suddenly in the middle of a long court case could be dealt with by negotiating when any change would come into operation. I also remind him that it was the considered view of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the significance of the change in the Bill merits our being very careful about the length of time for which we introduce the procedure.
We have all said in a number of ways in Committee and on the Floor of the House that we accept that this is not a perfect solution. We are not in the territory of perfect solutions when we talk about these issues.
I would make a number of points to the right hon. Gentleman. First, one purpose of the Bill is to provide assurance to our external partners on the sharing of intelligence material. Although I recognise the parallel that he draws with other court processes, that assurance is an important additional factor. If a time period was introduced, whether through a form of renewal or sunset, as one got towards the end of that period, there would be significant anxiety about what the future may hold. That would not satisfy the policy objective of giving that assurance to our external partners.
It is interesting that the Constitution Committee did not recommend a sunset clause. Its report said that the House may wish to consider the Bill being independently reviewed—not renewed—five years after it comes into force. The Government have accepted its recommendation in our new clauses.
New clause 9, which the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) may wish to speak to shortly, seeks to provide for the collection of information. We believe that that matter is addressed in a different way by our new clauses, under which the Ministry of Justice will collect and publish data on the number of declarations granted, the number of revocations and the number of final closed judgments.
Regular reporting and a full review of the operation of closed material proceedings will provide an insight into how the provisions are working in practice and a clear mechanism to provide reassurance on their operation. I urge right hon. and hon. Members to support that approach and the Government’s new clauses.
The Minister has kindly set out in some detail and in his usual authoritative way the basis for the new clauses. Members should not worry, because that is the high point of my compliments to the Government. It is downhill from here.
We had an extensive debate on this issue in Committee. In fact, we spent the whole of the last afternoon’s sitting on 7 February deliberating review, reporting and what is colloquially called sunset, but which, now that the Minister has corrected us, should be called renewal, which sounds much better. Two days before that, we debated the equivalent of new clause 9, which has been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell).
Two things happened in the debate on review, one of which the Minister has alluded to, that did not happen at any other time during the Committee proceedings. The first is that the Minister agreed to go away and look at something that we raised and come back with further proposals. The second is that we won a vote. The hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) referred to that earlier. For the record, with the support of the Liberal Democrats and in the absence of the hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley)—I do not want to prejudge how he may have voted—the vote was 9:9. The Chair, as is the convention, voted for the clause to be read a second time, but sadly, two or three seconds later, voted that it not be added to the Bill. However, it was good while it lasted.
There have been some technical changes to the new clause that we presented in Committee, and it is now new clause 4. For the avoidance of doubt, we will press it to a vote, because we believe that otherwise, proper review and renewal of this controversial part of the Bill will not be provided for.
On new clause 9, I put it to the Government in Committee that if they wanted to rely on CMPs, they should document them properly so that they had an evidence base for when they wanted to use them in the future. They were not persuaded. My hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington has referred to the contribution that Dr McNamara has made to our deliberations at all stages of the Bill. He is a legal academic specialising in open justice and proceedings related to terrorism matters, and his briefings have been extremely helpful, particularly on these provisions. He says about new clause 9:
“There does not appear to be any systematically compiled evidence of the scale of the use of secret evidence in the areas where it is currently used. There does not appear to be any publicly accessible formal or informal recording of the total overall use of CMP, or the total use within the different contexts identified by the Government. Nor is there any indication that such evidence exists out of the public eye…Where records have been requested the Executive has been largely unable or unwilling to provide records. Parliamentary questions in the Commons and the Lords have revealed a paucity of information is available to the current use of CMPs…As it stands, the Bill sets a very, very low threshold of openness for judgments under Clauses 6 and 7. Moreover, there is presently no central recording of how often CMPs are used in any courts, nor any centrally recorded information about them.”
He says that unless there is systematic recording, there is no practical mechanism by which the use of CMPs can be monitored. That is quite an indictment of the current position, and I can only repeat what I said in Committee and hope that it is more persuasive on the Floor of the House. The Minister should consider the matter for his own good, and the Government should take that point on board even if they are not prepared to support new clause 9 today.
On new clause 5, the Minister said that he would consider the issue of reporting and come back to the House, and he has done so. The new clauses on reporting that we pushed for in Committee, and those that the Liberal Democrats pushed for on a slightly different basis, were designed to emulate the situation in comparable legislation. That was why we specified a three-monthly review period. The Minister has come back to us with an annual review period, which seems somewhat parsimonious, if I may say so.
The Minister should take the point that this is controversial legislation—I would make that point even more clearly in relation to new clause 4—and touches on new ground. It contains many definitions that we are coming across for the first time, so it seems entirely appropriate that there should be more regular reviews. Perhaps we should be grateful for what we get, however, and at least the provision is for recurring 12-monthly reporting. So be it, and we do not intend to oppose new clause 5. We did not press our new clauses to Divisions in Committee but instead waited to see what the Minister would come up with. We are somewhat disappointed, but it is something, and the Government have at least listened.
New clause 6 does not do the job of new clause 4. It seems designed to act as a review for this part of the Bill, but it is wholly inadequate. Even for those who take a strong interest in this issue, including the hon. Member for Cambridge, the Government’s approach does not seem clear. I am not used to reading Liberal Democrat Voice in my spare time—that would be a terribly sad thing to do in my leisure hours—but I will read out two brief exchanges that put into focus the problem with what the Government are doing.
I am most grateful, and I think the whole House is grateful for the Joint Committee’s work: it has taken a forensic interest, produced three substantive reports and taken a huge amount of evidence. We would all be a lot poorer in discussing this matter were it not for its role.
The Joint Committee felt able to summarise the need for the annual renewal provision in one paragraph because it had highlighted the difficulties that arose from the rejection of the Wiley balance, the rejection of last resort, the rejection of “PII first”, and the rejection of the Wiley balance in the CMP, a matter that I believe we will have an opportunity to vote on when we press amendment 38 to a Division at the end of the debate. That has not been discussed at any length and all I will say is, as a paragraph of the Joint Committee’s report makes clear,
“The Special Advocates…consider that once a CMP is ordered, and the court has to decide which documents will be “open”…and which “closed”, the court should be required to perform the Wiley balance between national security on the one hand and the fair and open administration of justice on the other.”
That is a point that the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) constantly rejects in what appears to be a wilful misunderstanding of the way the PII process works, or indeed the way that the Wiley balance works. All of the proposals, which have had great support from the Joint Committee, the other place, many parties in this House and a substantial number of senior Members on the Government Benches, are dismissed out of hand by the Government in the belief that the new formulation, the revised new formulation or the revised, revised new formulation is good enough. For all those reasons, it will be necessary to have the annual review process.
Finally, not only are there issues with which we are now familiar, some of which we have just voted on, but the Government have slipped in new proposals. The hon. Member for Cambridge mentioned amendment 28. We believe, notwithstanding the Government’s reassurances, that the aim is to destroy the use of confidentiality rings. Government amendment 47, which we believe allows—[Interruption.] The Government know what their own amendment says. There are serious, additional clauses, which I am sure will be raised in the other place. There has not been the opportunity to raise them on the Floor of the House this afternoon. They have been introduced on Report and not properly debated.
I would just say that we have had an extensive debate on all the amendments on which the hon. Gentleman suggests there has been no debate. I wonder whether he might like to reflect on that.
Order. What I can reflect on is that we should be sticking to the new clauses before us, and, as I have said, I know that is what we are going to do now.
In addressing the new clauses, the Minister said it was important to maintain confidence in our legal system—not only for us to do so, but for our many thousands of constituents to do so. That is why it is so important constantly to review the impact of closed material proceedings. The Minister gave a figure of 15 or more cases a year going through this process, which is not an inconsequential number. Since entering this place, I have seen changes to our legal system that have worried me, such as the introduction of double jeopardy, and the fact that we now seem happy to imprison people for 20 years and when we discover that they did not commit the crime for which they were imprisoned we do not think that they should have much compensation, if any. We are now going down the route of secret courts, so reviewing the impact and consequences of secret proceedings is enormously important, because many thousands of my constituents and many millions of people across the length and breadth of this country are made very nervous by this change, coming on top of other changes. What happens in other EU countries that have proceedings similar to closed material proceedings? What happens in other liberal western democracies?
I conclude my comments by saying that over the weekend a number of Conservative colleagues whom I respect and admire immensely were talking about the UK leaving the European Court of Human Rights. I would support that, but I smile when I find that on the Monday we are talking about bringing in secret courts, as the two things do not make comfortable bedfellows. Thank you very much for allowing me a brief moment on my feet, Mr Speaker.
We have had an interesting debate on these new clauses. I note that the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) described the Bill as complex, controversial and important and asked whether I would accept his analysis. I agree that it is complex, inasmuch as we are dealing with the need for closed material proceedings and the nature of sensitive material. It is controversial and it is clearly very important, as it relates to the assurances we are seeking to give to overseas partners and, obviously, to the nature of justice itself, which was very much a feature of the preceding debate. In the context of his description, I certainly recognise the need for an assurance to this House and to the public about how the powers and provisions in the Bill will be used in practice, as well as on the points that have been made about that.
In essence, that question was at the heart of our debate in Committee about the utility, effectiveness and proportionality of the use of closed material proceedings and the frequency of their use, which, in many ways, touches on the point alluded to by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie). We have given an indication of how many cases are expected per year, but clearly the reporting mechanism we envisage is intended to provide a sense of how many times the provisions will be used in that way.
I shall focus on a number of points raised during the debate and characterise some of the themes that emerged. The first is the question of whether there should be a formal renewal process. The Opposition have sought to interpose an annual renewal through new clause 4, but even if we accept the principle, that is simply too short a time period for the reasons given by many right hon. and hon. Members. The House would not be able to assess the effectiveness and operation of the provisions, given that we are talking about cases that are likely to run for an extended period of time.
When we considered the timing and effectiveness of a renewal provision, going back as far as the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, we looked back at what happened under control orders, which is perhaps the closest parallel to an annual renewal debate on which we can draw. I recall the annual debates on control orders and I am sure that the hon. Member for Hammersmith will agree that some of them were sub-optimal, to say the least. In many respects, they became—[Interruption.] They were not, perhaps, the kind of fully formed debate that the hon. Member for Hammersmith is seeking through new clause 4, because, in essence, they became a cursory discussion at the time for the annual renewal of the provision. The debates were often short, were not necessarily well attended and did not necessarily apply the level of scrutiny that he is looking for. It is difficult to see, if he is talking about a renewal 12 months after Royal Assent, what information would be available to inform consideration properly of whether the legislation was effective. If we put aside the detail of the principle, there is a clear issue with the timing.
I do not think that the Minister’s saying that the poor quality of debate in this House is a good reason for not having annual renewal is his best point. Will he deal with a point on which I do not think he agrees with me? New provisions have been introduced to the Bill, in Committee, where they at least received some debate, and today. Amendment 46, in particular, seems to allow material that is irrelevant to the proceedings to trigger a CMP, which is a massive change that has not been debated at all because we have not had time to do so. Is that not a reason for allowing renewal after a short time?
I hesitate to tread on amendments in the previous group, but ultimately it is for this House to determine the appropriate way to examine legislation. With other legislation, it might simply be the process of review through Government activity or Select Committee activity, but in certain cases, because of the sensitivity, import or nature of the legislation, there might be some form of additional statutory provision. We have certainly touched on areas of legislation where that has had some application. For example, some sort of mechanism or review for reporting back to the House how the legislation has been used applied to previous terrorism legislation and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. Because of the sensitive nature of the issues in this case, the Government have accepted that the normal scenario whereby Select Committees or other bodies are part of the general rolling assessment of legislation is not sufficient for this particular Bill. That is why we have sought to introduce the new clauses this evening.
Now that the Minister is talking about engaging Parliament and now that his right hon. and learned Friend the Minister without Portfolio is back in his place, is it not a good moment to address the idea that Parliament should be engaged by ensuring that the reviewer who can look into all the secret aspects is appointed with the agreement of a Committee of both Houses of Parliament—namely, the Joint Committee on Human Rights?
I would say that the provisions we have sought to introduce on the appointment of a reviewer are similar to, and in line with, other legislation such as the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, whereby the Secretary of State appoints the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. The individual holding that office may well be the appropriate person to conduct this type of review or it may be someone else so that David Anderson or whoever is the holder of the office at that time is not overburdened, which could dilute the effectiveness of the independent reviewer’s analysis of the legislation. I hope that the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights would accept that the evidence and information provided by the independent reviewer has been instructive and relevant to that Committee’s consideration of the Bill.
I highlight the fact that the independent reviewer has provided quite an important perspective, looking at terrorism legislation as he does, which has added value not just to the Joint Committee’s review but to the debates we have had here. I note that David Anderson has been prayed in aid this afternoon and also in debates in the other place. We certainly recognise the value that an independent reviewer can have. I know from my discussions with other Ministers in other parts of Europe and elsewhere that the role of our independent reviewer is recognised for the importance and added value it brings in the analysis of legislation that touches on some sensitive issues.
I am sure I am pre-empting matters and that my hon. Friend was going to come on to this later in his speech. I asked what happens in other western European countries when it comes to reviewing closed court proceedings. Can he tell me what other European countries do on such matters?
It is difficult to answer my hon. Friend’s question. Parallels are difficult to draw in this respect. I can think of one European jurisdiction that is seeking to examine the appointment of an independent reviewer of its own terrorism legislation. We are unusual in having an individual who does such work. People are reflecting on the input from David Anderson, the current reviewer, and his predecessor, Lord Carlile, shining a light and having access to sensitive materials better to inform the debate on sensitive issues relating to terrorist legislation.
I am not seeking to avoid my hon. Friend’s question. It is genuinely difficult to draw parallels with the type of court processes and the review structure that we have in this country, and to say that another country deals with the issue by having an x year review or some sort of renewal system or independent reviewer. It is hard to make such an analysis, because countries and their systems are so different.
The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) spoke about the provision of information and the need for a database. On closed proceedings and closed judgments, there is a database which is held and managed by the Home Office and will be updated three times a year in relation to closed judgments, to ensure that special advocates are able to look at summaries of legal principles in particularly sensitive judgments. Those will be added on a less routine basis to reduce the risk of the summary being linked to a particular case, because of the sensitivity of some of the details. It is intended that summaries of all future closed judgments will be entered into the database to inform debates and discussions and the work of the special advocates.
Part of the debate has been on the principle of whether there should be an annual sunset or renewal—whatever language we choose—or whether the system should be on a five-year basis, which I know that others have suggested as an alternative, although that option is not before the House tonight. The choice that the House has is whether to accept the Government’s new clauses on the provision of information and the review, which I hope it will, recognising that this is an addition that seeks to improve the Bill and the scrutiny and analysis that it provides.
Ultimately, if we were to introduce some form of renewal, we would have to face up to the message that that gives to some of our external partners on the control principle and the sharing of intelligence, given that one of the principles behind the changes being introduced is to give assurance to our external partners, recognising the point that David Anderson and others have made that, in essence, our relationship with a number of external partners has been affected by some cases. If we were to provide an annual renewal, it would materially impact on that. Equally, if we were to provide a further formal five-year renewal in the Bill, our judgment is that that would not provide the assurance to our external partners that is anticipated for our intelligence relationships.
I am a little concerned that I am listening to a suggestion that the legislation is somehow for the benefit of our closest allies, the United States. It should be pointed out that the United States does not rewrite its law to take account of the fact that we send some of our intelligence material to it. Indeed, it is often argued that it is a good deal more leaky than we are. A former head of the CIA counter-terrorism centre recently remarked that he supposed that British intelligence must be very unhappy because it is often exasperated, quite reasonably, with its American friends, who are far more leak prone than it is. Nor has it sought to change its system of law to take account of our requests. Is that not one of my hon. Friend’s weakest arguments?
My hon. Friend says that it is a weak argument, but I disagree. An important part of the Bill is to ensure that justice is achieved in those cases where otherwise evidence would be excluded. Also, through the Norwich Pharmacal provisions, assurance is given that the control principle will be adhered to. That important provision needs to be considered as part of this segment of the Bill and when considering five-year renewal or otherwise. In essence, once we get towards the end of the five-year period, the assurance will not be there. People will be considering what the situation would be, and the issues around the control principle and the assurance that we seek to give to external partners are relevant factors for consideration in this context.
On the point made by the hon. Member for Cambridge on the ISC, under the Bill the ISC’s function will be to oversee the expenditure, administration, policy and operations of the security and intelligence agencies and other Government activities in relation to intelligence or security matters. In the course of that work, it may come across information relevant to this issue and it would be open to the committee to report on those matters to Parliament or to the Prime Minister if it found evidence that the Government may have been abusing the CMP. The ISC has the ability to examine some of these issues if that helps for the scrutiny that is applied in respect of the Bill.
The hon. Member for Hammersmith highlighted the conditions for a declaration to be made. They can be met on material that a party other than the applicant is required to disclose. Amendment 46 makes it clear that the two conditions for a declaration to be made can be met and based on such material. I do not know whether that is helpful to him in the context of the points that he made.
Ultimately, the House will need to determine whether the Government’s new clauses are sufficient. We believe that they are; they allow for a reviewer to look at the legislation in five years’ time. Following the report that the reviewer provides, it is open to the House to re-legislate if it considers that change is needed. Equally, we judge that the legislation on the provision of information gives assurance within an appropriate period on how the Bill will be used.
Others may take a contrary view, but we judge that the new clauses are appropriate. We recommend them to the House, because it is important for us to have the transparency and that ability to consider. That is precisely what the new clauses will give us.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 5 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 6
Review of sections 6 to 11
‘(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person to review the operation of sections 6 to 11 (the “reviewer”).
(2) The reviewer must carry out a review of the operation of sections 6 to 11 in respect of the period of five years beginning with the day on which section 6 comes into force.
(3) The review must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period to which the review relates.
(4) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send to the Secretary of State a report on its outcome.
(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(6) Before laying a copy of a report before Parliament under subsection (5), the Secretary of State may, after consulting the reviewer, exclude from the copy any part of the report that would, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, be damaging to the interests of national security if it were included in the copy laid before Parliament.
(7) The Secretary of State may pay to the reviewer—
(a) expenses incurred by the reviewer in carrying out functions under this section, and
(b) such allowances as the Secretary of State determines.’. —(James Brokenshire.)
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Expiry and renewal
‘(1) Sections 6 to 12 of this Act expire at the end of the period of one year beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
(2) The Secretary of State may, by order made by statutory instrument, provide that sections 6 to 12 of this Act are not to expire at the time when they would otherwise expire under subsection (1) or in accordance with an order under this subsection but are to continue in force after that time for a period not exceeding one year.
(3) An order under this section may not be made unless a draft of it has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.’.—(Mr Slaughter.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.