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These initiatives were driven by Lord West of Spithead, and are more likely to reflect personal policy preferences.
Lord West of Spithead has not introduced any legislation before Parliament
Lord West of Spithead has not co-sponsored any Bills in the current parliamentary sitting
The House of Lords Inclusion and Diversity Team is made up of three full-time posts: one Head of Inclusion and Diversity and two Inclusion and Diversity Managers. One Inclusion and Diversity Manager post is currently vacant but is expected to be filled in the New Year.
The two Houses have recently agreed a new approach to the restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, as set out in the Joint Report of the two Commissions (HL Paper 19) and in the resolution passed by the House on 13 July [HL deb. Col. 1497]. The new approach asks for different levels of ambition and a broader range of options for delivering the works to be considered. At this early stage in the development of proposals no targets have been agreed for the provision of toilet facilities in either (1) acquired or (2) restored buildings. Proposals for the restoration works require parliamentary approval, as set out in section 7 of the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019.
I refer the hon. Member to the answer given to HL13299 on 25 February 2021.
The Senior Deputy Speaker has asked me, as Chair of the Finance Committee, to respond on his behalf.
Scaffolding was removed around the roof level of the Elizabeth Tower in October 2020. More scaffolding is expected to be removed towards the end of this year and continuing into 2022.
Covid-19 has restricted the progress of the refurbishment. The completion date will be later than the planned 2021 date, and is now expected in 2022. Further information on the revised completion date will be announced once the schedule of works is finalised.
The original outline business case for the Elizabeth Tower assessed the costs at £29.7m. In 2017, the final business case for the Elizabeth Tower was approved at a value of £61m, subsequently revised in February 2020 to £79.7m. The additional costs due to the impact of COVID-19 are currently being assessed.
The Senior Deputy Speaker has asked me, as Chair of the Finance Committee, to respond on his behalf.
Scaffolding was removed around the roof level of the Elizabeth Tower in October 2020. More scaffolding is expected to be removed towards the end of this year and continuing into 2022.
Covid-19 has restricted the progress of the refurbishment. The completion date will be later than the planned 2021 date, and is now expected in 2022. Further information on the revised completion date will be announced once the schedule of works is finalised.
The original outline business case for the Elizabeth Tower assessed the costs at £29.7m. In 2017, the final business case for the Elizabeth Tower was approved at a value of £61m, subsequently revised in February 2020 to £79.7m. The additional costs due to the impact of COVID-19 are currently being assessed.
The UK government policy on National Security Vetting is outlined in the HMG Personnel Security Controls, which states the levels of clearance required for access to TOP SECRET material and the access controls in place. For long-term, frequent or uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET assets and/or access to TOP SECRET codeword material, the level of clearance required is Developed Vetting (DV). Occasional, supervised access to TOP SECRET assets is permitted for individuals with Security Check (SC) clearance.
The Foreign Policy and National Security Secretariat (FPNSS) within the Cabinet Office works with responsible departments across Whitehall to coordinate policy on the resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure. This policy coordination role compliments broader horizon scanning efforts within the department which aim to identify potential risks to infrastructure through early warning mechanisms or relevant intelligence.
Where crises impacting this infrastructure do materialise and could harm the UK’s national security, the Cabinet Office's National Security Watchkeepers, a team responsible for monitoring open source and government reporting tools on a 24/7 basis, alert the relevant teams within government.
Following any crisis notification, it is up to the relevant policy team in the FPNSS to work with the lead government department to assess the level of risk, identify any impacts and outline the appropriate next steps which HMG needs to take, including the activation of crisis machinery within the Cabinet Office where required.
Further to the last response from the Government Property Agency with regards to the Naval Monument, we can now confirm that all works have been completed and that it is now fully operational.
Remedial work has started and is ongoing. As our partners undertake remedial works, they have uncovered further defects and are continuing to carry out a full internal repair of the fountain and its pump system. Due to the location of the fountain, works were halted during the period of mourning, but have now resumed within the secure zone.
The Government Property Agency (GPA) remains the Custodian of the Royal Naval Division War Memorial following transfer of the freehold.
Renovation works to the Memorial were put on hold during a major refurbishment of London, Old Admiralty Building which was only completed in 2021.
The Government Property Agency is working with Heritage England to assess the works required to develop a suitable plan. We expect the works to be concluded at the earliest opportunity once we have received feedback from the Heritage survey, until this has been concluded the GPA is unable to give a timescale for completion.
The Government Property Agency (GPA) remains the Custodian of the Royal Naval Division War Memorial following transfer of the freehold.
Renovation works to the Memorial were put on hold during a major refurbishment of London, Old Admiralty Building which was only completed in 2021.
The Government Property Agency is working with Heritage England to assess the works required to develop a suitable plan. We expect the works to be concluded at the earliest opportunity once we have received feedback from the Heritage survey, until this has been concluded the GPA is unable to give a timescale for completion.
The National Security Adviser has appointed Whitehall leads to report to him directly on the UK’s collaboration with the US and Australia on AUKUS. The Ministry of Defence reports regularly to the National Security Adviser on the programme of work, conducted alongside US and Australian colleagues, to identify the optimum way to deliver new submarine capability to the Royal Australian Navy.
The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority. I have, therefore, asked the Authority to respond.
Professor Sir Ian Diamond | National Statistician
Lord West of Spithead
House of Lords
London
SW1A 0PW
27 October 2021
Dear Lord West of Spithead,
As National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority, I am responding to your Parliamentary Question asking the total number of COVID-19 deaths in England since 1 July; and how many of those deaths were people who were either (1) unvaccinated, or (2) had underlying health conditions (HL3191).
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) publishes mortality statistics for England and Wales compiled from information supplied when deaths are certified and registered as part of civil registration. Based on the latest data in the bulletin ‘Deaths registered weekly in England and Wales, provisional: 15 October 2021’1, there were 7,673 deaths involving COVID-19 registered between 1 July 2021 and 8 October 2021 in England.
Information provided at death registration can be used to identify the presence of pre-existing health conditions. The data are published quarterly in the ‘Pre-existing conditions of people who died due to COVID-19, England and Wales’ dataset2. These are currently available until the end of June 2021. In the second quarter of 2021 (April to June), 18.8% of people who died due to COVID-19 in England and Wales had no pre-existing condition. The data for the third quarter (July to September) will be published on 23 November 2021.
The vaccination status of the deceased is not recorded at death registration unless the certifying doctor or coroner considered it to be relevant to the cause of death. To produce statistics on deaths by COVID-19 vaccination status the ONS has created a linked dataset which includes death registrations, vaccination data from the National Immunisation Management System (NIMS) and Test and Trace data on polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test results. The methods are described in ‘Deaths involving COVID-19 by vaccination status, England: deaths occurring between 2 January and 2 July 2021’3. Unfortunately, this publication only covered deaths that occurred up to 2 July 2021. However, an update of this publication, covering deaths that occurred up to 24 September 2021, will be published on 1 November. Of the 51,281 deaths involving Covid-19 that occurred between 2 January and 2 July 2021, 38,964 (76.0%) occurred in unvaccinated individuals. Please note, however, that this proportion is likely to change in the most recent period, as an increasing number of people are now vaccinated.
Yours sincerely,
Professor Sir Ian Diamond
1 Deaths registered weekly in England and Wales, provisional: 15 October 2021
2 Pre-existing conditions of people who died due to COVID-19, England and Wales
A team in the Cabinet Office has developed a Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) strategy that seeks to define the high-level requirements for resilient PNT systems. This work has included engaging subject matter experts across a full range of Government departments, including those leading in maritime, aviation, energy and communications sectors. Views have also been taken from selected PNT industry members to ensure peer review and robust challenge. The review of current governance arrangements, which aims to ensure that coordination of PNT across government is put on sustainable footing, is nearing completion and is expected to be concluded shortly.
A team in the Cabinet Office has developed a Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) strategy that seeks to define the high-level requirements for resilient PNT systems. This work has included engaging subject matter experts across a full range of Government departments, including those leading in maritime, aviation, energy and communications sectors. Views have also been taken from selected PNT industry members to ensure peer review and robust challenge. The review of current governance arrangements, which aims to ensure that coordination of PNT across government is put on sustainable footing, is nearing completion and is expected to be concluded shortly.
The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority. I have therefore asked the Authority to respond.
19 January 2021
Dear Lord West,
As National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority, I am responding to your Parliamentary Question asking how many people aged (1) below 50, (2) 50 to 59, (3) 60 to 69, (4) 70 to 79, and (5) over 80 years, have died as a result of COVID-19 as of 31 December 2020; and how many in each age group had a serious underlying health condition (HL12082).
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) is responsible for publishing numbers of deaths registered in England and Wales. As part of the ‘Deaths registered weekly in England and Wales’ publication[1], we produce the number of deaths involving COVID-19 by age group. Table 1 below shows the number of deaths due to COVID-19 registered in England and Wales between 28 December 2019 and 1 January 2021, the relevant period used in our regular mortality reports, for the age bands below 50, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79, and 80 years and over.
The mortality statistics produced by the ONS are based on the information recorded when a death is certified and registered. A doctor will only record a health condition on the death certificate if it was in the sequence of events leading to death, or was a contributory factor in the death; the death certificate does not list all health conditions the person suffered from. Therefore, we can say in how many deaths a particular condition was involved (i.e. mentioned on the death certificate) but not how many deaths in total were of individuals suffering from such conditions. Similarly, where several conditions are mentioned on the death certificate, we cannot necessarily say whether each one was ‘serious’ in itself. For example, a chronic condition such as diabetes might have contributed to the death in combination with COVID-19, but be unlikely to have caused death on its own.
Information on deaths involving COVID-19 and pre-existing health conditions was published in July for the period 1 March to 30 June 2020 [2]. Table 2 shows the number of deaths involving COVID-19 occurring in England and Wales between 1 March and 30 June 2020, registered up to 4 July 2020, for the age bands below 50, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79, and 80 years and over, divided into those did or did not have one or more pre-existing conditions mentioned on the death certificate. The analysis of pre-existing conditions in the deaths involving COVID-19 is planned to be updated in the next six weeks.
Yours sincerely,
Professor Sir Ian Diamond
Table 1. Deaths due to COVID-19 registered between 28 December 2019 and 1 January 2021, England and Wales[3],[4],[5],[6]
Age band | Deaths |
|
Below 50 years | 1,499 |
|
50 to 59 years | 3,470 |
|
60 to 69 years | 7,837 |
|
70 to 79 years | 18,699 |
|
80 years and over | 49,325 |
|
Source: ONS |
Table 2. Deaths involving COVID-19 by whether a pre-existing condition was mentioned on the death certificate, deaths occurring 1 March to 30 June 2020, England and Wales[7],[8],[9],[10]
Age band | One or more pre-existing condition | No pre-existing condition |
Below 50 years | 807 | 192 |
50 to 59 years | 1,950 | 350 |
60 to 69 years | 4,333 | 523 |
70 to 79 years | 10,394 | 926 |
80 years and over | 28,375 | 2,485 |
Source: ONS
[2]https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/bulletins/deathsinvolvingcovid19englandandwales/deathsoccurringinjune2020
[3] Includes deaths registered between 28 December 2019 and 1 January 2021. These figures represent death registrations, there can be a delay between the date a death occurred and the date a death was registered. More information can be found in our impact of registration delays release.
[4] Does not include deaths where age is either missing or not yet fully coded.
[5] Does not include deaths of those resident outside England and Wales or those records where the place of residence is either missing or not yet fully coded.
[6] All figures for 2020 and 2021 are provisional.
[7] Includes deaths occurring between 1 March and 30 June 2020, registered up to 4 July 2020.
[8] Based on all deaths involving COVID-19 (ICD-10 codes U07.1 and U07.2) not only deaths ‘due to’ COVID-19 (i.e. where COVID-19 was the underlying cause of death).
[9] Includes deaths of non-residents.
[10] All figures for 2020 and 2021 are provisional.
The Cabinet Office (which includes the Prime Minister’s Office) does not hold any records on HMS Dasher or Operation Mincemeat. In line with standard practice, historic records are transferred to The National Archives. A number of files relating to both HMS Dasher and Operation Mincemeat are held by The National Archives, including under references CAB 154/66; CAB 154/112; CAB 79/60/18; CAB 79/60/20; CAB 79/60/24; CAB 79/60/26; CAB 79/60/27; and CAB 146/442.
The Cabinet Office (which includes the Prime Minister’s Office) does not hold any records on HMS Dasher or Operation Mincemeat. In line with standard practice, historic records are transferred to The National Archives. A number of files relating to both HMS Dasher and Operation Mincemeat are held by The National Archives, including under references CAB 154/66; CAB 154/112; CAB 79/60/18; CAB 79/60/20; CAB 79/60/24; CAB 79/60/26; CAB 79/60/27; and CAB 146/442.
The Cabinet Office holds the original CAB 93/7, it contains no material related to Operation Mincemeat. A version is held by The National Archives (TNA). Consultation of the volume held by TNA would need to be made by appointment, a service currently suspended owing to national restrictions. Details of how to arrange a visit are available here: https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/visit-us/
The UK and the EU discussed the Galileo programme during the Withdrawal Agreement negotiations. The EU’s offer then on Galileo did not meet the UK’s defence and industrial requirements.
Planning for a pandemic inevitably engages the work of many different departments. Each department is responsible for ensuring its own preparedness, and that of its relevant sectors, to manage the impacts of a pandemic. The Cabinet Office's role includes coordinating the regular assessment of the UK’s overall risk landscape for both internal and public purposes, the Resilience Capabilities Programme, managing central government response including by convening COBR, providing crisis management training through the Emergency Planning College, and working with Departments to test emergency response plans.
Urenco currently supplies around 30% of the global market with uranium enrichment services, a number which could rise in the coming years. Whether the UK is a net exporter at any given moment is subject to commercial agreements however the UK has the capability to supply a significant proportion of the global market.
HMG works closely with Urenco to explore opportunities globally and maintain their existing international contracts. HMG also works with Urenco to support investment into their UK facilities.
The UK steel industry not only underpins a range of domestic industries, it forms the core of some local communities and economies. The Government remains committed to a UK steel industry and a decarbonised future, supporting local economic growth and our levelling-up agenda.
The Government confirmed in the Civil Nuclear Roadmap that the UK will not support the use of plutonium stored at Sellafield by advanced nuclear technologies, whilst high hazard risk reduction activities are prioritised at site. The Government has no plans to reconsider this commitment.
It is an exciting time for GBN as we are running an SMR competition to identify those technologies best able to facilitate 2029 FID decisions and deliver projects in the mid-2030s. GBN is seeking technology partners that will provide design and development of various products, equipment or services related to the key plant required for SMR nuclear generation.
We are developing a new nuclear National Policy Statement (NPS) and have launched a consultation on a proposed siting policy, which includes greater flexibility in where nuclear power stations can be located. The Government’s Nuclear Roadmap has set out plans to streamline future nuclear development to make Britian the best place in the world to invest in nuclear.
Hinkley Point C is not a government project and EDF is responsible for delivery with the developers being responsible for any cost and schedule overruns and not UK taxpayers or consumers. On 23 January 2024, EDF announced a revised schedule that projected that Hinkley Point C would start generating between 2029 and 2031.
The 2022 British Energy Security Strategy set out our ambition to deploy up to 24 Gigawatts of civil nuclear generation by 2050, around 25% of our projected 2050 electricity demand.
GBN is running an SMR technology selection process to select those technologies best able to facilitate Final Investment Decisions in the next Parliament and be operational by the mid-2030s.
In November 2021, Government announced £210m in new funding for Rolls-Royce SMR, awarded through the Low-Cost Nuclear challenge. This investment was to further develop SMR design and take it through the regulatory processes to assess suitability of potential deployment in the UK.
It is our ambition to deploy up to 24 Gigawatts of civil nuclear generation by 2050, around 25% of our projected 2050 electricity demand.
GBN is running an SMR technology selection process to select those technologies best able to facilitate Final Investment Decisions in the next Parliament and be operational by the mid-2030s.
Through the Advanced Nuclear Fund, the Government has awarded up to £210m to support development of the Rolls Royce Small Modular Reactor (SMR) design. The Rolls-Royce SMR entered the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process in March 2022, becoming the first SMR to begin UK nuclear regulation. In April 2023, the Rolls-Royce SMR progressed to Step 2 of GDA.
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has made it more important than ever to reduce international dependencies on Russian energy supplies, which is why through the Sapporo Agreement and the Atlantic Declaration, the Government has committed to the development of shared, resilient supply chains to support global divestment from Russian nuclear fuel supply.
The UK’s uranium enrichment capabilities are amongst the best in the world, and Government has announced its commitment to growing these by developing a High Assay Low Enriched Uranium capability in the UK. The Government has also committed £13m, match-funded by Westinghouse, to fund preparatory work to bring Uranium Conversion capability back to the UK’s Springfields site, with the potential to deliver 7,500 tonnes of uranium conversion capability, for both reprocessed uranium and naturally enriched uranium, by the end of the decade. This would give a vital alternative capacity to Russia.
While fuel and uranium procurement is ultimately a commercial matter for reactor operators, the government continues to work closely with international fuel suppliers and our allies to mitigate and respond to any supply chain risks.
In the June 2022 Group of Seven Leaders’ Communique, the Government joined with G7 partners to state our collective intent to reduce reliance on civil nuclear and related goods from Russia, including working to assist countries seeking to diversify their nuclear fuel supply chains.
To this end, the Government has led discussions within the ‘Sapporo 5’ group of nuclear energy leaders Canada, France, Japan, and the United States to identify potential areas of collaboration on nuclear fuels, with the goal of reduced global dependence on Russian supply chains. UK regularly raises the topic of dependency on Russia for civil nuclear goods and materials with likeminded international partners and supports efforts to diversify.
In the June 2022 Group of Seven Leaders’ Communique, the Government joined with G7 partners to state our collective intent to reduce reliance on civil nuclear and related goods from Russia, including working to assist countries seeking to diversify their nuclear fuel supply chains.
To this end, the Government has led discussions within the ‘Sapporo 5’ group of nuclear energy leaders Canada, France, Japan, and the United States to identify potential areas of collaboration on nuclear fuels, with the goal of reduced global dependence on Russian supply chains. UK regularly raises the topic of dependency on Russia for civil nuclear goods and materials with likeminded international partners and supports efforts to diversify.
In the June 2022 Group of Seven Leaders’ Communique, the Government joined with G7 partners to state our collective intent to reduce reliance on civil nuclear and related goods from Russia, including working to assist countries seeking to diversify their nuclear fuel supply chains.
To this end, the Government has led discussions within the ‘Sapporo 5’ group of nuclear energy leaders Canada, France, Japan, and the United States to identify potential areas of collaboration on nuclear fuels, with the goal of reduced global dependence on Russian supply chains. UK regularly raises the topic of dependency on Russia for civil nuclear goods and materials with likeminded international partners and supports efforts to diversify.
The import, acquisition, supply and delivery of Russian oil and oil products into the UK has been banned since 5 December 2022. The ban uses the well-established non-preferential rules of origin under which products are regarded as originating from a country if there has been substantial, and economically justified, processing in that jurisdiction. Processing is regarded as substantial if it results in the manufacture of a new product such as the refining of crude oil into fuels.
In the three months to February 2023, since the ban came into effect, there has been no marked change in the volume of imports from India compared to the year before.
According to the International Energy Agency, Russian oil exports to India totalled 2.1 million barrels a day in March 2023, an increase of 1.7 million barrels a day compared to March 2022.
More precise data on international oil flows is observed by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero but is subject to commercial licensing agreements and cannot be published by the Department.
The Science and Technology Framework sets out our plan for investing in 5 critical technologies: Artificial Intelligence (AI); engineering biology; future telecommunications semiconductors; and quantum technologies. These have been chosen because they draw on UK strengths and create opportunities for growth, while also supporting national security, and UK goals such as net zero. We have already committed significant investment to those technologies, including £2.5 billion for quantum technologies and £2 billion for semiconductors over the next decade; up to £1 billion through our Semiconductors Strategy; and £1.5 billion in compute infrastructure across the exascale and AI Research Resource (AIRR) programmes.
His Majesty’s Government recognises the vital role that semiconductor components play across the UK’s defence and other critical sectors.
Semiconductor supply chains are inherently global. The Government is already in initial talks with like-minded nations, including through multilateral fora, in order to safeguard the security and resilience of our chip supply.
Our forthcoming UK Semiconductor Strategy will set out our plans to assess and act on emerging supply chain threats, and to build on our existing protective levers.
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) has been leading a review of the semiconductor sector. DSIT has worked with departments across Whitehall to highlight the importance of semiconductors, and of working together to improve the resilience and security of UK supply chains and to deliver economic growth.
The Government regularly monitors publications relating to high-priority sectors such as the semiconductor sector. The Government recognises the importance of the semiconductor industry to the UK and our forthcoming strategy will set out our approach to it.
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has been reviewing the Government’s approach to the UK’s semiconductor sector and intends to set out its support for the sector in the forthcoming UK Semiconductor Strategy. The Strategy will be published in due course.
Great British Nuclear is being set up to develop a resilient pipeline of nuclear new builds in the UK. Wylfa is recognised as a strong site, among others, and will be considered as part of this process. Once decisions have been made on which sites to develop, timelines for build and operations will be established.
The Government takes the protection and resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure seriously and departments work together to protect it from malicious and other hazards such as accidental damage. The Cabinet Office is responsible for coordinating interdepartmental efforts. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy is the lead department for the energy sector, including subsea energy infrastructure. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is the lead department for telecommunications policy, including telecommunications subsea cables. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for defending UK interests within the UK Marine Area (UK Territorial Waters and Exclusive Economic Zones) and forms part of HMG’s efforts to counter state threats.
On 25 May, the Secretary of State called in the acquisition by Nexperia of Newport Wafer Fab for a full national security assessment under the National Security and Investment Act. That process is underway and will proceed in line with statutory timescales. It would not be appropriate to comment further on the Government’s assessment at this stage.
Separately to this case, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is undertaking a review of the semiconductor sector, working closely with industry experts and representative bodies. The outcome of that review will be concluded later in the year.
On 25 May, the Secretary of State called in the acquisition by Nexperia of Newport Wafer Fab for a full national security assessment under the National Security and Investment Act. That process is underway and will proceed in line with statutory timescales. It would not be appropriate to comment further on the Government’s assessment at this stage.
Separately to this case, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is undertaking a review of the semiconductor sector, working closely with industry experts and representative bodies. The outcome of that review will be concluded later in the year.
The Government is in constructive negotiations with the developer over the proposed Sizewell C project. The Department cannot comment on negotiations given the commercially sensitive nature of discussions. The project is also subject to an ongoing application for development consent, entirely separate from the commercial negotiations.
The UK no longer receives information from the European Commission on the expected date by which the Galileo system and its different services will become fully operational.
The SBPP has now reported on options for improving the resilience of space-based PNT services and Government is considering the findings to determine the next steps as part of the business planning process.
The Government is committed to strengthening PNT resilience. Departments across Government are now looking at their resourcing for greater coordination of PNT requirements and risk appetite in relevant CNI sectors.
Once appropriate mechanisms are established, the outputs from GNSS and SBPP will provide a solid foundation to take forward further PNT resilience work.
OneWeb’s first generation satellites were not designed with Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services in mind.