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Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Warner
Main Page: Lord Warner (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Warner's debates with the Cabinet Office
(7 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest in the sense that my wife is a trustee of a major public orchestra. It does not receive public money, but I just make the point: if you do not receive public money, are you one of these public bodies? If you do, do you become one, and does that mean that you make a choice, which is quite a serious choice?
I also declare an interest because in my business we advise people on procurement and sustainability of procurement. I say to my noble friend that procurement is a very difficult issue on which to advise, because it is very widespread. What does it mean? It means almost everything from what might be called lavatory rolls at one end to procuring very large numbers of services or products. It can also cover the issue of the orchestra that procures another orchestra from abroad. As the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, said, it might have intended to bring an orchestra from, let us say, Russia to this country; if it then decides not to do so, is that the kind of decision that comes under the Bill?
I also have a concern, as the noble Baroness put forward, that the Secretary of State has an ability to remove from the exceptions things that for most of us are really important. If we are not to be allowed to procure on the basis of sustainability or climate change—things that really are existential issues—we have a serious problem, because on any definition of public bodies, the very bodies we are talking about are the ones that ought to be procuring and investing on those bases. The idea that this is only temporary, that it is in the Bill but can be removed by the arbitrary decision of the Secretary of State—and it could be arbitrary, because there is nothing in the Bill to say it is other than arbitrary—worries me considerably.
I rose not just to say that to my noble friend. I am afraid that the Government have a record of producing Bills that do not appear to have been carefully thought through. If the Bill had been produced to me as Secretary of State for the Environment, I would have sent it back and said, “There are too many questions in this, and I don’t want to have to present it to either House of Parliament because I can’t answer a number of the questions”. I do not blame my noble friend for not being able to answer some of these questions, but they are pretty fundamental, are they not? I just wonder what the Secretary of State responsible for the Bill said when it was brought in front of him. Did he ask what the definition of public body is or what a public function is? If he asked those questions, did he get answers? If he got answers, were they satisfactory, and why do we not have those answers when the questions are asked on the Floor of the House?
My worry is this. Out there large numbers of bodies, some of them very small, are worried that this will affect them. I do not believe that kind of legislation does us any good at all. Precision is absolutely crucial here, and we need to restrict this to a very clear, relatively small number of bodies and have a very clear understanding as to what it means.
If we take sporting bodies receiving government money—I cannot claim to be a sportsman and I declare no interests whatever on this front—it seems to me that if individual sportsmen wish to boycott something, the sporting body probably has to discuss that. If a body discusses that, it seems to me that under this Bill it can easily get itself into a position in which that is improper, if not illegal. Again, I do not see why people should have to ask themselves this question.
We are, at the moment, seeing a very inelegant discussion about individuals’ decisions on tax matters, pretty unfairly in most cases I have heard. It is difficult to understand quite a lot of the detailed tax legislation, but producing this legislation will ask a whole lot of other people to understand very detailed and extremely difficult concepts. I say to my noble friend that all I want is to feel that I could vote for something that I understand, and that other people can understand, which does not reach beyond the necessary areas and actually achieves some good. Those are three perfectly reasonable requests, but I am not sure that the Bill meets any of them so far.
My Lords, we are dealing with a Bill that is in highly controversial territory. If we have sloppy definitions in the Bill, it will encourage litigation. It would be a strange thing if we passed a Bill with a lot of problems around definitions that causes, over time, more people to raise issues around sources of investment through the courts. With all due respect to the Government of Israel, from time to time they have shown quite an enthusiasm for using litigation to make their points.
Also, picking up from the last group of amendments, we live in a rather different time in terms of who raises money for public services, particularly capital money for investments. If we take health and care, the areas I know something about, there is a lot more interest in the idea of going into the private sector—private equity and PFI being good examples—to try to raise money to build facilities of some kind or another for which the public sector has found it difficult to find the money. People who raise funding and use it to provide public services perform a kind of public function. If we have a sloppy Bill, they leave themselves exposed to probing of where their sources of money come from. You then run the risk of driving these people away from the kind of investments in public service that we may need to get some of our old capital structures improved over time. I suggest to the Committee that if we do not tighten up these definitions, we run a series of risks that are self-defeating to any Government.
I am very grateful to my noble friends for these probing amendments, and even more grateful after hearing the contributions from Members opposite that they have elicited. A number of very serious questions have been raised about ambiguity and lack of clarity.
I hope that the Minister is not tempted to reply with words that are meant to reassure us, such as, “Don’t worry. Everything will be all right. The Secretary of State will decide”. I must confess to the Minister that, the older I get, the less confidence I have in Secretaries of State. I suspect that, in a few months’ time, she will begin to have less confidence than she currently has. There is a good reason for that: all of us—I emphasise this—whatever side of the House we are on, need to be wary of overpowerful government.
We are going to be discussing the Occupied Territories in a group two or three later in this Bill and I do not have an answer to the noble Lord on this point today, except to reiterate that this Bill has been collectively agreed. I was particularly talking about the arrangements for regulations which, in turn, had been collectively agreed. I explained the system that when you have a new statutory instrument, there is a write-round which involves all relevant Ministers. In this particular case, that would certainly include the Foreign Secretary.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, can I ask her to take away the point I was ineptly trying to raise earlier? If a public body—we could take as examples housing, health and care—has an investment decision to make on a new building and/or new services, is it expected to find out more about the sources of the money going to be used to enable it to perform public functions and provide new public buildings? Are they expected to go that far?
I am grateful for that point, but I am not sure I entirely understand it, so perhaps I can offer to meet the noble Lord or to write to him and make sure that he gets an answer in good time.
Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Warner
Main Page: Lord Warner (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Warner's debates with the Cabinet Office
(6 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 19, to which I have added my name, and I will speak to Amendment 48 in my name. Amendment 48 is focused on a simple question: does the statement of compatibility by the Minister on the face of the Bill comply with the terms of Clause 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, or would the Minister have been wiser to make a statement under the terms of Clause 19(1)(b) of that Act?
Just to remind the Committee, the Minister states on the face of the Bill that its provisions
“are compatible with the Convention rights”.
It is, of course, possible for Parliament to pass legislation that is not compliant with convention provisions. That is indeed provided for in Section 19(1)(b) of the 1998 Act. But if we adopt that course, we have to fess up to the fact that although Ministers are
“unable to make a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill”.
I recognise that some members of the Conservative Party would find it a badge of honour to flourish a statement of non-compatibility with the Human Rights Act, but I would not have placed the Minister in that group, so I am curious to find out what is going on.
First, however, I must own up to my personal involvement with and attachment to Section 19 provisions in the 1998 Act, when I was a senior policy adviser to the then Home Secretary. At that time, there was a robust debate about whether, despite the sovereignty of Parliament, legislation could be stopped if it breached ECHR provisions. Quite naturally, parliamentary sovereignty inevitably triumphed, but there was concern in the Labour Government at the time that they wanted proper consideration to be given to the ECHR when Bills came to Parliament. With my good friend the late and much-missed Lord Gareth Williams, a distinguished lawyer, Home Office Minister and later Leader of this House, we came up with the idea of a ministerial statement of ECHR compliance on the face of the Bill. That led to the drafting of what became Section 19 of the 1998 Act. This provision was intended to make Ministers stop and think carefully about human rights convention compliance before they introduced a Bill to Parliament.
It is quite difficult to see that this has happened with this Bill. Clause 4 as drafted is a straightforward gagging provision. It stops people openly discussing a full range of possible actions they might take to express their disapproval of an Israeli Government’s continued breaching of international law in Gaza and the Occupied Territories. This places the Bill in breach of Article 10 of the convention—the right to freedom of expression—and therefore in breach of Section 6 of the 1998 Act.
That is not just my view—it is the clear view of Liberty, Amnesty International and many others, including many parliamentarians. People cannot see how Clause 4 can be squared with Article 10 of the ECHR. Liberty has also argued that the Bill constitutes an interference with the rights of freedom of conscience under Article 9 of the ECHR, a view that I think is shared by Quakers, given their beliefs.
In these circumstances, I am at a loss to see how the Minister can make the statement on the face of the Bill that it is compliant with Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act. When I consulted the clerk about framing an amendment to delete the statement on the face of the Bill, I was told I could not do that. However, they helpfully suggested that I could insert a provision that after the passage of the Bill, there should be a review of its compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998 within a given period. That is exactly what Amendment 48 would do, with particular attention paid to compliance with Article 10 of the ECHR, the right to freedom of expression. If that review found that the Act was not compliant, the Government of the day would then have to decide whether they would go forward and implement the Act, in contravention of the 1998 Act.
I return to the question I posed at the beginning of my remarks. If the Minister still believes that she has placed the correct statement of compliance on the face of the Bill, I respectfully ask her to share with the House the source of the legal advice that convinced her it was the right thing to do.
I turn briefly to Amendment 19, to which I have added my name and strongly support. I will not repeat the persuasive arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Collins. This amendment is an important step towards making the Bill more compliant with the Human Rights Act 1998, but I fear that the Minister’s statement on the Bill’s compliance will not pass muster.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, helpfully explained in his opening remarks the extent to which he agrees with the aims of the Bill but not the means chosen. However, his amendment could open a huge back door to councils and devolved authorities doing what they want in relation to BDS activities, because they would only have to dress up what they want to do as a statement of human rights policy. That statement is not even fully defined as regards what is meant by human rights. This could be a massive loophole. At the end of the day, it would still involve public authorities, including the devolved Administrations, in ignoring foreign policy as set by the UK Government. We must not allow ourselves to get away from the fact that that is crucial. We cannot have public authorities setting foreign policy.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord; I am trying to be helpful. It seems to me that it is even worse than he is saying. Clause 4(1) means that a democratically elected person could not even publish a statement saying that, had it been lawful, he or she would have done X or Y. It is not just that they cannot do it; they cannot even talk about doing it, even though they have been democratically elected by much of their population to take action in a moral and ethical way.
I am most grateful to the noble Lord as that leads on to my next question. It relates to those who are democratic figures in those countries and, indeed, our country.
As regards this country, my reading of this legislation is that, if I, in Parliament, call on the Government to sanction, let us say, a foreign Government’s Minister, or an enterprise or a body operating in another country—as I have done regularly in relation to the Wagner Group, by calling on British enterprises not to trade with those enterprises owned by the Wagner Group —I would be a person under this Bill whom a body would have to disregard. Not only are the Government seeking the nonsense that decision-makers should set aside due diligence on human rights, they are seeking to neuter parliamentarians raising the very concerns that we have raised on a regular basis.
I remind the Minister why this is so important: on 12 occasions, I had called for the proscription of the Wagner Group, and called on any British enterprises to desist from having any relationship with it, before the Government made the decision to proscribe it. Up until the point that the Government made the decision to proscribe the group, which I supported, I was in contravention of this Bill. I was in contravention of it on all the occasions that I called on the Government to do what I asked them to do, which they then did.
The nonsense of this legislation gets serious when it comes to Parliament raising human rights concerns about other countries. One country on the list is the DRC. A country not on the list is Rwanda. I have raised human rights concerns about the March 23 group in the conflict between Rwanda and the DRC. I am prohibited from calling on any British bodies not to trade with a group that is not currently proscribed by the British Government.
I refuse to be neutered in this Chamber, by this Bill, on raising human rights concerns. The Leader of the House is shaking his head from a sedentary position as to how I might be neutered by this Bill. I am sure that he has read the Bill. I am allowing him to intervene on me to explain why I am wrong in my interpretation of this Bill.
My Lords, I am sorry to disappoint your Lordships’ Committee after so many questions asked of my noble friend the Minister. But I am the Minister representing His Majesty’s Government on this group of amendments. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and my noble friends Lord Wolfson and Lord Leigh for refocusing the House on these two amendments. I will answer as many of the broader questions as I have time for after addressing these myself.
Let me begin with Amendment 48, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a review of the Bill’s compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998, and in particular Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within six months of Royal Assent. As my noble friend the Minister has set out, the Bill will apply to public authorities as defined in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. In the exercise of their public functions these bodies do not have their own rights under the Human Rights Act or the ECHR, including under Article 10. The Bill does not apply to individuals and their private functions; therefore, it will not infringe on any individual’s rights under the ECHR.
As for the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, about compatibility, the Government remain strongly committed to the UK’s long and proud tradition of free speech and to the ECHR’s Article 10 right to freedom of expression. The Minister has signed a statement of the Bill’s compatibility with ECHR rights. On sharing legal advice, His Majesty’s Government do not share legal advice, but we do act on it.
Nothing in the Bill goes against the European Convention on Human Rights. The ban will apply only to bodies that are public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998—
With due respect to the Minister— I am sorry to interrupt when he is keeping to his script—the point I was making was that the certificate that the Secretary of State or Minister signs on the face of the Bill does not just cover the actions of public bodies, it covers all aspects of that particular piece of legislation. I am arguing that there are parts of that legislation that make it impossible to sign with good heart that compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights—and, indeed, the Human Rights Act 1988. It is not just the issues around public bodies, it is about the totality of that piece of legislation being compliant. I gave some examples where it was not compliant. I am very happy to meet the Minister to give him another half a dozen in which it is not compliant. I was asking which legal Minister signed off this as compliant with the Human Rights Act.
My noble friend the Minister has signed the statement of the Bill’s compatibility and is comfortable with that. If the noble Lord, Lord Warner, would like to share his specific concerns further to this, I would be happy to look at them.
The Government remain strongly committed to the UK’s long and proud tradition of free speech and to the ECHR. My noble friend the Minister, on bringing this legislation to the House, confirmed that the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the convention rights.
Let me now turn to Amendment 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury. His Majesty’s Government appreciate the offer of co-operation and a meeting. We would certainly take him up on that very generous offer to hear out his concerns further. Amendment 19 would exempt decisions from the ban that have been made in accordance with a statement of policy relating to human rights produced by a public authority. The Secretary of State would be required to produce guidance on the content of such statements to which public authorities would be required to have regard—a significant word, as pointed out by my noble friend Lord Wolfson.
My Lords, despite the last debate, this amendment brings us to the heart of what I regard as a misguided Bill: Clause 3(7), which effectively provides the State of Israel with a considerable, unique protection, almost in perpetuity and certainly until new legislation is passed to overturn it. I will make three main points to justify the changes to this provision.
First, the primary justification for this extraordinary legislation is that boycotts, disinvestments and other such campaigns not only undermine UK foreign policy but lead to
“appalling antisemitic rhetoric and abuse”,
in the words of the departmental press notice launching this Bill. Yet, many groups in the Jewish diaspora have said that the Bill will not combat anti-Semitism. The Government’s claim that it will has been convincingly challenged by evidence produced for parliamentarians by the organisation Jews for Justice for Palestinians. Its evidence demonstrates that the rise in anti-Semitic incidents is
“correlated closely with spikes of violence in Israel and Palestine, particularly with the major Israeli army attacks on Palestinian areas, not with boycott and divestment advocacy”.
It was that formidable campaigner against anti-Semitism, Dame Margaret Hodge, who said in the Commons that this legislation would increase anti-Semitism.
Secondly, alongside drafting a Bill that is more likely to increase anti-Semitism than reduce it, the Government seem to have used wording in Clause 3(7) that is at odds with the UK’s stated foreign policy, because it includes “the Occupied Palestinian Territories” and “the Occupied Golan Heights” in the protection given to Israel. By treating these two areas as part of Israel, the passage of the Bill would seem to mean that the UK is legitimising Israel permanently retaining two large swathes of territory obtained by acts of war. As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, who is unfortunately not in his place, Amnesty International, and others have pointed out, this would mean that the Bill will violate UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which the UK voted for. The resolution declares Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, including east Jerusalem, as legally invalid and a clear violation of international law.
Thirdly, the Government’s claim for this legislation is that it makes it clear internationally that it is the Government who determine UK foreign policy, not protestors or other levels of government. Most people in this country and overseas would assume, then, that when the Foreign Secretary utters on policy towards Israel he speaks for the Government—therefore, they can rely on him to set out the current policy. With this in mind, I draw the Committee’s attention to a piece in the Times on 22 March with the headline:
“Gaza aid held up by arbitrary Israeli denials, says Cameron”.
In that piece, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, is quoted as telling the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee that it was,
“‘an enormous frustration’ that aid had been ‘routinely held up waiting for Israeli permissions’”.
To make sure that his views were fully understood, the noble Lord seems to have gone on to say that:
“Israel’s ‘arbitrary denials’ of aid being sent to Gaza is now the ‘main blocker’ to providing humanitarian assistance”.
All this on top of suggesting, in February, that the UK could unilaterally recognise a Palestinian state in the aftermath of a ceasefire.
The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has accompanied his words with deeds, by imposing sanctions on extremist settlers in the Israeli-occupied West Bank who have violently attacked Palestinians. He went on to say:
“This behaviour is illegal and unacceptable … Too often, we see commitments made”—
by Israel—
“and undertakings given, but not followed through”.
I found the noble Lord’s views refreshingly frank, and rather similar to my own. However, I also found it difficult to reconcile them with the wording and timing of the Bill.
We are now in a rather bizarre situation. On the one hand, we have Michael Gove bringing forward a Bill to give unprecedented protection to the Israeli Government —I could, if I were unkind, say that Clause 3(7) could have been drafted by Mr Netanyahu and Likud. On the other hand, there is the Foreign Secretary laying into the same Government for blocking humanitarian aid to a territory in which thousands of women and children have been killed or displaced, and are starving, as a result of Israeli military action.
Any responsible public body decision-maker or international observer would be entitled to be confused about what the UK Government’s policy is toward the current Israeli Government. Should people heed Mr Gove’s Bill or the words and actions of the Foreign Secretary, who has actually seen what is going on in Israel and the occupied territories? What would the Minister’s advice be to any confused citizen? Perhaps she and her colleagues might want to further consider accepting my amendment. I beg to move.
Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Warner
Main Page: Lord Warner (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Warner's debates with the Cabinet Office
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I intervene very briefly as a person who benefits very considerably from a local government pension scheme; indeed, pretty much my whole income comes from one. One thing that always concerned me and colleagues who were in these schemes was that they were well run, that their management was good, that they were reliable and that our deferred income—which is what a pension scheme is using—was being looked after well. What I hear from these amendments that are being spoken to in this group is that we need to strengthen the Bill if we are to continue with well-run pension schemes.
I also rather agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, that it is very difficult to see what the case is for treating public authority schemes separately from private schemes—but that is a debate for another part of the Bill.
Here we should really be accepting technical amendments endorsed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, and in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, which it seems to me would improve the confidence of beneficiaries of these schemes that the reliable management of the schemes would not be damaged.
My Lords, I should declare an interest as a beneficiary of the university superannuation scheme. Can the Minister remind us how many times any local government pension fund has taken decisions on political and ethical grounds towards investment in particular foreign countries? The Explanatory Notes to the Bill give us a very small number of examples of where local government pension funds have discussed whether they should. We will come later to the question of whether we should ban discussions of these sorts in a free country, but that is different. I worry about whether we are having an enormous debate about something which has not happened in this country and is unlikely to happen in this country. It happens in the United States, and the American debate filters into this country. Particularly on the right in British politics we have an awful tendency to pick up American partisan politics and try to apply them over here, which I am deeply unhappy about. Is this a real problem or a manufactured, confected problem? If so, could we possibly leave it aside until some future date when it perhaps becomes a problem?
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions today and for their engagement. I particularly thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake, Lady Janke and Lady Blackstone, and the noble Lords, Lord Shipley, Lord Willetts and Lord Hannay, who met me and officials to discuss the amendments a couple of weeks ago. During that meeting, noble Lords expressed their concerns regarding the financial and practical matters exception and the application of the Bill to the administering authorities of local government pension schemes. I sympathise with their ask for clarity in this area and I have taken some time to reflect on their comments. I will set out why, on balance, I think the Government’s drafting is sound on these points.
Before I address the amendments, I will set out why it is so important that the administering authorities of LGPSs are captured by the Bill. It is not a manufactured problem, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. Administering authorities come under frequent pressure from external pressure groups such as the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and the BDS movement to engage in BDS campaigns. We saw a notable example in 2021, when a UN special rapporteur wrote to the administering authorities of LGPSs demanding divestment from a number of Israeli companies. My noble friend Lady Noakes referred to this. The demands cited the LGPSs’ ability to play a transformational role.
We have also seen the BDS campaigners take credit for some decisions by administering authorities of LGPSs to divest from Israeli companies. For example, campaigners took credit for a decision by East Sussex Pension Fund to divest from an Israeli company.
Amendment 27, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, would ensure that the ban does not hinder the ability of public authorities to consider financial risk and impact in their investments in a way that is influenced by moral or political disapproval of foreign state conduct. The Government agree with the policy intention of the noble Baroness’s amendment, and I acknowledge her expertise in this area.
However, having looked into the matter, we remain of the view that the Bill as drafted does not prevent public authorities being able to assess the financial and political risk of investments. The exception for considerations reasonably relevant to financial value and practical utility ensures that public authorities, including the administering authorities of LGPSs, will be able to make commercially viable decisions. This includes decisions to exclude investments if an assessment of the political and economic risks of an investment’s location could reasonably have an impact on the financial return of the investment.
I am grateful for the contributions of my noble friends Lady Altmann and Lady Noakes, and I confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, that
“financial value or practical utility”
captures considerations relevant to an investment’s long-term value and financial risk, not just its current value. I hope that my clarifying this on the Floor of the House provides the noble Baroness with reassurance.
I want to clarify something that the Minister just said. Does this mean that, if my local authority pension scheme, from which I benefit, decided that an investment in Israel was risky and put the members’ money at risk, it could disinvest because it was risky, but not for any other moral grounds? Is that still permitted under this legislation?
As I was trying to explain, the important point is that it depends on the motivation for the decision. The Bill would prohibit only investment and procurement decisions that would appear to a reasonable observer to be influenced by moral or political disapproval of foreign state conduct, and have a territorial element. It would not prevent public authorities making any other kind of territorial or practical business considerations. I have been trying to clarify this.
As I am conscious of time, perhaps we could turn finally to—
I am sorry, we are getting very confused, certainly at this end of the House, as to what is the issue of risk. If a country—let us forget the names of the countries in the Bill—has a reputation for unrest and uncertainty, the cautious trustees of a local government pension scheme are highly unlikely to want to put their members’ money at risk. Where we have a situation in, say, a number of Middle Eastern countries where that is the position, they would, quite reasonably, in pursuit of their fiduciary responsibilities, not invest in those countries. So they would presumably be documenting that the reason they were not investing in those countries was the risk at which it would put their members’ money. Is that the position? As long as they show that that the reason they have made investment decisions to disinvest from, let us say, Israel or the Occupied Territories, is because it puts at risk their members’ money, is that okay under this legislation?
To confirm, I think that is what I said a couple of minutes ago. The sole reason must be that it is financially risky—that it is business risk guidance, not boycotts. My own feeling is that that is a helpful clarification. I am sure that noble Lords will look in Hansard at what I have already said.
If I might now finish, I would very much like to—
Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Warner
Main Page: Lord Warner (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Warner's debates with the Cabinet Office
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is no one on the Liberal Democrat Benches tonight who is sufficiently expert in international law to intervene at length in this debate, so I will be very brief.
I read the discussions from the last evening we met—I apologise that I was unavoidably away—and I note the argument made that international law is not simply the law but a broad network of treaties, conventions and agreements to which the UK has become a party. Much of it was drafted in the formative years after the Second World War by British lawyers—Conservative British lawyers, under Conservative Governments—in which we played, as Ministers still like to say, a leading role. Some of us are now quite nervous that there are some elements within the current Conservative Party, some of whom are in government, who are not particularly committed to maintaining our established reputation as a staunch upholder of international law.
We on these Benches would suggest that the Government take back paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Schedule, take into account the criticisms that the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and others have made, and consider how we can ensure that these are strengthened and clearer, so that we can all agree that there is nothing in the Bill that encourages denigration of international law. All those involved in taking investment decisions should be quite clear that, in dealing with overseas investments, the framework of international law is one that should always be considered and accepted.
My Lords, I intervene briefly, not because I am an expert on international law but because I have a great sense of déjà vu about the way this debate is opening up by comparison with the previous debate. The issue seems to be the creation of uncertainty about what the law means. That was the issue dominating the previous debate: that the trustees of pension schemes would be left in a state of uncertainty if we did not put clearer language in the Bill. This debate is starting to go through the same process but in another area, where there could be uncertainty about what people do in interpreting this legislation before they make their decisions. We are opening up issues that the Government need to attend to, to make sure that the Bill is clear to the people who will be required to implement it.
My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 32 and I want to focus my main comments on it. The contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, is a helpful one because he is focusing on strengthening this.
One of the problems, when we look at paragraph 8 and the implications of international conventions and the ILO, is that it is sometimes difficult to put it into concrete examples. The problem I had—and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, touched on this before—is when something goes into a territorial policy. I think of the debate we had on construction in Qatar and the British companies that were operating in building those sites, where the Qatari authorities were forced to have inspections by the ILO and forced to respond to a report that said their legal standards were not adequate. It could be that, at that time, a lot of investors, and perhaps even public authorities, would say that they should not be investing in companies that are adopting those sorts of laws—namely, those applied by the Qataris. Many textiles supply chains go into, for example, Bangladesh. The biggest fashion industry manufacturer is in Vietnam. The example of the Rana Plaza disaster, which we mentioned the last time we debated the Bill in Committee, required ILO intervention and British companies to say, “We will not invest”. Some of the most popular high street companies used strong leverage to get a change of policy by the Bangladesh Government. These are all legitimate concerns.
The fear is that this legislation will stop people making those sorts of decisions, or even expressing those sorts of opinions. It is that chilling effect again. Whoever replies to this debate—I thought it might be the noble Lord—should focus on the kind of concrete examples I have given, and give us an assurance that paragraph 8 includes all the things that my noble friend mentioned and that we will not have a situation where we are limited to very strict criminal things, which everyone accepts, such as slave labour and forced labour. There are lots of other examples. In the Rana Plaza example, people were forced to work in such dangerous conditions that hundreds lost their lives. Many of them were widows, leaving children to cope on their own.
It is important that we bring this debate back to some sort of reality. What are we talking about? What are the impacts of these sorts of things? We start off with a manifesto commitment on BDS, and now we are into the territory of saying that there will be a limit on what public bodies can do to ensure compliance with proper labour standards—things that this Government have been strongly advocating for.
My Lords, I have been trying to think of the right reverend Prelate as a public body. He is certainly a public authority, but he is at most a hybrid public body. I am not quite sure what sort of hybrid he is in this respect.
My name is on Amendment 33 and the clause stand part notice. I make it clear that this entire clause should go. The exact phrase in the Conservative Party manifesto in 2019 was:
“We will ban public bodies from imposing their own direct or indirect boycotts, disinvestment or sanctions campaigns against foreign countries”.
There was nothing about what they say there, although I note that the department’s memorandum for us says:
“It is intended that the measures will be widely construed”.
This is widely construed to the degree of being ambiguous and imprecise, as so much of this badly drafted Bill clearly is.
Yesterday I ran into the noble Lord, Lord Frost, in the corridor and commented on his rather good article, which was in the Telegraph on Friday, on freedom of speech as fundamental to the Conservative Party. I then asked him what he thought about Clause 4 of this Bill. He looked at me in some confusion and said, “I thought that had been withdrawn already”. I wish that that thought was a precursor of the change.
I have found it difficult to find arguments in support of the clause. I looked through the Commons Public Bill Committee stage, where evidence was taken from the legal adviser to the Free Speech Union, who said:
“My position is that clause 4 really needs to go in its entirety … there is no need—I think it is not necessary either politically or perhaps even legally—to prohibit statements. The mischief that is to be prohibited is the threatened act … This Bill very clearly targets expressions of political and moral conscience, which is to say the form of expression that is most highly protected by article 10””.—[Official Report, Commons, Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill Committee, 5/9/23; cols. 38-39.]
of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is not just the European Convention; we go back to the Atlantic charter, the fundamental basis on which the post-war international order rested, drafted by British diplomats, and in which the four freedoms include freedom of speech and freedom of belief.
I note that, in the Commons stages, one Conservative MP, David Jones, said:
“This is a Conservative Government. Conservatives believe in and value free speech … This is a deeply un-Conservative measure and I believe that the amendment”—
to Clause 4—
“is right and that the provision should go”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/10/23; col. 915.]
The Committee should take that seriously. In the Commons debates, another Conservative MP referred to this clause and the ones that follow as introducing the concept of “thought crime”.
The Constitution Committee of this House’s very critical report says:
“The protection of free speech is a fundamental right. In our view, clauses 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) unduly limit freedom of speech … The House may wish to consider whether clause 4 should be removed from the Bill”.
I dare to suggest to the Minister that this House will reject this clause and that, when the Bill returns to the Commons, it is quite possible that a number of Conservative MPs who do believe in conservative values of free speech will find it convenient not to be there when the Commons vote again. Therefore, it would be wise for the Government to consider their position and, I suggest, withdraw this clause.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, was kind about my previous speech and almost enticed me to get up and go over some of this ground again. When I spoke on Amendment 19, I was concerned about the statement of compliance with the Human Rights Act that the Minister had signed in the Bill. I probably took my eye off the ball a little by going for that rather than Clause 4 directly. But I said that the reason for the non-compliance was the presence of Clause 4 in the Bill, which was clearly in breach of Article 10 of the ECHR. I asked the Minister to cite the Government’s legal advice that justified that statement of compliance. I was given the usual answer from Government Front Benches, that the Government do not reveal their legal advice.
After that event, I turned my attention, as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, did, to the Constitution Committee’s report, which is an interesting document. Paragraph 5 says, in bold type, that this clause is in contravention of the ECHR. It does not mince its words; it says it clearly and unequivocally. It is worth looking at the make-up of the Constitution Committee. It has 12 members, five of whom are distinguished lawyers. It has a former Lord Chief Justice, a former Lord Chancellor and three eminent King’s Counsels. It also has a former Conservative Leader of this House: the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. The Minister was reticent about quoting the Government’s legal advice, but I am not at all reticent about citing the source of my legal advice: the Constitution Committee.
I can see no grounds why this Government should continue with this gagging clause when a very eminent set of lawyers on the Constitution Committee has said, in words of one syllable, that this is a breach of Article 10 of the ECHR. I will not go back over the ground about the statement of compliance—the issue is clear cut. It is that we remove this gagging clause, which is an impediment to free speech.
My Lords, I support the amendment that we are discussing, which would remove Clause 4(1)(b), and will speak also to the clause stand part issue that is grouped with it. I declare that I am a member of the Constitution Committee, about which the noble Lord was so complimentary a moment ago. I have also had a long involvement with Liberal Democrat Friends of Israel, and I understand where the pressure for legislation of this kind is coming from, and the concerns that have given rise to it, including some very aggressive campaigns that have occasionally veered towards anti-Semitism and contributed to a real sense of insecurity, leading to a demand for legislation of this kind.
When consideration was being given to a ban on boycotts, I do not think that anybody expected that this was going to include the sort of provisions that we are debating now—provisions to prevent people talking about a situation that has given rise to something as significant as a potential ban on boycotts. That is what this part of the Bill does—this prohibition of statements
“indicating (in whatever terms) … that the person intends to act in a way that would contravene section 1, or … that the person would intend to act in such a way were it lawful to do so”.
That really is the most preposterous set of words I have come across in any piece of legislation that I have looked at in my entire time in either House of Parliament. It is quite extraordinary and preposterous.
I have listened with interest to the noble Baroness. Can she explain why the rather talented and experienced Constitution Committee took a totally different view from her and was so concerned about Clause 4? Why is she saying that, in effect, it has got this wrong—that it should not be saying that Clause 4 should be removed from the Bill but should welcome it as delivering the requirements of the Bill? I am rather puzzled.
I have never been a member of the Constitution Committee—I am certainly not a current member—so I simply cannot answer that question. I do not know why it has reached the conclusions that it has, but I believe that they are not in accordance with the impact of Clause 4 as drafted.
When dealing with stopping people doing things and making judgments about whether doing so is right, a balance always needs to be struck. In this case, the Government have tilted the scales in favour of social cohesion. People may think that that is the wrong decision and that allowing elected officials to speak on behalf of an authority in the way that they want to is a price worth paying. I believe that, because of the limited nature of Clause 4 as drafted, it strikes the right sort of balance in this case.
We must remember that this Bill does not stop elected officials speaking in their own capacity, nor does it stop bishops doing so—not that that would ever be an easy thing to do. Individuals in public life can have a big impact on social cohesion, but they are not debarred by this Bill from giving their own views on BDS activities, even though they would have such an impact. In that sense, this Bill is a modest change to the status quo on public statements. It is certainly not as far reaching as people have tried to make out. I would like to get a little balance in this debate.
I refer the noble Baroness to Clause 1(7)(b), not just Clause 1(7)(a), which says
“any person seeking to persuade the decision-maker to act in a certain way”.
That sounds to me rather like an individual.
Indeed, but a person who is subject to Clause 1 is a decision-maker. The noble Lord has just referred to the person giving advice or the person seeking to persuade the decision-maker, but that person is not a decision-maker for the purposes of Clause 1, and therefore not for the purposes of Clause 4.
With all due respect, Clause 4 applies to Clause 1(7)(b), which refers to an individual. We must perhaps ask the Minister to advise us on whether that is true.
We discussed this very point on our first day in Committee, and I think I have stated the correct position on the interpretation of the Bill.
I think that it is necessary to make these points within the framework of the Bill.
I will move on and explain Clause 4, which, in its entirety, is an instrumental part of the Bill. It prohibits public bodies from publishing statements indicating that they intend to engage in activity prohibited by the Bill. That includes statements indicating that the public body would have acted differently if the legislation had not been in place.
I will deal directly with some points that I feel are misconceptions. The clause will not affect the statements of individuals, unless they are speaking as or on behalf of a public authority. The noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, is not speaking for a public authority in her colourful example; I assure her that she would not be in breach of the ban if she were making a statement of intent to boycott. Even when an individual is speaking on behalf of a public authority, the ban applies only to the public authority itself and there is no personal liability for the individual. Thos includes councillors, to answer the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. For that reason, I reiterate—
I am very sorry, but I must ask the Minister to address the question about Clause 1(7)(b). If she reads that clause, she will see that it could cover any individual who seeks to influence a decision-maker. That could include, in my interpretation, a journalist writing a campaign statement in a newspaper, asking whichever council it is to take action.
I will come on to decision-makers.
I reiterate that it is important that the Bill does not breach Article 10 of the ECHR on the right to freedom of speech, and I have already reiterated the Government’s support for free speech. The reason the Bill is compatible with the ECHR is that public authorities do not enjoy human rights, as the purpose of the convention is to protect individuals from undue interference by the state, of which public authorities form a part.
I gave a full reply to the committee in my letter of 15 March, and we have already added extra provisions to the Explanatory Notes, some quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to make it clear how the sorts of concerns expressed this evening may be mistaken. He provided an example where a local authority debated a motion to boycott that was ultimately not passed, and asked whether the public authority would be in breach of the ban if it explained that the reason it did not support the motion is that it would be illegal under the Bill. In this scenario, it is the individual councillors who said that this is the reason they did not support the motion in the vote. The public authority has not adopted the motion. Its statement merely summarises the individual councillors’ reasoning. It is therefore not an expression of the public authority’s intention to boycott. Even in the case where the councillor was speaking on behalf of that public authority, such a statement would be in breach of the Bill only if it clearly indicated that the public authority intended to engage in a boycott in the exercise of its public functions or would engage in such a boycott if that were lawful.