Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Purvis of Tweed
Main Page: Lord Purvis of Tweed (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Purvis of Tweed's debates with the Cabinet Office
(7 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I think this is a rather good Bill, although I agree respectfully with him that these amendments, particularly those on international law, merit careful consideration by the Minister and the Government. I say that essentially for three reasons, and I can be brief.
First, the general approach in this country is that public bodies do not have their own interpretation of international law. It is the Government who assess international law obligations, because they are binding on the United Kingdom as a state.
That leads me to the second point, which might in part answer that made by my noble friend Lord Deben. The effect of the Bill as drafted is to introduce, by the back door, potentially vast swathes of international law into our domestic legislation. As I never tire of saying in this House, we have a dualist system: international law is not part of domestic law unless and until it is incorporated. So the answer to my noble friend’s point may well be this: if somebody were to say in a domestic court that a public authority was in breach of “the law” because it had not complied with some international law obligation that was not part of our domestic law, the public body’s obvious retort would be to say that it is not subject to that obligation.
The third point is a practical rather than legal one. My concern is that, in the real world, if the Bill is left as drafted it will in practice drive a coach and horses through what it really seeks to achieve, because the courts will be clogged up with arguments, even if they are entirely unmeritorious, as to the scope of international law. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, about Richard Hermer KC’s opinion: it is something of a curate’s egg, and I will perhaps come back to that in a later group. But I agree that, on this point, he is absolutely right to sound a note of warning and to highlight that the Bill as drafted risks undermining the Government’s ambitions for it.
I gently invite my noble friend the Minister to reconsider the Government’s approach to this international law question, which we can perhaps come back to at a future opportunity.
My Lords, I apologise to the Committee because I did not participate in previous days in Committee or at Second Reading, but as these groups touch on the areas that I speak on from these Benches—international trade and international relations—I want to ask the Minister for clarity on a couple of areas.
I do not think there is a difference between us and the FCDO. If I may, I will move on to the other amendments, because I am trying, as I always do, to answer the questions noble Lords have asked. There are a number of different amendments in this group, and I think we should look at them in the round. I will turn to Amendments 18, 28 and 29.
I will start with Amendment 28, which is a probing amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes, which would remove paragraph 6 of the schedule. She said that was a direct approach. I thank her, more generally, for her support for this legislation and for providing this opportunity to explain why this provision was included in the Bill. Paragraph 6 of the schedule makes an exception to the ban for considerations that a decision-maker in a public authority reasonably considers to be relevant to compliance with the UK’s obligations under international law.
Amendments 29 and 18, as the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, has explained, would remove the existing exception and replace it with a narrower exception that would only allow public authorities to consider international law in a way that is influenced by moral or political disapproval of foreign state conduct, in line with regulations made by the Secretary of State. I would like to thank him, and my noble friend Lady Noakes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for raising this matter. I acknowledge the noble Lord’s and my noble friend’s valuable expertise in this area— of course, they have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who is not in his place, my noble friends Lady Altmann and Lord Wolfson.
There are very limited examples of when this clause might be relevant to public authorities, such as when abiding by sanctions under international law. It is therefore intended as a safeguard. I appreciate the noble Lord’s concern that public authorities could make their own subjective interpretations of foreign policy that are not aligned with the foreign policy of the UK Government. This exception can only be exercised by public authorities in a way that is “reasonable”. It would be up to the enforcement authority, or the courts, to determine whether the exception was exercised reasonably.
However, I appreciate noble Lords’ various concerns on this matter, including the impact on the courts, and the Government will consider these. We will no doubt return to the international law issue on Report. I thank noble Lords for their insightful contributions—
Can I press the Minister on that? My understanding is that, under the Bill, in the absence of a Minister or the Government coming to a determination that international law has been breached, a decision-maker in a public authority can make the decision that there is the potential of a breach. Therefore, a decision-making body at the moment, for example—because Ministers are warning the Israeli Government that their actions in the West Bank and Occupied Territories are potentially in breach of international law—would be permitted under Schedule 6 to make a decision not to invest.
I am not sure that I entirely understand the noble Lord’s question, but I will reflect on it. We will come relatively shortly to a group that will look at these issues more broadly. If I am able to do so, I will come back to him at that point.
As I have already said, various concerns have been raised, which we will consider. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that we value this House’s expertise, as I said at Question Time only last week. The Government will continue to think carefully about the important points that have been made. I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I have it in print, from many years ago, but I am glad that it is no longer the case. I can share it with the noble Lord. The analogy should not be pushed that far.
I also note that a group called Muslim Vote, which has put 18 demands to Sir Keir Starmer, has as the 17th demand the throwing out of the Bill, which I think shows what the group understands the point of the Bill to be: simply that it might stand in the way of whatever its aims are in relation to Gaza.
My Lords, part of the concern about the Bill is not its narrow scope but that it is extremely broad in its scope. Indeed, it would have a chill effect on decisions made across the country by decision-makers, fully consistent with their human rights obligations. I therefore support the thrust of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Collins.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggests that it is not possible to define human rights. I think her Front Bench and previous Front Benches, going back a very long time, will disagree with her; the FCDO publishes annual human rights reports. Her disagreement is not necessarily with the Bill but with the Government.
I merely said that it was not defined in Amendment 19.
It does not need to be defined in Amendment 19 because it would adopt the normal practice of human rights, as defined in the definitions at the front of the Government’s annual report on human rights—which I am sure the noble Baroness reads on an annual basis, as I do.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, indicated, those human rights reports refer to a separate category of countries, the priority countries, and he named them: the A to Z is Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. The thrust of the Bill seems to suggest that, unless the Government, through legislation, put sanctions to limit trade with certain countries, any decision-makers would not be able to make any decisions about investing in that country. That is contrary to current practice with countries from A to Z on the priority list.
For example, other than the sanctions that exist against certain elements of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Bill would prohibit a decision-maker in the United Kingdom deciding not to invest in a Taliban state-owned enterprise. That is extraordinary. Under this legislation, a decision-maker would be prohibited from making a decision about investing in a mining or a gold company in Zimbabwe, which has had many concerns over human trafficking and other human rights concerns. That is also extraordinary, because unless the Government have put in trade sanctions, the Bill will prohibit any other decision-making.
I very much support what the noble Lord said about Zimbabwe. He will know that there was a lot of corruption in the Marange diamond mines, with Government Ministers taking a rake-off from those diamonds. We should be boycotting diamonds from conflict zones such as that, or where corruption is involved—there are many other examples in Africa. I very much support the noble Lord’s point. The Bill would stop public authorities doing that.
I am grateful to the noble Lord. Not only do I agree with him but it goes beyond that. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify the point for me. Where bribery or labour-related misconduct are concerned, unless the Schedule relates to those, and there are general human rights concerns stated in the priority countries list, a decision-maker who uses the priority list—or, indeed, those issues that have been campaigned on, such as blood diamonds as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and my noble friend Lord Oates—would be in breach of law. That cannot be right, so I would be grateful if the Minister could put my mind at rest.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord; I am trying to be helpful. It seems to me that it is even worse than he is saying. Clause 4(1) means that a democratically elected person could not even publish a statement saying that, had it been lawful, he or she would have done X or Y. It is not just that they cannot do it; they cannot even talk about doing it, even though they have been democratically elected by much of their population to take action in a moral and ethical way.
I am most grateful to the noble Lord as that leads on to my next question. It relates to those who are democratic figures in those countries and, indeed, our country.
As regards this country, my reading of this legislation is that, if I, in Parliament, call on the Government to sanction, let us say, a foreign Government’s Minister, or an enterprise or a body operating in another country—as I have done regularly in relation to the Wagner Group, by calling on British enterprises not to trade with those enterprises owned by the Wagner Group —I would be a person under this Bill whom a body would have to disregard. Not only are the Government seeking the nonsense that decision-makers should set aside due diligence on human rights, they are seeking to neuter parliamentarians raising the very concerns that we have raised on a regular basis.
I remind the Minister why this is so important: on 12 occasions, I had called for the proscription of the Wagner Group, and called on any British enterprises to desist from having any relationship with it, before the Government made the decision to proscribe it. Up until the point that the Government made the decision to proscribe the group, which I supported, I was in contravention of this Bill. I was in contravention of it on all the occasions that I called on the Government to do what I asked them to do, which they then did.
The nonsense of this legislation gets serious when it comes to Parliament raising human rights concerns about other countries. One country on the list is the DRC. A country not on the list is Rwanda. I have raised human rights concerns about the March 23 group in the conflict between Rwanda and the DRC. I am prohibited from calling on any British bodies not to trade with a group that is not currently proscribed by the British Government.
I refuse to be neutered in this Chamber, by this Bill, on raising human rights concerns. The Leader of the House is shaking his head from a sedentary position as to how I might be neutered by this Bill. I am sure that he has read the Bill. I am allowing him to intervene on me to explain why I am wrong in my interpretation of this Bill.
I am talking about not the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but the Leader. No, the Leader prefers to shake his head and not to intervene. In his absence, I can think of no better deputy than the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
I will answer the noble Lord’s question: he is not a “decision-maker” for the purpose of this Bill.
I am not a decision-maker for the purpose of this Bill but, under Clause 1(7)(b) of this Bill, I am considered to be a “person”. A decision- maker making a decision based on what I asked them to do would be prohibited. Now the noble Baroness is shaking her head. Why would I not be considered a “person” under Clause 1(7)(b)?
My Lords, I am not going to waste the time of the House getting into these nitpicking debates. The noble Lord is not covered by this Bill.
I do not think that it is nitpicking. I would be considered a person when a body was making a decision based on what I called them to do. I know that I am not a decision-maker, nor am I a Minister of the Crown, nor am I an exempted officeholder, but I would be considered a person calling on bodies to act. If bodies choose to act on what I say, they are currently prohibited under this from acting.
The central point the noble Lord is seeking to make is that he will not be neutered. He would not be neutered because this Bill does not prevent any person seeking to influence a decision-maker. What it will do is prevent the decision-maker acting on those considerations if they are contrary to the Bill. The noble Lord can say what he likes here, in the street or anywhere else. This is a totally futile point.
I am grateful that Hansard will record the contradictory nature of the noble Lord’s intervention on me, when it comes to the nonsensical nature of the point of seeking to influence groups. Let me turn to why—
I am hesitant to interrupt an interruption, but I will. One of the issues we have discussed—it is about Clause 4 as well—is what hat somebody is wearing. For example, a leader of a council might go to a political conference and argue a particular policy. He is a decision-maker but is not performing a decision-making function. The people who might hear his speech at that political conference might think, “He is our leader; he will influence us”, so there is an impact on people being able to advocate particular policies. Is that not true?
I think it is. Other noble Lords may think not. I am looking forward to the Minister’s response to make sure that this is clear.
I wish to move the Committee on to a specific question about British International Investment. That is a body which receives its funding from government—from the taxpayer—but it is charged with making investment decisions in emerging economies. It operates under its ethical investment policy. It has a toolkit and operates under its own set of compliance rules when it comes to how it defines human rights. It takes international obligations under its co-ordination. That policy is not set by Ministers and is not determined by the Government. It makes its own, independent decisions on which countries it invests in.
British International Investment could choose, under its toolkit, not to invest in any of the human rights priority countries. My reading of this Bill is that this will be prohibited. Unless the Government specifically state that BII should not make investment decisions, BII would be in the scope of this Bill. That would be another very retrograde step for the UK with a development institution such as BII leading the charge on international human rights determinations for investments. I would be grateful if the Minister could state that BII is specifically exempt from this Bill.
My Lords, I was not at Second Reading because, as some of you know, I have been away for six months for reasons I will not explain.
The argument goes on from side to side, but the simple answer for me lies not just in the Bill but in the Explanatory Notes on economic activities of public bodies overseas. In the background to this legislation, we are told by those who prepared it that, if people argue that there should be no investment in Uganda—let me just give that as an example, as it is the country I come from—because of a number of human rights questions, the public body should not agree to that if the Government’s policy is different.
I find the Explanatory Notes absolutely disturbing for any democratic body. Many noble Lords know that I led a campaign against Robert Mugabe’s regime. In fact, I cut up my dog collar and never wore it for nine years and nine months. Some people would have said, “You are an archbishop of the Church of England, so you are part of a public body. The Government have not stated that you could do such and such a thing; therefore you will be in breach”. I find this sentence disturbing. There may be those who want, for example, to say that we must disinvest from a particular body, country or place because it is breaching part of our understanding and that sanctions should be brought, but paragraph 6 states:
“The Government has set out its view that it is not appropriate for public bodies to accede to such campaigns except where to do so is positively consistent with the UK’s foreign policy as determined by the Government. The Conservative Party manifesto for the 2019 Election included a commitment to ‘ban public bodies from imposing their own direct or indirect boycotts, disinvestment or sanctions campaigns against foreign countries.’ This Bill is intended to fulfil that commitment”.
Friends, in a free democracy, should we rule out public bodies that may feel, for example, that they should not invest such an amount of money and have our people working with a Government who are oppressing their people from doing so unless it is consistent with government policy? Sometimes opposition to certain things tells us who we are. I trust, I think because of our parliamentary democracy, that things will be challenged in both Houses but, for heaven’s sake, why impose such a thing on a public body? Are we simply saying that the Government cannot err, cannot turn a blind eye, cannot behave in a way that their citizens may find quite difficult? Some of us campaigned against the South African apartheid Government. At that time, there was a particular sort of Government who did not agree with sanctions. I remember arriving in Cambridge. We wanted to boycott green apples from South Africa. There was no way of doing this, but some of us decided to go to Sainsbury’s and announce as loudly as we could, “We are not buying these green apples from South Africa”. Do you know what happened? We never saw those green apples any more in Sainsbury’s. That is democracy. You cannot ban a public body from engaging in an activity which those who belong to it may feel very strongly about.
The Bill is trying to do something, but it is the way it is drafted. The explanation given has a chilling effect on a lot of us, because it suggests that the Government, of whatever shape, will always get it right, that, somehow, they have become omnicompetent and omniscient, and that there are no areas where because of political pressure they will not do it. I know where the Bill is trying to go, but it needs far greater revision if we are going to protect the rule of law in this country and not suggest that the Government always get it right. Some of our foreign policies have not been good. Somehow, we have spoken. Noble Lords have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said about some people from Africa. I find it disturbing that they would think that Ukraine should not be supported because all of them—and I am being honest—are getting a lot of money from Russia and are being supported by China, so any criticism of China and Russia, as far as the African continent is concerned, is very bad, but they will find it very easy to say, “What about Gaza? Why aren’t you doing so much about it?”.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Why is British International Investment singled out as a body which is able to operate its own independent human rights impact assessment for where it chooses to invest, while other decision-makers cannot?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. I will need to write to him on the specific case of BII, as I do not have the details to hand.
In answer to one of the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, the Bill is fulfilling a manifesto commitment to prevent BDS influencing public authorities in undermining community cohesion, which is why Israel is named in the Bill and why there are currently, as I believe, no exemptions. As I think the noble Lord is aware, we are intending to add exemptions under statutory instrument following the passing of the Bill.