(7 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for their amendments in this group. They are incredibly helpful. What we are trying to do here, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has just said, is elicit some certainty from the Government on behalf of those organisations which might find themselves drawn into the scope of this Bill. Even though they may not consider themselves to be public bodies ordinarily, they might find that they are when it comes to this Bill. We will come later to an argument about whether universities should be treated as public bodies and we feel, as we said at earlier stages, they should clearly not be. But that is not the only area where we feel that the Government have not thought sufficiently about what they are trying to do.
Amendment 11 from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, would, as she explained, apply the definition in the Freedom of Information Act. That would settle this to a large extent, in that we are clear about who is and who is not subject to that Act. It would be interesting to hear whether the Government are minded to welcome that suggestion because, from what the Minister has said on previous occasions, all the instances that she has referred to as justifying the need for the Bill would probably be covered. I am not sure why the Government do not just welcome that, to be honest; it does not answer all of our problems, but it would go some way towards that.
The introductory speech of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, was incredibly helpful and his amendments likewise. He concluded by saying he suspects that the Bill is actually performative in nature and worries that the operability is not at the forefront of anybody’s mind in government. I have no idea how true that is, but I share his concern that it is the job of this House to make sure that we do not pass legislation that is unworkable and just causes confusion.
Our Amendment 14 is probing and I accept what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, had to say about it. But we are just trying various ways in this group—and in the next, too—to work out which organisations will be subject to these new rules. The example that has been helpfully provided to me by Universities UK was the one that led to the tabling of our Amendment 14.
If the Government get their way and universities are to be treated as public bodies for the purposes of this Bill, although I very much hope not for any other purpose, their activities that we could argue are clearly outside their publicly funded responsibilities—those conducted, perhaps, with private money or are contracted to private companies—would in no way be subject to the rules within the Bill. There is a reference that makes this clear in the Explanatory Notes, but the amendment that we have suggested would put that explanation into the Bill. As I said, it is to probe exactly what the situation would be because, at the moment, universities are not clear about that and it is important that we give them that certainty.
An example was suggested to me by Universities UK. It is hypothetical but not so outlandish that this situation is not happening very frequently. I declare an interest as chancellor of Teesside University. Here is the hypothetical example: university A is considering a proposal to set up a transnational education partnership in country X. This could involve a partnership with a commercial or state entity in country X and the university board must consider a range of proposals. According to the Higher Education Code of Governance, governing bodies should
“conduct their affairs in an open and transparent manner”.
It is a fundamental duty of university governing bodies to safeguard and promote the reputation of the institution. As the new partnership would involve a significant investment and carry both financial and reputational risks, the board of university A is therefore asked to take a decision on the proposals.
To support its deliberations, the board would receive a paper covering the following: the potential financial exposure and opportunity of each proposal; underlying social, demographic and economic data that underpins a market assessment; due diligence on potential partners, including reputational factors; and a summary of ethical and reputational concerns relating to country X. All aspects of the paper would be deliberated by the board. Following an extensive discussion of the financial and reputational impacts of the proposals, the board decides not to proceed with the partnership opportunity because, on balance, the risks are deemed to outweigh the opportunity.
Can the Minister explain whether, in this example, the transnational educational partnership described constitutes a private or public activity of a university? Would the fact that the board discussion included reference to reputational and ethical concerns of direct relevance to a higher education institution mean that members of the board could be subject to action under the provisions of the Bill?
How can boards fulfil their duty to safeguard and promote the reputation of their institution if they are not able to openly discuss and consider material facts that could impact on said reputation without fear of legal action, even if those considerations are not the sole basis for the eventual decision? How can boards fulfil their duty to conduct affairs in an open and transparent manner if the very fact of discussing issues of demonstrable and material relevance would be actionable under the provisions of the Bill?
I raise this example to tease out some of the grey areas that we might be forcing universities to consider and because I am worried about the chilling effect this may lead to. I do not think there is a situation in which a university would not consider the reputational impact of a partnership. But I can conceive of a situation where that consideration would not be as open and as widely shared as we have come to expect, in the way that we would like things to be done in this country.
In this group, we would like to understand the Minister’s response to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in particular, on whether there might be any other way of making clear who is subject to this. In relation to my Amendment 14, I would like to understand exactly how this will work for organisations—not just universities, but others as well—particularly in relation to the example I raised.
My Lords, I am grateful for the thoughtful contributions from across the Committee. On the first day of Committee, which also touched on the scope of this Bill, we heard from the noble Lords, Lord Collins and Lord Wallace, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Johnson. We discussed the Bill’s application to hybrid public authorities. Today, we have heard in slightly different terms from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, my noble friend Lady Noakes and, of course, from the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman. I will try and come back on her essay question if I can.
Obviously, we have carefully considered the points raised in these debates. I would like to expand on our view of the scope in relation to Amendments 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. As noble Lords have said, the Bill will apply to public authorities, as defined in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. I would like to explain, in response to the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that “public body” is a general term with no single legal definition. The Bill’s Short Title provides a general indication of the subject matter of the Bill, and it is not unusual for the Short Title to use different terminology from the Bill’s substantive provisions.
My Lords, I apologise for interrupting. The Minister will be well aware that there is a particular use of the term “public body” by the Office for National Statistics, which means that debt incurred by a public body is counted as part of the national debt. That means that whether or not some of these hybrid public authorities are defined as public bodies matters a great deal to their financial planning. Again, the university sector is particularly concerned about this.
I thank the noble Lord for raising that point again. It has been raised before and I am aware of it. We are talking about quite marginal sums here, so it will not be definitive, but I am sure we will come back to that point.
Perhaps I should explain that we have used the HRA definition because it has three important advantages. First, it is one that has been on the UK statute book for over 25 years, as has been explained, and places public authorities under important fundamental obligations that they have to observe. Organisations should also already know how it applies to them. Secondly, over those 25 years, the courts have further clarified its scope and identified a number of relevant factors. These include, but are not limited to, the body receiving a significant amount of public funding, the body carrying out acts in exercise of statutory powers and the body providing a public service. Thirdly, the definition ensures that private activity remains out of scope of the Bill—private activity that is rightly protected by convention rights, including freedom of speech.
I am grateful to the Minister, but I am completely unclear about what a public body is after listening to that. Could she explain what a public function is? That might help us.
That is a good point and a good question. The noble Baroness also gave a good example. I suggest that I take away the distinction regarding the public function and have a look at it, and that I come back on the long example she raised, which she said had been given to her by Universities UK, on 7 May when we are due to debate the university amendment in Committee.
I sort of accept that, but while my example referred to universities we could equally apply it to other organisations as well. I would not want to see that consideration narrowed just to the issue of universities.
I agree with the noble Baroness; that is an entirely fair point. We agree that the Bill is complex when it comes to understanding. I want to make sure that, when I answer questions on things such as public functions, I am giving good information that is thought through and thoughtful. I have tried to explain today why we are using the Human Rights Act. That has advantages, which is why the Government have gone down that road.
I should respond to the point about cultural institutions that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, raised. Some of them are in scope of the Bill in their public functions only, and I set out earlier a number of factors that courts would consider in deciding whether an act was a public act. The noble Lord also pointed out that the Bill contains the power to exclude bodies in its scope from the ban via regulations. The Government do not currently foresee the need to exclude such bodies, but this power will allow the Bill to evolve in line with government policy.
For all these reasons, I have tried to explain why we have presented the Bill in the way that we have. There is a lot of comfort to be taken from using the Human Rights Act, but I look forward to returning to some of the questions that have been asked. In the meantime, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
If I may intervene, this definition debate is like walking through a giant sticky pudding. Most Members of the Committee are utterly confused about exactly what public bodies and public authorities are, and about which institutions will be in the scope of the Bill and which will not.
I shall raise a specific example. Could the Minister tell the House about housing associations? They undertake many public functions, which is another term that the Minister introduced but has not been properly defined. They deliver social housing, for example. They do so in partnership with local authorities, often managing the social housing that is owned by local authorities. Will they be in scope of the Bill or not?
The answer I must give in the short term is that it depends a lot on the courts. I will look at housing associations; I know they have come up in other Bills that we have discussed, including how they are treated in government finance. The point about using the Human Rights Act definition is that you get a 25-year history of interpretation.
My Lords, the Minister referred to the issues of public funding associated with universities and the national debt, and how that is counted. She said that these were marginal amounts of money. The UK university sector is worth £130 billion a year to the economy and employs three-quarters of a million people. Is that truly the definition of marginal? I declare an interest as chancellor of Cardiff University. Secondly, when we are looking at cultural organisations, does lottery money count as public or private money?
The honest answer is that I do not know about the lottery, but I will find out for the noble Baroness and write to her. On universities, of course she is right: very substantial sums of money, rightly, are involved in the education of our children. What I was explaining was that, at the margin of this activity—involving procurement and investment—the sum is relatively small compared with all that is done by universities.
May I offer a constructive suggestion on the clarity that might be adduced between now and further stages? Picking up on the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, as I understand it, in 2003 the first case before the court to answer the question was Poplar housing association, where it was deemed that Poplar was a functional public authority under the Human Rights Act. That takes us to the useful report that was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, from the Lords and Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights back in 2003-04, entitled The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act, which gets to the very matter we have been discussing. Obviously, jurisprudence has developed substantially since then. If the Minister could set out in writing how the Government regard the situation as having evolved since this very clear statement of the answer to the question we are struggling with this afternoon, that would perhaps nail the matter.
The Minister has been enormously forbearing and we are very grateful for that. I wonder whether she could help us in this regard in relation to cultural bodies—here I must declare an interest, as an independent non-executive director of the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra. What would be the position of an orchestra that received some funding—by no means the majority of its funding—from the Arts Council, and which determined that, in the aftermath of an invasion of a sovereign nation by another sovereign nation, it no longer wanted to perform supportively of, say, the Bolshoi Ballet? What would be the position of such an orchestra, or of a board, that made that decision because it saw a real reputational risk, in the aftermath of the invasion of a sovereign country, of appearing in support of the national ballet company of the invading nation?
I understand the question. Of course, we now have government sanctions against Russia, so the question is wider. The suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, is a good one, which would perhaps help us to move forward. I have already said that I will look carefully at the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman. The example of the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, is of a slightly different kind, asking rather the same question. Perhaps I can come back on that at the same time.
May I also ask a question? I am very grateful to the Minister, who has indeed been generous in responding, even if she has been unable to offer the Committee further clarification. Virtually all training in this country is privately provided, by private organisations, but publicly funded. Where do they fit into all this? They receive public money—from the DWP, say. I remember, as the former Secretary of State, visiting a lot of private providers. Where do they fit in? Do they come under the contractual relationship to which the Minister referred, or are they caught by the Bill?
It depends, and it also depends on case law under the Human Rights Act, which I have undertaken to look at and come back to noble Lords.
My Lords, I cannot resist suggesting that one definition of a “public function” is somewhere you are served warm white wine and canapés. That is a suggestion of how loose some of these terms can be.
The concern that a lot of us have about the Bill is that we are not entirely confident that the Government have thought through its full implications. The manifesto commitment was specific to boycotts against Israel and was concerned particularly with local authorities and universities. But we have a Bill here with a much wider set of definitions and a universal set of foreign states to which it applies, which raises a much larger number of questions. We also have a whole succession of loose definitions, which the DLUHC memorandum to the Delegated Powers Committee says, in effect, that we should not worry too much about, as we will do this all with regulations. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, would think that it is not necessarily always a good idea to leave everything to regulations. We are asking for greater clarity, certainty and, above all, precision, and a more limited potential scope for the Bill.
Before the noble Lord sits down, I will repeat the point that the Bill applies only to investment and procurement decisions, as everyone understands. We are trying to find a way forward on a manifesto commitment to ban public bodies from imposing their own direct or indirect boycotts or disinvestment or sanction campaigns against foreign countries. Obviously, we need to discuss a little further how we deal with that, but I reiterate the point that I made about the use of the Human Rights Act, because we are trying to be helpful by calling on existing case law. The concern that I had about the amendments we are discussing today is that they might extend the Bill in a way that was not exactly where the Committee seemed to be coming from. I look forward to further discussions on this key matter.
I take the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, just made in respect of schools, but I also agree with the point the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made about the jurisprudence that has arisen, which has clarified this for a number of institutions, including, I think the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester will find, the Church of England. In fact, I believe the first case to test whether a body in the Church was indeed a public authority was Aston Cantlow Parochial Church Council, which was trying to exact a chancel repair charge. In the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords at the time, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, deemed that the parochial council was not a public authority. Many details have been laid out by the courts quite clearly over the years, but if the Government could adduce that on to a single sheet of paper in the way that has been described, it would be very helpful.
My Lords, as I set out in my response to the previous group, the Government chose to apply the ban to public authorities as defined by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. It is a great advantage that your Lordships, perhaps in contrast to the other place, scrutinise Bills in this way. I cannot accept that it is a sloppy Bill—it is a good Bill—but I think that concerns have been overstated. My noble friend Lady Noakes just explained why, very eloquently. We need clarity. Most bodies know whether or not they are covered.
There is another good reason for using the Human Rights Act definition—obviously, I am happy to look further at its implications, as I have said—which is that the Government intended to apply the Bill to a broad range of bodies when they are exercising public functions. This was to ensure a consistent approach to foreign policy across the UK’s public institutions, to stop public bodies legitimising divisive campaigns, which can undermine community cohesion, and to allow public bodies to focus on their core purpose when engaging in procurement and investment. That was the intention of the manifesto commitment that I mentioned in the previous group.
These amendments seek, rightly, to probe the scope of the Bill’s definition of public authorities, but they also probe the need for the power to make exceptions to the ban. I will try to address each in turn.
I am very glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester has joined the debate. The Church of England would be in the Bill’s scope only to the extent that it exercises public functions. We have heard a little about the interpretation of that in the courts.
Before I address the specific amendments, I remind the Committee that the Bill will not create any new criminal offences. That is a very important point. I also take this opportunity to address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, which was picked up by my noble friend Lord Deben, on orchestras. Orchestras are very unlikely to be regarded as public authorities. Moreover, withdrawing from an event is unlikely to be regarded as a procurement decision for the purposes of our Bill. The definition of a procurement decision does not include contracts where it is the public authority providing the service.
I can also reassure the noble Baroness who raised the issue that defence contracts are also exempt from the Bill. In addition, for contracts in scope, the Bill already contains an exception to the ban for national security considerations. In practice, if a case is reported to an enforcement authority it will look at whether the public authority had regard to any of the exemptions to the Bill—for example, the national security exemptions —during the decision-making process. Evidence of this might include if the public authority shows that it was following guidance from the UK Government, or became aware, for example, that a supplier was engaged in espionage.
Amendments 26 and 23 probe whether charitable organisations would come under the Bill’s scope. Charities would be captured by the ban only if they were performing public functions. It is the Government’s understanding that most charities will not be covered by the Bill. I hope that provides reassurance to noble Lords.
I am sorry to interrupt, but I was just checking the relevant parts of the Bill relating to enforcement. The Minister said that no new criminal actions arise from the Bill. What we do have is the ability of the Secretary of State to have enforcement powers that include monetary penalties. If people refuse to pay the monetary penalties, what would that result in?
Perhaps I might continue on the points raised in the debate and come back to that point. It is a very reasonable question but I am not going to answer it without advice. However, there are no criminal sanctions in this Bill, which there often are in the Bills we consider in this House.
There may be a small number of cases where charities are delivering public functions; they would therefore be captured in respect of those functions. However, it is important to note that it does not mean that a charity is a public authority just because it is in receipt of public funding.
The Bill will not apply to charities’ private functions. For example, for universities, decisions that are part and parcel of delivering higher education would be public functions so they would be in scope of the ban. If a charity did have public functions in scope of the ban, it would apply only to investment and procurement decisions made within the public functions. That is a point that I need to emphasise. Therefore, the ban would not restrict how such bodies decide, for example, to distribute humanitarian aid, which was the subject of the earlier debate.
I think the Minister, or those who advise her, has misunderstood the point I raised in relation to the orchestra. The orchestra is putting on a concert version of “The Rite of Spring” as part of a Stravinsky festival. That festival is being held in a number of cities throughout the world. It is booked to appear at the new opera house in Dubai. It puts out a tender for ballet companies to provide the dance section of “The Rite of Spring” for this concert version. It specifically precludes in its procurement—so perhaps those who advise the Minister can reflect on this—the national ballet company of a country that has recently invaded a sovereign nation because it does not wish reputationally to be linked with that national ballet company. That is quite clearly a procurement. Is the Minister saying that that would not be covered by the Act and that the fact that the orchestra concerned receives a proportion of its funding from the public purse does not make it fall within the ambit of the Act? It is to that question specifically that an answer would be helpful. If she cannot give that answer, it demonstrates very clearly the concern about ambiguity that all contributors to this debate have articulated.
That is what we want an answer to: is it a public authority for that purpose because it receives public funding?
I am glad that we have focused on an individual example because, in my experience, this always helps us to clarify our own thinking. I think that, if the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, will allow me, I will take the orchestra example away, along with the example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, work out the right approach and get back to noble Lords, perhaps in discussions outside the Chamber.
We all want the same thing: to make sure that the Bill applies to the right bodies in the right way. That is what we are seeking to do, which is why we started with human rights legislation, which is often a popular start, for good reasons, to legislation. However, we have, as we do, scrutinised the detail of legislation today and have come up with some extremely good questions. It behoves us to go away. I am sure we can find good answers and use them to improve the Bill, which is, as I said when I introduced the Bill, what we are determined to do to get a good Bill that leaves this House in the right place and delivers on our manifesto commitment.
I turn now to Amendment 25, which seeks to probe whether a national governing body of sport that is in receipt of public funding would be in scope of the Bill. It raises some of the same questions and issues that we are going to consider. It is possible that a governing body of sport could be in scope of the Bill. If a sporting body is considered to be a public body under the Human Rights Act, on the basis that it exercises some public functions, the ban would apply only to the public functions exercised by that body, but a sporting body being in receipt of public funding would not in itself be enough for it to be considered a public authority. These bodies play a significant public role.
We have got the public function thing again, which the Minister has referred to frequently. She has clarified that public funding is part of what will determine whether the sporting governing body is a public body, but she said that would be relevant only in the conduct of public functions. I am not clear on this, given that at the end of the previous group we were promised a response on what a public function is. I think the Minister said that she would follow up in writing, but she is relying on that term frequently in her response to this group of amendments, which I do not think is helpful, unless she can say something at this stage about what she considers a public function to be.
The noble Baroness is right that we need to use the term “public function” with care and to be entirely clear what it means, but the receipt of public funding is another legitimate issue that we need to understand—and understand the scale as well.
As an example, if a young people’s badminton team were to be taking a tour of south-east Asia and felt it did not want to take part in events in certain regions of China and came under some pressure on this from parents or other groups, how would that be? You could say that enabling young people to engage in sport is perhaps a public function. I do not know. How would that be considered?
That example would not be procurement or investment, so it would be outside the scope of the Bill. However, the noble Baroness has raised the point. Sporting bodies can be within scope, as I explained, in procurement and investment decisions. The reason for this is that these bodies play a significant role in public life and it would send a very unhelpful signal if we were to single out governing bodies of sport as an exception to the Bill.
I am sorry to keep on about this, but there is then a need to define procurement. In the example that I am, perhaps tenuously, relying on, there would surely be procurement of transport services, accommodation services, catering services and venues.
It seems to me that the issue here is boycotting a sporting event, and that is not a procurement or investment decision—but I have already undertaken to look carefully at these individual examples, because we all want to understand exactly what we are talking about and to come to the right outcome.
Amendment 24 would carve out community interest companies. While it is not inconceivable that a community interest company might perform a public function, neither the purpose nor the structure of a community interest company naturally lends itself to that. It is not, by and large, what the Bill is designed for.
Amendment 22 seeks to probe whether schools and early years providers, such as nurseries, are in scope of the Bill. I can confirm that all publicly funded schools will be captured by the ban when they are performing public functions, and some early years providers will also be public authorities on that definition. Other early years providers may be captured to the extent that they are performing a public function. However, I will take noble Lords’ concerns on that issue away, because I think it comes into the same category as the other two examples we will be looking at.
Privately funded independent schools—and I think this will probably apply to private universities—will be captured to the extent that they perform a public function. However, they are unlikely to perform functions of a public nature in scenarios where they are captured as hybrid public authorities, which we discussed on the previous group. The ban will ensure that publicly funded schools remain shared spaces for all, and the Bill will ensure that schools and early years providers can remain focused on their core duties, rather than being distracted by divisive campaigns promoted by BDS and others.
If a Church of England or Catholic school says it will not buy from a country that is persecuting Christians, that is concentrating on its core responsibility. It is not avoiding it; it is what it is there for, which is to uphold the faith. Are we really going to dictate whether or not it should make that decision?
My Lords, the Minister has an advisory speaking time of 20 minutes. May I respectfully suggest that we leave any further interventions until the end to allow the Minister to answer as many of the existing questions as possible?
I have already said that I am trying to answer the many questions noble Lords have asked. There have been a great many interventions on me and I have been very patient. I have also made some undertakings to try to clarify some of these points, including childcare, which would cover the schools that my noble friend Lord Deben mentioned.
Perhaps I could turn to Amendment 54, which requires
“the Secretary of State to provide a comprehensive list”,
of the bodies in scope
“before the provisions in Clause 1 can be brought into force”.
The Government are not able to provide a comprehensive list of bodies captured by the Human Rights Act definition. However, I have tried to be clear on the categories of bodies that includes. To repeat, these include: central government agencies and non-departmental public bodies; UK Government Ministers and devolved Ministers; local authorities; administering authorities of local government pension schemes; universities and higher education providers with public functions; publicly funded schools; and some museums and galleries in receipt of significant public funding.
As with any definition, there will be further cases at the margins where it is impossible to generalise without the full facts of a case. That, of course, is where the courts come in. Legislation often uses general definitions—for example, the Human Rights Act from which we have taken the scope or the scope of bodies covered by obligations under public procurement legislation.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 14A. This would remove from the Bill the powers granted to the Secretary of State to amend the schedule to make exceptions to the ban for certain bodies, functions and types of considerations, and to amend or remove regulations made under these powers. I understand concerns about the use of subordinate legislation—the noble Lord knows that—and we are lucky that we have such a good committee to supervise its use. However, these powers are necessary to ensure that the ban can evolve over time and operate as intended, for example in response to emerging global events.
I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, that the FCDO is fully supportive of this legislation, and all regulations made under this Bill would follow the normal procedure of cross-governmental clearance and, of course, be approved by the Foreign Secretary. In the event that in future the ban has unintended consequences for a certain public authority, it is right for the Secretary of State to have the power to exempt that body, or a function of the body, from the ban via statutory instrument—I think today’s debate shows that that is necessary—and this would be subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses.
These powers will also allow the Secretary of State to exempt certain types of considerations from the ban. For example, Ministers may decide to exempt a narrow type of consideration to ensure the ban can evolve in line with government policy. The powers future-proof the legislation to ensure the ban can continue to operate effectively and mitigate against any unforeseen circumstances.
Before I close, I should perhaps address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, on the environment. The ban applies only to decisions that target a particular country or territory. For example, environmental campaigns, including ones against fossil fuels that are not country specific, are outside the scope of this Bill. I also reassure my noble friend that the power in Clause 3 cannot be used to remove any exception to the ban in the Bill as passed by Parliament. There is a schedule the noble Lord can look at, which includes environmental misconduct, which we are coming on to discuss.
I hope, finally, to address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, with regard to why there is a separate clause in the Bill for local government pension schemes. The administering authorities for local government pension schemes are public authorities under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Capturing administering authorities of LGPS in a bespoke provision means that the Pensions Regulator can use its existing powers and procedures to enforce the BDS ban for the administering authorities of LGPS. That avoids the Pensions Regulator setting up a separate enforcement system for the Bill. I am happy to have a discussion with him; we often discuss pensions issues which are of limited interest sometimes to the whole House.
I hope that my response to this group of amendments —importantly, alongside the undertakings I gave in response to my previous group which we expanded a little to bring in telling examples—will help the Committee to understand why we have chosen the Human Rights Act definition and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. I look forward to further discussion.
I hope I am able to intervene at this point before the noble Baroness sits down—some of these new rules that have been introduced for Committee stage I find incredibly damaging to our ability to properly scrutinise this Bill; I raised that point at the committee.
The noble Baroness said that the FCDO fully supports this legislation. She may recall that, at the previous Committee day, I specifically raised this question because I wanted to inform the Committee of the precise nature of the FCDO’s advice following United Nations resolutions regarding the Occupied Territories, which are specifically mentioned in this Bill. Perhaps she can take this opportunity to tell us how that advice could potentially impact the sort of investment and procurement decisions that organisations might make. There is advice issued by the FCDO in relation to the Occupied Territories.
We are going to be discussing the Occupied Territories in a group two or three later in this Bill and I do not have an answer to the noble Lord on this point today, except to reiterate that this Bill has been collectively agreed. I was particularly talking about the arrangements for regulations which, in turn, had been collectively agreed. I explained the system that when you have a new statutory instrument, there is a write-round which involves all relevant Ministers. In this particular case, that would certainly include the Foreign Secretary.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, can I ask her to take away the point I was ineptly trying to raise earlier? If a public body—we could take as examples housing, health and care—has an investment decision to make on a new building and/or new services, is it expected to find out more about the sources of the money going to be used to enable it to perform public functions and provide new public buildings? Are they expected to go that far?
I am grateful for that point, but I am not sure I entirely understand it, so perhaps I can offer to meet the noble Lord or to write to him and make sure that he gets an answer in good time.
My Lords, I was not expecting this group to elicit quite the debate it did, but it was incredibly helpful and welcome in exposing what the noble Lord, Lord Warner, called “sloppy”. He makes a fair point. The Minister said that she did not like that phrase but, given that we have been unable to agree a definition of a “public function”, unable to elicit a proper definition of “procurement” and have not agreed what a “public body” is by any means, I have to agree with him.
This is not us being mendacious or deliberately creating problems for the Government, although you could argue that is a fair thing for the Opposition to want to do; that is not what we are doing here. Like the noble Lords, Lord Willetts and Lord Deben, we are trying to get to the real nub of how this Bill enables the Government to fulfil the commitments that we all accept they made in their manifesto. We understand that the Government want to stand by those commitments, but we are so concerned that the legislation before us could end up straying into so many more areas. I honestly do not think that when this went into the manifesto, anybody had sporting bodies or schools in mind, yet here we are with the Minister unable to answer some quite straightforward examples, including a very good one from my noble friend Lord Boateng. I regret that.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Collins that, when the Government Whip pops up to try and rescue the Minister from having to take too many more interventions, that is fair enough, those are now the rules, but this place is supposed to be able to spend a bit more time in Committee—
I think that is a little unfair. The noble Baroness knows that I am always ready to take interventions and have continued to do so. I am doing my best to do the job that this Chamber does so well. We have used the Human Rights Act definitions and this Chamber has decided that that causes problems. I am sure those are soluble.