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Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sandhurst
Main Page: Lord Sandhurst (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Sandhurst's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is an honour to speak in your Lordships’ House for the first time and to do so in support of this Bill, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford. I am grateful for the kind words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Davies of Gower.
When I succeeded my father in 2002, I never in my dreams expected that I would take my seat as I thought we would no longer be here, but here I am—and after a contested election, if not the sort of election that some reformers might endorse. May I begin by saying how welcome everyone here has made me feel? I have received great support from the staff of this House, not least in the Library and at the digital drop-in, and of course from the doorkeepers.
I hope the House will forgive me if I say a little about myself. After Oxford I went to the Bar. I practised under my family name as Guy Mansfield. I was not the first barrister in my family; that was one James Mansfield. In 1772 he, with others, by habeas corpus, secured the liberty of Somerset the slave before the great Lord Mansfield—no relation. James was later Solicitor-General and Chief Justice of Common Pleas. His grandson William was not a lawyer. He went into the Army, was a distinguished soldier and reached the rank of full general. William Gladstone made him a Peer and he took the title “Sandhurst”.
My great-grandfather practised a little at the Chancery Bar. My grandfather and father both aspired to be lawyers but two world wars intervened. They both served with distinction and were lucky to survive, but they did not go back to the law afterwards,
My early practice covered a wide field, like many in my time: crime, civil and family, and a range of courts. I acted for clients from all backgrounds. I was lucky in my first two years to share a room in chambers with the future noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who was a great exemplar.
Life was often quite tricky. I was not always very good. My wife, who is not a lawyer, came once to watch me give a plea in mitigation. Ever the kind but critical friend, she said: “Had you nothing better to say?”
Some years later I went off to represent a district council in a planning inquiry. It was my first such, so I had never been to or seen one. I was greeted rather breathlessly by the planning officer, who said: “Oh, Mr Mansfield, this is my first inquiry. I’m so glad you’re here to show me the ropes.” I kept my counsel, we survived and we were successful.
In 1994 I took Silk. I also became a recorder and later a deputy High Court judge. The 1990s were a time of great change for the Bar. It had to respond to High Court advocacy rights for solicitors and to the introduction of conditional fees. At that time I chaired two Bar committees in succession that had to address these. Next we had the competition inquiry into the legal professions. As a result of that, I chaired the working party that introduced direct access so that people did not have to go through a solicitor to see a barrister. In 2005 I became chairman of the Bar. On my doorstep was the Clementi report, which wanted to introduce widespread change in the regulation of the legal professions. I am proud that in that year we on the Bar Council created a new constitution in the space of the year that took effect from 1 January 2006 with a new separate and independent regulator, the Bar Standards Board, under a lay chair. I think that was a big achievement.
I returned to practice. In 2009 I chaired another working party, in response to Sir Rupert Jackson’s inquiry into costs in civil cases, to look at something called a contingent legal aid fund. We came to the conclusion that the Government should look at such a fund, which would be a privately funded not-for-profit scheme to fund civil litigation. Sadly, it went into the long grass, where it remains. That is not for today but we must do more to support access to justice in the civil and family courts.
In 2012 I took over leading the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s legal team defending claims by 40,000 Kenyans for damages for alleged assaults in Kenya during the Mau Mau insurrection. That trial lasted for 232 court days and was far and away the most complex thing that I have ever done. When it finished in 2018, I thought, “That’s it.” I retired and looked for a change of direction—so here I am. I feel greatly privileged to have been elected. I hope my background shows areas where I might be able to contribute, but I will wish to contribute on a wider canvas too.
Turning to the Bill, which I shall deal with quite shortly, I have looked at it not only with the eyes of one who sat in the Crown Court as a recorder but as a member of the public who lives in this great city and travels on public transport, like everyone else. I am conscious that the Bill has created controversy and that some parts are not necessarily easy, but I suggest that its broad principles are correct. Today, I shall focus on just three of its provisions.
First, there are the provisions to protect emergency workers. My daughter is a consultant in the NHS. She works on the wards and has told me, quite a lot of times, of incidents of assault—not just in A&E but actually on the wards. Doctors and nurses deserve protection. Secondly, I commend the provisions to make different local bodies work together to prevent serious violence. That must be wise. Thirdly, I identify the provisions for the extraction of information from electronic devices. I say nothing about possible improvements by amendment; the principle is sound. I commend the Bill to the House.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sandhurst
Main Page: Lord Sandhurst (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Sandhurst's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a privilege to follow and support my noble friend Lord Moylan. If this speech is a little bit longer than I originally intended, it is to cover some of the ground that I understand would have been covered by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven.
Making non-crime hate records has real-life consequences for an individual that are too important to be left unregulated. As we have heard, non-crime hate records are kept when no crime has been committed but the police decide that they have grounds for concern about how that person might behave in the future. Once such a record is made, it can remain for ever, without review. It will be disclosed in an enhanced criminal record request. It does not take George Orwell to show where that can lead. I suggest Sir Robert Peel would have been astonished.
I turn to the real-life case of Harry Miller of Lincolnshire. In 2018 and 2019, he posted tweets about transgender issues on Twitter. He holds gender-critical views but denies being prejudiced against transgender people. To quote from the judgment in the subsequent judicial review:
“He regards himself as taking part in the ongoing debate about reform of the law”.
Mrs B, a transgender woman, read the tweets and regarded them as transphobic. She reported them to Humberside Police, which recorded this as a non-crime hate incident. She was the only person to complain. A police officer visited Mr Miller at work to speak to him—in his workplace—about these tweets and left Mr Miller with the impression that he might be prosecuted if he continued such tweeting. In a subsequent press statement, an assistant chief constable raised the possibility of criminal proceedings if matters escalated. Imagine what that felt like for Mr Miller. He, however, applied for judicial review.
Mr Justice Julian Knowles, in a very fine and lengthy judgment, found that the police’s action towards Mr Miller disproportionately interfered with his right of freedom of expression. He reminded us that free speech is an essential component of democracy and of these words in the unpublished introduction to Animal Farm:
“If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.”
As the judge stressed, true free speech includes
“the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative.”
On the facts, the judge concluded that the tweets were lawful and there was not the slightest risk that Mr Miller would commit a criminal offence by continuing to tweet. That is the judgment in the High Court. Further, he said the police visit to the place of work, coupled with the subsequent press statement, combined to create a disproportionate interference with Mr Miller’s right of freedom of expression. He found that this had a potential chilling effect.
Therefore, the police should not continue to record non-criminal speech without proper oversight—that is what we ask. There must be clear criteria applied by all police forces uniformly. At present, the College of Policing lays down guidelines, but they are no more than guidelines: a police force is free, in principle, to depart from the guidelines. Indeed, the current guidelines state that:
“The recording system for local recording of non-crime hate incidents varies according to local force policy.”
That is not acceptable. These records, by definition, are of a non-crime; they are subject to no time limits; and the guidelines do not provide for mandatory periodic review, whether after one year, five years or 20 years. This is too important to be left to varying and uncertain police practice. Policy and practice in this field cannot properly be left to the wide discretion of different police forces. It should be for the Secretary of State, answerable to Parliament, to decide when, if at all, and in what circumstances and how such records may be made and kept.
A person’s reputation is of inestimable value. If a confidential record is made that he or she has spoken or behaved in a way that someone else has perceived to be motivated by hostility but which does not amount to a crime, that individual becomes a marked man or woman when a request is made by a current or prospective employer for an enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service check. As matters stand, that mark or stain can remain for ever, so what is at stake is very serious. This amendment will ensure that regulations set a definitive framework to ensure fairness; to ensure a consistent and fair process of selecting and recording personal data, identifying the different categories of personal data and its processing, identifying the persons whose authority is required for such processing, ensuring they are of suitable rank, the notification of the individual who is the data subject, how long the data may be retained and with what reviews. If someone is to be denied employment, we must be confident that the basis for this is sound and properly managed.
We have heard from my noble friend that the provisions will not apply to the processing of information pursuant to ongoing criminal investigation, nor for the purposes of administrative functions of the police authority. There will be no interference with operational policing. These amendments are needed to ensure that freedom of speech and opinion is not subjected, as the European court has said, to the heckler’s veto, and to create a proper balance between public safety, freedom of speech and protection of reputation.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sandhurst
Main Page: Lord Sandhurst (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Sandhurst's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have put my name to this amendment, because it is a really useful proposal from London Councils. The noble Lord, Lord Tope, has well outlined the purpose and the benefits. The idea of a target of zero road deaths—I think that Sweden has a target going back 20 years—is a really important thing to go for in London.
Noble Lords will have seen the changes that have happened in London and other places because of the Covid epidemic. A couple of years ago, London provided much better cycle lanes and reduced some car widths and, in the process, reduced speeds. As someone who cycles around London all the time, I welcome that personally. Hackney, which was one of the first boroughs to go for this, is a pleasant place to pedal around now. It is key that this is done on as great a devolved basis as possible. Devolving it to the London councils seems an excellent idea; I am absolutely persuaded that they are capable of doing it.
The noble Lord, Lord Tope, touched on the £445 million of revenue generated by parking fines in London alone. The RAC Foundation appears to criticise this as milking the motorist but, as the noble Lord said, those people have contravened a regulation so we should not have any sympathy for them. If they had obeyed the regulation, be it on parking or speeding or whatever else, they would not have deserved to be fined. If they do not like being fined, it is quite simple: they should obey the legislation. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has got to say on this but it would be a first step in devolving some of these issues, which should be decided locally. If it is successful, it needs to go to other cities as well.
My Lords, I support these amendments. I do so as a resident and ratepayer of the London Borough of Wandsworth; I declare that interest. I was encouraged to speak in this debate and support these amendments by the Conservative leader of that borough. He believes that they are desirable and will be beneficial to the residents of his borough, and he will be answerable to his electorate in due course.
In short, these amendments will, subject to the Secretary of State’s approval, enable but not oblige a borough to take up powers over speeding restrictions and traffic light contraventions. The aim is very simple: to stop people speeding. Because the boroughs anticipate that taking over the management of speed enforcement will create something of a virtuous circle, they will be more energetic about it than the police are. They will enforce speed limits because they have a financial stake in it directly and, because they enforce it and recover the costs, they will have to recycle the money they get in highway improvements, traffic calming and road safety generally.
What is there not to like about that? It will benefit residents and road users. Better enforcement will bring down speeds on residential roads. Lower speeds reduce the level of pollution and particulates. Better enforcement by boroughs will make residential roads safer for pedestrians and cyclists. It is a commonplace that an accident at 30 mph can kill; a pedestrian hit at 20 mph or less has a much more viable chance of survival without even serious injury. So, if these amendments are accepted, there will be immediate health and safety benefit to residents in any borough that chooses to adopt them.
Giving boroughs control over speeding and traffic lights is simply a no-brainer. I stress that boroughs will not be compelled to adopt these powers; it will be for each borough to do so when the time is ripe and it is in a position to carry them out. In summary, these amendments will bring great benefit to the citizens of London.
My Lords, I am afraid that I take a converse view on this. London has a massive problem with increasing traffic congestion, and I do not believe that reducing the speed limit to 30 mph is going to bring the death rate down to zero. On the converse, one of the biggest problems in London is pedestrians crossing the road more transfixed on their mobile telephones than on watching oncoming traffic. I am not opposing this amendment; I am just saying that reducing the speed limit will not necessarily bring the death rate down to zero.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sandhurst
Main Page: Lord Sandhurst (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Sandhurst's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps I may begin by saying that I support Amendment 220. I endorse it completely and have nothing further to say on it. Noble Lords have spoken with great eloquence and force. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has explained, my Amendment 221ZA, is a probing amendment designed to correct the terms of a subsection in Amendment 221 in case that amendment goes forward and the Government are interested. Let me explain.
I should say at once that Amendment 221 is, in principle, good. If accepted, it would require the Government to carry out a review of the age of criminal responsibility. I have no argument with that whatever. The issue that I raise is with the list of factors to be considered by any such review and, in particular, the use of the word “gender”. The right word there should be “sex”. The requirement in Amendment 221 is that the review should take into account certain factors. It can take other factors into account, but the following are mandatory:
“age, gender and ethnic background”.
My focus is on gender. Those noble Lords who sat through the important debate on Monday night will have heard lengthy discussion of those terms and their use in legislation. I will come back to that.
When I drafted my amendment rather hurriedly on the Thursday, I focused on the terms in the Equality Act. Why I did so will become obvious in a moment. I used too many words; I just lifted other factors in order to include them. I am now satisfied that the only proper course is to remove the term “gender” and substitute that with “sex and gender reassignment”. The cohort, if the review were to take place, will be those under 18 and, for the large part, those materially younger. One could call them children. Importantly, “sex” is established in statute and describes physiology. It is not a social construct. It is easily identified, and is listed and defined, as I shall explain, in the Equality Act. It should be noted that “gender” is not so defined. I say that for noble Lords who were not here on Monday or have not studied the Act in detail.
Section 11 of that Act states:
“In relation to the protected characteristic of sex … a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a man or to a woman; … a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a reference to persons of the same sex.”
There is further elaboration in Section 212, which defines “man” and “woman”—in other words, the terminology that has just been explained. It states that,
“ ‘man’ means a male of any age … ‘woman’ means a female of any age.”
There we have it all clearly defined. Sex is a physiological condition and, importantly for the purposes of a review, it is an objective fact, not someone’s opinion. It is not what someone identifies as. We are talking here about people under 18, usually those much younger. Also, we all know that sex is registered at birth. It is on the birth certificate.
In the case of a small number of people who are under 18 and may fall within the ambit of the review, there may be those to whom the term “gender assignment” will apply. They will be few, but if that does apply within the meaning of the legislation, that, too, will be a fact, not an opinion. That is because gender reassignment is also a protected characteristic under the Equality Act. Section 7(1) of that Act defines gender reassignment as follows:
“A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.”
So gender reassignment likewise refers to a physiological process and does not include mere self-identification or opinion. Lastly, in case anyone were to ask, “What about gender recognition certificates?”, they simply do not apply. One cannot have one of those if one is under 18. I say that so that everyone knows where we are.
Put simply, if there is to be such a review, the mandatory—if that is the right word—considerations should be age, sex, gender reassignment and ethnic background, but not gender. I commend this approach and await with interest the Minister’s response.
I should say briefly in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle—perhaps it is not my place to do so because it was her amendment that I signed—that I should thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. We have been using various terms in Committee, but on this occasion he must be right. If one were considering children under 18 in the context of a review of the age of criminal responsibility, it would be a glaring omission to include “gender” instead of “sex” in the legislation.
Sometimes it may be appropriate to use both terms, and I supported that position on Monday in the particular context of a different amendment about hostility towards people. What I tried to suggest, and which Twitter does not reflect, is that hostility can be towards people in broader categories than those protected under the Equality Act. I would not want someone to be subjected to violent hostility, even on grounds that are not currently in the Equality Act, because they were non-binary or whatever. That is not really the point in this context. If I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put it very well.
What is more, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, will forgive me for making that concession, given that this is a probing amendment and her list of factors to be considered in any review was inclusive and not closed. I hope it is helpful to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in this way.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sandhurst
Main Page: Lord Sandhurst (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Sandhurst's debates with the Scotland Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too support the principle behind Amendment 269. We regularly see the disturbing prospect of bereaved families being unrepresented when public bodies have very competent representation. This undermines public confidence in justice, and it sometimes impedes the ability of the coroner or the public inquiry to get to the truth of matters of enormous public importance.
However, I am not persuaded that the mechanism contained in Amendment 269, in proposed new subsection (1), is the correct one. It provides that the representation for bereaved families must be
“at the same level or in proportion to the resources provided to the public authority or private entity”.
I would be content if competent representation were provided.
I draw to the attention of the Committee that there are cases in the Court of Appeal where it has been argued, under the Human Rights Act, that a defendant in a criminal case was entitled to representation under legal aid by Queen’s Counsel because the prosecution was represented by Queen’s Counsel. The Court of Appeal said no, and that what they are entitled to—and rightly so—is competent representation. So I think this is going too far.
The noble and Learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, suggested one way forward: that the public body should make provision. Another way of dealing with it would be for the chairman of the inquiry, or the coroner, to have a statutory discretion to order that specific persons be provided with public funding, whether by legal aid or otherwise. There are a variety of mechanisms, but I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that the principle now needs to be enacted.
My Lords, I shall speak shortly. I have always had a long interest in legal aid and its proper provision. My concern is that this amendment is aimed at the right target but goes too far. Look, for example, at the wording; as I understand it, it would apply every time there is an inquest involving someone who has died in a hospital. If that has been the result of possible negligence on the part of the hospital—I am talking about an NHS hospital here—then there is a potential claim against the hospital. If that potential claim has any reasonable merit, it is likely that solicitors experienced in medical and legal work will undertake the inquest because, in due course, if the claim is brought and damages are recovered and costs awarded, the cost of representation at the inquest will be recoverable in the personal injury action. That has been the case ever since the “Marchioness” disaster and the costs thereafter.
All I say is this: there should be representation in appropriate cases involving state institutions. We can all think of examples—not just Hillsborough; it could be a hospital or something else—where the state and a public authority are involved, and it is unfair to the family to have to scrabble around to get funds if they can. I would like to see careful consideration given by the Government to how this can be properly designed to find a balance. There is a strain on public resources; there are many other areas where legal aid is not provided, particularly in the family courts, and we know that funds are short. Equally, they should consider whether, in appropriate cases, it should be at the coroner’s discretion to direct the Legal Aid Agency to look at this. I argue that the Government should think very carefully about this and about what would be a fair balance, given the strain on public resources, to ensure that people who need and deserve it get resources provided to them.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sandhurst
Main Page: Lord Sandhurst (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Sandhurst's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendments 320 and 328, which would repeal the Vagrancy Act. This 197 year-old Act does nothing to tackle and resolve homelessness, and nor does it prevent antisocial behaviour. In fact, by criminalising rough sleepers, it prevents them accessing vital services to support them to move off the streets. This is important in the context of people trafficking—modern slavery. Its victims are those likely to end up sleeping rough on the streets to escape danger. They need our help. Criminalising rough sleeping marginalises the most vulnerable and may mean that rough sleepers move away from, not towards vital support. It does not address the underlying causes.
The Act now has only two effective provisions. Section 3 makes it an offence in any public place to beg or cause a child to beg. An offender can be locked up for one month. Section 4 addresses what we call rough sleeping. It also encompasses those who are in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. This is used to deal with people who are thought to be “up to no good”. The fact is that there are perfectly good ways of dealing with all those people both within and without the criminal law. Indeed, on 9 March the then Secretary of State said in answer to a Parliamentary Question that the Act should be repealed. In this amendment, we offer a fully drafted way forward. If minor changes are needed, they can be made—there is no problem there.
The number of convictions for rough sleeping and begging have fallen consistently in the past 10 years. Indeed, in 2019—the most recent year for which figures are available—only one person received a custodial sentence for begging, and only 16 received a custodial sentence for being in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. The numbers are tiny. Let us throw away the sledgehammer. The police, local authorities and other agencies have ample powers.
Let me explain very briefly. The Highways Act 1980, Section 137, makes it an offence wilfully to block free passage along the highway. That is punishable by a fine. The Public Order Act 1986, Section 5, makes it an offence to use threatening or abusive words or behaviour. That, too, is punishable by a fine. Moving to civil measures, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 introduced a wide range of measures to deal with the different types of anti-social behaviour. Recourse can properly be made to those measures for people who are repeat nuisances. They are all available under the 2014 Act.
Taking it very summarily in the short time available, there are civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance. Breach of those civil injunctions gives rise to civil contempt, with all the remedies available for that—up to 2 years’ imprisonment for the worst offenders, but it is done properly. Secondly, there are criminal behaviour orders. These can impose requirements as well as prohibit certain activities. Thirdly, there are community protection notices. These can be issued by the police, a social landlord or a local council if behaviour is detrimental to the quality of life of a local community. Fourthly, there are dispersal powers, under which a local council, following consultation with the police, may issue a public spaces protection order to place restrictions or impose conditions on activities that people may carry out in the designated area.
In respect of that, since 2014 the Home Office has issued statutory guidance under the 2014 Act, recently updated this January. Our amendment, as noble Lords will see from its terms, will strengthen that. We propose a co-ordinated package. Where something has to be done, the police and local authorities have the powers to do it. We ask the House to act now to put an end to this prehistoric, unjust and inappropriate law. I commend the amendments.
Briefly, I entirely support the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, and there is no point in repeating what have been compelling, eloquent and, I believe, unanswerable points. Long experience has shown that arguments do not get better by repetition.
What I wanted to do, however, was to make four quick points from my experience in support of Amendment 292J in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. First, the category of person dealt with is easy to identify. Therefore, that is not an answer. Secondly, the evidence of the risk of future offending is compelling. That in relation to Wales is set out—I need not repeat it—in the report of the Commission on Justice that I chaired and there is masses of such evidence. Thirdly, the proposal is plainly value for money. One has only to look at the cost of what it takes to deal with those who have gone wrong. Fourthly—surprisingly, some may think—the proposal would have enormous public support. When we canvassed views about it, and when I did so as a judge, one always found that the overwhelming majority felt that these people deserved a chance and support.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sandhurst
Main Page: Lord Sandhurst (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Sandhurst's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I appreciate that the noble Baroness who moved the lead amendment in this group is concerned primarily with Amendment 78B, but perhaps I might be forgiven if I focus exclusively on Amendment 78A. This relates to the new clause, which would apply a minimum mandatory sentence of seven years to the offence of rape.
I am against this proposed new clause and think it profoundly wrong. I am against it for essentially two reasons. First, as one who has practised in the criminal courts for many years, I know that the offence of rape carries within it a very broad spectrum of culpability, from the most serious kinds of offence to ones significantly less serious. That should be reflected in the ability of the judge to impose the appropriate sentences.
Already a life sentence is the maximum that can be imposed. This takes me to my second point—that I really think the amendment is unnecessary. Anybody who goes to have a careful look at the guidelines published by the Sentencing Council as to how courts should approach sentencing for rape will come to the conclusion that public protection is already appropriately safeguarded. In fact, the spectrum of custodial sentences set out in the Sentencing Council guidelines is between four and 19 years. There is a whole host of considerations set out to assist the judge in determining what level of sentence should be imposed.
That takes me to the last point that I want to make. If you go to the Sentencing Council’s guidelines, as I am sure many of your Lordships have done, you will see a whole range of mitigating circumstances—as well, of course, as aggravating circumstances. Those mitigating circumstances are circumstances that a trial judge could take into account when imposing a determinate sentence of less than seven years. In the new clause proposed in Amendment 78A, nothing is said, for example, about what the consequences would be of remorse or contrition, nor about the making of an early plea, although that of course now attracts a mandatory reduction as a general proposition. Nothing is said about what happens if the defendant has been assisting the prosecution, nor about the time spent on bail. All those things are built into the sentencing guidelines of the council, but they do not appear in the proposed new clause.
If the amendment was to be accepted by your Lordships’ House, very considerable injustice would be done. I also happen to think that it is wholly unnecessary.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 78B, on the maximum sentence for disclosing the identity of sexual offences complainants. I understand the motivation for this amendment and agree with the sentiment underlying it. The current level is obviously inaccurate and inappropriate, but it should not be addressed in isolation. It is correct that the present provisions for dealing with disclosure need revision, as they were passed in 1992 and plainly directed at conventional print, radio and TV media, antedating the internet. For newspapers and TV stations, a fine is generally appropriate. Since 2015, a level 5 fine has meant an unlimited one, which could run to hundreds of thousands of pounds for a newspaper that does this either deliberately or inadvertently. But we all know that today a malicious individual can cause similar damage with a post on the internet, and imprisonment may well be appropriate.
These are serious sexual offences—I do not deny that at all—but there are other matters of great sensitivity that will not be covered by this; it could well cause offence and upset if they are not dealt with at the same time, and they should all be looked at as a whole. The ones that I pull out in particular are, for example, to be found in Section 71 of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. There is still only a fine if you disclose identity, when really it is a very sensitive matter—but, for historical reasons, it remains just a fine. So too if you disclose the name of someone involved in slavery—it is also only a fine—and so too with witnesses in the context of youth justice, which also results in only a fine. All those cases are dealt with in a magistrates’ court. Those things, which are all sensitive and difficult, would be better dealt with in the round. It might be that, for one category of offences, it was thought that the maximum sentence ought to be more than two years, and for others two years, but you want to look at them as a package and reach a considered decision.
This is a worthy amendment, in one sense, but it should not be pursued. Instead, I urge the Government to bring on the review with the Attorney-General that has been promised, really get cracking on it, and look at all offences of the unlawful disclosure of witnesses’ names. I am sure that, if the Government’s officials have time after Christmas, they could draw up a list of all those categories pretty swiftly and get on with it, so they are all dealt with as a whole. I call on the Minister to give appropriate assurances in that respect.
My Lords, I support the amendment. I am conscious that the Bill is on Report. This is a probing amendment, but it raises an important and pressing point. I hope I shall be short. I make four points.
If this offence is taken on its own, I think we would all agree that two years is plainly an insufficient maximum. Let us assume for these purposes that an offender comes before the court, is not a murderer and has not been a party to the death of any victim, but has had access to the bodies and has done what Mr Fuller did. It appears that he committed many offences of sexual penetration of corpses to which he had access by virtue of his employment. It may not be common, but we simply do not know what someone may do in the future. It is an appalling prospect, but we simply cannot exclude the possibility that a non-murderous necrophiliac might offend in a similar way. I suggest that we must do all we can both to deter and to punish in that event. If there is no murder but a large number of offences, is 10 years really too long a maximum sentence for someone such as Mr Fuller?
I talk about punishment because it is impossible to contemplate the horror of a relative who learns that their deceased loved one was defiled in this way. We as society owe it to such a relative, who is truly a victim, to show that we respect the dead and will mark such behaviour in a way that demonstrates that respect.
When I was approached by the noble Baroness to help her on this matter, I asked the Library to do some research. It very helpfully uncovered materials relating to the debate that took place in 2003. There was the Home Office’s consultation paper of July 2000, and section 8.6 addressed this issue. It disclosed that at that time, somewhat to the authors’ surprise, there was no offence that made necrophilia illegal. The consultation disclosed that there was
“no firm evidence of the nature or the extent of the problem”,
but agreed that
“human remains should be shown respect”
and noted that
“relatives and friends would be deeply distressed”.
In section 9.2, that consultation addressed sentences for a range of offences. From my reading of the Government’s response in November 2002—I do not criticise anyone for this—it appears that the authors at that point may have proceeded on the assumption that the offence would follow and be additional to a charge of murder or manslaughter. In other words, it was not looked at on the basis of a stand-alone sexual deviant.
If we are looking for a comparator, brief research has disclosed what happens in Canada, where the offence carries a maximum sentence of five years. I question whether even that is sufficient in the worst case, but I leave it to others to consider.
To conclude, this is a most unpleasant criminal offence. It must be reconsidered as a matter of priority. The current sentence for the stand-alone offence is simply too low. I urge the Government to address this with dispatch and not to delay once the immediate clamour over the Fuller case has died down. It is not difficult. It simply needs a suitably steep maximum sentence to mark its gravity.
My Lords, Amendment 78DA, moved by my noble friend Lady Noakes, is in regard to the maximum penalty for the sexual penetration of a corpse. I first place on record my shock and horror at David Fuller’s horrifying offending; my thoughts are with the victims and their families. I assure the House that the Government are committed to looking in detail at what happened in this appalling circumstance to ensure that it simply never happens again.
As we have heard, just this afternoon Mr Fuller has been sentenced to a whole-life term of imprisonment. An investigation into other aspects of his offending is ongoing. The House will understand why I will not comment on the sentence passed in this case, but I thank all those in the police, the CPS and the wider criminal justice system for bringing him to justice.
The Government have announced an inquiry into the events that occurred in hospitals in Tunbridge Wells. This will help us understand how the offences took place without detection in the trust, identify any areas where early action by the trust was necessary and consider wider national issues, including for the NHS as a whole. The Government have already made good progress in establishing the independent inquiry. I understand from colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care that the inquiry’s chair, Sir Jonathan Michael, has developed draft terms of reference already and will engage with the families on them in the new year before they are published.
As well as that inquiry, I assure the House that the Ministry of Justice is reviewing the existing penalties available for the offence of sexual penetration of a corpse. The statutory maximum penalty for that offence is, as my noble friend indicated, two years’ imprisonment.
I reassure your Lordships, however, that that is the statutory maximum penalty for one offence. Where the offence is sentenced alongside other offences, each offence will be sentenced individually. The overall sentence passed will therefore reflect the totality of the offending behaviour.
I also pay tribute to my noble friend’s work in supporting the inclusion of this offence when it was debated during the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It was created primarily to deal with a different circumstance—different circumstances were in mind at the time. The focus was on the situation where a murderer abuses the corpse of their victim after death, and it was therefore perhaps thought likely that those sentenced for this offence would, for the most part, be sentenced at the same time for another offence, such as murder—which of course carries a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment. As we have seen in the Fuller case, that is sometimes the case but may not always be so.
It is therefore right that, in view of this depraved—which is not a word I use often, but I think is appropriate in this context—and horrifying offending where we have seen an individual commit this offence independently of other offending in relation to that victim, we review the current statutory maximum penalty for the Section 70 offence. It may also be that this review, and the public inquiry into the offending in hospitals in Kent, will highlight other issues that need to be considered relating to the existing offences that deal with sexual abuse of corpses.
To be clear, I am not saying—I cannot this afternoon —that the Government will adopt the specific approach taken in this amendment, but neither do I rule out future changes to the maximum penalty. Rather, we are reviewing the maximum penalty in its context, and speaking with DHSC officials to ensure that learning from the inquiry into events in hospitals can be taken into account into our review of the penalty. That is the best way to reach a considered conclusion about how to amend Section 70 appropriately.
As to timing, the inquiry into the events at hospitals in Kent is due to publish interim findings in the new year, with the full report at a later stage. I will write to my noble friend, and place a copy in the Library, with any further information on the inquiry’s timescales as soon as that is available. Our review of the available maximum penalties is likely to follow a similar timescale, to ensure that findings from the inquiry can be taken into account in our conclusions. It is therefore important that we await the findings of the inquiry before amending the current legislation. I listened carefully to how my noble friend opened this short debate, and I therefore ask her formally to withdraw this amendment.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sandhurst
Main Page: Lord Sandhurst (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Sandhurst's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I begin by saying how grateful I am to my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford for the time that she has given me, and others, since the debate in Committee on 1 November and for bringing forward these amendments. Having said that, I have some observations to make, in particular about freedom of expression.
Events since the debate in November have made the need for proper regulation even more pressing. Since that debate, as we have heard, the Court of Appeal in Miller has stressed the danger of the chilling effect of police intervention on individuals minded to speak on controversial public topics. The president of the Queen’s Bench Division, in her very powerful judgment, said that the revised guidance published by the College of Policing, which was then before the court, did not
“go very far, or not nearly far enough to address the chilling effect of perception-based recording more generally.”
She emphasised that
“additional safeguards should be put in place so that the incursion into freedom of expression is no more than strictly necessary.”
Finally, she said:
“Guidance should truly reflect what the police are expected to do and should not mislead by omission either the police who have to use it or the public.”
At much the same time as that judgment was being written, a similar matter came before the court in Strasbourg—the case of Dr Pal. It was decided against the United Kingdom on 30 November 2021—just two months ago. Dr Pal, a journalist, was arrested, detained and charged with hate speech in respect of a person called AB. Only when it came to the magistrates’ court did the CPS abandon the prosecution. Dr Pal then brought proceedings for wrongful arrest, or false imprisonment. The Strasbourg court observed that the arresting officer’s decision to arrest
“appears to have been based on the subjective viewpoint of AB”—
that is, the complainant himself —
“without any acknowledgement of the fact that the right to freedom of expression extends to information or ideas that defend, shock or disturb.”
The court said that
“there is no evidence that the criteria … relevant to the balancing of the rights to freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life … were taken into account prior to the applicant’s arrest. In particular, no consideration appears to have been given to the subject matter … and whether they could be said to have contributed to a debate of general interest.”
In short, there have been two important decisions from very senior courts which have stressed the vital importance of paying proper regard to freedom expression and to the need for those in authority to understand and reflect that the right to freedom of expression extends to ideas that may shock or disturb others. There must be fresh guidance, it must reflect those observations, it must be clear and decisive—and it must be soon.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing her two amendments, which we welcome. It was fair of her to point out the legacy of the recording of non-crime hate incidents and the legacy of the Macpherson report on Stephen Lawrence’s murder. We welcome that the existing guidance will be turned into statutory guidance. I have one question for the Minister: what is the likely timetable for that statutory guidance to be available to be reviewed by Parliament?
On Amendment 114E in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, I have a genuine question, and this is not a party-political point: how would his amendment have an impact on domestic abuse cases? As I have said before to the House, I sit as a magistrate in both family court and the criminal court, and I deal with a lot of cases related to domestic abuse. While non-hate crime incidents are not recorded on the police national computer, we see information on call-outs and it is common to see information on text records between the parties, usually a man and a woman. Sometimes those text records go on for pages and are relentlessly abusive. How would that information be affected by his amendment?