Better Prisons: Less Crime (Justice and Home Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Thursday 12th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an illuminating debate on a most important report. I will come to the report shortly, but first I will address the five compelling and varied maiden speeches.

First, the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, comes with an exceptional career in the law behind her, and no doubt still ahead. I am sure she will, from what I have heard and read, give voice not just to the important interests of the City of London but to the interests of the vulnerable and of the arts.

Secondly, my noble friend Lord Redwood is an eminent parliamentarian of 36 years’ standing. He was astute to identify that failures in productivity in public service are a central issue today, as they have been for many years, not just in the field of prisons but across our society. He was right to stress the importance of quality and efficiency. We will all benefit from his experience and insight.

Thirdly, we had the noble Lord, Lord Babudu. He is the executive director of Impact on Urban Health, which works to develop the potential for cities to be healthier. His experience in that, and more particularly at the sharp end of knife crime, of which he told us a little, will give the House valuable insights, and we should listen to him.

Fourthly, we had the noble Baroness, Lady Davies of Devonport. She was a remarkable athlete and an Olympian of great distinction. She has built on that platform to campaign on and highlight, based on her own experience, the misuse and particular dangers of hormonal drugs, both in sport and for teenage health. Further, she understands the importance of a level playing field in all respects and the need to provide decent facilities for women prisoners. We will surely benefit from her experience and wisdom.

Last but not least, we had the noble Baroness, Lady Neate. She is the newest of our Cross-Bench people’s Peers. She will be a valuable addition, not least because she was the chief executive officer of Shelter, a charity of which I am a long-standing supporter. Her expertise in the important field of delivering legal services for social welfare will be valuable to this House, as will her work with Women’s Aid.

I turn to the report. I welcome the opportunity to speak on the Motion and acknowledge the hard work of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee in producing the Better Prisons: Less Crime report. I declare that I was a member of this committee until December 2024, and that I took part in the first stages of its evidence gathering. I congratulate its chair, the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, on not only his truly compelling speech today but his work as chair of that committee when I served on it.

The report—noble Lords will be glad to hear that I shall not attempt to address every facet of it—provides a stark account of a system under acute pressure and engaged too often in firefighting. I am grateful to the committee for laying out their recommendations so clearly. The consequences of doing nothing are real for us all: offenders, staff and the public. Something must be done.

Our prisons are now at a critical point—we all know that; we hear it too often, but they are strained to the point where their core missions of public protection and rehabilitation are compromised. Those conclusions mirror what has been reported by HM Inspectorate of Prisons. At times they go further. Overcrowding and violence are persistent realities and too many prisons are quite unable to provide regimes capable of reducing reoffending. Apart from locking people up to keep them away from us and keep us safe, prevention of reoffending is what prisons should be about. As my noble friend Lady Buscombe, in her elegant speech, showed by reference to what she had said over 20 years ago, in 2005, the political class in this country has failed to address the issues that this report brings to light.

I turn to the newish issue of Islamic extremism in prisons. Last year, the Conservative Party raised concerns about the threat posed by Islamist extremist inmates. We were not the only ones to do so, but it is an important issue. This followed violent attacks on staff by high-profile extremist offenders and evidence of organised radicalisation within the estate. Indeed, I myself asked a Question on this in this House. Islamist gangs inside prisons have held makeshift sharia-style trials and groomed vulnerable inmates. Some prisoners apparently seized power in certain wings.

That problem sits alongside other well-recognised safety problems, and these have to be tackled robustly. The Government and His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service must work better together as a united team. They must ensure that effective specialist counter-extremism units exist, and staff must be trained to identify and respond to radicalisation threats before they metastasise into actual violence. The attack in April 2025 at a separation centre, where extremist inmates used hot oil and improvised weapons against officers, was horrifying and underlines the urgency of this issue.

On reoffending and purposeful activity, the committee’s analysis of these issues—and we have heard other speeches from noble Lords on this—cannot be faulted. As for purposeful activity, the report is spot on. It rightly identifies and links lack of work, education and training with higher levels of self-harm, unrest and, most importantly for all of us, reoffending. The Government appear to recognise this. In their manifesto for the last election they pledged to

“work with prisons to improve offenders’ access to purposeful activity, such as learning, and ensure they create pre-release plans for those leaving custody”.

Much has to be done. There is a worrying new dimension. The Chief Inspector of Prisons recently stated that, in Manchester, 35% of prisoners were locked up all day. That is absolutely staggering and terrible.

On education, I was disappointed to read that independent watchdogs and monitoring boards, to which we should listen, have described seismic cuts to prison education provision. Some 300 education staff were recently made redundant—that is not the way forward. Reports indicate reductions in core classroom education of 25% across the country; in some prisons, the drop is as much as 60%. Governors have had to make teaching roles redundant and to slash the number of courses available, yet this Government have acknowledged that education is one of the most effective tools to break the cycle of offending. Something must be done; this must be put right. The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, was right to stress this and to draw on his own experience and expertise in this field. We want to stop reoffending—we all do.

The cuts here undermine the principles that we all support. Prisons should not be a revolving door into further criminality, as noble Lords have explained. Reduced education opportunities reinforce boredom and frustration, and they do not put people on the road to improvement. Too many people in prison have low or non-existent literacy and numeracy; that has to be addressed. It should be a core aim in prisons. It also, as we all know, makes violence more likely. People who cannot articulate in words turn to physical means. Cuts have left offenders without the skills to reintegrate into society. If our aim is to reduce reoffending then cutting education is at odds with that aim. The noble Lord, Lord Timpson, himself told the committee that he had walked past too many classrooms and workshops with no one sitting in them.

To turn to the issue of staffing, the Justice and Home Affairs Committee has underlined its alarm at the reductions. It has warned that they could jeopardise rehabilitation efforts and make reoffending levels harder to change. My noble friend Lady Bertin was absolutely right to stress the importance of recruitment and getting it right—recruiting enough of the right people in the right way and then keeping them. On staffing the evidence is unambiguous. Morale is low and experience is thin in key areas. Officers spend their shifts just trying to maintain order, with no time for purposeful engagement with prisoners—which is what we all want. Training reform must be accompanied by career progression improvements which recognise the professionalism of the job. Here I should mention the observations of my noble friend Lord Lucas. In his valuable contribution, he highlighted the importance of having the right governors in the right place for long enough, but not for overlong. From his experience in education, he stressed the value of mentoring. To conclude on the issue of staffing, we welcome the proposals for a Prison Service medal. I urge the Government to give this serious consideration.

Finally, I turn to accountability. The current independent inspection framework lacks effective enforcement powers when standards slip. Too many good recommendations from the Inspectorate of Prisons and independent monitoring boards are acknowledged but not then implemented. They lie in the shadows. The committee’s call for enhanced powers for inspectors and formalised collaboration between inspectorates must be taken seriously.

What matters now is for implementation reforms to work. We must prioritise education and training programmes, not cut them. We must support prison staff and not see them leave for better-resourced jobs. We must bolster the security and rehabilitation framework to deal with extremist threats concretely, consistently and effectively. We want a system that protects the public and gives those who can be reformed a genuine chance to go on to live a crime-free life.

This experienced committee’s report contains many wise recommendations—I can touch on only a few core points. The Government must now act on them. They have accepted the recommendations and we want action. I urge members of the committee to check on delivery. I hope that, in a year’s time, they will be asking questions in the House if this has not happened.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sandhurst]

48: Schedule 2, page 22, line 6, leave out from “in” to end of line 13 and insert “Schedule 6A.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment broadens the cohort to whom Section 35 (victims’ rights to make representations and receive information) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 applies to include any victims listed in Schedule 6A. It also probes the rationale behind the three part categorisation of crimes in Schedule 6A.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 48 to 54, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, concern the operation of the victim contact scheme and the new helpline provisions introduced by the Bill, and in particular the Government’s decision to structure eligibility around the three-part categorisation of offences in new Schedule 6A. We welcome the Government’s intention to expand access to information for victims. The extension of the victim contact scheme and the creation of a statutory helpline represent important recognition that the victim should not be left in the dark about the progress, release or supervision of those who have harmed them. But the detail matters, and it is the detail of Schedule 6 that these amendments probe.

Amendments 48 and 49 address the decision to confine the statutory rights under Section 35 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 to victims of offences listed in Parts 1 and 2 of new Schedule 6A and subject, in the case of Part 1, to a specified custodial threshold. Amendment 48 would align Section 35 more broadly with new Schedule 6A as a whole, and Amendment 49 probes why the current drafting draws the line where it does. Noble Lords will have seen that new Schedule 6A divides offences into three parts. Victims of Part 1 offences qualify when the offender receives

“a sentence of imprisonment … for a term of at least the specified … length”.

Victims of Part 2 offences qualify without that same threshold. Other offences are treated differently still.

The question before us today is: what is the principled basis for this threefold division? For example, Part 1 includes crimes such as wounding with intent to cause GBH, rape, aggravated burglary, abduction and child sex offences. Part 2 includes crimes such as stalking, coercive behaviour and putting people in fear of violence. It seems to us wrong that the latter list of offences does not include a custodial threshold for eligibility for the victim contact scheme, but the first list of offences does include such a threshold. The Minister said on Monday that use of the victim contact scheme is available for the “most serious cases”. Why, then, should the victim of, say, child sexual offences or abduction whose offender did not receive a sentence of imprisonment for a term of at least the specified sentence length be ineligible for the victim contact scheme? Following the Sentencing Act and subsequent reforms that were debated in this House, we have seen, and will continue to see, a marked shift in the sentencing landscape. Fewer people will receive immediate sentences of imprisonment, and sentences will be shorter.

First, the automatic presumption for suspended sentences will mean that many offenders guilty of crimes under Part 1 of the new schedule—wounding with intent, rape and so on—may receive suspended sentences. That will make their victims ineligible for the victim contact scheme. This, frankly, is an insult to victims and the public. Part 1 is a shopping list of serious crimes for which there should be no restrictions on victims’ eligibility for the victim contact scheme.

Secondly, under the Sentencing Act, the majority of offenders will be released after just one-third of their sentence. The practical consequence is that far more offenders than now are to be subject to supervision outside custody. That shift makes the victim contact scheme more, not less, important. The scheme is not a mere information line. It allows victims to make representations regarding licence conditions and, where they apply, parole decisions. In a world in which release and supervision decisions affect more and more cases, the ability of victims to engage meaningfully with those processes becomes essential to maintaining confidence in the system.

The noble Lord, Lord Timpson, stated that the Sentencing Act will more or less double the number of people being tagged. That will mean that at least double the number of victims will want to engage with the victim contact scheme. Faced with these facts, it is difficult to see why eligibility should depend so rigidly on whether an offence falls into Part 1 or Part 2, or whether a custodial sentence crosses a certain line.

From the perspective of the victim, the impact of the offence is not measured in statutory parts or sentencing thresholds. If the offender is subject to release conditions or to supervision in the community, the victim may well have legitimate concerns about notification, exclusion zones or contact restrictions. Those concerns do not disappear simply because the sentence imposed fell just a little below the specified sentence length.

Amendment 50 turns to the new helpline. The Government have rightly recognised that some victims fall outside the formal victim contact scheme but nevertheless need access to information. The helpline is intended to fill that gap. However, as the Bill is drafted, it is still limited by reference to the categorisation in new Schedule 6A. If the purpose of the helpline is to provide a route for victims to obtain basic information about the offender’s custodial or supervisory status, why should it not extend to all victims of offences listed in new Schedule 6A? If Parliament has already determined that those offences merit inclusion in new Schedule 6A, what is gained by further subdividing access to information within that list?

Amendments 51 to 53 similarly address the exclusion of victims whose offenders are serving suspended sentences. As matters stand, victims whose offenders are serving suspended sentences or community orders may not fall within the scope of the helpline in the same way as those whose offenders are in custody. Yet, arguably, it is precisely in such cases that victims will have acute and immediate concerns. An offender not in custody but serving a suspended sentence or community order remains in the community; the victim may live nearby. The potential for proximity, breach or renewed contact is real, not nugatory.

I once again point out that it is government policy that the presumption for most of the offenders for whom this clause is relevant will be to receive suspended sentences. This automatically means their victims will not be able to access the helpline. If the Government are going as far as to legislate for a helpline, it should reflect the realities of modern sentencing. The distinction between custody and community supervision is no longer as clear-cut in terms of risk or impact. This is the result of the Government’s own legislation. A victim whose offender is under probation supervision in the community has every bit as much interest in knowing the conditions imposed and the mechanisms for enforcement as one whose offender is in prison.

Finally, Amendment 54 probes the question of accountability. The Bill places duties on providers of probation services to take reasonable steps to provide information to victims about release, licence conditions and other relevant matters. That is welcome, but what is to happen if a victim believes that those reasonable steps have not been taken? It is not clear from the legislation what mechanism exists for review or appeal. Probation officers increasingly exercise functions that have a quasi-judicial character, particularly in relation to the formulation and management of licence conditions. This is once again due to the Sentencing Act.

Where discretion is exercised, there should be some form of oversight. Amendment 54 proposes a modest and practical solution: that where a victim is dissatisfied, there should be a route to seek reconsideration by a senior probation officer. The Government no doubt accept that the existence of an appeals process is important. Indeed, it is a fundamental element of our judicial process. It does not seem right, therefore, that probation officers, who are already subject to fewer checks and balances and less public scrutiny, should be shielded from an appeals process concerning their decisions.

These amendments ask the Government to explain the rationale behind the categorisation in new Schedule 6A, and to consider whether access to the victim contact scheme and helpline should better reflect the contemporary sentencing landscape. If we are serious about placing victims at the heart of the justice system, access to information and participation cannot depend on seemingly arbitrary distinctions. I beg to move.

[The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)]

My Lords, I should inform the House that, if Amendment 48 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 49 by reason of pre-emption. Also, if Amendment 50 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 51 to 53 by reason of pre-emption.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity of setting out the Government’s position. Our approach is carefully considered. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to make party-political points out of this by using language such as “insult to victims”, particularly when, in relation to the principal part of his argument, he is just plain wrong.

The starting point is that we must prioritise public funds to ensure that they go where they are most needed. We have done this by providing proactive support to those victims where the court has imposed a longer sentence, because a longer sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence. Of course we recognise that all victims of crime will want information about the offender in their case. For that reason, we are introducing a new route for all victims—the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is quite right about this—to request information via a dedicated helpline.

This is why new Schedule 6A is in three parts. Part 1 ensures that the most serious cases, involving victims of violent, sexual, and terrorism offences where the defendant has been sentenced to a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, can receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.

Part 2 ensures support for victims of stalking and harassment offences, regardless of sentence length. We recognise that, even where there is a short sentence, this cohort of victims needs and will receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.

I am just trying to ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, can hear the information I am giving him back, because we think that what the noble Lord said is not right, so I thought he might be interested in hearing what I have to say about it.

Part 3 ensures that victims of other sexual and violent offences, and breach offences linked to violence against women and girls, will be able to get information through the helpline should they request it, including for those offences in Part 1 where the sentence for the offence is less than 12 months. We consider that this is the right place to draw the line, but we will keep eligibility under review to make sure that we are reaching the right victims.

The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences, and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either service. The Bill also includes a discretionary power that enables victims of any offence, where the offender is serving a sentence of imprisonment, to be provided with either service, where they request it and probation deem it to be appropriate.

The victim contact scheme and the victim helpline will apply only where there is a custodial sentence. That is not only because of the consideration of public funds but because the information provided via these routes, such as the date of release on licence and conditions of licence, self-evidently does not apply unless there has been a custodial sentence. Where a suspended or community sentence is imposed by the court, under the victims’ code, the police witness care unit will explain the sentence to the victim.

Finally, regarding Amendment 54, I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that there is already a route for victims to request a senior probation officer review of a decision about what information to provide, so this is already catered for. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I addressed this at some length in opening. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Minister for correcting my errors. I shall add nothing more. I am also grateful for the Minister’s explanation of how—she hopes, at least—this will work in practice. On that basis, I shall withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 48 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Sandhurst]

58: Before Clause 8, insert the following new Clause—
“Functions of Commissioner: protecting those assisting victims of crime(1) Section 49 (General functions of Commissioner) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (1)(a) insert—“(aa) take such steps as the Commissioner considers appropriate to support or protect individuals who act in good faith to assist victims of crime, where those doing so promote the interests of victims and witnesses or encourage good practice in the treatment of victims and witnesses.”(3) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (1)(aa), steps taken by the Commissioner may include reporting, making recommendations, or consulting with relevant authorities regarding individuals who assist victims to promote good practice and victim protection.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the Victims’ Commissioner may take discretionary steps to support individuals who assist victims of crime, as part of their statutory role promoting the interests of victims and witnesses.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 58, 59 and 60 are intended to strengthen the role of the Victims’ Commissioner. They would ensure that the commissioner can more effectively promote the interests of victims and witnesses and respond to cases that have wider public policy relevance.

Amendment 58 clarifies that

“the Victims’ Commissioner may take discretionary steps to support individuals who assist victims of crime”.

The amendment was brought about following the recent case of Mark Hehir, the bus driver who courageously intervened to prevent one of his passengers being the victim of theft. His actions were nothing short of heroic. He placed himself at real risk to protect passengers and members of the public. His decisiveness in a high-pressure situation should be applauded. Public recognition of his bravery has been strong. A petition in support of him gathered over 140,000 signatures. This demonstrates the widespread view that those who act courageously to protect others should be commended and supported, not left vulnerable to professional or personal consequences. The case highlighted the gaps in protections for citizens who step in to assist victims. Ordinary people who act responsibly should not face penalties or career repercussions for doing the right thing.

Amendment 58 would go some way to addressing that gap. By explicitly allowing the Victims’ Commissioner to support individuals who assist victims, the amendment would ensure that the commissioner can take discretionary action in cases of public significance, such as providing advice, engaging relevant agencies or highlighting best practice. The amendment represents a practical safeguard for citizens such as Mr Hehir and a clear statement that society values and protects bravery and civic responsibility. If individuals such as Mr Hehir do not deserve protection, it is difficult to see who does. This is about recognising heroism and ensuring that those who intervene to protect victims are not left unsupported.

Amendment 59 proposes the removal of the statutory restriction that currently prevents the Victims’ Commissioner exercising functions in relation to an individual victim or witness. We welcome the expansion of the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers in Clause 8, but would like to understand why the Government have included a restriction to the expansion. By removing the restriction entirely, the amendment would ensure that the commissioner can intervene in such cases without procedural or statutory impediment.

It is important to stress that this amendment does not seek to replace existing complaints mechanisms; nor does it transform the commissioner into a case-by- case complaints handler. Instead, it would empower the commissioner to identify and address systemic issues revealed through individual cases, providing a crucial bridge between personal experiences and broader improvements in policy or practice. In doing so, it would strengthen the commissioner’s statutory remit to promote the interests of victims and witnesses rather than limit it.

Amendment 60 takes a more targeted approach, should the Minister oppose Amendment 59. It seeks to limit the restriction on the Victims’ Commissioner exercising functions in individual cases to circumstances where there are ongoing criminal proceedings. This would strike a sensible balance, preserving the integrity and independence of live judicial proceedings while allowing greater engagement with victims and witnesses outside the live court processes. By doing so, it would ensure that the commissioner’s statutory role in promoting the interests of victims and witnesses is meaningful and practical rather than being constrained by overly rigid restrictions.

Amendment 60 seeks to allow the Victims’ Commissioner to request information from agencies, to monitor how individual cases are handled and to promote good practice where lessons from a single case could benefit other victims or witnesses. It would maintain the commissioner’s ability to drive improvements and to highlight systemic issues, without creating any conflict with ongoing judicial processes.

These amendments are designed to enhance the Victims’ Commissioner’s role in supporting victims and witnesses, to ensure that individual cases can inform systemic improvements, and to promote best practice. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)]

My Lords, I inform the Committee that if Amendment 59 is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendment 60 by reason of pre-emption.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government firmly believe that the Victims’ Commissioner—I have known the current occupant of the role for many years and have the utmost regard for her—has a crucial strategic role in representing the interests of victims and the witnesses of crime and anti-social behaviour.

Amendment 58 would significantly widen the commissioner’s remit by requiring her to support and protect individuals who assist victims. Of course, we agree that the work of those who dedicate their efforts to supporting victims is crucial, but the proposed widening of the Victims’ Commissioner’s statutory functions would, in the Government’s view, dilute the fundamental purpose of the Victims’ Commissioner; that is, to promote the interests of victims and witnesses themselves. In fact, the commissioner’s statutory function of promoting the interests of victims and witnesses already allows her to work with and support those who themselves support victims, and she does not need an explicit statutory function to continue with that.

Since the definition of “those assisting victims” could be interpreted broadly, this amendment also risks heavily extending the casework burden that would be imposed by the two other amendments, to which I now turn.

The Government have already brought forward Clause 8, which proposes to amend the existing statutory limitation on the exercise of the commissioner’s functions in relation to individual cases to allow her to exercise her functions in relation to cases that indicate a wider systemic issue. But Amendments 59 and 60 would go further—either entirely removing or narrowing the existing limitation. We understand the amendments to be creating an alternative. We do not believe that this is the right approach and consider that our carefully designed Clause 8 achieves the right balance.

The Victims’ Commissioner is not a complaints body, and it is important to maintain this distinction. Her role is to advocate for victims as a group and to address system-wide issues—that is what Clause 8 does. It is up to her to decide which cases she believes create those system-wide issues.

Individual victims already have a clear escalation route through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman if they are dissatisfied with their experience of the criminal justice system. Expanding the commissioner’s involvement in individual casework to this extent would shift his or her role towards handling complaints rather than overseeing the system as a whole.

It is also vital that decisions of the judiciary and other independent public bodies that support victims of crime remain free from external influence. The current legislative bar, and the amendment to it that we have proposed through Clause 8, safeguards that independence and avoids any uncertainty about the commissioner’s role in such processes. We do not believe that Amendments 59 or 60 achieve that.

The point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she has raised and discussed with me before on the many occasions on which we have now met—obviously, I look forward to many more—is a good point and one that we need to keep under review. Perhaps the noble Baroness and I can discuss it further the next time we meet. As I say, I very much look forward to that.

I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, agrees that preserving the Victims’ Commissioner’s strategic function is essential to holding the system to account effectively, and I invite him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I listened with interest to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, had to say, and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I encourage the Minister to listen with care to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said and perhaps to move our way on certain aspects.

Dealing with Amendment 58, the law should not leave people such as Mr Hehir exposed to detriment for acting courageously. It may be that the Victims’ Commissioner is not the right person, but we put this forward in the hope that it would allow consideration of what to do in such situations. The amendment sends a clear message that civic responsibility and bravery should not be met with silence or indifference on the part of authority.

Amendment 59 would remove the restriction on individual cases. We appreciate that the commissioner has a strategic role to promote the interests of victims and witnesses generally, but that cannot be done effectively if individual cases are placed beyond reach. We accept that Clause 8 enables the commissioner to act in cases relevant to public policy, and we are grateful for that, but individual cases often reveal systemic failings. Removing the restriction entirely would enable oversight and the identification of patterns that will require reform. If we are serious about learning lessons, we suggest that the commissioner should be able to look at cases from which those lessons arise, but do so with discretion.

If the Minister considers that Amendment 59 is too broad, Amendment 60 would provide a possible balanced alternative. It would preserve the integrity of live criminal proceedings, it would allow engagement in individual cases once proceedings have concluded, and it would ensure that the commissioner can examine outcomes, seek information and promote improvements without interfering with the courts. It reflects a sensible constitutional boundary.

In summary, these amendments would not unduly expand the commissioner’s role but would clarify and strengthen it. They would ensure that individual experiences inform systemic reform and that statutory restrictions do not undermine the purpose of the office itself. A Victims’ Commissioner who cannot meaningfully engage where necessary with individual cases is constrained in fulfilling the commissioner’s core duty.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

The noble Lord seems to be suggesting that the Victims’ Commissioner does not now engage with individual cases. My understanding is that she very much does, but to feed towards her statutory role. That is quite different from getting involved in the minutiae of an individual case, supporting a victim or witness and promoting that individual’s interests.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, there is clearly a balance to be struck. I think we should, as we go forward, because we all have the same interests at heart here, look carefully at whether there will be occasions when the commissioner should look at individual cases, not so much to interfere but to draw on the information that can be gleaned from them and use them in setting policy. With that said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 58 withdrawn.

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Debate on whether Clause 11 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 11 stand part of the Bill. This clause seeks to extend the right to prosecute to those with different qualifications from solicitors or barristers.

As my noble friend Lord Gove highlighted at Second Reading, the Crown Prosecution Service faces constraints in whom it can employ, and the criminal Bar is facing a retention crisis. Last year, a national survey by the Criminal Bar Association found that one in three criminal barristers intends to quit. It is obviously crucial that we have enough Crown prosecutors for cases, and we fully appreciate on this side the challenge that the Government face. However, I do not believe that this clause is an appropriate solution. Rather than carefully addressing the causes of those pressures and looking for proper solutions, this clause simply moves the goalposts. It redefines who is qualified to undertake what is highly serious work. That is not good enough.

While it has been argued that allowing CILEX members to prosecute will help to increase diversity, this argument should not be used as a smokescreen for what could potentially dilute standards. I dare say that is not what those truly calling for diversity want either, on their part. Genuine diversity in the legal profession is not achieved by lowering thresholds or by altering qualifications to fill gaps. It is achieved by facilitating pathways and by supporting structures within the profession, so that people from all backgrounds can succeed on an equal footing. To suggest otherwise risks turning diversity into a box-ticking exercise. It does not demonstrate an authentic commitment to broadening access to the profession.

We cannot risk lowering the quality of prosecution. This would not be fair on the defendant, and certainly not on the victim, and it is definitely not in the long- term public interest. Victims and defendants rely on the competence of the prosecutor. A victim must have confidence that their case is being handled by someone who is suitably qualified. Those who prosecute murders today will some years ago have prosecuted in the magistrates’ courts; they start at the lower level and they move up, gaining their experience moving from level to level as proportionate to their skills.

A defendant whose liberty may be at stake is entitled to proper assurance. These are not minor concerns; they go to the heart of our justice system. More widely, any weakening of our standards risks undermining public confidence in the justice system as a whole and weakening the supply, I suggest, of future prosecutors of serious crime. Can the Minister please explain what assessments were undertaken previously of the impact of this proposed change?

If we are to expand the pool of prosecutors, we must be absolutely sure that this shift is backed by sufficient evidence of good quality, and that any necessary safeguards are in place to ensure that standards will not drift or diverge over time. The Committee deserves clear evidence that this reform will enhance, and not diminish, the quality of prosecutions. We have not been shown that evidence. Without it, this clause risks creating more problems than it solves. I urge the Minister please to reflect carefully on these concerns and to ensure that any change to the thresholds is supported by robust, transparent evidence and proper safeguards. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make one or two brief observations about this, if I may. First, I must declare an interest, in that about 10 years ago I was made an honorary vice-president of CILEX. In case it is thought that I am speaking with the interests of CILEX in mind, I wanted to make that absolutely clear.

My first observation is this: the transformation of the way in which the legal profession operates and its financial position has been enormous over the last 20 or so years. Sometimes, I think we forget the huge difference there is in remuneration for those who practise in areas such as commercial and administrative law and those who practise in the criminal sphere. This is having a very serious effect on the ability.

How that problem is solved is a matter for Her Majesty’s Government, not for me, but it seems to me that, in looking at what the state can afford, it is necessary to look at the way in which an organisation such as CILEX has transformed itself, the qualifications that are given and the reality of many cases. As a judge, one sometimes feels that the best experience for being a good prosecutor is having done a lot of prosecutions, not necessarily where they had a first-class degree from a great university or whether she had done extremely well in the solicitor’s or Bar finals; experience is important.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain a sufficient number of qualified Crown prosecutors. We suggest that Clause 11 supports this aim by increasing the CPS’s recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors. It is axiomatic that a shortage of Crown prosecutors adds to the backlog because it cannot make decisions quite as quickly about prosecutions as it could if there were more of them.

Currently, the Crown Prosecution Service is restricted in who it can appoint as Crown prosecutors due to an unnecessary legal requirement. This is set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold what is known as the general qualification. The general qualification is a term of art, having a very specific meaning in this context. It means that a prospective Crown prosecutor must have

“a right of audience in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts”,

even though most of those rights of audience—for example, before the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—are never going to be exercised by a Crown prosecutor in a million years.

This requirement can exclude certain qualified legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners—from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—who have relevant criminal practice rights but are prohibited from becoming Crown prosecutors. These legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners, often hold the right skills and specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including having rights of audience for the courts in which they will actually appear, as opposed to rights of audience for the courts in which they will not, but they do not meet the general qualification criteria. This restriction limits the DPP’s ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent and reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.

The purpose of this clause is to remove the requirement for the general qualification and, in doing so, give the DPP the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. I can reassure the Committee that the removal of the general qualification requirement will not in any way dilute professional standards; there are appropriate safeguards to preserve standards.

Prospective professionals eligible to be a Crown prosecutor who do not at the moment hold the general qualification must still meet the authorisation requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007—they have to be appropriately qualified, authorised and regulated, and be able to exercise rights of audience and conduct litigation, both of which are reserved legal activities under the Act. It is a criminal offence under the Act to carry out reserved legal activities unless entitled to do so.

In addition, it is important to note that the measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional. Instead, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the DPP’s control. The DPP will retain full discretion over appointments, ensuring that only suitably qualified and experienced individuals become Crown prosecutors. Newly eligible professionals must meet the same Crown prosecutor competency standards as those who qualify through more traditional routes. I also emphasise that those appointed following this change will, like all Crown prosecutors, be subject to performance monitoring by the CPS, including case strategy quality assessments focused on the application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.

This change reflects the modern legal services landscape, spoken to powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common, where professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing this unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause may also support the recruitment of a diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors.

I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has ever met any CILEX practitioners; I certainly have, and they are an amazing cohort of people. I am sure he absolutely did not intend to suggest that somehow those who have qualified through an alternative route are, by very definition, less competent than those who have gone through the traditional route. If that is the suggestion, then it is not one this Government can support. I therefore hope that the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 11 to stand part of the Bill and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition to it.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. At the heart of it lies the underfunded state of our criminal justice system—something which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has highlighted. Looking forward, the criminal justice system needs more money and the prosecution service needs proper funding, as of course do those who defend in the criminal courts; but Clause 11 does propose a significant shift, extending the right to prosecute to individuals who do not hold the long-standing qualifications of solicitors and barristers. I cast no aspersions on CILEX, but I make that observation. There is a difference in their training and educational background. This clause will expand capacity, there is no doubt about it—and there is no doubt that the system requires it, for the reasons that others have outlined in this debate—but it will not address the underlying cause of problems faced in the criminal courts. We must not go down a route which results in weakening of standards, undermining of public confidence, and unfairness to victims and witnesses involved in the criminal courts.

A central issue remains the absence of clear evidence in support of Clause 11. We have sought clarity from the Minister on what assessments were undertaken on the impact of this change, whether risks to standards were considered, and whether safeguards are in fact in place to maintain standards over time. Without clear evidence, Parliament cannot truly judge whether the proposed reform protects the quality of prosecutions. We must not embark on a position where there are unclear professional boundaries and variations in training and oversight.

We recognise the pressures facing the criminal justice system and the need for more good people to embark on careers in the criminal courts, whether in defence or in prosecution; in this case, we are talking about prosecutors. We share the desire for a stronger, more resilient system, but Clause 11 does not, we suggest, properly address the causes of these pressures. We urge the Minister to reflect carefully on the concerns which I have raised and to consider whether Clause 11 provides the assurance and evidence that this House, our justice system and, indeed, victims deserve. That said, I will not pursue my opposition.

Clause 11 agreed.

Debate on whether Clause 12 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 12 is an exception to the many provisions of the Bill that we support. It concerns the recovery of costs in private prosecutions. On its face, it may seem a minor and rather technical amendment, but in substance Clause 12 represents a significant shift in long-established policy and practice. It has serious implications for access to justice, particularly for victims of fraud and economic crime.

Private prosecutions should be regarded as a safeguard, rather than an anomaly, in our criminal justice system. Such prosecutions exist precisely to ensure that, where the state cannot or does not act, victims are not left without recourse. Private prosecutions are conducted in the criminal courts and are subject to the same judicial oversight, obligations of disclosure and prosecutorial duties as any other prosecution. Judges retain full control throughout, and the Crown Prosecution Service retains its power to take over cases where it considers that to be appropriate. For many years, Parliament, Ministers and the courts have recognised that private prosecutions serve a public interest. That is why the current costs regime allows courts to order payment from central funds for reasonable sums properly incurred by private prosecutors. This payment is not a windfall. It is simply reasonable compensation for costs already borne, and even then recovery is typically partial and not complete.

It is our strong belief that Clause 12 would change that settlement fundamentally. It gives the Government power through regulations to cap the recoverable costs of private prosecutors. In so doing, it risks making many legitimate prosecutions financially unviable. That is particularly so for charities and other public interest bodies which pursue cases only after other routes have failed. This would represent a sharp departure from previous ministerial policy.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I listened with interest to the Minister. I remain of the view that private prosecutions are a constitutional safeguard for when the CPS is unable or unwilling to act. There remains the position of charities and there remains the position of corporations and other organisations trying to protect their intellectual property by exercising perfectly lawful prosecutions. The example given of the costs in a particular case is not really helpful, as we do not know the details. It is the sort of things that we would have had detail of had there been a proper consultation first, and we would not have one cherry-picked example given to us.

That said, I remind the Committee that what we are looking at here is £3.9 million—not a lot. It is not a small sum, of course, but it is not a large sum in the context of the criminal justice budget. My concerns have not been put to rest but, in the circumstances, I shall not occupy any more of the Committee’s time. I beg leave to withdraw.

Clause 12 agreed.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her eminent supporters for bringing forward these amendments, and to all noble Lords for their contributions in respect of Amendments 61 and 62. I think I can deal with Amendment 61 quite shortly. We have had powerful and compelling speeches on the amendment from its proposers. It seeks to remove a presumption that a computer and software system on which a prosecution relies is working and reliable. We all know what has prompted this: the terrible Post Office scandal.

It is absolutely plain that prosecutors must no longer be able to rely on the systems being necessarily in working order as evidence for the purpose of criminal cases. The Government have had long enough now—and officials even longer than this Government—to look at this problem. If they have not, they have been prodded with a sharp stick by these amendments, and I am confident that, prodded with that sharp stick, they will come up with a solution. They will have to do so by Report, because otherwise I think this amendment will be carried then. I need not say any more.

Amendment 62 proposes a new clause to prevent an overreliance on a person’s musical taste as probative of criminal proclivity or intent. On this side we agree that a person’s creative or artistic taste should not result in them being treated prejudicially by the judicial system. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon and Lady Chakrabarti, and others in support of this amendment.

We have some reservations about this amendment as it is currently drafted. We accept the good intentions behind it. We understand the danger it is designed to meet, namely that people are treated prejudicially for their creative and artistic tastes, and it is undoubtedly the case that those from particular backgrounds are vulnerable to this and may in effect suffer, or risk suffering, mistreatment in our courts. Against that, we fear also that the amendment might create other difficulties, creating genre-specific shields for certain evidence and thereby treating some expressions differently from others—in other words, shifting the balance too far and creating another class that is not protected. While we are sympathetic to this amendment, for those reasons we cannot support it.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I get to my feet with some diffidence, given the range of eminent speakers, many of whom I have the most utmost respect for, who have spoken in favour of this group of amendments. I start with Amendment 61 in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lord Beamish, my other friend, who is in fact also noble—the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot—and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. This is a powerful group, and I entirely accept what they say about the difficulties created when there is a presumption that a computer is working properly unless the defendant is able to produce evidence that it is not. That can create an enormous obstacle for defendants. It is extremely difficult to prove that something is not working in those circumstances, so I accept that. I also understand that what is sought here is to reverse that position and to take it back to the position of Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.

I have already discussed this briefly with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. The difficulty I have with this amendment is that it is extremely broad, and the problem with that is that, since Section 69 was introduced, what constitutes digital material has evolved significantly. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says that it is no answer to say that computers are everywhere, but I am afraid we have to be realistic about this. The computer evidence that is adduced in the criminal courts is, for example, the extremely complicated accounting software that is relied on by banks. That is at one extreme. But there is also the routine evidence that comes into criminal courts every single day, which can include text messages from mobile telephones, email chains, social media posts, DVLA printouts, medical records from GP surgeries and even criminal records themselves from the police national computer.

There is a real risk that if the amendment in this broad form were introduced, it could bring the criminal courts to a standstill. I know that is obviously not the intention, but I am concerned about whether there is a way of finding that we can limit it so that it excludes the routine use of computers—often things that people would not even think of as computers at all; the law recognises that a mobile phone is a computer, but most people would not think of it that way—and is limited to the cases that have caused real concern to those in your Lordships’ House, where a conviction is often based solely or mainly on the evidence of a computer. I can see a very different case to be made for that kind of evidence as well.

I entirely understand the intention behind this amendment, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Beamish and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for the work that they have done in relation to Horizon. It is humbling to stand here and talk about the Horizon victims and survivors and what happened to them, and I would not want anyone to think that the Government are not listening in relation to this.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I can be brief. I support Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. We have already spoken about the need for consistency across our justice system. That includes extending the powers to compel offenders to attend their sentencing in the Crown Court to magistrates’ courts. This amendment would also bring the periods in which a case can be discontinued into alignment; indeed, I am interested to see what justification exists for the difference between the two. We have heard a compelling speech also from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, with a particular example. I know that one should be wary of individual examples, but it is a compelling example and we should listen to it carefully.

Apart from making the system more consistent in its procedures, this amendment would allow prosecutors in the Crown Court to discontinue a case at a late stage, preventing unnecessary, costly and time-consuming trials. In the context of a court backlog and the need for efficiency, allowing this more flexible mechanism for bringing prosecutions to an end appears to us to be a measured and sensible improvement. To be clear, Amendment 63 still allows the option to reopen a case following a successful victim’s right to review request, if it is concluded that the CPS has made an error in stopping the prosecution. This amendment would not do away with this important scheme which is available to victims. We thank the noble Lord for his efforts and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I will start with a little trip down memory lane. In either 2010 or 2011, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, when sitting in the Court of Appeal, heard a case called Killick. That was a case where prosecution had been restarted and, as part of his judgment in relation to it, the noble and learned Lord said that the Crown Prosecution Service needed to come up with a system that would allow victims to challenge a decision not to prosecute, without them having to bring judicial review proceedings. As he may remember, I was the prosecutor who remade the decision to charge in that case and, as a result, the Crown Prosecution Service—under a certain Director of Public Prosecutions, who may be known to your Lordships in another context at the moment, and I, working as his principal legal adviser—devised the victims’ right to review scheme.

I wrote much of the legal guidance, so the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is correct when he says I know quite a lot about it. I am a huge fan of the victims’ right to review scheme, because although the Crown Prosecution Service is in many ways a completely wonderful organisation, everybody is human and sometimes people get things wrong—and when we get it wrong, we want to put it right. Obviously, a right is not a right unless it has a remedy attached to it, and that is a real problem in some of these cases. The noble Lord knows, because I discussed this with him when we met, that my practice when I was dealing with reviews of cases was always that if I took the decision to offer no evidence, I would write to the victim and say, “In 14 days I am proposing to do this, unless you want to make representations to me as to why I should not, or seek judicial review proceedings”. I completely get the issue here.

The only note of caution I will sound is this. It would be a substantial change, with wide-ranging implications for both victims and defendants. For that reason, it needs to be considered carefully, because discontinuing a case is not simply putting a pause into proceedings. Restitution requires fresh proceedings, starting back in the magistrates’ court, which risks delay and uncertainty for both victims and defendants. It does not go straight back into the Crown Court as a restart. That is why robust safeguards and controls, which are not in this amendment, are essential when making these decisions.

For example, in the magistrates’ court procedure, which this amendment seeks to replicate, the defence can refuse to accept a discontinuance and insist on no evidence being offered, or insist that the Crown Prosecution Service makes a decision as to what it is going to do. We are anxious to ensure that discontinuance is not, for example, used in the Crown Court as a way of getting an adjournment that would not be got under other circumstances, as in saying: “We don’t have enough evidence here. We need another three months to get it, so we’re going to discontinue and then restart”. That could create awful uncertainty, both for victims and defendants, as to what is going on. There are, for example, cases where somebody is a youth at the time they are charged and, if the case is then discontinued, they may then be tried as an adult later on.

I am not saying that I do not understand the problem or that this may not be part of the solution, but it needs to be considered carefully. What we plan to do is to consider this proposal further in the context of the wider court reforms and Sir Brian Leveson’s most recent report, with his recommendations for improving efficiency. I also welcome the expansion of the CPS pilot, strengthening victims’ voices before final decisions to offer no evidence are made. The outcome of that pilot will also inform our thinking. For the time being, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Sandhurst]

64: Clause 13, page 16, line 36, at end insert—
“(aa) in that sub-paragraph for “28” substitute “56”;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment increases the window for applying to the Unduly Lenient Sentences Scheme from 28 days to 56 days.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments concerns the terms of the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which we consider has too narrow a window to effectively allow for victims to reflect upon and review the sentences given to their offenders. Amendments 64, 65 and 66 aim to increase the existing 28-day window for applying to the unduly lenient sentence scheme to one of 56 days.

Similarly, Amendment 69, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to allow the 28-day time limit to be extended in exceptional circumstances. We thank the noble Baroness for this amendment. We on these Benches are very receptive to the idea of including an “exceptional circumstances” clause in the unduly lenient sentence framework. It is a safeguard that recognises that victims may, for one reason or another, not always be able to act within the current timeframe. Currently, there exists an asymmetry between offenders and victims. Offenders might be able to seek extensions or have certain deadlines adjusted, whereas victims are rigidly bound by the 28-day window. This amendment helps to address that imbalance.

The process of applying for review of a sentence is not one that can always be readily undertaken within four weeks. It requires a knowledge of the law that often requires the instruction and subsequent direction of a lawyer, which in and of itself is a process that can often take up to, if not beyond, the 28-day window that victims are given in which to appeal. Crucial to this process is the availability of the sentencing remarks, a problem which we have partially solved in the Sentencing Act by requiring their release within 14 days, but that occupies, none the less, half the time the Government currently offer to appeal a lenient sentence.

Perhaps the most effective case for change is a human one. Victims must face and relive the most traumatic events of their lives in court. They have to re-encounter their offender in some cases—not due to the current drafting of Clause 1, I accept—and in the cases we are concerned with, they have to deal with what they believe to be an unjust sentence.

An increase to 56 days is not a drastic one; it simply increases the window to two months, and it allows slightly more time for the process to be completed. We on these Benches are also open to the idea of a longer window to apply specifically for victims and, where they are murdered in cases of extremely serious crime, their next of kin. That may be for another day.

I turn to Amendment 72, which seeks to place a clear statutory duty on the Crown Prosecution Service to notify victims or, in the case of a deceased victim, their next of kin, of their right to request a review under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. At present, whether a victim is informed of the scheme can depend upon practice rather than principle. In some cases, of course, victims are advised promptly and clearly. In others, awareness depends rather upon chance, whether it is mentioned to them by their legal advocate or at some other time during the court process, or whether they independently discover its existence. That is not a satisfactory basis on which to safeguard a right of such importance, and particularly one that is time limited within a strict statutory window.

A right that expires after 28 days, or indeed 56 if our earlier amendments are accepted, is meaningful only if the person entitled to exercise it is made aware of it in good time, and before time starts to run. Without notification, the right is illusory at best. Amendment 72 therefore proposes a straightforward and practical safeguard; namely, the CPS must write to the victim, or their next of kin, within 10 working days of a sentence being delivered, informing them of their ability to seek a review. This is not burdensome. The CPS is already engaged with victims throughout the prosecution process. Contact details are held; communication channels should exist. This amendment simply makes notification consistent and mandatory. Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has the same aim as our amendment, albeit with a marginally different mechanism. I hope that we can work together to achieve this reform.

If we are to maintain a short and strict time limit for challenging unduly lenient sentences, the least that we can do is to ensure that victims are properly informed of that right. Without such a duty, access to the scheme may depend less on justice and more on happenstance. We trust our judges, but we know that even they are not infallible. Some will be more sparing with their sentences; some will be more certain in their own judgment and not feel the need to alert victims to the scheme. Others will simply forget on occasions. This should not be the case. The Government are very well equipped to create a system in which a letter is sent out, within 10 days, alerting victims of their right to apply for a review of the sentencing. They do it endlessly in other departments; it should be a seamlessly transferable process. All are equal before the law. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my two amendments in this group, Amendments 69 and 75, also make proposals for unduly lenient sentences, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has mentioned. From these Benches, we have been keen to improve the access that victims have to challenge what they believe is an unduly lenient sentence. I had amendments to try to achieve this in the Victims and Prisoners Bill in 2023-24.

It is worth pausing to review what has happened since 1988, when the ULS scheme started and victims were given the right to ask the Attorney-General to reconsider the sentence of their offender. One of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, concerns guaranteeing that victims are informed. Currently, the victims’ code places responsibility for informing victims about the ULS scheme on witness care units. For bereaved families entitled to the Crown Prosecution Service bereaved families scheme, the CPS should where possible, through the prosecutor and the trial advocate, meet the family at court following sentencing—if they attend the hearing—and inform them about the ULS scheme where appropriate. However, evidence from victims and bereaved families shows that this often does not happen, with many learning about the scheme only when it is too late to apply. By contrast, the offender and their legal representatives are present at sentencing and able to start planning any appeal against the sentence. In extenuating circumstances, the offender can also be given more than 28 days to launch their appeal. The offender also has post-sentence meetings with their legal representatives. It was clear then, and it remains so now, that the offender had and has more rights and support than the victim. This is not a level playing field.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. I am delighted that the Minister is in listening mode—I might win one at last.

Dealing with my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s points, I think the point is simply this: we certainly do not want to encourage victims down the road of hopeless applications which actually make things worse for them and make them more disappointed. Extending the time limit of itself does not do that; that is simply extending the time limit. Informing them properly does not do that, and the CPS could, I am quite sure, design a standard form letter which states the time limit for doing this but that the parameters —it would not use that word, obviously, but plain English —for an application are limited, so people should not raise their hopes. That would be the way forward.

I would be very happy to meet the Minister after the recess to discuss this. There is merit in the idea of guidance or guidelines—that seems attractive. We seem to be moving in the right direction, so that there might be an extension of time to 56 days and that the 28-day time limit on any basis might be extended where exceptional circumstances arise, and that on any basis there should be some mandatory obligation on the Crown Prosecution Service to notify victims of their right, and I hope that that would include next of kin in appropriate cases. I think that addresses everything. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 64 withdrawn.

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[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to be able to support my noble friend Lady Sater’s amendment. I have heard her express these views before, I heard her express them just now, and there is nothing more to be said. I urge this Committee to get on and agree with her.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sater, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for tabling Amendment 68. We agree with the principle that children who commit crimes should thus be charged as children, even if by the time of their court appearance they are above the age of 18. What matters is the mental state of the offender at the time the offence was committed, not the lottery of when he or she comes to court. The amendment seeks to ensure that there is no loophole preventing this being the case, and we therefore hope that the Government will agree with that aim.

Amendment 70 in my name concerns the collection and publication of data relating to offenders’ immigration history and status. This is a sensitive issue. Illegal immigration has long been a core political issue for voters and has become even more salient in recent years. There continues to be widespread misinformation and unfounded assertions, both in person and online. That is because empirical evidence concerning immigration has not always been readily available. People perceive changes occurring as a result of policy, but often operate under the assumption that the Government are shielding themselves from transparency. That is not the case, of course, but it must be dealt with.

Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than with crime rates. The public feel less safe, they see the demographic change and they link the two. This is problematic. It can lead to misguided opinions about certain parts of society. There is no available data to inform opinions of what the true position is. Non-governmental studies and disjointed data releases have repeatedly justified this connection, but the lack of clarification from the Government still leaves room for the general public to be decried as fearmongering or bigoted. It is not just policy: people deserve to know the impact that government policies are having on their everyday lives, especially when they can have immediate impacts on their safety.

We say that there is a clear case to publish crime data by immigration status. Accurate and comprehensive data allows for informed debate and evidence-based policy. At present the information is scarce, it is fragmented and it leaves the public, and indeed policymakers, reliant on conjecture. If transparency and open justice are priorities, to release offender data by foreign national status and immigration history would provide clarity, support public confidence and allow all sides to address the facts without speculation.

The Minister will be aware of the time we have previously spent on the topics in Amendments 71 and 74. Amendment 71 would exempt sex offenders and domestic abusers from being eligible for early release at the one-third point of their sentence, while Amendment 74 would reaffirm the Government’s policy of favouring suspended sentences but once again seeks to exclude sexual offences and domestic abuse from the presumption. Custodial sentences should of course by judged by the extent to which they deter reoffending. We accept the Government’s belief that short custodial sentences often do not serve this end, but reoffending cannot be the sole metric by which the nature of a punishment is decided. The prison system at least prevents individuals from offending while they are incarcerated.

For sexual offences and domestic abuse, these considerations are not abstract, certainly for the victims. Victims’ lives, safety, sense of security, the opportunity to reorganise their lives and perhaps move or otherwise change their way of living, are directly affected by whether an offender is at liberty or in custody. In 2019, the first year for which comparable data is available, there were 214,000 arrests for domestic abuse and 60,000 convictions, a conviction proportion of 28%. In 2025—six years later and under this Government—there were 360,000 arrests for domestic abuse but only 41,000 convictions, a drop from 60,000 and a conviction rate of just 11%. Something must be done.

The Government have highlighted the scale and seriousness of sexual offences and domestic abuse. They have described violence against women and girls as a “national emergency”. They have committed to strategies including specialist investigative teams and enhanced training for officers, and demonstrated recognition that these crimes demand careful handling. It would be inconsistent to promote such measures while making it easier for offenders of these crimes to avoid immediate custody.

This principle also extends to early release. It becomes a moral question rather than a purely empirical one when an offender has drastically altered the life of a victim by means of their crime. I do not think it reflects who we are as a society if we say that those who commit as invasive and exploitative a crime as sexual assault or domestic abuse should not serve the full extent of their sentences.

I end by saying I hope the Liberal Democrats will support these amendments. They have made it a point of principle, as have we, that victims of domestic violence deserve targeted measures to prevent them suffering further harm. Their justice spokesman in the other place, Josh Barbarinde, tabled a Bill last year to prevent domestic abusers from being released early under the Government’s SDS40 scheme. They now have a chance to put their principle into practice, as Amendment 71 would have exactly the same effect. I hope they will be able to offer their support.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with Amendment 68 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. She spoke passionately about this issue during the passage of the Sentencing Act and I pay tribute to her wealth of experience on this topic. As a former youth magistrate and a member of the Youth Justice Board, I have a lot of sympathy for the issues raised.

However, this amendment would radically change the youth justice landscape. As the noble Baroness knows, sentencing guidelines already make it clear that, when an individual is dealt with as an adult for crimes that were committed when they were a youth, they are to be sentenced as though they were being sentenced at the time that they committed the offence and not when they appear before the court. They also state that the courts have got to consider not only the chronological age of the offenders but their maturity and other relevant factors that remind the court they are not just mini-adults and need to be treated differently. Our position is that we remain concerned about the operational and legal complexity associated with a proposal like this. We are worried that we may not be able to achieve this during the passage of the Bill. However, I would like to speak to the noble Baroness, if she is willing to meet with me, and let us see what we can do.

Amendment 70, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, aims to place statutory duties on the Crown Court, HMCTS and the Secretary of State in relation to collecting and publishing data on sentencing. This Government remain committed to developing the data we publish on foreign national offenders. The Ministry of Justice has already taken action to increase transparency on the data published and, notably, in July, for the first time the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have signed all three of my noble friend Baroness Brinton’s amendments. I will not speak to them at any length. Amendment 38 prompts me to declare an interest, having been chair of the organisation Refuge for very many years. In connection with Amendments 43 and 44, it strikes me that there is quite a read-across between these and those we debated earlier on the response of a victim and how they are affected, and how an offender is prompted, under the amendments on appearance in court, to address what has happened. But it is not that read-across that I want to spend time on.

I was a member of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee and the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, has picked up one of its recommendations. Her amendment is a good deal more ambitious than the recommendation in our report, which just talked about the objective being to have victim navigators available in all cases. She is calling for rollout within six months, which strikes me as ambitious. Ambition is good.

The report was headed “evidence gathering”, and the evidence we heard was about assisting the police and getting best evidence. Through a friend who has been involved in assisting the police in a number of slavery cases, I realise how difficult this is. I will mention a couple of them. On one occasion a big police operation was set up to rescue people who were block-paving. It was almost impossible to hold any of the people who were the subject of this. They managed to keep one, despite all the preparation and all the common-sense, humane ideas, such as: do not just pull them into a room and start questioning them, but sit them down and say, “Would you like a glass of juice?” It sounds obvious, but apparently it was not entirely obvious. On another occasion, throughout the police interview a woman who was being prostituted was in touch with her “boyfriend”, who was telling her what she should be saying. How that could have got through, I do not know.

One of the things which prompted us to make this recommendation was that the then Minister who gave evidence seemed not to have heard of victim navigators. They are not the same as advisers who assist victims to cope with the process. There is obviously quite a lot of crossover, but they are very focused on the process and not just a support.

As the noble Lord has just said, and as we so often argue, a bit of investment could yield good financial results. That is one reason why victim navigators are a good idea. I believe there are only 11 at the moment. I pay tribute to Tatiana Gren-Jardan and Louise Gleich, who have been very much behind the scheme, and its success is in large part due to their own skills and input. It is also worth saying that it is not just about getting convictions; one of their achievements has been helping to repatriate victims who want safely to go back to their countries of origin. It is a great scheme, and it is up to the police to pursue it. So perhaps this is something for the MoJ and the Home Office, but I hope this debate can prompt some government support to forward the scheme.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this debate and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Goudie, for bringing forward the amendments.

Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, proposes a new clause that seeks to place a duty on relevant authorities to commission support services for caregivers of victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence or exploitation. The amendment would ensure that those with responsibility for the victims are not overlooked by the system and have access to the appropriate support. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response as to how the amendment could be delivered and might function in practice.

Amendments 43 and 44 would introduce new clauses concerning restorative justice. These build on the provisions in the Bill, better to enable victims to explain the impact of a crime to the offender and to participate meaningfully in the justice process. Some victims engage with restorative justice services, but such engagement must be voluntary. Victims should not be placed under any pressure to engage further with the offender. None the less, there are findings showing that these services reduce the likelihood of offenders reoffending and can result in other social benefits, including delivering value for money. We on this side are interested to hear from the Minister how the Government will ensure that services such as these are used where it is thought they are likely to be beneficial.

Amendment 45 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, seeks to implement the recommendation of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee that victim navigators be rolled out nationally so that they are available in all cases. In response to that recommendation, the Government stated in December 2024 that they want to build on the research of the previous Government on how best to support victims. In addition, the Government said they had met the NGOs delivering the victim navigator programme to understand its impact and to explore options for expansion. We have also heard an authoritative and persuasive speech from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, who obviously has real hands-on experience in this area. We should listen carefully to what he has to say, and I hope the Minister will speak to him and engage with him.

We look forward to hearing an update from the Minister on what further research has been undertaken and what conclusions the Government have reached since then. I reiterate my thanks to noble Lords for raising these important issues, all of which speak to the purpose of the Bill: to ensure that victims receive the support and services they deserve throughout their journey through the justice system.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

I shall speak first to Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Hamwee. While entirely understanding the motivation for the amendment, the Government believe that it would be neither necessary nor helpful to place a statutory obligation on certain authorities to commission certain support services for this cohort. In a world of finite resources, that would prioritise provision to third parties.

I reassure the noble Baronesses that the parents and carers of victims of abuse and exploitation can already access support services. The funding that the Ministry of Justice provides to the Rape and Sexual Abuse Support Fund and to police and crime commissioners can be, and is, used to commission specific support services for parents and carers.

Parents and carers will often access services that the victim themselves is accessing, particularly where the victim is a child. Parents and carers of victims of crime can also seek mental health support or other support through local services and the NHS. Having said this, I recognise that more can be done to support this cohort. As part of the violence against women and girls strategy, this Government has committed up to £50 million to transform support for victims of child sexual abuse through expanding the use of child houses. These are incredible places, as anybody who has had a chance to visit the one in London can tell you. They offer vital wraparound support to non-abusing parents and carers in one physical location. In addition, the Ministry of Justice has founded the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse to develop an online directory of support services for those affected by child sexual abuse. This can be easily navigated to identify services for parents and carers and other affected adults.

I turn now to Amendments 43 and 44 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton, Lady Jones and Lady Hamwee. This Government recognise the positive impact that restorative justice can have in appropriate cases and are very grateful to the restorative justice providers who continue to offer this important service. We agree that when delivered in the right circumstances restorative justice can improve victim satisfaction, reduce reoffending and bring benefits to victims, offenders and their communities. Under the current victims’ code, victims must be told about restorative justice services when reporting a crime, but we have been told that this may be too early—we are listening— and that is why under the new code consultation launched last week we are retaining this but have proposed an additional entitlement for the victim to be told about restorative justice again after an offender has been convicted. We look forward to engaging stakeholders during the code consultation.

Where services are available and victims and offenders are willing, referrals are already made, and that is supported through PCC-funded local services alongside our facilitation of restorative justice across prisons and probation. However, placing referral to restorative justice for all victims on a statutory footing, in our view, is neither necessary nor appropriate. Restorative justice self-evidently requires the consent and participation of both parties and the safety and welfare of those involved is paramount. Automatic referral is therefore not always suitable. For example, a victim of stalking who has fought tooth and nail to end all contact might understandably see the offer of restorative justice as, at best, insensitive and, at worst, a way in which the perpetrator in their case could continue their campaign.

The Government already monitor delivery. PCCs submit biannual reports as part of the MoJ grant management process, providing insight into victim support services, including restorative justice. Many PCC police and crime plans also set out clear commitments to supporting restorative justice. In our view, introducing a further national assessment would simply duplicate these existing measures. As we prepare for upcoming changes to the PCC commissioning model, we will explore changes to the delivery of victims’ funding, including restorative justice, to ensure that this is delivered in the best way in the future while avoiding unnecessary statutory requirements. For these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to not to press her amendments.

I turn now to Amendment 45 in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. We value the excellent work delivered by Justice and Care through its victim navigator programme. This Government are committed to ensuring that victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are supported to help rebuild their lives and to engage with the criminal justice system to bring those who have exploited them to justice. We recognise the positive impact that tailored support can have on securing victim engagement, and that is why we have already put provision in place across a number of areas important for supporting prosecutions. Adult victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are already supported by the modern slavery victim care contacts in England and Wales. That is where they have access to a dedicated support worker who will support them to help access legal aid, legal advice and legal representation and assistance during criminal proceedings.

The Home Office is also in the process of procuring the new support for victims of modern slavery contract for adults. To support child victims of exploitation and modern slavery, the government-funded independent child trafficking guardian service provides specialist modern slavery support and advocacy, across two-thirds of local authorities in England and Wales, to child victims and professionals who work with them. This includes help for the child to navigate the complexities of the criminal justice system. An invitation to tender for the national contract, which covers all of England and Wales from 2027, is currently live. Because of the existing provision, the Government do not consider it necessary to enact an additional statutory requirement to fund independent victim navigators, as this would duplicate the support services they have already put in place. I hope that, in the light of this, my noble friend will feel able not to press her amendment.

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[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I also put my name to Amendment 46, which was originally laid by Sarah Champion in the Commons; the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has spoken to it comprehensively, so I will not add anything to that. Instead, I will speak to Amendment 47 in my name, which, in many ways, is very closely related. Amendment 46 came through discussions with Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner; Amendment 47 comes through working with another organisation, the Marie Collins Foundation in Northern Ireland, which specifically works with child sex abuse victims who have been abused online.

Amendment 47 is an attempt to find, in essence, a clearer definition of what is harmful to CSA victims and, in a sense, to give the Government breathing space while they decide whether they need to go further and be clearer. Under the current CICS, a crime is considered violent only if it involves physical injury, the threat of immediate violence or a non-consensual sexual assault. To a large extent, that excludes online child sexual abuse.

There was a court case in 2023, where an individual called “RN” went to court against the CICA. The Court of Appeal in this case confirmed that online grooming may fall within the scheme where threats cause a child to fear immediate physical violence even if the threats are made remotely. However, the court also said that many online cases would still fall outside the scheme and that this can produce outcomes that are counterintuitive and unjust. It also made it clear—this is the reason for the amendment—that any broader clarification of coverage is a matter for Parliament and not for judicial interpretation.

What we are trying to achieve is to recognise exactly what this type of abuse is. It commonly consists of a combination of blackmail, coercion, threats and domination, which are, in effect, a combination of emotional and psychological abuse. It involves compelled actions, such as the creation and sharing of sexual images, livestreamed sexual activity, or other sexual acts directed by an offender against the child—all of which is online. It results in sustained fear, loss of autonomy and erosion of individual agency. It can also lead to long-term psychological harm, including trauma-related conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression and so on.

What we are trying to achieve is, first, to capture online-only child sex abuse cases where the nature of abuse is such that the conduct meets the scheme’s existing criteria for a crime of violence. Secondly, it seeks to operate within the existing legal framework by clarifying how violence is understood, rather than by redefining CSA or injury. Thirdly, it proposes to support consistent and workable decision-making by the CICA on online-only CSA cases, which is not the case at the moment. Fourthly, it would avoid creating any hierarchy of abuse by grounding eligibility in established scheme principles. Fifthly, and lastly, it would provide an interim pragmatic response, pending wider consideration of scheme reform.

I hope that the Government will look at the evidence, take on board what is happening and, in particular, as is often the case with online abuse, look at the scale at which this is increasing year on year, to see whether it is something that needs to be looked at more clearly and recognised in law for the harm that it is doing.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for bringing forward their amendments and helping to shape what has been a valuable debate about the issue of just compensation for victims.

Amendment 40, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, raises an important concern about how the victims of fraud, bribery and money laundering offences can be better compensated both domestically and abroad. Indeed, I have heard his arguments on more than one occasion before and never failed to be persuaded by them.

These crimes do not just inflict monetary loss on victims; they often involve sophisticated deception. They can cause significant psychological distress, emotional trauma and lasting insecurity. More widely, they undermine trust in our society, and so deserve the Government’s attention. The Government must look carefully at my noble and learned friend’s suggestions for a review. It could be important and beneficial for the City of London, as a centre of finance of worldwide renown. If we can take the lead on this, that would be an encouragement to people to do business here.

This brings me to Amendment 67, in my name. I should say that a gremlin came in here—and I am not blaming the typist. Where it says:

“Sentencing guidelines on court fines”,


it should of course say compensation orders. The amendment is intended to correct an imbalance for victims. Its purpose is clear: to ensure that victims are compensated properly, according to the actual value of items stolen. This principle would apply in cases of fraud, burglary or theft, and in any other crime which has resulted in a victim suffering financial loss. The responsibility for repayment should be put squarely on the offender through the issuing of compensation orders. It is only right and just that offenders pay back the value of what they have stolen to their victims. There should be a direct link, so that offenders fully face up to the consequences of their actions in a real and logical way.

This measure is simply proportionate. At present, offenders may not be made even to begin to compensate for the damage inflicted, which only adds further insult to injury. To correct this imbalance, the amendment would require the Sentencing Council to revise the relevant sentencing guidelines within 18 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. This would lead to a more consistent approach across cases, and sentencing would recognise and account for the amount actually taken or lost. Justice for victims should be material, not merely symbolic. That would help to strengthen public confidence in our courts. We urge the Minister to give serious consideration to the amendment.

Amendment 46, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and Amendment 47, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, concern the criminal injuries compensation scheme. The former seeks to broaden its eligibility to all victims of child abuse; the latter aims to bring online-only child sexual abuse into the scope of recognition of the scheme. It is important that the scheme keeps apace with the evolving landscape in which criminal activity now takes place. All victims must be properly supported, with access to the appropriate mechanisms for compensation and redress. I look forward to hearing the response of the Minister, on how the scheme can be updated.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords—

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sandhurst]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 17, at end insert “or at the at victim’s request.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the role of the victim in the exercise the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing under clause 1.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, seek to ensure that the Bill lives up to its purpose in the name of victims.

Clauses 1 and 2 set out how offenders can in future be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing. But, as currently drafted, they contain no mechanism to involve the victims directly in the process. This is contrary to the Bill’s purpose to make provision for an enhanced experience for victims within the criminal justice system. Indeed, it is unclear in what situation a judge would be minded to make such an order without the request of the prosecution and what the criteria for such a decision would be in that instance.

If, in the absence of a request by the prosecution, the court’s power to compel attendance is not automatic, I look to the Minister to say why that is the case. Further, I ask her to clarify whether published guidance will be provided to judges as to what factors should be considered when making an order, beyond the practical considerations of officer safety.

The amendments which we advance, on the other hand, would overcome some of our concerns. They would enable the victims to have a say and to request that the offender be ordered to attend. As the Minister set out at Second Reading, the reasoning behind this Bill’s provisions is to compel attendance in the first place and to provide an opportunity for victims to look the defendant in the eye and explain exactly how a crime has affected them. The sentencing remarks are often their last opportunity for this. Why, then, should victims not be given a say whereby they can expressly request that an offender is ordered to attend? This would both give the victim a greater voice and give the judge greater clarity on how to proceed.

The second two amendments in this group, Amendments 4 and 9, would also require the courts to consult the victims if the judge is minded not to make an order compelling an offender to attend sentencing. If a victim is deceased or incapacitated mentally or physically, our amendments would allow family members or another appropriate representative to be consulted in their place. Justice should not stop when the victim cannot speak for themselves. This would put victims at the centre of the process. It would ensure that such decisions are taken not behind closed doors but in consultation with those victims whom these decisions affect.

We cannot treat these issues as merely procedural. For a victim, a sentencing hearing can be a profoundly significant moment, and it is an opportunity for closure. I am sure that the last thing noble Lords would want is for a victim to feel disconnected, sidelined or unheard by the courts in the run-up to a hearing. This amendment would also give judges a chance to explain and justify their decisions. If the offender will not be in attendance or the judge will not exercise their powers to compel attendance, victims or their representatives deserve an explanation of why that is the case. This should happen both where a victim has made a request for an offender to be ordered to attend and where they have not. We do not consider this to be a heavy burden on the courts. It should instead be considered best practice. These steps would ensure that the judge’s decision-making process is consistently transparent. It would make our system more accessible and demonstrate to victims that they are a priority, not an afterthought, particularly at the point of sentencing.

This Bill was presented to Parliament as an opportunity to address these very concerns. Our amendments would fill real gaps in drafting. I am sure the Minister will want to reflect carefully on them. I look forward to hearing the contributions of other noble Lords to this debate. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I shall make two observations. The first relates to the remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in relation to how judges will exercise these powers and whether guidance will be given. No doubt the Lady Chief Justice will consider whether to give guidance, or such guidance might be given by practice direction or be the subject of discussion at the Judicial College, but the handling of this is entirely for the judiciary. It is difficult enough, and it certainly would not be in any way appropriate for the Ministry of Justice to give guidance. It seems to me that the exercise of this judicial power must be for the judicial branch of the state and it alone—unless, of course, Parliament in its infinite wisdom decides that it wants to set down the criteria. I strongly urge Members not to do that.

The second relates to a more practical point, and that is the ability of the victim to intervene in the decision and to be able to make a request. It is sometimes forgotten that a transformation occurred during the 2000s and the next decade in the way in which the Crown Prosecution Service dealt with victims. There was a time when the victim was regarded as peripheral to the way in which the courts operated and to matters that had to be taken into account. That position changed remarkably and for the better. I think it is appreciated that the judicial power to have someone brought into court has to be exercised with the greatest degree of thought. If the Crown Prosecution Service were to request this to happen, I would be astounded if it had not consulted the victim. In my experience, that is what often happens in these difficult circumstances. There is a discussion as to the best way of proceeding and it is very important that this is approached in that sort of way.

If the victim was to be allowed to make the request directly, this raises the question as to how. Is this to be done in open court with the discussion of the various issues? Is it not best left to the wisdom of the Crown prosecutor and the judge’s ability to ask questions as to the victim’s views? It seems to me this is a much more efficacious way of dealing with the matter rather than bringing the victim in personally—because there is no suggestion of a victim’s advocate for this—to what will be, if this power is to be exercised, an occasion of great difficulty. The last thing anyone wants to happen is to provide secondary victimisation by an awful scene in court. I urge the Government to exercise very considerable caution in considering this amendment.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9, once again in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seek to give a victim or a bereaved family a defined role in the process of ordering someone to attend their sentencing hearing.

Victims have been at the forefront of this measure. It is precisely because an offender’s refusal to attend sentencing can compound the trauma for victims that we are giving judges an express power to order attendance, building on the judge’s existing common-law powers. Whether to order attendance must remain a judicial assessment of what is in the interests of justice. It will be made case by case, with the judge retaining the ultimate discretion having considered all the circumstances.

As I said when responding to the previous group, we anticipate that judges who are considering making an attendance order will hear submissions from both prosecution and defence. Prosecuting counsel will inevitably be expected to advance the views of the victim and the family, having sought them beforehand and having asked them; I can tell the Committee from my own experience that if they have not spoken to the victim or the victim’s family, the judge is likely to tell them to go away and do so—so it happens now. If there is no victim personal statement, the judge will, in my experience, inevitably say, “Why isn’t there one? Does the victim want to make one?” I can tell the Committee, again from my own experience, that the views of victims and their families are given great weight by the judge.

That said, we are anxious not to create unrealistic expectations in the minds of victims or their families that they would have the right to require the offender’s attendance at court. That could lead to some difficult experiences for victims and their families. What if, for example, the judge were to find that the offender had a reasonable excuse for non-attendance but the family of the victim disagreed? Plainly, the judge’s decision would have to prevail, but at what cost to the family if they had believed that they had the right to require attendance? We do not want to make sentencing hearings any more stressful or distressing for victims than they already are.

Judges must have the discretion to do what is right based on the facts in front of them and the submissions that they hear. There will be cases where it is not in the best interests of victims or families for the offender to be in court, including the occasions—thankfully rare—when the offender is likely to be disruptive or disrespectful and cause further distress.

To place a statutory duty on the court to consult a victim whenever an order is not made risks creating additional delay at the point of sentence. What, for example, if the victim’s family have chosen not to attend court, yet there is a mandatory statutory duty upon the judge to find out and consult them? As I have already said, the one thing that the Crown Courts do not need is any additional delay. In addition, such a statutory requirement risks placing an additional unnecessary emotional burden on victims and families.

The Bill preserves judicial discretion. We expect judges to take account of all relevant circumstances, including victims’ interests, and we are confident that they will do so because that is what they already do. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who contributed to this short but thoughtful debate, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. This debate has underlined how crucial these provisions are to the overall purpose of the Bill, why they warrant close attention and the balance that may have to be struck. We must, of course, get this right.

The Bill was brought forward with the express purpose of strengthening victims’ rights and improving their experience of the criminal justice system. But, as drafted, if we are not careful, victims will remain on the sidelines of a key decision-making process: whether an order should be made to compel an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. If the Bill does not allow victims to make explicit requests for compelled attendance then it will fall short of its own purpose and logic.

Notwithstanding the Minister’s assurance as to what happens in practice so far as the CPS is concerned—or happened when she was sitting in the Crown Court—surely it should be made obligatory for the CPS to ask the victim whether they wish the defendant to be compelled to attend and, if in receipt of a positive answer, to pass that view to the court. It will then be for the judge.

The current position is that judges have discretion to use their powers to compel attendance, even without a request from the prosecution, but we suggest that it is not clear when judges would exercise that power. We look to Ministers to confirm that—whether from them or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has pressed for, from the judiciary—there should be guidance as to the exercise of the powers. We would also be grateful if the Minister would outline the reasoning behind why these orders are not automatic in the event of non-attendance and when reasonable force can be safely administered.

Our amendments offer a simple and straightforward improvement. They would have ensured that victims could make such requests and are consulted where the court is minded not to make a compulsory order, regardless of whether they had made the request. Sentencing hearings are often the final opportunity for victims to be heard and to feel that they are heard, so why would we deprive them of a say in decisions that directly shape that experience? Victims’ voices must be embedded in the process; they should not be treated as merely passive observers.

We have also observed that where a victim has died or is incapacitated, the system must not simply move on without them. Family members or appropriate representatives should be consulted in their place. We hope the Minister will carefully reflect on the points raised today to help fulfil the Bill’s stated purpose and fill what I am sure are unintentional gaps in its drafting. We look forward to hearing how the Government intend to move forward in due course but, for the moment, we will not press these amendments.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a few observations. No one can doubt the revulsion towards sexual offenders who have attacked their own children or have the potential to do so, but there are two practical points that we must bear in mind.

First, the criminal justice system and the criminal courts, and the family justice system and the family courts, have been starved of resources by both Governments—there is no doubt about that. When sentence lengths are increased by both parties, we end up with a situation in the prisons that is a crisis. In deciding what orders to make in this kind of case, it is of paramount importance to have regard to the resource implications. It is no use saying that there is money for this. There is not. The courts system is starved, and the result of that is victims suffering in a whole host of other cases by the tremendous backlog. Both this Government and the last Government are responsible for the position into which the courts have been placed. When we look at this, please have regard to resources.

The second point, a point made by the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Meston, is that it is important that we get correct the balance as to what the Crown Court is to do and what the family court is to do. I am not sure, having listened to this debate, that that is a matter that has been sufficiently addressed. The one thing you cannot have—because it is a waste of resources and does not deploy expertise correctly—is the lines not clearly drawn. I hope very much that, before this comes back, there will be the opportunity for those who have day-to-day responsibility in the judiciary and the Courts Service, together with the ministry, to be sure that we have got the most effective and efficient use of resources and the right kind of drawing the line. It is very difficult, but we cannot ignore the bankrupt state of the courts. It is a regrettable fact, and we must not make the mistake we have made in relation to sentencing.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for organising my notes here—I have been listening hard. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this group, which concerns the operation of Clause 3 and the use of prohibited steps orders for the safeguarding of children where a parent or individual with parental responsibility has been convicted of serious sexual offending. The group rightly raises profound questions about thresholds, discretion, safeguards and consistency, and indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has pointed out, the balance between the two wings of the court system—the family and the criminal courts. I thank noble Lords for their searching and constructive contributions to this debate, all of which are motivated by a shared desire to protect children from harm.

I begin with Amendment 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, Amendment 14, in my name, and Amendments 15 and 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. All these amendments concern and probe the four-year custodial threshold that currently triggers the duty on the Crown Court to consider making a prohibited steps order. I thank the Government at the outset for the constructive manner in which they have already engaged with the clause. They accepted, during the Bill’s passage through the other place, that the original scope of Clause 3 was too narrow. As drafted on introduction, it applied only where the offender had committed sexual abuse against their own child. Following sustained concern, the Government rightly expanded that clause, so that it applies where the offender has abused any child. That change was welcome and necessary.

However, while the class of victims has been widened, the custodial threshold remains set at four years. It is here that noble Lords have expressed deep unease. A four-year sentence is an extremely high bar. There are numerous sexual offences involving children that may result in sentences well below four years yet would plainly justify the imposition of a prohibited steps order to safeguard a child, such as sexual communication with a child, causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity, certain forms of indecent assault or online grooming behaviours. These may, depending on the facts, attract sentences of significantly less than four years. Yet it would be surprising to suggest that an individual convicted of such conduct should automatically fall outside the scope of a safeguarding measure which has been designed to prevent them from exercising parental responsibility without scrutiny.

I think all noble Lords accept that there is a balancing exercise here. The state should not intervene lightly in family life. We must be careful not to construct a regime which is too blunt and results in unnecessary or disproportionate separation of children from parents. However, equally, Clause 3 as drafted risks being too narrowly drawn and failing to engage precisely in those cases where concern is most acute. The current threshold risks excluding serious and dangerous individuals because the custodial term imposed falls short of an arbitrary figure. We look to the Minister to explain why four years was chosen, what evidence underpins that decision and why a lower threshold or an offence-based approach was not chosen.

Amendments 22 and 27 raise an issue of rather different but also troubling nature—the power of the Secretary of State by regulation to amend the list of offences to which Clause 3 applies. As drafted, that power is not limited to expansion. It allows the list to be amended. That necessarily includes the possibility of reduction. It is difficult to conceive of a principled reason why a future Government would wish to remove sexual offences from the scope of a safeguarding provision of this kind. That prospect should concern the whole House. We accept the need for flexibility. The criminal law evolves. New offences may be created, particularly in the online sphere, as was illustrated by the recent Grok AI scandal and by non-consensual deepfakes of women and children in particular.

I recognise that Parliament cannot foresee every future risk. Recent controversies involving emerging technologies only underline that reality. It is therefore sensible that Ministers should have the power to expand the list where gaps emerge. However, it is not at all clear why the power should run in the opposite direction. Our Amendment 22 seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State would be able only to expand the list of relevant offences rather than shrink it. Opposition to what is modest drafting would raise serious questions about the Government’s intentions. We hope that the Minister will reflect carefully on that.

In that context, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for Amendment 27, which would add Section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, on sexual communication with a child, to the schedule. This offence criminalises the deliberate sexualised communication with a child for the purpose of sexual gratification. A technology-enabled form of abuse can be profoundly harmful. It often forms part of a wider pattern of grooming. Its inclusion in the schedule would materially strengthen the safeguarding framework, particularly if the threshold under Clause 3 were to be revisited.

Finally, Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, seeks to extend Jade’s law to cover attempted murder. This amendment raises an important principle. While the law recognises that certain conduct is so grave that parental responsibility should be curtailed automatically, it is difficult to see why the distinction between murder and attempted murder should be a point of difference, particularly given the catastrophic harm that attempted murder can cause.

This has been a thoughtful and serious debate. The amendments in this group are aimed at strengthening Clause 3 to protect children from harm while respecting the practical policy constraints which the Government face. We have no doubt that the Minister will engage constructively with the issues raised and provide the House with the assurances and explanations that these amendments request.

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Moved by

[Lord Sandhurst]

35: After Clause 4, insert the following new Clause—
“Restricting parental responsibility of offenders convicted of child crueltyAfter section 10G of the Children Act 1989 (review of orders made under section 10E or following an application under section 10F) (inserted by section 4), insert—“10H Duty to make prohibited steps order where serious child cruelty is committed(1) This section applies where—(a) the Crown Court sentences a person (“the offender”) for an offence listed in subsection 10 for a term of imprisonment of 2 years or more, and (b) the offender has parental responsibility for at least one child.(2) The Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order with respect to each child for whom the offender has parental responsibility.(3) The order must—(a) specify that no step of any kind which could be taken by a parent in meeting their parental responsibility for a child may be taken by the offender with respect to the child without the consent of the High Court or the family court, and(b) be made to have effect until the order is varied or discharged by the High Court or the family court.(4) But the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—(a) making the order is prohibited by section 29(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002,(b) a prohibited steps order is already in force that meets the requirements in subsection (3), or(c) it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so.(5) A prohibited steps order made under this section ceases to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal(6) Sections 1, 7 and 11 do not apply where the Crown Court proceeds under this section.(7) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court.(8) The Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in connection with the enforcement of a prohibited steps order made under this section.(9) A reference in this Act to an order under this section includes, so far as the context permits, an order varying or discharging it.(10) The relevant offences for subsection (1) are —(a) causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult, or allowing them to suffer serious harm (section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004);(b) child cruelty, neglect and violence (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933);(c) infanticide (section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938);(d) exposing children whereby life is endangered (section 27 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861);(e) an offence under sections 4, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 or 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1860, if the victim is under the age of 16;(f) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—(i) female genital mutilation (section 1);(ii) assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia (section 2);(iii) assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl's genitalia (section 3);(g) cruelty to children (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933).””Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would apply similar provisions, including prohibited steps orders, from Clause 3 to certain offenders of child cruelty.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 35, standing in both my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, would insert a new clause into the Bill to extend the safeguarding framework in Clause 3 beyond serious sexual offending so that it also applied to those convicted of the most serious child cruelty offences. In effect, it would mirror Clause 3.

Before I address the amendment in detail, I want to place on record my thanks to Helen Grant, Member of Parliament, for her tireless work on this issue. Over a number of years and across several Bills, she has consistently drawn Parliament’s attention to a clear and troubling gap in our safeguarding framework—that is, the absence of a coherent, systematic response to the most serious forms of child cruelty. Her campaigns for a child cruelty register and her persistence in ensuring that these issues remain firmly on the parliamentary agenda are no doubt something that all noble Lords can both respect and support.

Clause 3 introduces an important and welcome provision for the protection of children. The logic is compelling: where conduct is so grave that it demonstrates a fundamental incompatibility with the exercise of parental responsibility, there should be an automatic safeguarding mechanism. Amendment 35 asks a simple but profound question: why should that logic apply only to sexual offences and not to other, most serious forms of child cruelty?

The new clause proposed by the amendment would mirror the architecture of Clause 3 in many ways. It would introduce a duty on the Crown Court to make a prohibited steps order where an offender with parental responsibility was convicted and sentenced for a defined list of serious child cruelty offences. The threshold for such offences would be a custodial sentence of two years or more. We suggest that that is an appropriate balance between protection and practicability.

These offences have been carefully selected and reflect those on Helen Grant’s proposed child cruelty register, for which the Government have previously expressed support. They embrace serious crimes such as causing or allowing the death or serious harm of a child, child cruelty and neglect, infanticide, certain offences under the Offences Against the Person Act where the victim is a child, and offences relating to female genital mutilation, FGM. During the Crime and Policing Bill, the noble Baroness said,

“Ministers will continue to pursue this issue with vigour”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 250.].

The offences set out in this amendment strike at the very heart of a child’s safety and well-being. It is only right that a prohibited steps order be imposed.

If the Government truly believe in acting to prevent child cruelty, then to reject this amendment would be to defend an inconsistency in the current framework which we say is difficult to justify. A parent convicted of a serious sexual offence might automatically be prevented from exercising parental responsibility, while a parent convicted of causing severe physical harm or life-threatening neglect may not be. From the child’s perspective, that distinction is artificial. The harm is real, the risk is real and the need for safeguarding is just as acute. This amendment does not undermine family life unnecessarily. It does not sever parental responsibility permanently. It simply ensures that in the most serious cases, no steps may be taken by the offender without the oversight and consent of the family courts. They are best placed to make decisions concerning welfare and long-term outcomes. The amendment would bring coherence to the Bill and align it with the broader safeguarding principles that Parliament has repeatedly endorsed.

This amendment is motivated by a simple proposition. Children who have suffered the most serious forms of cruelty deserve the same automatic safeguarding protections as those who have suffered serious sexual abuse. I commend this amendment to the Committee and urge the Government to engage constructively with it, in the same spirit in which Clause 3 itself was conceived. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the automatic restriction of a person’s parental responsibility is a novel change to the law and must be done in a responsible and proportionate manner. The Government want to understand how these new measures operate in practice before we consider expanding the scope to other offences. We will carefully monitor how the provision operates once it is implemented and, as part of that implementation, officials will develop a system to help us understand the impact the measures are having, how the measures work in practice and how we can make improvements. For cases not in scope of the measure, whether that is because they fall outside the four-year threshold that has previously been debated or because they involve different crimes such as child cruelty, there are existing routes available in the family courts to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility. It is our evaluation that it is right that children are protected in that way while we evaluate the effect of the measures in the Bill. For these reasons I invite the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I find that an interesting reply. No reasons are given other than that this is novel. The provisions in Clause 3 are themselves novel, and all we ask is that where a serious offence of cruelty has been committed in respect of a child, that should be sufficient reason to adopt the same approach as that taken with sexual assault. What is the difference in practice for the child between being sexually assaulted and suffering cruelty? Having said that, we hear what is said and will engage with the Minister between now and Report, but we will wish to consider the position on Report.

Amendment 35 withdrawn.

Prisoners for Palestine: Hunger Strikes

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

Let me be very clear. I do not want to see any person in our prisons die, and I am very grateful for the hard work of healthcare and prison staff throughout the estate to make sure that those refusing food are receiving appropriate treatment. Any prisoner who feels that they have been treated unfairly can raise a complaint through the established process, including escalating to the independent monitoring board, which is present in every prison, and asking the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman to conduct an independent review. To grant bail is not a power within the gift of Ministers. The decision to remand someone charged with an offence is for the independent judges, and lawyers can make representation to the court against the decision on behalf of their clients. To reiterate to my noble friend, I am focused on ensuring every prisoner gets the best chance of leaving prison in good health and never comes back.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, further to the Question from the noble Lord, Lord Hain, in the absence of clear statutory guidance on how to balance prisoners’ autonomy with the duty of care, what steps have the Government taken to ensure that prison governors and healthcare professionals have a legally sound ethical framework to follow if a hunger striker’s life is at imminent risk?

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question and concern, because we were all concerned about what was happening. I spent an awful lot of time making sure that all the policies and procedures in place were being followed, which they were. Obviously, this is about how the health partners in prisons work together. Having spoken to a number of them on a regular basis, I was proud of their professionalism, compassion, kindness and care. They did a fantastic job in very difficult circumstances.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 16th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill has been laid before us in the name of victims, so we must grasp the opportunity to ensure that the Bill fully lives up to its name. The Bill strengthens the measures proposed in the predecessor Bill, which fell before the last election and was lost. I thank all those groups and organisations that have made valuable contributions so far.

The first important matter that I address is the attendance of convicted persons at their sentencing hearing. If the courts cannot compel attendance by criminals, justice is undermined; it is vital that the courts have power both to compel attendance, by reasonable force if necessary, and to punish criminals who resist or fail to attend their sentencing hearings. I shall expand on that in a moment.

Next, I turn to those guilty of child sex offences. We welcome the provision that parental responsibility is now to be restricted for child sex offenders who have committed offences against any child, not just their own child or children. It is also paramount that victims are given more information about the release dates for their offenders and are kept informed about their whereabouts and the risks, if any, that they may pose to their safety. That is particularly necessary, because it was revealed that 91 prisoners may have been released by mistake between 1 April and 31 October this year.

We are pleased with the provisions to address non-disclosure agreements, but we will need more time to consider the detail of the proposed exemptions, and we look forward to hearing about those.

The Bill before us has some shortcomings, and we must address these if we are to make the most of this opportunity and of precious parliamentary time. For example, we on these Benches believe that courts should order offenders to pay compensation that truly reflects the victim’s financial loss when penalties are imposed. More broadly, there have been justified calls for greater transparency, following the crimes and subsequent cover-up of grooming gangs across the nation. These calls will grow louder and more urgent as victims demand justice, and we need more transparency.

I turn first to the provisions for unduly lenient sentences. The current deadline for applications to the scheme for a review of sentence is 28 days from the date when sentence is passed. In the months before her untimely death, the former Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales, my much-missed noble friend the late Lady Newlove, highlighted that victims are often unaware of this deadline because the prosecution has not brought it to their attention. The Government’s election manifesto committed to

“ensuring victims can access the information and support they need”.

That is why we recommended an extension of the time for an application to be made from 28 days to 56 days. This will give victims more time to process an application. In addition, the Crown Prosecution Service should be obliged to notify victims that the scheme exists—they have to know about it if they are to do something—and to provide information, within 10 working days of a sentence being passed, explaining the application process and the relevant deadlines for making victim impact statements.

Many victim impact statements have faced difficulties. Victims must be able fully to express in their personal statements the impact that crimes have had on them. Victims deserve a platform, but such statements are evidence in the case and as such are subject to strict rules. We accept that what they say must not be contrary to any statutory limitations on free speech—they must not make allegations of untried criminal conduct or be offensive or inappropriately provocative—but victims must have their voices heard. At the heart of these calls is a call for greater transparency in the system: transparency about the courses of action available to victims after sentence, and allowing victims themselves to explain their suffering without inappropriate censorship. We must take this opportunity to help enhance trust in the courts and the process, and to bring accuracy to our public discourse.

At present, we do not know enough about the backgrounds of those who commit offences. Too often, the public is left to speculate. In the other place, the Opposition tabled an amendment to set the record straight. It would require courts to collect data on sentenced offenders in relation to a number of factors: nationality; sex at birth and, where applicable, country of birth; method of entry into the United Kingdom; and visa route, visa status and asylum status. The Government should then publish these statistics every three months. This will ensure that both policymakers and the British public have an accurate debate and can reach informed decisions when it comes to criminal justice, integration and border control.

There are clear and legitimate concerns about integration and social cohesion. It is imperative that the Government do not dismiss these or overlook them. Accurate data is important. Its absence allows misleading statements to be made, sometimes deliberately and malevolently, but even if innocently made, they can have a damaging effect. We implore the House to take this opportunity to make a profound impact on our current policies through this Bill.

As for the implementation of the Bill as it stands, there are also practical issues which the Government must consider. How exactly will offenders be compelled to attend sentencing, when prison officers already find themselves ill-equipped to handle violent or disruptive offenders? What provisions will be put in place? Officers should be enabled to use reasonable force, so long as it is not disproportionate. This must include the power to restrain and to quieten disruptive offenders during hearings. As for child sex offenders, now that sex offences against any child will result in a restricted parental responsibility order, what provisions will the Government take to ensure that the family courts are not overwhelmed by appeals once the Bill passes into law?

We fear that, until these questions are addressed, the Bill will not fulfil its aims, nor be satisfactory for the victims in whose name the Bill is being put forward. We support the aims of the Bill, but there remain real gaps and real missed opportunities. We are fortunate enough in this House to have the chance to correct them. We must prove our worth by making necessary changes in the interests of victims and the public, so that there is trust in the system as a whole. Only then can we deliver real justice for victims, improve confidence and improve trust in our courts and the justice system. We need to be able to enjoy informed debates across our political life. I look forward to engaging constructively with the Government and with noble Lords across the House to help the Bill live up to its name.

Judicial Appointments Commission (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I hope not to detain the Committee for very long. I declare my interest as a solicitor of the senior courts of England and Wales—a professional qualification that fills me with considerable pride even now, after many years of practice. In mixed company, where no one is aware of my political or administrative responsibilities over the years, I always indicate my function, when I am asked, as being a lawyer, not a politician, because that is the priority I place on that profession.

In no way do I wish to criticise these arrangements—indeed, I think that they are very sensible—but I want to point out a little of the history here and a bit about what I think may be a misunderstanding in the composition, particularly in relation to the three professional members that we will be discussing. Before the 19th century in this country, the provision of legal services was an amorphous, muddled arrangement that caused considerable difficulties; I will not refer to Shakespeare’s view on lawyers because plenty of people since Shakespeare have had a similarly negative view.

By the time we reached the 19th century, we had ended up with a clear division between barristers and solicitors. Although many countries went down that path and went on to merge those two sides of the legal profession into attorneys or some other single name, we retained that until the Legal Services Act 2007, so who a lawyer is has probably always been, in most people’s minds, a solicitor or a barrister.

We were then joined by legal executives: fellows of CILEX. I must pay tribute to the people who had previously been described as managing clerks, in terms of their functions in offices—they were people doing enormously important jobs—because all of my knowledge of property law was given to me by the managing clerk of the firm to which I was originally articled and in which I became an assistant. I pay massive tribute to their ability and knowledge.

Originally, though, however well-equipped they were, they were not lawyers. The 2007 Act came in and redefined “lawyers”—a word that is spread around. I know that my noble friend has talked about legal practitioners; again, they are slightly different from lawyers, in my opinion. We had lawyers being redefined in 2007 as solicitors, barristers, legal executives—fellows of CILEX—and licensed conveyancers. I have to say that the word has taken on a rather broad description, frankly. A lot of solicitors now have difficulty in dealing with licensed conveyancers whose licences appear to have been granted by bodies that most solicitors have never heard of. Trademark agents, patent agents and law costs draftsmen are lawyers under the Legal Services Act 2007.

Paragraph 5.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum states that commissioners should be

“persons practising or employed as lawyers”.

This Motion has been defined by the Minister as simply being moved so that fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives are eligible to be the third lawyer. However, if you then describe lawyers more broadly in this document without defining them in the context of, specifically, fellows of CILEX—or you do not include all those defined as lawyers under the Legal Services Act 2007—it is rather confusing because, if you say “lawyers” and maintain that description, there is no reason whatever why a law costs draftsman should not be appointed, thus maintaining the diversity that the Minister rightly suggests should be brought to bear in the commission. I think that that is confusing.

I know that these documents are mostly looked at only by other lawyers, as are the constitutions of the commission. But looked at from a public point of view, or if there is an argument or a discussion, clarification of this really is necessary. The Minister made it clear and I am perfectly happy with that, but it is wrong to generalise the term “lawyers” unless you define it within the terms of eligibility in that long list I have just given of people who are now claimed to be lawyers—much to my surprise, I have to say.

I am not looking at this narrowly; I am old-fashioned and have been around so long that, as I said at the start, I always thought that lawyers were either solicitors or barristers. I did not know about this longer list because of my ignorance in not actually having looked at the 2007 Act, which I have now read. I would be grateful if the Minister would reflect on that and perhaps make it clear—it has to be made clear somewhere—that merely being a lawyer, which is argued to be necessary in having the three representatives, is not broad at all but is actually confined to that one strand of lawyers under the 2007 definition, which is to be a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations. They make technical changes to the Judicial Appointments Commission. As explained, the number of commissioners will increase from 15 to 16 and a third professional commissioner will be added. This will mean, subject to the observations of my noble friend Lord Kirkhope, that a barrister, a solicitor and a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives will be on the panel. The regulations also expand the list of offices from which the senior tribunal commissioner may be drawn. This ensures that holders of broadly equivalent judicial offices have equal opportunity to serve.

The Minister notes that these changes are intended to help the JAC manage a higher level of recruitment. The number of exercises and recommendations has grown in recent years, and the addition of a further commissioner should assist in meeting that workload. We accept that these regulations are largely technical, but remain concerned about the structure of the JAC. The current arrangements separate ultimate responsibility for judicial appointments from Ministers who are accountable to Parliament. This can weaken accountability, fracture responsibility and leave Ministers less directly answerable when appointments fail or standards fall short.

For that reason, the Conservatives continue to propose a judicial vetting committee within the Lord Chancellor’s office. Such a committee would be appointed by and accountable to the Lord Chancellor, ensuring that appointments are made on merit while restoring democratic accountability. In doing so, it would place ultimate responsibility for judicial appointments clearly with Ministers, who are answerable to Parliament and the public.

We would be grateful if the Minister could offer a few brief points of clarification. First, will the expanded eligibility of the senior tribunal commissioner affect the independence of the JAC or the balance of judicial representation? Secondly, is any further review of the JAC’s structure planned, particularly in light of proposals for a judicial vetting committee? Thirdly, will guidance be issued to ensure that adding commissioners does not create delays or extra burdens in the recruitment process?

Finally, I touch on the observations of my noble friend Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate. He acknowledged that these arrangements are sensible, but helpfully highlighted that the definition of a lawyer has been expanded over recent years to include a much wider range—not simply barristers, solicitors and, more recently, legal executives, but licensed conveyancers, patent agents and others. He suggests that the term “lawyer” is looked at carefully if it is to mean eligibility for judicial appointments, because it needs clarification if it is not to extend to a wider range than those in the three premier categories—if I can call them that—of barristers, solicitors and legal executives. Having said that, and subject to the assurances which I have sought, we on this side recognise the technical purposes of these regulations and are content not to oppose them.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

Amendments 153 and 154 in my name were also not moved in the Commons. They would ensure that driving prohibitions and restriction zones do not adversely affect the ability of offenders on probation to attend their employment, education or rehabilitation programmes. We discussed the principle of this on Monday, and I accept the noble Lord’s assurance that the imposition of these restrictions will be carefully tailored so as not to have adverse impacts on those activities. Again, a digital management system will avoid conflicts much more efficiently than a paper-based one.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this group. If there is a single theme in these amendments, it is that we cannot go on legislating for increased demands on our criminal justice system without ensuring that the system has the capacity and is resourced to cope with them. Amendment 88 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foster, is a straightforward attempt to put the Government’s own commitments on a statutory footing. If the Government are serious about being transparent about prison capacity and probation case loads, as their 2024 annual statement on prison capacity claims, they should have no hesitation in agreeing to Parliament receiving that information on an annual basis. It is not possible to plan sentencing policy responsibly without understanding the numbers and the pressures on the system that must administer it.

Amendments 93, 93D and 93E in this group address the issue of Crown Court sitting days. These backlogs have consequences for victims awaiting closure, for defendants waiting to clear their name, and for the overall ability of the system to move cases towards sentence. Whether the cap on sitting days should be lifted entirely or adjusted specifically for sentencing hearings is a legitimate question, and an assessment of the merits is the very least the Government should provide.

Amendment 119 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, calls for digital tracking of offenders’ progress and provides for the sharing of data on offenders’ progress between the courts and the agencies—this is plainly a good idea, and we support it. We urge the Government to take it on board and give teeth to the new court powers. It is difficult to think of any sensible objection. If we move offenders out into the public from prisons, we need to know how they are doing. Good, accurate data informs good policy.

The Committee has also heard important contributions on the impact on the Probation Service of new sentencing and community-based powers. The Probation Service already strains under unmanageable case loads and severe staff shortages. That is why we support Amendments 134 and 137. Amendment 134 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, would ensure that provisions in the Bill likely to drive up demands on probation are not to be brought into force until the independent inspectorate is satisfied that the service can meet that demand. It would also empower the inspectorate to trigger a prioritisation framework for local areas. That is not disruptive; it is responsible. It recognises that probation officers cannot be asked to do more and more with less and less resource and without there being, in the end, a serious risk to public safety. Amendment 137, again from the noble Lord, Lord Foster, would require the Secretary of State to establish maximum case load limits before commencing major parts of the Bill. If the Government believe that probation has to shoulder more responsibility, they must give probation the capacity to succeed.

Amendments 139A, 149, 150 and 152 are all aimed at ensuring proper resourcing. Again, there is the need to ensure that the Probation Service is not overloaded and is properly resourced. For the reasons I have explained, that is absolutely right and necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, before the Minister responds, perhaps I could ask the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, a question. I think that the amendment in his name and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, refers back to their Amendment 76, headed “Electronic monitoring: practicability of enforcing restriction zone requirements”. That amendment itself acknowledges that there may be differences in the availability and accuracy of the technology in urban, rural and indoor environments. This is a straight question: I am not sure whether we are in the UK here, or just in England and Wales, but is the noble Lord suggesting that the restriction-zone condition should not be brought in until the whole country is covered by the technology?

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

We are saying that the relevant technology has to be available for this to work. It might be that it could be done on a regional basis, but the important thing is that it is not introduced somewhere where there is not the ability to make it work.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

I would like to begin by thanking noble Lords for giving the Committee the opportunity to debate the capacity of the criminal justice system. I must of course start by saying that this Bill is a necessary step towards ensuring that we have a sustainable justice system.

I turn first to Amendment 88, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath. I reassure noble Lords that this Government are committed to greater transparency on prison capacity. We showed this by publishing the first annual statement last December, and we will shortly publish the 2025 edition. However, setting the timing of publication and the content of the report in primary legislation would create unnecessary rigidity. Our goal is to increase transparency without compromising flexibility.

I now turn to the amendments that address the issue of capacity within the Probation Service. I am pleased that this gives me another opportunity to pay tribute to our incredible probation staff, who work tirelessly to keep the public safe. I am proud to be their colleague.

I begin by recognising the close interest of probation trade unions in Amendment 134, tabled by my noble friend Lord Woodley. I greatly value our ongoing engagement and meaningful consultations; their input will continue to inform our approach. I also thank my noble friend for mentioning the two horrendous attacks on our probation staff in Preston and Oxford. These are fine public servants who turn up to work to protect the public; they, and all probation staff, should not be in fear of their safety. I send both my colleagues best wishes for their recovery.

We recognise HM Inspectorate of Probation as a key stakeholder and value its involvement in implementing the provisions of this Bill, but it is important to preserve its independence as an inspectorate. This amendment risks shifting the inspectorate towards a regulatory role, compromising its independent scrutiny.

While we are sympathetic to Amendment 139A, we fear it would duplicate existing reporting mechanisms and risk delaying measures in the Bill that would themselves improve probation capacity. We already have strong and independent scrutiny, and ensure transparency on probation case loads and staffing through various publications. For example, HMPPS publishes quarterly reports covering probation staffing and case loads.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, noted, the National Audit Office has conducted a thorough analysis of probation capacity, and this is informing a Public Accounts Committee inquiry. However, a further statutory reporting requirement, particularly one imposed within three months of Royal Assent, would duplicate existing processes and divert resources away from implementation and capacity building. Thanks to the established analysis and reporting processes, we are clear about the challenges facing the Probation Service, and, thanks to the detailed picture on capacity that this data gives us, we are taking swift, targeted action.

As the noble Lord, Lord Foster, correctly predicted, I can inform noble Lords that we are recruiting an additional 1,300 trainee probation officers by March next year and are working hard to retain experienced officers. We are also investing up to £700 million by the final year of the spending review. While the detailed allocations of that money are still to be finalised, I reiterate that my priorities are clear: more people in post, digital investment that saves time and tools for probation to use.

We are starting to see the benefits of an initial £8 million investment in new technology, including an initiative called Justice Transcribe. This cutting-edge AI tool has cut note-taking admin time by around 50%, with outstanding user satisfaction scores. I have heard that probation officers are describing it as life-changing. Furthermore, many of the measures in this Bill will have a positive impact on probation capacity. Delaying these essential reforms while we undertake work proposed by the amendment would not be helpful for our front-line staff.

Amendment 137 speaks to a similar concern about the case loads that our hard-working probation officers manage on a daily basis. While I understand the intent behind this amendment, it is important to recognise that not all probation cases are the same. Imposing a fixed case load limit would not account for these variations; it would make it difficult to manage workloads effectively across the service, it would reduce organisational flexibility and it could undermine the professional autonomy and judgment of our valued practitioners and managers. These top-down limits could therefore potentially lead to unintended delays and bottlenecks, and would serve only to mask the capacity problems I am working to resolve.

On Amendment 119, I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the Probation Service already uses digital systems to effectively manage those under probation supervision, but there is a lot more to do here, especially using AI. I believe that its potential is massive.

I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for Amendments 153 and 154, which give me the chance to discuss one of my favourite subjects: the rehabilitation of offenders. Supporting offenders to rehabilitate and stopping the cycle of reoffending is a vital part of ensuring that the new restrictive conditions protect victims. All restrictive measures must accommodate rehabilitative aims such as employment. That way, we will better protect not just a single victim but all victims. So, where there is a rehabilitative purpose, such as driving for employment, practitioners will have the ability to grant permission for this. Restriction zones will be developed to ensure that an offender can access rehabilitative activities, including employment, while, of course, also considering the victim’s needs.

Electronic monitoring is the subject of Amendment 155, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and Amendments 93D and 110ZB, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foster. This is a vital tool for managing offenders in the community, and there will be a significant uplift in tagging alongside the provisions in this Bill. Where appropriate, electronic monitoring will be applied to support monitoring and compliance with restriction zones. When a restriction zone is not electronically monitored, the Probation Service will monitor offenders’ behaviour and any potential breach. They will have a suite of options available to them to respond to breaches if they identify that offenders have not complied—for example, through police intelligence or victim concerns. Our professionally trained staff are experts in this specialist work, but we do not feel that a report on the practicality of enforcing restriction zones is necessary.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her Amendment 93E. We share the ambition of ensuring that time in custody is used productively to reduce reoffending. Every prison has a legal duty to provide education. This is monitored through the annual HMIP report, regular Ofsted inspections and published prison education statistics. Therefore, a statutory requirement is not necessary. I reassure the noble Baroness that I look at the data regularly, and I challenge it when I am not content.

Lastly, I turn to Amendment 93 and remind noble Lords that we inherited a justice system in crisis, with a court backlog at record levels and rising, and victims waiting years for justice. We have already taken action to tackle court backlogs and improve court productivity. For this financial year, we are funding a record 111,250 Crown Court sitting days to deliver swifter justice for victims—over 5,000 more than the previous Government funded last year. This will mean that more trials and hearings can be heard, tackling the backlog of cases. However, even at maximum capacity, sitting days alone cannot solve the backlog. We need to do things differently. This is why we need fundamental reform, not piecemeal measures.

The previous Lord Chancellor commissioned Sir Brian Leveson to lead an independent review of the criminal courts. We are considering its recommendations carefully before legislating where necessary. This amendment seeks to require an assessment of introducing uncapped Crown Court sitting days for sentencing hearings. However, listing decisions are a judicial function, not an executive one. It is essential to preserve judicial independence in managing court business. Introducing a statutory requirement in this area could be seen as government influencing judicial listing decisions, which would compromise that principle.

I am grateful to noble Lords for bearing with me. I hope I have reassured them about the seriousness with which this Government are taking the issue of capacity. I reiterate my offer to meet with noble Lords before Report.

Finally, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, who has spotted a drafting error in the Bill and sought to correct it through Amendment 103. He clearly has a bright future in legislative drafting ahead of him. I confirm that the Government accept that this amendment is needed and will not oppose it if the noble Lord wishes to move it formally.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Lord Bishop of Gloucester]

My Lords, I will make a few brief comments; I am aware of time, and there is a lot to get through. I wholeheartedly agree with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I thank him for his kind comments.

When it comes to sentencing, I have believed for many years that we need more independence and not less. My own submission to David Gauke’s sentencing review focused on this, and, as has been said, followed the Justice Committee’s recommendations—I ought to underline that—in its own inquiry on public opinion and the understanding of sentencing.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for using language about “a change of approach”, because it is important that we get away from making legislation based on a public narrative that is not based on evidence—so-called penal populism. How do we enable the Government to remain focused on maintaining a sustainable approach to custody and facilitate greater scrutiny of the impacts of policy and legislation on prison and probation without the constant pressure from that public narrative, which is affecting the way we do our sentencing? The aim of these amendments, which uphold the principles of independence, is to support Ministers to make objective, evidence-based policy in the midst of all the pain and loss that come through crime.

A couple of years ago, I was in the Netherlands looking at its criminal justice system. Ministers there were horrified at how the public can so affect the way that Ministers act—at how people can beat a path to the door of Ministers, which then affects legislation. The Netherlands has decoupled the way Ministers make legislation and the independent factor, which is what we want to do here. I wholeheartedly agree with these amendments, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for these amendments. Collectively, they seek to introduce an independent advisory panel on sentencing and reducing reoffending. The stated purpose of this panel is to facilitate greater scrutiny of the impacts of policy and legislation on prison and probation resources. I am sure that all noble Lords support that aim, and the idea of creating an independent body to help the Government in developing better policy in this area is an interesting concept that we hope the Minister will give proper consideration to.

These amendments seek to implement recommendation 9.1 of the Independent Sentencing Review by Mr David Gauke and others, a document that has inspired many of the provisions of the Bill. Should the Government decide not to support this recommendation, they should make plain their reasons and justification.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester for these important and thoughtful amendments. They seek to give effect to a recommendation from the Independent Sentencing Review, by David Gauke, which would involve creating an independent advisory body that would provide greater scrutiny of the impacts of policy and legislation on the criminal justice system. I absolutely understand the sentiments behind these amendments, and we recognise that this Bill represents a big change to sentencing in the future and that the Government will need timely advice from voices of expertise and experience. I have worked with some of the organisations the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to and hold them in the highest esteem.

The Government do not believe that it is right to legislate for a new statutory panel at this stage, but I will say a little about how we think we can take forward the spirit of this. There are already many advisory and oversight authorities for prisons and probation, many of them with statutory remits. However, we will certainly continue to consider whether the creation of a new advisory body is the appropriate mechanism to ensure greater scrutiny and greater effectiveness of the impacts and outcomes of policy and legislation in this area.

Although we are considering this recommendation from the Independent Sentencing Review carefully—I hope I have made it clear that we take it very seriously—we do not support an amendment at this time. As I hope the Committee will understand, creating such a panel requires a good deal of thought about its purpose and responsibilities and how it could fit within the panoply of organisations that already advise the wider criminal justice system. It is already a Rubik’s cube.

As noble Lords will know, the Government are undertaking an ongoing review of arm’s-length bodies, and this sets out clear principles, including ministerial policy oversight, avoiding duplication—that is very important—and improving efficiency. So we are not clear that the creation of such a body in statute, as this amendment would do, would quite align with these aims. So, although we do not accept these amendments today, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and indeed the whole Committee that the Government will continue to consider this recommendation.

On the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the right reverend Prelate about improving the understanding of the press and the public, we are certainly in the market for anything that will improve their understanding of how the criminal justice system, particularly sentencing policy, works. So I hope this reassurance about the seriousness with which we take the spirit of David Gauke’s recommendation, and indeed the amendment, enables the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment at this stage.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, to follow on from what my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said, we on these Benches support this amendment, for all the reasons given and explained at length by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool.

I will add one point. We heard yesterday in the discussion on restricting jury trials about defendants gaming the system, with which, in the context of jury trials, I do not entirely agree. It undoubtedly happens some of the time, but not all of the time, because it is not a reason generally for electing a jury trial. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, has illuminated the degree to which defendants who are guilty of particularly nasty offences can game the system by retaining their cases in the magistrates’ court and avoiding committal to the Crown Court for sentence or trial. I am bound to say that his amendment shows an ingenious solution to that, by seeking to extend the unduly lenient sentence scheme. We support it on that basis as well.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I can be brief. Amendment 93C, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, seeks to extend the unduly lenient sentence scheme so that for victims of technology-assisted child sexual abuse, and where the victim is a minor, their next of kin should be able to refer sentences to the scheme, regardless of the level of court where the sentence has been passed.

The noble Lord explained the rationale for his amendment eloquently and elegantly, and with clarity. His detail was illuminating. This is a narrowly framed and entirely reasonable proposal. Technology-assisted abuse does not respect borders or ages, and is often complex, cross-jurisdictional and deeply traumatic. It cannot be right that a victim’s ability to challenge an obviously lenient sentence depends on the court level at which the matter has been disposed of and in which the perpetrator was tried.

This amendment would close that gap and ensure parity of access to this important review mechanism for victims of what are in fact some of the most serious and distressing offences dealt with by our criminal justice system. It would, we believe, stop the system being gamed, to the advantage of the offender and the disadvantage of the victim. It would strengthen accountability without widening the scheme beyond its existing remit. This is a practical, victim-centred improvement and we urge the Minister to give it serious consideration. I ask: if not, why not?

Sentencing Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 120 is in my name. I will also speak to Amendments 123 and 124 in my name. These three amendments are minor and technical, and we have tabled them as small but necessary changes to ensure that the Bill functions as intended. I begin by explaining the changes to Clause 29 through Amendment 120. This is a necessary technical amendment which ensures that the new automatic release from recall regime is integrated into the legislative framework and functions as needed. The changes to Clause 34, through Amendments 123 and 124, are also technical. They update cross-references so that existing powers which allow the Secretary of State to amend the number of hours specified in an unpaid work requirement continue to function correctly in light of the amendments made by Clause 34. I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his series of drafting amendments, which seek to tidy up the language and cross-references in the Bill. We on these Benches do not oppose the amendments, which will make things clearer for anyone reading the Bill in future.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his view on these minor and consequential amendments.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 122, which is on page 25 of the Marshalled List, would give the Probation Service the power to change the required residence of an offender under supervision, and to make necessary consequential changes to the probation conditions and terms that apply to that offender’s probation. Any such change would, however, be subject to the approval of the sentencing court.

This amendment is about trusting probation officers to do their job by giving them the power to tailor probation terms to the needs of individuals under their supervision. It would have the incidental benefit of saving the court’s time. The safeguard is, however, the requirement for approval by the sentencing court, but it is to be imagined that in most cases that would be a formal procedure. It is right that the sentencing courts have ultimate control, but I would confidently expect the proposed changes sought by probation officers to be approved.

This amendment is all about trusting probation officers to tailor the probation over which they have supervision to the needs of individual offenders. I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 122, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, which concerns the power of the Probation Service to vary residence requirements and associated conditions of supervision.

I begin by saying that we on these Benches appreciate the intention behind the amendment. The ability to move an offender from one address to another, particularly where there is a risk to a partner, former partner or family member, is plainly necessary in some circumstances. The Probation Service must have the tools to protect victims and to manage offenders effectively. This amendment seeks to provide a clearer statutory framework for doing so.

The amendment rightly provides that, where the Probation Service makes any such variation, it must return to the sentencing court for approval within 14 days of the confirmation. That is an important safeguard; the offender, the interested parties and the court must all be properly kept in the picture. However, we would welcome greater clarity from the Minister on how, in practice, the Probation Service would assess necessity, ensure proportionality and manage the additional administrative and supervisory burdens that such powers might create. Probation must also be properly resourced and supported.

We are also mindful that changing an offender’s residence could have profound consequences, not only for supervision and risk management but for the offender himself, in the form of employment, family ties and wider stability that underpins rehabilitation. The threshold for such a direction must therefore be robust, evidence-based and truly transparent.

In that spirit, I hope the Minister can reassure the Committee that the objectives behind this amendment—protecting victims and enabling better offender management—are achievable within existing powers, or, if not, that the Government will consider whether a more tightly defined mechanism might be appropriate. We are grateful to the noble Lord for raising these issues, and we look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, it is, and should remain, the role of the court in sentencing to determine the requirements that should apply to a particular community sentence and how they are varied. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out, it is vital that risk is managed quickly and effectively. This is particularly important in cases where, for example, domestic abuse is of concern.

Where an individual has been sentenced to a community or suspended sentence, probation practitioners undertake comprehensive assessments to ensure that risk is identified throughout an order and managed early. This means that they can take appropriate action to respond to that risk, ensuring offenders are monitored effectively. This includes applying to the court, where appropriate, which has powers to vary the requirements of a sentence, including the powers to revoke a community order and to resentence, where it would be in the interests of justice.

We are creating a new domestic abuse flag at sentencing so that domestic abusers are more consistently identified. This helps prison and probation services manage offenders effectively and ensures that victims are better protected. Before making a relevant order containing a residency requirement, the court must consider the home surroundings of the offender.

The court can already give probation the power to approve a change of residence when requested by the offender—for example, where an offender would like to move closer to where they were undertaking a programme or to their place of employment. Offenders released on licence from a custodial sentence can already be required to comply with residence obligations. These can be varied as required, either by probation or the Parole Board, as appropriate, depending on the offender’s sentence.

To be clear, if an offender fails to comply with the terms and conditions of an order, they can be returned to court to face further penalties, including custody. I hope the noble Lord will agree that there are sufficient existing processes in place, and I urge him to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

This is a probing amendment, and I very much hope that the Minister will be able to bring into the public domain what is going on in this area. I look forward to his explanation. I should say that this is an issue similar to the devolution of policing and youth justice, and to the problem we have at the moment with the assisted dying Bill. The problem of not addressing devolution in Wales sensibly and with discussion will, I am afraid, weary this Parliament on a number of issues where the differences of opinion between the Government here and the Government in Cardiff ought to come out into the open so that we can have a proper debate. I will say now that I intend to do that on each successive occasion that these issues come up. I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for bringing this issue to the Committee. Effective probation practice depends fundamentally on local knowledge, local accountability and integration with wider services, including housing, health, substance misuse, skills and so on. In Wales, these services, in contrast to probation, are largely devolved. It is therefore entirely reasonable to ask whether the current arrangement or settlement best serves the people of Wales and whether the structures we have today genuinely allow probation to work in partnership effectively with the devolved landscape.

The noble and learned Lord has raised an important point. We on these Benches do not commit ourselves today to the specific mechanism set out in the amendment. Devolution of an important plank of the criminal justice function requires proper consideration, planning and, above all, collaboration—I emphasise that word in the light of what the noble and learned Lord has said—between the United Kingdom Government and Welsh Ministers. We agree that that conversation cannot be avoided. It must be approached constructively with regard to the Welsh perspective.

Probation in Wales faces real pressures and deserves a stable and effective framework within which to operate. If the Minister believes that the current reserved model remains the right one, the Committee would expect him to set out clearly how it delivers coherence, integration and accountability, and how it is effective not in theory but in practice. We are grateful to the noble and learned Lord for initiating this debate, and we look forward to the Government’s response, probably not for just the one time.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for his amendment and his thoughtful engagement on this issue and others. I know he has met my noble friend the Minister outside the Chamber to discuss these things.

The Government committed to undertake a strategic review of probation in their manifesto, and it is still our plan to review the governance of the Probation Service, looking at partnerships across England and Wales. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, mentioned the Manchester model. I hesitate to agree with the suggestion that it is being imposed on Wales, but I have to say that I am rather a fan of the Manchester model. In fact, I regard myself as the progenitor of it—or one of them—when I was at HMPPS as its lead non-executive director. That is part of what is on offer, as it were.

It is important that the recommendations in this Bill are first implemented and that we bring stability to the Probation Service in England and Wales as it currently is before undertaking any structural review. The Government believe that this would not be the right time to consider factoring structural changes into the many changes to probation that will arise as a result of this legislation. I understand that the doctrine of unripe time is often a fairly feeble excuse for inaction, but I am sure that everyone in the Committee recognises that—if I can put it like this—the capacity for change in the Probation Service, with this Bill and the current situation, is pretty much maxed out.

The amendment proposes devolving the Probation Service, but not the equivalent in relation to sentencing or prisons. Devolving parts of the criminal justice system in this way would create a divergence between the management of offenders and the wider criminal justice, sentencing and prison framework across England and Wales. We know that poor handovers, weak communication or gaps in support during the transition from custody to the community are among the greatest barriers to successful resettlement, so we are concerned that some of the changes that might arise as a result of this would create friction in the way that I have suggested. Therefore, any framework in which prisons and probation are separately owned, funded or designed carries a real risk that the two halves of the process might fail to connect, particularly at a time of strain. When that happens, people leaving prison can all too easily fall through the gaps.

That is the heart of the Government’s view at the moment—that this is not a good time to impose structural change on the Probation Service. We want to be sure that we do not create the sort of risks and frictions that I discussed. We will continue to work closely with the Welsh Government to support the local delivery of services by devolved and reserved partners in Wales. I hope that I have given the noble and learned Lord some reassurance, at least sufficient for him to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment, in the final group of what has been a very long afternoon and evening, would give the power to a court when granting bail to a defendant charged with the most serious driving offences to suspend that defendant’s driving licence pending the outcome of criminal proceedings.

To recap fast, the offences covered by the amendment are: causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate driving; causing death by driving unlicensed or uninsured or when disqualified, or by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs; driving or being in charge of a vehicle while unfit through drink or drugs; and driving or being in charge of a vehicle while unfit through having alcohol over the limit or controlled drugs over the limit.

The reason for this amendment is obvious. When a court grants bail, it is carrying out an exercise of balancing the public interest in not prejudging the guilt of a defendant before that defendant is tried against the other public interest of keeping the public safe. I contend that the balance is clear when a power formally to suspend the driving licences of defendants charged with these offences is under consideration. These are life-threatening driving offences, and suspending a licence as a condition of bail for such a defendant is entirely appropriate. The suspension may not always be imposed but for the power to be there seems quite clearly desirable. I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for bringing forward this amendment. It proposes as a condition of bail to allow the courts to suspend the driving licence of individuals charged for certain driving offences. The offences in question include causing death or serious injury by dangerous driving or by careless or inconsiderate driving, or by unlicensed, uninsured or disqualified drivers. In addition, it includes those charges relating to driving when under the influence of drink or drugs or above the prescribed limits.

Safety on our roads is of prime importance, and the police have the ability to impose driving bans as a condition of bail under the Bail Act 1976 to ensure that further driving-related offences are not committed by those charged while criminal proceedings are ongoing. Indeed, driving offences committed while on bail are rightly treated as a serious matter. None the less, the potential benefits of public safety must, in a country where you are presumed innocent until proved guilty, be balanced with the rights of an as yet unconvicted defendant. Individuals who are granted bail may be on bail for extended periods of time, during which they may, assuming that other conditions on work have not been put in place, still have to drive to their place of work, for example.

So far, the powers to impose a driving ban as a condition of bail have been operational matters for the police. That said, allowing the court to suspend the driving licence of an individual as a condition of bail pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings would be a preventative step to reduce the risk of further driving-related offences being committed. We thank the noble Lord for initiating this debate and look forward to the Government’s response.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this is the last amendment this evening. I am sorry to have to detain noble Lords, but I regard women’s justice as important. I know that the Minister does too, as he chairs the Women’s Justice Board, which is the subject of this amendment. It is quite new and is an important innovation with an impressive membership. I will not detain noble Lords by, as I had intended to do, reading through its purpose as set out in the terms of reference. However, its focus on early intervention and diversion, community solutions, issues specific to pregnant women and mothers with dependent children and reducing the number of young adult women entering the criminal justice system is not something that I have heard expressed before. These are all very important.

I am not suggesting that the board is not transparent. Its minutes are online, and the terms of reference include publication of an annual report as well as ad hoc reports. However, publication effectively by the Secretary of State would give its work the weight that it deserves. That is probably the best way of describing it. Even though this is the last amendment, it was one that I thought of early on. We cannot go through a Bill such as this without highlighting the needs of women offenders. We have referred to them, but it has felt a little as if they have been rather an add-on.

I will take the time to say that very often women who are offenders are victims before they are offenders: in particular victims of domestic abuse but also victims of circumstances. The MoJ data from 2023 estimated that 10% of cases that result in sentences of 12 months or less are related to domestic violence and, in a further 10% of cases, the offender is flagged by probation for domestic violence—so I am told by Refuge. I should declare an interest there, having a very long time ago chaired Refuge for a very long time.

The offences are often small, but they can be persistent. So we, the Liberal Democrats, were very pleased to see the creation of the Women’s Justice Board. It has for a long time been party policy. In fact, I discovered that my noble friend Lord Marks summed up the amendment that went to our party conference, including this. We would like to entrench its position as solidly as possible and give it the appropriate publicity. I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, on the Conservative Benches, we are grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment, which, although the last tonight, is certainly not the least important. It rightly draws our attention to the work of the Women’s Justice Board and the special needs of many women offenders. The case for transparency and for this report being published is well made. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sandhurst]

51: After Clause 11, insert the following new Clause—
“Whole life order: murder of a police or prison officer(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 21 (Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc), in sub-paragraph (2)(c), after “duty,”, insert “or if the motivation for the murder was connected to the police officer or prison officer’s current or former duties,”.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would expand the circumstances in which it is appropriate to apply a whole life order for murdering a prison or police officer, to include murder motivated by the victim’s current or former duties.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to introduce the second day of Committee on the Sentencing Bill. Amendment 51, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, proposes a targeted and necessary change to Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act, dealing with the Sentencing Code. Its purpose is straightforward: to ensure that, where a police or prison officer is murdered because of or in retaliation for their current or former duties, that murder automatically falls within the highest sentencing category—that is, one where a whole-life order is available and, ordinarily, appropriate.

At present, Schedule 21 refers to murders committed “in the course of” the victim’s duty. Those words are too narrow. We suggest that the provision was intended to capture the most egregious attacks on those who serve the public in roles that inherently expose them to danger. However, the phrase

“in the course of … duty”

in the statute has, in practice, been interpreted by the courts in a restrictive manner, excluding cases where an officer is murdered because of, in retaliation for or in consequence of their earlier performance of their official duties—for example, when a murder takes place a while later, after service has ended.

This amendment would correct that anomaly by inserting the essential clarification that, where the motivation for the murder is connected to the officer’s current or former duties, the case will fall within the highest sentencing category. That is legally coherent and morally necessary. Motive is already a well-recognised component of sentencing. It is taken into account in terrorism offences, hate crimes, witness intimidation and organised crime retaliation. It is therefore entirely consistent with the existing principle that the deliberate targeting of an officer because he or she carried out their duty should be regarded as an aggravating feature of the utmost severity.

This amendment would not create a new offence. It would not broaden the law on homicide or interfere with the Law Commission’s wider review. With precision and exclusively, it would ensure that the statutory scheme reflects Parliament’s clear and settled understanding that to murder a police officer or prison officer simply for having done their job is among the gravest crimes known to our law.

Let me speak plainly. We have seen the consequences of the existing drafting. The tragic case of former prison officer Lenny Scott revealed the gap starkly. Lenny Scott, whose widow and father I and others met last week, carried out his duties with integrity in HM Prison Altcourse, Liverpool. In March 2020, he discovered an illegal phone in the hands of a prisoner. He was offered but refused a bribe to turn a blind eye. He duly reported it, and, as a result, not only was the prisoner discovered to have had a phone but it was discovered that he had been having an affair with a woman prison officer—which was pretty serious, if you think about it. For that simple act of professionalism, Lenny received explicit threats at the time that he would be seen to. Those threats were graphic. They contained details about the appearance of his twin boys, who were no older than six years old.

Some years later, on 8 February 2024, after Lenny had left the Prison Service, those threats were put into practice. He was hunted down and murdered—shot as he left a gym class, in a planned act of revenge. It was a murder directly and unequivocally connected to the past performance of his duties. This was a gangland execution intended to punish Lenny for doing his duty and not giving way to what had been asked of him, and to terrify and intimidate other prison officers into doing gangsters’ bidding in the future. Because this crime did not occur in the course of his duty but a couple of years later, the statutory framework failed to treat it as the kind of murder for which Parliament provides the highest penalty and the judge therefore did not pass a whole-life order. This is a clear loophole in the legislation, and I look to the Minister to put it right. How many more Lennies will there be?

Serving officers in prisons and in the police force must know that there is the added protection of whole-life-order deterrence after they have left as well as when they are in active service. How many serving or former officers walk our streets knowing that they will remain potential targets long after they take off the uniform, and knowing that under the law as presently interpreted, their killers may not face the penalty that Parliament intended for those who attack innocent public servants?

We cannot undo the tragedy that happened to Lenny Scott and his family, nor repair the pain, but we can ensure that the law is changed. We can ensure that the sentencing framework recognises that the risks to officers do not end when their shift finishes and certainly do not disappear when they have left the force. When a murder is motivated and driven by the officer’s service, the seriousness, risk and moral culpability are exactly the same. This is a plain gap in the legislation as currently drafted, and it must be closed immediately.

It is very disappointing that this amendment was opposed by the Government on Report in the other place. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats together were in rare agreement on this amendment. I urge the Minister not to oppose it.

This amendment is modest in drafting but deep in its importance. It transcends political fault lines. I suggest that there is no reason why any noble Lords should oppose it. It simply makes no sense that a whole-life order can be imposed for the murder of a prison officer while he is a serving prison officer and while he is at work, but not if he is killed on the weekend with his family. This amendment would restore coherence to the statutory scheme and protects those who seek to protect us. I commend it to the Committee.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great honour to have the opportunity to speak for the Government during the second day in Committee on the Sentencing Bill. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for drawing attention to this important topic, which I have carefully considered.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

What happened to Lenny Scott is absolutely appalling, and we need to ensure that we do all we can so that no other prison officers, or previously serving prison officers, have the same fate. We want to work with the Law Commission and to take away the points raised by the noble Lord to discuss them with colleagues. What is important is that we ensure that the public are protected from the people who commit these terrible crimes.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I shall be reasonably brief. Amendment 51 is simple, precise and entirely consistent with established principles of sentencing. It does not create a new offence and, with respect, it does not pre-empt the Law Commission’s broader review. Instead, it addresses a real gap—and, with respect, we do not need the Law Commission to decide whether there is a gap here. Prison officers in particular need this protection. We have seen the tragic consequences, and this is the sort of threat that we are likely to see more of, not less.

We look to the Minister for assurances on this. Otherwise, it will come back on Report. It must be accepted that murdering a police officer or prison officer because of or in the course of their duty is one of the gravest crimes imaginable. The law should reflect this, not simply to punish but to deter. It must deal with and deter against calculated acts of revenge against former officers. Gangland people will learn about this. It will get about in prison. They will know. It will go down the network.

This amendment is significant for the men and women who carry out with integrity the difficult and demanding work of protecting our streets and looking after—I use that phrase advisedly—the prisoners under their care. It is important that we reassure and encourage them. We want the best people to serve in our prisons. We do not want recruitment to be handicapped. What message will it send out if the Government say, “Oh well, if you’re shot down two years later, that doesn’t count. We’ve got to hope that the judge gets it right”? We must provide the right protections throughout the careers of these officers and beyond. We have the opportunity today to close that gap.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment for now, but it remains very much on the table.

Amendment 51 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 52 would provide for the Secretary of State to make an assessment of the benefits of mandatory rehabilitative programmes regarding healthy relationships for individuals sentenced for offences when the victim is a woman or girl and to lay a copy of that assessment before Parliament. I declare an interest as a trustee of Safer London, a charity which works with young Londoners affected by, or at risk of, violence and exploitation. Among these are young Londoners who display harmful sexual behaviours. Often, they may not have a full understanding of their actions, where their behaviours may stem from or that they themselves need support.

I am under no illusion that an intervention is likely to be quick or easy. These are young or not so young people who have had no role model or a bad role model, who may be neurodiverse, who may be resistant to relevant specialist treatment and support. They may not understand what a healthy relationship is like. They may believe that what is harmful is what a girl or woman wants. The picture over recent years has become further confused by what they see online or on social media. I am under no illusion that this is easy, but it is important. A Bill seeking to reduce reoffending is just the place where this kind of action should be taken. I am not asking for such programmes immediately, though it is good if there are some that can be accessed. However, I would like to see put into the public domain an assessment of the benefits of programmes such as this.

The other amendments in this group are in the name of the Conservative Front Bench. They seem to focus largely on the number of rehabilitation activity days. The number of days is a factor, but it is neither the first factor nor the only one; the content of rehabilitative activity and the reasons for that are more important. In other words, the approach should be more reasoned and nuanced than these amendments might suggest.

I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments, many of which are in my name—Amendments 53, 54 and so on—address the Government’s proposal to transfer a significant element of sentencing discretion from the courts to probation practitioners: determining the number of rehabilitation activity days under community orders and suspended sentence orders. The amendments seek not to frustrate reform, although, as we made clear on our first day in Committee, we oppose the changes. They are intended to ensure that, if such powers are to be reallocated to the probation officer or practitioner from the judges, they are supported and buttressed by the same principled framework of accountability, transparency and procedural safeguards that have underpinned judicial discretion through the years.

The constitutional architecture of this country has long rested on the independence and authority of our judiciary. Sentencing is a judicial function and the product of reasoned evaluation of seriousness, culpability, risk and proportionality. Judges exercise that responsibility transparently, in open court and subject to appellate review. These protections exist because sentencing is a public act in which legitimacy rests on visible fairness. Society, represented by the third limb of the constitution—the judiciary—is passing sentence on outlaws and criminal offenders.

Clauses 11 and 12 would shift this discretion from judges to probation practitioners. Probation professionals are dedicated and skilled, of course, but they were never intended to assume quasi-judicial responsibilities. The Government may describe this as flexibility, but flexibility cannot become a veil for judicial discretion exercised behind closed doors without consistency or oversight. If probation offices are to take on direct decision-making powers that influence the substance of a sentence, proper safeguards must apply; the Bill, we submit, contains none.

Amendment 53 would therefore require the Secretary of State to establish, by regulation, clear national criteria governing how rehabilitation activity days are to be determined. Decisions of such consequence must not depend on local practice, staffing pressures or administrative expediency; in these straitened financial times, I emphasise “staffing pressures or administrative expediency”. Judges operate within well-established frameworks. Probation practitioners should not be left to improvise.

Amendment 54 would require written reasons for the determination of rehabilitation days. Giving reasons is a cornerstone of fairness. Offenders must personally understand what is required of them. Victims must be able to trust the process, and the courts must be able to review what is being done in their name.

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[Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)]

My Lords, I was not intending to intervene at all in this group, but could I just try to inject an element of reality into Amendment 86A, which the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, proposes? It requires the courts service to record and retain, in respect of all offenders convicted and sentenced in the Crown Court and magistrates’ court, the details that have been referred to: country of birth, nationality, ethnicity, immigration status, and the offences themselves.

It is important to remind the Committee that, in the magistrates’ courts, hundreds of thousands of minor offences are dealt with every year. For example, there are hundreds of thousands of motoring offences such as speeding, careless driving, not having insurance and matters of that sort, as well as tens or hundreds of thousands of failures to pay a TV licence. The vast majority of those cases do not trouble a court in the normal sense, in that there is no hearing in a court. They are dealt with under the single justice procedure. Almost all of them, save those that are contested, are dealt with, essentially, on the papers.

The information identified in the proposed amendment is not available at the moment, and it is difficult to see how it might be made available. I cannot, for the moment, think of a way that it could be done without exponentially increasing the burden on the system generally and imposing huge burdens on those who have been prosecuted for speeding or not having a TV licence, and so forth. Unless there were compulsion of some sort for this information to be given, nothing could sensibly happen. I do not seek to express a view on the merits of collecting such information, or at least parts of it, for some cases; that already happens, as in the Crown Court, to some extent. However, the breadth of this amendment travels into the area of unreality, I regret to say.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have tabled amendments and spoken on the topic of transparency. It is an important aspect of the criminal justice system that it is accountable and instils trust in the public, who rely on it.

Beginning with Amendment 58A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we on these Benches broadly support the aim of this measure. Knowing the affordability and accessibility of treatments and activities is an important part of ensuring that the probation system is working. Such matters are vital to persons on probation, and they can make a real contribution to those who complete their probation periods. Regional inequalities should be known and addressed, so that all who are subject to such orders have the same means with which to complete their sentence. That may be an ideal, but it is what we should be aiming for.

I offer support from these Benches for the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough. There may indeed be real practical issues and objections, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, has reminded us of, with all his experience. He is right to draw our attention to the practical difficulties in identifying and recording ethnicity and other information—that may well be for another day. That is a fundamental objection; none the less, we would argue that the Government should certainly be looking at what information can be sensibly obtained in this area.

I was somewhat surprised to hear the noble Lord, Lord Marks, say “yes” to the collection of data in principle but “no” to its publication. That is what I think he said. Who will see it, then? Just civil servants and Ministers? Not Members of Parliament? Not Members of this House? If collected, it will certainly leak. Maybe I misunderstood him.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I think the noble Lord did misunderstand me. I did not oppose publication in any broad way; I simply said it was a matter of discretion as to what should be published and what should be kept private. The issue of universal publication is the danger that I expressed. It is a matter of discretion, relevance and importance, and those are decisions to be taken by those who collect the information.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I think there are problems with that as to how the discretion would be exercised and who would set what rules. I will not spend any longer on this, but I suggest that my noble friend Lord Young of Acton was right when he drew attention to the interim guidance supported by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. We really have to think about this. We need information—we need some sunlight—and if we do not have accurate information, the wrong information will be put out there, will be used by populists and will be dangerous.

We need accurate information. If it is limited to serious and Crown Court cases, that would at least be an important start. We do not need to know the ethnicity of every driving offender—that is clearly unnecessary—but why not for offences of violence and everything else in the Crown Court? If it can be done, let us just look at it.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, forgive me for interrupting the noble Lord. I am grateful to him for giving way. Why do we need to know anyone’s ethnicity? Why is that relevant at the stage that we are talking about? I am afraid I just do not get this argument. Why is ethnicity relevant and to whom is it relevant?

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

It is only one of the factors included. I did not mean to select just that. I was using it as shorthand for what is in my noble friend Lord Jackson’s amendment, which includes country of birth—which I suggest is relevant—and nationality.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I beg the indulgence of the Committee to specifically answer the reasonable point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. There is and has been for many years significant concern about the overpolicing of some communities. That has given rise to a number of key initiatives, including the police action plan, which the noble Lord with his great expertise is well aware of. That is based on the collection and collation of data around ethnicity. You cannot have one without the other, I am afraid.

Therefore, to keep the faith and trust that taxpayers have in the criminal justice system, one has to collect as much data as possible. If one collects it to prevent overpolicing, one should also collect it for other reasons, so that you have a clear, transparent system.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

There is quite a lot to cover in this group. My noble friend has made the point. We never suffer from having too much information. If it is collected in bits and pieces, there is the danger of distortion.

The report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, exposed a decade-long data collapse and made it clear that this should not carry on any longer. This is an area in which we have dragged our feet for too long. The majority of OECD countries have mandatory reporting statutes. The fact is that the United Kingdom does not do the same, and that is no help to anyone other than the offenders.

We need to do something to implement the recommendations from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. The amendment would give forces the necessary data to record, analyse and respond to different dynamics in different communities. Publishing data would prove to the public that the Government are not concerned with accusations of bigotry but focused on outcomes. These are clear benefits in this amendment for noble Lords’ efforts to tackle crime and reduce reoffending. I hope the Minister has considered it carefully.

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Moved by

[Lord Sandhurst]

59: Clause 13, page 28, line 26, at end insert—
“(3A) Where a court imposes a driving prohibition requirement under subsection (3) the court must be satisfied that suitable arrangements exist for the practical monitoring of compliance with the requirement.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would add a general practicability condition to the imposition of driving prohibition requirement, ensuring they may only be imposed where compliance can realistically be monitored.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. We on these Benches welcome the underlying principle of Clauses 13 to 16, which relate to new community order requirements that can be imposed on offenders as part of their suspended sentences and community orders that can be imposed on offenders as part of their sentences. However, as I asked at Second Reading, the big question is: how are these going to be made a practical reality?

There is a commendable aim here: to equip the courts with additional tools that will both enhance public protection and steer offenders towards genuine rehabilitation. It may surprise noble Lords to hear that we on these Benches do not oppose suspended sentences as a concept or in application. It has been abundantly clear, I hope, that we take issue with Clauses 1 and 2 as they are currently drafted because we believe that there should not be such an indiscriminate provision for criminals to serve their sentences in the community. However, for those offenders who should serve their sentences on a suspended basis, these clauses are a welcome measure. They will improve the regime—or, at least, they have the potential to improve the regime, if properly drafted.

Many noble Lords have spoken of their support for suspended sentences in favour of short-term custodial ones, arguing that the short-term benefits of serving such sentences in prison are largely outweighed, if not entirely negated, by the effects of custody. Although we recognise this argument and, in many cases, agree with it, I would respectfully point out that this is just one side of the coin. Of course, the outcomes for prisoners themselves are an important consideration in this debate—because, if successful, the Bill will prevent or reduce the rate of recidivism—but we must recognise the wider public. They also have an interest in recidivism—namely, that it does not occur—as well as a legitimate interest in seeing the right people be positively punished.

If we are to give support to the broader aim of this Bill, it will hinge entirely on the Government’s ability to ensure—in fact, to guarantee—that those on suspended sentences will be managed in a manner that drives towards public safety, not just the term of the sentence. If it cannot be shown that those being released into the community cannot be managed in a safe and effective way, we will fail the public by allowing this Bill to pass into statute. Noble Lords may wish to point to statistics that claim that reoffending rates are lower for those on suspended sentences, but the reality is that the statistic is not nothing. If we are to allow offenders on to the streets, we must do so in a way that does not increase the danger to citizens going about their lives and does not increase the crime rate.

A higher number will receive suspended sentences than do at the moment. It must be common sense that, when imposing suspended sentences, judges have striven, at least to date, to impose them on those for whom they think there is a lower risk of breach. But if it is to be, in effect, for everybody, inevitably there will be those for whom there is a higher risk of breach.

On day one in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, spoke in opposition to exemptions we suggested from the suspended sentence provision in Clause 1. She said she had thought:

“If there is a real danger to the general public, we probably wouldn’t be looking at a sentence of less than 12 months”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1342.]


The reality is that there is a range of crimes for which offenders are routinely sentenced to immediate custodial terms of 12 months or less. It is a matter of fact that certain sex offenders come within that category. The noble Baroness may not consider such people a real danger to the public, but we on these Benches do. Further, the Minister has confirmed that, in reality, this presumption will extend to sentences up to 18 months once guilty pleas are accounted for; in other words, 18 months discounted to 12 because of a prompt and early guilty plea, and then suspended.

We must be very clear about this: sentences of up to 18 months’ imprisonment apply to categories of people who are certainly violent and certainly dangerous. They may not be dangerous to a particular identified individual, meaning that the exemptions in the statute will not apply. Instead, we are at the mercy of court orders to keep the public safe.

The amendment proposed on day one to exempt those involved in terrorist or associated offences from the suspended sentence provision was also met with resistance. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked:

“If an offender commits a terrorist act, is he looking at 12 months or less?”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1350.]


Under the Terrorism Act 2000, a person who wears an item of clothing or displays an article related to a proscribed organisation will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment “not exceeding six months”. This means that an offender wishing to fly an al-Qaeda or a Nazi flag on the street will, in this case, now receive a suspended sentence. They are not putting a particular individual at significant risk of harm, but I am sure noble Lords will agree that they are a risk to the public and the behaviour of the public generally. Such behaviour winds people up. Yet will they not be exempt from this presumption, as currently drafted?

We will never support this measure, but if we must resign ourselves to the possibility that this will soon be the reality, we on these Benches will strive to do everything we can to lessen the risk to the public. That is why the amendments in this group have been tabled, and I will now briefly outline the practical aims of each.

Amendments 59, 64, 69 and 72 would add a general practicality condition to the imposition of the new community order requirements. This has been suggested to ensure that they may be imposed only where compliance with such requirements can realistically be monitored. Imposing these new orders will be meaningless if we cannot ensure that they can and will be enforced in practice. It is of no practical benefit to ban an offender from a particular type of public event if there is no meaningful way of ensuring that he or she will in fact not attend such events when released into the community. Likewise, there is little value in placing a driving prohibition on an offender who feels no deterrent from getting back on the road as a result of an order that he knows is fruitless in practice.

These amendments touch on a point of the utmost importance. If the Government oppose them, they are saying that they are willing to allow the courts to impose orders which they know will not be upheld in practice. This was the exact justification for the removal of the rehabilitative activity days in Clause 12; namely, that the maximum thresholds are rarely upheld in practice and so they needed reform. Will the Government follow the same logic for the new powers they are giving the courts, or will they allow conditions of suspended sentence to be given out in the full knowledge that they are just token gestures?

We make this point not only to expose the inconsistent arguments that the Government have set out in the Bill. This is not simply a matter of an ineffective law that is likely to waste the already stretched resources of our judiciary; failure to get this right will lead to more crime. It will result in more sexual offences, assaults, thefts and knives on our streets. If offenders cannot be practically managed under the new community requirement conditions, they should not be allowed to return straight to society.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness. That is very interesting, and I will take it back to the department.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the explanation given by the Minister, but the issues at stake here are not theoretical; they are practical questions about how these conditions will actually work. Will they be real, meaningful and enforceable? The Government have repeatedly asserted confidence in suspended sentences and the expanded use of community-based requirements. If that confidence is well placed, these amendments should be entirely uncontroversial; they do nothing more than ensure that what is ordered by a judge can be delivered in reality.

We are not seeking to impose obligations to enforce on the licensee of a public house, for example, but they should know so that they are then free to pass the information on to the police or the Probation Service, because they will not want someone there who is the subject of an order. It will be a public house order, for example, because the offender has a particular issue with behaviour in such places—so too with football grounds or other specified events. The host, if that is the right word, should be informed and should know that a particular individual, if recognised, should not be on his premises and can be turned away.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, with her usual acuity, pointed to the civil liberty aspects of this as well. I will not embark on those, but she also identified practical and policy issues underlying these provisions in Clauses 13 to 16. We on these Benches suggest that these amendments insert a simple and reasonable test. They do not impose a condition unless compliance can realistically be monitored in practice by the Probation Service, and the Probation Service will need help from the hosts. It is not radical to say that orders issued by a court should carry weight. A prohibition that in practice cannot and will not be checked is not a deterrent. A restriction that cannot and will not be enforced is not a restriction. Without these safeguards, we will create orders that are performative rather than protective. They will offer only the illusion of safety to communities and to victims.

The Government themselves use this precise standard when justifying reforms elsewhere in the Bill—for example, removing rehabilitative activity days because the system “did not operate effectively in practice”. The provisions in Clauses 13 to 16, if they are to be enforced, must be enforceable in practice and must be effective. If a condition is imposed but nobody has a duty to enforce it, it is not a condition at all. The Probation Service is not going to have time to run around the pubs, football grounds and so on; it is going to have to rely on information from other people.

These amendments would simply ensure that the supervising authority has responsibility for enforcement and is given the means to do so, rather than the vague hope that somebody may intervene if they happen to notice a breach. Without this duty, we repeat here that the failures seen with criminal behaviour orders and football banning orders, where thousands of breaches each year go unpursued and offenders learn that compliance is optional, will be repeated. Public confidence will not be restored by rhetoric; in fact, it will be damaged. It will be damaged by visible consequences, namely failures to enforce.

The Government propose to release more offenders into the community under suspended and community-based regimes. That is a political choice. Having chosen that path, they must choose the responsibility to ensure that it works and that it is safe. We should not be asking the British Government to accept greater risk while refusing the safeguards that would mitigate that risk. Ministers who believe that this strategy will reduce reoffending should have no objection to tests of practicability, enforcement duties and notification requirements. To oppose these amendments, they must be justified as to why they will be unenforceable, unmonitored, unaccountable conditions. That is a hard case to make to the victims, to police officers on the street or to the public whose safety is being traded away.

The amendments we put forward are not obstructive but supportive. They would help, indeed allow, the Government’s policy to function in the real world, not just on the printed page. If we are to put offenders back in the community who might not otherwise have been there—indeed, probably would not have been—the very least we owe the public is confidence that these conditions will be monitored and enforced, so I urge the Government to look again at these amendments and to reflect. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, for moving his amendment. Providing care for individuals with addictions, gambling in particular, should be a fundamental role of a national health service, and we support his aims.

As the noble Lord explained, gambling addiction is a chronic issue across this country. Roughly 2.8% of all adults are engaged in at-risk or problem gambling—a huge number of people either in need of, or at risk of needing, support services. His amendments highlight this issue and the need for our services properly to address gambling addiction.

We support the sentiment behind the approach to general addiction recovery services of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe. Often, individuals with addiction either cannot or do not want to accept recovery services. To introduce a requirement to engage with services would serve those people. This is particularly the case in prisons. Last year, there were almost 50,000 adults in recovery in alcohol and drug treatment centres in prison and secure settings. Almost 60% of those individuals were undergoing treatment for crack or opiates. That 60% comprises vulnerable individuals being treated for misuse of the hardest substances.

The principle behind Amendments 131 to 133, from the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, clearly reflects the reality of the situation. We heard an interesting proposal from the noble Lord, which merits consideration. We also heard an interesting speech from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, who of course has great experience as a Minister in this field. We remain, however, not fully convinced that this group of amendments would have the desired effect.

There is a large question mark hovering over the whole Bill: the general enforceability of the new orders it introduces. We have explained that we do not agree with the decision to suspend sentences under 18 months—that is, 18 months because the Government have opposed our guilty plea amendment—but if the Government are to make this all work, the new orders they impose have to be effective. As I have said before, we are not convinced that they will be.

As I have already argued, the Government’s new drinking establishment entry prohibition requirement realistically is unenforceable. Public event attendance is too vague and too broad. The Government’s approach to new orders is largely deficient. We do not think they should be taking on new responsibilities, even if there is a need for them, as is the case with gambling addiction, when they have demonstrated an incapacity to plan for the existing responsibilities that are being imposed.

The onus, therefore, is on the Government to demonstrate that the noble Lord’s well-intentioned amendments can be accepted, if possible, and then implemented. We would like this to be the case, but only if possible. Gambling addiction and addiction in general require attention from our state, but the state must first prove itself competent. We look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for sharing their views and tabling these amendments, which raise important issues around tackling gambling harms and the harms caused by other addictions. Just last week I met a prisoner at HMP Wormwood Scrubs whose life have been devastated by gambling harm. Although the data on gambling is limited, I understand that this is an important issue impacting the lives of offenders and their families.

Amendments 70 and 78 would introduce new community order requirements: one prohibiting an offender from entering a gambling establishment, and one introducing a mandatory treatment requirement. I wholeheartedly share the commitment of the noble Lord, Lord Foster, to supporting offenders whose lives are impacted by gambling. I assure noble Lords that courts already have the power to prohibit offenders serving a community or suspended sentence from entering gambling premises. They can do this through a prohibited activity requirement.

However, I reassure the noble Lord that we will continue to keep the menu of community requirements under close review. Clause 17 introduces a power to add or amend community requirements using secondary legislation. This will provide further flexibility to ensure that the framework is kept relevant to the offending behaviour.

The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foster, and my noble friend Lord Brooke, and supported by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, speak to the wider issue of how the criminal justice system can support and treat those whose offending is driven by addiction or mental health needs. I know this issue is close to noble Lords’ hearts and I agree completely that alongside effective punishment we have a duty to rehabilitate offenders with gambling addictions and other needs. We must provide them with the right support throughout the criminal justice system to rebuild their lives. I hope it will help your Lordships for me to set out the ways in which we are already doing so.

Pre-sentence reports help the court identify underlying issues such as harmful gambling, mental ill-health and addiction, which may influence offending behaviour. Mental health conditions and addictions can be considered at sentencing where they are relevant to the offence or the offender’s culpability. Courts are encouraged to take an individualised approach, particularly where the condition contributes to someone’s offending. Where appropriate, courts may consider mental health treatment requirements, funded by NHS England as part of a community or suspended sentence order, where mental health has been identified as an underlying factor. The use of these requirements has increased significantly in recent years.

Alongside this, HMPPS delivers a broad range of rehabilitative interventions through probation, which can help address wider gambling-related harms. This includes support with thinking and behaviour, homelessness or unemployment. We also work closely with health partners to ensure that pathways to treatment and recovery services are accessible for offenders and aligned with prison and probation services. This includes increasing the use and effectiveness of mental health, alcohol and drug treatment requirements as part of community and suspended sentences.

For those in prison, there is already a statutory duty for prison governors to provide health services in custody, with our approach guided by the principle of equivalence of care to patients in the community. We are ensuring that prison leavers remain in treatment on release by strengthening links to prison, probation and treatment providers.

Finally, support for those with gambling-related harms in the criminal justice system will be bolstered by funding from the statutory gambling levy. The Government have committed to publishing an annual report on the progress of this. I will also reach out to representatives in the gambling industry and will look to host a round table with them next year to better understand the impacts of gambling harm and what more we can do.

The noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, also tabled Amendment 108, which would give new powers to set licence conditions prohibiting offenders from entering a gambling establishment. I want to be clear that the provisions in Clause 24 will support our aim to give practitioners a full range of tools to manage and support offenders. Existing powers enable probation to set additional licence conditions related to gambling, including prohibiting offenders on licence from gambling or making payments for other games of chance.

Probation also has an existing power to request an additional licence condition, directing offenders to undertake activities to address their gambling activities, where necessary and proportionate to their risk. HMPPS delivers a broad range of rehabilitative interventions through probation, which can help address wider gambling-related harms. We will be looking at issuing operational guidance to practitioners on effective usage of gambling-related licence conditions, alongside implementation of the new conditions set out in Clause 24. I would very much like to harness the considerable expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Foster, on this topic. I hope that he will be keen to work with me and my officials as this work develop0s.

Finally, I thank my noble friend Lord Bach for his Amendment 101. I reassure him that probation practitioners carefully consider what licence conditions to recommend as part of their supervision and management of an offender. They can tailor conditions to the specific needs of the offender, in line with managing public protection.

Although there is no formal process for representations, this is not considered to be necessary. Probation practitioners draw on a range of information when applying licence conditions and discuss conditions with offenders as part of release planning. They must ensure that licence conditions are necessary and proportionate, and they can grant necessary exemptions to licence conditions for rehabilitative purposes. This will be the same for the new conditions.

I repeat my thanks to noble Lords for allowing the Committee to debate these important subjects, but I hope I have explained why the Government do not agree that these amendments are necessary. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.