(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also support my noble friend Lord Moynihan. I wish to ask the Minister two questions that arise on this topic that I have found in the impact assessment.
At paragraph 68, there is a description of the enforcement regime in relation to the provisions in the Bill:
“Enforcement will be delivered via a mainly civil sanctions regime”.
In respect of a standard duty premises, we can see that there is a fixed penalty and an ability for the regulator to impose a fixed penalty of £500 per day from the date on which the
“penalty is due until the date the contravention is rectified or the notice is withdrawn by the Regulator”.
There is furthermore a power, in the most “egregious cases” according to the impact assessment, of a criminal prosecution of the relevant person. My first question picks up on a theme in an earlier group. To what extent does the Minister think this will have an impact on volunteering and the willingness of people to take on roles where they would be responsible for facing such enforcement?
My second question is in relation to the funding estimates in the impact assessment. One can see, in paragraph 98 on page 23 of the impact assessment, there is a description of how it is that the civil servants have reached their valuation of what the Bill is going to cost. In the previous paragraph, they discuss the impact of outdoor festivals, but in paragraph 98 they say that outdoor events other than festivals
“have not been included in the analysis. These events are not included due to the absence of specific and accurate data about the number of events and their respective capacities. This lack of a comprehensive list of these events means that a reliable estimate of the number of events could not be made. Therefore, outdoor events other than festivals have been excluded from the appraisal analysis”.
I suggest to the Committee that this is simply not good enough. This is an impact assessment which tells us on its first page that the possible financial impact of these measures is somewhere between £1.8 billion, which is the best case, and £4.9 billion. To simply exclude the valuation from outdoor events because no attempt can be made to assess how many people may attend is simply not good enough. We can see this is a policy that has been developed without the needs of the kinds of small sports grounds that my noble friend has identified. Would the Minister agree that the common-sense position would be to consider excluding completely these kinds of small sporting venues from the operation of the Bill?
My Lords, I will try to be as short as possible at this time of night. Schedule 2 excludes from the scope of the Bill sports grounds that are not designated sports grounds. So far, so good—but it is not straightforward. The exclusion for recreation and leisure in part 1 of Schedule 2 applies only where those attending are not members or customers who paid. If it is a members’ club, you are not excluded.
Furthermore, a sports ground is defined as being a sports ground within Section 17 of the sports grounds Act, or whatever it is called. The definition in that Act says that it means
“any place where sports or other competitive activities take place in the open air and where accommodation has been provided for spectators consisting of artificial structures or of natural structures artificially modified for the purpose”.
The reference to accommodation for spectators could well include a pavilion or some other fairly relaxed accommodation, with perhaps a bar attached and changing facilities, and so on. It does not have to be a pavilion as I understand it, which would include accommodation for 800 people. It is just a sports ground which has accommodation, because you are looking at the sports grounds Act.
So a question arises where there are quite large playing fields, a pavilion and a members’ club, and 200 people come from time to time to watch the match on Saturday against other clubs. It is not a lot of people, and children come, and everyone else. From time to time—because that is the wording in the Bill—there is a match against their local rivals, and they bring 400 friends along, and the home team have got 600, so you have 1,000. Are they going to have to search everyone who comes, and every car, and so on?
I am not saying that this is entirely wrong, but I do suggest that thought has to be given to how it will bite. What is the definition of an outdoor event or a sporting event of the sort I have in mind, such as football matches between local villages and towns? Cricket matches sometimes attract quite a lot of people. I am not talking about county grounds but just matches between two clubs that are old rivals on a bank holiday or something like that. This is all in the open air, in a completely unconfined space and, one hesitates to say, not on the highest level of the risk register. I am not going to tempt fate by saying anything else. I ask the Minister to consider this, certainly before Report.
My Lords, given the hour, I shall be extremely brief. I felt that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, made some very convincing points, but I am afraid we still basically disagree with most of these amendments, because we disagree with the premise that rural sports grounds are less likely to be attacked. I do not think that there is evidence for that—at least, I remain unconvinced that there is evidence.
My second point echoes that of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, about requesting sector-specific guidance. I think that that would be a very useful thing for the Minister to pursue. Having sector-specific guidance for sports grounds would perhaps help with some of the concerns that noble Lords on the Conservative Benches have raised this evening.
(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am minded to support the amendment, but maybe that is because I am a little uncertain about how we are going to ensure that what we all want, which is to protect the public, is guaranteed by the Bill. I worry about a certain mission creep. At Second Reading, a lot of people quoted Sir John Saunders saying:
“Doing nothing is, in my view, not an option”,
but I also quoted Yvette Cooper, the Home Secretary, who quoted him as saying:
“Equally, the Protect Duty must not be so prescriptive as to prevent people enjoying a normal life”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/10/24; col. 625.]
As I understand the aim of the amendment, it is simply to ensure that we do not forget what the point of the Bill is. Whether we like it or not, regulatory powers have a tendency of leaving their original aim and growing or going elsewhere. In that sense, I want to ensure that we do not forget what the Bill is about, and that means this amendment. It might seem silly to say that, and tempting to say, “We won’t forget what this Bill is about”, but a lot of the evidence in relation to the Bill does not indicate that the specific measures in it will actually keep people safe from terrorism. I do not doubt that it puts a huge amount of responsibility on individuals, but I do not know that the end result is going to be what we intend it to be. I was of a mind to think that the amendment might help to keep focus; that is one of the things that I was attracted to.
One of the things that is nagging me—and I am going to raise it here because it seems an appropriate place—is that, if we are going to say that the aim is to protect people from terrorism, we also need to know what we mean by terrorism. I am not being glib. The Government themselves have noted that the Bill is partly in response to the changing nature of terrorism—we now have lone-wolf terrorists; it is not straightforward, so we cannot just rely on the secret services and so on—so the changing nature of those terror threats requires this regulation. However, I do not know that we are closer to knowing what that definition of terrorism is. We can all say, as we all will, that we want to pass a piece of legislation that will keep people safe from terrorism, yet we have decided that we do not know how to define terrorism.
Let us think of the official confusion in relation to Axel Rudakubana. As one journalist pointed out last week, saying that he was known to the authorities is an understatement. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, pointed out that this is about putting responsibility on individuals but, in that instance, it is hard to name an authority or individual who did not know the threat embodied by that young man, including the police, social services, mental health services, counter-extremism services, education establishments and Childline. He actually said, “I am going to be a mass murderer”, and we know about the ricin, the al-Qaeda manual, and so on. Yet he was not labelled a terrorist. I worry that, if we are confused about our definitions, in relation to this Bill as well, there could be problems.
I have a final point on this. I also worry precisely because we have decided, or declared, that terrorism is changing—I do not challenge the idea that there is something in this—such that somebody who created ricin and had an al-Qaeda manual was not labelled a terrorist. He did not fall through the net—he was caught in the net—yet, none the less, as has been pointed out, nothing was done.
At the same time, we have an expansive slippage between the notions of extremism and terrorism. It has become very unclear what we mean. It might be a joke, but it was revealed over the weekend that the report commissioned, albeit rejected, by the Government, featured a reading list indicating dangerous, far-right extremism that could lead to terrorism. A viewing and watch list was included, featuring Michael Portillo’s “Great British Railways” programme and “Yes Minister” as potentially indicating a problem.
You know, that is, like, “What? How mad”. The reason I am mentioning it is that I do not want mission creep in relation to definitions, or in relation to the regulatory aspects of this Bill. I am terrified of the unintended consequences for community organising, civil society, venues and so on. I just think there is nothing wrong with a very specific reminder of what we want this Bill to do. That is what attracted me, at least, to this amendment.
My Lords, I of course approve of the Government’s overall intention behind the Bill. However, I have serious concerns about how it will be implemented and whether it is necessary to have this wide range of powers on quite small organisations, events and places that will have events coming within the scope of the Act—when it is an Act—only once or twice a year. We could have real problems there.
My concerns are similar to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, from whom we just heard. There is a real need for focus, and for the Secretary of State, when making regulations, to get them sharply on the point. This is especially so in relation to the likely impact on smaller businesses as well as voluntary and community-run organisations in the standard tier premises. There is a lack of evidence that the Bill will adequately reduce the threat of terrorism to smaller organisations, if indeed they are likely to be at risk.
There will be problems too for one-off and occasional events, which may attract quite large numbers, but in informal surroundings. There will be a big burden on them. How will it really work? So, the purpose is necessary. Just because there are going to be 850 people at an event, do we really need the whole panoply of this Bill?
In 2023, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee produced a report, which, for those who have not looked at it recently, is well worth looking at. It was a careful and well-evidenced report that addressed the then draft Bill. I know that things have moved on since then, but the conclusions reached by that committee on the evidence to which the report referred highlight areas that need to be addressed in the approach to be adopted today.
The committee pointed out that in the 2010s—a slightly different period from the one that my noble friend Lord Davies opened on—there were 14 terror attacks. A lot of those involved knives; there were also vehicle attacks, bombs and one firearm. This was in the 2010s. The majority were out of scope of what is in the Bill: they were on the streets, on Crown premises such as barracks, or on transport. Those would not be covered by the Bill, yet they were the bulk of the attacks. This Bill is irrelevant to them.
My Lords, I am slightly wary, because I want to probe what we mean by the definition of buildings. I find these issues interesting. but I am less interested in them technically and will probably be accused of steering into Second Reading territory.
I genuinely think that trying to clarify what we mean by “building” is important. It speaks to my fear that the Bill might unintentionally dampen down civil society, have an impact on grass-roots activity and lead to a hyper-regulation of public spaces. I do not think that is what it intends to do, so I urge the Government not to expand beyond a narrow view of what a building is.
I was struck when a village in Lincolnshire was forced to cancel its Christmas fair, after it had been told to block off roads due to the risk of a potential terrorist attack. In a discussion on this, somebody noted that it was because there were worries about the impact of Martyn’s law, when it becomes law. I did a little digging and discovered a number of organisations that said that councils and other organisations were citing Martyn’s law guidelines—as we know, it is not a law—in a risk-averse way, pushing back against large gatherings such as bonfires and so forth.
My nervousness is that this law will be used to push a precautionary principle when it comes to civil society. I get anxious about that, so the last thing I want to do is to interpret any gathering, temporary or otherwise, where there are a lot of people, as a building or structure. Somebody just made a point in relation to markets and Christmas markets. One organiser said, “If this carries on, I doubt we will continue, as it takes all the joy out of it”. I just remind the Committee, to go back to the Home Secretary’s point, that the aim of the Bill is not to destroy the capacity of ordinary people to gather, because that would be to let the terrorists win. So, whatever way we come down on our definition of buildings, let us not forget that there is a cost to pay if we overinterpret this to say that, “There is a large group of people; terrorists can attack them; close everything down”. In which case, the terrorists will have won, and what is the point of that?
My Lords, whichever way we look at this, I suggest that it is absolutely plain that we need a clear definition of “building”. A number of good points have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, made a good suggestion. The amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is also a good one. There is merit also in taking at least part of the Building Act, but “building” needs to be defined. Thus, I think it must be clear, when one considers it, that Section 121(2) of the Building Act is not completely apposite, because it does include the words,
“a vehicle, vessel, hovercraft, aircraft”.
One could include the definition there but exclude expressly those words or any other bits. One could do it by reference to the Building Safety Act, or it may be that the best route is to go to the definitions section at the back, look at the two existing statutes that are in place and take a good definition combining those where appropriate. I suggest that we certainly need a proper definition of “building” at the back, which must include demountable, collapsible buildings—things that very often look almost like a tent. Are large tents to be included, or a circus site event which could hold 500 people? If we are going to protect people, let us get it right.
My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has put his finger on it. It seems to me that, if it is a large tent and 500 people are gathered within it, then somebody ought to be making arrangements to ensure that people are protected. That is what the Bill is about. I have listened with great fascination to the discussion about where we draw the definition of “building”. I always tend, because I am prejudiced that way, that when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, gives us a view on definitions, we should take serious note of that, because in my experience he is usually right. I leave it to the Government to come forward with what they think is a satisfactory definition that embraces what we need.
Ultimately, what we are trying to say with this legislation is that people who organise public events, whether they are formal events, community events, concerts or whatever else, should be thinking in advance, “Is this going to be secure?” That also means thinking about what I will do if somebody over there commits a terrorist act that has an implication for the people who are gathered in my event. I hope that my noble friend, when he replies, will say that the Government will look again, will gather together all those with strong views on the definition of “building”, temporary or otherwise, tents or not, and work out what works best. I think that our objective here is quite clear: that people should have a responsibility for the protection of people when they have gathered them together for whatever purpose.
My Lords, I can be quite short on this. The purpose of this amendment is to address the use of the words “from time to time” in the context of defining the premises to which the obligations will apply—whether from time to time 200 or more individuals may be present or, in the case of the enhanced duty, 800. It is a probing amendment. I acknowledge straight away that “not less than once a month” may not be the right definition, but there had to be something, and “from time to time”, I suggest, is simply too vague.
Is it to be once a year? If you have an event every year, that is “from time to time”. As is presently defined, the premises are caught if
“it is reasonable to expect that”
a given number of individuals may be present “from time to time”. An annual event might be caught, but what happens if it is just someone who does something from time to time? As a lawyer, I am very uncomfortable with this, and I can see the arguments that lawyers much cleverer than me will produce.
The premises are ordinarily qualifying premises only in the sense that they have a capacity of 200 or 250, but they may have an annual day to which 750 come one year and 900 come another. Will that come into this category? They may even have an annual day to which a bit over 800 might be expected. If that is so, the full panoply of the Act will fall: not just to the qualifying premises events but to the enhanced premises events. It is important to be clear about what you want to catch, who will be subject to enhanced obligations, and what is proportionate and necessary to keep people as safe as we reasonably can without creating unnecessary barriers and boundaries. I ask the Government simply to look very carefully at the words, “from time to time”, and to consider whether a better definition could be employed.
Amendment 11 suggests a provision that, where premises are
“assessed as low risk by an independent safety assessor”,
they are to be
“exempt from the duties imposed under this Act”—
in other words, you can have an opt-out. It might be that that would be applicable only to lower categories of events, but it is certainly worth looking at. If you have a good record, you would not do it tomorrow. However, in a year or two, everyone will have experience of how this works—the regulator will have that experience—and, if they see that a given place is well regulated and well run, it will not need to be within the full panoply of the Act.
My Lords, despite supporting the Bill in general, I strongly support Amendment 11, which I will speak to. An assessment of risk, which is generally agreed to be appropriate in all aspects of modern life, seems to be absent from the Bill. Any premises or event, regardless of the real risk of it being attacked, must take a series of potentially very costly precautions.
It is worth noting that of the 15 terrorist attacks to which the impact assessment seems to refer as the main basis for the Bill, six were in London, two in Manchester and one in Liverpool, and all were in urban areas. In fact, all of them were in areas that had tarmac underneath them; not a single one was in a rural area. Does that suggest that it is right to treat events in rural settings as being as high risk as those in urban areas? It is like applying 20 miles per hour speed limits throughout the entire country: it might marginally improve safety, but at a cost of bringing the economy to its knees. In their search for economic growth, is this really what the Government want? I urge them to introduce a little good sense and allow there to be an assessment of risk in these situations.
Without straying into other parts of the Bill, I would hope that people and premises that fall within scope of the Bill, be it a 200 or an 800 threshold, would have clarity over their responsibility areas. If they look at Clause 5, “Public protection procedures”, they will know exactly what is required of them for those public protection matters that fall within the scope of the Bill. So, whether it is “from time to time” as in one day a year or as in every week or every month, if we are more prescriptive, as would be the case under the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, we would take out a number of premises that—even if it was only one day a year, as the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, mentioned—would still meet the criteria of the scope of the Bill. My judgment is that the measures in Clause 5 are important but not onerous. They are about training, support and examination of a number of areas. Therefore, if from time to time, one day a year, a premise falls within scope to meet the objectives, the responsible person needs to examine the premise and look at the measures needed in place. That is the reason.
I say that not because I want to impose burdens on a range of bodies but because the terrorist threat is substantial. While the terrorist incidents have occurred in large cities, there is no likelihood that they may not occur in other parts of the country. Therefore, those measures are required within the scope of the Bill. From my perspective as the Minister responsible for taking the Bill through this House, it is important that they are required on a “from time to time” basis, not on a very prescriptive monthly basis. That is why I urge the noble Lord not to press his amendments.
In the case of an enhanced premises, where there is an event of 1,000 people once a year but for the rest of the year there are never more 200 or 300 people going through, does that bring it into that category? You are normally just “qualifying” premises and so must have the facilities and systems in place to deal with a terrorism event if, heaven forbid, such happens, but if, now and again, you get to 800 people, does it mean that you have to search everyone coming and going throughout the year or is it only when there is the event? That is where I have concerns.
My Lords, the amendment leading the group was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, so he should have replied and he must formally withdraw it.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThe collection of non-crime hate incident information is important because it helps to get a picture of potential wider crime in due course. But make no mistake: this Government’s priority is securing the streets, protecting the public and improving neighbourhood policing. The noble Lord will know that we are very clear that we support action on rape and sexual offences, and we are going to support action on burglary and put in place neighbourhood policing. Even today, the Home Secretary has announced half a billion pounds of extra support for policing, over and above what will be announced in December’s final settlement, to secure neighbourhood policing and tackle the very issues the noble Lord mentioned.
My Lords, last year, I spoke in the debate on the new code of practice and urged the then Conservative Minister to require that each police force, among other things, report to the Minister on how many new incidents of non-crime hate speech had been recorded in the previous 12 months, and every year thereafter. Can the Minister tell us—and if not, write to me—whether this is happening, and if it is not, will he undertake to put such a requirement in place?
The Home Secretary has today announced potential reforms to the monitoring of police performance and what they need to monitor. If the noble Lord looks at what the Home Secretary said, he will see that there will be an ongoing process of monitoring police performance, and as part of that, the recording of non-crime hate incidents will undoubtedly be a key issue.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord should know that the 1,000 are going to be in place by March 2025, and he can hold the Government to account on that figure. We are recruiting now; it is currently 14 November 2024, and, from memory, by March 2025 the 1,000 will be in place. We have improved support for probation staff and increased the pay level from 1 October to 1 April this year, to recognise and, I hope, retain people who are in post.
My Lords, the Chief Probation Officer said in September that they expected up to one-third of early release prisoners to reoffend. What steps have the Government taken to ensure that victims of early release violent offenders are first informed and then supported?
The initial assessment by officials of the early release scheme has indicated that there has not been a significant change to the number of recalls that have taken place—although that is always potentially an issue with anyone, at any time, who leaves prison with the remainder of their sentence in place. Victim liaison is extremely important. I assure the noble Lord that, in the event of breaches taking place, recalls happen quickly and individuals are recalled to prison as a matter of emergency.
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am delighted to respond in this debate on His Majesty the King’s gracious Speech. In doing so, I declare my interest as chair of the executive committee of the Society of Conservative Lawyers.
It is a pleasure to welcome the new Government Front Bench. I have great respect for the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, who has distinguished himself in his work in opposition. I welcome the noble Lords, Lord Timpson and Lord Hanson. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, on his excellent maiden speech and look forward to hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, shortly. Finally, but not least, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, whose maiden speech I particularly enjoyed; it was very moving. We will benefit from his arrival.
I commend the ambition of the crime and policing Bill, which continues the good work of the last Government’s Victims and Prisoners Act. However, my focus today is on what is not in the gracious Speech. To protect victims and run effective criminal courts, we need properly funded and competent prosecutors and defendants require competent defence lawyers. However, for serious sex offences, there is a real shortage of lawyers who are “ticketed”—in the jargon—to appear in such cases. Delays follow, justice suffers and victims suffer. Thus, Ciara Bergman, chief executive of Rape Crisis England & Wales, recently called for a government strategy to retain barristers in this field. A recent Criminal Bar Association survey of 780 criminal barristers found that almost two-thirds of prosecutors said they would not reapply to be ticketed on the rape and serious sexual offences list. These are skilled professionals who can sell their services in the market elsewhere. Government must act fast. Pious aspirations and new laws are not enough.
My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier has already addressed Mr Malkinson’s appalling case. That and the postmasters’ scandal have highlighted the need for top-quality prosecution and defence lawyers. Worse still, Mr Malkinson’s case was let down badly by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. That commission has been forced to apologise following Christopher Henley KC’s inquiry, which found grave shortcomings in its conduct. That body needs better resources and new leadership. I ask the Front Bench to please note that.
The sub-postmasters’ scandal would not have been uncovered but for the judgment in the civil action they brought. That action was possible only because it was backed by litigation funders. A Supreme Court decision last year, by a side wind, has thrown the market of funding into confusion. Before the Dissolution, there was a short Bill before Parliament to put that right. It was lost. There was no mention of it in the King’s Speech. What plans do the Government have? Where is the Bill, and why is it not mentioned? We need it now.
Next, on private prosecutions, we do not need to await the outcome of Sir Wyn Williams’s inquiry to know that there must be a major change in the way that these are conducted. The Post Office was a private prosecutor, and it highlights what can go wrong. It had a vested interest in the outcome; it should have been the CPS. What plans do the Government have to review the extent and use of such powers? We do not need to await the result of the inquiry—so action, please.
On SLAPPs, we have heard already that a Private Member’s Bill that was going through was lost. We have been assured that such a Bill is a work in progress, and I do not doubt Ministers’ good faith. However, they should note that there are plenty on all sides of the House who will make them subject to questions and pressure if such a Bill is not forthcoming soon.
Lastly, on coroners’ courts, we must do much more to achieve an efficient coronial system. In fact, we must do as the recent senior coroners have urged and put the coronial system on a proper national footing. It must be taken away from the ambit of local authorities; they do not have the resources. The Government must have plans for that, and I would like to hear what they are.
(1 year ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this treaty with the Republic of Rwanda underlies the safety of Rwanda Bill. If were not ratified by Parliament, the Bill would lose its foundation stone; but today, as I hope Members understand, this House cannot by its own resolution block the ratification process. Only a resolution passed in the other place can do that.
I have read with care the committee’s report. It sends an important message to the Government, but—and this is important—whatever it says about the arrangements in Rwanda going forward and its anxieties about whether they will be effective, it does not complain about the terms of the treaty. I stress that. The treaty, as this careful report notes, puts into legally binding form the arrangements previously set out in the 2022 memorandum of understanding, with enhancements, which, the report notes, if effective—I emphasise the word “effective”—will provide important safeguards for persons transferred to Rwanda. That is what the report says. Of course, we shall know whether that is so only if and when the Bill becomes law and the process begins.
To adopt what my noble friend Lord Howell has said, this report provides a useful agenda for the Government—and, indeed, for all of us when we debate the Bill. The report acknowledges that the treaty will improve the protections previously set out in that earlier memorandum. It identifies practical steps that need to be taken before the protections could be deemed operational, and such that they might make a difference to the assessment reached by the Supreme Court.
Like my noble friend Lord Howell, I hope that the Government will read this report with care and not just pay lip service to it. The report argues that evidence is also needed that the arrangements have been effective in practice. One can see that that evidence will be available only if the process is embarked upon and after it has been in practice; that is, if it has taken place.
The authors of the report, members of this distinguished committee, are doubtful that the treaty would change the position in Rwanda in the short to medium term. That will arise only if this treaty is in effect and the arrangements have been tested. Clearly, when we debate the Bill, we will have to see what reassurances we receive from the Government. On that basis, the authors recommend that the treaty not be ratified until Parliament is satisfied that the protections have been fully implemented.
It is worth looking again at Article 3(1) and (2) of the treaty:
“The Parties agree that the obligations in this Agreement shall be met in respect of all Relocated Individuals, regardless of their nationality, and without discrimination”.
That is the core agreement. It continues:
“The Parties agree to take all steps that are necessary or appropriate to ensure that their obligations can both in practice be complied with and are in fact complied with”.
That is the obligation on the Rwanda Government and on our Government. It continues:
“Those steps shall include continuing discussions, support”—
that is a matter that the committee was concerned about—
“and the fullest cooperation between the Parties with a view to maintaining and enhancing their practical ability to do so. Both Parties recognise the importance to that end of the monitoring arrangements set out in this Agreement, and the taking of all reasonable steps to ensure that that monitoring is as effective as possible”.
The committee none the less recommends that the treaty is not ratified, as have several speakers today, until Parliament is satisfied that the protections provided have been fully implemented. However, if it is not ratified there will be no Bill. That will end the process. The time for advancing those arguments is when we debate the detail of the Bill and ask: are we confident that it is right to have a second go?
I suggest that the report does not identify anything objectionable or contrary to principle in the treaty itself. The report’s concern is that the treaty obligations imposed may not be adhered to by the Republic of Rwanda when and if the Bill is passed and the migrants are sent to that country for processing. I remind this House that, as an earlier speaker said, the Supreme Court did not doubt the good faith of the Government of Rwanda. So the true question today is whether Parliament, when it debates the Bill, should have confidence that the aspirations on which it is founded are sound. Will the aspirations contained in the treaty be fulfilled? That is a judgment to be made then by Parliament and ultimately by Members of the other place as the elected representatives.
The second resolution therefore puts the cart before the horse, although obviously I have no problem with the first Motion. I suggest that the treaty itself is entirely reasonable. It contains clear obligations on both parties. The points made in the report can be given effect to either by amendment to the Bill or ultimately by not passing the Bill in its current form. I am not urging either of those courses at this stage, but that is what is open to Parliament.
It is in that debate that the proper forum will arise. First, Parliament is entitled to proceed on the basis that Rwanda now will act in accordance with its obligations under Article 10, which bind Rwanda in both international law and its own domestic law not to remove persons except to the United Kingdom. Secondly, if there is structural failure—even passing imperfections arise in practice—we can be confident that the matter will be taken up in Parliament and that Ministers, particularly in the other place, will be given a hard time. They will be pressured to act and there will be action. The Rwandan Government have made it clear that they see compliance with international law as paramount—not least, as we know, because they wish to replicate their United Kingdom deal with other countries.
In the Bill, as we have heard, Clause 2 will impose an obligation to treat the Republic of Rwanda as a safe country. That is something this House can debate when the Bill comes before it. It will have the committee’s report. If this House is satisfied that the country is unsafe, no doubt it will say so. That may be because, for example, no judges have been appointed; it might be for any number of reasons, but we can address Clause 2 then. But that does not go to the validity or the value of this treaty.
Today, I respectfully submit to this House and to those who have drawn up this very careful report, is not the place to oppose ratification and certainly not for the reasons advanced. If the House divides, I shall of course support the first Motion to Take Note, but I shall vote against the second Motion.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have already spoken about the operational independence of the police, which I think we all regard as sacrosanct. The Answer that I repeated included the line:
“it would be disrespectful and demonstrably wrong for protests to take place on Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday”.
Actually, I do not think that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister used the word “demonstrably”, but what he did say was “disrespectful”. However, he went on to say:
“part of that freedom is the right to peacefully protest. And the test of that freedom is whether our commitment to it can survive the discomfort and frustration of those who seek to use it, even if we disagree with them. We will meet that test and remain true to our principles”.
I happen to think that is exactly right and describes the country I am proud to be a citizen of.
My Lords, as we have heard, Peel’s fifth principle requires the police to demonstrate complete independence of policy. Of that, it is equally plain that my noble friend the Minister is well aware. Will he therefore remind the Home Secretary of this principle, since her public criticisms of the Metropolitan Police make it impossible for the commissioner to retain his operational independence or at least the appearance of operational independence, which is vital to public confidence? The Home Secretary seems either to be ignorant or to be flouting it.
My Lords, I have already referred to the policing protocol, which governs all the actors’ principal responsibilities. We should focus on taking steps to reassure the various communities that are coming under pressure; —the police are definitely doing that. Police forces up and down the country have stepped up neighbourhood patrols to support local Jewish and Muslim communities, including visiting schools, synagogues and mosques. Sadly, we have seen a significant increase in hate crime reported since Hamas’s terrorist attack in Israel, and the Metropolitan Police has made a number of arrests to date linked with that. That shows that the Metropolitan Police is more than capable of exercising its responsibilities and is doing a good job.
Perhaps I may say from a personal point of view that the virulent anti-Semitism that we have seen makes me feel physically sick. My Jewish friends are afraid, and in this country that is disgusting.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the committee, of which I was a member and which was so excellently chaired by my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes, reported last November. We heard from 56 witnesses. They covered a range of experience: academics, Ministers, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, prosecutors in the courts, the Home Office, financial services, regulators and a range of internet platforms and service providers, as well as telecoms companies. Above all, we heard from the victims.
The picture was absolutely clear. We face in this country a really serious problem with fraud. Too many of our institutions have failed to take it seriously enough or to address it effectively. We have to act, and now. Our report identified the issues. It provided in one easily readable, if quite long, document a route map for police, government, regulators and major commercial players. There is no excuse to say that they do not know what to do, or to deny that there is a problem.
I will remind the House briefly of some core findings. Fraud is the most commonly experienced crime in England and Wales, yet is excluded from the crime figures. It accounts for approximately 41% of all crimes against individuals. Losses total at least £4 billion a year. The Bank of England has admitted that it directly affects consumer confidence. Most fraud happens online; 80% of reported frauds are cyber-enabled. The exponential growth in fraud and scams, we found, has been invisible. Fraudsters face little risk of being caught. Victims are embarrassed to report it. Law enforcement is underresourced.
We found that this underprioritisation has created a permissive culture across the Government and law enforcement agencies. This then permeates through to affect the attitudes of the private sector players in the fraud chain—internet service providers, telecoms companies and the like. They have not stepped in to do what they can to prevent customers being scammed. Indeed, I received an email to the effect that they feel they have not had a fair hearing from our committee; I do not know whether others did.
Organised criminals around the world turn to the UK as a lucrative market to commit fraud. As we have heard, their proceeds are used to fund human trafficking and the drugs trade. The telecoms sector has to date had no real incentive to prevent fraud and has allowed blame to be placed elsewhere for too long. There have been no sticks, and certainly no carrots. It must do more to tackle phishing emails, smishing texts and fraudsters making spoof phone calls, as well as those emails that infiltrate our machines.
Until all fraud-enabling industries fear significant financial, legal and reputational risk for their failure to prevent fraud, they will not act. We were clear that the Government must act to introduce a new corporate offence of failure to prevent fraud across all sectors to address this, and we did not limit that to so-called large companies.
I welcome the important measures in the Online Safety Bill to prevent fraudulent content and scam advertising on online platforms and to hold tech companies accountable when they fail, but these will bite only on fraudulent advertisements. They are an important plank but they are only one plank—you cannot build a house from them. The telecoms industry, financial services, the insurers, indeed all our great service industries in this country, must face the same requirements and get their act together.
The Government published their Fraud Strategy in May and appointed Anthony Browne MP as anti-fraud champion. That is a good start but it is not enough. Let me explain: I applaud the proposals to ban cold calls on all financial products, to ban SIM farms, to make it harder for fraudsters to spoof UK numbers making it look like they are calling from a legitimate UK business, and to stop people hiding behind fake companies, and I applaud the plans to create new powers to take down fraudulent websites—but we need a facilitation offence. Telecoms companies must be put under duties to do more. Plans to improve the law enforcement response and trade and charters addressing areas of business activity are welcome, but they are not enough to ensure the changed culture needed to drive down fraud in this country.
Surprisingly, to date the Government have been reluctant to introduce what we regarded as adequate provisions to push business to take steps to prevent fraud. Regulation has to be proportionate, of course, but reasonable steps to prevent fraud taken by all businesses will reduce the opportunities for these scammers. They will help our economy grow; everyone will be more prosperous as a result. Thankfully, on Tuesday this week, this House expanded the scope of the duty to prevent fraud imposed by the economic crimes Bill. I just hope that it will not be taken out in the other place, because it would likely bounce back again here.
Only if all businesses are driven to take proportionate steps to stop fraud will things change. Economic benefits for all will flow. The costs to business and the consumer will be off-set by a clean, fraud-minimised environment. We will all win. People have to look at the big picture, beyond the ends of their noses. If the Government are serious about their promise to make sure that every part of the system is incentivised to take fraud seriously, they must not only introduce new charters for business but ensure that the different sectors, whether banking, finance, tech, insurance or telecoms, are all driven to make life much more difficult for the fraudster. That requires a duty to prevent fraud applied across the board.
Enforceable obligations must apply not just to large businesses. The six key steps we identified in the report are critical. Ministers must act now, and they must act decisively.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 119 and to the overall challenge to Clause 53. To be absolutely clear, there is no reason why the Government should not ignore and override an interim measure by the Strasbourg court. The requirement that Amendment 119 seeks to impose is also neither necessary nor appropriate. I regret to say that I disagree with the conclusion of the Joint Committee: what is proposed does not breach Article 34 of the convention.
Neither is Clause 53 a circuitous route to block interim measures. It permits Ministers to disapply the duty to remove a person to whom interim measures under Rule 39 have been asserted by the European court. Equally, the Minister will retain the power to ignore the interim measure if he or she so wishes. There are a number of reasons for this. First, as has been explained by my noble friend Lord Wolfson on previous occasions—I think he will add more later this evening—our treaty obligations have force in our domestic law only when Parliament enacts legislation to this effect, hence the Human Rights Act direct effect. Secondly, and of importance to others in this House who, like me, value this country’s good name and reputation, the interpretation which is now used to found this interim measure was placed only in 2005 on Rule 39 by the Strasbourg court. That decision was contrary to previous decisions of that court: in other words, it did not follow what we would call precedent. Indeed, it was contrary to the express intentions of those who drafted the convention, as a study of the travaux préparatoires would make plain.
Time does not permit tonight a lengthy exegesis, but for those who would benefit from further learning on this topic, I recommend the recent policy exchange paper, Rule 39 and the Rule of Law, by Richard Ekins KC (Hon), professor of law and constitutional government at the University of Oxford, with a preface by Lord Hoffmann, formerly a judge of the House of Lords, and a foreword by Lord Sumption, a former Supreme Court justice. It is important for us all to understand that Rule 39(1) states:
“The Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of their own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which they consider should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings”.
That is just an indication of view or, as Lord Hoffmann says, a shot across the bows. It is not a power to make an order or direction against a contracting party. The court has not been given power under the convention to make an interim order binding on a party to the convention. The convention does not, in terms, as it would have to, confer a power to grant binding interim relief. The member states, including this country, made a deliberate decision in 1949, and subsequently, not to empower the court in this way.
I have already referred to Lord Sumption. He described Professor Ekins’s arguments as timely and powerful. In the preface to the paper, Lord Hoffmann explains that a ruling of a court such as the Strasbourg court is binding upon parties only if the court had jurisdiction to make it, and that not only is there nothing in the language of the convention which expressly confers such a power but that the usual aids to the construction of a treaty—the travaux préparatoires and the subsequent practice of the court—reflect a clear understanding that no such power exists. The court does not have jurisdiction.
What has happened in the court’s recent jurisprudence is that this advisory power—a sensible advisory power—has been assumed to be a power to grant legally binding interlocutory relief. In short, there is no breach of treaty obligations by the United Kingdom if it does not comply with an interim direction, so Clause 53 should remain and Amendment 119 is inappropriate.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, brought his copy of Hansard from Second Reading with him. My recollection of the Minister’s explanation regarding Section 19(1)(b) was that the matter had not been tested by the courts. That sticks in my mind because I thought it was curious, since the Government are rather critical of people running off to the courts for interpretations of the law.
I will say quickly, because I want to put it on the record, that I subscribe to the view that no asylum seeker can be illegal and to the comments about international law which have been made. I am afraid that I am going to retreat from the big picture and Second Reading to Amendment 1—possibly unconventionally. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for tabling it, because it made me start thinking about the definitions of a lot of other terms used in Clause 1. The term he has singled out—I agree with him that it needs clarity—raises a lot of issues. There is a sort of endless loop of argument about compliance by the individual and compliance by the Government in their assessment of what they are doing.
In my mind, that is not the only phrase in Clause 1(1) that needs to be clearer. The same sentence uses the wording,
“and in particular migration by unsafe and illegal routes”.
That raises a lot of issues, does it not? Unsafe, of course, is a matter of judgment. As for illegal routes, in legislative terms, how does a route become illegal? What does “and in particular” signify in this context? Does the reference to unsafe and illegal routes exclude other routes? I really do not know. It is good prose, but not in this context.
Another phrase which bothers me at a technical and, I have to say, a political and a practical level is
“in breach of immigration control”.
Superficially, one understands what that means, but I do not know and was unable to find whether this is a technical phrase and so legally clear within domestic law. Immigration control is breached by a contravention of legislation, I would think, at a given time. That is clear enough. However, in the area we are discussing, the Immigration Rules—which we know are constantly changing and which come from Ministers and do not touch the sides for parliamentary scrutiny—are part of immigration control. So, I would be interested to know what that means in this context. It seems to me that one could portray this as delegation to Ministers by another mechanism. It is not clear—this is the political point, I suppose—so it is not a deterrent. I think it is inappropriate and gives more power to the Executive, which the Constitution Committee reports are given
“an unusual degree of power”
by the Bill.
I have added my name to Amendment 84. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is not in his place; I did not expect to find that the debate on this would come today, and possibly neither did he. I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate for highlighting compliance with the anti-trafficking conventions. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that we need to come together with a single list that we can gather around.
I do not want to pre-empt debates on the substantive issues regarding trafficking and slavery—I say that without intending to suggest that the conventions and directives are not significant; they are—but will simply say that I expect the term “world-leading” to be used quite a lot with reference to the Modern Slavery Act when we get to that part of the Bill. The international nature of trafficking means that the UK has to consider it internationally and comply with conventions and directives—which brings us directly back to the point that many other noble Lords have made.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 2, 4, 84 and 148. I shall not speak to Amendments 1, 3 and 5. As for those later amendments, I will wait to hear what the Minister has to say about their meaning and effect on the Bill.
I turn to Amendment 2. Let me begin by way of introduction by explaining what I understand to be the effect of Clause 1(5) of the Bill, which will disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Importantly, it does not mean that the convention ceases to apply to matters covered by the Bill or to acts by Ministers and officials; they will still be covered by it. Section 3 provides that
“primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”.
If the noble Lord looked at the national statistics on immigration for 2022, he would see that the figure is about 47,500 immigrants coming in by boat, but of those, there was a large portion of Albanians, and none of them were permitted to stay; they were shipped back to Albania.
That may be so, but the numbers are on a rising plane, and it is not simply Albanians now, they are coming from elsewhere. All I say is this. This is a carefully interlinked package of provisions. It may not be attractive or how we have done things in the past, but we face very different circumstances, and I suggest we should not seek to unpick its structure.
I just ask the noble Lord about his point on Section 3 of the HRA, which he regards as disadvantageous. He talked about courts having to make a strained interpretation. I wonder whether he would give me some idea of how many cases there have been where the courts have had to strain to make this interpretation. Presumably, if they felt they had to do that, they would have had to resort to Section 4, declaring incompatibility. The review by Sir Peter Gross did not have a major problem with Section 3—I think there was a little tweak that has escaped my memory for the moment. It was broadly satisfied with the operation of Section 3, so I wonder why it is so difficult. With Section 4 and declarations of incompatibility, there is the disadvantage of having to make remedial orders—and there is not really capacity in the Commons to do that—and/or end up in the Strasbourg court. It seems to me much better to give some leeway to the courts to interpret legislation compatibly with the convention.
, I looked at Sir Peter Gross’s report yesterday and the night before to remind myself of what it said. Two points are important. One is that it was not unanimous on that point, unlike on everything else. We are not told where the disagreement was, but at least one member did not agree that nothing should be done. Secondly, it lamented the fact that there had been no statistics kept of the cases in which the court has gone down the route of Section 3, so we do not actually know when there has been what might be called a strained interpretation or when it has been a perfectly natural interpretation. You can read it if you look at individual judgments. The one in which Lord Steyn spoke is the case of Ghaidan—I cannot remember the other name in the case—
I have a very short point to make. I was delighted to hear the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, say that he was a great fan of the rule of law, but he, like the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, seems to think that it is something that can be moulded in accordance with political desire in Parliament. We should be quite clear about this, and the point is not a difficult one.
The rule of law is made up of various ingredients. One of those ingredients is compliance with international obligations. If you do not like the obligations and wish to comply with the rule of law, you either secede from the convention or international obligation or you change it. So long as it is there, you have to comply with it if you want to say that you are a country that observes the rule of law. We are a leading world democracy. If we do not abide by the rule of law, we place ourselves in the company of numerous rogue nations. This country deserves better than that.