Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 37A is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. Clause 31 of the Bill provides that,

“Except so far as this Part or regulations under this Part provide, nothing … confers a right of action in any civil proceedings in respect of a contravention of a requirement imposed by … this Part”.


It then goes on to say that that subsection

“does not affect any right of action which exists apart from the provisions of this Part”.

I was quite confused by that clause, and relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, also sought clarity. Our amendment would provide that:

“Nothing in this Act or regulations made under it affects any right of action in civil proceedings”.


If we have interpreted the provision correctly, that is a rather more straightforward way of saying it.

When the point was raised at Second Reading, the Minister said that the lack of time meant that we did not have the opportunity then to discuss the clause in detail. He said there would be opportunities in due course, so I am taking this opportunity. My question is, quite straightforwardly: does the amendment express what the Government are seeking to say, particularly with regard to breach of statutory duty? If it is not as the amendment sets out, why not? I beg to move.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to act as junior counsel to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened carefully to some comments that the Minister made on Monday, which alluded to this clause, and I thought about them carefully, but they were brief and I, too, wish to test what is really intended by the Government. My feeling is that the Government have made an inadvertent mistake in Clause 31 which they can easily rectify.

This Bill is designed to protect citizens by imposing clear statutory duties. When clear statutory duties are imposed and there is a breach of those duties, it is very common for a citizen who is a victim of that breach to be able to bring a civil action. The purpose of the civil action is often to recover damages, though it may involve other declaratory judgments too.

I want to give a few examples, because I think we are going to have one substantive debate on this clause and then a decision will be reached. I am going to mention a number of instances in which breach of statutory duty gives rise to a civil action to obtain judgments of the kind I mentioned. First, driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition gives rise to a statutory duty which can result in a judgment for damages. In this Bill we are talking about something much bigger in scale than driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition, but it may have exactly the same consequences.

There are other examples. If there are unsafe systems or means of work in any workspace, there can be an action for breach of statutory duty without it being necessary to prove negligence, nuisance or any other tort —civil wrong—that requires specific proof of certain aspects. Allowing a vehicle to be driven by an uninsured person allows a claim for breach of statutory duty. The failure to arrange compulsory insurance for employees allows such a claim. If a landlord fails to provide habitable standards, equally, there can be such a claim. If a company fails to disclose required financial information to investors, there can be such a claim for breach of statutory duty.

If a shop sells faulty electrical equipment whereby a fire is caused in the home for which it has been bought, for example, one does not have to prove negligence. One may have an action under the Sale of Goods Acts or their equivalent, but there is an opportunity to obtain damages for breach of statutory duty. At a construction site, the failure to provide safety barriers gives rise to such an action. If we go to a restaurant and suffer food poisoning because it has failed to reach the statutory hygiene standards, we can make a claim for damages for breach of statutory duty. If one fails as an employer to provide proper training to employees on handling hazardous chemicals, that too gives rise to a potential claim for breach of statutory duty. I have chosen just a few examples—and there are others—where one does not have to prove negligence and the components of negligence.

Such provisions are all designed to secure protection for individuals without the need to prove those other elements of common-law civil wrongs. I do not understand why those rights are removed by Clause 31(1). I invite the Government to reflect on what is, as I have suggested, probably an inadvertent failure.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to differ with the noble Lord, but not because I do not want deserving people to recover compensation. My reading of the Bill as it stands is to the effect that, as drafted, Clause 31 achieves two things. First, it puts beyond doubt any question whether the breaches of requirements under the Bill can of themselves be a ground for a civil claim. It says plainly that such breaches will not in themselves be a ground. However, it is important to be aware that the fact that a breach of duty under the Bill or regulations has occurred will still be evidence that will be admissible in a civil claim which alleges negligence or other breach of common-law duty. The important point is that there may have been a breach that was without negligence.

If there has been a breach then it will be strong evidence that something has gone wrong that should be compensated for, but it may be capable of explanation and justification in the civil courts, which does not excuse criminal liability. Put simply, the Bill as drafted makes plain that a breach of statutory duty will not of itself alone give rise to an actionable breach of duty sounding in damages.

Secondly, as it stands, the Bill makes it clear that what is said in Clause 31(1) does not affect—that is, detract from—any right of action that exists in common law. In other words, a claim of negligence, in particular, or any other common-law right will remain; so this provision takes nothing away. Where, in a civil action, the claim establishes that as a matter of fact there has been a breach of such statutory duty, that will be evidence in the case and it is likely to be strong evidence. It will be a matter for the court to determine whether it is evidence of negligence or other evidence that might give rise to a justifiable claim for damages, and what weight to give it. I hope that is clear.

The amendment proffered to us would delete the whole of the existing clause, and would simply say:

“Nothing … affects any right of action”.


With respect, I suggest that that would be less clear and less helpful to the courts, because it will leave open a possible argument that breaches of statutory duty are themselves grounds for action, even where no want of care has been established. That would be getting closer, in effect, to strict liability for civil damages, however blameless the body or person concerned. That is why it is a step too far. It is unnecessary and potentially damaging, when we look at the vast range of bodies and people who will be affected.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, who I respect very much as a lawyer. To say that this applies strict liability is, with respect, completely wrong, is it not? All strict liability requires is proof that damage has taken place. Breach of statutory duty involves at least a failure to act on the part of the person sued. To elide this into strict liability is just not correct.