Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to act as junior counsel to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened carefully to some comments that the Minister made on Monday, which alluded to this clause, and I thought about them carefully, but they were brief and I, too, wish to test what is really intended by the Government. My feeling is that the Government have made an inadvertent mistake in Clause 31 which they can easily rectify.

This Bill is designed to protect citizens by imposing clear statutory duties. When clear statutory duties are imposed and there is a breach of those duties, it is very common for a citizen who is a victim of that breach to be able to bring a civil action. The purpose of the civil action is often to recover damages, though it may involve other declaratory judgments too.

I want to give a few examples, because I think we are going to have one substantive debate on this clause and then a decision will be reached. I am going to mention a number of instances in which breach of statutory duty gives rise to a civil action to obtain judgments of the kind I mentioned. First, driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition gives rise to a statutory duty which can result in a judgment for damages. In this Bill we are talking about something much bigger in scale than driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition, but it may have exactly the same consequences.

There are other examples. If there are unsafe systems or means of work in any workspace, there can be an action for breach of statutory duty without it being necessary to prove negligence, nuisance or any other tort —civil wrong—that requires specific proof of certain aspects. Allowing a vehicle to be driven by an uninsured person allows a claim for breach of statutory duty. The failure to arrange compulsory insurance for employees allows such a claim. If a landlord fails to provide habitable standards, equally, there can be such a claim. If a company fails to disclose required financial information to investors, there can be such a claim for breach of statutory duty.

If a shop sells faulty electrical equipment whereby a fire is caused in the home for which it has been bought, for example, one does not have to prove negligence. One may have an action under the Sale of Goods Acts or their equivalent, but there is an opportunity to obtain damages for breach of statutory duty. At a construction site, the failure to provide safety barriers gives rise to such an action. If we go to a restaurant and suffer food poisoning because it has failed to reach the statutory hygiene standards, we can make a claim for damages for breach of statutory duty. If one fails as an employer to provide proper training to employees on handling hazardous chemicals, that too gives rise to a potential claim for breach of statutory duty. I have chosen just a few examples—and there are others—where one does not have to prove negligence and the components of negligence.

Such provisions are all designed to secure protection for individuals without the need to prove those other elements of common-law civil wrongs. I do not understand why those rights are removed by Clause 31(1). I invite the Government to reflect on what is, as I have suggested, probably an inadvertent failure.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to differ with the noble Lord, but not because I do not want deserving people to recover compensation. My reading of the Bill as it stands is to the effect that, as drafted, Clause 31 achieves two things. First, it puts beyond doubt any question whether the breaches of requirements under the Bill can of themselves be a ground for a civil claim. It says plainly that such breaches will not in themselves be a ground. However, it is important to be aware that the fact that a breach of duty under the Bill or regulations has occurred will still be evidence that will be admissible in a civil claim which alleges negligence or other breach of common-law duty. The important point is that there may have been a breach that was without negligence.

If there has been a breach then it will be strong evidence that something has gone wrong that should be compensated for, but it may be capable of explanation and justification in the civil courts, which does not excuse criminal liability. Put simply, the Bill as drafted makes plain that a breach of statutory duty will not of itself alone give rise to an actionable breach of duty sounding in damages.

Secondly, as it stands, the Bill makes it clear that what is said in Clause 31(1) does not affect—that is, detract from—any right of action that exists in common law. In other words, a claim of negligence, in particular, or any other common-law right will remain; so this provision takes nothing away. Where, in a civil action, the claim establishes that as a matter of fact there has been a breach of such statutory duty, that will be evidence in the case and it is likely to be strong evidence. It will be a matter for the court to determine whether it is evidence of negligence or other evidence that might give rise to a justifiable claim for damages, and what weight to give it. I hope that is clear.

The amendment proffered to us would delete the whole of the existing clause, and would simply say:

“Nothing … affects any right of action”.


With respect, I suggest that that would be less clear and less helpful to the courts, because it will leave open a possible argument that breaches of statutory duty are themselves grounds for action, even where no want of care has been established. That would be getting closer, in effect, to strict liability for civil damages, however blameless the body or person concerned. That is why it is a step too far. It is unnecessary and potentially damaging, when we look at the vast range of bodies and people who will be affected.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

There have always been instances in which some Acts have given rise to immediate civil liability. In others, you had to plead that the breaches of regulations and so on were evidence of negligence. That was so under the old Factories Act and, I think, under the health and safety Act—I cannot remember, but it was a common pleading which I used to do 30 years ago.

It is for the Government to make it absolutely plain whether they want this to be a strict liability—in the sense that the moment that a breach occurs, however blameless, but nonetheless in breach, the party is, damages should follow. My understanding is that the Bill as drafted had that in mind, although it may be difficult. Think of a terrorist act: there may have been a relatively minor breach of regulations. Is that to give rise to millions of pounds-worth of damages, where it has no or very little causal connection, but just enough?

I understand where those moving the amendment are coming from, but this is a matter of policy for those behind it as to the parties likely to be affected and whether the change is necessary. It would be interesting to hear from the Minister what the philosophy is behind the drafting.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I will speak to Amendment 37A to Clause 31, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. This amendment proposes to remove Clause 31 and replace it with a new provision, stating that:

“Nothing in this Act or regulations made under it affects any right of action in civil proceedings”.


The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill represents a critical step in strengthening the security framework for public venues and premises across the country. The increasing sophistication and unpredictability of terrorist threats demand that we establish robust and effective measures to protect the public. By setting out clear responsibilities for operators of certain premises, the Bill aims to ensure that the tragic events that we have seen in the past are less likely to be repeated in the future.

As we consider Amendment 37A, it is essential to examine whether the proposed changes will support or potentially undermine the Bill’s objectives. At its core, this amendment seeks to clarify that the Bill will not interfere with the right to pursue civil claims. Such a provision could be seen as a safeguard, ensuring that individuals and organisations maintain access to legal redress if they believe that negligence or a breach of duty has contributed to harm caused by a terrorist incident.

This is a significant consideration. Civil liability serves as an important mechanism for accountability and justice in our legal system. It encourages responsible behaviour, provides a pathway for compensation and often plays a complementary role in reinforcing public safety. Ensuring that individuals retain this right can provide reassurance that public security measures do not come at the expense of fundamental legal principles. However, there are important questions that we must address.

First, is this amendment necessary? It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that civil liability is not displaced unless explicitly stated in the legislation. Therefore, some may argue that this amendment is redundant and risks introducing ambiguity into the Bill’s interpretation. If the existing legal framework already protects the right to bring civil claims, we must carefully consider whether including an explicit provision could inadvertently complicate matters rather than clarify them.

Another practical consideration is the potential impact on compliance with the Bill’s requirements. Premises operators, many of whom are already facing financial and operational pressures, may view the introduction of this provision as increasing their exposure to litigation. This could have the unintended consequence of discouraging proactive security measures if operators become overly concerned about the risk of legal action. It is essential that the Bill strikes a balance between imposing reasonable obligations and supporting those who are making good-faith efforts to comply.

Furthermore, we must assess whether this amendment could lead to increased litigation that detracts from the primary purpose of the Bill. Legal disputes can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, diverting attention from the urgent task of implementing effective security measures. We should be mindful of the potential for unintended consequences that may hinder the Bill’s objectives. It is also worth considering the impact on the insurance market. If the inclusion of this provision is perceived as creating greater uncertainty or exposure to liability, it could lead to increased insurance premiums for premises operators. This may place an additional financial burden on businesses and organisations that are already navigating a challenging economic environment.

That said, the Government must also be mindful of the importance of maintaining public trust and confidence in counterterrorism measures. Ensuring that individuals have access to justice when they have been wronged is fundamental to our legal system and to public confidence in the rule of law. If stakeholders, legal experts or civil society organisations believe that this amendment is necessary to provide clarity and reassurance, their concerns should be carefully considered. Ultimately, the key question is whether the amendment strengthens the Bill by providing clarity or whether it introduces unnecessary complexity that could hinder its implementation. I look forward to hearing the Government’s view on this matter and the perspectives of other noble Lords.

As we deliberate on this amendment, let us remember the importance of striking the right balance: ensuring robust security measures that protect the public, while safeguarding access to justice and upholding the legal rights that are fundamental to our democracy. We must strive to create a framework that achieves both security and fairness in the face of evolving security threats.

--- Later in debate ---

I refer back to what the Minister said when he was explaining the Henry VIII powers in the Bill, which I disagree with. He said we need to be able to respond with flexibility for different circumstances. I understand that. One of the things that appeals to me about this review is that if the Government see, after 18 months, that the Bill is not actually leading to more public safety but is killing off a very important industry for a free society then we can adapt accordingly. If we do not have the review, we will never know.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I speak to Amendments 46 to 49. I adopt everything that my noble friend Lord Davies has already said, so I can be short.

Amendment 46, which is a probing amendment, is very simple. We all know we cannot let the terrorist indulge in preventable acts of terror. I emphasise “preventable”. Equally, we cannot allow the threat of terror to close down society and normal life as we now understand it to be. Also, it must be plain that once the Act has been enforced for 18 months, people will have a better idea of what may and may not work, so a review at that stage will be helpful to everyone. It is a shakedown period and it will cut both ways.

As to Amendment 47 and the six-month delay of commencement, that is simply to impose a minimum period—it can be longer if appropriate—before regulations and other actions can be taken by requiring draft guidance to have been issued and consulted on first. This will simply ensure that businesses and other bodies are properly consulted before guidance is finalised. It will ensure that the consultation on the guidance has preceded the laying of regulations. We are moving into new territory. A wide range of powers is being exercised over disparate bodies and a wide range of organisations in respect of matters which have not previously been subject to such detailed supervision. It is obviously right that those affected should be consulted. That will apply to the potential enforcers—the SIA and local authorities—as well as to those on the receiving end who are running the establishments and organisations where these regulations will apply.

Finally, Amendments 48 and 49 are simply probing amendments on the timescale. We have heard that it may take two years to come into force. We tabled these amendments, as my noble friend has said, to test how that period will work.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling the amendments today. I hope I can respond to them in a positive and reassuring manner.

First, I will look at Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst. All through this debate, at Second Reading, in Committee, and in discussions that we have had outside of this Chamber, we have been keen to reassure noble Lords that we are trying to strike the right balance between public protection and burdens on premises and events. In fact, I prefer the word “standards” to “burdens”; a burden is something that is difficult. What we are trying to put in place is a number of basic standards which it is important for businesses and organisations to meet.

I have said throughout consideration of the Bill in Committee and at Second Reading that, following Royal Assent, we expect that there will be a period of at least 24 months to give us the time to ensure that those responsible for premises and the events in scope understand the new obligations, that they have time to plan and prepare, and—to go back to previous discussions —any training required of volunteers or staff is undertaken.

The proposed timetable in Amendment 46 of 18 months would, with respect, be before any detailed action has been taken under the provisions of the Act. It would assess the preparations generally, as opposed to the actual impact and implementation downstream. Ministers, including myself and my right honourable friend Dan Jarvis will keep legislation under review, including its effectiveness, impact and implementation. Should unintended consequences be identified, the Bill provides powers, which have been subject to debate, to adjust the regime as appropriate. I hope the noble Lord will reflect on Amendment 46 and, when the time comes, withdraw the amendment.

On Amendment 47 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, there will be a 24-month implementation period before the Act is commenced. The Government intend to issue guidance under Clause 27, published before commencement. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord seeks to put some timeframes on that. I think it is best to leave that to judgment, both in the guidance and in the consultation on that guidance with key partners.

Again, the 24-month period covers Amendments 48 and 49, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst. The implementation period will allow those in scope to prepare for and comply with the new obligations. It is important that the SIA, particularly, is operating as soon as is practical. The Government must be certain that it is ready for its new role. We anticipate that this will take at least 24 months—it might take slightly longer—in the light of previous timeframes for other regulators introduced under previous legislation.

I do not anticipate any delays in commencement, but I want to keep the flexibility and appropriate ability for the Government to pick an appropriate commencement date when the Government assess that the SIA has fulfilled its duties, as we anticipate them under the Act, and that the organisations impacted by the Act at that stage are fully prepared and cognisant and are able to implement. Again, I gently suggest to the noble Lord that it would not be sensible for the Secretary of State to be driven by a tied provision in the Act, as opposed to the judgment that, as I have said to the Committee, will look in due course at whether or not we put those provisions in place.

Generally, in relation to Amendments 48 and 49, the 24-month period is what I would hope to be a realistic time to establish the set-up of the regulator and for those in scope of the Bill to prepare. If the Bill achieves Royal Assent, which I hope it will, the noble Lord, this House, the House of Commons and the court of public opinion—that is, the people in businesses and pubs and others who will be impacted by this legislation—have the opportunity to feed into both the Government for their guidance and the SIA for its guidance, as well as into the debate generally about implementation, about how they think the Act is going and what measures are being put in place. A formal consultation or review, as outlined and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would inhibit that process and set formal timescales that would not be helpful. This House remains the first port of call for any concern or points that noble Lords may want to raise about the implementation downstream. I hope that reassurance means that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.