Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Committee (2nd Day)

21:26

Clause 5: Public protection procedures

Amendment 20A

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

20A: Clause 5, page 4, line 16, after first “or” insert “giving advice about”
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to understand the Government’s expectations of organisations under the new duty to implement procedures “for preventing individuals entering or leaving the premises or event”.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 21A, 22, 23A and 24A. Amendment 20A seeks to probe the Government’s expectations of organisations that will have the duty to put public protection procedures in place. The public protection procedures listed in Clause 5(3) include measures

“for preventing individuals entering or leaving the premises or event”.

We have no concerns about the prevention of entry to a premises or event, and we can conceive of circumstances where leaving a premises or event would not be the right thing for an individual to do in certain circumstances.

That said, there is a real question for organisations running premises and events. If they are required by the Act to put measures in place to prevent people leaving the premises, what will that look like in reality? Are we empowering people in, for example, a church hall to lock its doors with people inside in the case of a terror incident, or do we expect volunteers to stand in the way of people trying to leave to prevent them leaving? Can we really expect small community organisations to make these decisions for people? Would they not be at risk of prosecution if they got these decisions wrong? This is a specific query but one where clarity from Ministers is necessary.

As background to this amendment, I remind the House that there have been emergencies in the past where the official advice has been wrong, at great cost. After the tragic Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, we learned that the official advice had been wrong and that many of those who survived did so only by ignoring the official advice to stay in their rooms and close their front doors until the fire was over. So we look to the Minister to set out his expectations for how this duty will work in practice. Amendment 21A would add a second test to the Secretary of State’s powers to amend Clause 5. As drafted, the Bill permits the Secretary of State to amend Clause 5(3) if he is satisfied that further procedures will reduce the risk of terrorism.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has already spoken about regulatory mission creep, and my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth has pointed out the risk that procedures may be overburdensome for small organisations such as community centres and church halls. Our amendment seeks to add a proportionality test that the Secretary of State will have to meet before he can amend subsection (3). I am quite sure that the Government can add procedure after procedure to reduce risks under this section of the Bill as introduced, but we need them to consider whether these further procedures are reasonably proportionate before they introduce them. I hope that the Government will take this on board and look at how the Bill can be improved here.

21:30

Amendment 23A is a very specific probing amendment. I will not labour this point. With this amendment, we are seeking an answer to the Government’s expectations of organisations with enhanced duties putting together their plans. It is a simple question which I hope the Minister can answer today. Can he give us a rough sense of what “reasonably practicable” will mean in this context?

Amendment 22, tabled by my noble friend Lord De Mauley, proposes the introduction of a new clause to allow public protection procedures to be waived by the Secretary of State or the Security Industry Authority under specific circumstances. This amendment represents a pragmatic and sensible approach to ensuring that security regulations are proportionate, fair and effective. This is a neat and well-drafted amendment that would give the Government greater flexibility when implementing security measures under the Bill. The Bill rightly seeks to enhance public safety by mandating security measures at qualifying premises and events. However, as with all regulations, there must be room for flexibility to address situations where compliance would be unreasonable or ineffectual. This amendment achieves precisely that balance, by allowing a waiver where the cost of implementation is disproportionate or where the prescribed measures would offer no tangible benefit in reducing the threat of terrorism.

On the issue of cost, we must recognise that many of the venues and events that are captured by the Bill are run by small businesses, community organisations and charitable groups. Imposing blanket security requirements without consideration of financial viability risks driving these important contributors to our social and cultural fabric out of operation. This amendment ensures that, if a venue can demonstrate that the cost of implementing a particular procedure is unreasonable, it can seek relief. This is a common-sense safeguard that acknowledges the real-world financial pressures that many operators face.

The amendment also addresses the fundamental need for security measures to be proportionate and effective. Not all public protection procedures will be relevant to every venue or event. For example, a small rural gathering with minimal public footfall may face no credible terrorist threat. In such cases, mandating extensive security measures would not only be unnecessary but could erode public confidence in the overall security framework, by appearing arbitrary or heavy-handed.

The amendment places a clear and reasonable burden of proof on the applicant, who must demonstrate either that the costs are unreasonable or that the security measures would not reduce the terrorist threat. This would ensure that waivers are granted judiciously and only when justified by evidence. Moreover, by involving the Secretary of State or the Security Industry Authority, the amendment ensures that waiver decisions are made by those with the appropriate expertise and accountability. This provides a safeguard against abuse while maintaining the flexibility needed to adapt to different circumstances.

This amendment is not about weakening security standards but about ensuring that they are applied in a way that is fair, proportionate and effective. It reflects a mature understanding that security is not a “one size fits all” solution. I commend my noble friend Lord De Mauley for tabling this proposal and urge the Government to give it very serious consideration.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendments 20A, 21A and 23A.

As we have heard, Amendment 20A is a probing amendment to do with advice. Always leaving persons where there is reason to suspect an act of terrorism is occurring or about to occur is not necessarily the right course. You need to have procedures in place which not only prevent leaving but give advice about what to do—it might be to leave or not to leave. If we are going to have specific terms in the Act, it should be clear that the broader picture is encompassed. It could be construed as being simply advice about leaving. At present, on one reading at least, it is too inflexible.

I move on to Amendment 21A. To reduce the risk of reasonable harm is, I suggest, too bold and too bald. Is any risk, however small, to be encompassed by this, to make it even smaller? You will never make any risk negligible. Is any harm, however modest, to be encompassed? What is being guarded against? There is nothing to detract from the purpose here. It is simply to make it workable in real life. We must be sensible about imposing what is, in effect, strict liability for unforeseen circumstances. That is why we suggest that there should be an assessment of the risk, cost and outcome, and proportionality.

Amendment 23A is simply to give a clear time. Currently, I suggest, the words “reasonably practicable” are too vague. They could lead to arguments. It would be better to set an end date. Is it once the document is prepared that it should be provided or is it the time in which to prepare it? To me, reading this, it was not clear. There has to be reasonable time to prepare it and there has to be a time limit after that for providing it. Really, there should be an end date in any event for providing it, which should be clear; in other words, you have a reasonable time to do things but it must be done within three months, six months or whatever is the right time. That is the purpose of this.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 22 is in my name. I am sure we all recognise the threat that the Bill seeks to address and do not underestimate its importance. The attack on the Manchester Arena was, frankly, awful and we must do everything we can to prevent such things happening in future. However, in doing so, we surely must not inadvertently stamp out important local and cultural community-enhancing opportunities for people to enjoy themselves in times when, frankly, there is not much joy to be had.

At Second Reading, the Minister said, I think at column 646, two things which particularly concerned me. First, he referred to “public protection” even in the case of an event attended by as few as 200 people. He referred to “evacuation”, “invacuation”—apparently a word in the Bill drafters’ lexicon, if no one else’s—“lockdown” and “communication”. I will examine “lockdown” in a moment.

Secondly, the Minister expanded on the wording in Clause 6(3)(b), which refers to

“measures relating to … the movement of individuals into, out of and within the premises or event”,

and he added the words,

“such as search and screening processes”.

Let me illustrate my concerns by reference to two different types of event.

First, I help run one of hundreds, probably thousands, of annual parish and village charity fundraising events around the country. Ours, like countless others, is knocking on the door of becoming a qualifying event. We have assessed the risk of attack carefully, and already we have in place sensible precautions. The area is surrounded by walls, so a vehicle could not get near the crowd. A bomb or gun attack, although of course awful, would be highly unlikely, as the target is low value and, furthermore, the event is conducted in the open air, so a bomb would be vastly less effective than in a building with a roof and walls. When I spoke on Amendment 11, I referred to the fact that all 15 attacks listed in the impact assessment took place in urban areas.

I turn now to lockdown. Incidentally, it appeared from PMQs today that the Prime Minister himself does not fully understand the concept of lockdown. But the noble Lord the Minister said in the context of this Bill that it is

“the process of securing premises to restrict or prevent entry by an attacker by, for example, locking doors or closing shutters”.—[Official Report, 7/1/25; col. 646.]

How does he recommend that we in our village event would exercise lockdown? The event is outdoors, not in a building. There are no doors to lock or shutters to put down. Yes, the area is surrounded by walls, but they would not keep out a determined attacker if there was such a hypothetical person. So we will be required to have in place the ability to lock ourselves down but we are, in practical terms, unable to. There is genuinely very little likelihood of an attack but, when the Bill comes into effect, we will be obliged to do something that I cannot yet understand how to achieve.

Similarly, I have grave concerns about the implications of the Minister’s reference to “search and screening processes”. It is important that he explains what he means by “search and screening”. Does it mean full-body scanning, for which each unit costs several hundred thousand pounds and daily rental costs are several thousand pounds? Does he mean having a hand-held metal detector passed over attendees’ bodies? Even those, to be effective and not the knock-off ones of the kind one can buy on the internet, cost thousands of pounds. Does he mean that bags are to be searched? Exactly what does he mean?

At the event I am contemplating, the imposition of the requirement to search or scan guests, as referred to by the Minister at col. 646, could be so costly that it would be an additional reason that we could no longer hold our event, which last year—admittedly an exceptional year—will have given more than £5,000 to local charities and village schools. Is closing us down really what the Government want to do?

The impact assessment estimates the 10-year cost to enhanced duty premises at £52,093. It is not clear whether that would be the same for a qualifying event, but it does not look far off to me. That is just over £5,000 a year, which would kill off very many such events. In the debate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, referred to his concerns that costs should not unduly constrain events such as those I am concerned about, and I hope that His Majesty’s Government think the same.

Secondly, I am involved with a major annual rural open-air sporting event. There are many similar events around the United Kingdom through the year, including agricultural shows, Eisteddfods, game fairs, horse trials and shows, music and literary festivals, Guy Fawkes Night events, Green Man—the list is long. These are not small affairs, yet many are run on a shoestring and, in recent years, several have already been lost.

In the case of the event I am involved with, the main issues are the same as those I referred to earlier: lockdown, and scanning and searching. The viewing public arrive in cars along narrow country roads with already very long queues. In practical terms, it would be impossible to search all the cars as they arrive. Depending on the direction from which they approach, traffic control decrees that they are directed to a number of car parks that surround the event on all sides. There being no suitable natural barriers, it would also be impracticable to funnel the crowds, once on their feet, so that they can be searched individually as they move into the event area.

Many of these events run at little more than break even, so the cost of barriers to funnel the crowds, combined with that of searching and scanning equipment and manpower, is likely to mean that they would not survive.

21:45

Modern life is well practised in the preparation of well thought-through risk assessments. In cases such as the events I am contemplating, risk assessments are intelligence-led and based, as necessary, on thorough briefings from the intelligence community and the police, who I am sure the Minister would agree do an outstanding job keeping us safe. The solution, therefore, to the problems the Bill creates, as proposed in my Amendment 22, is that it allows that the risks can be thoroughly assessed, and that those of the public protection procedures that are agreed to be unnecessary can be waived. My amendment acknowledges that this would need to be signed off by the SIA or the Secretary of State.

In the debate on Monday, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said:

“Ultimately, what we are trying to say with this legislation is that people who organise public events, whether they are formal events, community events, concerts or whatever else, should be thinking in advance, ‘Is this going to be secure?’”.—[Official Report, 3/2/25; col. 522.]

He said later that

“the fundamental issue, which is raised by this set of amendments, is not what is the burden of this but what is the risk appetite that the people who are organising this event, and that we as a nation have, about the event concerned?”.—[Official Report, 3/2/25; col. 540.]

He is at least partly right that the Bill does not allow the people who are organising the event to consider the risks. It demands that they do certain things, regardless of the level of risk, dependent on whether the crowd is more than 200 or more than 800—or, apparently, if it is unticketed, in certain circumstances not to do so.

In making his case against Amendment 11, the Minister prayed in aid the fact that the threat to the UK is currently graded “substantial”. He is of course right, but there are four other possible levels of threat: “critical” and “severe”, which are higher than “substantial”, and “moderate” and “low”, which are lower. The Government’s position on the Bill’s rigidly set figures of 200 and 800, with strict requirements on organisers’ obligations above each, takes no account of the threat level. There are many other factors that bear on the real risk, and therefore the measures it is appropriate to take at an event, such as the environment in which it takes place. I have mentioned rural and urban, and there are widely varying environments even within those. The dynamics of an audience will be vastly different from event to event. There are many variables that affect the nature and value of an event as a target for an attacker, but the Government’s approach takes no account of them. An intelligence led, risk-based approach would involve co-operation with the police and security forces in order to arrive at a carefully tailored plan for each event.

It is worth saying that the Government have already made themselves unpopular enough with people in the countryside. Do they really want to provoke them further by causing their favourite events to cease? The rural and farming community, as I am sure the Minister knows, is among those at highest risk of suicide. Do the Government want to put themselves at risk of criticism for exacerbating this, because this really is the way to do it?

I have some further questions for the Minister. First, on the requirement in Clause 6(3)(b) relating to

“the movement of individuals into, out of and within the premises”,

what does the Bill mean by movement within the premises? Is this movement between specific areas? How would such areas be defined; or is it movement generally? How do the Government envisage that this be monitored or controlled?

Secondly, on the requirement in Clause 6(3)(c) relating to

“the physical safety and security of the premises”

or event—I think the Minister said at Second Reading that this included hostile vehicle mitigation—to what extent does that include hostile vehicle mitigation in an event’s car parks?

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

I am sorry have to say to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, that the time limit is 10 minutes for him. If he could bring his remarks to an end, the House would be very grateful.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I will. Thirdly, as regards the requirement in Clause 6(3)(d) relating to security of information about the event that may assist in planning acts of terrorism, given that most large events are pre-advertised and many are pre-sold, how practical will this requirement be and how does the Minister consider it can be complied with? I will write to the Minister with my other questions.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I suspect that the answer to quite a lot of the points that have been made lies in the term “reasonably practicable”, which is seen throughout the Bill. I asked some questions about that on the previous day of Committee, in particular whether reasonably practicable was limited to physical considerations or included financial ones and was a mix. Fair enough, my amendment was about the meaning of “immediate vicinity” and that is what the Minister answered, but I do not think he answered that question. If he is able to do so today, I think it might help us quite a lot. The financial implications are specifically referred to in Amendment 22.

I first heard the term “invacuation” about 20 years ago and I heard it from the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey. I am very doubtful about Amendment 20A. I do not think it can be dealt with by advice. Taking the example of Grenfell, it seems very harsh to say this, but bad cases make bad law. I really doubt that the example we have heard could be answered by the change in the Bill proposed by this amendment.

With Amendment 21A, I suppose the question is whether reasonably practicable encompasses proportionate. I think, in the context, it does. Conversely, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and I think he is right to question in Amendment 23A whether it is appropriate that a copy of the document dealing with procedures is provided to the SIA as soon as reasonably practicable after it is prepared. It would be helpful to have a specific time limit here to ensure that the documents are prepared quickly, in a timely manner. That may be something for the SIA to be able to indicate was required, but it would be right not to have an entirely open-ended arrangement that could mean that some people who should be preparing documents do not get on with them as quickly as they should.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower’s amendments in this group, specifically Amendments 21A and 23A, and I hope to do so very briefly. It strikes me that Amendment 21A is a crucial brake, as it were, on the power of the Executive. It introduces a test of reasonable proportionality to the creation by the Secretary of State of further procedures by regulation.

I know that there are some later amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and others on the totality of the Henry VIII clauses in this clause and ensuing clauses. But, in the event that these specific provisions, namely subsections (4) and (5), remain in the Bill, Amendment 21A represents a crucial limit on the powers of the Government. In the age-old phrasing relating to proportionality, it is important not to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Insisting that “further procedures” meet an additional test of being reasonably proportionate imposes on the Secretary of State a duty to consider the question of proportionality in a measured and proper way.

Finally, Amendment 23A, as others have said, would provide an express and definitive timeframe for ensuring documentary compliance. The legislation would thus avoid uncertainty and vagueness by creating a specific time period. That strikes me as being in the interests of the person responsible for the enhanced duty premises or qualifying event and in the interests of the SIA. In short, everyone would know where they stand, and I suggest that that kind of awareness is to be commended. I look forward to hearing the Government’s clarification of all the points made.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the speeches which have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, talked about sledgehammers cracking nuts; I slightly wonder whether that is what the amendments in this group would have the effect of doing. It is clear that for the qualifying premises—let us separate out the enhanced duty ones for a moment—what is being talked about is taking reasonably practical measures, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, and that there should be appropriate public protection.

When I listened to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, I thought that it sounded as if, as an event organiser, he is already exemplary because he has thought about these things. I am sure that he has briefed the volunteers and the people around him about this. I slightly wonder why people have got so worked up about what the consequences and implications of all of this are.

If people want to know why there is this question of whether you invacuate or evacuate—whether you lock the doors or whatever—I am very taken by the accounts I heard of the Borough Market incidents. There were decisions which had to be made instantly as to whether to shut and barricade the doors or bring people in from outside. That assessment is going to be made on the spot, in an instant, but it is much better if the event organisers or the premises organisers have spent a bit of time thinking about it in advance, as clearly the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, has done, briefing each other and considering the various “What ifs?”. There is no right or wrong answer in those cases; you have to make the best assessment, but you will always make a better one if you have thought about it in advance, worked out what the choices are and what drives them.

My other point is about Amendment 22 and the waiving of public protection procedures. This sounds like the sledgehammer to crack a nut, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. A bureaucratic process will be set up whereby an events organiser or a premises organiser will make an application for a waiver to a public body, no doubt filling in lots of forms. Frankly, would it not be quicker just to do what the Bill asks: to make appropriate, reasonable arrangements? That is surely what is there and, if they are appropriate and reasonable, then the organisers will not have problems as a result of this Bill.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords who have tabled these amendments because, self-evidently, they have generated a discussion on some important points. That is extremely valuable, not just as clarification today but for those who ultimately, should this Bill become an Act, have to implement it downstream, so I am grateful to noble Lords for them. If I may, I will try to deal with the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst, first and then return to that of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, as a separate series in due course.

Amendment 20A from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst, concerns the procedure under Clause 5 for preventing individuals entering or leaving premises or events. Clause 5 sets out some types of procedure, four in total, of which lockdown procedures may be used to reduce the risk of harm by moving people away from danger. I think the proposals in the legislation are dependent on the premises or event. They would potentially include locking doors, closing shutters or, in some cases, moving people to a safer part of the premise.

The noble Lord highlighted some examples in his contribution. If an armed attacker were outside a theatre, leaving doors open or unlocked would risk the attacker entering the premises. There could be a plan whereby, at certain events, a lockdown procedure would have to be activated to secure the auditorium against entry, such as locking the doors until the police arrive or securing the scene, which may reduce harm to staff and the audience. It might be a procedure relating to particular circumstance. It will vary according to the type of situation or attack.

In some cases—as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey mentioned, this happened in the event at Borough Market—a lockdown might help to save lives. In other cases, it might be more appropriate for people to flee. Statutory guidance will be published by the Home Office/SIA in due course to illustrate the Bill’s provisions, including on public protection measures. During the London Bridge attack—the noble Lord said that he wanted the Minister to give examples—some premises successfully executed a lockdown procedure and, in doing so, saved lives. That is really important to remember.

We are not being prescriptive. Going back to what my noble friend Lord Harris said, the public protection procedures in Clause 5(3)(a), (b), (c) and (d) set down the type of things that organisations and the responsible person need to think about and prepare for as part of a plan. With all due respect to the noble Lord, the changes he is proposing are not necessary because the Government consider that the requirements of the clause are appropriate as drafted. Again—we will come on to this issue in a moment, with other amendments in the name of the noble Lord—we are trying to be proportionate and reasonable.

On Amendment 21A, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that proportionality is at the heart of the Bill as a whole. It is important to remind the Committee that this Bill has been through several iterations. It has been through consultation, drafting, a Home Affairs Select Committee, previous Government engagement and the engagement of this Government. Out of that, we want to get proportionate measures that ensure that in-scope premises and events take proportionate and appropriate steps.

It is about being reasonably prepared and prepared for risk—straying into what the Lord, Lord De Mauley, said—whatever the size or location of a premises. He is right that the majority of these attacks have taken place in urban areas at large venues, or in urban tarmacked areas. That is not to say that it will not happen elsewhere, that a terrorist group will not pick a farm event, a small village hall or another similar event.

That is why not just this Government, but the Government he supported, put in place the measures before us today. It is why the Bill went through a public inquiry, emerging from the recommendations of Sir John Saunders. It is why it went through the draft legislation process, and why the Commons Home Affairs Committee supported it on a cross-party basis, even though the majority of its members were from His Majesty’s Opposition. We are trying to be proportionate and reasonable, and the public protection procedures in Clause 5 are an important element of the Bill’s effectiveness and power.

I hope that assuages the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. Again, we are trying to do something that is proportionate, achievable and relatively cost-effective. I have mentioned elsewhere the cost of the potential measures. We have estimated it at around £330 per year for the lower tier. That is not in terms of cash being paid out to anybody; that is our assessment of the potential costs that can be incurred. It is about good practice, good training, good support, making sure that we have evacuation and invacuation procedures, looking at the exits and entrances and what would happen, and making those assessments, while making sure that the responsible person knows what they are.

The Secretary of State could add further procedures if they consider that necessary, but I am straying into later amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I have some sympathy with those, and I hope that when we reach them—probably now on Monday—I will be able to give some comfort to the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Anderson, about the use of Henry VIII powers. However, we will deliver that at a slightly later date in the consideration of the Bill. Whatever happens, if there were any changes under the current proposals, they would be subject to the affirmative procedure, so this House and the House of Commons would have an opportunity to support or reject any changes brought forward by the Government as a whole.

On Amendment 23A, from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, again gave a reasonable level of support to the idea of a timeframe for any duty and consideration being put in place. Clause 7 places the legislative requirement on those responsible for enhanced duty premises and events to prepare and maintain a document that records important elements of their compliance. That is a valuable document that will help the regulator consider compliance. It should be provided to the Secretary of State via the Security Industry Authority as soon as is reasonably practical. This will enable the SIA to make an initial evaluation of the premises’ or event’s security approach and engage in meaningful discussion or engagement about any potential inspection.

There is no single standard type of premises or event. Some will have long-established premises with little change needed and some will have to make changes accordingly. To ensure that regulatory provisions work as effectively as possible for all, the document should be sent to the SIA at an early stage. However, at the moment, by providing a maximum timeframe of six months, the amendment may result in either inaccurate documents or material that is out of date being sent. It could hinder regulatory activity and it could hinder the provision of advice and help to strengthen the venues’ practices. But I have noted what the noble Lord said and what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said in support. Although I do not wish to accept the amendment today, those points have been put on the record and we will obviously examine them in due course.

I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley. I genuinely understand his motivation to ensure that the Bill does not render it difficult to put on many events that are valuable for cultural, social, tourist and business purposes. I accept and understand that objective. The Bill as drafted has caused concerns that he has put on the record—which, again, I will examine because of his timeframe, and if he writes to me I will examine those concerns as well—that are founded on his belief that this will be damaging. But, in my view, the Bill sets down the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey mentioned: procedures for public protection in place so far as is reasonably practical. In determining what is reasonably practicable, the responsible person—which may in this case indeed be him—will take into account their operating context and the particular circumstances of the premises or event. They will consider the appropriate procedures in the light of the cost and resources. That is the assurance I give him.

What we are asking for in the Bill, under the various clauses before us, is that he thinks, as I think he has tonight, about the consequences and about whether there is a threat; that he makes that assessment; that he makes the provisions; that he—or she—looks at whether those areas need to have that plan; that he makes sure that the volunteers in an organisation know about that plan; and that he makes sure, potentially, that the paid professionals he or she is dealing with look at and understand that plan. Accordingly, no procedure is required to be put in place at unreasonable cost to the responsible person, and in the measures in the clauses that he mentioned and expressed concern about, such as public protection measures, he will note that there is no mandating of those public protection measures or mention of scanners or other material. There is simply an assessment for the responsible person to organise accordingly.

The first condition in the noble Lord’s amendment for the grant of a waiver is therefore unnecessary. Furthermore, it is anticipated that developing and implementing these procedures should be simple, for cost and staff time. Some of the actions required as part of the procedure could be as simple as locking doors, closing shutters and identifying a safe route to cover. Some of the areas that he has mentioned, such as open-air events, will qualify under the Bill only if they have the requirements in earlier clauses—a building, or a paid entry or exit or ticketing system. Again, I accept that some of the events that he referred to in his contribution may have that, but the whole purpose of the Government’s proposals—which I remind him was shared by the previous Government in broad terms—is to provide good practice, a framework and a consideration for somebody responsible to think of a plan in the event of a terrorist attack.

I assure the noble Lord that this is not about preventing a terrorist attack. That is the job of the police, to whom I pay tribute, the Security Service, to which I pay tribute, and the myriad organisations trying to make sure that we stop bad people doing bad things before they ever get to the stage of doing them. But, sadly, he will know that the risk is always there. The security services try to do this every day of the week, but there may be occasions when something difficult and challenging happens, and this Bill is about what happens when that begins. It is about mitigating the risk, having that plan and proposals in place, and having those public protection measures to stop an attack and reduce the vulnerability in that place.

I genuinely understand the noble Lord’s intention and I look forward to receiving his letter and giving him a full response to it. I hope that I can assure him that the Government’s objective is to put good practice in place at minimal cost and ensure that those people who have a responsibility for an event transmit the evacuation protection plans to those who can impact those plans in the event of that split-second moment, as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey said, when a daily event of enjoyment, pleasure and fun suddenly sees, in its immediate effect, a terrorist attack under way. We are trying to ensure that the split-second decisions that saved lives in Borough Market are thought about beforehand to save lives in the event of an attack.

I would love to assure the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, that no attack would ever take place at the Caerwys Agricultural Show in my former constituency, for example, or at a scout gathering somewhere else, but I cannot. We will stop it upstream when we can but, in the event of an attack happening, we are asking whether the people on the ground know what to do. That is what the Bill is about, and that is why I urge him to write to me and not to press his amendments this evening, as, indeed, I urge the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst. Their points are well made and they will continue to be considered, not just during the passage of the Bill but, crucially, when Royal Assent is achieved. The two-year period that we have to implement the Bill is the time when the guidance and discussion that the noble Lord seeks will be part of the consideration of this, I hope, successful and productive legislation.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the hour is late, and I shall be as brief as I possibly can. This has been a useful debate, with most of these amendments seeking clarity from the Minister on the Government’s expectations for the practical implications of the Bill, as well as proposing a genuinely workable new mechanism to exempt premises or events where the Bill is not reasonably applicable, as under the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord De Mauley.

I thank my noble friends, particularly my noble friend Lord Sandhurst for speaking in support of the amendments and about assessment of risk and proportionality. My noble friend Lord De Mauley made a very good case in support of his amendment, which sought clarity as to the extent of searches. He is absolutely right that these small events are run on shoestrings in some cases, and they will be lost to rural communities if we are not careful about how we present the Bill. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her support for Amendment 23A.

I will just say to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, that we are not worked up on the Benches on this side of the House. We merely seek clarity, which of course he will of course understand and respect. It is our place to probe, which is exactly what we have been doing this evening.

In finishing, I just thank the Minister for his response on this group. He has had a very constructive attitude to the amendments that we have proposed to the Committee and I thank him for his continued engagement. We need to get this Bill right but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 20A withdrawn.

House resumed.

House adjourned at 10.15 pm.