Investigatory Powers Bill
Lord Rosser Excerpts(8 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rosser (Lab)
We welcome the spirit of the Government’s amendments, which, as the noble and learned Lord said, seek to fulfil the commitment the Government made during the passage of the Bill in the Commons to introduce a clear and appropriate threshold for accessing internet connection records. The concern was that access should not be available in connection with non-serious crime. The threshold for serious crime appears workable and appropriate.
We welcome, too, the fact that specific offences such as stalking and harassment have been addressed and can lead to access to ICRs. However, we have continuing concerns around the definition of “relevant crime”, which we feel is too broad and could still lead to the use of ICRs in connection with crimes that would not be regarded as serious. Last April, the then Home Secretary told the shadow Home Secretary that restricting ICRs to serious crime would: hamper the ability of the police to investigate online stalking and harassment; disrupt police investigations of online grooming or the sending of sexual communications to a child; reduce the ability to investigate online fraud; hinder the ability to identify and disrupt the sale and distribution of illegal material online, including illegal weapons, counterfeit medicines or illegal drugs; and prevent the police from progressing investigations where there may be a threat to life, but where it is unclear whether a crime is involved—for example, locating a missing or suicidal child—because many of these activities would not meet the serious crime threshold.
We do not disagree with the intention set out in that communication from the Home Secretary to the shadow Home Secretary, but if the Government have a list of specific offences or types of offences which they feel fall below the serious crime threshold but should not be subject to a restriction on access to ICRs, perhaps that is a matter that needs further discussion about what should be included on the list or what should be covered. We wish to see the wording in the government amendment tightened further. We would want to work with the Government on this while the Bill is progressing through its stages in this House. I hope that the Minister, on behalf of the Government, will feel able to indicate that he is willing to have further discussions on this and the wording of the amendment in the light of our concerns about the apparent broad nature of the definition of “relevant crime”.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord. I welcome the suggestion that we are at least heading in the right direction with regard to these amendments. We would of course be open to further discussions on this topic so we can address more fully what is a relevant crime in this context. I will add that one has to bear in mind that these potentially intrusive orders will be made only where it is necessary and proportionate. That is the test that exists, but I welcome the opportunity for further discussion with noble Lords.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I have not spoken at all on this Bill so far but I should like to make a practical point following what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and previous speakers have said. I speak as a former family judge who over the years has been very involved in safeguarding. One of the most important things is to be sure that the police—it is really the police that we are talking about, rather than the security services—have all the tools that they can possibly have to be able to convince a jury, on a prosecution, that a really serious crime has been committed. If this is going to catch even more paedophiles I endorse it, and I hope the House will agree with me.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I shall be very brief. As has been said, the provisions of this Bill have been subject to considerable scrutiny. The heart of Amendment 156A is about the balance between privacy, security and safety. Inevitably there will be disagreements, which have been highlighted in this debate, about where an appropriate and proper balance lies.
On Amendment 147A, I have virtually no knowledge about the Advocate-General’s opinion, to which reference has been made. However, if we have that opinion, we would like to hear at some stage whether the Government think that it would have implications for any of the provisions and procedures in the Bill, were that opinion subsequently adopted.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, Amendment 156A seeks to prevent the retention of internet connection records. The Committee will not be surprised that the Government cannot support such an amendment. We have been absolutely clear about the need for internet connection records. We addressed that when publishing the operational case for these powers.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester referred to a model of pre-legislative scrutiny. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred to the most scrutinised Bill ever seen. My noble friend Lord King alluded to the three reports we have had, and the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, spoke about the Joint Committee that he had chaired which scrutinised these matters. Over and above that, we had the evidence given to the Public Bill Committee by, for example, the noble Lord, Lord Reid, and Charles Clarke. They were asked whether they thought that ICR were a key part of updating legislation for the current world, and both agreed definitively. I commend the contents of those three reports to the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and also commend to him the findings of the Joint Committee. He asked whether the UK was unique within the “Five Eyes” or indeed the world in seeking to develop these powers. It may well be that we are the forefront of developing them, and a good thing it be. I quote from the report by David Anderson QC:
“Comparing the UK’s legal regime with those of other countries is fraught with danger”.
I commend to the noble Lord, Lord Oates, what follows in that report because David Anderson develops those points and explains them. It is on the record, we have had it for a long time, we have considered it in the development of the Bill and the Joint Committee considered these matters. That is why the Bill is in its present condition.
The noble Lord, Lord Evans, observed that we have the ability to secure effective police investigations in areas where other countries have failed. I mentioned on a previous occasion the comparison between the results in the UK and Germany regarding the investigation and prosecution of cases involving paedophilia. I do not accept that, because we are ahead of others, somehow we are wrong.
Lord Rosser
“( ) In this Part—“relevant communications data” means—(a) communications data of the kind mentioned in the Schedule to the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/859),(b) internet connection records, or(c) relevant internet data not falling within paragraph (a) or (b);“relevant internet data” means communications data which may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, the sender of a communication (whether or not a person).”
Lord Rosser
The intention behind this amendment to Clause 83 is to replicate the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act in its original form. In so doing, it would restrict the scope of Clause 83 and equate it to existing data retention provisions in DRIPA, with the only addition being the inclusion of internet connection records.
Under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, the term “relevant communications data”, as I understand it, covers internet access services, internet email and internet telephony. Those categories replicate the 2009 data retention regulations, which implemented the then EU data retention directive. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 extended DRIPA to include what was called IP address resolution data.
Clause 83 currently empowers the Home Secretary to issue retention notices covering some six categories of data under the definition of “relevant communications data”. One of these categories is internet connection records. That therefore leaves five other categories, which on the face of it would appear to go wider than the existing data retention categories under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
As the Bill is currently drafted, the term “relevant communications data” could be interpreted as some sort of catch-all definition of relevant communications data that would cover the collection of virtually any type of communication on a network, including communications where the sender or recipient was not a human being. If that is an accurate assessment, the definition of “relevant communications data” in Clause 83 would cover not only background interactions that smartphone apps make automatically with their supplier servers but presumably also the entire internet of things.
I therefore seek an explanation from the Government as to why the scope of “relevant communications data” in the Bill is not consistent with that in current recent legislation, the reasons and justification for the apparent broadening of the scope, and the difficulties that presumably the Government believe would be caused if the scope of Clause 83 were restricted in line with the amendment and instead equated to existing data retention provisions in DRIPA, apart from the addition of the inclusion of internet connection records. I beg to move.
Earl Howe
My Lords, the amendment seeks to amend the definition of “relevant communications data”—that is, the communications data that the Secretary of State will be able to require communications service providers to retain.
In looking at how the amendment is couched, I would like to bring the Committee’s attention to a statement made by David Anderson QC in his report on investigatory powers. He said that,
“any new law … must be couched in technology-neutral language”.
The Government agree. However, the amendment would go against that advice. It would seek to revert to the technical language from the data retention regulations 2009. This, in turn, as the noble Lord mentioned, was drawn from the EU data retention directive 2006, which was struck down in 2014.
I suggest to the noble Lord that it would be inappropriate to base today’s law on specific tele- communications definitions from a decade ago. For example, the amendment would ensure that we retained a reference to dial-up internet access in our legislation. That surely cannot be appropriate where broadband and mobile internet access are now the norm. The approach we have taken is to keep our definitions technologically neutral, as David Anderson recommended and as, indeed, is sensible in the drafting of any law that needs to apply across a range of technologies over time.
I hope that the noble Lord will recognise that it is not appropriate to tie our data retention regime to specific, and outdated, technological language. Those are the reasons why the Government cannot support the amendment.
Lord Rosser
Perhaps I may ask a question on that point. Not unfairly, the noble Earl made reference to regulations of some years ago, but presumably it is also accurate to say, and perhaps he could comment on this, that very recent legislation—namely, DRIPA 2014, as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015—has also used the wording referred to in the amendment. Therefore, it also relates to legislation that is not particularly old and indeed is pretty recent. As I see it, we are making a change in wording from legislation that was passed only a year or two ago.
Earl Howe
The noble Lord makes what is, on the face of it, a fair point. We have language, as I have explained, that is out of date. But even where the language is not out of date in the kinds of instances that he refers to—for example, legislation refers to the “international mobile equipment identity” of devices—the rate at which telecommunications change means that that kind of language could become out of date very quickly. We try to read across the data descriptions that originated in the 2006 directive to the communications technologies of today, and do so in technology-neutral language. That is why we have departed from the approach that the noble Lord is advocating.
As the noble Lord will remember, DRIPA was emergency legislation. We simply replicated the existing language in that Bill. We now have an opportunity in the Bill before us to do rather better and try to future-proof the terms that the Bill contains.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for that explanation. In the light of what he has said on behalf of the Government, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser
Since the issue of the Wilson doctrine has been raised, perhaps I could refer to the recent report from the Select Committee on the Constitution. It referred to the Wilson doctrine and made particular reference to a case decided last year, where,
“the Investigatory Powers Tribunal held that the Wilson Doctrine provided fewer safeguards for parliamentarians’ communications than had commonly been supposed”.
The Select Committee ended that section of its report by saying:
“We note that the surveillance of parliamentarians is a significant constitutional issue and would welcome clarification from the Government of its current understanding of the Wilson Doctrine”.
Do the Government intend to give an indication of their current understanding of the Wilson doctrine, in line with the views expressed in that recent report from the Select Committee on the Constitution?
Earl Howe
My Lords, Amendment 169AA would remove the role of the Secretary of State and law enforcement chiefs from the warrant authorisation process, in circumstances where an equipment interference warrant is sought for the purposes of acquiring the communications or private information of a Member of a relevant legislature. This proposal reflects an earlier amendment discussed by this Committee in the context of interception. As I understood her, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is concerned that the safeguards contained in the Bill politicise the process of authorising a warrant. I do not share that perspective at all.
As my noble and learned friend Lord Keen said when we first discussed this matter, this amendment would in fact reduce the safeguards for parliamentarians. In line with the commitment given by the previous Prime Minister last November, the Bill provides a triple lock where warrants concern a parliamentarian’s communications or private information: they must be issued by the Secretary of State; approved by the Prime Minister; and authorised by a judicial commissioner. The Bill goes even further in the context of equipment interference warrants issued to law enforcement agencies, which are issued by a law enforcement chief and must be approved by the Secretary of State, the Prime Minister and an independent judicial commissioner.
I will not rehearse the arguments for the double lock at this point, but it is important to remember, as the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, reminded us, that it was endorsed by the Joint Committee of Parliament that scrutinised the draft Bill and, following amendments made in the other place, enjoyed cross-party support. The additional safeguards provided for parliamentarians add an extra layer of checks to the process. I do not share the perception of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that the process introduces the risk of political bias. In fact, I find it difficult to see what possible benefit would accrue from removing one of the checks that we now propose—that regarding the Secretary of State or law enforcement chief. In view of that, I respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I will move on briefly to the amendment tabled by the Government. Amendment 173 is—this answers the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—a small, technical amendment that simply corrects the omission of a definition from Clause 114. The amendment adds the appropriate definition of a “designated senior official” to the clause, informing the reader of the persons to whom the provision applies. We do not think that there is any need to revisit the relative definitions in other parts of the Bill, and the amendment does not change how the equipment interference regime operates in any way.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the Government’s view of the Wilson doctrine. As he will be aware, in its judgment of 14 October the IPT comprehensively rejected the claim brought by a number of parliamentarians that their communications were improperly intercepted and found that all activity was within the law. The IPT also found that MPs’ communications with their constituents and others are protected by RIPA, the statutory legal regime, and that the regime governing the interception of MPs’ communications is compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.
In February 2015, the Government published an updated draft code of practice on the interception of communications, which explicitly recognised the importance of communications between constituents and their elected representatives. In consequence, the Bill now provides for this in statute by setting out a role for the Prime Minister in authorising warrants which target a parliamentarian. I hope that that is helpful.
Investigatory Powers Bill
Lord Rosser Excerpts(8 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Murphy of Torfaen
My Lords, this part of the Bill concerning Members of Parliament is a hugely important and grave issue, but I think it is probably about right now. As the House and the Minister will know, when the legislation went through the other place, there was a change. Instead of the Prime Minister being informed about a Member of Parliament or of this House having a warrant against them, now the Prime Minister must approve such a warrant. I think that is absolutely right.
There are a couple of points worth making. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that the idea of the Speaker of the House of Commons being involved is a very difficult precedent to set, not only because it puts a great burden on the Speaker but because this part of the Bill refers not just to the British Parliament—both this House and the other place—but to the Welsh Assembly, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and, for the time being at least, the European Parliament. If the Speaker was to be involved, surely it would be necessary for the Presiding Officers of those parliaments and assemblies also to be. Frankly, that is something that they would not particularly welcome.
With regard to the point made about the First Minister of Scotland, that same argument applies. If you say that the First Minister of Scotland ought to be involved, surely the First Minister of Wales would have to be involved and, presumably, the First and Deputy First Ministers of Northern Ireland as well—not to mention, for the time being, the President of the European Parliament. I am not sure that would work. Nevertheless, it is important that such matters are raised.
Finally, is the Wilson doctrine obsolete as a consequence of the legislation? Will it be replaced by what is now in the Bill, or does the Wilson doctrine still stand in the sense that it has always referred to a change of policy, rather than to individual people— Members of the House of Commons or whoever—who might be subject to interception? I would be grateful to the Minister if he said, when he responds, whether the Wilson doctrine is now finally dead and buried.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
Perhaps I may make a brief comment about Amendments 85A and 85B in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We, too, want to hear the Government’s response to the views expressed by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I will not go over those views, since the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has already set them out. In brief, the first is the fact that paragraph 33 of Schedule 8 includes a power to amend the provisions of Schedule 8 itself. The committee said that it needed “a very convincing explanation” of why that was necessary; otherwise, it would find the power inappropriate. The other, as the noble Lord said, concerns the fact that the powers conferred by paragraph 33 of Schedule 8 include a power to amend future enactments whenever passed or made. The committee commented that it felt that such powers were inappropriate. In view of the comments made by the committee, we, like the noble Lord, wish to hear the Government’s response to the committee’s points.
Lord Keen of Elie
I will begin with that last point on Amendments 85A and 85B. The Government believe that the power is necessary for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but we are conscious of the terms of the report made by the Delegated Powers Committee. We are still reflecting on those comments and intend to respond in due course. I hope that that will give some satisfaction to the noble Lord. The matter is still under consideration and no final view has been arrived at.
I now turn back to the matter raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. By way of background, your Lordships will be aware that, last November, the Prime Minister announced additional protections for the communications of Members of Parliament and Members of other legislatures, including the Scottish Parliament and the assemblies. Clause 26 sets out the requirement for the Prime Minister to approve the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant to acquire communications sent by a Member of Parliament or intended for a Member of Parliament. Again, I use the term “Member of Parliament” to embrace Members of the other legislative assemblies referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Murphy.
Amendment 43A would remove the role of the Secretary of State from the warrant authorisation process where the Wilson doctrine is engaged—I will come on to the Wilson doctrine in a moment—which would in fact reduce the safeguards for parliamentarians. In line with the commitment given by the Prime Minister last November, the Bill provides a triple lock where warrants concern a parliamentarian’s communications: they must be authorised by the Secretary of State, agreed by the Prime Minister and authorised by a judicial commissioner.
I will not rehearse again the arguments for the double lock at this point, but it is important to remember that it was endorsed by the Joint Committee of Parliament that scrutinised the draft Bill and that, following amendments made in the other place, it enjoyed cross-party support. The triple lock for parliamentarians simply adds an extra layer of checks to this important process. It is difficult to see what possible benefit would accrue from removing one of those checks—that is, the Secretary of State—which would also serve to undermine the accountability of the Secretary of State to Parliament for the activities of the agencies that the Secretary of State oversees. In view of that, I respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Amendment 45 would provide a role for the First Minister of Scotland in approving warrants to acquire communications sent by or intended for a Member of the Scottish Parliament. However, we do not consider that it would be appropriate for the First Minister to have a role in approving a decision taken by the Secretary of State on what is a reserved matter.
As to the operation of serious crime warrants, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, might have had in mind, particularly in Scotland, it is of course for Scottish Ministers to determine what additional safeguards they wish to provide in relation to parliamentarians. That is a devolved matter within their competence, and the same may in due course apply in the context of the Welsh Assembly—or, indeed, any other assembly that is set up.
The effect of Amendment 44 would be to provide for the Prime Minister to inform the relevant legislature that such a warrant or warrants has or have been issued—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. Noble Lords will be aware that the Wilson doctrine, as it is termed, followed from a statement made by the then Prime Minister that, as a general policy, there would be no tapping of MPs’ telephones—but that, if there was a need to make a change to this general policy, the Prime Minister would, at a time of his choosing and when the national security situation allowed, make a Statement in the House. That is what is encompassed within the Wilson doctrine.
In a Written Ministerial Statement last November, the Prime Minister again confirmed that the Wilson doctrine continued to apply. He went on to explain the Government’s position on the Wilson doctrine and how it would apply in the 21st century. In his Statement, the Prime Minister was clear that the Wilson doctrine does not place an absolute bar on the interception of parliamentarians’ communications and confirmed that he would be consulted should there ever be a requirement to target a parliamentarian under a warrant issued by a Secretary of State. As has been noted, particularly as a result of the changes in the other place, the Bill now goes further by providing that the Prime Minister must provide explicit authorisation for a warrant to target a parliamentarian’s communications.
I understand that every Administration since 1966 has confirmed that the Wilson doctrine remains in place. This Government have done so on numerous occasions in Parliament. The doctrine includes the Prime Minister’s commitment to inform the relevant legislature, at a time of his choosing and when national security allows, should there ever be a change to the general policy. There has been cross-party agreement on this issue for more than 50 years. In view of the Prime Minister’s statement, and the stringent safeguards in the Bill, which go further in statute than was previously provided for, no further statutory provision is considered necessary.
Lord Rosser
I will make just one very brief point. These amendments on modifications relate to an area where the system could—and I use the word “could”, not “will” or “would”—be abused, in the sense of a significant modification being made to a warrant perhaps not having to go through the kind of process one would have to go through with the initial warrant. I hope the Minister might respond in a rather wider context than the specifics of the amendments and set out why the Government believe, as far as the Bill is concerned, that the modification process cannot be used to achieve a major change in a warrant without having to go through the proper procedures of getting judicial authorisation. To some extent, I think that what lies at the heart of this issue on modifications is wanting an assurance, which can be given really only by spelling out the process that would prevent the system being abused in this way.
Lord Keen of Elie
Perhaps I might begin with that last point. The whole structure of the Bill involves checks and balances. At the end of the day the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will carry out auditing and oversight functions to ensure that the requirements in respect of warrants and their modification have been adhered to. Therefore, it is a question of looking at the overall structure and functioning of the warranty system under the Bill. It is not spelled out in any one particular clause. I just make that observation at this stage.
Amendments 53, 55, 56 and 57 seek to provide that all modifications to a warrant must be authorised by a judicial commissioner. In our view, that is neither necessary nor appropriate. Clause 32 creates a carefully constructed regime, differentiating between major modifications and minor modifications. A major modification is one which adds or varies the name or description of a person, organisation or set of premises to which the warrant relates. A modification which adds or varies a factor identifying the communications described in the warrant will be a minor modification; for example, a minor modification might be adding a new telephone number for a known target. In addition, a modification that removes something from a warrant, and so reduces the conduct authorised by it, is a minor modification. The Bill makes this sensible distinction between major and minor modifications. In neither case is the judicial commissioner required to authorise the modification because the requirement to modify warrants to keep them up to date is first and foremost a safeguard.
I will explain how major modifications will operate under the legislation. The Bill provides for major modifications to be made only to so-called thematic targeted warrants. Current statute, such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, allows for the issue of such warrants. They may be granted against, for example, the members of a kidnap gang. Thematic targeted warrants are invaluable in complex or fast-moving investigations. The Bill serves to put them on a clearer footing and to strengthen the safeguards that apply to them.
These warrants cannot be open-ended. Their scope must be sufficiently defined for the Secretary of State to be able meaningfully to assess whether the action is necessary and proportionate—the relevant statutory test. The Bill introduces a new safeguard, requiring the warrant to be modified to include names or descriptions of the subjects of the warrant, as far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, as the investigation progresses. This will assist the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner in overseeing the warrant. There would be no benefit in having a commissioner authorise a modification that is being made in the first place only to inform his own oversight of the warrant. It would introduce unnecessary bureaucracy and the Bill already makes it clear that major modifications that engage the Wilson doctrine or legal privilege will be subject to the full double lock.
In our view, providing a role for the judicial commissioner in authorising a minor modification is even more superfluous. A minor modification caters for those circumstances where the subject of a warrant changes his phone or starts using a different email address. Those under investigation regularly change their phones or use different communications services in a bid to evade detection. The speed and volume of modifications of this nature are such that a role for the judicial commissioner in authorising the modification would cause the operational agility of the system to slow almost to a halt. This would inevitably have an impact on the ability of our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to perform their core function of protecting the public.
Clause 33 provides clear definitions of what constitutes a senior position in a public authority—that is, the authority that can deal with modifications—and an example is someone at the level of brigadier in the Ministry of Defence. We believe it is entirely appropriate that a person holding such a position is able to make a minor modification; for example, to determine that a new means of communication, such as a telephone number, being used by the person under investigation should be added to the warrant. Of course, we recognise the importance of ensuring the process for making modifications is as rigorous as it can be. That is why the Bill was amended in the other place to apply the necessity and proportionality test to minor modifications, as well as major modifications. Accordingly, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 53.
Amendment 54 would limit the circumstances in which a minor modification may be made to an interception warrant. It would have the effect that the only modifications that could be considered minor would be ones that either remove something from a warrant or correct an error in the description of a factor. We suggest that the amendment is unnecessary and would undermine the effective operation of the modification process. It would mean, for example, that where the subject of a warrant bought a new mobile phone, simply adding the mobile phone number to the warrant would be a major modification. The Bill would then require that this modification be made by the Secretary of State, or a senior official acting on their behalf, and notified to a judicial commissioner, even though the Secretary of State has already made the decision that it is necessary and proportionate for the communications of the individual to be intercepted, and the judicial commissioner has already approved that decision.
We recognise the importance of ensuring that the process for making modifications is rigorous. That is why we have amended the Bill following consideration in the other place such that there must be a consideration of necessity and proportionality for minor modifications, not just major modifications, as I mentioned before. We amended the Bill to ensure that the judicial commissioner is notified of a major modification to a warrant, as well as the Secretary of State, so that they have an ongoing visibility as to the extent of the activity authorised by the warrant. In conclusion, the process for making minor modifications is already sufficiently stringent, the amendment is unnecessary, and it would undermine the efficient operation of the warranty and modifications process. I invite the noble Baroness not to move Amendment 54.
Amendment 60 relates to where a major modification is being made when the protections for the communications of a parliamentarian or items subject to legal professional privilege apply. The amendment seeks to provide that, even where it is not reasonably practicable for the Secretary of State to sign the modification instrument, the instrument may be signed by a senior official only if it is being made urgently. This amendment is unnecessary and is, I believe, based on a misunderstanding of what Clause 34 provides for.
Clause 34 enables an instrument making a major modification where Sections 26 and 27 apply—in relation to parliamentarians and items subject to LPP—to be signed by a senior official where it is not reasonably practicable for the Secretary of State to sign it; for example, when the Secretary of State is out of the country, working in their constituency or otherwise unavailable. But the modification must still be personally and expressly authorised by the Secretary of State before the senior official can sign the instrument. The senior official is signing on behalf of and to acknowledge the Secretary of State’s authorisation. That is why we suggest that Amendment 60 may be unnecessary.
It may be appreciated that there will be instances when the Secretary of State is simply not physically able to sign a modification instrument. The purpose of Clauses 34(8) and (9) is to make explicit provision for this and to make it clear that a modification made in such circumstances—where the Secretary of State has approved but is not available—is not an urgent modification. That underlines the point I was seeking to make earlier, that there will always have been authorisation by the Secretary of State. Against that background, I invite the noble Baroness not to move Amendment 60.
Investigatory Powers Bill
Lord Rosser Excerpts(8 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
“General public reporting
(1) A person subject to a warrant or notice under Part 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 of this Act may publish and make publicly available a report including—(a) the number of warrants or notices to which they have been subject;(b) the number of accounts affected; and(c) the number of warrants or notices they have complied with.(2) A person may make the disclosure under subsection (1) in relation to any warrants or notices received in the previous 180 days.”
Lord Rosser (Lab)
The amendments in this group relate to issues which have been raised by service providers, and are all largely probing amendments to ascertain the Government’s response for the record. As has already been said, Clause 2 addresses “General duties in relation to privacy” for a public authority—including the relevant judicial authority—in connection with the issuing of warrants and notices, and sets out the considerations to which the public authority must have regard.
Amendment 25A, the first in the group, provides for a new clause after Clause 2, which would allow companies served with a warrant or notice, whether complied with or not, to publish figures in aggregate for warrants and notices received in the previous 180 days. The point of the amendment is to pursue the issue of transparency where there has been engagement between companies and law enforcement and government agencies under the provisions of the Bill. Such transparency would also appear to be a prerequisite for redress, should the way in which the powers in the Bill are being used be called into question.
In America, the USA Freedom Act significantly reforms the transparency of US surveillance laws, and this amendment is based on part of the provisions of that Act. There seems no reason why there should not be the facility for the level of transparency called for in this amendment, which would enable providers to publish statistical data about the number of warrants received and those given effect to. Not only does this amendment give the Government the opportunity to respond to the specific terms of the amendment but it will enable the Government to say what their intentions are for providing a clear framework for transparency under the Bill in the light of the USA Freedom Act.
The Minister made reference in an earlier debate to the letter that had been sent to my noble friend Lord Rooker in relation to the privacy clause. Towards the end of that letter, dealing with the last of the 10 tests to which reference was made in an earlier amendment, the letter said:
“The Bill also provides for the Secretary of State to designate international agreements under which cross-border requests for information can be made. This will ensure in the future that our protections and safeguards for requests for data under the legislation are capable of being harmonised with like-minded open and democratic Governments”.
The letter went on:
“As the Home Secretary made clear during the Bill’s passage in the House of Commons, we are seeking to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the US to this end”.
It would be quite helpful if the Minister was able to say in response what is the likelihood of the bilateral agreement with the United States of America being achieved, and within what kind of timespan.
I shall move on to the other amendments in the group. Amendments 63, 64 and 65 relate to Clauses 39 and 41. Clause 39, on “Implementation of warrants”, provides that the person who has obtained the warrant—that is, the head of the intercepting agency—may require other persons to assist in giving effect to a targeted interception warrant or mutual assistance warrant. Clause 39(4) provides:
“A copy of a warrant may be served under subsection (3) on a person outside the United Kingdom for the purpose of requiring the person to provide such assistance in the form of conduct outside the United Kingdom.”
Amendment 63 amends Clause 39 to exclude the extraterritorial provision in cases where any mutual assistance arrangement exists between the United Kingdom and the provider’s jurisdiction. It also serves to establish international mutual assistance agreements, of the kind recommended by Sir Nigel Sheinwald, the fast-departing Prime Minister’s special envoy on intelligence and law enforcement data sharing. It seeks to establish international mutual assistance agreements of the kind that he recommended—as currently under negotiation with the US Government—as the primary route by which UK agencies obtain data from overseas communication service providers. The amendment would continue to enable the imposition of warrants on communication service providers in non-mutual legal assistance countries.
Clause 41, on the “Duty of operators to assist with implementation”, provides that a telecommunications or postal service provider served with a target interception warrant or mutual assistance warrant is required to take steps to give effect to it. This obligation applies whether or not the operator is in the United Kingdom. Subsection (4) ensures that the steps a service provider is required to make must be “reasonably practicable”, and subsection (5) provides that, in considering what is reasonable,
“any requirements or restrictions under the laws of the country”,
in which an operator is based must be taken into account.
Amendments 64 and 65 would amend Clause 41 by seeking to establish a reasonableness test for overseas communication service providers. They would also establish international mutual assistance agreements, where they exist, as the primary route to obtain data from these communication service providers. The amendments would also give effect to the Government’s commitment that enforcement powers should not be applicable where an overseas communication service provider is acting under the auspices of an international agreement. The amendments to Clause 41 state that a relevant operator is not required to take any steps which it is not reasonably practicable for the relevant operator to take which, for a relevant operator outside the United Kingdom shall include,
“any steps which would cause the operator to act contrary to any laws or restrictions under the law of the country or territory where it has its principal office for the provision of telecommunication services”.
There is a fairly widely held view that the current international legal framework by which UK agencies obtain data from overseas providers needs updating. Sir Nigel Sheinwald recommended that the UK Government engage like-minded Governments to conclude new mutual assistance agreements, which address conflicts of law and provide a sustainable and workable approach for UK agencies to obtain content data from overseas providers. It appears some progress is being made with the US Government towards such an agreement. The Bill currently provides UK agencies with several options to seek data from overseas providers, including mutual legal assistance treaties, the mutual legal assistance convention, international agreements of the kind recommended by Sir Nigel Sheinwald, and service of a UK warrant extraterritorially.
The unilateral assertion of UK jurisdiction overseas risks creating a conflicting world of laws and a difficult and uncertain environment for local staff of overseas companies in the UK and UK companies abroad. The Bill does not direct agencies as to which power to use under what circumstances, and that is an issue that these amendments seek to address. The new international assistance agreements are additional and complementary to mutual legal assistance treaties but, unlike such treaties, international assistance agreements would permit UK agencies to request data directly from overseas providers, in their home jurisdiction, without application to a local court. These amendments do not seek to push all requests through the existing mutual assistance treaties process.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply. I will read it carefully in Hansard and reflect on what he had to say. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser
Unless the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has driven a coach and horses through these amendments—I shall have to consider carefully what he said—I would like to thank the Government for bringing them forward. As has been said, they incorporate in all the relevant parts of the Bill the change that was made in relation to trade union activity in providing protection for it when the matter was debated in the Commons. We welcome the amendments and the Government honouring the commitment that they gave in the other place.
Investigatory Powers Bill
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Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, the Investigatory Powers Bill seeks to address an issue that, in theory, is simple and straightforward: namely, the appropriate balance between individual privacy and collective security in the digital age. However, what make it in reality a far from simple and straightforward issue are the very different views on where that appropriate balance lies.
The vote in the referendum last Thursday to leave the European Union has, potentially at least, added to the complexity, since it has raised the question of what the implications of that decision might be for the proposals in the Bill and their effectiveness and relevance, bearing in mind the considerable co-operation with what are still, at this moment in time, our European partners over security and intelligence issues and the European arrest warrant in the fight against terrorism and serious crime. What happens if the present level of co-operation is scaled down? If it were scaled down, would it happen only from the day we left the European Union or would it start to happen earlier?
The resignation of our European commissioner does not suggest that our involvement with and influence in the European Union and European organisations will continue at the present level until the necessary negotiations on our withdrawal have been completed. I ask the Minister to make some meaningful comment on this point when he responds at the end of the debate. This question was not discussed during the passage of this Bill through the House of Commons, but it should be considered, and answers sought, in this House.
As the Minister said, the Bill was the subject of extensive pre-legislative scrutiny, including by a Joint Committee of both Houses chaired by my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen. Prior to the pre-legislative scrutiny, there had been extensive scrutiny of our investigatory powers in three independent reviews, including one by David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. His review and the other reviews stressed that legislation relating to interception and communications data needed to be consolidated and made subject to clear and robust privacy safeguards. This Bill is also intended to replace the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, which contains a sunset clause requiring new legislation to be passed by the end of this year.
Safety and security matter—a point brought home to us all too painfully just over a week ago when one of our much respected and much admired parliamentary colleagues, Jo Cox MP, was brutally murdered in the street in broad daylight in this country.
The current threat level for terrorism is severe. We have also seen major attacks recently in Paris, Brussels and elsewhere. The Bill, though, covers not only terrorism but other serious crimes such as people trafficking, including the trafficking of children, sexual abuse, stalking and harassment. The security and intelligence services, GCHQ, the National Crime Agency and the police must have the powers to deal with these threats in an age when those involved in terrorism and criminality are operating online with a reach and on a scale that has not existed before through exploiting the technological advances now available for their own ends.
Human rights matter, too, including the right to privacy, the right to be left alone, the right to have private data protected and the right to redress when needed. My noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, who is in her place, and her family were put under surveillance by the Metropolitan Police with no justification at all. Those whose job it is to protect us, and to whom I do not think we always give sufficient credit and thanks for what they do on our behalf, cannot be expected to carry out their responsibilities with one arm tied behind their back. Equally there have to be effective checks and there has to be public confidence among all sections of our diverse community that the arms of those who protect us are not extending into areas where there is neither the need nor the justification.
Safety and security and human rights are not mutually exclusive. The Bill has completed its passage through the Commons. The Labour Party voted for it at Third Reading in the light of both significant amendments made in the Commons to meet our Labour red lines and in the light of undertakings given by Government Ministers to address further issues of Labour concern during the Bill’s passage through this House. It is now up to the Government to deliver on those verbal undertakings, now on the record in Commons Hansard. They include a commitment to introduce a threshold for access to internet connection records so that the powers cannot be used in investigating minor crimes—which is what the Bill as presently drafted in effect permits.
On Report in the Commons, the Government Minister, in response to our argument for a general serious crime test for communications data and a higher threshold on top of that for the use of internet connection records—but one which would provide that offences such as grooming, harassment and stalking were still covered—said he was committed to doing what we were seeking, and continued:
“I do so because it is really important that we have a threshold that works, particularly on ICRs”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/6/16; col. 1120.]
A further commitment was made in respect of the protection of journalistic sources. We have already secured amendments to the Bill providing that judicial commissioners, when considering a warrant, must give weight to the overriding public interest in a warrant being granted for the use of investigatory powers against journalists, and that they must ensure that it is in keeping with wider and more general privacy points.
However, there are still matters outstanding on this point, including the extent to which the Bill does or does not provide for the same level of protection for journalists as is currently the case under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. There is also the question of the definition of who is and who is not a journalist now that we are in the digital world. The Government Minister in the Commons accepted that a solution needed to be found and said:
“I am happy to say that we will look at this issue with him”—
the shadow Home Secretary—
“and others in greater detail as the Bill enjoys its passage through this House and the other place”,—[Official Report, Commons, 7/6/16; col. 1117.]
with the reference to “others” including the National Union of Journalists.
There is also an outstanding issue over legal privilege. The Bill now provides that it is only in exceptional and compelling circumstances that warrants may be issued where one of the purposes is the obtaining of legally privileged communications. Questions about the provisions in the Bill have been raised by the Law Society and the Bar Council, and I understand that the Government are continuing to discuss the concerns raised with the relevant organisations. We will need to know the outcome of the discussions and whether these concerns have been resolved. This is not about preserving the special status of individuals who work in journalism or the legal profession, or indeed as parliamentarians, but about protecting the public and their ability to raise issues through these channels on a secure and confidential basis.
In the Commons, the Government also accepted in principle our amendments relating to appointments to the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner, which would increase the role of the Lord Chief Justice in making recommendations for appointment to the Prime Minister. We will also need to be satisfied that the safeguards around modifications to warrants have been strengthened sufficiently to ensure that major modifications cannot be made by the back door, thus avoiding the provisions laid down in the Bill for obtaining warrants. We are not yet satisfied that this issue has been fully resolved, although we recognise that it is not a straightforward matter and we would be willing to work with the Government on it.
A number of crucial changes to the Bill were secured in the Commons through the approach we, as the Official Opposition, adopted. First, on the powers in the Bill which enable information to be retained in bulk form, the Government accepted our argument that there should be an independent review of the operational case for such powers. These are actually powers which, for the most part, are currently available and being exercised at present, but not on a statutory footing with safeguards. The investigation will be carried out by David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and will consider the necessity of the powers and whether the same result could have been achieved through alternative means. He will conclude his work before the relevant clauses in the Bill are reached in this House. This was a fundamental concession as far as we were concerned. While it clearly depends on what conclusions David Anderson reaches, it is quite likely that the findings of his review will prove to be the major issue.
Secondly, we pressed for and achieved an overarching privacy clause in the Bill against which the use of the exceptional powers in the Bill will have to be justified. We believe that it is vital to have this in the Bill so that privacy considerations are at its heart. Thirdly, we secured a provision that makes it clear that legitimate trade union activities are not a sufficient reason for powers under the Bill to be exercised. Fourthly, on judicial oversight of decisions to approve warrants for the exercise of powers under the Bill by the Home Secretary, a judicial commissioner will have to consider necessity and proportionality, and balance that against the overarching privacy clause. The judicial commissioner will not just be scrutinising the process. Fifthly, progress was made on providing protection for whistleblowers when giving information to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
The Joint Committee on the draft Bill called for protection for members of the intelligence services who raise concerns about the misuse of investigatory powers with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The Bill provides for an individual to be able to give information on a voluntary basis to the commissioner without that individual committing a criminal offence or incurring a civil liability. However, the Solicitor General in the Commons agreed on Report to make it absolutely clear in the Bill that whistleblowers can make disclosures to the IPC without fear of prosecution. The Bill also now provides greater protection over access to medical records, which can be retained and accessed only in “exceptional and compelling circumstances”.
I have not referred to all the changes to the Bill secured in the Commons, or to all the undertakings given by the Government in respect of amendments to the Bill tabled in this House. What has been achieved, though, is an indication that, thanks to the persistence, determination and constructive work of the Official Opposition and others, and the willingness of the Government to listen, there are now much stronger safeguards in the Bill protecting people’s privacy and their human rights than existed in the original Bill or exist under current legislation.
That does not mean that the Bill is perfect—I am sure we will all want to listen to areas of continuing concern that may well be expressed both inside and outside this Chamber as we consider the Bill in detail. Clearly, our position on the Bill has changed since it started its passage through the Commons. We are looking, though, to make further progress during debates on the Bill in this House and, in particular, to hold the Government to the outstanding commitments and undertaking they gave in the Commons and on which the House will expect to be updated as we go through the Bill.
Child Refugee Resettlement
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Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to an Urgent Question asked in the Commons earlier today. We appreciate and welcome the steps that the Government are taking. In the Commons yesterday, the Government confirmed that they were accepting the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Dubs which was passed in this House. They also said that they would urgently consult others prior to bringing forward more detailed proposals and that a meeting of the Local Government Association was scheduled for later this week.
It appears that 10 Downing Street has now told the Daily Telegraph that the first children will be arriving by the end of the year, which is a totally different tenor of response to that given in the Commons, which was all about urgency and getting on with it as quickly as possible. Will the Government tell us the estimated timetable for implementing my noble friend’s amendment, which the Government have accepted? Will the Minister also say whether it will be an objective to take in at least the first 300 children before the start of the school year in September, since it will not assist the position of such children if they have to join a school well into the start of the school year?
Finally, 157 children have been identified by Citizens UK as being in Calais and having family connections here. I appreciate that earlier a Minister said he could not comment on the figure of 157, but will the Government give an assurance that they will take prompt action to ensure that those children in Calais with a valid legal claim for reunification are reunited as a matter of urgency with their families here under the Dublin arrangements?
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who asked a number of questions. The Daily Telegraph picked up the No. 10 statement and misconstrued it. No. 10 said that we would proceed with this programme as quickly as possible and that by the end of the year we will have seen children arriving in this country. That does not mean to say that it will be 31 December before any child arrives.
It is difficult for me to define the estimated timetable because of the need, as specified by the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, to consult local authorities before we are in a position to say how many children can be accommodated. I can only assure the noble Lord that we need to take necessary but not undue time to do that, that we are already engaged with the French authorities to ensure that the vulnerable children who I know the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, wants us to prioritise are identified as quickly as possible, and that we will do the same in Greece and Italy.
I cannot, as the noble Lord will therefore surmise, be specific about whether we will admit 300 children before the start of the school year. The very nature of this announcement means that we must take the necessary time to consult others before bringing forward final proposals on how to implement. All I can say is that we will not only implement the letter of this amendment but its spirit, and we will do so enthusiastically and as speedily as we can. Naturally, as I have already emphasised, those children in Calais are likely to be the first candidates.
Immigration Bill
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, today is a day for pithy comments rather than rehearsing arguments that I have already made on this subject, which are on the record. Amendment 59B is different from the previous amendment in that an olive branch has been offered in the shape of nine months rather than six months. We have been told that the delays in the system are historic and that the system is now under control, so it seems that there should not be a problem with six months —but there we are.
I support in particular the noble Lord’s comments about the shortage occupation list. It would be inappropriate to go through all the jobs on that list but without wanting to be too frivolous, I noticed that, for instance, string players are on the list but there is no mention of players of wind or brass instruments. That is the sort of detail and the sort of thing that really makes you wonder about the policy.
The nine months proposal would be in line with almost all other countries in the EU, so there would be no pull factor. Having spoken up and given my support to the noble Lord, I will sit down.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
The amendment your Lordships sent to the Commons on allowing asylum seekers the right to work after six months, like the other amendments carried in this House against the Government’s wishes, did not find favour with the Government or indeed receive any indication of movement by them on the issue.
As has been said, at present in most cases asylum seekers are not allowed to work in the UK unless they have waited over 12 months for an initial or subsequent decision, and are not considered responsible for any delay. Those who do qualify for the right to work under these restrictions are then able to apply only for jobs on the shortage occupation list. However, we are currently reviewing this issue as part of a wider policy review and consequently we will not be supporting the Motion sending the matter back again to the Commons—albeit now saying nine months rather than six months.
Earl Howe
My Lords, Amendment 59B, proposed in lieu of Amendment 59, while slightly less radical than the earlier amendment, would still mean fundamental changes to the government policy of restricting permission to work to those who have been awaiting a decision, through no fault of their own, for 12 months. As the noble Lord reminded us, those allowed to work are restricted to jobs on the shortage occupation list introduced in the last Parliament. As I indicated earlier, the Government believe that this is a fair and reasonable policy, and we believe that because of the need to ensure that access to jobs is prioritised for British citizens and those with leave to remain here—including, importantly, refugees.
The new amendment would not only allow asylum seekers to work after only nine months; it would also remove the important caveat that any delay must not be of the asylum seeker’s own making. This would benefit those who are responsible for delaying a decision on their claim and purposely frustrate the asylum process simply to gain permission to work or to avoid removal. It would also benefit individuals whose cases were complex for perfectly good reasons, such as those accused of serious criminal acts, including war crimes, where there is an inescapable imperative to investigate the facts before reaching a decision. It would also allow unrestricted access to the labour market—that is to say, not just to jobs on the shortage occupation list—regardless of the interests of British jobseekers. It is a recipe for a free pass into the UK employment pool and that really is not fair to British people competing for the same jobs. In making policy in this area, we have a duty to consider how such policy impacts on society as a whole, not just on asylum seekers.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, rather dismissed the arguments rehearsed by my noble friends Lord Ashton and Lord Bates in earlier stages of the Bill. But there is a danger that the noble Lord’s amendment would serve to encourage unfounded claims from those who do not need protection at all but are simply seeking employment opportunities, knowing that if they play their cards right they can achieve that objective within nine months. These are opportunities for which they would not otherwise be eligible. That cannot be right or acceptable. The shorter the period allowed for in this context, the more we encourage spurious asylum claims of this kind.
Currently, the Immigration Rules allow non-EEA nationals to work here if there is no suitable resident worker available. This gives priority to those filling roles on the shortage occupation list and is subject to numerical limits. If non-EEA nationals could bypass these restrictions by lodging an unfounded asylum claim, this approach would be completely undermined. It could encourage illegal migrants to come here and make an unfounded asylum claim, which would prejudice the position of British people and recognised refugees in our labour market. I say that because if we were to experience an increase in unfounded claims, the knock-on effect would be to delay claims from genuine refugees and undermine our progress towards a fair and efficient asylum system.
There has been much debate about delays in decision-making in the Home Office, but this is no longer an issue. Delays have been brought under control and, in the great majority of cases, asylum seekers receive a decision within six months. Many of those who do not are the complex cases that I referred to earlier. The noble Lord’s amendment carries an increased risk that we will be obliged to give a free pass to people with a criminal record—or, shall I say, with a criminal past. The majority of refugees are granted asylum within six months and once that happens, they have unrestricted access to the labour market.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, suggested that his amendment was a route out of poverty but this suggests that asylum seekers are penniless. While awaiting a decision, they receive free accommodation and a cash allowance to cover essential living needs if they would otherwise be destitute. While their claim is outstanding they can undertake volunteering activities that can benefit a community, giving them a sense of purpose, and we are exploring ways to support this.
The amendment proposed is unnecessary and I really do not think that the noble Lord has made his case. Asylum seekers do not need to work and what he proposes carries the risk of serious abuse. I firmly believe that the current policy strikes the right balance. As I said earlier, it is fair and reasonable towards genuine asylum seekers; it is consistent with our international obligations; and it takes into account the rights and needs of our society as a whole. On that basis, I ask noble Lords to resist Amendment 59B in lieu.
Lord Green of Deddington
My Lords, I do not doubt for a moment the good intentions of those who have put forward this amendment. The Government have moved a very long way to make sure, as much as they can, that overseas domestic workers are not exploited. Everyone is bound to concur with that.
The difficulty I have is that this amendment is not confined to domestic workers who are actually subject to abuse: all would be entitled to leave their employer, for any reason. Well, that is a considerable concession. However, if I have read the amendment correctly, they can stay here for not less than two and a half years. That creates a gaping hole in the immigration system. We are talking here about 17,000 people a year. Of course, word will spread very quickly that you can get to the UK on a domestic workers visa, walk out on your employer, stay here for two and a half years and then almost certainly go into the black economy and not go home. That will lead to a huge gap in our system, and I have to say that I think it is very unwise.
Lord Rosser
We continue to support the Ewins recommendations on overseas domestic workers, as well as the amendment that your Lordships sent to the Commons, which it has not accepted. We note that there has been some movement on this issue by the Government, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, referred. I hope that in his response the Minister will be able to reply in detail to the questions that have been raised in this short debate, and I hope that the answers will be found satisfactory by those who asked the questions.
The Earl of Sandwich (CB)
My noble friend Lord Green said that the Government have moved a very long way but I cannot agree with him. The Government have moved a short way. We heard previously, at earlier stages of the Bill, about the national referral mechanism being the fulcrum of the Government’s argument. I acknowledge that they have moved, but anyone who has sat and listened to 50 domestic workers, as I did with my noble friend Lord Hylton, will know that there is an atmosphere of fear, which is very hard to convey, but the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has already pointed that out. Even applying to the national referral mechanism, reporting very dangerous circumstances and forms of abuse, carries its risks for these people. Therefore, I urge noble Lords to think very hard about this amendment and I support my noble friend.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I find this much more difficult than some noble Lords. Motion C1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, would limit immigration detention to 28 days, save in exceptional circumstances. I cannot support that.
Immigration detention is confined to cases where there is a realistic possibility of removing the person concerned from this country within a reasonable time. The fact is that that often takes more than 28 days, because of the need to liaise with the country to which the person is being removed and because, very often, the individual concerned does not co-operate with the process.
Furthermore, the law requires that immigration tribunals refuse bail only in circumstances where there is a risk of the person absconding or some other substantive reason for keeping them in detention, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said a few moments ago. It is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, pointed out, that many of the persons detained have mental problems and many of them do not speak English, but it is also true that many expert bodies provide much-needed advice and assistance—and properly so—to those who are detained. I cannot support a 28-day absolute limit, saving in exceptional circumstances, because the circumstances that I have outlined are far from exceptional; they are quite standard.
Motion C2 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would require a bail hearing every 56 days. This is more difficult. I think the Government’s position, approved in the other place yesterday, of a bail hearing every six months, is adequate. The reason is that it is a default provision. It is additional to the right of the individual, advised by all those expert groups, to apply for bail at any time, and to argue at any time that there is now no reasonable possibility of being removed, or that there is no good reason—for example, a fear of absconding—for detention.
I also mention Motions D1 and D2. Motion D1, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, would prevent the detention of a pregnant woman, save in the most exceptional circumstances. The problem with that is that it would prevent the detention for removal of a woman who arrives at Heathrow Airport with no basis for entry and who can, if she is detained, be removed from this country, and rightly so, within a short period—for example if she is not making an asylum claim. That is not “the most exceptional circumstances”; it is a fairly standard case. Motion D1 would also, as I understand it, prevent in any circumstances the detention of a pregnant woman who is the subject of a deportation order but who refuses to go voluntarily, who can be removed within a very short period. I cannot support that.
Motion D2, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is again more difficult, but I am satisfied on balance that government Motion D is a very substantial change which will protect pregnant women, made in response to the amendment approved by this House.
We ought to bear in mind that what the Government have agreed under subsection (2) of the new provision is that a pregnant woman may not be detained under a relevant deportation power for more than 72 hours or for more than seven days where, and only where, such detention is authorised personally by a Minister of the Crown. The Minister in the other place, Mr James Brokenshire, has responded to the concerns expressed by this House and I am persuaded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that this amendment, which was approved in the other place, should be approved.
Lord Rosser
While it is welcome that the Government now acknowledge that long-term detention without judicial oversight is unacceptable in relation to considering bail, the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, relates to required judicial oversight of whether a person should continue to be detained at all beyond 28 days, related to whether the exceptional circumstances of the case require extended detention.
We have a commitment to end indefinite detention in the immigration system. The independent Shaw review into the welfare of vulnerable persons in detention also called for action to end excessive detention. This amendment provides for a presumptive limit on immigration detention of 28 days and requires the Secretary of State to gain judicial approval for any extension beyond that period, which would be permitted only if exceptional circumstances had been shown. I certainly do not wish to reiterate all the arguments that have been made, and I take on board the points made in earlier interventions about keeping it brief, so I shall just say that we shall be voting for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.
On Motion D1, as the Minister said, last week the Government announced plans to introduce a 72-hour limit on the detention of pregnant women, extendable to one week with ministerial approval, and a government amendment to provide for this was agreed in the Commons yesterday. That amendment was not in line with the findings of the Government’s independent review by Stephen Shaw into the welfare in detention of vulnerable persons, which found that the presumptive exclusion of pregnant women from detention should be replaced with absolute exclusion. Shaw concluded that immigration detention poses clear health risks to pregnant women and their unborn children and that it is being used more widely than in the “exceptional circumstances” outlined in Home Office guidance.
The amendment moved by my noble friend in the light of the Government’s resistance to an absolute ban has the support of various interested groups on the basis that it is the best that might currently be achievable. However, an absolute ban on the detention of pregnant women remains our objective, and we will seek to deliver it at the first available opportunity, a stance that has the full backing and support of my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)
My Lords, will the Minister clarify for my benefit a matter which concerns me? Does he agree that the writ of habeas corpus referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, would not be of any use in the circumstances that we are discussing because the return to the writ would simply show that there was lawful authority for the detention? If that is right, does he agree that the right to liberty could be relied upon only by reference to the Human Rights Act and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which would mean that any statutory provision that we approve would have to be read and given effect in accordance with the convention right to liberty?
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, like others I recognise the contribution that the Government are making in money and personnel, so far as those are being sent. But I regard the dangers of which we have heard—the situation in which unimaginable numbers of children have been caught up—and our moral responsibility as outweighing everything. The dangers include the risks of trafficking and exploitation. Was that not precisely what the previous Government set out to counter in their flagship legislation? Prevention is the best response so relocating, supporting and welcoming children would contribute to that objective. The Minister says that this amendment is not the best or the most effective way but it is not an either/or. Whatever other countries do or do not do, the UK must not do just what is better than others but what it knows is right. This amendment is in the best interests of the children who are the subject of it.
Lord Rosser
I will be brief, since the arguments for this amendment have already been powerfully made. I also endorse the comments made by my noble friend Lord Dubs and other noble Lords about the measures that the Government have already taken. But while on the one hand the Government say, rightly, that we need to play a role at the heart of Europe, on the other they decline to assist over taking in unaccompanied refugee children in Europe who have fled from war, conflict and persecution and are already alone and at risk, simply because they are already in Europe.
Europol estimates that 10,000 unaccompanied refugee children went missing in Europe last year and we know that children are being exploited. The Government maintain that taking in any unaccompanied refugee children from among those already in Europe would increase the so-called pull factor—an argument for which there is no firm, hard evidence one way or the other. But at the heart of the unproven pull factor claim is a policy stance that we should leave all unaccompanied refugee children already in Europe to their fate. That is an unacceptable stance and if my noble friend decides to put his amendment to a vote, we will support him in the Division Lobby.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am very sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, appeared to be so dismissive of the many measures that I set out in my opening remarks. I emphasise that those measures include both children in conflict zones and those who have reached the shores of Europe. We want to ensure that those children already in Europe are able to access the help and protection that they need; we simply disagree on the method outlined in the amendment in lieu.
I will emphasise something that I should have highlighted earlier: our position is firmly based on the evidence and advice of the expert organisation in this field, namely the UNHCR. Our approach focuses on family reunification and the wider risk categories of children at risk, rather than just unaccompanied children. The UNHCR has commended this approach, and I ask noble Lords not to dismiss that point. As the world expert in this field, it has cautioned against creating additional routes and benefits that target unaccompanied children, because of the risk of encouraging families to send children ahead alone—in other words, causing children to become unaccompanied, with all the risks that go with it. That would be a terrible thing to do or to encourage. We surely must do nothing that puts more children’s lives at risk. Our new children at risk scheme, which I referred to earlier, is designed specifically to avoid creating perverse incentives like that.
We agree that we have a duty to help vulnerable children across the globe, whether in conflict regions, in European member states or in the UK, to access the help and protection they need. But it is our belief that simply physically transporting some unaccompanied children from one part of the EU to another is not the best or most effective way to fulfil our duty. That is why we are providing the significant support I have already outlined to build capacity in European asylum systems and ensure children are able to access that support.
We also believe it is best to support family reunification —bringing families together—rather than creating perverse incentives for children to be separated from their family, which I fear is what the noble Lord’s amendment would do. We already have several routes for families to be reunited safely. Our refugee family reunion policy allows immediate family members of a person in the UK with refugee leave or humanitarian protection—that is to say, a spouse or partner and children under the age of 18, who formed part of the family unit before the sponsor fled their country of origin—to reunite with them in the UK.
That is the answer to my Commons colleague Stephen Phillips: under that policy, we have reunited many refugees with their immediate family and continue to do so. We have granted more than 21,000 family reunion visas over the past five years. Even where an application fails under the Immigration Rules, our policy requires us to consider exceptional or compassionate reasons for granting a visa outside the rules.
Immigration Bill
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Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling the amendment on behalf of us both. I was alerted to this issue by briefings at an earlier stage of the Bill from the JCWI and ILPA. As the noble Baroness said, the late and much missed Lord Avebury tried to resolve this issue during the passage of what became the 2014 Act, but to no avail. It falls to us to try to resolve it now.
I will not repeat the case in support of the amendment that has already been made so clearly by the noble Baroness. Instead, I draw your Lordships’ attention to a singular aspect of the permission-to-rent scheme that the amendment is designed to remedy. The UK has a strong tradition of upholding the rule of law. All of us can be sure in our interactions with the state that officials who make decisions that affect us are accountable to the law. Whether it is the person next door applying for planning permission, the imposition of a fine for speeding, the grant of a licence to serve alcoholic beverages or a local decision to cut council services, in every case the people affected are either directly notified of the decision or are able to access information about it that is available in the public domain. By informing people of the decisions that affect them, we ensure that government operates reasonably transparently. We ensure that power is exercised in a reasonably accountable way, and that any arbitrary or unlawful use of power is communicated directly to those that it affects. The system helps to ensure that Ministers and other public servants wield their considerable power within the law.
Here, though, we have a scheme under which the Home Secretary can decide whether or not a person—and, potentially, their entire family—is made homeless. I emphasise to noble Lords that this is no exaggeration. To take the example that the noble Baroness referred to, we have been made aware of the case of a man with a wife and two young children who have every right to be in this country and possess the right to rent but, because he does not have the paperwork to evidence that, he is unable to find housing for his family. They have come to the end of a tenancy and have now been forced, as a family of four, to live with relatives while the Home Office processes his paperwork.
The right-to-rent scheme has a huge impact on individuals who are caught up in it. But, despite the importance that the Home Secretary’s decision makes to an individual’s life in future, there is no right to be informed of that decision and of the grounds on which the decision was made.
The Government will tell my landlord whether or not I have permission to rent and therefore whether or not I might have a home to go to come tomorrow, but they will not tell me. This cannot be tenable in a country that operates under the transparent rule of law. People have a right to know whether they will be entitled to rent accommodation. Moreover, as the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe stated in his recent memorandum on the human rights of asylum seekers and immigrants in the UK, the right to adequate housing applies to everyone. Ensuring that right is essential to the inherent dignity of every person, irrespective of their legal or immigration status.
A simple administrative reform can resolve this issue, which, as I have said, has important human rights implications. I urge the Minister either to accept the recommendation or to make a clear commitment to sort this out once and for all.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
I, too, have received a briefing on the issue that has been raised, and I certainly do not wish to reiterate the points that have been so ably put. There seems to be a strong argument for at least clarifying the situation—I think that that is what is being asked for—and ensuring that we do not end up with people being made homeless as a result. I very much hope that in his response the Minister will be able to provide that clarification—and an acceptable clarification as well.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would, as she explained, provide that a person disqualified by virtue of their immigration status may apply to the Secretary of State for written confirmation that permission to rent has been or will be granted to them. The amendment would amend the Immigration Act 2014, which introduced the right-to-rent scheme. It would work in conjunction with the existing provision, which states that a person who is otherwise disqualified from renting premises as a result of their immigration status is to be treated as having a right to rent where the Secretary of State has granted them permission to occupy premises under a residential tenancy agreement.
I hope that I can persuade the noble Baroness that the amendment is unnecessary and potentially even a step backwards. The Secretary of State is already able to grant permission to rent to people who are otherwise disqualified from renting. This may include migrants without leave who have sought asylum, families with minor children who are in the family returns process or those who face a genuine obstacle to leaving the UK. A migrant may obtain confirmation that they will be afforded such permission by contacting the Home Office, and all a landlord need do then is to contact the Home Office landlords’ checking service with the migrant’s Home Office reference number to confirm that they may rent to that migrant. Following that process will give the landlord a statutory excuse from any civil penalty under the right-to-rent scheme.
Very importantly, this system allows for a swift process, without the need to require a migrant to make a formal application or for them to await written confirmation through the post that they may rent. Our experience since the right-to-rent scheme was introduced on 1 December 2014 is that this process works well. For those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Incidentally, there is no inconsistency between the FoI response and the letter from my noble friend Lord Bates. As I explained, a migrant may already contact the Home Office in order to establish whether they will be granted permission to rent. Existing arrangements are straightforward and work well. I should also mention that the Home Office is in the process of revising its published guidance in response to concerns raised during previous debates. I have no doubt that it will factor in the points made in this debate as well. Once that is done, the guidance will set out even more clearly how a migrant may contact the Home Office. But I suggest that requiring that they make a formal application and then have to await written confirmation may lead to unnecessary delays and in fact would serve no useful purpose.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, from these Benches I support this amendment very warmly. In the previous stage of the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, we had an amendment dealing with vulnerable people but it was debated alongside and really overshadowed by the amendment on a time limit to detention. The amendment provided that detention should take place only in exceptional circumstances determined by the First-tier Tribunal.
After the amendment was tabled, I was quite embarrassed by the opposition to or considerable doubts about it expressed by a number of organisations for which I have the greatest respect. They told me that we had got it wrong and that we should not provide for any exceptional circumstances in the case of pregnant women. I explained to them that the amendment was expressed as it was because we were trying to approach the Government with an offer of compromise. We hoped that the Government would meet us halfway by agreeing to not a complete exception but the one we expressed in that amendment. The list of vulnerable people was taken from Stephen Shaw’s report, in which—no ifs, no buts—pregnancy means vulnerability. As the noble Baroness said, and I will see if I can get it out without tripping over the word, he spoke of the,
“incontrovertibly deleterious effect on the health of pregnant women and their unborn children”.
His Recommendation 10 was that they should be excluded.
The Government have added what is now Clause 62 to the Bill and there will be guidance; I acknowledge that that will come to Parliament. However, it will be through the negative procedure, and this is another of those examples where we can talk to our hearts’ content but will not be able to alter what is proposed. I was worried when I saw that new clause in the last stage and I worry now about the expression “particularly vulnerable”. I say again: there should be no ifs, no buts.
The Government proposed the adults-at-risk approach that has been referred to. I thank the Minister for his letter, in which he describes the Government’s concern about allowing all pregnant women access to the UK regardless of their immigration status, and therefore access to maternity services. The noble Earl will recall the debates that led up to the health charge being imposed—I suppose it is two years ago now—and that was one of the concerns which was expressed. We now have the health charge.
The letter from the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, explained:
“The higher the level of risk (and pregnant women will be regarded as being at the highest level of risk), the less likely it is that an individual will be detained”.
He added that the Government’s view,
“is that the best approach is a considered, case by case one which is represented by the adults at risk policy”.
I find it difficult to reconcile the two parts of that—that this is the “highest level of risk” but that there will be a “considered, case by case” approach. I do not think that the Minister can be surprised at the anxiety expressed by the very considerable number of well-respected organisations which are anxious about the policy given their experience of the current policy.
The noble Baroness referred to the all-party group inquiry, of which she and I were members. I turned it up this morning to find the comments that we made then about pregnant women. They included the evidence of Hindpal Singh Bhui, a team inspector at HM Prisons Inspectorate, who said that,
“pregnant women are only meant to be detained in the most exceptional circumstances. And again, we look for evidence of this”.
Of course, I am talking about the historical position. The inspector continued:
“And on the last couple of occasions that we’ve looked, we haven’t found those exceptional circumstances in the paperwork to justify their detention in the first place”.
Our report went on to say:
“We were also told of pregnant women being forced to travel long distances, sometimes over several days, when initially being detained, and failures in receiving test results and obstetric records. In one case, we were told that an immigration interview was prioritised over a 20-week … scan”.
The report continued:
“We are disappointed that the Home Office does not appear to be complying with its own policy of only detaining pregnant women in exceptional circumstances. We recommend that pregnant women are never detained for immigration purposes”.
I see no reason to depart from that but every reason to support it and the amendment.
Lord Rosser
I apologise in advance for the fact that my contribution will contain a fair element of repetition of what has already been said but it will be relatively brief.
In his review for the Home Office into the welfare of vulnerable persons in detention, Stephen Shaw recommended that it amend its guidance so that the presumptive exclusion from detention for pregnant women was replaced with an absolute exclusion. Stephen Shaw said in his report that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons had told him that in its view there was little to suggest that pregnant women were being detained only in exceptional circumstances. He also said that the Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees had pointed out that an inspection of Yarl’s Wood had found pregnant women being detained without evidence of the exceptional circumstances required to justify this, with one of the women being hospitalised twice because of pregnancy-related complications. In the light of the evidence presented to him, which he set out in his report, Mr Shaw said that he had not sought further evidence that detention had an adverse effect on the health of pregnant women and their unborn children, since he took this to be a statement of the obvious.
Stephen Shaw also said in his report that he believed that the Home Office should acknowledge the fact that in the vast majority of cases the detention of pregnant women does not result in their removal, and that in practice pregnant women are very rarely removed from this country except voluntarily. Concluding, he said that he was strongly of the view that presumptive exclusion from detention should be replaced with an absolute exclusion.
I hope that the Government will reflect on their apparent decision not to accept Stephen Shaw’s strong recommendation in respect of the detention of pregnant women. It is my party’s policy that pregnant women should not be detained in these circumstances, a view also expressed by Mr Shaw in his independent report to the Home Office. If my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett decides, at the end of the debate—and, most importantly, after the Government’s response—to test the opinion of the House, we shall support the amendment.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I support the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in relation to the first amendment and retrospection, which was addressed by the Constitution Committee, and to the other two amendments and the extent to which they do or do not mean that the Secretary of State could dictate to a criminal court, including a court of criminal appeal. I am afraid I did not see the Minister shake his head when the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made that comment, but I hope that, if that is the position as far as the Government are concerned, it does not mean that the Secretary of State will in any way be able to dictate to a criminal court and that the Minister will set out very clearly in his response why it is incorrect to draw that inference or assumption from these amendments.
Lord Keen of Elie
I shall begin with the observations made with regard to alleged retrospective effect in the provisions in Clause 63. Reference was made to a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of B v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Before that decision, which is subject to an appeal that I will come back to in a moment, it was widely—indeed, universally—understood that individuals could be released on immigration bail in circumstances where their detention was no longer lawful under the Hardial Singh principles; that is, there was no reasonable prospect of their deportation and they therefore had to be released. That understanding was shared by the relevant tribunals: the First-tier Tribunal and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. Indeed, it was the decision of the president of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission which was overturned in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, that determined that if detention was no longer lawful under the Hardial Singh principles, it would follow that bail could not be granted and, in particular, that bail could not be granted subject to conditions. As one might imagine, that had wide-ranging implications for the purposes of security, particularly in the case of B, who appeared to be an established Algerian terrorist who was at risk of carrying out terrorist activities to assist others in Algeria and elsewhere. The decision of the Court of Appeal has been suspended pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, which is set down to take place in December. However the Government’s position is that the position prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal was correct and it should be reinforced by statutory provision. It is for that reason that Clause 63 is in its present form. I understand that the appeal to the Supreme Court will proceed in any event, but it is essential, particularly in a matter that impacts on our security, that there should be no doubt or difficulty and no gap in our legislation so far as that is concerned.
Turning to Amendments 10 and 11, the test of practicability is for the Secretary of State, not the court, but there is no question of the Secretary of State usurping the functions of the court. It may be recollected that for that reason an amendment was made to Schedule 10 at an earlier stage to make clear that the Secretary of State could not usurp or overturn any decision-making power of the court or tribunal in these circumstances. That remains our position with respect to Schedule 10, as amended.
Lord Green of Deddington (CB)
My Lords, the principle of the immigration skills charge is not in dispute. It is absolutely vital that the skills of our own workforce should be improved if we are to achieve the major reduction in immigration which the public so anxiously wish to see. The main issue is one of timing as to when it should come into effect.
The Migration Advisory Committee, to whose work I pay a warm tribute, gave three reasons for its strong support for this scheme. First, to raise the cost of immigrant labour so as to reduce the numbers; secondly, to contribute to the extra cost involved for public services; and, thirdly, to compensate for what it described as the,
“rather modest efforts to upskill UK workers”,
by those firms employing Indian IT workers. All those matters need tackling as soon as possible.
I certainly accept that there may be some loose ends in respect of some of the public services, but we need to get on with this. The Government have announced that they will bring the measure into force in April 2017. That seems a reasonable way to get this moving in a vital area.
Lord Rosser
The Government have said that the £1,000 per year immigration skills charge will be paid by employers who sponsor tier 2 migrants, with a reduced rate of £364 per annum applying to small businesses and charities as set out in the Immigration Rules. There will be an exemption in respect of migrants undertaking occupations skilled to PhD level, primarily science and research roles. An exemption will also be applied for graduates who switch from tier 4 to tier 2 for the purpose of taking up a position in the UK. As far as other areas, organisations and categories are concerned, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills is apparently continuing to consult, including with devolved Administrations and other government departments.
In their letter of 7 April, on Ministry of Defence headed paper, the Government said that they intend to introduce the charge from April 2017 rather than from a somewhat earlier date provided for in the Bill. As they have also said that they are looking at phasing in the charge, can the Minister say what the intention to introduce the charge from April 2017 means as far as timescales are concerned?
The Government have confirmed that secondary legislation will be needed before the charge can be introduced. They expect to lay regulations in the autumn and to publish a draft before they are laid, with interested parties being given an opportunity to comment. There are difficulties with potentially significant issues being dealt with by secondary legislation because such proposed legislation cannot be amended, only accepted or rejected in its entirety.
There appears to have been little analysis provided on the impact of the immigration skills charge. Can the Minister say how much money will be raised by the charge; what percentage of existing training budgets that will represent; and for how many will this additional money provide the training envisaged? What analysis have the Government undertaken to show that the introduction of the charge will achieve the stated objective, as set out in the letter of 7 April, of encouraging employers to think differently about their recruitment so that, where possible, they recruit and train up resident workers and reduce the need to recruit skilled labour from outside the European Economic Area? Has an impact assessment been undertaken and, if so, what did it indicate? By how many is it expected that the charge will reduce the need to recruit skilled labour from outside the European Economic Area?
The Government also ought at least to give a commitment that they will listen to and take into account the views of interested parties when the draft regulations are published prior to being laid; and that interested parties will be given sufficient time to respond, bearing in mind that the draft could be published in the middle of the holiday season.
In looking at where, to whom and from when the charge will apply, what are the criteria against which the Government are determining and making their proposals? Against what criteria, for example, will proposals on the extent to which the charge should or should not apply in the National Health Service be formulated? While the decision not to apply the immigration skills charge to those switching from a tier 4 student visa to a tier 2 visa is a positive move for the health service, it will not as I understand it exempt overseas doctors recruited by the NHS on tier 2 visas to fill medical vacancies in hard-to-recruit medical specialties and areas.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
My Lords, I am a little reassured but I have to say that I am still left in much confusion as to how the Government intend to get from here to where we all wish to be. The ability of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to raise a very large number of fair questions about what is intended by all this simply demonstrates how unclear many of us in this House and outside are about how the Government will ensure that the extra skills are provided from within this country. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Green, that there is a long-term problem of companies in Britain finding it cheaper and easier to recruit direct from abroad rather than spending money on training their own employees. That applies not just to the Indian IT sector but also to long-distance truck drivers and all sorts of occupations in the private sector.
However, in the public sector the Government are responsible for training. As regards when we introduce this charge, I simply point out that it takes two or three years to train a nurse and longer to train a doctor, let alone a good maths teacher. Therefore, a year is not enough. We will find in the interim period that schools and hospitals will pay sums out of their flat budgets, out of which they are already paying for additional pension increases—so budgets are being squeezed—before any new training schemes have provided the additional skilled recruits from within the United Kingdom. That is part of the argument we are making about phasing in for the public sector.
I very much hope that we will have Labour support on this occasion. As I understand it, the Labour Party supports the public sector. I have heard reports that the Labour Party in the Commons has instructed the Labour Party in the Lords not to support this measure because it is a Liberal Democrat amendment and it is a bit queer about supporting Liberal Democrat amendments. I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be able to bring his party along. However, I appreciate that sometimes in the Lords the Labour Party Front Benchers have to defend positions they are not entirely happy about, as, indeed, do the Conservative Party Front Benchers.
Lord Rosser
I reassure the noble Lord, who is clearly very concerned about my present state and what I have had to say on this amendment, that I fully support an agreement—obviously, to his surprise—regarding what I said from this Dispatch Box. Interestingly enough, the noble Lord has not responded to the objections that I raised on his amendment.
Earl Howe
My Lords, with the leave of the House I will briefly answer the noble Lord’s questions. First, as he is aware, we regularly consult external partners and experts including the Red Cross and Save the Children. We will continue to do that. Secondly, we are revising our guidance on family reunion, which provides specific guidance for those already in the UK on how to apply for family reunion and instructions for caseworkers on how to consider such applications. We intend to publish this in April and we will communicate it to all relevant officials. Details of how to apply are already available on GOV.UK and refugees granted international protection are advised about their entitlement to family reunion when they receive their asylum decision.
Lord Rosser
I take this opportunity—I believe I am doing it at the right place—to express our thanks to all those who have participated in the debates on the Bill, which I believe is now a better Bill than the one that was sent to us from the House of Commons. We are grateful for the amount of information provided by Ministers and the Bill team, for the numerous meetings that have taken place and for the willingness of Ministers to listen to concerns about the Bill and, in some instances, the willingness of the Government themselves to bring forward amendments or place statements on the record to address those concerns. I particularly express appreciation of the work undertaken during the passage of the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Bates, whose approach, as with that of his Front-Bench colleagues, has I think been appreciated on all sides of the House.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, from these Benches I add our thanks, particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Bates, who has started on a rather long walk, as my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire said. It is one of a series of admirable walks but the noble Lord’s colleagues have been walking well alongside him, and after him, during the course of the Bill. It feels a little odd to agree that the Bill do now pass, because we are by no means clear what it will provide by the time that it has endured—a word that the noble Lord the Chief Whip might use—ping-pong. We are by no means finished with these issues or with the Bill itself.
The Role and Capabilities of the UK Armed Forces, in the Light of Global and Domestic Threats to Stability and Security
Lord Rosser Excerpts(9 years ago)
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Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, this debate, which has been initiated by the Minister, is most appropriate, coming as it does shortly before the Government finalise their pending 2015 strategic defence and security review. Presumably it is designed to achieve the aims of the national security strategy. I hope that in his response the Minister will be saying rather more than he has so far about the national security strategy and the Government’s current thinking on the SDSR, and the extent to which it will or will not either repeat or add to what his party said in its recent election manifesto. I will also wait to see if the Minister takes up the challenge posed by my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford over the alleged black hole, assuming of course he survives the ministerial cull advocated by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley. I also await with interest his responses to the powerful contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, on the case of Sergeant Blackman, as well as the points about the intended increase in our reserves and what will happen if that increase is not achieved.
One important point for a coherent strategic defence and security review is that it should set out both the thinking and the actual and anticipated developments which have led to the conclusions reached and decisions made. Without that, there will inevitably be doubts and uncertainty over the factors or pressures which have driven whatever proves to be the content and conclusions of the review. The SDSR, as has been said on more than one occasion in the debate, must be strategically driven. While there may be considerations or developments both actual and anticipated of a highly sensitive security nature which it may not be possible to disclose, I hope that the Minister will be able to give a commitment that the SDSR will be as open and transparent as it possibly can be in setting out the thinking and considerations which will have driven the conclusions and decisions reached, including the nature, length and extent of operations which our Armed Forces can be expected to undertake—including at any one point in time—in the light of the resources allocated.
The House of Commons Defence Committee published a report, I think last March, outlining a number of developments spelt out by the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, that it considered meant that the national security strategy was no longer adequate, along with the Future Force 2020 structure. The committee also felt that there was a need for a rebuilt conventional military deterrent against states such as Russia and for continuing investment in what it described as next-generation warfare, including strategic communications, cyber warfare capabilities and intelligence.
The Royal United Services Institute, in drawing attention to the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 and the distribution of the Libyan Government’s stock of arms across North Africa and the Middle East, has referred to concerns about the security implications of the proliferation of advanced military capabilities in the hands of non-state actors. Others, including noble Lords in this debate, have raised concerns about the loss for an island nation such as ours of a maritime patrol aircraft capability and about our ability in the future to defend the Falkland Islands. Can the Minister say whether these issues are among those being considered as part of the SDSR and the national security strategy? It would be helpful if he could also say something more about the Government’s thinking on the way in which the nature of military involvement, not least our military involvement, may be changing. Considerable publicity was given to the announcement by the Prime Minister last week that two British jihadis fighting in Syria had been killed by an RAF drone strike, which was long-distance military involvement conducted, as I understand it, by Armed Forces personnel within our own country. Technology can and does change the nature of military involvement and action, but so too does political decision-making. The Government have been very specific recently that we are not going to be involved in the latest actual or likely areas of military involvement through putting boots on the ground. Does that continue to reflect the Government’s approach and is that approach—which we saw in relation to Libya and which now applies in relation to Iraq—likely to be reflected in the SDSR?
Is there a Government view that we should be less actively involved militarily in future in what some might describe as other people’s conflicts, or is it the Government’s view that that should not be our stance but instead that where there is British military involvement in other countries, it should not be by having British troops on the ground engaged directly in military action? If the latter approach is the Government’s position, does that in their view mean a change in the relationship within our Armed Forces of the roles of the Army, Navy and Royal Air Force, a change sufficient to have a significant impact on how total available resources should be allocated in future between the three services?
I believe the Minister said that our forces were involved in 21 joint operations in 19 nations. It would be helpful if, following this debate, the noble Earl could provide more information on where our Armed Forces are currently involved in joint operations, and the nature and objectives of that involvement.
One issue which has been the subject of discussion and debate in the Chamber on a number of occasions and again today is cyber security and the threat of cyber attacks. I remember going to one discussion on cyber security outside this House at which one of the experts said, in essence, that it was effectively impossible to guarantee yourself protection from such attacks. The maximum that you could and should do was to make it as difficult as possible for those seeking to make such attacks, so that they were much more likely to turn their attention away from you and towards potentially weaker targets. The extent to which that factor might come into play may be more questionable in the defence field, where cyber attacks are more likely to be state-organised and state-run or financed. There ought to be a requirement on every company working with the Ministry of Defence, regardless of its size or the scale of its work, to meet the terms of a cyber security charter in order to seek to reduce the risk of hackers using small suppliers to break into the systems of major defence companies or the department itself. There also needs to be a requirement for all private companies to report serious cyber attacks threatening our national infrastructure, and that obviously applies to defence as well.
I do not of course expect the Minister to start going into detail about our own capabilities, either offensive or defensive, in the field of cyber security and cyber attacks, but I hope that he will be able to say something in general terms on this issue when he responds, including on how the additional resources which the Government have previously said are being put into cyber security have been and are being used. One would like to think that those who seek to attack us in this way are as wary of what we can do to them as we may be of what they might be able to do to us.
The need for defence, security, foreign affairs and international development strategies to be co-ordinated and developed together rather than in separate silos has never been greater. We are faced with a Middle East where conflict increasingly seems to be the norm rather than the exception. With that comes the consequence of large and increasing numbers of refugees within the Middle East itself and those seeking to reach Europe in the quest for the basic human desire of safety and security, and a chance to lead lives free of fear. In the Middle East and beyond, we face the impact of extremist terror and intra-Islamist conflict. In Ukraine, we have the instability and uncertainty created by hostile military intervention from Russia, while in the Far East we see China flexing its military muscles and desire for domination and control, which will probably only intensify as it faces economic difficulties within its own boundaries. In some other countries we see the emergence of nationalist movements and populist parties with their associated calls for a more introverted approach rather than the internationalist approach which must surely continue to be the way forward. The emergence of such movements and parties is usually driven by domestic issues, whether economic or political, which are portrayed as putting at risk prosperity, stability and identity.
The wide interest in the forthcoming SDSR and national security strategy will be shared by our defence industry and all those whose jobs, either directly or indirectly, depend on that industry. What are the Government’s objectives under the forthcoming SDSR for maintaining or increasing levels of employment in this area and the need, if that is to be achieved and the skills base protected and developed, of providing a regular and steady workflow?
It is usual in debates such as these to take the opportunity to express gratitude and thanks to our Armed Forces for the vital work they do and the commitment they show and give, and this debate should be no exception; indeed, it has been no exception in that regard. In the last few years in particular, the commitment shown in protecting, defending and furthering the interests of our nation both at home and overseas has led on more than just a few occasions to loss of life, or life-changing or serious injuries, physical and mental, to members of our Armed Forces. The potential sacrifice they know they may have to make is not some remote possibility. It is real, and they deserve our respect and admiration for being prepared to accept that burden on our behalf. The noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson of Abinger, spoke forcefully on the need to support and help both those who make that sacrifice and their families.
The forthcoming SDSR and the national security review should set out what we require of our Armed Forces in the years immediately ahead. We need to be sure that they have the resources, including personnel, to meet those objectives. If we do that, we know that our Armed Forces will deliver in full.
Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2015
Lord Rosser Excerpts(9 years ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
My Lords, the purpose of the order that we are considering today is to continue in force legislation governing the Armed Forces—the Armed Forces Act 2006—for a further period of one year, until November 2016. This reflects the constitutional requirement under the Bill of Rights that the Armed Forces may not be maintained without the consent of Parliament.
The legislation which makes the provision necessary for the Armed Forces to exist as disciplined forces is renewed every year. There is five-yearly renewal by Act of Parliament. That is the primary purpose of Armed Forces Acts. Between Acts, there must be an annual Order in Council. That is the purpose of the draft order that we are considering today.
If the Order in Council is not made by the end of 2 November 2015, the Armed Forces Act 2006 will automatically expire. The effect of this would be to end the powers and provisions necessary to maintain the Armed Forces as disciplined bodies.
The order will continue in force the 2006 Act until the end of 2 November 2016, when a new Act of Parliament will be required to provide for the legislation to continue for the next five years. We expect the next Armed Forces Bill to be introduced into Parliament soon, and I look forward to our debates on the Bill and on matters of great importance to our Armed Forces during its passage in your Lordships’ House. Indeed, before then, I look forward to enjoying a full and interesting debate next week on the role and capabilities of the UK Armed Forces in the light of global and domestic threats to stability and security.
Turning back to the business in hand today, I should say something about why we need to keep the 2006 Act in force. The Armed Forces Act 2006 applies to all service personnel wherever in the world they are operating. It provides nearly all the provisions for the existence of a system of command, discipline and justice for the Armed Forces, covering such matters as offences, the powers of the service police and the jurisdiction and powers of commanding officers and of service courts, in particular the courts martial. It is the basis of the service justice system that underpins the maintenance of discipline through the chain of command which is so fundamental to the operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces.
The 2006 Act also provides for a number of other important matters for the Armed Forces, such as for their enlistment, pay and redress of complaints. Members of the Armed Forces have no contracts of employment and so no duties as employees. Although members of the Armed Forces owe a duty of allegiance to Her Majesty, their obligation is essentially a duty to obey lawful orders, but without the 2006 Act, commanding officers and the courts martial would have no powers of punishment for either disciplinary or criminal misconduct. That is why the Armed Forces Act 2006 is so important and why we need to continue it in force. I beg to move.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his explanation of the purpose and need for the order. We have this debate on the Armed Forces continuation order each year, and I must say that I am no clearer at present than I was when I was first involved in these debates what would be the implications if the order was not carried.
I do not intend to speak at any length. We support the order and, as the Minister said, we have a separate defence debate in the Chamber next week. However, bearing in mind the wide-ranging nature of the order and the apparent consequences if it was not agreed, it has always seemed to me—if, apparently, to no one else—that consideration of the order each year could be used as the basis for an annual general defence debate in the Chamber. There is, after all, very little, if anything defence and Armed Forces-wise that it could be argued would not be relevant in a debate on an order which if not agreed calls into question the continuation of our Armed Forces as a disciplined fighting force.
As paragraph 7.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum states, the Armed Forces Act 2006, which the order extends for a further year from 2 November 2015,
“provides nearly all the provisions for the existence of a system for the armed forces of command, discipline and justice … It also contains a large number of other important provisions as to the armed forces, such as provision for enlistment, pay and redress of complaints”.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, for their comments and questions. I shall address them in turn.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, devoted his remarks to questions around the hypothesis that were this order not to be approved, the effect on the Armed Forces would be to render them, in practice, completely ineffective. I can confirm that. The practical effect of not renewing the Act would be that the Armed Forces as we know them would cease to exist because, among the many important provisions in the Act, the key provisions are perhaps the duty to obey lawful commands and the mechanism for enforcing that duty. Without these, the Armed Forces would be unable to continue as disciplined forces. They would continue to owe allegiance to Her Majesty but to deploy the Armed Forces in practice or in theatre would be rendered almost impossible because the system of obeying duties would fall away.
Lord Rosser
Perhaps I should clarify. I understand fully the point that the noble Earl has made. Is the Minister saying that it would be impractical to undertake military action because there would be no duty to obey commands, or is it also the case that if this order was not passed it would be illegal for our Armed Forces to undertake any action? Is it an issue about practicality or is it an issue about whether it is legal?
Earl Howe
It is both, as I understand it, in that the requirement for annual renewal can be traced back, as noble Lords have pointed out, to the Bill of Rights 1688. It declared that the raising or keeping of a standing Army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law. That means, essentially, that it would be illegal to have a standing Army or, indeed, a standing Royal Navy or Royal Air Force. It has not been a matter for any Government in living memory to contemplate a scenario whereby Parliament might not approve the continuation of the Armed Forces.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I am not advocating that either but I am not entirely clear that the Explanatory Memorandum actually says that about the legality, in words of one syllable.
Earl Howe
I shall naturally take advice from those who are expert in this field. If anything that I have said is wrong or requires expansion I will of course write to the noble Lord. I agree that this is a subject of theoretical interest. I am glad to hear that there is no proposal to take the questions to their logical conclusion, but I recognise the importance of the questions that the noble Lord poses and will be happy to clarify, perhaps at greater length in writing, what the legal position amounts to.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, also referred to the Bill of Rights, but focused her remarks on the system of complaints and asked whether the changes that are being introduced are on track. They are. As she knows, the Ministry of Defence worked closely with Dr Susan Atkins, the first Service Complaints Commissioner, to make the service complaints process more efficient and to strengthen the commissioner role. That was the basis of the Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill that received Royal Assent on 26 March this year. As she is aware, the Act shortens the complaints process and replaces the commissioner with a new Service Complaints Ombudsman. Implementation is expected in January. The ombudsman will have significant new powers, while maintaining the right balance between the authority of the military chain of command, which must be responsible for looking after its own people, and strong independent oversight through the ombudsman.
Nicola Williams, the former ombudsman in the Cayman Islands, with whom I had a useful conversation the other day, took over as the commissioner in January and will become the first ombudsman, subject to approval by Her Majesty the Queen. Nicola Williams’s first annual report on the fairness, effectiveness and efficiency of the service complaints process was published on 24 March. The Government’s response was published on 16 July 2015.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, asked me whether the Explanatory Memorandum reflects the content of Mr Morrison’s letter. I will have to get back to her on the answer to that.
As for the timetable for the Armed Forces Bill, I anticipate that it will be introduced into Parliament shortly. I cannot comment on its content before that happens, but my understanding is that the Bill should be under way in October.
Counter-ISIL Coalition Strategy
Lord Rosser Excerpts(9 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement already made in the other place by the Secretary of State updating the position in Iraq and Syria in respect of action against ISIL. The Secretary of State has also issued a Written Statement today on the subject of UK embedded forces in which he confirms that,
“up to 80 UK personnel have been embedded with US, Canadian and French forces”,
since the international coalition commenced military operations against ISIL last year. The Secretary of State went on to say:
“A small number of embedded UK pilots”—
I think it was five—
“have carried out airstrikes in Syria against ISIL targets”,
although,
“none are currently involved in airstrikes”;
and:
“Ministerial approval is required for UK embeds deployed with allied forces on operations”.
The House of Commons voted against military action in Syria in 2013 and parliamentary authority has only been given to UK air strikes against ISIL in Iraq. The Prime Minister told the House of Commons on 26 September 2014:
“I have said that we will come back to the House if, for instance, we make the decision that we should take air action with others in Syria”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/9/14; col. 1266.]
That undertaking has clearly been broken, unless the Minister is going to tell us that neither the Prime Minister nor the Secretary of State for Defence knew what was going on with UK pilots carrying out air strikes in Syria. Can the Minister tell us, therefore, if the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence knew? If they did, when did they know, and which Minister gave the required approval, and when, for these UK embeds to be deployed with allied forces on operations? Were they aware that in so doing, they were authorising UK pilots to carry out air strikes in Syria against ISIL targets?
Did the Prime Minister know that embedded UK pilots had carried out, or had been authorised to carry out, air strikes in Syria against ISIL targets when he made his statement on 26 September last year? If the authorisation for UK pilots to carry out air strikes in Syria against ISIL targets was given during the time of the previous coalition Government, can the Minister say if the then Deputy Prime Minister would have been advised of, or his approval sought for, a small number of embedded UK pilots carrying out air strikes in Syria against ISIL targets?
The involvement of members of our Armed Forces in Syria has come to light only as a result of a Freedom of Information Act request, and the future of that Act is now under threat from this Government. Without that ability to make a Freedom of Information Act request and secure an answer, the involvement of members of our Armed Forces in Syria would not have come to light since it is clear that neither this Government nor perhaps the previous coalition Government had any intention of telling either Parliament or the British people, even though Parliament had voted against military action in Syria and the Prime Minister had pledged to come back to the House if the decision was made that we should take air action with others in Syria.
In his Statement, the Secretary of State said:
“UK personnel have embedded with other nations’ air forces since the 1950s”;
and in the House of Commons today, the Secretary of State sought to say that the Government had actually been quite open about what had happened because they had responded to a freedom of information request. Can the Minister tell us the last time embedded UK forces have been involved in operations and military action in a country when the House of Commons has voted against our Armed Forces being involved in military action in that country and has not subsequently changed its decision?
On the Secretary of State’s claim of openness by the Government because they had responded to a freedom of information request, the reality is that without that request—and most people would have assumed that, in the light of the Prime Minister’s undertaking last September, there would be no British military personnel involvement in operations in Syria—the first the nation might have known about this activity would have been if something had gone wrong. Can the Minister now give an undertaking that there will be no further use of embedded forces in Syria without parliamentary consent, in accordance with the Prime Minister’s undertaking?
We share the Government’s abhorrence of ISIL’s cold-blooded terrorism and we remain ready to work with the Government to defeat ISIL and will carefully consider any proposals that they decide to bring forward. In so doing, we would need to be clear about what difference any action would make to our aim of defeating ISIL, about the nature of any action, its objectives and legal basis. But going behind the back of Parliament and keeping it in the dark, as it is clear the Government have done with the forced disclosure that UK pilots have carried out air strikes in Syria against ISIL targets contrary to Parliament’s decision, does not help.
Somebody in government has tried to be too clever by half by maintaining, as the Secretary of State for Defence has done in his Written Statement, that the Prime Minister’s undertaking excluded UK personnel embedded within other nations’ armed forces operating in Syria, on the basis that it applied only to the deployment of UK forces. The Prime Minister certainly did not make that exemption, and neither did Parliament in its decision. That somebody has done a disservice to the nation, to Parliament and to our Armed Forces—which have served, continue to serve, and will always serve us with great bravery and commitment.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I am most worried about the statement in this Statement:
“There is a well-planned, integrated strategy to defeat ISIL”.
That is not what it looks like to many on these Benches and elsewhere. We are in an extremely complex situation in the Middle East in which some of our partners are on our side in some respects and on the other side for other purposes. I was being briefed at lunchtime today about the complexities around the Kurdish forces which are involved in the conflict both in Syria and in Iraq, and the deeply ambivalent attitude of the Turks and of the Iraqi Government to their activities. That is merely one of the many complexities that we face.
The coalition, after all, includes Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and many others, many of which have reservations about how we see the conflict. For many purposes, Iran is effectively now an additional member of the coalition, and one of the strongest forces opposing ISIS. I wish I could see a well-integrated strategy. I fear that it is not possible to have one, given the complexity of the situation facing us.
We are talking about local forces that are engaging ISIS. Jabhat al-Nusra is one of the forces that engage ISIS but I am not entirely sure that we want to support it or provide it with more assistance. Some of the Shia militias in Iraq are not as easy as we would like, and sadly the Free Syrian Army, which we have been training, is not one of the strongest forces in the land. I was also worried by what the Prime Minister said at the weekend about domestic radicalisation and counterterrorism because we are all clear that there are direct links between domestic radicalisation and the actions of some of our allies and partners in promoting radical and jihadist versions of Islam against moderate Islamic practices.
We recognise that the Government are edging towards asking for British planes to be involved in bombing in Syria. A small number of British planes bombing ISIS in Syria is no more likely to resolve the multiple conflicts across the Middle East than bombing Damascus would have done two years ago. There is no shortage of aircraft in the Gulf states and Turkey that are quite capable of bombing ISIS from the air. It worries me that we are told that 30% of the surveillance activities over Syria are being conducted by British planes. That suggests that not many other planes apart from American ones are flying over Syria.
Sadly, some of the Governments have themselves supported radical Islamic groups and are still ambivalent about attacking Sunni groups, however radical or brutal, such as Jabhat al-Nusra. It is not in Britain’s interests to cling to the hard-line Sunni side of a developing Sunni-Shia conflict. Nor is it in our interests to present ourselves to ISIS as an existential enemy—I note that the Statement downgrades “existential threat” to “direct threat”, which is perhaps a little better—when ISIS is a much more direct threat to moderate Muslims and to regimes across the Middle East. We should be working with others to promote a coherent response from the neighbours of Syria and Iraq, which we can support, not repeating the mistake of the 2003 Iraq war when we followed the Americans into bombing and then occupying an Arab country.
Some of Britain’s allies in the Middle East have actively funded radical Islamic mosques and movements in the UK and elsewhere. The Prime Minister’s commitment to combat radicalisation within Britain would be more persuasive if he spelled out to the Saudi Government, in particular, our condemnation of Saudi money funding radical groups, and that the Saudis must now themselves take responsibility for containing violent jihadism among Sunni Muslims.
The Prime Minister responded positively to a request from our Middle East partners that we should conduct an inquiry into the Muslim Brotherhood. It is now time for the Prime Minister to ask them in return to conduct an inquiry into the funding of radical Islamic groups in our territory.
I have some questions, if I may. Which local forces are responding? Do they include Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq? Do they include the Shia militias? What is their attitude to Jabhat al-Nusra? How many of our Middle Eastern partners are currently flying air strikes over Syria? I was told the other day that only one was doing so—Jordan. In terms of embedded personnel, how many RAF pilots are embedded in US drone units, which are flying drones, including armed drones, over the Middle East? How many embedded personnel from other states are currently embedded in British forces? I have been told that French pilots are flying in RAF strike fighters, for example. We, of course, know about the Dutch in the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force. Are there others? Would it not be proper, either now or later, to give us at least a Written Statement telling us what the position is the other way round as well?