Immigration Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 12th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I understand fully that the intention of the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, is to reflect the recommendation from Stephen Shaw that pregnant women be absolutely excluded from detention. On this point, I reiterate what I made clear on Report and set out in my letter to the noble Baroness and to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. While the Government agree that it is not right to detain pregnant women unless there are exceptional circumstances, it does not consider that an absolute exclusion would be workable.

As has been explained in this House and in another place, it is important that the Government are able to detain, for a short period, those with no right to be in the United Kingdom who refuse to leave voluntarily. For example, if an immediate removal is planned, a short period of detention may be appropriate to facilitate a safe departure where there are absconding risks or other public protection risks to be considered. Furthermore, exempting from detention an individual who has arrived at the border with no right to enter the United Kingdom and who can be put on a return flight quickly would allow pregnant women access to the United Kingdom regardless of their immigration status.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, mentioned that 99 pregnant women were detained in Yarl’s Wood in 2014 and that this number had reduced to 69 in 2015. I am advised that there is, at present, one pregnant woman in Yarl’s Wood. She is a foreign national offender who recently completed an 18-month prison sentence and was detained there on 9 February. A deportation order was signed and removal directions were in place for 3 April. These were later brought forward to 26 March but then deferred because of an asylum claim being made. I am advised that there has now been an application for judicial review as well. Taking that case as an example, if removal ceases to be imminent there is every prospect of release subject to conditions. This is what frequently happens in these circumstances and goes some way to explain why only a small proportion of those actually in detention are subsequently removed from detention and deported. Many are released under condition and their asylum or immigration status is determined subsequently and the matter disposed of in that way.

I stress that we are dealing with cases in which there are exceptional circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, observed that uncertainty over immigration status could itself be a source of stress and anxiety for a pregnant woman. That may very well be the case: who could dispute it? But she went on to say that they can be detained for not very good reason. We cannot accept that. Our policy and guidelines are very clear: pregnant women are to be detained only in exceptional circumstances. There is a requirement for that detention in particular and exceptional circumstances.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, will be aware that, on Report, I stated that the Government intended to reflect on the detention of pregnant women and would have a considered position by Third Reading. I apologise to the House for the delay in completing that consideration. This is a complex issue and the Government continue to give it serious thought in the context of the work that is under way in developing policy on adults at risk in detention and the further implementation of Stephen Shaw’s report and its recommendations. That is taking time to finalise because the Government do not want to rush what is and is recognised to be a highly important issue. But I assure the noble Baroness and the House that the Government will be making a formal announcement on this matter very shortly. Indeed, the Government expect to make such an announcement in a matter of days.

The announcement will not involve an absolute prohibition on the detention of pregnant women. It will, however, set out a very clear and limited time for detention, only in exceptional circumstances, as it may be applied to pregnant women.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

I wonder if the Minister can explain to us why, if it is possible for the Government to make a statement in a few days, it is not possible to make that statement today.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

If I was in a position to make the statement today, I am sure the noble Lord appreciates that I would do so. He may be familiar with the wheels of government and with the requirement for these matters to be approved at various levels before a final statement is made. If I was in a position to make that statement, I reassure the noble Lord that I would not hesitate to make it.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

But this is Third Reading. Is there not a sense of urgency in these matters?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There is certainly a sense of urgency in this matter and that is why I expressed my apology to the House and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I had indicated that by Third Reading I would be in a position to confirm the Government’s position on this. However, it is a matter that requires detailed consideration. It is a matter that has ramifications. It is a matter that has to be considered in conjunction with Home Office guidelines. It is a matter that must be consulted on and finally approved before issue, and it is for that reason that, regrettably, there has been a period of delay in respect of this point.

I underline that it will not involve an absolute prohibition. It will, however, involve a very limited power of detention to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and for a very limited period. That is what is anticipated at present. As I sought to point out on Report, it is simply not practicable to have an absolute bar in respect of pregnant women. There are circumstances in which, for example, a pregnant woman arriving at an airport or a port, clearly with no right at all to enter the United Kingdom, may present either a security risk or a risk of absconding, and without any power of detention it would be quite impossible to arrange her return at that time of arrival. Therefore, in these circumstances, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. Many have spoken so eloquently, drawing attention in particular to the implications of this for unborn children, and have made the case very strongly.

I realise that the Minister is in a difficult position in that he is not able to make the statement to which he referred. I asked him for reassurance that the new policy will mean that pregnant women are detained genuinely in the most exceptional circumstances because the current policy is that they should be detained only in the most exceptional circumstances. While the hint of a time limit is encouraging, I have heard nothing to reassure us that the new policy will be different from the old policy.

I quite understand that it is not the Minister’s fault—if that is the correct word—that he is not able to make the statement today. But Stephen Shaw delivered his report to the Home Office on 24 September. The Government have had over six months to consider this crucial issue, which they know many people—organisations, individuals who gave evidence to Shaw and individuals who gave evidence to the inquiry—feel very strongly about. They must have known that people would want a clear answer on this by now and I am afraid that clear answer has come there none. I am quite sure that the noble and learned Lord understands why it is not good enough to say, when this is the last chance we have to discuss it in this House, that we should wait for a few days because the Government have not managed to get their act together to enable him to make the statement today.

Given that every noble Lord who has spoken did so very strongly in support of this amendment, I feel that I have no choice other than to test the opinion of this House.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

7: Clause 63, page 59, line 27, leave out “The amendment made by subsection (3) is” and insert “Subsections (3) and (4) are”

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, Amendments 7, 10 and 11 are all relatively minor and somewhat technical in nature. Clause 63 ensures that a person may be on immigration bail when they are liable to detention, even if they can no longer be detained, and subsections (3) and (4) apply this to people who have been released on bail under the current provisions of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. Amendment 7 to Clause 63(5) removes the reference to an amendment being made by subsection (3). This is because, in an earlier draft of the clause, subsection (3) contained an amendment to Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act, but subsections (3) and (4) no longer use that construction.

Amendments 10 and 11 to Schedule 10 ensure that any cross-references in other legislation to immigration bail granted, or a condition imposed, under Schedule 10 will include the rare circumstance when bail is granted by the court, just as if it were granted by the tribunal. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation but, on Amendment 7, it seems to me that we have never really had an explanation of why it is necessary for these provisions to be made retrospective. The Constitution Committee raised the matter in its report to the House on the Bill, and referred to the Government’s acknowledgement of retrospectivity in the Explanatory Notes, which said:

“This clause is retrospective in its effect because it is intended to clarify the law following a recent Court of Appeal judgment”.

Having read on in the Constitution Committee’s report, I wonder whether “clarify” is the right term. I do not think one can talk about correcting a Court of Appeal judgment, but that is the flavour of what the Constitution Committee had to say. The Government’s response to the committee was that the clause has been remodelled, which does not seem quite to take the point. Could the noble and learned Lord assist the House by explaining why this does not broaden the scope of the Bill and why it is appropriate?

My first reaction on reading Amendments 10 and 11 was to wonder whether the draftsman could not have made a real effort to make them really opaque and difficult to follow. After that rather flippant comment, the serious point is that, as I understand the issue, the Secretary of State is now to have powers over courts as well as the tribunals. The noble and learned Lord is shaking his head, so I look forward to his refuting that. We are bothered, as we have been concerned before, about not respecting the independence of the judiciary. What if a tribunal judge thinks that it is contrary to a person’s human rights to impose the electronic monitoring condition, and the Secretary of State says that it is not contrary to do so? The judge is very conflicted there. What if he or she wants to impose a condition, and considers that it would be practicable to do so, but the Secretary of State says that it is not practicable, so the judge cannot impose the condition? If that meant that the judge did not grant bail to that person, this would be a considerable—and, I think, unwarrantable—interference with the person’s right to liberty. Would the noble and learned Lord expand a little on his explanations?

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I support the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in relation to the first amendment and retrospection, which was addressed by the Constitution Committee, and to the other two amendments and the extent to which they do or do not mean that the Secretary of State could dictate to a criminal court, including a court of criminal appeal. I am afraid I did not see the Minister shake his head when the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made that comment, but I hope that, if that is the position as far as the Government are concerned, it does not mean that the Secretary of State will in any way be able to dictate to a criminal court and that the Minister will set out very clearly in his response why it is incorrect to draw that inference or assumption from these amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I shall begin with the observations made with regard to alleged retrospective effect in the provisions in Clause 63. Reference was made to a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of B v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Before that decision, which is subject to an appeal that I will come back to in a moment, it was widely—indeed, universally—understood that individuals could be released on immigration bail in circumstances where their detention was no longer lawful under the Hardial Singh principles; that is, there was no reasonable prospect of their deportation and they therefore had to be released. That understanding was shared by the relevant tribunals: the First-tier Tribunal and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. Indeed, it was the decision of the president of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission which was overturned in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, that determined that if detention was no longer lawful under the Hardial Singh principles, it would follow that bail could not be granted and, in particular, that bail could not be granted subject to conditions. As one might imagine, that had wide-ranging implications for the purposes of security, particularly in the case of B, who appeared to be an established Algerian terrorist who was at risk of carrying out terrorist activities to assist others in Algeria and elsewhere. The decision of the Court of Appeal has been suspended pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, which is set down to take place in December. However the Government’s position is that the position prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal was correct and it should be reinforced by statutory provision. It is for that reason that Clause 63 is in its present form. I understand that the appeal to the Supreme Court will proceed in any event, but it is essential, particularly in a matter that impacts on our security, that there should be no doubt or difficulty and no gap in our legislation so far as that is concerned.

Turning to Amendments 10 and 11, the test of practicability is for the Secretary of State, not the court, but there is no question of the Secretary of State usurping the functions of the court. It may be recollected that for that reason an amendment was made to Schedule 10 at an earlier stage to make clear that the Secretary of State could not usurp or overturn any decision-making power of the court or tribunal in these circumstances. That remains our position with respect to Schedule 10, as amended.

Amendment 7 agreed.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

Once again, my Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment. With her usual lawyer’s quickness, she picked up the point that I raised on Report. As I said then, it is a point that was raised with me by an organisation local to me in the East Midlands, Baca. It was worried because it could not understand why that wording was there. It is perhaps not surprising if groups are worried and perhaps slightly cynical when they come across measures that they do not understand, given that there is so much in legislation that they do not like. So I am delighted that, at the last minute, the letter from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie—not the noble Earl—made it very clear that the definition, as in the amendment, is,

“separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so”.

It is helpful to have that in Hansard because of course your average punter cannot read the letters sent between Ministers and Members of your Lordships’ House. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will repeat that for the record. Also, like the noble Baroness, I would appreciate an explanation of why this clause is necessary, given that this is, as the letter says, the,

“established definition in the Immigration Rules”,

and it is accepted by the UN. I am glad that through this organisation raising this matter with me, we have some clarity on what is meant by it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister. As they have observed, there is already an established definition of “unaccompanied” in the present context. It is not in guidance alone; it is in the Immigration Rules, and that is important. The definition states that an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child is someone who—perhaps I may, as suggested, read this into the record—is under 18 years of age when the claim is submitted, is claiming asylum in their own right, is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so.

Following the commitment given by my noble friend Lord Bates on Report to explain how the definition would operate, I wrote to the noble Baronesses—albeit, as they observed, at the last minute—to confirm that there is no intention of altering the definition of “unaccompanied” as set out in the Immigration Rules for the purposes of the transfer provisions in the Immigration Bill. Furthermore, defining particular categories in primary legislation is not always desirable or even necessary. As your Lordships will appreciate, there are times, particularly in the context of the current migration crisis, when the Government need to respond quickly to changing circumstances.

I should make it clear that at present we have no intention of amending the definition of “unaccompanied”. We would do so only in response to a significant change in circumstances, but it is important that in such circumstances we are able to react swiftly and efficiently. Clearly, regulations subject to parliamentary scrutiny are a more appropriate way to achieve that result than placing something on the face of this Bill.

I reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister, that safeguarding and promoting the welfare of vulnerable children is at the forefront of the Home Office’s work with the Local Government Association and the Department for Education to develop a transfer scheme for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. I understand the concerns about the definition of “unaccompanied”—it may have unintended consequences and inadvertently place children in the hands of traffickers—but immigration officials working with these vulnerable children are trained to be alert to any signs that a child is at risk of harm or abuse or may have been trafficked. Where an asylum-seeking child is accompanied by an adult who is not a parent or a relative, Home Office officials work with local authority children’s services to verify the identity of the adult and establish the true relationship with the child. If that relationship cannot be verified or there are ongoing welfare or safeguarding concerns, the child will be treated as unaccompanied.

In the light of those points and our recent correspondence confirming that we have no intention of amending the already established definition of “unaccompanied” for the purposes of the transfer provisions, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is reassuring. It is difficult to imagine how urgent the circumstances might be that would require a swift change of the definition. However, I am very glad to have the assurances about the position on the record in Hansard, which, as the noble Baroness said, is most easily accessible by those outside this place. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.