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Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, one of this Government’s favourite slogans has just been repeated, that our asylum system is broken, followed by a claim that a Johnson Government will fix it. Two years ago, the Home Secretary said that her then plan would halve the number of boats crossing the channel in three months and make them infrequent in six months. Needless to say, since then they have increased tenfold. In response, the Home Secretary and the Government have introduced this Bill, which contains no new safe and legal routes, nothing to target ruthless criminal gangs and smugglers, and a number of empty and unworkable solutions.
If we want to know why the asylum system is broken, we need look no further than this Government and the Home Office. The number of initial asylum decisions being made by the Home Office each year has dropped by more than 40% over the last five years. That is why the backlog has increased. Some 67,000—some say it is even more—are still waiting for an initial decision on their asylum claim. Relationships, with France in particular, have reached rock bottom, and there appears to be a general lack of trust within the EU. International development aid has been cut back, contrary to an election commitment. Reducing levels of support will do nothing to prevent people having to leave their home to seek asylum.
This Government continue to be a Government of slogans. A Government of workable solutions they certainly are not, as this Bill all too clearly shows. The Government say that they are motivated by a desire to crack down on the criminal smuggler gangs but then produce a Bill with measures directed at the victims of those smugglers rather than at the gangs themselves. Despite promising safe legal routes as an alternative to dangerous journeys, the Government have cut safe legal routes for family reunion, refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, and have included no safe legal routes in this Bill.
The Government claim that the Bill will stop boats arriving and return people who travel in them. The reality though is that this Government have failed to get in place a single returns agreement with EU countries, and nothing in the Bill changes that. Just five people were returned last year. The Government claim that the Bill will mean pushbacks at sea, even though Border Force officials have said it is dangerous and unworkable. France has refused to agree to receive boats safely back, and so these pushbacks simply cannot happen in practice.
The Government claim that the Bill will mean offshore processing, even though no country has agreed and the cost to the taxpayer would be huge. The Government claim the Bill will fix the asylum system, even though it will add even longer delays to asylum cases being assessed.
The Government claim the Bill will stop trafficking gangs, even though they are cutting protection for modern slavery. In pursuit of the Government’s stated aim of preventing people using a defence of being a victim of modern slavery against deportation, the Bill removes a number of key protections for victims of human trafficking and modern slavery, rowing back on crucial protections created under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. It will make the identification and protection of modern slavery victims more difficult.
Former top police officer and now anti-slavery commissioner, Sara Thornton, has raised concerns about the potential consequences the Bill may have on the ability to prosecute offenders. She said that watering down protection for modern slavery victims, including UK-resident children caught up in criminal exploitation and county lines, will
“severely limit our ability to convict perpetrators and dismantle organised crime groups.”
Mistakes are often made when people are ruled not to be victims of human trafficking or modern slavery. The Home Office’s own data shows that four out of five rejected human trafficking claims challenged in the UK last year were overturned. Out of 325 claims in the Home Office-run national referral mechanism scheme that were appealed, 255 were reversed.
The modern slavery provisions are particularly alarming for the impact they will have on children, including significant numbers of British children who are trafficked and exploited in the UK. Despite that, the Bill does not provide safeguards for children, does not recognise that children need different provisions and protections from adults, and does not make policy that acts in the best interests of the child.
Since 2014 the Government have spent more than £200 million on numerous deals with French authorities—equal to around half a million pounds per week of taxpayers’ money—yet the crossings are increasing as the Government proclaim that Brexit has given us control of our borders. The Government’s mood fluctuates between, on the one hand, denouncing the French for not doing enough to stop the crossings and, on the other, telling us how many such crossings have been stopped by the French authorities as a result of the deals we have done with them. What we do know though, is that the Government’s various deals with the French did not prevent the tragic loss of 27 lives when an inflatable dinghy capsized some six weeks ago, in late November last year.
We need new agreements on joint policing and asylum with France and other EU countries to prevent more of these deadly crossings, and covering all aspects of security co-operation, including exchange of information on tackling criminal smuggler gangs and facilitating safe legal routes and safe returns.
If this Government are serious about cracking down on the criminal smuggler gangs that profit from putting desperate people in flimsy dinghies, neither can they ignore the ways that these gangs lure in vulnerable people online. The Government have not put forward anything to address this, even though it is a huge part of the problem. We should criminalise those who advertise and glamourise deadly crossings online. The Government are continually playing catch-up, as organised criminal networks find new ways to exploit vulnerable people online. We also cannot keep waiting for the Government’s long overdue, much delayed online harms legislation to crack down on social media companies that fail to take down the accounts of those who promote these dangerous journeys on their platforms.
What we got, during the passage of this slogan-driven and ill-thought-through Bill, were 80 government amendments tabled three days before Report stage in the Commons, and an admission from the Government that they had managed to produce a Bill that would criminalise RNLI volunteers for their courageous, life-saving work. The effect of that was to increase public support for, and donations to, the RNLI, as a snub to this Government’s original intentions against the RNLI, from which they have now been forced to retreat. However, the Bill still appears to break international maritime law and the duty for a ship to attempt to rescue persons in danger at sea by requiring passing boats or vessels to ignore people in distress or face criminalisation.
The Bill criminalises someone arriving in the UK to claim asylum, changes the immigration offence of how someone enters the UK and specifies the mode of entry as either legal or illegal. The Bill also makes provision for differential treatment of refugees based on how they arrive into the UK and the point at which they present themselves to the authorities, with those who travel via a third country, do not have documents or do not claim asylum immediately being designated “group 2” refugees. Yet the refugee convention contains a single unitary definition of refugee, solely related according to their need for protection.
The Red Cross has said that this differentiated treatment will not deter dangerous journeys. It points out that, even where people have a choice in their mode of travel, it is rare for a person fleeing to have any idea of their rights or the complexities of the asylum law where they arrive. The Red Cross suggests that removing family reunion rights will increase the number of particularly women and children using illegal routes and will actually shore up the business model of the criminal gangs and smugglers.
The Bill enables the prosecution of individuals intercepted in UK territorial seas and brought into this country who arrive in but do not technically “enter” the UK. The new offence will carry a maximum sentence of four years.
There is no visa or entry clearance application for someone to make to come to the UK to claim asylum. Under this Bill, someone with a well-founded fear of persecution arriving in the UK intending to claim asylum will be committing a criminal offence. Article 31 of the refugee convention provides that states
“shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees … where their life or freedom was threatened … they present themselves without delay … and … show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”
The courts have recognised that it would be hollow if asylum seekers could not rely on this international law protection. If all countries were to take this approach of criminalising those who enter illegally for the purposes of claiming asylum, the entire international system for refugee protection would fall apart.
When we left the European Union, we also left the schemes which gave the UK the ability to return those seeking asylum to safe countries via the Dublin III system. This allowed those seeking asylum who entered the UK to be returned if they had first registered in another country in the European Union. At the moment, not one agreement has been struck between this Government and the 27 member states of the EU, therefore restricting the ability to return individuals who registered elsewhere first. Under the Dublin III regulation, the UK safely returned hundreds of asylum seekers to European countries. Since the Dublin regulation stopped applying to the UK at the beginning of last year, the UK has returned, as I said, just five asylum seekers to European countries, at a time when channel crossings have significantly increased.
The Bill provides for asylum seekers to be removed from the UK while their claims are being processed, opening the door to offshore processing. The Government have previously stated that, among other places, they would use such powers to process claims in Africa and Ascension Island, and on disused ferries and abandoned oil rigs. The reality is that such a system would be ineffective, inhumane and very expensive for the taxpayer. Offshore processing in Australia cost an estimated 1 billion Australian dollars a year to deal with 300 migrants.
Last year, some 28,500 people made the dangerous channel crossing. Research by the Refugee Council suggests that around two-thirds who crossed the channel via small boats and claimed asylum were granted humanitarian protection. Over 70% of people arriving via small boats come from just five countries, namely Iran, Sudan, Syria, Iraq and Vietnam, and Afghanistan was seventh, behind Eritrea—hardly countries free from strife and persecution. Neither has the number of asylum applications suddenly reached an all-time peak. In 2002, the number of such applications was over 84,000.
Looking at international comparisons, we do not seem to be faced with more applications than anywhere else. In 2020 there were around six asylum applications for every 10,000 people living in the UK. Across the EU, there were 11 asylum applications for every 10,000 people. Compared with EU 27 countries, the UK ranks 17th for asylum applications per head of population.
I know that much reference will be made today to Clause 9, which was added in haste and without proper scrutiny in the Commons. Powers to deprive someone of British citizenship have existed since 1914. This Bill, though, also gives the Home Office sweeping new powers to deprive a person of their British citizenship without any notice. This is not acceptable and is causing intense concern among people with dual nationality. In the shadow of Windrush, warm words from the Government about how fairly and responsibly they will use the power just will not suffice.
Children, including unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, can make up almost 25% of those seeking asylum in the UK. Where is the replacement for the Dubs scheme, which this Government closed before it had reached anywhere near its potential to protect children? Where is the provision for a safe resettlement scheme for Afghanistan, which has been promised but not yet delivered?
The Bill will not solve the problem of dangerous boat crossings that are putting lives at risk. Instead, it proposes unworkable solutions that will cost the taxpayer dear and undermine international humanitarian conventions and agreements at a time when co-operation is needed more than ever. The Bill does not improve security co-operation and will not secure returns agreements or create the safe, legal routes the Government have promised. Instead, it will increase the asylum backlog, keeping more people in limbo in accommodation. The Bill will not stop trafficking gangs, as the Government are cutting protection from modern slavery and thus making it harder to prosecute and convict people traffickers.
At heart, the Bill is about a Government and a Home Secretary who know that their policies to date are failing and who, in a bid to attract more favourable headlines, are concentrating their fire even more on the victims of people traffickers and deadly channel crossings, rather than setting out sensible plans to deal with the criminal gangs involved based on co-operation, not insularity. In short, this Bill is a sham.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, briefly, I offer Green group support for these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made a point that needs to be reinforced. We have a question, which will arise later with my Amendment 33. Do we have one class of British citizenship or two? If you are not a British citizen because of past discrimination, can we really allow you to be discriminated against again just because of where you or where your parents were born? That is simply unacceptable.
My Lords, we strongly welcome Clause 1 and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, in a Bill where there is so little to welcome, the early clauses of Part 1 seek to redress historical injustices in our nationality law. That is certainly welcomed from these Benches, as well as by other noble Lords who have spoken.
Clause 1 corrects an historical injustice left over from what many would regard as the appalling situation in which mothers did not have the same citizenship rights as fathers. It addresses the citizenship rights of children of mothers who were British Overseas Territory citizens. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her amendments. We raised the clarity of drafting of the clause when the Bill was in the Commons. As the noble Baroness also explained, this concern was raised by the JCHR, which noted that the language in this clause is not the same as the language used for similar purposes in the 1981 Act and raised questions over how well the clause achieves its intention. The JCHR said:
“We recommend that the Home Office consider how best to ensure that the intention to treat those previously discriminated against equally well as those not previously discriminated against, is made clear in the drafting of clause 1.”
In the Commons, my colleagues pushed the Government to amend the clause so that its drafting reflects the drafting in the 1981 Act, when this discrimination was addressed for children of British citizens. I am sure that the Minister will appreciate that, in raising this concern, we are all trying to get this right and make the clause work as it should.
The Minister’s response in the Commons was that he did not believe that amendments were necessary, which is quite a standard government reply, and that the current drafting worked as intended. He also said that these points would be further clarified in underpinning guidance. Have the Government given this issue further thought since it was raised in the Commons? What objection do they have to a minor amendment to answer the JCHR’s concerns? If Ministers believe that that will be further clarified in guidance, should they not consider clarifying it in the Bill?
When we consider the good character requirement—I do not want to repeat everything that has been said—the JCHR is concerned that requiring good character when considering applications resolving prior discrimination risks perpetuating the effects of discrimination for those previously discriminated against. Much of this debate is familiar. As has been said, over the past few years the JCHR has routinely raised concerns about the impact of the good character requirement in cases resolving previous discrimination and in cases concerning children. I simply ask: how does that square with our primary duty to act in the best interests of the child and how is that currently balanced with the good character test? Can the Minister provide details to the Committee on how many children each year are refused citizenship based on this requirement and on what grounds it is deemed that they do not meet the test?
I too welcome the questions raised by my noble friend Lord Dubs on behalf of the JCHR on the application of the good character requirement in Clause 3. I simply wish to make the point that we are debating this clause due to gaps left in the law where we attempt to redress historical discrimination. Where the JCHR is raising concerns that the good character requirement is inappropriate where an applicant has already had their rights denied for a significant number of years, the Government should consider that challenge seriously. If we are to remove existing injustices in our system, we should do so thoroughly and with great care, so that we do not find ourselves having to come back for further fixes at a future date.
I look forward to the noble Baroness the Minister’s reply on behalf of the Government—or perhaps it is the noble Lord; I am sorry.
I thank noble Lords, and I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Rosser..
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling Amendments 1 and 2. Both refer to Clause 1, which I am pleased to introduce, as it corrects a long-standing anomaly in British nationality law. I appreciate my noble friend’s attention to detail in seeking to make sure that this new provision is clear and in line with the parallel provision in the British Nationality Act 1981 for children of British citizen mothers. However, we do not think that an amendment is needed, as the proposed wording here achieves what is intended. In saying that this provision applies to someone who would have been a citizen had their parents been treated equally, we are talking about a situation where the law applied equally to mothers or fathers, women or men. We are satisfied that the current wording does what is required.
I turn now to Amendment 8 and consequential Amendments 10, 12, 17 and 21, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. British citizenship is a privilege, reserved for those who meet the requirements of the British Nationality Act 1981 and who respect the law and values of the UK. This is reflected by the statutory requirement for an individual to be of good character when they apply for British citizenship. Published guidance sets out the basis for how we assess whether a person is of good character and the types of conduct that must be taken into account as part of this assessment.
Decision-makers are required to give careful consideration to each application on a case-by-case basis, and must decide on the balance of probabilities whether an applicant is of good character. Grounds for refusal of citizenship on the basis of not meeting the good character test include criminality that meets the threshold laid out in guidance, immigration offending such as illegal entry or unlawful residence, and serious adverse behaviour such as war crimes, terrorism or genocide. Such behaviour is fundamentally in opposition to core British values of decency and adherence to the law. Removing the good character requirement from all registration routes for British citizenship would mean that we could no longer refuse citizenship to those opposed to these values.
I turn, finally, to Amendment 9, for which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dubs; I know he has taken a great interest in a number of the provisions of the Bill. I start by reassuring the Committee that the Government are committed to removing discrimination from nationality legislation. That is the aim of Clauses 1 and 2. The Government also recognise the difficulties that current British nationality law has presented for some British Overseas Territories citizen parents who wish to pass on their citizenship. However, the Government do not agree that the application of the good character requirement as set out in Clause 3(4) results in unlawful discrimination. Removing the good character requirement for those applying to register as a British citizen having acquired British Overseas Territories citizenship through the new routes established by Clauses 1 and 2, as this amendment proposes, would be unfair and inconsistent with the approach for British Overseas Territories citizens who can apply to become British citizens by virtue of Section 3 of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 and who are subject to the good character requirement.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned the word “misdemeanour” in connection with such matters. We need to be clear that the guidance is clear that a criminal record does not necessarily mean that an application for citizenship will be refused. Those with a non-custodial sentence or who have received an out-of-court disposal will normally be refused citizenship unless three years have passed. Caseworkers have discretion to make an exceptional grant of citizenship in certain circumstances. On the subject of children, we ought to remind ourselves that 10 years old is the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales.
I want to clarify that the good character test applies only to new provisions introduced in the Bill to resolve historical discrimination where it already applies to the current route that the person would have been entitled to register under had the discrimination not existed. So the only people who will have to meet a good character requirement under Clause 3 are those who would have had an entitlement to registration as a British Overseas Territories citizen under Sections 15(3), 17(2) and 17(5) if their parents had been married, because registration under those routes carries a good character requirement.
To try to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, where people would have become British automatically had women and unmarried fathers been able to pass on citizenship at the time of their birth, the good character requirement does not apply.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how many children this issue has affected. I am afraid that I do not know the answer and will have to write to him. I should say that if the person would have become British automatically had the discrimination not existed, they will not now have to meet the good character requirement. That deserves reiteration.
I ask noble Lords to withdraw or not move their amendments for the reasons that I have outlined.
I am very grateful for that important clarification. The cost price is the maximum that should be charged, not the actual cost that should be charged.
There may be some difficulty around whether there is to be a means test, as implied by subsection (3), but the important addition to the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Mcintosh—subsection (4) —is the requirement for the Secretary of State to raise awareness of the right to be registered as a British citizen or British Overseas Territories citizen. As Amnesty rightly points out, thousands of children grow up in the UK excluded from their citizenship rights because they are unaware that they are without British citizenship and need to exercise their right to be registered.
Citizenship should not be an optional extra. It is the right to have rights. It is not, as the Minister said on the previous group, a privilege. It is a right that these people have. It is also likely to make those who acquire it feel more included, and more likely to be loyal to this country, its laws, values and traditions. It is not just of value to those who acquire it but to everyone in the UK, and, as such, the cost of acquiring it should not fall solely on the applicant but on society as a whole.
My Lords, I express our support for the amendments in this group. The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, raise a simple and crucial point. The intention of this part of the Bill, at least its early clauses, is to remove barriers for those who have been unjustly denied citizenship. To then present a barrier to that citizenship in the form of fees for accessing those withheld rights raises obvious problems. This is particularly, and one would hope undeniably, the case for those who would and should have been automatically granted citizenship if it were not for outdated injustices impacting their mother or the marital status of their father.
What has so far been missing from the Government is clarity on this issue. I understand that in Committee in the Commons, the Minister would not directly answer questions as to whether fees will be charged. I hope we may fare a little better today, with the noble Lord the Minister—if that is who responds—telling the House whether the Government intend to charge people to access these routes. Is the intention no fees, fee waivers in some cases, reduced fees from what we have now, or the continuation of existing fees? When and how will this be made clear? In the Commons, the Minister suggested that this was more appropriately dealt with in secondary legislation, but why should clarity not be provided in the Bill in relation to this key issue?
I express too our support for Amendment 13, in the name of my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett, with notable cross-party support from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. As has been said, to say that my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett has been tenacious on this issue would be the understatement of the year; she has been rather more than that.
The amendment tabled by my noble friend addresses a current fee policy that charges people who have the right to register for citizenship exorbitant amounts to do so. As has been said, the amendment does not ask the Government to scrap the fee for application; it simply requires the fee not to be higher than the actual cost of the registration process. As has been said, this means it could be fixed at a considerably lower level or there could be no fee at all.
In particular, I add our strong support for measures to reduce the cost for children to register their citizenship, which they have as much right to access as any Member of this House, and to remove the cost completely, certainly for children in our care. Although the Government have repeatedly resisted this change, it is not without Cabinet support, as has been said. After all, the Health Secretary has described the fees as
“a huge amount of money to ask children to pay”.
I repeat that these costs are levied against children who are born here, grew up here and go to school here but who, unlike their classmates, are not automatically British at birth. Surely it is the will of this Parliament and our nationality law that those children are entitled to citizenship after certain conditions are met. But, in reality, that right is being denied for at least some—probably many—because it is just too expensive for them to access. The Government have already been asked for information on the numbers who have been denied citizenship on the basis that the fees are too high. I am not sure whether we are going to get a response to that point.
There has been some discussion about the legal position. As has been said, in February last year the Court of Appeal, in referring to the best interests of the child, ruled that the child citizenship fee, at over £1,000, is unlawful. That had also been determined earlier by the High Court. A number of noble Lords commented that, instead of using the obvious vehicle of this Bill on citizenship to rectify the issue, the Government have argued—as I understand it—that they want to await a further ruling in the Supreme Court.
Finally, I admit my surprise that, in the Commons, the government Minister claimed that this issue of the cost of registering citizenship was
“not a matter for the Bill.”—[Official Report, Commons, Nationality and Borders Bill Committee, 19/10/21; col. 165.]
This part of the Bill is about access to citizenship. I question how the Government can say that this issue, which has been raised many times across both Houses and with cross-party support, should not be regarded as a matter for this Bill. I hope we have a helpful response from the Government when they now reply.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester speaking on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for tabling Amendment 13; and to my noble friend Lady McIntosh for tabling Amendments 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 18 and 22 on fees charged for applications for British citizenship and British Overseas Territories citizenship. My noble friend the Minister would also like to place on record her thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for engaging with her on this subject in various meetings.
I first turn to the amendments put forward by my noble friend Lady McIntosh. You will be aware of the importance that application fees play in the funding of the migration and borders system, which has been noted in this debate, and that this income is vital to reduce the reliance on taxpayer funding and run a sustainable immigration system. Immigration and nationality fees are set in fees regulations, which are laid before Parliament and subject to the negative procedure. I hope that answers a number of noble Lords’ questions. If we were to remove or amend fees during the passage of the Bill, it would undermine the existing legal framework without proper consideration of the sustainability of the system and fairness to the UK taxpayer. Not only that, but it would create an alternative mechanism for controlling fees, which would reduce the clarity of the fee structure.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, noted, I am of course aware that similar provisions were considered in the other place. We are sympathetic to the view that a fee should not be charged where a person missed out on becoming a British citizen due to historical anomalies.
In answer to the specific questions of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, about those who cannot afford application fees, we have always provided for exceptions to the need to pay application fees for leave to remain in a number of specific circumstances. These exceptions ensure that the Home Office’s immigration and nationality fees structure complies with international obligations and wider government policy.
The subject of children in government or local authority care also came up. The Government do cater for children and their well-being. There are a number of exceptions to application fees, which protect the most vulnerable, including young people who are in the care of a local authority and applying for limited or indefinite leave to remain.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as we have heard from my noble friend Lady Ludford, the Chagos Islanders were evicted by the UK Government in the late 1960s and early 1970s to make way for a US naval base, and they are still exiled from their homeland. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Horam, there are two separate and very distinct issues here. The first, as the noble Lord quite rightly says, is giving the Chagos Islands back to the islanders, which is very much an issue for the Foreign Office. This amendment is about giving Chagos Islanders nationality, and that is very much the responsibility of the Home Office, not the Foreign Office. I would also say, in response to the last speaker and to the noble Lord, that century-long precedents are not necessarily good precedents.
One impact of the eviction has been to deprive descendants of their citizenship rights. The Chagos Islands remain a British Overseas Territory and, as we have heard, were it not for the eviction, they would have passed British Overseas Territories citizenship from generation to generation. In certain circumstances, they could have acquired entitlement to be registered as British citizens and, since 2002, they could have benefited from a general discretion from the Home Secretary to register as British citizens.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, said, the Government’s objection in the other place does not hold water. The situation of the Chagos Islanders is unique and, while the other measures in this part of the Bill to address historic injustices are welcome, they are incomplete without the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, which we wholeheartedly support. As the noble Baroness explained, it is narrow in scope, focused exclusively on the Chagos Islanders’ direct descendants and limited to a five-year window, either from the date the amendment comes into force or five years from when the eligible person turns 18. The Minister will have to do more than simply repeat the words of her colleague in the other place to convince noble Lords not to pursue this matter further on Report.
I would like to express our support for this new clause. I wish to be clear about its objectives and will read from the Member’s explanatory statement:
“This amendment would allow anyone who is descended from a person born before 1983 on the British Indian Ocean Territory to register as a British overseas territories citizen. They may also register as a British citizen at the same time. Both applications would be free of charge. The application must be submitted within 5 years, or in the case of a minor born before the date of coming into force, before they reach 23 years old.”
As we have heard, the proposed new clause is intended to rectify a long-standing injustice which impacts descendants of the Chagos Islanders who were forcibly removed from British Indian Ocean territory in the 1960s. I too wish to express my appreciation and admiration of all those who have been raising and pursuing this issue over a number of years, not least my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett and the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker—although I know they are not the only ones who have been working on behalf of the Chagos Islanders.
The issue has significant cross-party support, and the case for this change was powerfully made by a Member of the Minister’s own party in the Commons, Henry Smith MP, who was supported by Members across that House. The clause, as I have indicated, would extend the right to register for citizenship to the grandchildren and other descendants of this population, and it would, as has been pointed out, apply to only a small number of people.
In the Commons, the Minister’s response was not too encouraging, suggesting that this would be too significant a departure from existing law. However, he did say that the Government had heard the strong points made and would
“continue to consider what more we could do, particularly given the low uptake of the £40 million Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office fund designed to assist this diaspora community, and we will certainly be keen to look at that and, potentially, at how it could allow those people to settle here in the UK.”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/21; col. 258.]
What consideration of this issue has since occurred across Government? What have Ministers settled on as to
“what more we could do”?
In recent years, we have raised significant concerns about this Government’s ongoing foreign and defence policy as regards the Chagos Islands. The Bill provides an opportunity for a distinct and limited change to our own law—one which would have a significant impact for those affected by half a century of injustice. This is surely a unique case. Frankly, we are not setting a precedent, which is what the Government seem to have been arguing to date.
I would like in particular to add our support for Amendment 14 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We hope that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, is feeling a lot better very soon.
Labour’s shadow Minister raised this issue in the Commons and received disappointing answers. As we have heard, the amendment would put right a discrepancy in our nationality law and adoption law. Currently, an adoption order can be made where a child has reached the age of 18 but is not yet 19, but the same adoption order can confer British citizenship only where the child is under 18. In the same order, our law provides that a person is a full member of their adopted family but also that they are not, because they cannot share citizenship with them.
The answers given by the Minister in the Commons were that 18 year-olds are
“capable of making their own life choices”,
that they can
“purchase alcohol, accrue debt, join the Army, or vote in an election”,
and so they are
“fully fledged and can theoretically live independently of other family members”.—[Official Report, Commons, Nationality and Borders Bill Committee, 19/10/21; col. 190.]
On that basis, is the Government’s argument that at 18 someone is young enough to be adopted and provided for in our adoption law, but at the same time too old to really be an adopted child and be recognised in our nationality law?
The Minister in the Commons also argued that this change would be “out of step” with existing nationality law. One can only comment that this amendment is not seeking to make a general change to our law. By its nature, it is a completely limited, clearly defined provision for a small number of children who are going through our adoption system. It is difficult to see why this would be controversial rather than a common-sense change.
I also welcome the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and her questions to the Government. We await the response with interest. We welcome Clause 7 and recognise that its aim is to provide a means to correct further injustices, but our concerns are, first, to make sure that the clause is used and is not just a token power which the Secretary of State “may” choose to action. That is probed by Amendments 16 and 20. Will the Minister clarify whether it is the Government’s intention that the Secretary of State may choose not to allow for a person to be registered as a citizen in a case where they have been subject to a historical injustice?
Secondly, we wish to be sure that this clause is rightly a reactive and fleet-of-foot mechanism to respond to newly identified problems but that it is not an excuse to avoid making further changes in the law where these are necessary. Where a further injustice or any flaw in our nationality law is identified, the Government must amend the law to rectify that. No doubt, the Government could say in their response whether that is their intention.
On the question of the inclusion of British overseas citizens in the provisions of Clause 7, addressed by Amendment 24, the ministerial response in the Commons was unclear. At the same time, the Minister seemed to claim that the clause needed to be as flexible and unfettered as possible but also that it was right to put limits on it; to not include cases which may arise on British overseas citizenship. That would appear somewhat contradictory.
We support the amendments and await answers to the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I hope the Minister will also respond to my questions on this group of amendments.
I thank noble Lords for tabling these amendments to Clause 7, which will allow the Home Secretary to grant British citizenship to those who would have been, or been able to become, a British citizen, but for historical legislative unfairness, either an act or omission of a public authority or their exceptional circumstances. It also creates a similar route for governors in overseas territories to grant British Overseas Territories citizenship on the same basis.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her letter to all Peers of 25 January. If I understood correctly what the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, said, I rather gather that it did not make a great impact on her. I am probably in the same category. Nevertheless, I appreciated receiving the letter.
I have added my name in relation to Clause 9 standing part of the Bill, which was spoken to with such clarity and authority by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and will speak to that. No doubt there will be a need for some reflection on all the amendments in this group, as well as the stand part debate, as to what may or may not happen on Report.
Frankly, through Clause 9, the Government—metaphorically speaking, I stress—take no prisoners. They seek to amend the long-standing position, under the British Nationality Act 1981, that an individual must be notified if they are to be deprived of their nationality. That requirement of prior notice is removed by Clause 9
“if it appears to the Secretary of State that … the Secretary of State does not have the information needed to be able to give notice … it would for any other reason not be reasonably practicable to give notice … or … notice … should not be given … in the interests of national security … in the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or … otherwise in the public interest.”
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, made particular reference to that last part on the basis that it is so broad and wide-ranging.
Yet, as we know, the present rules already allow for citizenship deprivation letters to be delivered to an individual’s last known address. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out—this was repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—the Government said that there have been no cases where the requirement to give notice stopped a deprivation of citizenship order coming into being. Of course, that begs the question: why do we have Clause 9 at all? I do not think that we got an answer to that in the letter from the Minister of 25 January 2022.
The number of people deprived of their citizenship, which the Government can now do on the basis that it would be
“conducive to the public good”,
has risen over the past 12 years. We have heard a variety of figures during this debate as to the extent of that deprivation and the numbers involved. I have a figure, too. It does not tally with some of the figures that have been given but the figure that I have is that, between 2010 and 2018, around 175 people were deprived of their citizenship on the grounds that it was conducive to the public good. A significant number happened in 2017, as has been said; the figures certainly seem to be on an upward trend.
In that context, information on the Court of Appeal decision that has been referred to that upheld a High Court ruling—the D4 case—says that the Home Secretary
“argued that notification had been given to D4, who has been detained in the … camp in Syria since January 2019, by simply placing a note on her Home Office file, relying on regulations introduced without parliamentary approval.”
Under Clause 9, we are faced with even wider powers being given to the Home Secretary. In the light of a note simply being placed on a Home Office file, relying on regulations introduced without parliamentary approval, how are we expected to have any confidence in the provisions of Clause 9 being applied fairly and objectively when this kind of thing is going on and has been brought to our attention? In how many cases has this been done, with a note simply being placed on the Home Office file? It certainly does not inspire confidence in giving the Home Office the kind of powers that are provided for in Clause 9. I know that the Minister will tell me that these powers relate only to the notification of a decision to deprive, but it is the criteria against which the conclusion can be reached to give notification of a decision without notice that are of concern.
My Lords, Clause 10 talks about, to quote the Explanatory Notes,
“cases where parents have chosen not to register their child’s birth, which would have acquired their own nationality for their child, which means that the child can register as a British citizen under the statelessness provisions.”
I seriously question how many parents have such a detailed understanding of nationality law that they choose not to register their child’s birth in order to register their child later under statelessness provisions to give them British citizenship. That is just not credible. How many cases can the Minister cite where parents have deliberately not registered the nationality of their child in order for that child to get British citizenship under the statelessness provisions?
This strikes me as a cynical attempt to tighten the law, in a similar way to that in which the Bill tightens the provisions around modern slavery, to give the impression of being tough—bordering on xenophobic —on immigration, when there really is not a problem. It should not be part of the Bill. The power in this clause given to the Secretary of State to deny British citizenship to a child, unless she is satisfied that the child cannot reasonably acquire the nationality of its parents, needs to be qualified at the very least.
Amendment 30 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights
“to ensure that British citizenship is only withheld”
from a stateless child born in the UK
“where the nationality of a parent is available to the child immediately”,
without any legal or administrative hurdles. We will support this amendment if this clause stands part of the Bill.
These are decisions being taken by parents and the Secretary of State about an innocent child who has no influence over what is being decided about their future—decisions about something as fundamental as citizenship. For that reason alone, we strongly support Amendment 31: that the best interests of the stateless child born in the UK must be central to any decision whether to grant or refuse British citizenship.
This is what we have come to: seeking to deny stateless children born in the UK British citizenship. As I said on a previous group, British citizenship has benefits to society as well as to the individual concerned. This is not just about the best interests of the child, although it should be; it is about what is in the best interests of society. Keeping children stateless as they grow into adults surely increases their chance of being radicalised and becoming a threat to society. On the last group, the Minister kept talking about high-harm individuals. All the evidence points to one of the most important factors in radicalisation being people not feeling part of society or of this country. Keeping a child stateless surely will increase the danger of that person growing into a terrorist.
My Lords, my name has been added to the proposal to oppose Clause 10 standing part of the Bill, which was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As has been said, Clause 10 is intended to disentitle stateless children in the UK from their statutory right to British citizenship. It proposes amending and restricting a vital safeguard in British nationality law that prevents and reduces childhood statelessness. Under our international obligations, we have safeguards that mean that a child who was born in the UK and has always been stateless can acquire British citizenship after five years of residing here.
Through Clause 10, the Government now propose to restrict and amend that obligation. Clause 10 requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that a child was unable to acquire another nationality before being permitted to register as a British citizen. That creates an additional and unjustified hurdle to stateless children’s registration as British citizens, which could be difficult for a child or those acting on their behalf to prove.
Rather than helping such children attain citizenship, the Government are intent on putting up more barriers and making it more difficult for children under 18 to be registered. They seem to want to try to deny citizenship, particularly citizenship of the place where the child was born and lives—in fact, the only place they know. No doubt the Government will explain what substantial wrong they consider this clause addresses and what hard evidence there is that that wrong is actually significant, as opposed to it being claimed as such.
Clause 10 can only be highly damaging to a child’s personal development and their feelings of security and belonging, with this exclusion and potential alienation being inflicted in their formative years. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to the serious implications that can have. There has been no assessment made by the Government of the impact this proposal will have on those children affected, which suggests that this issue does not trouble the Government. As my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett said, how can this be in the best interests of the child? This issue is addressed in Amendment 31, reflecting a JCHR recommendation.
In the Commons, we supported an amendment to Clause 10 which sought to ensure that the Government act in compliance with Article 1 of the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the Government having failed to protect the existing safeguards, which are in line with international law, in this Bill. The amendment altered Clause 10, so that British citizenship was withheld from a stateless child born in the UK only when a parent’s nationality was available to the child immediately, without any legal or administrative hurdles. That is as per Amendment 30, moved by my noble friend Lord Dubs, which also reflects a JCHR recommendation.
I am probably being overoptimistic in hoping that there will be a positive government reply to this stand part debate. At the very least, if my fears are justified and we do not get a positive reply from our point of view, I hope that we will be told what the hard evidence is that Clause 10 actually addresses a significant wrong, rather than one being claimed as such.
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for tabling Amendments 30 and 31 to Clause 10, which requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that a child aged between five and 17 cannot reasonably acquire another nationality in order to be registered under the stateless child provisions. I also note the opposition to and concerns about this clause of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, should they not be satisfied by my response. In an ideal world, we would not need to include this clause, but current trends mean that we feel we must.
That goes to the question that the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, asked about the figures. In 2017, in the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, even though the applicant was eligible for the grant of British citizenship under paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the BNA 1981, and despite the fact that they could acquire the nationality of their parents, the judge recognised that his conclusion
“opens an obvious route to abuse”.
The figures bear that out. In 2010 there were five cases; in 2018 they peaked at 1,775. There is obvious evidence that this is happening. I rest my case there.
Clause 10 has been developed in response to concerns that a number of non-settled parents, many of whom did not have permission to be in the UK at the time of their child’s birth, have chosen not to register their child’s birth with their own authorities in order to qualify under the current child statelessness provisions. This in turn can impact on the parents’ immigration status.
Amendment 30 would add a new condition to Clause 10, so that a child is defined as being able to acquire a nationality from birth only if there were no legal or administrative barriers to them doing so. That would mean that the parents I have talked about could, in theory, benefit from the stateless child provisions by not registering their child’s birth. In answer to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, it is very easy to register a child’s birth. The parents simply need to complete a form and provide supporting information about their identity, status and residence and the child’s birth. I do not think that is difficult.
I appreciate that the noble Lord’s use of the term “barriers” might have been intended to suggest something more significant and assure him that the clause already reflects our expectation that children who cannot reasonably acquire another nationality should not be excluded. The UNHCR’s document Guidelines on Statelessness no. 4: Ensuring Every Child’s Right to Acquire a Nationality through Articles 1-4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness recognises that the responsibility to grant nationality to children who would otherwise be stateless is not engaged where a child could acquire the nationality of a parent through registration or a simple procedure. The genuinely stateless child will not be affected. This is about those who can reasonably acquire another nationality. It is not about the Windrush generation—they are entitled to be British.
We do not think it is fair that parents can effectively secure a quicker route to British citizenship by choosing not to register their child’s birth. In doing so, they are depriving their child of a nationality, which is not only about identity and belonging, as I heard one noble Lord say, but can allow them to acquire a passport or identity document and the ability to travel overseas to see family, for example.
They are also taking advantage of a provision intended to protect those who are genuinely stateless. We want them still to be able to benefit, but we want to change the registration provisions so that parents cannot effectively choose statelessness for their children and then benefit from the provisions. We think it is appropriate that families should take reasonable steps to acquire a nationality for their child. We will set out in guidance the sort of steps that we think are reasonable, and applications will be considered on their individual basis.
Amendment 31 would mean that we could not regard a child as being able to acquire another nationality, and so decline their British citizenship application, if it would not be in the best interests of the child to gain that nationality. Noble Lords have pointed out the value they see in a child being able to secure and acquire a nationality, and it is difficult to see why parents might argue that it is not in their child’s best interests to share their status. We have already taken into account that some countries’ nationalities may be problematic for a child to acquire. The proposed clause reflects our expectation that a parent should not need to try to acquire a nationality for their child if it is not reasonable for them to do so.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this part of the Bill has a very simple purpose: it is designed by the Government to make life harder for refugees. The two-tier refugee system is designed to give the illusion of there being a proper way of being a refugee, but it will inflict huge suffering and injustice on desperate people.
It is probably not the normal tactic to plan what we are going to do next in front of the Government Front Bench, but although I applaud the intentions of noble Lords who tabled the 16 amendments to the clause, the only way is to take it out of the Bill. It is so vile, so obnoxious, that it really should not be in here.
This has not been mentioned very much but we must remember that, to some extent, we have a moral duty to take refugees. A lot of these refugees are coming from countries we have invaded, or where we have interfered or done all sorts of things, whether it is burning too much fossil fuel, causing climate change, or destabilising their Governments. Please can we remember that there is a moral duty? It is all very well referring to population density and so on, but we owe these people and we should never forget that.
My Lords, I shall resist the temptation to offer a view on what public opinion is. What I do remember is that a lot of people expressed a view on what public opinion was over climate protesters and people who threw statues into the water at Bristol, but when cases came up before a jury, they reached some very interesting decisions on guilt or otherwise. That suggests that some of those who profess to know what public opinion is may not necessarily be right when the public have a chance to hear the arguments presented to them and are then asked to make a decision.
Clause 11 is about differential treatment of recognised refugees and its impact and implications. We believe that it contravenes the 1951 refugee convention. It sets a dangerous precedent by creating a two-tier system for refugees, and it is also inhumane. Under the Bill, the Home Secretary will be given sweeping powers to decide asylum cases based on how someone arrives in this country and their mode of transport, not on the strength of their claim—contrary to the 1951 refugee convention, of which Britain was a founding member.
Under the clause, only those refugees who meet specific additional requirements will be considered group 1 refugees and benefit from the rights currently granted to all refugees by the refugee convention. Other refugees who are not deemed to meet those criteria will be designated as group 2 refugees, and the Secretary of State will be empowered to draft rules discriminating against group 2 refugees with regard to the rights to which they are entitled under the refugee convention, as well as their fundamental right to family unity. The different ways in which those two groups could be treated is not limited in any way by the Bill. Clause 11 does, however, provide examples of ways in which the two groups might be treated differently, even though they are nearly all recognised as genuine refugees. Those who travel via a third country, who do not have documents or who did not claim asylum immediately will routinely be designated as group 2 refugees. The clause goes on to set out how the length of limited leave, access to indefinite leave, family reunion —that is, whether family members, mainly women and children, are entitled to join them—and access to public funds are likely to become areas for discrimination against group 2 refugees.
The government policy paper, the New Plan for Immigration, proposed that instead of fully fledged refugee status, group 2 refugees will be granted “temporary protection” for a period of no longer than 30 months,
“after which individuals will be reassessed for return to their country of origin or removal to”
a safe third country. Temporary protection status
“will not include an automatic right to settle in the UK, family reunion rights will be restricted and there will be no recourse to public funds except in cases of destitution”—
in other words, a state, deliberately created, of complete uncertainty over their future for group 2 refugees.
Clause 11 would therefore make a significant and unprecedented change in the law, resulting in the UK treating accepted refugees less generously, based on the journey they have taken to reach the UK and the timeliness of their asylum claim. This attempt to create two different classes of recognised refugee is surely inconsistent with the refugee convention and has no basis in international law. The refugee convention, which was enshrined in UK law in 1954, contains a single unitary definition of “refugee”. It defines a refugee solely according to their need for international protection because of feared persecution on the grounds of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Anyone who meets that definition and is not excluded is a refugee and entitled to the protection of the refugee convention.
The Commons committee considering the Bill heard in evidence from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ representative to the UK that this clause and the Bill were inconsistent with the UN convention and international law. If the Government disagree with that—an issue raised by my noble friend Lady Lister —no doubt they will spell out in some detail in their reply their legal argument for saying that the clause does comply with the convention and international law.
This is, however, not just a matter of law but of fairness and humanity. By penalising refugees for how they were able to get to the UK, the Bill builds walls against people in need of protection and shuts the door on many seeking a safe haven. Most refugees have absolutely no choice about how they travel. Is it really this Government’s intention and desire to penalise refugees who may, for example, as a matter of urgency, have had to find an irregular route out of Afghanistan? Are the Government saying that people are less deserving if they have had to take a dangerous route to our shores? Is an interpreter from Afghanistan who took a dangerous journey to our shores less deserving than a refugee who was lucky enough to make it here on one of the flights out of the country?
The Government acknowledge that such journeys are very dangerous and sometimes fatal, yet they do not seem to appreciate the compulsion—that the alternative of not doing so is even worse—which drives people to make such journeys. If people truly had a reason to believe that they would be safe where they are, they would not make the journey. Simply making the journey more dangerous or the asylum system more unwelcoming will not change that. Of the first 5,000 people who came in 2020 by boat, well over 90% were deemed by the Home Office to be eligible to apply for asylum: they were genuine asylum seekers. They were not here illegally—but they will become illegal if the Bill is enacted.
Penalising people for how they arrived in the UK has particular implications for already vulnerable groups of refugees such as women and those from LGBT communities. Women are often compelled to take irregular routes to reach safety, as we see only too clearly in Afghanistan. There are simply no safe and legal routes. Under the proposed changes, however, women who arrive irregularly, including through a safe third country, will be penalised and could be prosecuted, criminalised and imprisoned. The same obstacles will apply to those from LGBT communities.
Unless the Government can provide safe routes, penalising people for making unsafe journeys is simply inhumane, although, even then, not everyone would have the time or ability to access a safe route, even if one existed. By not providing safe routes, the Government are also fuelling the business model of the people smugglers they claim their proposals will destroy, and then penalising the victims they have had a responsibility for creating. The Conservative-led Foreign Affairs Committee, of which the Home Secretary was then a member, warned in 2019:
“A policy that focuses exclusively on closing borders will drive migrants to take more dangerous routes, and push them into the hands of criminal groups”.
The Government’s impact assessment warns that increased deterrence in this manner
“could encourage these cohorts to attempt riskier means of entering the UK.”
As has been said, Clause 11 also says that group 1 refugees must have
“come to the United Kingdom directly from a country or territory where their life or freedom was threatened”.
In other words, the Government are setting an expectation that, to be recognised as a refugee supposedly deserving of the support usually afforded, the UK must be the first safe country in which they have sought asylum. Commenting on the Bill, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said:
“Requiring refugees to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach would undermine the global, humanitarian, and cooperative principles on which the refugee system is founded.”
It was pointed out in oral evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights that it was unlikely that
“any country close to the main countries of origin of refugees would have ever considered signing a convention if that meant that they would assume total and entire responsibility for all the refugees.”
In addition, when the refugee convention came into being in the early 1950s, there was little or no commercial air travel, so any refugee reaching this country would have to have crossed land borders from safe states. Yet there was no view then that such a refugee should be seen—as under this Bill and the Government’s interpretation of the refugee convention in international law—as a criminal liable to up to four years in prison and to being sent back to France, and with any claim for asylum being regarded as inadmissible.
Even within Europe, most of the countries that refugees pass through on their way to the UK already host significantly more refugees and asylum seekers per population than the UK does. According to the Home Office’s own statistics, the UK is 17th in terms of the numbers it takes, measured per head of population. Unless safe routes are developed, all that will happen is that there will be an increase in dangerous crossings, because that will be the only way in which people can reach the United Kingdom.
As it is, France takes three times more asylum seekers than the UK, as does Germany. Global provision for refugees could not function if all refugees claimed asylum in the first safe country they came to. As my noble friends Lord Griffiths of Burry Port and Lord Coaker have pointed out, most refugees are hosted in developing countries and the UK receives fewer asylum applications than most other European countries. Under international law, the primary responsibility for identifying refugees and affording international protection rests with the state in which an asylum seeker arrives and seeks that protection.
Clause 11 sets out a non-exhaustive list of the ways in which refugees who arrive irregularly and become group 2 refugees may be treated differently. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill state that the purpose of this is
“to discourage asylum seekers from travelling to the UK”,
and to encourage
“individuals to seek asylum in the first safe country they reach after fleeing persecution.”
It is not clear, since the Government have provided no explanation, how the stated aim will result from the policy; perhaps the Government in their response will provide that explanation.
Evidence from many refugee organisations suggests that refugees seek asylum in the UK for a range of reasons, such as proficiency in English, family links or a common heritage based on past colonial histories. In addition, refugees do not cite the level of leave granted or other elements of the asylum system as decisive factors. The Home Office’s own study from 2002—I do not think there has been one since then—noted that there was little evidence that respondents seeking to come to the UK had a detailed knowledge of UK asylum procedures, benefit entitlements or the availability of work in the UK. There was even less evidence that the respondents had a comparative knowledge of how these conditions varied between different European destination countries.
Given that individuals have little knowledge of the asylum systems of the countries they end up in, it is not clear that differential treatment will dissuade individuals from coming to the UK via safe countries. However, what the Government are proposing will certainly result in a refugee population that is less secure, and it will punish those who have been recognised through the legal system as needing international protection, such as women and girls fleeing the Taliban or Uighurs fleeing genocide in China.
The Explanatory Notes also state that 62% of asylum claims in the UK up to September 2019 were from people who entered irregularly. This means that the policy intention is to impose strictures on the rights and entitlements of the majority of refugees coming to the UK, even though we take fewer than comparable countries. Those penalties would target not just those who have entered the UK irregularly or have made dangerous journeys but all those who have not come directly to the UK, regularly or irregularly, from a country or territory where their life or freedom was threatened, those who have delayed claiming asylum or overstayed, and even those who arrive in the UK without entry clearance and who claim asylum immediately.
My Lords, noble Lords have repeatedly talked about undermining family reunion. I confirm to the noble Baroness, and for Hansard, so that noble Lords do not come back at me again and again to make this point, that group 2 refugees will be afforded the entitlements in a way that is compatible with the refugee convention, including family reunion, compatible with the ECHR. Most importantly, they will be provided with protection against refoulement. I make that point again: group 2 refugees will be afforded the entitlements in a way that is compatible with the refugee convention, including family reunion. I hope noble Lords will not come back to that point—well, they will do so, but I have made my point, I hope.
If I can, I will continue on the generosity of the great British public and this Government. Over 88,000 BNO status holders and their family members—almost 90,000, as my noble friend said—have chosen to apply for the BNO route, with over 76,000 granted it so far. Meanwhile, we led Europe in airlifting some 15,000 people out of Afghanistan to the UK from mid-August under Operation Pitting. If any noble Lord wants to stand up and say we were not generous in that situation, I beg them to do that now. That is over and above the earlier transfers of around 2,000 locally employed staff and their families under the Afghan relocations and assistance policy. Our new Afghan citizens resettlement scheme also aims to welcome a total of 20,000 people. These people, who noble Lords were talking about earlier, are the most vulnerable people in the world today and our generosity has been exemplary.
Can I just clarify a point? The Minister has said it is not true that family reunion rights are going to be restricted. But as I understand it, the Government’s New Plan for Immigration did give a detailed indication of what different treatment might look like for group 2 refugees. I am perfectly willing to stand corrected if what I am saying is wrong, but as I understand it, the New Plan for Immigration said, in relation to group 2 refugees who will be granted temporary protection:
“Temporary protection status will not include an automatic right to settle in the UK, family reunion rights will be restricted and there will be no recourse to public funds except in cases of destitution.”
Is that quote from the Government’s new plan wrong? In other words, is it not correct that family reunion rights will be restricted?
It is not correct to say that family reunion rights will be restricted for group 2 refugees. They will be afforded the entitlements in a way that is compatible with the refugee convention, including family reunion. If someone, be they a group 1 or group 2 refugee, is deemed a refugee, they will be afforded family reunion rights compatible with the ECHR.
Can I just carry on? I will then of course allow an intervention from the noble Lord; he is always courteous to me.
I want to further reassure the noble Baroness that, even where a refugee or a family member is a group 2 refugee, “reasonable discretion” will be exercised with respect to the determination of differentiated entitlements. We have built this notion into current drafting by ensuring that the determination of whether a refugee is in group 1 or group 2 will depend on whether they could have been reasonably expected to claim asylum in another safe country, and their asylum claim in the UK was made as soon as is reasonably practicable. Our view is that these standards provide adequate discretion to take into account particular facts of an individual case when determining tiering and therefore whether they are granted differentiated entitlements. Would the noble Lord like to intervene now?
I would because I am getting thoroughly confused, which is something I perhaps do quite frequently, I accept. I will read out again from the JCHR report. It says:
“The policy paper that preceded the Bill, the Government’s ‘New Plan for Immigration’, gave a more detailed indication of what different treatment may look like, as it proposed that instead of fully fledged refugee status, Group 2 refugees would be granted ‘temporary protection’ for a period of no longer than 30 months ‘after which individuals [would] be reassessed for return to their country of origin or removal to a safe third country.’ Temporary protection status ‘will not include an automatic right to settle in the UK, family reunion rights will be restricted and there will be no recourse to public funds except in cases of destitution.’”
Those are quotations from the Government’s New Plan for Immigration policy statement. In relation to group 2 refugees, who are being created by Clause 11 —that is the new bit and what the Bill is doing—it quite clearly states:
“family reunion rights will be restricted”.
I ask again: is that correct or incorrect? If it is not, why is it written in the JCHR report? If the Minister is going to tell me that the JCHR has got it wrong, please say so clearly now.
Before the noble Baroness responds, I add that I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is confused: I fear that the Minister is being mildly disingenuous with us. Can she confirm that there is a difference in the intended treatment of group 1 and group 2 refugees as concerns family reunion? Otherwise, what is the point of Clause 11(6):
“The Secretary of State or an immigration officer may … treat the family members of Group 1 and Group 2 refugees differently, for example in respect of … whether to give the person leave to enter or remain”
et cetera? What is the point of this being in the Bill if there is no intention to treat group 2 refugees differently? The Minister told us about how this will not breach the refugee convention and so on. I asked specifically about the comments on Article 8, and I look forward to her replying specifically on that. But can she confirm whether their intention is to treat group 1 and group 2 refugees differently in terms of rights to family reunion?
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, for putting my mind at rest. I initially hesitated to support Amendment 40 as it highlights particularly vulnerable asylum seekers, potentially giving the false impression that we do not believe that all asylum seekers are vulnerable, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee just said. Nor do we want to give the false impression that we on these Benches support in any way, shape or form what we believe to be the illegal practice of differentiating asylum seekers, as Clause 11 attempts to do, for any reason. This amendment only probes the requirement of Clause 11(2)(b) that asylum seekers must
“have presented themselves without delay to the authorities”,
which might be an issue whether Clause 11 remains part of the Bill or not.
Amendment 40 lists examples of those who may have suffered particular trauma that may cause them to hesitate in claiming asylum. I can talk only about my personal experience as a gay man, trying to conceal my sexuality for fear of being found out for the first 40 years of my life, even in a country that decriminalised homosexual acts between consenting men aged 21 and over when I was nine. The point is this: just because it is legally safe to be gay in this country does not mean that it feels safe to be gay in this country. Even Dame Cressida Dick—the person of the moment—did not feel able to be publicly open about her sexuality until she became Commissioner of the Met, and it has never been illegal to express your sexuality as a lesbian in the UK. I can only imagine what it might be like, coming from a country where you can still be executed if you express your sexuality, to come here and then be expected to claim asylum “without delay” because of your sexuality. It is so clearly and obviously unreasonable.
As the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, said, it is also less likely that those fleeing persecution will be able to produce evidence of their sexuality, be open about it or overcome the fear of being open about it because of concerns about family members who remain in their home country. The noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, spoke compellingly, from personal experience of helping particularly vulnerable refugees, of how long it takes asylum seekers to recover, as my noble friend has just highlighted. There is compelling evidence of the need for this amendment and we support it.
As my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett said in moving this amendment, Clause 11 provides that to be a group 1 refugee you must have presented yourself to the authorities “without delay”. This amendment would provide that vulnerable groups are not subject to this time constraint. As one sees from reading the amendment, this would include, though not exclusively, children, survivors of torture, sexual violence and gender-based violence, LGBT refugees, victims of modern slavery and disabled refugees. This is a probing amendment to find out more about how the “without delay” provision will work in practice. As has been said, traumatised people, for example survivors of sexual or gender-based violence, who are largely, but certainly not exclusively, women, do not always feel —to put it mildly—in a position to unburden themselves to the first complete stranger or border, immigration or other government official that they meet on arrival.
The position of single men and sexual orientation has also been raised. The noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, referred to the article in the Times about single men who arrive from across the channel being detained and locked up. In a previous debate, I asked whether the Minister could say whether that Times article was true. I ask again: is that article true or false? It is important that we get an answer because it relates to this amendment as well.
As well as answering that question, I hope the Minister will give some indication of how the “without delay” provision will work in relation to the vulnerable groups covered by the amendment, what kind of leeway or otherwise the Government intend there to be and what exactly “without delay” means in this context.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate for what have been very thoughtful contributions. I will directly address the question that the noble Lord asked me in the previous group about locking single males up. I have not seen the Times article. If he will allow me, I will look at it and respond in due course.
Although the policy is intended to deter dangerous journeys and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country, I assure noble Lords that we have been very careful to strike the right balance between how the policy achieves its aim and protecting the most vulnerable, which is what noble Lords have spoken about this evening. Before I explain why I think statutory exemptions are probably not needed, I will offer a few thoughts in relation to how the “without delay” element of Clause 11 is anticipated to operate.
There are two broad categories under which I envisage the exercise of discretion is most likely to be appropriate. The first is where a person finds themselves unable or unwilling to present themselves to the authorities for any reason that pertains to their proposed asylum claim. In such instances, there will need to be very careful consideration of whether it was reasonably practicable for that person to have claimed without delay. For example, if they had been tortured—noble Lords have given this sort of example—suffered sexual violence at the hands of state authorities or, indeed, feared admitting their sexual orientation due to state persecution on those grounds, this sort of situation would trigger very careful consideration.
The second category is where a person was simply not in control of their actions. In such circumstances, we would also be very careful to consider the facts of that case when determining whether it was reasonably practicable for that person to have claimed without delay. I think primarily of victims of human trafficking, unaccompanied children, and those suffering serious physical or mental disabilities.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked about statistics. I do not have them to hand, but I will try to get them.
On the guidance and training, one of the things that I looked into in great detail way back, when we talked about LGBT people in the detention estate, was how practitioners went about establishing claims made on the basis of a person’s sexual orientation. It is fair to say that, back in the day, “clunking” would probably have been a charitable word to use—some of the ways people were questioned were on the verge of being inhumane. We really went to extraordinary lengths to try to change that and make it a much more humane process. It is now about establishing the reasons why someone is making a claim, not proving it, so our policies and training are now designed to support claimants in being able to explain their claim in a very sensitive and safe environment. Our approach, I can confirm, is trauma informed.
Our guidance on sexual orientation and gender identity, as I said previously, was developed to take these issues into account—UNHCR, Stonewall and Rainbow Migration contributed to its development—and we will review and update our training and guidance where necessary to support people who are LGBT+. I confirm again that this will take people’s experiences into account, including the trauma that they have suffered. I thank those organisations, particularly Stonewall, Rainbow Migration and UNHCR, that have helped to make the process far more humane so that people’s very difficult journeys and experiences are eased somewhat by our attitude and approach.
My Lords, after the emotionally draining Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, I told myself not to get so involved with this one, but how can noble Lords not get so involved when we are dealing with measures such as this? I cannot believe that it is not also taking a toll on the Minister, who, at all times and in every circumstance, tries everything she can personally to meet and persuade noble Lords. I wanted to put that on the record in case there was any misunderstanding of my remarks on the other Bill.
Again, we reiterate that we believe that the sole determinant of how an asylum seeker should be treated by the UK are the circumstances that forced them to seek sanctuary in the United Kingdom. If they genuinely have fled war or persecution, they should be treated as refugees, with all the rights associated with that status, regardless of how they arrived in the UK. These amendments seek to clarify in what circumstances a second-class refugee, as defined by Clause 11, would have no recourse to public funds, and what would happen to those individuals in such circumstances, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, explained. The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, articulated the consequences of having no recourse to public funds. In short, do the Government intend to make group 2 refugees—a dreadful and, we believe, illegal term—destitute and homeless, or just for them to suffer grinding poverty?
I assume these measures are supposed to be a deterrent, but I ask noble Lords to put themselves in the position of a genuine asylum seeker in a migrant camp in northern France, considering what their next move should be. Would they feel that they would be better off destitute and homeless in France, or destitute and homeless in the United Kingdom, where they speak the same language, for example, or have friends or relatives? Would they believe, despite the Government’s best efforts, that they would still be better off in the United Kingdom than in France, for the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, listed so clearly?
Can the Minister answer this question? Are the Government really on a race to the bottom with other countries, such as France, to see who can make life more intolerable for genuine asylum seekers? The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, raised the issue of France. I agree with my noble friend Lady Ludford: my understanding was that the French were complaining that it was easier to work illegally in the UK than in France, which was why people were coming to the UK. My understanding is also that the benefits given to refugees in France are higher than in the UK, but I stand to be corrected. Having asked the Minister that question, with some trepidation I await the Government’s response.
My Lords, one of the ways that the Government can differentiate under the Bill between group 1 and group 2 refugees is to apply “no recourse to public funds”. The two probing amendments in this group would remove that provision. I listened with interest to what the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, had to say, as I did to my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett in moving the amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, asked what the policy intent of NRPF is—I think she asked that twice during her contribution. Having heard the view of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, I will be interested to hear what the Government’s view is of the policy intent behind no recourse to public funds being applied to group 2 refugees.
We fully agree with these amendments, which are probing. A question was put to the Minister, and I simply want to support that ask of the Minister to set out in detail when the Government would consider this an appropriate differentiation to use, and in what cases. To whom within group 2 refugees do the Government expect this differentiation on no recourse to public funds to be applied, and in what circumstances? Against what criteria will that decision be made?
We are not talking about applying no recourse to public funds to persons without a valid refugee claim or economic migrants. Clause 11 applies solely to people the Government recognise as refugees with a valid right to be here and to seek safety. Bearing that in mind, it would be interesting to find out in what circumstances they think it appropriate to apply no recourse to public funds to people in the group 2 category.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for explaining their Amendments 46 and 54. As I have said elsewhere, I hope I can reassure the Committee that the powers under Clause 11 are both broad and flexible.
To come first to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, there is no obligation to exercise the provisions and, where they are exercised, there is no requirement to do so in any particular way. We will of course produce guidance and rules in this respect in due course, but those products will reflect the flexibility in the clause by providing appropriate discretion to take into account people’s individual circumstances.
The same therefore applies to no recourse to public funds. Details will be set out in due course, but I reassure noble Lords that we will take particular care to take into account relevant factors when considering the imposition of the condition, if it is imposed at all, including the impact on families, children and other vulnerabilities that have been raised elsewhere. In addition, we are mindful of potential impacts on local authorities and wider civil society. The policies in the Bill are of course subject to an impact assessment in any event. I stress that no one will be NRPF if they would otherwise be at risk of destitution. If they are, they can apply for a change of conditions to remove the condition.
I shall pick up on a few points. The first was about the policy intent, which is to disincentivise dangerous journeys. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral is right: we have to disincentivise people from risking their lives.
My noble friend Lady Stroud talked about safe and legal routes. She was probably not in the Chamber when I laid out absolutely all of them. I refer her to the letter I sent to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, setting all of them out, including several routes for family reunion; I hope she will take a look at that. I commend her on coming up with the solution, yet again, of working with the French. I agree that we need to work not only with the French but with other countries because this is a global problem that now requires a global solution from each and every state on the globe.
I turn to push factors versus pull factors. Push factors do not explain secondary movement, there is no doubt about that. If push factors were all, people would stop in the first safe country that they reached—that is an absolute fact. We must keep all options on the table to stop illegal migration. I hope, but doubt, that I have reassured the noble Baroness that I appreciate and understand her concerns, and the requisite levels of discretion and sensitivity will be exercised with respect to—
I thank the noble Baroness, but I disagree.
To answer my noble friend’s intervention about who decides, it is caseworkers.
I may have misunderstood the thrust of what the Minister has said on behalf of the Government, but it came over to me that the reason why we have no recourse to public funds is to disincentivise dangerous journeys—that is, people will know that there is no recourse to public funds, and if they know that it may make stop them making those journeys.
If that is the case, why cannot the Government tell us the circumstances in which no recourse to public funds will apply? Their response has been, in effect: “Someone will draw up guidelines later on, but we do not know at the moment what they will say or the circumstances in which there would be no recourse to public funds.” In that situation, it just is not credible to say that something where the Government do not know how it will be applied would act as a disincentive on dangerous journeys.
Yes, my noble friend is absolutely right. It is not unusual for guidelines to be drawn up after legislation has been brought in.
It is true that it is not unusual for guidelines to be drawn up subsequently but, presumably, in including the provision in the Bill, the Government had at least some idea of the circumstances in which it would be applied. The answer I am getting now is that they cannot tell us any circumstances in which it will definitely apply.
It might be helpful to the noble Lord if I outlined situations in which it might be applied, as opposed to putting them in the Bill. I am very happy to go away and look at that and write to him with some examples of where it might be applied—I get his point on that.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am very grateful for the historic information that the noble Lord has provided. My understanding is that, as the years have gone on, the number of successful appeals has increased and the number of first-time decisions to reject application from refugees has gone down. While I do not deny that those might be the overall numbers going back to 2004, in saying that most applicants for refugee status are successful, we are basing it on the last few years—the current trend rather than the historic numbers the noble Lord refers to.
I am reminded of heavy-handed policing of football supporters in the 1980s. I remember a football fan saying to me, “If you treat us like animals, we’ll behave like animals”. Warehousing asylum seekers may be a short-term gain, but it is likely to create long-term problems.
I too express my appreciation to my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett for the determination and commitment she has shown in pursuing not only this but so many other key issues about which she rightly feels very strongly. I repeat what the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, said: this clause and these amendments are about asylum seekers. In the Bill—a government document—Clause 12 is titled “Accommodation for asylum-seekers etc”. We are talking about asylum seekers, not illegal immigration, although I accept that there are those who make no distinction between the two. The other point I make at this stage is about the quite interesting exchange between my noble friend Lord Dubs and the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington. I think there was rough agreement—if not I am sure I will stand corrected—that the kind of numbers coming over in the back of a lorry are very similar to those coming over in small boats across the channel.
To get the timescale on this, I say that 10 years ago it was 40,000 asylum seekers a year. That is roughly the number now—30,000 on the channel and 10,000 by other means. The difference, as I mentioned, is the potential in the channel for the numbers to go up very fast and make it even more difficult for the Home Office and local government.
The potential is, of course, a matter of speculation. I note the point the noble Lord makes, but up to now there is agreement between him and my noble friend Lord Dubs that the numbers have been roughly the same.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but my understanding is that the number of asylum claims a decade or more ago was something like double what it is now. We are talking not about similar numbers crossing the channel in boats compared to those in the past, but about half as many.
The point I wanted to make was that, when people were coming over in the back of lorries—not all that long ago—they were largely unseen and the Government were not proposing the measures in the Bill. However, when similar numbers started to come over in small boats across the channel, with pictures of them landing on our shores regularly appearing on TV, it became a big political issue for the Home Secretary and the Government, following some rather rash promises they made to their supporters. Consequently, we now see the Bill, which frankly is an attempt to save the political skins of the Home Secretary and the Government. It really has nothing to do with properly trying to solve a problem. We ought to remember what is driving it—the political future of a Home Secretary and Government who made rash promises. Because people are coming over no longer in the backs of lorries, where you do not see them regularly on television every night, but in small boats across the channel, with pictures of them on television, it has become politically very awkward.
The amendments in this group are driven, as has been said, by serious concern over the Government’s track record on accommodation for asylum seekers, not least in connection with Napier barracks, and the provision in Clause 12 for creating asylum accommodation centres. It is worth repeating that last June a court judgment ruled that the accommodation at Napier barracks was inadequate, in that it did not meet the minimum standards required by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Both the process for selecting people to be sent to Napier barracks and the process for monitoring its ongoing suitability while they were there were flawed and unlawful. From January 2021 the residents were given an order not to leave the site until they were permitted to do so. The claimants were unlawfully detained, under both common law and the European Convention on Human Rights.
The report on Napier of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons raised a number of serious concerns, including that the screening of potential residents for physical and mental health problems was “wholly inadequate”, with all of those interviewed reporting feeling depressed and one-third feeling suicidal, and that there was extremely poor communication with those accommodated at Napier. We have heard today from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham that Napier has improved, but it is fair to say that he also said that it is far from being as it should be. It is a legitimate question to ask why the Home Office allowed Napier barracks to get into the position where it required a court judgement, and why we should now accept that the same thing will not happen again.
Clause 12 gives the Government powers to house different groups of asylum seekers in undefined accommodation centres. It appears that these centres would involve congregated living in hostel-type accommodation—the type of accommodation which has been shown to be unsuitable to house people, many of them traumatised, in the asylum system for long periods. As others have said, this move away from housing in the community is likely to impede integration prospects and will surely make access to needed support and services more difficult. I simply ask the Government, and I hope that we get an answer in their response: is it now their policy to move away from housing in the community for asylum seekers?
The Explanatory Notes to the Bill say that the accommodation centres for those at different stages of their asylum claim, including those with “inadmissible” asylum claims, will
“increase efficiencies within the system and increase compliance”,
but no evidence is given to support that assertion. It would be helpful if the Government could provide that evidence in their response to this debate.
While the term accommodation centre is not defined—again, perhaps the Government will do so in their response —there is an implication that the Government are seeking to replicate the kind of inferior accommodation that we have seen at Napier. This more prison-like and isolated accommodation provides a very poor environment for engaging with asylum claims and is more likely to retraumatise extremely vulnerable people and hinder future integration.
As I understand it, last summer the Home Secretary visited the notorious reception centre on the Greek island of Samos, which campaigners have described as “prison-like” and “inhumane”. Is that what the Home Secretary seeks to emulate in her accommodation centres? The Government must know the answer, since I believe I am right in saying that initial submissions for the procurement of these accommodation centres were invited by the end of September last year. The contract is to be delivered in accordance with Part 2 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, and it stated, as I understand it, that it is for housing up to 8,000 people for periods of up to six months. Could the Government say in their response how accountability and standards will be maintained in such asylum accommodation when there is no public access to the contracts? How did the Government decide that commercial confidentiality should take priority over the public interest in knowing about the contracts and transparency?
Since April 2020, the Home Office has been using two large-scale accommodation centres for asylum-seeking men who have arrived in the UK by boat: Napier barracks in Kent and the Penally camp in Wales, which is now closed. A report by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Immigration Detention noted that, although legally speaking these are not detention centres, they none the less replicate
“many of the features found in detained settings—including visible security measures, shared living quarters, reduced levels of privacy, and isolation from the wider community”.
Frankly, that seems wholly inappropriate. No doubt the Government in their response will wish to provide some reassurance on this point.
It would be helpful too if the Government could spell out what freedoms and rights will be restricted or diminished for the occupants in these accommodation centres, and what independent access will be allowed, and to whom, to these centres to ensure there is some regular accountability for conditions and standards.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI have the Clause 15 stand part debate and Amendment 195 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for their support in opposing this clause, and my noble friend Lord Blunkett for his support on Amendment 195.
Clause 15 puts in the Bill an existing immigration law on inadmissibility that makes any asylum claim inadmissible in a number of circumstances, including if the claimant has passed through a safe country or if they have a connection to a safe third country. The result of a finding of inadmissibility is that, unless the Secretary of State decides that there are exceptional circumstances, the claimant will be denied access to the UK’s asylum system for a “reasonable period”, currently defined as six months in Home Office policy, while the UK seeks to transfer them to “any other safe country”. With the huge backlog and delay currently in the system, it is impossible to understand how adding another six months to the asylum process will help an already dysfunctional system.
We believe that, as drafted, Clause 15 should not stand part of the Bill. It is just not acceptable or deliverable in practice. We have concerns on the definitions of “safe third state” and “connection” and the lack of relevant international agreements. Serious concerns have been raised by the UNHCR and the cross-party Joint Committee on Human Rights, among others. There is an absence of adequate safeguards against returning individuals to countries in which they will be denied rights owed to them under the refugee convention.
Safe returns, as part of an international asylum system, are not new and are accepted under agreed conditions. However, this clause does not provide for safe reciprocal return agreements. Even as it stands, the UK Government do not have return agreements with EU member states—namely the “safe third countries” that refugees are most likely to have passed through.
I think it is both. We need to assess people on a case-by-case basis and we need to have return agreements in place. It is not an either/or. I fully acknowledge the need to have return agreements in place. We could not return someone to a country that said it would not accept them; that simply would not be on. That underlines the need to have formal return agreements in place.
Does that mean that the Government accept that Clause 15 is pretty meaningless without such agreements in place? There is no argument about that, then.
No, I do not accept that Clause 15 is meaningless. I am agreeing that we need to have return agreements in place. I do not think anyone would disagree with that point.
If we do not have return agreements in place by the time this clause comes in, we will end up with a lot of people being here for six months while the Government try to find out if they can send them back to another country. If you have no agreements with any other countries, you know before you start that that is a further six months wasted before the Government seek to do anything meaningful. Clearly the clause is meaningless without those agreements in place.
I was going to go on to say that if no agreement is possible within a reasonable period, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK, but I am not disagreeing with the point that return agreements need to be in place. I think I have made that quite clear. Similarly, this is a global challenge, so every nation in the world has to be mindful of the fact that they will be in similar positions as the months and years go on.
I do not know if the noble Lord heard my last point, but we do not necessarily need formal return agreements in place. We can do returns without formal agreements. The point about Dublin is that the formal arrangements that were in place did not necessarily work. It is important to try both—formal and informal, diplomatic and otherwise. It works both ways and, as I said, this is a global challenge. It is not that it is not an EU problem either.
Can I just be clear? Will this then work on the basis of some ad hoc arrangements that will be determined through diplomatic channels, in which other countries take people whom we have declared inadmissible? As I understand it, the number of people we are likely to declare inadmissible will be high. Will all that be done by ad hoc arrangements? Will there not be any agreements and will these countries come forward and say, “Yes, that’s fair enough. You declared the claim inadmissible; of course we will take them back”. Is that how it is going to work?
My Lords, I am saying that there are a number of ways in which we can seek to secure this—formal, informal, diplomatic and otherwise. I am not saying there is a single solution to returns. Therefore, Clause 15 still needs to be in place.
It might not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants who have travelled via or have a connection to a safe country. The provisions that we have drafted already have flexibility that allows us to consider whether an individual has exceptional circumstances to warrant consideration of their asylum claim through the UK asylum system. As I said, this includes best interests. We also have the family reunion provisions that I mentioned earlier so, if individuals have family members in the UK, they should apply under those provisions. The inadmissibility provisions should not be used to circumnavigate those provisions and create a back door to enter the UK by dangerous means.
Furthermore, if an individual has not been recognised as a refugee, but has been provided with a different form of protection from refoulement, that country is safe for them to be removed to. To define a “safe third State” in the way suggested by the amendments ignores the other forms of protection available to individuals, which ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to.
Regarding Amendments 74, 73B, 74A and 75B, the UK should not be obliged to assess the substance of an asylum application where the applicant, due to a connection to a safe third country, can reasonably be expected to seek protection in that third country, or where they have already sought protection in a safe country and have moved on before the outcome of that claim, or where a claim has already been granted or considered and refused. This is a necessary part of achieving the policy aim of deterring those unnecessary and dangerous secondary movements. We are not alone in operating this practice. These amendments ignore the other forms of protection available to individuals that ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to. Amendments 75, 75A, and 76 would significantly undermine the aim of these provisions. The provisions as drafted send that clear message for those who could and should have claimed asylum in another safe country to do so.
I commend the spirit of Amendment 76, which would introduce a new clause to strengthen our inadmissibility provisions and deter irregular entry to the UK, particularly where that means of entry indicates that individuals have travelled to the UK via a safe country. I agree with the premise of this amendment—that access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need and not driven by criminal enterprise. The provisions in the Bill send that clear message. However, this proposed new clause probably goes too far, and would breach our international obligations. It could place individuals in indefinite limbo, which would be against the object and purpose of the refugee convention. The provisions as drafted ensure that individuals are not left in limbo, with their asylum claim neither considered in the UK nor another safe third country. If after a reasonable period it has not been possible to agree removal of the individual to a safe third country, as I said earlier, their asylum claim will be considered in the UK. The introduction of Clauses 14 and 15 as they stand aims to strengthen our position on inadmissibility, further disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys, and encourage them to claim asylum in the first safe country.
I will leave it at that. I hope that noble Lords will be happy not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I apologise but, in the war of attrition that this Bill has become, we seem to have lost any contributions other than from the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Front Bench.
Bearing that in mind, I will add to what my noble friend said rather than repeat anything she said. This clause smacks of the Home Office trying to remove or deport people before they have had a reasonable chance to appeal against a removal or deportation decision. No doubt it is embarrassing when repeated stories emerge of government charter flights taking off almost empty because the courts ruled that the majority of those with a seat on the plane should not be deported, but the answer is not to deport them before they have a reasonable chance to put their case before the courts. The answer is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office to ensure that there is a cast-iron case for deportation that cannot be overturned in the courts at the last minute. Yet again, the Bill focuses on the wrong solution to the problem.
I am sure the Minister will agree that as the Home Office becomes better at making its decisions and more and more appeals are turned down, as opposed to the current situation where the majority are accepted by the tribunals, there will be fewer appeals as lawyers say to their clients “Look at what’s happening now. There’s absolutely no point in appealing.” That is the answer to this problem, not Clauses 22 and 23.
My Lords, the Bill’s system of penalisation includes curtailing appeal rights, as set out in Clauses 22 and 23. These clauses create an expedited appeal route for those who have been served with a priority removal notice and who have provided evidence or a claim after the PRN cut-off date. Most importantly, the right of appeal would be limited to the Upper Tribunal. However, where a person provides a good reason for lateness, they will not be subject to this clause.
Clause 23 wraps certain other appeals a person may have into the expedited appeals process, further restricting appeal rights. The Government say the reason this clause is needed is prevent delaying tactics, remove incentives for late claims and protect the system from abuse. It is probably fair to say that in this Bill, where so much of it is driven by the party-political considerations of the Government, they will be part of the so-called lefty-lawyers amendments—we have one or two others—who seem to have become the bête noire as far as this Government are concerned.
As has been said, I have added my name to the clause stand parts to Clauses 22 and 23, to start, at least, to probe concerns that have been raised about these provisions. The Law Society, the Public Law Project and Justice have recommended that these clauses be removed from the Bill. The UNHCR has raised legal concerns. I suggest that these are not concerns the Government should take lightly.
The UNHCR has said the expedited appeals process, as designed under Clause 22, risks “miscarriages of justice”. Its legal observations agree, as do we, that accelerated processes can be appropriate for
“manifestly unfounded or repeat claims, as long as they are sufficiently flexible and contain adequate safeguards to ensure that they can be determined fairly and justly.”
The UNHCR is, though, entirely clear that appeals
“should not be accelerated … for reasons that are unrelated to their merits.”
The widespread expediting of appeals under these sections is, in the words of the UNHCR, “arbitrary” and
“unrelated to considerations of justice or efficiency.”
It risks people having their human rights violated as a result of a truncated appeals process for asylum claims. The incorrect decision can cost an individual their safety, security and livelihood.
Clause 23 is particularly troubling on the “arbitrary” point as it joins certain pre-existing appeals to the expedited process, even where they pre-date the priority removal notice and were made entirely on time. I ask the Government: what in this clause actually targets the expedited process on vexatious and unmerited claims? That is the reason Ministers give for why the clause is needed but, as far as I can see, it is not what the clause as drafted achieves.
I will make a couple of further points. First, the Public Law Project has said that making a system quicker is patently not the same as making it efficient. In order to be efficient, a system must move both more quickly and more accurately.
My Lords, we support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for the reasons my noble friend Lady Ludford has explained. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, Amendment 94A is not to replace one arbitrary number with another but to probe how much legal aid should be provided in such cases. The Minister described, in a previous group, how cases are of different complexity and how people will be given more time to secure and collate evidence if they are from a vulnerable background. For example, if they come from an LGBTQIA background, they are less likely to be able to acquire evidence quickly, and therefore, the date on the notice they are given would change even during the process. Surely that points to the fact that each and every case is different and will require a different amount of legal aid, depending on how much aid is needed to advise in each particular circumstance. I understand that people who are in this situation do need legal aid, but surely the number of hours should be as case-specific and flexible as the deadline date of any notice for them to submit their evidence.
We too support the amendments we are debating. I suppose, in a sense, this clause is a rare section of the Bill, in that we welcome it but desire it to go much further, as has already been said. Amendment 94A is a probing amendment, but it is a very valid one, because, clearly, the Government have come to the view that the seven hours of support that will be available will be sufficient.
My Lords, for the reasons I explained in a previous group, accelerating appeals processes is not the solution to the last-minute successful appeals against removal or deportation. Rather, it is improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office. Clause 26 is another clause with the wrong solution to the problem, and while Amendments 97 to 99 seek to limit the damage that accelerated appeals might cause, it is more lipstick on more pigs.
To my shame, I am struggling to keep my head above water on this Bill and asking that Clause 27 does not stand part of the Bill does not go far enough. Already the Home Secretary can certify that the decision to remove or deport can be appealed against only once the claimant has been removed or deported, which makes such an appeal more difficult. We should have tabled an amendment to remove that power, let alone Clause 27, which proposes to go one step further, allowing the Secretary of State to certify that a claim cannot be appealed against at all if she thinks it is clearly unfounded. That should be a decision for the tribunal and not the Executive.
In this group, I have the Clause 26 stand part amendment, and Clause 26 requires the Tribunal Procedure Committee to create a fast-track route for certain appeals made from detention. The accelerated process would apply where the Secretary of State “considers” that an appeal brought in relation to the decision would
“likely be disposed of expeditiously.”
Of course, that raises the question of the basis on which the Secretary of State will decide that an appeal brought in relation to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously. Will it be done on a whim? Will it be done on the basis that we need to speed things up and this may be the way to do it? Will they be getting legal advice on whether they should consider that it is likely to be disposed of expeditiously? What happens if they do decide that an appeal brought in relation to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously, and they then find that it cannot be disposed of expeditiously? What is the redress in that situation?
The Explanatory Notes state:
“This clause aims to establish an accelerated route for those appeals made in detention which are considered suitable for a quick decision, to allow appellants to be released or removed more quickly.”
As far as the Explanatory Notes are concerned, it is being done for the highest of motives, and nothing to do with simply trying to speed up the process.
The Law Society, Justice, the UNHCR and the Public Law Project have recommended that the clause be removed from the Bill. They raise that the fast-track system largely replicates, as has been said, a system that was already found to be unlawful in 2015 in a Court of Appeal ruling.
We support the amendments and concerns raised in this group, but I intend to speak only to the amendment in my name, which is to oppose Clause 26 standing part of the Bill. The concerns are very clear. As I said, various organisations have recommended that the clause be removed from the Bill. Their basis for saying so is that it amounts to a new detained fast-track procedure that was found to be unlawful in 2015 due to being “structurally unfair”. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as
“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.
It held that the policy did not sufficiently appreciate
“the problems faced by legal representatives of obtaining instructions from individuals who are in detention”,
nor did it
“adequately take account of the complexity and difficulty of many asylum appeals”
and
“the gravity of the issues that are raised by them”.
Since that ruling, the Tribunal Procedure Committee has repeatedly taken the position not to introduce specific rules in relation to cases where an appellant is detained. In its report of March 2019, the TPC concluded that
“a set of specific rules would not lead to the results sought by the Government. If a set of rules were devised so as to operate fairly, they would not lead to the increased speed and certainty desired.”
Following the clear and somewhat damning court ruling and the position of the TPC, the Government’s response has been, as we now see, to legislate to reintroduce a fast-track procedure by forcing the TPC’s hand and requiring it to create one.
The questions for the Government are fairly simple. What is it about this scheme that is significantly structurally different from the scheme that was found to be legally unsound? What about this scheme will prevent it having a timetable
“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity”?
Why, and on the basis of what evidence, do the Government disagree with the TPC when it says that such rules should not be brought in since they cannot both operate fairly and achieve the desired result of speed?
One wonders whether the Government are risking further judicial proceedings in replicating a scheme that has been found to be unlawful or, indeed, whether they would care too much anyway if there were such future judicial proceedings. I await the Government’s response.
My Lords, I will come to the amendments in a moment but, since we have had a number of references to the old detained fast-track scheme, I will start by saying a word about that.
Obviously we considered carefully the legal challenges to the detained fast-track. We are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. It is right to say that the courts have been clear, in upholding the principle, that an accelerated process for appeals made in detention, operated within certain safeguards, is entirely legal. We believe that the new accelerated detained appeals route will contribute significantly to the timeliness with which appeals can be decided. We will be able to remove swiftly people found not to be eligible to remain while those people with valid claims can be released from detention more quickly, which is also important.
So far as the Tribunal Procedure Committee is concerned, the Bill sets out a clear policy intent but, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, changes to tribunal procedure rules are for the TPC to draft and are subject to its statutory consultation requirements and procedures. We have already begun to engage with the TPC on the elements of the Bill that will require tribunal rules to be made or amended and will continue to do so as the Bill progresses and passes into law.
I turn to the amendments before the Committee. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and, in his absence, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for Amendment 97. I understand the motivation behind it. It is right that appeals made from detention should be dealt with in a timely way so that, as I have said, people are not deprived of their liberty for longer than necessary, but we recognise that not all appeals made from detention will be suitable for the accelerated detained appeals route. So Clause 26 specifies that if a decision is certified as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal, in those circumstances the Secretary of State must consider that any appeal to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously. Importantly, the tribunal may remove a case from the accelerated detained appeals route if that is the only way to ensure that justice can be done in a particular case.
I may not have been listening as attentively as I should have been, but if the Minister has already said it I ask him to repeat the criteria under which the Secretary of State will make the decision that he or she considers that the appeal is likely to be disposed of quickly, which was a question I asked. Another point rises from something he said—that the clause now sets an extremely high bar for an appeal to be released from the scheme, and provides that it can be done only where
“it is the only way to secure that justice is done.”
Am I not right in saying that this has been amended by the Government during the Bill’s passage, and that the original language permitted the release of a case if the tribunal
“is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so”?
Why is it no longer the case that “the interests of justice” are a good enough reason to take action?
I shall reply to the second point first, if I may. The language in Clause 26(5) is essentially the same language as in Clause 23(7).
Is it the same or essentially the same? My understanding, and I may be wrong, is that the Bill now says that
“it is the only way to secure that justice is done”,
where previously it said
“that it is in the interests of justice to do so”.
They may be similar but they are not the same words.
My Lords, I think we are at cross-purposes. I was not saying that the language had not changed; I was saying that the test in Clause 26(5) is the same test as in Clause 23(7). On the question of whether the language has changed, I think the noble Lord is right. I will write to confirm the position—I do not want to get it wrong at the Dispatch Box—but I think there was a change in this clause. The test as set out is entirely proper. Is the only way that justice can be done to take the case out of this tribunal? If that is the only way justice can be done, it ought to be done. If this tribunal therefore, by obvious logic, can deal with the case justly, it should do so.
On the first question, I am not sure how much more I can say. The Secretary of State must consider, in order to certify a case as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal, that any appeal to that decision would be likely to be disposed of expeditiously and that the other conditions are met. In coming to that conclusion, the Secretary of State would obviously have to look at all relevant factors. I am not sure that I can take it much further than that, but let me look again at the noble Lord’s question in Hansard. If I can add anything more, I will do so, so he is in possession of everything I can say before we look at it again—no doubt on Report.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am also very impressed by the moderate contribution from my noble friend Lord Horam on the Australian experience. I have a question, therefore. How do the Australians get round the alleged breach of the refugee convention?
I reiterate what was said a little while ago: this is about asylum, not general immigration policy. There is a considerable difference between the two; that does not always get recognised.
This proposal to offshore asylum claims is inconsistent with the global humanitarian and co-operative principles on which refugee protection is founded. Frankly, if everybody did what we are proposing, there would not be much of the refugee convention left, as I am sure everybody recognises and, in their heart of hearts, knows to be true.
Having made those introductory comments, I will endeavour to be brief. I want to ask one or two questions. The Minister in the Commons said:
“Schedule 3 aims to reduce the draw of the UK by working to make it easier to remove someone to a safe country where their claim will be processed. It amends existing legal frameworks to support our future objective to transfer some asylum claims to a safe third country for processing.”—[Official Report, Commons, Nationality and Borders Bill Committee, 26/10/21; col. 388.]
As I have just indicated, the Minister referred to “some asylum claims” being transferred. Will the Government spell out in their reply what categories or types of asylum claims would be processed in another country, and what categories or types of asylum claims would be processed in this country? In addition, based on claims made over the past three years, what number or percentage of total asylum claims and claimants would be processed in and removed to another country, and what number or percentage of total asylum claims would still be processed in this country? I assume that the Government have figures on that.
Information on the countries we have reached agreement with for offshore processing has been, to say the least, a bit thin on the ground, with Ministers saying to date that they are not prepared to enter into a “running commentary” on the conversations that are taking place. I hope that the Government will be a little more forthcoming today on which specific countries we have reached agreement with, or confidently expect to reach agreement with, and which countries have declined to reach an agreement with us. Also, how many different bilateral negotiations are we currently involved in?
It is unacceptable to be told by the Government that we should agree to a policy and its associated clauses and schedules, which, however repugnant, are meaningless and cannot be implemented unless appropriate agreements are reached with other countries—and then, when asking the Government to give information on whether and what agreements have been concluded, to be told by them that it is none of our business. That is what the Government have been doing to date. We expect better from their response today. However, if the Government are going to continue to play dumb on this issue, perhaps it would be better for them to withdraw Clause 28 and Schedule 3 until such time as they have concluded agreements with other countries, without which the policy cannot be implemented.
The only thing the Government have said is that the model the Home Office intends to proceed with is
“one where individuals would be processed as part of the asylum system of the country that we had an agreement with, rather than people being offshore and processed as part of our asylum system.”
So it is not just offshoring; it is also treating and dealing with people under another country’s asylum system rather than our own. The duty to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers are respected would still fall on the UK; it would be helpful if the Government could confirm that in their response.
Essentially, as has already been said, the UK would be outsourcing its refugee convention obligations, potentially to less wealthy nations. The UNHCR has been highly critical of efforts to offshore asylum processing, noting how
“offshoring of asylum processing often results in the forced transfer of refugees to other countries with inadequate State asylum systems, treatment standards and resources. It can lead to indefinite ‘ware-housing’ of asylum-seekers in isolated places where they are ‘out of sight and out of mind’, exposing them to serious harm. It may also de-humanise asylum-seekers.”
As I have just said, I will not go any further than my honourable friend did in the House of Common, save to say that people who—
I understand that the Minister may be unable to respond immediately to the extremely valid question the right reverend Prelate has asked. Presumably, however, the Government as a whole know the answer to his question. Why does the Minister not agree to write to us and tell us what those answers are?
I have said I will write, but to be more explicit than my honourable friend was in the Commons might risk exploitation on routes taken by children. Therefore, this is as far as I will go today. I will lay out the various safe and legal routes through which children can come to this country and reiterate what my honourable friend said in the House of Commons.
My Lords, taking up what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, just said, my lay and naive understanding of international conventions, such as the refugee convention, is that processes of clarifying or simplifying should involve international co-operation and coming to a global agreement over what those interpretations, clarifications and simplifications are.
Amnesty and Migrant Voice put it differently. They say:
“Clauses 29 to 38 constitute an attempt by the Home Office via legislation to unilaterally re-write the UK’s international refugee law obligations and, in doing so, reverse the decisions of the UK’s highest courts”.
As I have said before in this Committee, international conventions, as far as I am concerned, serve no purpose unless the signatories abide by a common understanding of what the convention means. Any deviation from the settled and accepted interpretation of an international convention must be agreed universally, not unilaterally, as these clauses attempt to do. Any attempt by the Bill effectively to rewrite what it means could result in the UK breaching its international obligations and we believe that none of these clauses should stand part of the Bill.
As has been said, this part of the Bill provides for “interpretation” of the refugee convention. It includes some entirely new provisions and replicates or amends some existing provisions.
On existing provisions, this part of the Bill repeals the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. These regulations transposed a key EU directive on standards for asylum systems, the qualification directive, into UK law. The Bill repeals the regulations and puts versions of the provisions into primary legislation instead.
The UNHCR noted with concern the Government’s approach to interpreting the refugee convention. I will read an extract from its legal observations on the Bill in full. It said:
“We note with concern the Government’s approach to interpreting the Refugee Convention. Any treaty must be ‘interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ In the case of the Refugee Convention, as the UK Supreme Court has noted on more than one occasion, ‘There is no doubt that the Convention should be given a generous and purposive interpretation, bearing in mind its humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in its preamble.’ In addition, the Vienna Convention specified a range of sources that ‘shall be taken into account’ in interpreting a treaty; these all reflect the agreement of the parties, and include other agreements and instruments from the time the treaty was concluded, as well subsequent agreements, State practice and international law. In other words, States cannot, under international law, unilaterally announce their own interpretation of the terms of the agreements they have made with other States. This, too, has been repeatedly recognised by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of the UK.”
I do not want to repeat what has already been said, but I just ask: do the Government agree with that extract from the UNHCR’s legal observations on the Bill? If they do agree with it, do they believe that they are still abiding by it?
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.
The starting point is that we are no longer members of the European Union and, by extension, the Common European Asylum System. In response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, these provisions are not a direct response to the case of AH (Algeria). They are about having an opportunity to define clearly and unscramble refugee convention terms following our exit from the EU. It is right that, at this time of legal change, we take the opportunity to reassess the operation of our asylum system and reconsider our approach not only to fundamental policies but to processes, so that we can create a clearer and more accessible system.
The fact is that the development of the asylum system through international conventions, European law, domestic legislation, Immigration Rules and case law has created a complex legal web that can be difficult to understand and apply; that goes for claimants, decision-makers and the courts. I do not propose to use props—I understand that that is not permitted—but, for my own assistance on a later group, I brought a book called, rather laughingly, The Immigration Law Handbook. We consider it a desirable law reform to define clearly key elements of the refugee convention in UK domestic law. In response to my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, that is exactly what we are doing. We want to make the position clearer for everyone, including decision-makers and the courts.
A lot has been said that touches on the same point but, with great respect, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, perhaps put it most forcefully. She used a number of metaphors. Let me respond to them. This is not about tripping anybody up. It is not a sleight of hand; it is difficult to do one of those on the Floor of your Lordships’ House. This is about bringing clear definitions before Parliament and having them all in one place. The central point is this: there is nothing wrong—indeed, I suggest that there is everything right—with the UK, through this Parliament, interpreting its obligations under the refugee convention. That is entirely lawful. I use “lawful” in both its narrow and wide senses. It is lawful in the sense that it is in accordance with the law; it is also lawful in the broader sense of being in accordance with the political or constitutional principle that we call the rule of law. Further, it is in accordance with the Vienna convention. Everything we are doing complies fully with all our international obligations, including the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. I will come back to the question that the noble Baroness asked me in that regard a little later.
With respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, it is not perverse to use domestic legislation to give effect to and interpret international treaties. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that I am not in the business of appeasing the far right; nor am I in the business of deleting obligations under international law. Many of the definitions, which repay careful reading, are very similar to those already used in the UK—for example, those contained in the 2004 qualification directive, which was transposed into UK law via the 2006 regulations.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his kind words. I assure him that I of course give proper consideration to international reputational impacts, but surely there can be no adverse impact by complying with international law and interpreting treaties in accordance with the Vienna convention.
Respectfully, what I said earlier is that it is not the arbiter of the interpretation of the convention. I do not think that is inconsistent with the point the noble and learned Lord just made.
I was proposing to sit down, after suggesting to the Committee that we should keep these various clauses in the Bill.
Before the noble Lord sits down, I was wondering whether he would explain some of the changes that are being made or cover them in a subsequent letter. As I understand it, Clause 33 replaces Regulation 4 in the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, which is repealed by Clause 29. The wording is largely the same but, as I understand it—and I may be wrong—the existing regulations reference
“protection from persecution or serious harm”,
whereas Clause 33 references only “protection from persecution”. Why has that change to the language been made and what will its practical effects be?
There are changes of language in other areas, such as from a “may” to a “must” in Clause 34. What problem is that intended to solve? Is it not the Government’s intention to explain the reasons for the changes they have made where they have made them?
The “may” and “must” point, to which the noble Lord referred, will come up in a later group because, from memory, there is a specific amendment on it. I was proposing to deal with that when I respond to that amendment. I think we are going to come to the persecution and serious harm point later but, if I am wrong, I will write to the noble Lord and explain it. However, we are coming to “may” and “must” on a later group.
My Lords, I could simply repeat what I said at the conclusion of the last group: the UK should not engage in the unilateral reinterpretation of the refugee convention—not that we are rewriting it, but we are reinterpreting it—but I shall go into a little more detail.
The JCHR, supported by Amnesty and Migrant Voice, believes that the standard of proof as to whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear should remain as “reasonable likelihood”. Amnesty makes the additional point that, as well as raising the standard, Clause 31 makes the decision more complex and the Home Office is getting it wrong too many times already.
We support Amendments 103 and 104 but we also agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that Clause 31 should not stand part of the Bill. Amendment 105, to which I have added my name, attempts to bring the definition of “particular social group” into line with international standards and UK case law. Again, based on the principle that the Bill should not be unilaterally reinterpreting the refugee convention, as I said in the previous group, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that Clause 32 should not stand part of the Bill.
Amendment 111 seeks to prevent the definition of “particularly serious crime” from being reduced to 12 months’ imprisonment. As my noble friend Lady Ludford said, bearing in mind that the Bill attempts to set the maximum penalty for entering the UK without authority at four years’ imprisonment, the two changes could potentially exclude all asylum seekers who do not enter through resettlement schemes. As before, we support the assertion of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that Clause 37 should not stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I will be brief. We support the intentions of the amendments. I thank my noble friends Lord Dubs, Lady Lister of Burtersett and Lady Chakrabarti, who have been leading on these amendments.
I found it interesting to hear from my noble friend Lady Lister that there was no pre-legislative consultation on the issues covered by Amendment 105. Normally if we want changes in the law, we are told that such things have to go through a lengthy and elaborate process, but these seem to have appeared with a certain degree of rapidity.
I really only want to ask the Government a couple of questions. First, in each of the three cases—that is, Clauses 31, 32 and 37—what is the problem that the Government claim to be fixing? What is it, particularly in relation to Clause 31, about the current standard of proof that they believe is failing?
Secondly, could the Government tell us where the pressure has come from to make these changes in the law? Clearly this is not simplification; it is changing the law, so let us not beat around the bush on that. Where has the pressure come from? Has it been intense? From what sources has it come? Who, or what organisation, has been after achieving these particular changes in the law? I do not recall—though I may be wrong—having heard people marching through the streets demanding these changes, which makes one wonder if some requests for change were made at a political fundraising dinner where no one else knew what was going on.
My Lords, I set out why we think this interpretation is correct. I am certainly not saying that we are using this interpretation because it is the EU one; I was referring to the EU to make the point that, with respect, it is very difficult to challenge this as somehow an unfair, unworkable or inapt interpretation when it is actually reflected in the EU jurisprudence. I absolutely take, with respect, the noble Baroness’s comments about the importance of the equality impact assessment for the policies being taken forward through the Bill. The public sector equality duty is not a one-off duty; it is ongoing, and I want to provide reassurance now that we will be monitoring equality impacts as we put the Bill into operation and as we evaluate its measures and, indeed, those in the wider new plan for immigration.
I assure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester that we are well aware of the particular issues facing women and survivors of gender-based persecution and, indeed, the asylum system is sensitive to them. The interview guidance contains clear instructions to interviewers in this area. We seek to offer a safe and supportive environment for individuals to establish their claims. Despite references to the decision of this House in its judicial capacity, in Fornah, those comments were obiter. I underline that there is no authoritative definition in case law of what is a “particular social group”, and that is why it is absolutely right for this Parliament to define it in this clause.
Clause 37 amends the definition of a “particularly serious crime” from one which is punished by imprisonment of two years or more to one which is punished by imprisonment of 12 months or more. To be clear, imprisonment means an immediate custodial sentence—I am not sure that any noble Lord made that point, but it is important. Indeed, it is why I brought the handbook: if you receive a suspended sentence, you are not caught by its provisions—going back to the underlying legislation. Furthermore, not only does it have to be an immediate custodial sentence of 12 months or more but the second limb has to apply—namely, whether the individual is a danger to the community—and that is rebuttable.
We cannot accept Amendment 111 because it would potentially allow dangerous foreign national offenders to remain here, putting the public at risk. If somebody has been sentenced to a year or more in prison, we should not enable them to second guess the verdict of the jury or the decision of the court by allowing them to bring into play again whether they were such an offender. We seek to allow only the second bit of it to be rebuttable; namely, whether they pose the relevant danger.
I think I have answered all the questions that have been asked. On the last point put by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, at the heart of this lies not some dinner party conversation but a lack of clarity in the current case law and standards, which make it harder for decision-makers to make accurate and efficient decisions; that is it.
That may be the case, but all I asked of the Minister was to tell the Committee who has been making representations for these changes.
I have not been here as long as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but, with respect, I do not think it fair to ask me that question as I stand here. The Government receive representations on this issue all the time. One might say that we receive representations from millions and millions of people who voted for this Government at the last election when immigration reform was full square in our manifesto. I say with great respect to noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that we are having a very interesting debate on some important legal points. If he wants to make political points, I am happy to respond in a political context.
Since when has it been making a political point to ask where the pressure has come from to make these changes? Since when has that been a political point?
The pressure has come from the people of the United Kingdom, who elected this Government with an overwhelming majority.
I will very briefly address something that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said about people arriving here directly by aeroplane. As we will see when we get on to the group substituting “arrives in” for “enters”, even if someone came directly by aeroplane, they would not be legally arriving in the United Kingdom. This clause is central to many of the provisions contained in the rest of the Bill. I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his important, detailed and necessary exposition of his reasoning. Despite how long it took, it was absolutely essential.
Clause 36 seeks to redefine and undermine Article 31 of the refugee convention in UK law as a basis for penalties and prosecutions. As we discussed in previous groups, there is an accepted and settled interpretation of Article 31. As Amendments 106 and 107 seek to establish, passing through another country in order to get to the UK is not failing to enter the UK directly or without delay. This should, therefore, not allow the UK to impose penalties or treat asylum seekers less favourably as a result.
Amendment 108 highlights the particular difficulties some asylum seekers could face on account of their protected characteristics. Again, however, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti: there should be no reinterpretation of Article 31, no group 1 and group 2 refugees, and no four-year imprisonment because people had no choice but to travel through other countries to get to the UK, whether the UK considers those third countries safe or not.
Clause 36 is the sand upon which this Bill is built, and it needs to be washed away.
Article 31 of the convention exempts refugees “coming directly from” a country of persecution from being punished on account of their illegal presence in a state. Clause 36 of this Bill is the Government’s attempt to reinterpret what Article 31 means by “coming directly from”, and they are doing it to tighten up the rules to suit their policy that all asylum seekers should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. The clause provides:
“A refugee is not to be taken to have come to the United Kingdom directly from a country where their life or freedom was threatened if, in coming from that country, they stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom, unless they can show that they could not reasonably be expected to have sought protection under the Refugee Convention in that country.”
This is a very broad interpretation which would cover anyone who travels through, or briefly stops in, any safe country on the way to the UK. Frankly, this is in opposition to the established understanding of the convention and, indeed, UK case law. This goes against established interpretations of Article 31 made, as has been said, in the case of Adimi and others. This case sets out that stopping somewhere must be understood as referring to something more than a transitory stop en route to the country of intended sanctuary.
We support the amendments in this group and the opposition to Clause 36 standing part of the Bill. Clause 36 is a supportive measure for Clause 11, being about differential treatment of refugees, which we have discussed at some length. This clause underpins the Government’s plans to base our treatment of refugees on their means of travel, rather than on their need and the realities of the violence or horror they have fled. It is on that basis that we oppose this clause.
If we interpret the convention, which is what we are now being asked to do, in such a way that it is unrecognisable to our international partners and our own courts, at what point can we still be considered to be complying with the convention? We are not opposed to arrangements for the safe return of refugees to another state where they have legitimately spent time and started an asylum application. There are established routes for doing this, as provided for under the Dublin III regulations, of which we ceased to be a part when we left the EU. That is not what this clause provides for, as a number of other noble Lords have made clear in their contributions.
On the basis that this clause unilaterally attempts to redraw what the convention means by stopping in a safe country, I ask the Government to think again, without any great hope of getting a favourable response.
My Lords, our Amendment 119E, seeks to put a global resettlement scheme on a statutory footing. In that sense, it is very similar to the new Dubs scheme, if I can call it that, for unaccompanied children. I also speak to Amendment 116, which was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate.
The Government’s stated intention through this Bill is to prevent people risking their lives taking dangerous journeys to the UK, but instead of talking about differential treatment, inadmissible claims, pushbacks, offshoring, reinterpreting the convention and other measures, we should be talking about safe and legal routes. If a person fleeing conflict, torture and persecution has a safe route by which to get here, they will take it. If they do not, they will take other, dangerous routes. Suggesting that other measures have or may have any deterrent effect is frankly not an answer when there is no international evidence, and the Home Office has recognised that asylum seekers often have no choice in how they travel and face exploitation by organised crime groups. If the Government want people to travel here by safe, alternative routes and break the business model of the people smugglers, their efforts need to be focused on providing those routes, which the three amendments I refer to do.
I will concentrate the rest of my remarks, which will be brief, on resettlement schemes. The argument for the Dubs scheme has been made before and was made very powerfully again tonight by my noble friend Lord Dubs. Initially, the Dubs scheme, passed into law by a Conservative Government, was envisaged to take 3,000 unaccompanied children who had fled unimaginable horrors and were travelling or in refugee camps on their own. It has been said tonight that, in reality, the scheme was capped at 480 children, and fewer children were actually resettled before the scheme was closed down. Where is the Government’s commitment to taking unaccompanied children who are in desperate need of safety? Does the Minister accept that, without this route, some children will have turned, and will continue to turn, to people smugglers instead?
Our earlier Amendment 114, Amendment 116 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, and my Amendment 119E all deal with a global resettlement scheme. Amendment 119E seeks to put the UK resettlement scheme on a statutory footing and would require the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the operation of the scheme and the number of people resettled under it. For now, it does not include a target, unlike Amendment 116. As the Opposition, we have raised concerns that the 5,000 people due to be resettled under the Afghan resettlement scheme may not be enough of a commitment in response to that crisis.
So there are questions about how a target would be designed, but the aim is the same as Amendment 116. It is, first, to create an active global resettlement scheme that can respond flexibly and at speed to needs, as they emerge; and, secondly, to ensure some kind of mechanism to hold the Government to account. This is to ensure the scheme is actually resettling people at the rates and numbers expected and is not simply announced in a press release then left to lie dormant or underperform.
Announcing the UK resettlement scheme, which was launched after the closure of the Syrian scheme, the then Home Secretary confirmed that
“the UK plans to resettle in the region of 5,000 of the world’s most vulnerable refugees in the first year of the new scheme”.
Since that announcement, as I understand it, the scheme has settled less than a fifth of that number each year, with an annual average of 770 people. How do the Government expect the other 4,230 of the world’s most vulnerable refugees each year to travel here? Do they expect them to go elsewhere or not go at all?
If we share the aim of ensuring people who are fleeing the worst can do so safely—and I am sure everyone in this House does—we need to work together to provide a reliable, active, responsive route to do so. Currently, the Bill is silent on this and, in answer to questions from the Commons, the Government gave no details about their plans. I hope the Minister is able to give more detail tonight.
The Government should, in this Bill or alongside it, commit to an expanded proactive resettlement route. The mechanism for doing that is provided in both Amendments 116 and 119E.
My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in what has been quite a full debate. Amendment 115 seeks to introduce a safe route for unaccompanied children from countries in Europe to come to the UK. We all want to stop dangerous journeys in small boats and avoid a repeat of the distressing events of 24 November last year in the channel, where 27 people tragically lost their lives. We all know that children were impacted by that event, and I am sure that every noble Lord in this Committee is concerned about vulnerable children.
I think we can also agree that European countries are safe countries. Together, EU countries operate the Common European Asylum System, which is a framework of rules and procedures based on the full and inclusive application of the refugee convention. Its aim is to ensure the fair and humane treatment of applicants for international protection. There is no need for an unaccompanied child in a European state who needs protection to make a perilous onward journey to the UK, because that protection is already available to them.
I therefore argue that these proposed clauses would put vulnerable children in more danger by encouraging them to make dangerous journeys from outside Europe into Europe to seek to benefit from the scheme. They would create a new pull factor, motivating people to again entrust themselves to smugglers. While they might avoid the danger of a small boat, we know that journeys over land—for example, in the back of lorries—can be equally perilous. We cannot and must not do anything that supports the trafficker’s model. I am resolute on that. I know that is not what the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, intends, but it is the reality of this proposed new clause.
The UK does its fair share for unaccompanied children. According to the latest published statistics, there were 4,070 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children being cared for in England. In 2019, the UK had the most asylum applications from unaccompanied children of all EU+ countries and had the second highest in 2020. The Government met their one-off commitment to transfer 480 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children —we did meet that commitment—from Europe to the UK under Section 67 of the Immigration Act 2016, which is referred to as the Dubs scheme. This is essentially that scheme again in all but name.
The clause also fails to take into account the reality for unaccompanied children entering the UK domestic system right now. I am very grateful to the many local authorities who have been able to provide support on a voluntary basis to the national transfer scheme, introduced to enable the transfer of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children from one local authority to another, which aims to deliver a fairer distribution of unaccompanied children across the UK. Due to the extremely high intake of unaccompanied children over recent months, particularly as a result of small boat crossings on the south coast, and pressures of entry on local authorities, the national transfer scheme has been unable to keep up with demand. The unprecedented demand resulted in the exceptional decision to accommodate new arrivals of unaccompanied children in hotels to ensure that their immediate safeguarding and welfare needs could be met, pending their transfer to longer-term care placements. It is not ideal and it is not in the interests of those children who are currently waiting in hotels for local authority placements to agree to this clause. We need to prioritise finding long-term placements for those children already in the UK and ensure that we have a sustainable transfer scheme to deliver long-term solutions.
I must pick up the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, on one point. He talked about 1,500 places being pledged. He will know that, over the years, I have constantly challenged local authorities to come forward to the Home Office if they have places, and those numbers have not been forthcoming. Unfortunately, places pledged to a charity do not necessarily translate into places. His comments do not reflect our experience on the ground, given that we are using hotels for some newly arrived UASCs while urgently seeking care placements. The Government have mandated the national transfer scheme to ensure that we prioritise care placements for those unaccompanied asylum-seeking children who are in the UK.
Turning to Amendment 116, I understand the desire that Members of this Committee have to establish a minimum number of resettled refugees each year. Our current schemes are non-legislative, operating outside of the Immigration Rules and on a discretionary basis. Operating in this way has seen us resettle over 26,000 vulnerable people since 2015.
It is important that we take into account our capacity in the UK to support people, so that we can continue to resettle people safely and provide appropriate access to healthcare, education, housing, et cetera, without adding to the significant pressure that those services are already under. This amendment seeks to bring in a statutory minimum of 10,000 refugees each year within one month of Royal Assent. We already have over 12,000 refugees and people at risk who we are in the process of resettling permanently and integrating into society.
I turn now to Amendments 118 to 119B. I assure the Committee of my support for the humanitarian intentions behind these proposals and sympathise with the many people across the world who currently face danger and persecution. For resettlement, the UK works according to the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, which means that we do not take into consideration the ethno-religious origin of people requiring citizenship, as we resettle solely on the basis of need. That is not to in any way decry what the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has said, but we settle on the basis of need, as identified by the UNHCR.
I am very sorry to the noble Baroness; that was not my intention at all and I am very sorry she feels that way. It is absolutely not the case. All I can say is that we have now reached the time we are at. We must try to make progress; we must all work together to do that. I say on the record that I am very sorry to the noble Baroness—it is nothing to do with her and I am very sorry she feels that way.
There are only five days scheduled in Committee on this Bill. This is by no means the longest Committee stage for a piece of legislation. Perhaps there ought to be a reflection on the Government’s side as to whether they did not seriously underestimate the number of days that were needed for Committee stage.
I will say from these Benches that, if the Government insist on bringing forward such controversial legislation, they cannot expect anything other than a number of noble Lords wanting to speak on these issues. If it were uncontroversial, noble Lords would not be queuing up to speak on the Bill. This is why we are in this situation, and we need more time so that we can adequately scrutinise this very controversial Bill.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, explained, these amendments seek to ensure that the mental and medical needs of asylum seekers are addressed. They would require the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice to ensure that
“the United Kingdom’s obligations under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966”
are fulfilled in relation to asylum seekers.
Whether their claims are deemed to have merit or not, asylum seekers are entitled to be looked after while they are in the United Kingdom. For the reasons that the noble Baroness explained, they are likely to be more vulnerable and in need of greater care than the general population. God forbid we engage in offshoring —either exporting refugees to a third country while they application for asylum in the UK is considered or, even worse, doing so for them to pursue their asylum claim in that country. That should not absolve the United Kingdom of its obligations under the 1966 covenant. We support these amendments.
The two amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would require the Secretary of State, first, to lay before Parliament codes of practice providing for guidance to assess the mental and physical health needs of any asylum seeker; and, secondly, to consult before preparing those codes.
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which reference has been made, provides that states recognise
“the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”
I am sure that the Committee is grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, for the opportunity to have this debate because the trauma experienced by people who have suffered violence, persecution, forced displacement and separation from loved ones has been a focal point of our debates on many clauses in this Bill. Recent experience has shown, to put it bluntly, a distinct failure by the Home Office to screen or properly care for the physical and mental health of people who arrive to seek asylum.
The figures showed, I think, that one in five people placed in Napier barracks had to be transferred out owing to vulnerabilities that the department should have screened for and responded to; these included people who had been trafficked and tortured. The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration said:
“There was inadequate support for people who had self-harmed.”
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lord, I strongly support the basic thrust of Amendment 183 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I do so having regard to the negative effects of the system of tier 1 visas, both in our own country and overseas. The first undesirable effect of this dirty money is on the economy of London; in particular, the cost of housing being pushed up to unaffordable levels by foreign so-called businessmen seeking secure investments, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. My noble friend Lord Faulks identified a lack of progress by the Government in this area.
I accept that there may be some business opportunities in meeting the demand and providing both professional and artisan services to tier 1 investors. Personally, I would not want to earn my living from dirty money, in effect stolen from people of overseas countries. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, explained this with his usual skill. Not only do some of these tier 1 investors illegally suck money and assets out of their own country to enjoy in ours but they take full advantage of our well-developed system of justice and the rule of law—JROL. This means that they can keep their assets secure and also enjoy a reliable means of passing them on to their offspring. Of course, they have no incentive to seek to implement any decent form of JROL in their own country because it is not in their interests to do so. The lack of JROL and the negative effects of corruption mean that countries such as Russia, and many developing countries, will never be able to achieve their full economic potential.
For instance, defence equipment apart, I cannot think of any manufactured product that comes from Russia. No wonder it has an economy the size of Italy’s, despite its natural wealth, larger, if declining, population, and vast space. It is not for us to interfere with the internal arrangements of other sovereign states, but if we denied oligarchs, the super-rich and despots of countries without JROL the safety and advantages of a safe landing and base in UK and other similar countries, they might be more inclined to seek to put their own countries in order. This would have enormous economic benefits and other benefits for the people of those countries.
I turn to the problem of Ukraine. It is clear that any invasion by Russia will result in severe sanctions against Putin’s regime, including Russian tier 1 investors in the UK who are judged to be close to Putin. I am confident that the Government are planning such potential sanctions as we speak, although the likely targets will already have taken precautionary action. However, if our worst fears are realised, we should go much further and hit all Russian tier 1 investors, whether they are President Putin’s friend or foe. That way, they might be more inclined to get off their posteriors and put pressure on Putin and maybe even think about improving JROL and press freedom in Russia. Furthermore, this course of action would not adversely affect the inhabitants of Russia.
We cannot continue to allow filthy, dirty money to come into the UK via the tier 1 investor visa route, because it pollutes our economy, damages the economies of other countries, and seriously erodes our soft power position.
Amendment 174 would return rights to people in the UK who are on the overseas domestic workers visa—primarily, the right to change their employer and renew their visa for a period of not less than 12 months. The then coalition Government changed the visa regime in April 2012, so that workers and their immigration status are tied to their original employer, and their visa cannot be renewed past six months. That has caused real concern that the working people involved are tied into situations of abuse and slavery. The cross-party Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, as it then was, said that the changes to the regime had
“unintentionally strengthened the hand of the slave master against the victim of slavery.”
It concluded:
“Tying migrant domestic workers to their employer institutionalises their abuse; it is slavery, and is therefore incongruous with our aim to act decisively to protect the victims of modern slavery.”
In 2015, the independent Ewins review called for all overseas domestic workers to be given the right to change employer and apply for further leave to remain in the UK for up to 30 months. It found that the terms of the domestic worker visa were
“incompatible with the … protection of overseas domestic workers’ fundamental rights while in the UK”.
Unfortunately, the Government disagreed with the recommendation; instead, they made more limited changes to the Immigration Rules, with the effect that all domestic workers can change employer during their six-month visa, but only those who are found to be victims of trafficking or modern slavery can change employer and apply to stay for longer in the UK. The problems with this limited approach were set out in the Ewins report: they failed to provide an immediate escape route out of abuse; the six-month limit makes it difficult for people to find other employment; and the national referral mechanism requirement means that a person must have taken the step to report, and met an evidential burden to prove, that they are victim of slavery, which, frankly, many are too frightened to do. We certainly support the thrust of Amendment 174.
Amendment 181 would exempt international volunteers from paying the immigration health surcharge, and I await the Government’s response with interest. I would like to know what consideration the Government have given to extending the exemption, and have the Government met charities which have raised concerns about its effect on volunteering in particular sectors, especially social care?
Amendment 183, about which most has been said—with some feeling and fervour—would require the Government to suspend the tier 1 investor visa route, known as “golden visas”, until the review into those visas has been made public. In its 2020 Russia report, the Intelligence and Security Committee recommended that a key measure for
“disrupting the threat posed by illicit Russian financial activity”
is an
“overhaul of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa programme—there needs to be a more robust approach”.
In March 2018, the Government announced a review of golden visas issued between 2008 and 2015. This followed revelations that the Home Office and banks had made next to no diligence checks in that period. According to a freedom of information request in June 2021, the Home Office is reviewing 6,312 golden visas, half of all such visas ever issued, for a range of possible national security threats. Almost four years since the Government announced the review, and as has been said more than once this evening, the findings have not yet been reported.
Many of those who received visas during this period will have been eligible to apply for British citizenship over the past seven years, and it is surely essential that there is full transparency about the findings of the review, including: a detailed breakdown of how many visas have been revoked; how many cases have been referred to law enforcement; and how many applications for renewal or citizenship have been denied.
In the Commons last month, Stephen Kinnock MP asked the following question:
“Six months ago, the Government said that they were finalising their report into how more than 700 Russian millionaires were fast-tracked for British residency via their so-called golden visa scheme. Can the Foreign Secretary tell the House when that long-overdue report will be published?”
The Foreign Secretary’s reply was:
“We are reviewing the tier 1 visas that were granted before 5 April. I am sure the Home Secretary will have more to say about that in due course.”—[Official Report, Commons, 31/1/22; col. 60.]
Therefore, I ask the Minister, speaking on behalf of the Government: does the Home Secretary have “more to say” about this tonight? We are all waiting to hear why it has taken so long to produce this report. In the absence of a credible explanation, one can conclude only that there are some embarrassing reasons that have led the Government to delay producing this report.
Between what the noble Lord has just outlined and what the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has just said, that probably explains both ends of the system in different ways.
On visa extensions, although I fully support the noble Baroness’s determination to improve protections for migrant domestic workers, rewinding the clock and reinstating the features of a route that were deliberately removed almost a decade ago is not the answer—probably, in part, for some of the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, outlines.
The overseas domestic worker visa caters specifically for groups of visitors who by definition stay for short periods. That visa allows private domestic staff to accompany their employer where that employer enters the UK as a visitor and where they intend to leave together. Approximately 20,000 visas are issued every year on that basis, and the vast majority leave well within the validity of their visa.
The amendment seeks to reintroduce features of the route which were removed for good reason. We must not forget that abuse existed before 2012 and be mindful that allowing overseas domestic workers to stay could inadvertently create a fresh cohort of recruits for traffickers. We must avoid a route that could be used by criminals to entice victims to come to the UK.
Noble Lords have referred to the report, commissioned by the Government, by James Ewins QC, which, crucially, did not establish a direct link between the length of stay and the likelihood of exploitation. Years later, this picture remains. There is no greater risk if a domestic worker is here for two weeks or 12 months, so increasing the length of time that they can stay will not afford them greater protection from being exploited.
I think that the noble Baroness and I share the same objective of the delivery of a safe and appropriate system for a very vulnerable category of workers. However, for all the reasons that I have given, we do not agree on the means of achieving it.
I am aware of comparisons that have been made between those employed in the healthcare sector who are exempt from the health charge and those who come to the UK as volunteers. However, there are very clear and important distinctions between workers and volunteers on the charity worker visa. The route should not be used to fill gaps in the labour market, even on a temporary basis. To answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, yes, we have been engaging with charities. The Government think that appropriate immigration concessions are already in place, which support volunteers on this route. The charity worker visa offers a low fee, compared to other work routes, and sponsors pay a lower licence fee, in recognition of their charitable status. While the charity worker route is the main route for volunteers, it is not the only way in which volunteers can be recruited to support the work of charities.
I note the concern of the noble Lord, Lord German, that the immigration health charge might deter volunteers from coming to the UK. Published figures indicate that, for the years immediately preceding the pandemic—clearly the years after that are very unusual—the number of charity visas granted remained broadly consistent. This indicates that volunteers are not being deterred by having to pay the health charge.
The NHS must continue to be properly funded and the immigration health charge plays an important role in that. It has generated almost £2 billion for the NHS since its inception, and it ensures that temporary migrants who come to the UK for more than six months make a direct contribution to the comprehensive range of NHS services available to them during their stay. Those who pay the charge can, from their point of arrival in the UK, use the NHS in broadly the same way as a permanent resident, without having to make any prior tax or national insurance contributions. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord German, will not press his amendment.
On Amendment 183, I hear noble Lords loud and clear. I recall the debate that my noble friend Lord Faulks and I had during the Criminal Finances Bill. I also completely acknowledge the point about those relying on funds that have been illegitimately acquired. It is because of those concerns that we have committed to a review of visas issued under the route between 2008 and 2015. We are finalising the review, if noble Lords can be patient, and we will publish it in due course—I knew there would be a sigh from behind me and in front of me when I said that.
Four years is quite a long time to produce a report. Why has it taken four years to date and why are the Government still in a position where they cannot really give any proper indication of when it will be produced? “In due course” is the cop-out expression for a Government who do not really know.
My Lords, I will have to think of a new phrase: perhaps “shortly”.
My Lords, the short point that my noble friend Lord Paddick wanted to make, as he generally does, in leaving out Clause 74(3) is that, again, this seems to conflate immigration and terrorism. It extends powers to question people about involvement in terrorism at the border and applies the powers to people being detained under a provision of the immigration Acts, and so on. The objection runs like a thread through the Bill, to so many points. Immigration and terrorism are not the same. Not all terrorists are immigrants. Terrorists who have succeeded in the UK have been British, and if the Government allow, in legislation, the bias implied by the conflation of these two, no wonder others display the same bias. I beg to move.
This clause would extend the use of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act to people who have been detained under the immigration Acts and transported outside of a port or border area. Schedule 7 can be an important tool in the prevention of terrorism, but it has had a chequered past at times. It has been improved in recent years by the work of independent reviewers of terrorism legislation, two of whom we are now fortunate to have as Members of this House.
I have three or four questions for the Government on the provisions of Clause 74. Have the Government consulted on the extension of the power? Has the change been requested and, if so, by whom or by what body? Can the Minister give more detail on the scale of the problem this is designed to address? How many individuals are officers unable to stop and question under the current arrangements? How was the period of five days arrived at? For those who travel through conventional routes, does not the power have to be used pretty much immediately, in which case five days is a considerable extension? Finally, the powers apply provided an officer “believes” that the person arrived at sea, was apprehended within 24 hours of arrival, and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. What will that “belief” that the officer is required to have be based on? It would be helpful if the Government could give some responses to those questions.
I thank both Members of the Committee for their remarks. Schedule 7 examinations have been instrumental in securing evidence to convict terrorists, yielding intelligence to detect terrorist threats and supporting the disruption or deterrence of terrorist activity. Currently, officers may exercise Schedule 7 powers only when an individual is located within a port or border area as defined in the Act. Clause 74 will provide an added layer of protection to the existing processes in place for dealing with those who arrive irregularly by sea in the UK. I think that goes some way to answering the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—they are arriving irregularly outside of ports. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, has stated:
“In principle, people arriving irregularly in the United Kingdom should be liable to counter-terrorism examination as much as those arriving at sea ports and airports.”
This clause ensures that, for those arriving irregularly by sea, such as via illegal channel crossings, this will continue be the case.
There are several reasons why those who engage in illegal channel crossings can be moved to a different location from their place of arrival very quickly after arriving. They can range from weight of numbers to the need to move the vulnerable or those in need of medical attention to more appropriate facilities. It is impractical and inhumane to keep large groups of people port side in order to give counterterrorism police an appropriate opportunity to exercise their current powers under Schedule 7.
I reassure noble Lords who tabled the amendment that this is by no means an attempt to treat all migrants arriving in this manner as terrorists, or to stop and examine large numbers of people away from ports and borders. Schedule 7 is not designed and cannot be used as a universal screening mechanism, and Clause 74 has been deliberately drawn to provide an appropriate time window for counterterrorism police to exercise their powers under Schedule 7.
To remove the effect of Clause 74 would impact our ability to determine whether those who are entering the UK in this way are involved in terrorism, impacting our national security. It would continue a scenario where those who arrive in the UK by conventional means are subject to powers to determine involvement in terrorist activity, whereas those who have arrived irregularly by sea, and about whom we have very little documented information, may not be.
I cannot answer precisely who has been consulted on this, other than the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and obviously the counterterrorism police will have a keen interest in how this debate develops. To answer on the numbers, this concerns those arriving irregularly by sea, outside established ports, under the existing rules. I could not tell you how many there are. The other questions impinge on operational matters, on which I am not qualified to comment. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, to assist the House to move swiftly on to votes, we on these Benches will try to restrict ourselves to one speaker who will speak for us all, unless we are provoked by subsequent contributions. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that it is rather unfair to the Minister—particularly as he is a new Minister—to ask him to deviate from his script. However, we agree with my noble friend Lady Ludford and with all other noble Lords.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett has set out the background to and purpose of this amendment. As we know, currently only those born on the islands and the first generation born in exile have the right to British Overseas Territories citizenship and, therefore, to British citizenship. As a result, families have been broken up and communities divided. Some members have access to citizenship rights while others do not.
In the Commons, as has already been commented on, the Government accepted, on 4 November last year during the Committee stage of the Bill, that the Chagossians presented a unique case. By Report Stage in the following month, however, the Government seem to have decided that the Chagossians were no longer a unique case, because going down the road proposed,
“would undermine a long-standing principle of British nationality law … under which nationality or entitlement to nationality is not passed on to the second and subsequent generations born and settled outside the UK and its territories”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/21; col. 258.]
The reason that the small number of Chagossians in question do not meet this condition is because they are descended from people who were evicted against their will from a British overseas territory. That is why they are unique, as the Government have already conceded. They did not leave of their own free will to settle elsewhere: they were kicked out—forcibly evicted. There would be no precedent set by agreeing to this amendment. In effect, the Government are using, in support of their case to deny these Chagossians the right to British citizenship, the cause of the very injustice which this amendment seeks to address. We support this amendment, and it would appear that we are far from the only ones in this House to do so.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for meeting my noble friend Lady Williams last week and for the opportunity to hear further about the issues impacting the Chagossian community. As has been said previously, both in Committee and when my noble friend met the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, last week, and as noted by my noble friend Lady Altmann, the Government empathise and sympathise with the Chagossians about how they were treated in the 1960s and 1970s.
It is, however, important to clarify who this amendment seeks to assist. It is not those Chagossians who were of the generations born on the British Indian Ocean Territory, as they have always been British nationals and have been automatically considered both British Overseas Territories citizens and British citizens since 2002. Similarly, it is not their children, the first generation of Chagossians born outside of British territory, who are also both automatically British Overseas Territories citizens and British citizens. It is also not those in the first generation of Chagossians born outside of British territory, who, as the Chagossian community highlights, have missed out on rights to British nationality due to historical legislative unfairness, and this Bill already seeks to rectify that issue.
This amendment is limited to those in the second and successive generations of Chagossians born outside of British territory who, like all children of British nationals by descent, face a different route to British nationality. For this generation, if they wish to acquire British nationality, it is right that they must establish a close, continuing connection with either the UK or a British overseas territory by lawfully residing and settling there, although I recognise that since the 1970s, it has not been possible to establish such a link to the British Indian Ocean Territory. This must be in line with either the UK’s or an overseas territory’s Immigration Rules. This has also been the case with Hong Kong British Nationals Overseas, who do not have a right of abode in British territory and must complete a period of residence in the UK before acquiring the permanent residence status that is required in order to naturalise as a British citizen.
The points raised by the descendants of Chagossians, who are members of the second generation born outside British territory and who are now seeking to settle in the UK under the Immigration Rules, are often very complex. As the Minister for Safe and Legal Migration has stated in the House of Commons, the Home Office is keen to consider what more we could do to support those families seeking to settle here under the current system.
The Home Office is actively engaging with the Chagossian community to identify practical proposals that would support the second generation born outside British territory in navigating the system. In addition, the Home Office is discussing with the FCDO how the £40 million Chagos support fund, referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, could be used to deliver further support for Chagossians seeking to settle here under the Immigration Rules. Those discussions are current and ongoing, and I had some this morning.
As the Government have consistently stated, allowing entitlements to—
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, has reached agreement with the Government. I wish I could say the same.
I will speak to Amendment 21 to Clause 10, which requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that a child aged between five and 17 cannot reasonably acquire another nationality in order to be registered under the stateless child provisions. The Government allege that parents were deliberately not registering the birth of their children and acquiring citizenship of the parents’ home country to wrongly claim British citizenship, by falsely claiming their children were stateless. We believe this clause should be taken out of the Bill.
In Committee the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, provided, at column 548, figures of five cases of this route being used in 2010, which peaked at 1,775 cases in 2018. The Minister concluded “I rest my case”, but this raised further questions: for example, were those 1,775 cases in 2018 the number of stateless children born in the UK who were granted British citizenship in total, legitimately or otherwise, or the number where parents had deliberately chosen not to register their child’s birth to take advantage of the system? The Minister assumed it was the latter but said that she would write, and she did so on Friday.
In Committee, I specifically asked the noble Baroness whether the 1,700 odd cases in 2017 that she referred to were the total number of stateless children granted UK citizenship, or the number of cases of deliberate abuse of the system that Clause 10 purports to tackle. The Minister replied:
“I assume … the latter, but I will write to the noble Lord with the details of the figures I have here”.—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 550.]
However, when the Minister wrote, the figures in the letter do not equate to those she gave from the Dispatch Box. Neither is there an answer to the question: of those cases, how many were a deliberate—or even a suspected—case of abuse of the system?
The letter goes on to talk about the sampling of over 200 stateless child applications received between 2015-2021, which on my calculations is about 1% of the applications received. It goes on to say that, in 96% of the sample, the parents were Indian or Sri Lankan and then:
“90% of Indian and Sri Lankan parents had been able to take steps to contact the High Commission to obtain a letter to show their child was in fact not a citizen of that country”
and, in brackets:
“(We do not have data on how many actually attempted to register the birth)”.
In summary, we have numbers in the letter that appear to be at odds with what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box, we have a sample of only 1% of all applications and we do not know how that sample was selected. In the sample, in 90% of cases the relevant high commission confirmed the child was stateless and the Government have no data to show whether parents attempted to register the birth at the time. Despite this, the letter concludes:
“This demonstrates a clear and conscious decision by the parents not to acquire a nationality for their child for at least 5 years”.
That conclusion cannot possibly, in good faith, be drawn from the facts, whichever sets of facts presented by the Government that the House chooses to believe—either the facts the Minister gave from the Dispatch Box or the alternative facts contained in the all-Peers letter.
If the Government cannot now determine how many cases are genuine and how many are the result of attempting to inappropriately acquire British citizenship, on what basis will the Secretary of State exercise her powers under Clause 10 to decide whether the child in question is able to acquire another nationality? Specifically, if, as in 90% of cases in the sample, the relevant high commission confirms the child is stateless, on what basis will the Home Secretary decide not to believe the high commission, decide that the child could acquire the relevant nationality and deny the child British citizenship? What happens to the child denied nationality by the relevant high commission and by the Secretary of State?
If, as the Government suggest, this route is being used inappropriately by parents to acquire British citizenship for themselves, the Government should bring forward legislation to prevent parents acquiring British citizenship through their children by this route, rather than making innocent children, born in the UK, stateless. I was hoping the Minister would write in good time, with a clear and unambiguous answer to the questions I put to her in Committee on 27 January. She did not and she has not.
I am reluctantly left with two options: either the Minister addresses the apparent discrepancies and presents the House with a clear case for Clause 10 now or he agrees to take this away and address our concerns at Third Reading—otherwise I will be forced to conclude that the case is not made for Clause 10 and will divide the House. We cannot leave UK-born children stateless at the whim of the Home Secretary. Clause 10 should be taken out of the Bill.
My Lords, I will not say anything on the amendment addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, in view of what he has indicated about the progress that has been made between Committee and Report, although of course we will listen very closely to what the Minister has to say and indeed read what is in the Minister’s letter, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, referred to.
As has been said, Clause 10 is intended to disentitle stateless children in the UK from their statutory right to British citizenship. Under our international obligations we have safeguards that mean that a child who was born in the UK and has always been stateless can acquire British citizenship after five years of residing here. Through Clause 10 the Government propose to restrict and amend that obligation. Clause 10 requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied a child was unable to acquire another nationality before being permitted to register as a British citizen. That, of course, creates an additional—and one would probably feel unjustified—hurdle to stateless children’s registration as British citizens which could be difficult for a child or those acting on their behalf to prove.
There is also the issue that the uncertainty created by Clause 10 could be highly damaging to a child’s personal development and their feelings of security and belonging, due to this exclusion and potential alienation being inflicted in their formative years. Indeed, the question was asked in Committee: how can this be in the best interests of the child?
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made reference to the figures which were given by the Government in their response. He also referred to the question which was asked as to whether the figure of 1,175 was the number of stateless children born in the UK who were granted British citizenship, or whether it was the number of cases where parents deliberately chose not to register their child’s birth in order to take advantage of the system. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to the letter that was received on behalf of the Government, and to the apparent discrepancies between what was said in Committee and the figures which appear in the letter.
I wait with interest to hear the response of the Government, because we, too, asked the question about what the case for Clause 10 was. I think I am right in saying—I recall it being said—that the Government felt that the figures that they gave at Committee were a fairly conclusive argument in favour of abuse of the system, and therefore that this was the case for Clause 10. On the basis of the letter which has been received, and the comments which have been made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, there is some doubt as to whether the case has been made.
The noble Lord has asked a number of questions and asked for a number of assurances. The answers he receives will clearly influence the decision he then makes in respect of Clause 10 standing part, and will influence what we, as the Official Opposition, do if the matter is put to a vote.
My Lords, although at first glance it would seem reasonable for the Home Office not to have to give notice to a terrorist overseas that they were being deprived of their British citizenship, it of course means that there is no effective right to appeal, as the subject would be unaware of the decision. We have also seen cases where the Home Office could have given notice, even to the last known address or by email, and chose not to. The increase in the use of this power needs to be reversed.
The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, seek to introduce a range of judicial oversights, would remove the subjective element of the decision and tighten the grounds on which a deprivation of citizenship order may be made without notice to the person concerned. Others would strengthen the test for making such a decision; ensure, if the person concerned contacts the Home Office, that he is told what has happened and that he has a right of appeal; and allow the Special Immigration Appeals Tribunal to oversee such decisions. Any time limit on appeal would start when the subject is notified.
I understand that a government Minister would have signed these amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, had they not been out of time—the deadline for tabling government amendments being several days before that for other amendments. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for the time, effort and ingenuity he has brought to bear in bringing forward such a comprehensive suite of amendments that could arguably halt, if not throw into reverse, the current practice by the Home Office increasingly to use this power to deprive citizenship without notice. We wholeheartedly support these amendments.
However, were the House to divide on taking Clause 9 out of the Bill, we would, along with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, support that Division. At the end of the day, the Government should be taking ownership of the actions of British citizens, including terrorists overseas, ensuring, wherever possible, that they are extradited to the UK to stand trial, rather than depriving them of British citizenship, preventing them returning to the UK, and making them some other country’s problem, whether with notice or not. However, while therefore agreeing with much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, has said, we are unable to go so far as to support her amendment, as there could be exceptional cases where, as a last resort, citizenship should be removed.
I think I am right in saying that until the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, spoke, all those speakers who had spoken against Clause 9 were noble Baronesses. I am not sure what the significance of that is, and I do not say that in any wrong way; I think it is a great credit to them. Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I hope they will forgive me for intruding on their space.
Although we appreciate that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, are certainly an improvement on Clause 9—I, too, would like to express my thanks to the noble Lord for all the work I know he has put in—as it stands, we do not feel the case has been made by the Government for why Clause 9, and deprivation of nationality without prior notice to the individual concerned, are actually necessary. That is what we are talking about: not whether nationality should be removed but whether it should be possible for the Secretary of State to remove it without prior notice.
Currently, under the British Nationality Act 1981, an individual must be notified if they are to be deprived of their citizenship. So what is the problem when, for example, the present rules already allow for citizenship deprivation letters to be delivered to an individual’s last known address, or to a parent, or to a parent’s last known address? I say that against the background that the Government have already said there have been no cases where the requirement to give notice has stopped—prior to the recent High Court decision—a deprivation of citizenship order coming into being. It is also against a background where the number of people deprived of their citizenship has risen considerably over the last 12 years—an upward trend with a peak, I think, in 2017.
One thing we can be sure of is that if the Government have the powers under Clause 9, even with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, we will see deprivation of citizenship orders being made without prior notice, because if it is not the Government’s intention to take advantage of the powers to deprive a person of their citizenship without prior notice, why are they seeking them? Against that scenario, we need to be satisfied that there is a real and overriding necessity for this additional power now, when it has not been deemed necessary before, beyond it being perhaps more convenient or helpful on occasions not to have to go through the procedure of giving prior notice to the individual concerned. The lack of a compelling and meaningful government response on that point, and there having been no cases where the requirement to give notice has stopped the deprivation of citizenship order coming into being, is significant.
If a proven national security need does arise for the power not to have to give prior notice of a deprivation of citizenship notice coming into being, the Government can get such necessary legislation through Parliament, as we know, with remarkable speed. In the absence of such a case being made for this power—and the lack of it clearly has not caused a serious difficulty until now—we should be wary of agreeing to Clause 9, even as amended, remaining in the Bill.
I suggest that the situation has not been helped by finding out from information in the Court of Appeal decision that in the D4 case the Home Secretary
“argued that notification had been given to D4 … by simply placing a note on her Home Office file, relying on regulations introduced without parliamentary approval.”
That ought to make us very wary about giving the Secretary of State and the Home Office the additional powers in Clause 9, now that we know how existing statutory powers and requirements on notification have been interpreted and implemented in the D4 case.
The consequences of the clause are likely to be felt most—but certainly not exclusively, as the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, said—by those from ethnic minority backgrounds. It is no surprise that it is in this area that the Bill, particularly Clause 9, has caused most concern about how the new powers might be applied and interpreted and what the evidence is that they are needed now and have not been needed before.
It is unlawful to deprive someone of their citizenship and leave them stateless. Even so, the Home Office is still on record that British citizenship
“is a privilege, not a right”.
Yet without citizenship people do not have rights, and we are talking about significant rights. It has been estimated that nearly 6 million people in England and Wales could be affected, and that under this proposal two in five British citizens from an ethnic minority background are eligible to be deprived of their citizenship without being told, since they have, or may have, other citizenships available to them—I think that was the basis of the comment about two classes of citizenship—compared with one in 20 characterised as white. That is a sobering consideration for the Government, or should be, when looking at the merits or demerits of Clause 9, not least in the light of how the Secretary of State and the Home Office in the D4 case interpreted and implemented the requirement to give prior notice under the law as it exists at present. What would be tried if Clause 9, even as amended by the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gave the power not to have to give prior notice?
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford raised the issue of trust, or rather the lack of it, among society groups. The Government ought to reflect very carefully on that in considering whether Clause 9, even as amended, should remain in the Bill. I have to say that as far as we are concerned the case has not been made for Clause 9, even as amended, to remain in the Bill, and we shall certainly be looking for an opportunity to vote against it.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, especially the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who has tabled these amendments; I am very grateful for his expertise in this matter. I also acknowledge Amendment 20, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and Amendment 22, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.
The House will recall that we debated this matter at length in Committee. I say now, as I said then, that inaccurate and irresponsible media reporting continues to fuel fear and concern about how Clause 9 is to operate. I will repeat what I said then, starting with my noble friend Lady Verma: the deprivation power itself is not altered. Clause 9 does not alter the reasons why a person is to be deprived of British citizenship and we are not stripping millions of their citizenship.
To answer the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and others, Clause 9 does not target dual nationals, those from ethnic minorities or particular faiths, or indeed women and girls; there is no secret decision-making, and law-abiding people have nothing to fear from Clause 9. It is simply about the mechanics of how a deprivation decision are conveyed to the individual concerned.
My Lords, those who heard the Minister outline the position of the Government earlier today with regard to the plight of Ukrainians must have been dismayed by his response. None the less, I make no personal criticism of him at all.
Some of us have in mind the cavalier attitude of Mr Johnson to treaties that he recently signed, such as the Northern Ireland protocol. When I consider many of the suggestions which come out of the Home Office as to how to deter migrants from coming to this country, I have no confidence that this Government will always comply with the letter—far less the spirit—of the convention. I do not suppose that the new clause proposed by Amendment 24 will be a complete remedy. However, it is a very useful statement of an important principle, and I shall vote for it.
Not surprisingly, there is nothing I could add to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said. We shall certainly be supporting this amendment if it ends up being put to a vote.
My Lords, from these Benches, I told the noble and learned Lord that we will be supporting him. He said that that was the right answer.
With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, under the rules of Report stage, one is allowed to speak only once during the debate.
My Lords, as has been said, Clause 11 is about differential treatment of recognised refugees. There is the distinction that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to between refugees and immigration generally. We believe that Clause 11 contravenes the 1951 refugee convention: it sets a dangerous precedent by creating a two-tier system—group 1 refugees and group 2 refugees—and, frankly, it is also inhumane.
Under the Bill, the Home Secretary will be given sweeping powers to decide asylum cases based on how someone arrives in this country and their mode of transport, not on the strength of their claim, contrary to the 1951 refugee convention, of which Britain was a founding member. The different ways those two groups could be treated is not limited in any way by the Bill, although Clause 11 provides examples: those who travel via a third country, who do not have documents or who did not claim asylum immediately will routinely be designated as group 2 refugees.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise very briefly to offer Green support for this amendment and to address one specific point and one specific question. The right reverend Prelate, in introducing this, set out how little we know about what is proposed of these accommodation centres, and how much we know of their horrors. In Committee, the Minister and I discussed a particular horror with which I had personal contact during the Covid pandemic.
I also note that there is a continuing situation where the High Court ruled that people in hotels and other accommodation are entitled to £8 a week to meet some of their basic needs. This includes being able to afford a bus fare to attend an interview, or to buy some basic hygiene products. Looking at the list of people who the right reverend Prelate has included in this amendment, it is worth a question here. Imagine being a parent of a child and not ever being able to buy any sort of treat for your child. If the child really wanted some little piece of food, the parent would not be able to buy it. Instead, they would get only what is provided in the three meals a day in the canteen.
I know that we are still waiting for a description of what these accommodation centres are like. Can the Minister confirm, following the High Court ruling, that there will be at least a very small basic payment for people in the accommodation centres so that they can have some kind of choice and some kind of life?
My Lords, I will certainly wait with interest to hear the response that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham gets to this amendment, because, if I understood him correctly, he said that it is the same amendment he tabled before. I understand that he asked for information and assurances about accommodation centres in Committee, and it is because he did not get them either in Committee or since then—he has had nothing in writing; presumably he asked the questions quite clearly in Committee about what he wanted—that he has had to table this amendment today, and will table it again, seeking to exclude vulnerable groups from the accommodation centres.
I hope that in their response the Government will explain why it has been so difficult to give the right reverend Prelate the answers to the questions he raised last time seeking information and assurances in respect of these accommodation centres. I do not understand what the difficulty can be since, presumably, in putting forward that there will be accommodation centres, the Government have some idea of what they will and will not provide and what they will and will not be like, and are in a position to give assurances when they are sought.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken to this amendment. I just say from the outset that the Bill does not actually create accommodation centres—that was done back in 2005—but when we have more detail on the accommodation centres, I will be very happy to provide it to the right reverend Prelate, including any detail about design.
On the question of how long someone might stay there, the usual time is about six months. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that they have to be humane, welcoming environments.
On the question of who we might accommodate in the centres, as I said before, we will accommodate people only after an individual assessment. There are no current plans to use the centres to house families beyond this. The centres will be used to accommodate only those who require support because they would otherwise be destitute, so those who obtain accommodation with friends or family are not affected by the measure. It is to prevent people becoming destitute.
The provision has nothing to do with unaccompanied minors; it is about adults in the asylum system and their dependants who are accommodated by the Home Office under the powers in the Immigration Act. Unaccompanied minors are not accommodated under these powers.
On the point about certain individuals not being suitable for these centres, there are no plans to accommodate in this type of accommodation asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers who are not destitute. As I have said, those who can obtain accommodation with friends and family will be unaffected. Individuals will have opportunities to disclose information as supporting evidence as to why they should not be housed in accommodation centres, and we do not have current plans to use centres to accommodate those with dependent children.
I may have said this before, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has just mentioned it: it is not possible to completely rule out placing those with children in accommodation centres in the future, because if there are no available flats or houses to house them in, it might be a better option for them, depending on their situation, and certainly better than using hotels.
On whether they are detention centres, the answer is no. I do not think the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was asking whether they were detention centres; she was making the point that they are not detention centres, and that is correct: people are free to move about. Individuals applying for support because they are destitute will naturally be expected to live there because they have nowhere else, but, as I have said, they can leave the centres at any time they wish because they have obtained alternative accommodation.
I had just asked a question of the Box about payment, and I am going to double-check whether I have the answer. Here it is: facilities at the accommodation include catering, therefore individuals will not require cash for food during their stay, but cash might be provided for other essential items not provided in kind. I hope that with that, the right reverend Prelate will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Clause 15 puts into the Bill an existing immigration law on inadmissibility that makes any asylum claim inadmissible in a number of circumstances, including if the claimant has passed through, or has a connection to, a safe third country. The result of a finding of inadmissibility is that, unless the Secretary of State decides that there are exceptional circumstances, the claimant will be denied access to the UK’s asylum system for a “reasonable period”, currently defined as six months in Home Office policy, while the UK seeks to transfer them to “any other safe country”. With the huge backlog and delay currently in the system, it is impossible to understand how adding another six months to the asylum process will help an already dysfunctional system.
Clause 15 as it stands is neither acceptable nor deliverable in practice. We also have concerns on the definitions of “safe third state” and “connection”, and on the lack of relevant international agreements. Serious concerns have been raised by the UNHCR and the cross-party Joint Committee on Human Rights, among others. There is an absence of adequate safeguards against returning individuals to countries to which they will be denied rights owed to them under the refugee convention.
Safe returns as part of an international asylum system are not new and are accepted under agreed conditions, but this clause does not provide for safe reciprocal return agreements. Even as it stands, the Government do not have returns agreements with EU member states, namely the safe third countries that refugees are most likely to have passed through. Instead, this provides for cases to be stalled and unilaterally declared inadmissible, without a requirement for a relevant returns agreement but on the basis of dubious connections to another state, where a person may or may not be able to enter an asylum system. We are talking here about asylum, not general immigration.
The clause provides that a claim is inadmissible if a person has a connection to a third state. It then clarifies that a connection can be made with a state that a person had never been to. It further clarifies that a person can be removed to a completely different state other than the one that they have been deemed to have a connection with. The UNHCR has described this as
“a significant and highly problematic departure from international practice and UK case law.”
I will endeavour to be brief. I appreciate that this is Report and not a rerun of Committee, but in Committee the Government accepted on more than one occasion that we needed to have returns agreements in place. There was no direct answer given to a question asked by my noble friend Lord Dubs, who sought confirmation that to date we do not have an agreement with any country for the return of the people whom we are now talking about. This is about asylum. The answer no doubt is that we just do not have any such agreements. Despite saying in Committee on more than one occasion that we needed formal returns agreements in place to return people, the Government later went on to claim that we do not necessarily need formal return agreements in place, and that we could have
“formal and informal, diplomatic and otherwise.”—[Official Report, 3/2/22; col. 1106.]
The reality is that we need formal return agreements in a situation where the number of people the Government intend to deem inadmissible will be high. In that situation, you cannot address this through unstated, unclear, ill-defined, informal ad hoc arrangements, as the Government seek to suggest. This clause is clearly based on the presumption that the Government can persuade other countries who already take greater asylum responsibility than the UK to accept people from the UK and agree to relieve us of a substantial part of the modest responsibility we currently take.
The reality of Clause 15 is that no such agreements are likely to materialise in the foreseeable future, as was clear from the debate in Committee. Dublin III has now gone and not been replaced. That is why my Amendment 32 provides the much-needed safeguards that Clause 15 can come into force only if the UK has safe returns agreements with third states and not before. I beg to move.
My Lords, Clause 15 allows the Secretary of State to declare an asylum claim inadmissible if the person has a connection with a “safe third state”. Because it is a declaration of inadmissibility, there is no appeal other than judicial review, and there is nothing to stop the Home Secretary from removing the person to another third state with which they have no connection in the meantime, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained. A connection to a safe third state includes where a claim for asylum in that country has been refused, a country where they could have claimed asylum but failed to do so, or where the Home Secretary thinks that it would have been reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum in another country.
Given what I have already stated about an indefinite state of limbo, surely the Minister’s words would have some sort of weight. I have also said that any decision to declare a claim inadmissible and remove an individual will be subject to standard principles of public law, and that we will consider their obligation within a reasonable time.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for their contributions to the debate. I also thank the Minister for her response. I appreciate that there are two amendments down: one takes the clause out and the other seeks to amend the clause to provide for safe return agreements to be put in place. I appreciate that other noble Lords can ask for a vote, but I will not be seeking a vote on taking the clause out. Instead, I intend to seek a vote on the amendment we have put down.
My Lords, I want to briefly restate what I said in Committee. Not only is the Home Office seeking the power to remove an asylum seeker to any country while their claim is being considered but it is seeking to remove them to a country and then tell that country, “If you think they are a refugee, you take them; they’re not our problem any more”.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has just said, according to Amnesty and Migrant Voice, offshoring by Australia effectively excluded legal, judicial, medical, humanitarian and media scrutiny. It has cost it over half a billion pounds a year, according to the British Red Cross, and failed to stop those seeking asylum, including by boat. Evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place from independent academics supports these conclusions. The UNHCR has
“voiced its profound concerns about such practices which have ‘caused extensive, unavoidable suffering for far too long’, left people “languishing in unacceptable circumstances’”
and denied them “common decency”.
I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Horam, says: the Government should be looking at every option, but surely they should be taking into consideration the evidence that I have just cited and considered any counterevidence. Then, having worked out its practicalities and decided whether it is to go ahead, they should bring forward legislation—not bring forward legislation and then decide whether they are going to use it.
Clause 28 and Schedule 3, as drafted, should not be part of the Bill. We support all the amendments in this group that seek to prevent anyone being removed from the UK while their asylum claim is being considered, particularly Amendment 35, to which I have added my name.
Amendments 35 and 37 would remove the subsections of Clause 28 and Schedule 3 which allow for offshoring. That is, as we know, the power to export offshore any person in the UK who is seeking asylum without first considering their claim. Let us just repeat: we are talking here about asylum, not general immigration policy.
Clause 28 amends the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which states that a person seeking asylum cannot be removed from the UK while their asylum claim is being processed. The Bill withdraws that right by allowing the transfer of any asylum seeker to any country listed by the Government. The Government have been somewhat reticent in telling us about the progress of any negotiations they are having with any other countries on this score. I think that is where we hear the term about the Government not wishing to give a running commentary; in other words, “We’re going to keep you in Parliament in the dark about what is going on”.
The Bill is silent on what, if any, legal obligations the UK would consider itself to have towards asylum seekers once their asylum claims have been dealt with. This issue was raised again by my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett and others. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has commented that the provisions of the Bill allow the Government to externalise their obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers to other countries with only minimal human rights safeguards, an issue to which my noble friend Lord Cashman referred. The only thing the Government have said is that the model the Home Office intends to proceed with is
“one where individuals would be processed as part of the asylum system of the country that we had an agreement with, rather than people being offshore and processed as part of our asylum system.”
It is not just offshoring—it is also treating and dealing with people under another country’s asylum system rather than ours.
My Lords, I spoke at some length on the legal aspects of this group of clauses in Committee and, having had the advantage of being able to indicate an overall view of them in the newspapers earlier in the week, I really do not want to try the patience of the House, and I certainly do not want to weaken rather than strengthen the number of compelling arguments that have already been heard on them in the past few minutes.
However, they are such objectionable clauses that I cannot simply remain silent. I do not criticise the Minister for this, I am a great admirer of his, but on Monday, at 5.49 pm, in the middle of the debate, we finally got a seven-page letter that sought to argue—if only I were still a judge and could deal with the arguments conclusively by rejecting them—the Government’s case for redefining the requirements of the convention.
When we come to Clause 31, the Minister, very fairly, recognises that it would overturn 25 years—a quarter of a century—of settled jurisprudence of the clearest authorities in this country. That is how we have been dealing with it for 25 years. He does not say that it was a wrong approach to the convention; all he argues—as I say, I do not accept it—is that what they are doing provides another possible interpretation of the convention. Is this really the moment at which to reject our established jurisprudence and substitute for it what may or may not—I would say not—be an arguable alternative view of the whole of this.
Clause 31 rejects what has been accepted as the holistic approach: you look at fundamental question arising under Article 1(A) of the convention in the round, you take all circumstances into consideration and you apply the standard of proof of reasonable likelihood—because heaven knows that is the standard which you should be using. You do not carve it up and create endless difficulties, and then say, “Well, actually, part of it has got to be on the balance of probabilities”.
I have quoted this before, and I will end with this: Hugo Storey, a recently retired judge of the Upper Tribunal who has spent his life dealing with these sorts of cases and is the immediate past president of the International Association of Refugee and Migration Judges, said that this clause would produce prodigious litigation and endless problems, and that it is not compliant with the way that the UNHCR wants Clause 31 to be applied. I will not go into the arguments on Clauses 32, 34 and 36—they are all objectionable, for the reasons already given. We really must vote down as many of these as we can.
My Lords, I will be very brief. I wish to say that we agree with the amendments in this group, which seek to address the issue that the Bill is seeking to change existing, long-standing definitions and, frankly, make things worse and harder for many of those who would be involved in, for example, seeking asylum. We support the intention of these amendments, and I will leave it at that.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will be brief. It has been said that Amendment 70A would reinstate the rights that migrant domestic workers had under the pre-2012 visa regime. It would allow workers to change employer and, crucially, renew their visa—a fundamental right that they do not currently have, leaving them either trapped with abusive employers or destitute and at risk of further harm.
We have reservations about proposed subsections (2)(c) and (d). Although they reflect the situation of a person who applied for a domestic worker visa before 2012, these proposals may be slightly more permissive for people who are currently here, for example, on a skilled worker visa.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, said, if the Government are not prepared to accept this amendment in full, they should at least agree to take it away and come back with a proposal to protect these workers, in particular by allowing them to change employer and renew their visa.
Amendment 75 would require the Government to publish their review of Tier 1 investor visas granted between June 2008 and April 2015 before any replacement scheme can be brought into operation. As has been said, in March 2018 the Government announced a review of golden visas issued between 2008 and 2015, following revelations that the Home Office and banks had made next to no diligence checks in that period. As I understand it, according to a freedom of information request in June last year, the Home Office is reviewing some 6,312 golden visas— half of all such visas ever issued—for a range of possible national security threats. We now know, almost four years after the Government announced the review, that the findings have not been reported, and, subject to what we may hear in response, no satisfactory explanation has been given for this unacceptable delay. One is left to one’s own conclusions as to why the Government might be so interested in delaying the outcome of that review.
I note what the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, said had happened since 2015, and the reference to money from—I think—Chinese sources, and to a Labour MP. I would not like to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, who referred to party politics, but my recollection is that there was also a suggestion that a Mr Ed Davey may have received some money from the Chinese. I assume that, unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, just did not recall that, any more than Mr Ed Davey did.
I listened with interest to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I think she said she had dreamt that there had been a general election—but she did not tell us what the result had been, and whether I would be happy with it or disappointed.
In conclusion, I hope we will hear something positive on Amendment 70A. The right reverend Prelate, the Bishop of Bristol, went through all the arguments for the amendment and the reasons it is needed, and I have no intention of repeating them. I also hope we hear something positive and more specific on Amendment 75. I asked the Government in Committee about the timescale. I said, “Is it this year?” and the reply was:
“Yes, I hope that it will be this year”.—[Official Report, 10/2/22; col.1924]
Bearing in mind that a few weeks have passed since Committee, perhaps the Minister will be able to say something firmer and more specific than, “Yes, I hope that it will be this year.”
We also think that the provisions in Clauses 76 and 77 are unnecessary and in fact ought to be removed from the Bill.
The Bill requires the Tribunal Procedure Committee to give the tribunals the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for “improper, unreasonable or negligent” behaviour. There are issues about wasted costs. As has been said, this change could certainly affect the willingness of lawyers and solicitors to take on difficult cases for fear of risking personal financial liability. As far as we are concerned, the immigration tribunals already have all the case management costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure.
In Committee I asked how many of the cases dealt with by the immigration tribunal over the last 12 months fall within the category of unreasonable behaviour, for which the Government would expect these costs orders measures to be activated. I thank the Minister for his letter in response, which states in the second paragraph that:
“It is not, however, possible to say how many cases dealt with by the Tribunal within this period fell within the category of unreasonable behaviour. This is because we do not hold data on the number of cases where behaviour or circumstances could have been considered unreasonable, but where no costs order was sought, or considered by the tribunal of its own initiative.”
I have to say that that letter simply confirms that the Government have no hard evidence to support their assertion that the provisions of Clauses 76 and 77 are necessary, because of the reasons set out in the letter, which I quoted and which indicate a certain paucity of hard evidence to support the Government’s position.
I will be interested in the Government’s reply to see whether they challenge my interpretation of the content of the letter of 3 March which the Minister was good enough to send to me. However, certainly, in the absence of a government response saying that their letter did provide the hard evidence to back up their view that the provisions of Clauses 76 and 77 are necessary, I must say that it is very difficult to understand why they are bringing forward the provisions outlined in those clauses.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Baroness McIntosh of Pickering for explaining her amendment. Government Amendment 73 is a technical amendment to Clause 77. It does not change the policy; it makes a minor revision to the drafting of subsection (1) of Clause 77 to ensure that it matches the rest of the clause in only making provision in relation to the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. This change will prevent any uncertainty arising about the jurisdictions in which this clause should be applied, and it gives the Tribunal Procedure Committee complete clarity about how to approach drafting the rules to enact these measures.
I turn now to Amendments 72 and 73. The Government are committed to making the immigration and asylum system more efficient, while also maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. To achieve this, we need all representatives involved in these proceedings—whether they are acting for the appellant or for the Home Office—to play their part in ensuring that appeals run smoothly. Representatives do not just have a duty to act in the best interests of their client; they also owe duties to the courts and to the public interest, which include acting with integrity, upholding the rule of law and supporting the proper administration of justice. We are aware that there are concerns about the behaviour of some representatives in immigration proceedings, which can waste judicial and tribunal resource and lead to delays in the tribunal process. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours which have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. These have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules through, for example, abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications. As with the current costs orders regime, the policy will apply equally to the representatives of both parties—in answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. This will include the Home Secretary when represented by presenting officers. To further ensure fairness, the paying party will be able to make representations before any order is made, and the tribunal retains absolute discretion as to whether a charge should be made in each case.
As I explained in Committee, tribunals can currently make wasted and unreasonable costs orders which relate to the legal costs of the parties. However, these mechanisms are generally only considered at the request of the other party and are infrequently employed. Clause 76 creates a new power for tribunals to order a party to pay an amount which represents a portion of the tribunal’s costs which have been wasted as a direct result of that party acting unreasonably, improperly or negligently. This power applies across all tribunal jurisdictions and is subject to the Tribunal Procedure Committee making rules for its application in a particular tribunal. It will allow the tribunal to make an order in relation to wasted tribunal resources in the same types of circumstances which would currently warrant a wasted or unreasonable costs order. An order can be made against “relevant participants”: this means legal and other representatives exercising rights of audience, and the Secretary of State where they are a party and do not have legal representatives. I hope that this goes some way to reassuring my noble friend.
To encourage increased consideration of whether to make costs orders, Clause 77 provides a duty on the Tribunal Procedure Committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. This will lead to judges more regularly considering whether to make a wasted costs order, an unreasonable costs order or a tribunal costs order under the new Clause 76 provision. This will ensure that circumstances and behaviours which have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. While the requirement in Clause 77 is for the TPC to make rules in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber, it is at the committee’s discretion to create similar rules in other jurisdictions if it considers it appropriate. Specifically, Clause 77 requires procedural rules which identify circumstances or behaviours which, absent of reasonable explanation, the tribunal will treat as warranting consideration of the making of a costs order. The rules thereby introduce a presumption that requires the representative, or other relevant party responsible for such circumstances or behaviour, to explain themselves and why such a costs order should not be made. This will ensure the regular consideration of costs orders by the tribunal. More importantly, however, the tribunal will retain absolute discretion as to whether to make an order in all cases.
Noble Lords have asked whether this will mean fewer representatives willing to take on immigration work. The Government think it right that representatives should explain themselves if they are responsible for circumstances to be set out in the rules as warranting consideration of a costs order. However, where there is a reasonable explanation, no order would be expected. The tribunal continues to have full discretion as to whether to make the order. Therefore, these changes should not impact legal representatives who fulfil their duties to the court, remain committed to their work and ensure justice for their clients.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked why these changes are being made in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber and not in other jurisdictions. Obviously, the Nationality and Borders Bill as whole is focused on reforming the asylum system. Clauses 76 and 77 are part of a programme of reforms designed to streamline immigration and asylum appeals. There has been judicial concern, and a recognition that a problem exists with the behaviour of some legal representatives and other relevant parties in immigration proceedings. It is at the discretion of the Tribunal Procedure Committee to create similar rules in other jurisdictions if it considers it appropriate.
For the reasons I have outlined, I hope that my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering feels able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I give the Liberal Democrats’ support for this amendment and pay tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Patten of Barnes, for their repeated campaigns to support Hong Kong and in particular young Hong Kongers.
It is perhaps right that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, is on the Front Bench when, for once, we are saying, “Actually, you’ve got this right”. So often, we seem to give her such a hard time, although we say, “We think that she is probably with us but having to give the government line”. The fact that the Government have now acknowledged the importance of supporting young Hong Kongers is very welcome. Alongside the privy counsellorship, we are very keen to welcome that.
I am afraid that these Benches disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington—actually, this is the right thing to do. It is not about to open the floodgates to mass immigration, but it does give an opportunity for young Hong Kongers who feel the need to come here to do so.
I express our wholehearted support for the amendment and the extension of the BNO scheme to young Hong Kongers. I congratulate all noble Lords around this Chamber, from all parties and no party, who have campaigned on this issue. I thank the Government for their decision and the progress that has been made, which has led to agreement all around the House.
I thank noble Lords and pay particular tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, who tirelessly campaigns on this and other issues. I thank him for his kind words, and I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate on Amendment 76.
We recognise that the BNO route is creating unfair outcomes for the families of BNO status holders, with some children able to access the route independently because they were old enough to be registered for BNO status, while their younger siblings, aged between 18 and 24, are unable to do so. That is why, on 24 February, the Government announced a change to the BNO route to enable individuals aged 18 or over who were born on or after 1 July 1997 and who have at least one BNO parent to apply to the route independently of their parents.
The policy change addresses the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and other Members of both Houses. It will ensure that we are addressing potentially unfair outcomes for families of BNO status holders and ensure that the UK meets its ongoing commitment to BNO status holders.
In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I say that there are of course other routes for those who are not eligible under this particular scheme. We intend to lay the changes to the Immigration Rules in September, and they are expected to take effect from October.
In the light of these assurances, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, obviously, these Benches wholeheartedly support Amendment 79 for the reasons explained.
I have some sympathy for the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, as far as Amendment 82 is concerned. One would hope that there would be cross-departmental working on trade agreements so that there would be no agreement to any visa deal without Home Office agreement. However, bearing in mind the apparent disagreement between the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence over the role of the MoD in the channel in relation to migrant crossings, I am not reassured. Perhaps the Minister can reassure the House on this issue.
I too will be brief. I was anticipating a more favourable response to Amendment 79 and the issue of the QR code. I was certainly taken aback to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Oates, that the Home Office has now rejected the bar code. I accept that the Government did not give any specific commitment in relation to the QR code when we discussed the matter in Committee, other than to say that they would take the matter back to the Home Office.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI apologise—the House will have to put up with me rather than my noble friend Lord Coaker. I note what the Minister said about reserved matters and the approach and feelings of the devolved Administrations. One only hopes that these matters can be resolved in a satisfactory way acceptable to all parties.
I will speak to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Coaker. All the amendments in this group are tidying-up amendments, and most are consequential on changes this House saw fit to make to the Bill on Report. We on these Benches are content with all the amendments proposed today.
Amendments 1 to 6 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker make minor, technical changes to what is now Clause 44 of the Bill. On Report this was Clause 39, and your Lordships’ House voted to remove a subsection that provided for a new offence of arrival into the UK. These amendments are consequential on that change.
Amendment 8, also in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker, is consequential on the decision of this House to remove Clause 58 from the Bill on Report. Clause 58 would have provided for the credibility of trafficking victims to be damaged by late compliance with an appropriate trafficking notice. This tidying-up amendment removes a now-defunct reference to Clause 58, which is no longer part of the Bill.
Amendment 10, also in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker, removes a subsection from Clause 70 on child victims of modern slavery. This clause was added to the Bill on Report as an amendment led by my noble friend Lord Coaker. The subsection being removed disapplied what was then Clause 64 to child victims. However, Clause 64 was then removed and replaced by a subsequent amendment. Amendment 10 removes the reference to Clause 64, which no longer exists in its original form.
I have also been asked to introduce Amendment 9 as the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, is unable to be here; he sends his sincere apologies to the House. As a result of the number of votes on Part 5 of the Bill, the noble Lord has tabled this amendment to ensure that there is consistency across the Bill. Like other amendments, Amendment 9 is a tidying-up amendment and does not introduce new issues of principle. It simply removes the previous definition of “public order”, which is no longer used due to changes made to Clause 67 agreed by your Lordships on Report. The noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, has asked me to put on record his thanks to all those who last week supported his amendment to give support and leave to remain to confirmed victims of modern slavery. He also made the point, with which I and others strongly agree, that we regret Part 5 being included in the Bill at all, but the Bill still leaves this House with significant improvements, which we hope the other place will support.
Finally, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, for her amendments, which are consequential on amendments that these Benches supported on Report. I also welcome Amendment 11 from the Minister, which reflects the decision of this House to remove Clause 9 from the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, if I may, I will just detain the House a little longer to mark the end of this Bill’s passage through your Lordships’ House. It has been very wide-ranging. It has had five thorough days in Committee and three days on Report. During this time, in response to the terrible situation in Ukraine, we have added important measures to the Bill which introduce new visa penalty provisions for countries posing a risk to international peace and security. I was very pleased to see support for these measures across the House.
I was not so pleased, though, by the removal of some important measures, the aim of which was to find a long-term solution to long-term problems in our asylum and illegal migration systems which successive Governments have faced over decades. Those amendments will now be considered in the other place and no doubt we will debate them soon.
Notwithstanding that, I want to take this opportunity to recognise the contributions of those who have supported me in steering the Bill through the House. In particular, I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton, my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and my commendable noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom for sharing the load from the Front Bench.
I also express my thanks to all noble Lords who stayed up very late on a number of occasions and thank Members on the Front Bench opposite for their engagement on the Bill, accepting that there have been some areas of disagreement between us. I thank in particular—because I cannot thank everyone—the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Rosser, Lord Paddick and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
I also extend my thanks to officials at the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, as well as lawyers and analysts, not only in those two departments but across government. On my behalf and my ministerial colleagues’, I extend our thanks and appreciation to all of them for their professionalism over the past months. I also thank the teams in our respective private offices.
There should be no doubt about the merits of the Bill’s ultimate objectives, namely to increase the fairness and efficacy of our system, to deter illegal entry into the UK and to remove more easily from the UK those with no right to be here. That is what the British people voted for, it is what the British people expect and it is what the Government are trying and determined to deliver. In view of the crises now confronting our world, it is surely now more important than ever that the Bill moves swiftly to become law. On that note, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
I will not detain the House for long but I think that I ought to say a few words; first, to thank the Minister, in particular, for the number of meetings that I know she has held—I suspect that she has lost count—and her willingness to respond in writing and in some detail on issues that have been raised, which is certainly appreciated. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Sharpe of Epsom. I will not comment too much about people who stayed late since I probably fell rather short in that regard myself. Some of us made sure we left in time to get last trains, but not everybody did.
Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in Motion C the Government claim that the provisions in Part 2 are compliant with the UN refugee convention—in which case, they should have no objection to Motion C1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which puts such an assertion on the face of the Bill to ensure that the courts are able to test Part 2 against the UN refugee convention. In accordance with the Government’s claim in Motion C, the Government must surely agree with Motion D1 that, whether the Government categorise a refugee as falling into group 1 or group 2, as set out in the Bill, none the less, both groups must be given all the rights under the UN refugee convention. If not, Part 2, contrary to the Government’s claim in Motion C, would not be compliant with the UN refugee convention.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee has dealt with Motion E1 on the right to work, and Motion H1 on family reunion, which we also support. We hesitate to support Motion G1 in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, because it leaves offshoring on the face of the Bill. We totally, absolutely and completely disagree with offshoring but my understanding is that we are running out of options other than double insisting on the removal of the provisions from the Bill, which, I am told, would have serious consequences. Therefore, we will vote for Motion G1 to force the Government to secure the approval of both Houses for each country they propose to use for offshoring, by means of the affirmative resolution procedure once they have laid before Parliament the estimated first two-year costs for operating such a system for each country. Once Parliament has seen the countries that the Government propose to use for such an abhorrent practice, and the costs involved, we hope that no Parliament would approve such a practice.
The Ukrainian refugee crisis and the lamentable shambles created by insisting that those fleeing Putin’s war must have a visa to enter the UK, with the Home Office being unable to cope with the numbers of applications, clearly demonstrates the need for there to be appropriate resourcing, infrastructure and support for local authorities permanently in place to cope with such crises before they arise. Before Ukraine it was Afghanistan, before Afghanistan it was Syria; we need systems and processes in place to deal with these crises. The Motion in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham seeks to achieve this without the previous set annual numerical target, instead allowing the Secretary of State to set the target and to put in place such measures as are necessary to achieve that target. Of course, we also support the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, in his Motion K1 in relation to those fleeing genocide.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, that less than 20% of immigration to the UK in recent years has been asylum seekers, and the Bill deals only with that 20%. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Horam: where are the provisions that specifically target people smugglers in the Bill? These policies target what he himself described as victims, and only the victims.
My Lords, I will attempt to be brief, as I am sure the House would now like to hear the Government’s response rather than listen to me at any great length. On Motion C1, proposed by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, as has just been said, if the Government are convinced that Part 2 is compliant with the convention and indeed agree with the principles that it should be so compliant, why should they be opposed to nailing their colours to the mast on this crucial issue and making this clear in the Bill by accepting this amendment?
On Motion D1 on differential treatment, to which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, spoke, as well as a number of other noble Lords, this new version of the previous Lords amendment disagreed to by the Commons deletes the subsections which provide for differential treatment of refugees. Instead, it provides that the Secretary of State must guarantee both group 1 and group 2 refugees all their rights under the convention and ensure that family unity can be maintained. I only make the point—I do not want to repeat all the points that have already been made—that under the Government’s plans for the Bill, a person who had fled Ukraine and travelled across Europe to get here could not be a group 1 refugee because they would have passed through other countries rather than “coming here” directly. At best, they would be group 2 refugees and could be treated as having committed a criminal offence for having reached this country without prior authority or a pre-approved claim. That is the reality of what differential treatment of refugees, which the Government are so determined to implement, can actually mean in all its harshness in respect to people currently fleeing for their lives from a war happening now in Europe.
On Motion E1 on the right to work, the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud and indeed other noble Lords have more than covered all the arguments in favour. It is just interesting that the Government have always argued in other situations that people should be in employment rather than requiring benefits, even though a considerable percentage of those in work also qualify for benefits because of low pay. The Government have reversed their stance with asylum seekers since the Government deny them the ability to work for 12 months and then only in specific circumstances, even though many asylum seekers want to work, have the skills to work and would be contributing further through paying taxes and not claiming more than minimal benefits. Reducing the qualifying period for being able to work for six months would also encourage the Government to work harder at providing the necessary resources to determine a much higher percentage of asylum applications within a six-month period.
I need to speak a little longer on Motion F1. I have put down a new version of our Amendment 8 that still provides that the Government may not commence their inadmissibility provisions until they have safe, formal returns agreements with third states. This time, though, our amendment has a sunset provision, since we have to put down a different amendment, which means that it delays the commencement of Clause 15 to allow time for international agreements to be put in place, but after five years that protection will lapse so it does not block the plans indefinitely. However, frankly, if the Government have not managed to negotiate any international agreements over the span of five years, one would hope they would take a hard look at the plausibility of their plans in the first place—clearly, they intend to use Clause 15 and its provision on a significant scale, or at least one must assume so.