Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

129: After Clause 54, insert the following new Clause—
“Misuse of Drugs Act 1971: power to search for possession of drugs for personal use
(1) The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 is amended as follows.(2) In section 23 (powers to search and obtain evidence), after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The constable conducting a search under subsection (2) must explain to the suspected person the grounds for suspicion and must record the explanation.(2B) Subsection (2) does not apply if the constable also has reasonable grounds to suspect that the drug is—(a) in the possession of the person for that person’s personal use only, or(b) in the vehicle or vessel for a person’s personal use only.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the power of the police to search a person or vehicle for possession of controlled drugs for personal use only.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 129, I will speak also to Amendment 276 in my name. It is unfortunate that these amendments were not grouped with amendments concerning the new violent crime prevention orders, as these, too, relate to police stop and search.

As well as being a police officer rising to the most senior levels in the Metropolitan Police over the course of more than 30 years, I worked in Brixton in south London between 1980 and 1982, in the 1990s, and again in the early 2000s. I was a police sergeant during the Brixton riots, a chief inspector and acting superintendent in the 1990s in Brixton, and I was the police commander in Lambeth, unusually in the rank of commander—the equivalent of assistant chief constable—in the early 2000s. In so saying, I am an expert on police stop and search. I realise that an expert is somebody who knows a little bit more about a subject than other people do, but I think I fall into that category, particularly in areas with high levels of visible minority communities and a poor track record of police community relations.

In 2001, Lambeth, with Brixton at its heart, had the highest street robbery rate in western Europe and high levels of burglary, and criminals were openly dealing crack cocaine and heroin on the streets. We were 100 police officers short of the 1,000 officers we were supposed to have in Lambeth. I recall an incident when I was a sergeant in 1982, the year after the Brixton riots, that clearly demonstrated that the community was concerned about street robbery, and not about possession of small amounts of cannabis for personal use. When we chased a handbag thief into an illegal gambling den, the youth was ejected from the premises into our waiting arms; when we chased someone who we thought had cannabis, the door was slammed in our faces.

In 2001, it was more than just community priorities, and that involved the arrest of one of my officers for allegedly taking cannabis from suspects on the street and keeping it himself. But one of the prime motivations for suggesting on the front page of London Evening Standard that the police should not arrest people for small amounts of cannabis for personal use was that there were far more important things for the police to spend their time on—both far more serious crimes that were at endemic levels and crimes that were a priority for the community. Clearly, possession of small amounts of cannabis was not one of them. When the “no arrest” policy was introduced, a public opinion survey found that well over 80% of people in Lambeth were in favour of the approach—slightly lower among the black community but still over 80%.

Following intense media debate and the submission of detailed data about how long it took officers to process someone arrested for cannabis—two officers over four hours each—plus the administrative work by police support staff and the CPS to prepare the case for court, the court time involved and the usual conditional discharge or small fine on conviction, this all persuaded the then commissioner to agree to a six-month pilot in Lambeth, where no adult was arrested for possession of small amounts of cannabis. These are the sorts of penalties courts are imposing today for possession of small amounts of class A drugs for personal use, if the case gets to court at all—many cases are dealt with by means of a police caution.

Despite false stories in newspapers, an independent assessment by the Metropolitan Police Authority of the pilot, which was extended to 12 months, showed reductions in all forms of serious crime, an increase in the amount of cannabis seized—as officers were able to quickly and easily deal with any that they found by seizing it and warning the person on the street—and an increase in the number of class A drug dealers arrested. Fears of an influx into the borough of those seeking cannabis proved to be the reverse of what actually happened.

Police and community priorities change. Now, in many areas of the country, knife crime is the priority, rather than street robbery. Noble Lords will quite rightly think that properly targeted stop and search is a powerful weapon in taking knives off the street, particularly if third-party information—community intelligence—points to those who are the knife carriers.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has done some number-crunching on stop and search, and I am very grateful to Matt Parr —he might not be thanking me in a moment—who briefed Peers on the issue last week. Some 63% of police stop and search is for drugs; over 80% of those stop and searches are on suspicion of possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use. On average, only 9% of police stop and searches—less than one in 10—are intelligence-led; the proportion varies by police force between 23% in the best performing and 1% in the worst. These are HMICFRS figures. The top five police forces in the UK account for 90% of all stop and search carried out. Policy Exchange, a centre-right think tank, published a report a few weeks ago that found the Metropolitan Police had the highest rate of stop and search of any police force and the lowest rate for apprehending drug dealers.

Tackling knife crime is the Government’s priority, it is our priority, and it is the priority of many communities, but, looking at the facts as presented by HMICFRS, it is not police officers’ priority when it comes to stop and search. My Amendment 129 would not allow the police to stop and search someone on suspicion of personal possession of a small amount of a controlled drug for personal use. The police already cannot search for possession of illegal psychoactive substances that are not covered by the Misuse of Drugs Act; in fact, possession of small amounts of illegal psychoactive substances for personal use is not even an offence.

We are not talking about not tackling drug dealing—that is not covered by this amendment; indeed, there will be more police resources available to tackle drug dealing. We are not even talking about an untried and untested leap of faith. When we did not arrest people for simple possession of cannabis over a 12-month period in Lambeth, the police ended up concentrating on more important offences instead, more serious crimes and crimes that were a priority for the community.

We have too few police officers at this time, as I had in Lambeth when I was the police commander. We have too much serious crime, as I did when I was the police commander in Lambeth. We need to focus scarce police resources on what really matters; whatever that priority is, it is not possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use.

The key to effectively reducing serious violence is the police and communities working together, with communities providing information to the police about who is involved in serious violence, so that the police can concentrate their efforts, particularly stop and search, on those carrying and using knives. Policy Exchange believes that community policing is key. Other metropolitan forces, such as Merseyside, the West Midlands and West Yorkshire, do less stop and search and more community policing than London’s Metropolitan Police, and they are far more effective at arresting those involved in drug dealing.

Nothing is more damaging to police-community relations, trust and confidence in the police than poorly targeted stop and search. From standing in the middle of Brixton, being bombarded with bricks, paving slabs and petrol bombs, as I was in 1981, following a massive poorly targeted stop and search operation, I can tell noble Lords that that is the sort of damage it does. Visible minorities are four times more likely and black people nine times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than white people, but they are no more likely to have something illegal in their possession than white people. That is when the police have to have reasonable grounds to stop and search people. Amendment 129 would not allow the police to stop and search for small amounts of controlled drugs for personal use, removing the cause of so much hostility between the police and communities, whose support and co-operation are vital in reducing serious violence.

That is not the only disproportionate form of stop and search. In 2010, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, responding to a European Court of Human Rights judgment that suspicionless stop and search under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act was illegal, said:

“The first duty of Government is to protect the public. But that duty must never be used as a reason to ride roughshod over our civil liberties”,


adding that the then Government would not have appealed the judgment, even if they could. She said that the court found that the powers were

“drawn too broadly—at the time of their initial authorisation and when they are used”

and

“contain insufficient safeguards to protect civil liberties.”—[Official Report, Commons, 8/7/10; col. 540.]

That is very similar to the position we are in today with Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which still allows indiscriminate stop and search.

The purpose for which the police are using Section 60 goes far beyond what Parliament intended it to be used for. When this power was given to the police there was a recurring problem with rival gangs of football supporters arranging to meet at a specific time and place, arming themselves with weapons. Noble Lords will immediately see the point of a Section 60 power to search everyone in the area at the time rival gangs planned to meet, without the need for reasonable suspicion in these particular circumstances. This rarely, if ever, happens today.

Instead, if there has been a stabbing, the police will routinely impose a Section 60 order in the area surrounding the incident. That is not what it was intended for and of limited use in such circumstances. The first thing a knifeman will do after stabbing someone is dispose of the weapon and go to ground. Even if he is in the area, there is usually a description, from witnesses or CCTV, and other powers of stop and search based on reasonable suspicion can be used. I maintain that the Section 60 power is being misused and is ineffective.

The second problem with Section 60 is that indiscriminate stop and search causes untold damage to police-community relations. As I have said, people from minority-ethnic communities are four times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police and black people are nine times more likely. But when it comes to Section 60, where no reasonable suspicion is required, that figure rises to you being 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police if you are black than if you are white. The overwhelming majority of these people have nothing on them to justify such a stop and search. Community intelligence is vital to make stop and search effective in tackling knife crime, but communities are losing trust and confidence in the police because too many innocent members of their communities are being stopped and searched using Section 60.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It is part of that operational independence of the police that they know what is best for their area; therefore, it might be relevant for police forces in a certain area not to have much occasion for the use of Section 60 stop and search.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Chakrabarti, for their support for these amendments. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that the issue of drugs is very complex: it needs a complex approach and stop and search of this nature is not the way to go. When I suggested to the commissioner that we did not arrest people for cannabis in Lambeth, former MP Ann Widdecombe accused me of usurping the power of Parliament: she cannot accuse me of that now.

Turning to the response of the Minister, almost her whole argument around Amendment 129 was an argument against decriminalisation, yet this amendment does not call for the decriminalisation of personal possession of drugs. It is all about focusing the police on serious crime, rationing scarce police resources by focusing them on what is really important to communities and to the courts. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that he rarely saw anybody in front of him for possession, particularly of class B drugs, unless by chance—usually it is when the police find cannabis when they have arrested the person for something else. They are there for the substantive offence and they get charged for the cannabis as well, for example.

The noble Baroness talked about the harm caused by drugs. Why, then, are new psychoactive substances not controlled by the Misuse of Drugs Act not an offence? Why is personal possession of psychoactive substances not illegal under the Psychoactive Substances Act, if drugs cause so much harm? Why is alcohol not illegal when we look at the harm that alcohol causes? But we are not talking here about decriminalisation; we are talking about getting the police to focus on what is important. As far as Section 60 is concerned, I support stop and search. I have said how important stop and search—properly focused, acting on community intelligence and focusing on those who are suspected of carrying and using knives—is, and how important Section 60 is.

The Minister talked about the figures between 2019 and 2020 and the number of weapons that stop and search removed. This is not an argument about removing the power of the police to stop and search; it is about focusing intelligence-led stop and search on taking knives off the street to be even more effective. The figures that the noble Baroness gave about the number of weapons taken off the street, I assume, are not weapons found by using Section 60. If Section 60 searches were only 3% of all searches, and only 1%—one in a hundred—of Section 60 searches find a weapon, then the figures that the noble Baroness quoted cannot possibly be about Section 60. Why is she using figures about stop and search generally when the amendment she was addressing is about Section 60? It is a blunt instrument.

The noble Baroness is right; it has to be an inspector who authorises a Section 60. Until a couple of years ago, it was a superintendent who had to authorise a Section 60. That is why there has been a 2,800% increase in the number of times Section 60 orders are issued, and that is why Section 60 is so ineffective, with only one in 100 searches resulting in a weapon, and why it is so damaging to police-community relations, which are essential to tackling serious violence.

The noble Baroness said no one should be stopped and searched based on their race. You are 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched under Section 60 if you are black than if you are white. The two things do not add up. Of course nobody should be searched on the basis of their race, but the facts are that you are 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched if you are black than if you are white. That is why Section 60 is so damaging and so ineffective. That is why I brought this amendment but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 129.

Amendment 129 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

130: After Clause 54, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty of candour
(1) The Secretary of State must within 12 months after this Act comes into force—(a) consult such persons as they consider appropriate, and(b) lay before both Houses of Parliament a report regarding the matters in subsection (2).(2) Those matters are means of achieving a culture of transparency in police forces and prosecuting authorities in England and Wales including a statutory duty of candour in their dealings with the victims of crime and the relatives of victims of crime.(3) The proposed duty is subject to any exemption required in the interests of national security.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is based on a recommendation from the Report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, to create a statutory duty of candour to be owed by law enforcement agencies to victims and their families.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

There is no rest for the wicked. I rise to move Amendment 130 in my name and support Amendment 132A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which seeks to achieve similar things.

I must first declare an interest. When I was a deputy assistant commissioner in the Metropolitan Police—the equivalent of a deputy chief constable—I told the truth about a misleading statement made to the News of the World by the then commissioner of the Metropolitan Police about the shooting dead of the innocent Brazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes, by the police in 2005. Another senior officer leaked to the BBC the content of the statement I had made to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was investigating a complaint by the family of the deceased that the police had misled the public. In response, the Metropolitan Police issued a press release saying it knew the officer who had given evidence to the IPCC and what he said—what I said—was not true.

The deputy commissioner at the time tried to bully me into issuing a press statement saying that I was mistaken. Instead, I instructed solicitors to threaten to sue the Metropolitan Police if it did not retract its press statement which effectively called me a liar; I was not the easiest senior officer to manage, as noble Lords can probably work out. The Metropolitan Police withdrew the press release and paid my legal fees. The IPCC subsequently confirmed what I had told it was true, but the die was cast; I was subsequently forced out of the police service for telling the truth. I think it is important for the Committee to know where I am coming from when I talk about this issue.

My amendment is based on the recommendation in the Report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel to create

“a statutory duty of candour to be owed by … law enforcement agencies”

to victims and their families. The Daniel Morgan Independent Panel was announced by the former Home Secretary Theresa May on 10 May 2013 to address questions arising from and relating to police involvement in the murder of Daniel Morgan; the role played by police corruption in preventing those responsible for the murder being brought to justice; the failure to confront that corruption; the incidence of connections between private investigators, police officers and journalists; and the alleged corruption involved in the links between them.

It is not possible or necessary to go into all the findings of the independent panel, but I want to give two examples. First, the Metropolitan Police admitted on more than one occasion that police corruption had impacted on bringing those responsible for Daniel Morgan’s murder to justice, but when asked by the independent panel what that corruption was, and what impact it had had, the Metropolitan Police refused to provide an answer. This is even though Tim Godwin, the then acting commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, had made a formal admission of corruption on behalf of the Metropolitan Police at a meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority. The Metropolitan Police’s response to the panel was, “You’ll have to ask him what he meant.”

Secondly, at every stage following the initial investigation of the murder, the Metropolitan Police maintained that the initial murder investigation had been carried out in accordance with the standards of murder investigation at that time. It was only seven years after the independent panel was formed that the Metropolitan Police made the panel aware of the existence of the London Homicide Manual, which set out the standards expected of murder investigations at the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder. This document proved that the initial investigation was not, in fact, carried out in accordance with the standards expected at the time. Such a lack of frankness, candour and honesty is a disgrace that these amendments seek to address.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for reminding us of the resilience and suffering of the Hillsborough victims’ families and of the Morgan family, and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Chakrabarti. I too prefer the noble Lord’s amendment; we tabled ours first. We need to address this issue.

The Minister said that this is not the first time that we have had a discussion about the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel report and the duty of candour, but it is the first time that we have had an opportunity to do something about it. It is, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, very disappointing that the Government did not take the opportunity of this Bill, which is so obviously the vehicle that should be used to get a statutory duty of candour on to the statute book. I hope the noble Lord will bring back his amendment on Report, so that we can divide the House on this very important issue, because this needs to happen. Wherever you look, this is urgently needed, whether we talk about Hillsborough, Daniel Morgan or what is happening in the Metropolitan Police at the moment—even yesterday, officers were convicted of offences.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised the very important point about support for officers. I am still regarded as a traitor by some in the police service because I told the truth about what happened after the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, spoke powerfully about the need to protect victims, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, gave his own worrying example of the need for better, greater candour on the behalf of the police.

We will come back to this on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 130.

Amendment 130 withdrawn.

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[Lord Dholakia (LD)]

My Lords, the purpose of the amendment in my name is to remove Section 176 from the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. With regard to what is affectionately known as shoplifting, it is estimated by the British Retail Consortium that businesses lose £770 million a year to shop theft—and retail theft crimes are rising year on year. According to figures available from the Home Office, there was an overall increase in retail theft of 19.1% between 2014 and 2018, compared with an increase of 4.96% between 2010 and 2014. This is no surprise.

Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 allows anyone accused of shoplifting anything under £200 to plead guilty by post, as if they had been given a parking ticket. Use of this legislation is often cited as a cost-saving exercise, but the truth is that it does not save money. In fact, it does the opposite, as everyone loses, whether it is customers who end up paying higher prices or the retailers who lose their jobs when the business fails. But it is still being used, with Thames Valley Police for example informing local shops that they will not send out officers to deal with shoplifters who steal less than £100-worth of goods. This piece of legislation has, therefore, massively reduced the deterrent to theft and the punishment that an offender can expect, with many savvy criminals exploiting the situation to steal with virtual impunity.

Just one in 20 of all shoplifting offences are now prosecuted, while the number of cautions for such thefts have fallen from 40,000 to just 5,000 in a decade, according to figures obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, it is worth noting that it takes an average of 30 offences before an individual is convicted of a shop theft that results in a custodial situation. It is soul destroying for hard-working businesses to have their livelihood literally stolen away from them. The British Independent Retailers Association has come to see me on a number of occasions; its crime survey for 2021, just completed this month, shows that two-thirds of its members see most crimes against businesses valued at less than £200, while two-thirds of members also reported a disproportionate increase in the theft of goods worth less than £200 since this threshold was put in place in 2014. This shows that businesses are losing more and more each year to this type of crime, as it is currently being left unchecked.

John Barlow, a BIRA member in Nottingham, rightly pointed out that the police are basically telling kids, “Help yourselves”. Of course, there are more serious crimes that the police need to solve, but you cannot just give thieves a licence to steal. Shop theft is not a victimless crime; in fact, smaller independent retailers feel the impact of retail crime more acutely than larger retailers, which typically have better security systems, employ guards and security staff, sell larger orders and have better margins and economies of scale. Conversely, a small retailer operating on a typical margin of 8% would need to sell £2,500-worth of goods to make back £200 of stolen goods. In addition, they are often working alone, unable to call in back-up from another staff member, and left literally at the mercy of the perpetrator and the trauma of the event. How can this be right?

The removal of this legislation would send a signal to those who perpetrate shop theft: it is very clear that you will be prosecuted; your actions matter; and you will be held to account. It would show that this Government really hold our retailers, who have kept our country going through the pandemic, in high regard, and that the retailers can have confidence that justice will be served. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support my noble friend Lord Dholakia in wanting to protect small shopkeepers by calling on the police and CPS to take low-level shoplifting more seriously. Repeated low-level theft adds up and, as my noble friend has just said, when the profit margins are typically around only 8%, you need to sell a lot of goods to make up for those losses. This is particularly a problem if perpetrators do not believe that the police and courts will take effective action. I would welcome a response from the Minister to reassure small shopkeepers that the Government take this issue seriously—and that includes what action they will take in response to my noble friend’s amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am not sure that this requires a change in the law; I think the problem lies elsewhere. Section 176 should have been an improvement; low-value shoplifting offences should have been dealt with much more quickly and efficiently.

The Home Office guidance for implementing Section 176 is very clear. It sets out, for example, that repeat offenders, organised criminals and people going equipped should all be referred to the CPS for prosecution, rather than using the simplified procedures. I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.

Something has gone wrong. I am going to guess that it is a consequence of 11 years of austerity inflicted on police forces. Rather than being a legal problem, it is a simple operational matter of the police not having the resources to deal with the problem—they cannot respond, investigate or prosecute. I think the solution lies in policing and not the law.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

110ZA: Schedule 4, page 205, line 42, at end insert—
“(1C) The constable must record the reasons for each determination including the assessment of each of the matters the subject of subsection (1B).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with Lord Paddick‘s amendment to page 206 line 18, requires a custody officer to record case-specific reasons why it is necessary and/or proportionate to release a person on bail, including the reason for any conditions attached.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 110ZA in my name I will speak to my Amendments 110ZB, 110ZC and 110B and to Amendment 110A in the name of my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond in this group.

We now come to pre-charge bail, also known as police bail, where the police need more time to investigate than the time limits for keeping someone in custody without charge allow. In 2017, in response to concerns that people were being kept on pre-charge bail for too long, particularly journalists under investigation as a result of the phone hacking scandal, the Government used 18 clauses of the Policing and Crime Act to severely curtail the time someone could be held on pre-charge bail.

At the time, briefed by police practitioners, we told the Government that their changes to police bail were unworkable and that they had gone too far the other way. Some 18 clauses of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 are now all but reversed, relegated to Schedule 4 to this Bill. There clearly needs to be a balance between the need for a thorough police investigation, diligently carried out within resource constraints—which, because of the significant cuts in police officer and police support staff numbers since 2010, have been considerable—and the adage that “justice delayed is justice denied”. The irony of telling the police to speed up their investigations while at the same time curtailing their ability to do so will not be lost on the Committee.

It must be necessary and proportionate for the police to release a person on bail, including the imposition of any conditions of that bail. I know from my own professional experience that custody officers tend to record something along the lines of “I am releasing this person on bail because it is necessary and proportionate to do so” or “because it is necessary to ensure that the person surrenders to custody” or whatever Section 30A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 says may be a reason for releasing a person on bail. This is simply copied and pasted into the custody record. I was sitting here earlier reading that and realising that perhaps, as a police inspector reviewing detention, I might have been guilty of a similar act of simply copying generic paragraphs out of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

This is not sufficient and Amendments 110ZA and 110ZB are designed to address this. The police officer should record the case-specific reasons why it is necessary and proportionate to bail the person and the case-specific reasons for imposing the conditions, if any, attached to the bail—not “to ensure the person surrenders to custody” but why the officer thinks this person is unlikely to surrender to custody; for example, because he has absconded in the past, perhaps. If the factors to be taken into account in paragraph 17 of Part 2 of Schedule 4 are included in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in a new Section 30A(1B), so should be the requirement to say what it is about this person that makes release on bail necessary. Later in the Bill, in Clause 132(7), courts remanding children in custody will be required to set out their reasons for doing so in writing. This amendment requires the police to do the same when it comes to police bail decisions.

On Amendment 110ZC, following representations made by the Law Society—from my professional experience I see the merit in some and not others—I agree with it that the if the matter is straightforward, what is called in the legislation a “standard case”, a senior police officer should be able to extend bail only to a maximum of six months before the case is referred to a magistrates’ court for independent adjudication, rather than the nine months suggested in paragraph 29 of Schedule 4 to the Bill.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments bring us to the issue of the reform of pre-charge bail. The intention of the Government with this set of changes is clear: to create a more effective and proportionate pre-charge bail system through “Kay’s law”, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Kay’s law has been so named after Kay Richardson, who tragically lost her life at the hands of her estranged husband while he was released under investigation rather than on bail. It is clear that we need robust decision-making around the use of pre-charge bail in order to ensure that it is used fairly. This is why we have removed the presumption against bail and introduced the risk factors to be considered by the custody officer.

Let me first address the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Amendments 110ZA and 110ZB relate to record-keeping for bail decisions. I certainly agree that there should be a clear audit trail to evidence how these decisions have been made. I do not, however, consider that it is necessary to legislate for this, given that it is an operational process, but it is our expectation that custody officers are already keeping records of how they came to their decisions as part of best practice within each force. I acknowledge that this may not be done with the consistency we would expect, which is why it would be more appropriate to include provision for this in the national statutory guidance on pre-charge bail, which is to be published by the College of Policing.

Amendment 110ZC is concerned with the timescales for the review of pre-charge bail. Again, I fully recognise that we must provide the correct balance here—the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to balance in his opening remarks—between the rights of those who may have been victims of crime and those who, at this stage, have yet to be charged with an offence. The new timescales provided for in the Bill, which have been subject to public consultation and engagement with law enforcement, charities and victims’ services, strike a fair balance and will create a system that works better for all involved. That being the case, the Government are satisfied that nine months rather than six is the appropriate point at which decisions around the extension of pre-charge bail in standard cases should be referred to a magistrates’ court. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for sharing his personal experience on this subject. As he said, it will place further pressure on the police, but on the opposite side, it would potentially clog up the courts if referrals were brought forward. Following our consultation, we believe it is equitable for extensions up to nine months to be made by a senior police officer, and only then should the matter be referred to the courts.

Amendment 110B would require police forces to publish data annually on the number of individuals released on pre-charge bail and those released under investigation. We heard some powerful arguments from my noble friend Lord Wolfson about data in the previous group, and I am about to reiterate some of those, because we agree that accurate data is crucial in order to monitor the impact of these legislative changes and ensure that they are operating as intended. I am pleased to inform the noble Lord that the information he seeks is already collected by forces and published by the Home Office annually through the Police Powers and Procedures bulletin. Perhaps to anticipate a subsidiary question, statistics on the number of individuals released on pre-charge bail have been published yearly since 2017-18. The Government have recently amended this collection to include the number of people released under investigation. This information has been collected for 2020-21 and will be published later this year.

One might reasonably ask, since it has been four years since the last round of reforms, why we still do not know how many people are released under investigation. There are 43 forces across England and Wales, as the noble Lord well knows, which use different case management systems and data warehousing. We have been collecting data on the number of individuals on pre-charge bail since 2017, first on a voluntary and now on a mandatory basis, and we have also started collecting more data on pre-charge bail in terms of offence, breach, demographic and so on, and on released under investigation and voluntary attendance. This is voluntary collection at the moment, but we are working with police and systems providers where forces have been unable to provide data to enable reporting with the intention of changing to mandatory collection following the reforms as system updates allow.

Turning to quite a different matter, the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, has tabled Amendment 110A, and I acknowledge her long association with this subject. This would create a new criminal offence of breaching pre-charge bail conditions where a person is arrested elsewhere than at a police station and where there is no reasonable excuse to do so. It is essential that we keep in mind the safety and welfare of victims at this stage of the criminal justice system, as well as balancing this against the risk of criminalisation of individuals who have not been charged with an offence. Noble Lords will be aware that debate around the consequences of breaching these conditions has been ongoing for a number of years. While I understand those concerns, I cannot agree that such a criminal offence would be a proportionate response to this issue. Pre-charge bail is just that: pre-charge. There has been no charge or conviction against the individual as yet. It would therefore be disproportionate to criminalise the individual at this point, particularly where they may face a harsher sentence for the breach than the one carried by the offence for which they were originally arrested. Bail should not be punitive in nature according to the principle of the presumption of innocence.

On top of this, the Government do not currently have an accurate snapshot of the number of individuals who breach their conditions each year—I fear we are back to data again. Without knowing how many people this would affect, such an amendment could well lead to unintended consequences, criminalising a potentially large group of people and tying up the courts system. I stress that there is obviously no desire on the part of the Government to allow suspects to breach their conditions wantonly. Where there has been a breach, police officers will look to consider whether a substantive offence is established, such as intimidation or harassment in the first instance. In certain circumstances, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, alluded to, there is also the option of a court order, such as a sexual risk order or the new domestic abuse protection order, breach of which is a criminal offence in itself.

The Bill also introduces a three-hour pause on the detention clock where an individual has been arrested for breach of their conditions. This will allow the police further time for progressing the case, either through investigation of the breach or preparing a substantive case for charging. The Government have already made a commitment in the Commons to increase the data collection in this area, which will provide a more detailed understanding of this issue. It is my hope that this may yield a more proportionate, tailored and workable policy solution in the future.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to Sarah Jones’s amendment in the other place and asked about the Minister’s consultation. I fear I do not know the answer to that; I will get back to him on when it may be expected to report. She also acknowledged that the collection of data around breaches of conditions to better understand the scale of the problem was part of the problem we have here. I think the Minister’s response was welcomed by his colleague Sarah Jones in the other place and she was content to withdraw her amendment. It has been helpful to explore these issues, but in the light of my explanations, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her support and for so clearly and powerfully explaining her Amendment 110A. Arresting somebody for breaching pre-charge bail where the only thing the police can do if somebody has breached the conditions is simply to re-bail them under the same conditions undermines the whole purpose of police bail—there is no sanction at all. The Minister said, “Well, the person has not been convicted of an offence and they could end up being convicted of breaching the bail but not of the original offence.” I may have been dreaming, but I seem to remember being at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court, albeit the stipendiary magistrate concerned was known colloquially as “Shotgun Maclean”, and his saying to an arresting officer that, unfortunately, in a not-guilty offensive weapon trial, the officer had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of possessing an offensive weapon, but for breaching court bail—in that when they first appeared in court the person was released on court bail to reappear for the not guilty hearing—he would go to prison for three months.

There is the whole argument about this being disproportionate for somebody who is not convicted of a criminal offence if they were convicted of breaching bail, but it happens already when people who are innocent breach court bail. This seems to completely undermine the noble Lord’s argument. The point of Kay’s law is to stop dangerous people being released under investigation with no conditions attached. Without a sanction for breaching the conditions that are imposed, the conditions have no weight.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede. Regarding the sort of cases he referred to, I would expect—particularly if analysis of computers was involved, for example—that these would not be standard cases and that the Crown Prosecution Service would designate them as such, so the six-month or nine-month limit would not apply. I am not sure that the cases he referred to were relevant to the examples I gave.

I accept that the Government have consulted on this, but I would go back to the Law Society, which is on the other side of the argument—including as it does defence solicitors—and feels that nine months in a standard, straightforward case not involving such things as computer analysis would be a long enough extension for a senior officer. However, we will reflect on what the Minister has said and, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 110ZA withdrawn.

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[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, my task in this debate is easy: all I have to do is to support the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and say that I have rarely heard an amendment moved more comprehensively than he just did.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support my noble friend Lord Beith. He has clearly explained his amendment: persons other than those mentioned in the Bill are in positions of trust. Although there is no evidence of widespread concern about instructors in dance, drama or music abusing their positions of trust, there are examples and fairly recent high-profile cases. My noble friend explains that either we should leave it to the courts to decide whether someone is in a position of trust or a more comprehensive list is required that is not limited, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, to the examples in the amendments.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to some extent, although one could imagine that children are more vulnerable in certain scenarios and one-to-one situations than in others. But we support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Beith.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too support these amendments, and I too found the introduction from the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to be comprehensive. The brief in front of me asks why some youth activities are included and others are not, which is the point the Minister will have to address when he winds up this brief debate. I will not repeat those points about why certain activities might be included and others might not, and I am sure that everyone who has spoken in this debate wants to achieve the same end, but there are different mechanisms to do that.

I agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who, as she said, somewhat unusually found herself in agreement with potentially using Henry VIII powers to amend legislation. While listening to this debate, I remembered the biography of a very famous English composer that I read recently, just a few months ago. He would fall foul of these regulations and would very likely go to jail on the basis of that biography.

I hope this problem is not widespread, but it is something that people are far more alert to these days than they were in the past. It is right that the Government should ensure that the appropriate structures are in place in each of the activities for which young people get support, so that, if things go wrong, the coaches or whoever is involved can be held to account in an appropriate way.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The art lesson may be a good example. With respect, there is a huge gulf between the relationship of somebody to their art teacher, if they go to an art group, and the sort of intimacy that a physical sports coach has with somebody or the sort of power, control and sense of authority that a religious leader has over a young person.

I shall give one example of evidence, picking a made-up country from private international law. Let us say that, in Ruritania, there is a huge number of cases of a particular category. It might well then be said, “We can see there is a problem with this category. It has happened in Ruritania. The circumstances are the same as in the UK. You should add that.” That is just one example. I do not want to limit the evidence that we would rely on but, with respect, we cannot say that, because there has been a case in an art class or a case here and a case there, we will include all these categories. We should not include every circumstance in which adults have close contact with under 18 year-olds. I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, wants to come in.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the Government’s position but I do not understand the argument that we are surreptitiously changing the age of consent. If a 16 or 17 year-old wants to have a sexual relationship with their music teacher, they had better find another music teacher; the solution is quite simple. They should not continue in a professional relationship and have a sexual relationship at the same time.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

With great respect, the point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, shows that if we draw this too widely, we are limiting the ability of a 16 or 17 year-old to have a sexual relationship with that person. This the balance that we want to strike. At the moment, there is nothing to prevent a 17 year-old having a consensual relationship with a person with whom they have a tuition relationship or other kind of relationship. The question is: where do you draw the line? We say the line should be drawn at sport and religion. If you draw it too widely, you impact on that person’s ability to have a sexual relationship with other adults.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

113: Clause 46, page 38, leave out lines 33 to 39.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to probe the proportionality of the inserted subsection in comparison to other offences.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 113 in my name I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group. I declare an interest as a Liberal Democrat and someone generally against sentence inflation, but I have specific points to make on this clause.

Clause 46 effectively increases the maximum penalty for “destroying or damaging” anything by fire, or for any offence involving damage to a memorial, which means something “erected or installed”, or

“a garden or any other thing planted or grown which has a commemorative purpose”,

whether it is the statue of a national hero or a slave trader, a person’s grave or a pet cemetery. The clause does this by removing the financial limit on when the case can be tried at, or sent to, the Crown Court for sentence. Magistrates’ courts cannot send someone to prison, I believe, for more than a maximum of 12 months, but a Crown Court judge can send someone to prison for criminal damage where there is no threat to life for a maximum of 10 years.

To put this into context, Clause 2 of this Bill, as drafted, increases the maximum penalty for assaulting an emergency worker from one year to two years, while this part of the Bill increases the penalty for damaging a memorial from one year to 10 years. It is clear where the Government’s priorities lie; it is more important to protect a statue of Churchill than it is to protect our brave men and women police officers.

It gets worse. New subsection (11B) of Section 22 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, inserted by Clause 46, includes

“any moveable thing (such as a bunch of flowers)”

left in or on a memorial, as part of the memorial—so, a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison for damaging a bunch of flowers. Pick up a bunch of flowers placed at the feet of Churchill’s statue and hit a police officer round the face with it, and you can get up to 10 years in prison for damaging the flowers but only two years for assaulting the police officer. Amendment 113 is designed to probe the proportionality of subsection (11B). Amendment 114 is consequential.

In fact, bearing in mind that the limit for a summary-only trial—at least in the original Bill, and I cannot find any amendment to it—is £200-worth of damage, to replace, repair or restore the property damaged, it is unlikely that anything other than minor superficial damage would be below this value. There may well be a case to treat graves as a special case, where it can be deeply distressing if the burial plot is disturbed, but, aside from that, I am yet to be convinced that Clause 46 should stand part of the Bill, at least in its current form.

There is far more merit in protecting the living, as Amendment 115 proposes to do, than in protecting the memorials of the dead. Damaging life-saving equipment is a very serious matter, and there is far more merit in this amendment than in Clause 46.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to support these amendments. We are now getting into the stuff that I will fight tooth and nail over. As an archaeologist and activist, I feel that I have a little bit of insight into this whole situation and perhaps into the ridiculous law that the Government are trying to introduce here. Instead of debating and discussing it and coming to a sensible resolution, this is part of a battle in a culture war, which is absolutely ludicrous.

History is important, but it is not fixed. People like to think that we all know what it is and it is in all the books, but, actually, as an archaeologist, I know that we reinterpret it all the time and are constantly making new discoveries. Just in the last week or so, we found Roman statues in a totally unexpected place. This is what happens: we change our minds about history and it gets rewritten.

The problem is that we have some very ugly history, which is littered with powerful and wealthy white men who, behind a thin veneer of toffish respectability, did some quite nasty things and were responsible for atrocities such as the enslavement of millions of people, genocides, war crimes and the grabbing of wealth from some of the many nations that we now call “developing nations”. Our statues ignore this history and pretend that it was benign and that these were good guys, which is simply not true: they were slavers and pillagers, and we ought to recognise that. Having their so-called heroism set in stone is actually quite offensive. There is no hint in many of these statues that they did some evil deeds.

People—many members of the public—do not like this, and they are showing their dissatisfaction with celebrating people who really should not be celebrated. They raped and pillaged, and the fact that they then spent a lot of money on universities, libraries or parks does not really make it all all right. So the question of what we should do with these monuments is important, but not easy. It should force us to confront the evils within our history and reflect on how they carry through to the social and economic conditions of our present.

Instead of leading on this quite important dialogue, the Government simply storm in with a new criminal offence, which I find so ludicrous that I feel I ought to go and speak directly to the Home Secretary about it. They are trying to put their fingers in their ears, sing “Rule Britannia” and pretend that all of this did not happen and that it was all okay—but it was not. Councils all over the country and the Government have to realise that statues are not something that we cannot change or remove. The fact is that some of these statues celebrate evil deeds, and the Government should recognise that.

I have more to say, if noble Lords wish.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The short answer to that is that I did not make my argument on the basis of deterrence. Sentencing encompasses a number of factors: there is deterrence; there is the actual punishment for the offence; there is marking society’s disapproval at what was done. I hope that I made my argument very clearly on the first two. I was not suggesting that people would necessarily be deterred; I hope that they will be, but that is not the main basis of my argument.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this short debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her support, albeit coming at the issue from a slightly different angle to the one from which I was coming. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for picking up on what I said, which is that this needs to be more targeted. I specifically said that Clause 46 “as drafted” is not suitable. It needs to be much more accurately targeted; otherwise, it enables people to make the accusation that I did not make, that this is about dramatically increasing the penalty for what could be very minor damage to a statue of a very divisive figure. In fact, I made reference to the fact that doing anything to a grave, for example, could be deeply distressing and it may be that the penalty needs to be increased for that particular purpose. Clause 46, however, goes far too wide and draws those who feel that it is about culture wars into the argument, where that would not be the case if it were more far more tightly drawn; but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 113 withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard part one
Wednesday 20th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I no longer have to declare an interest but some Members here may know that I was until May this year police and crime commissioner in Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. As such, I will make a very brief contribution to this first debate in Committee.

I personally support—I hope from my experience—the early amendments that have been proposed. As has been said already, it is quite clear that anyone who works with the police nowadays, knows them or sees them closely at work, will know that for a long time, I suspect, as in the rest of society, mental health, mental illness and all that follows from it was not given anywhere near the importance it should have been. I am glad to say that it is my experience, certainly in the police force I was close to, and I am sure in others too, that chief officer teams are now giving the issue of mental health due regard. That is why any covenant that left this out would be lacking; I do not want to comment on the covenant— good points have been made on it.

I urge the Minister and the Government to consider seriously these obviously non-partisan suggestions, which are meant to be helpful. That is all I want to say, but my experience tells me that this is becoming a larger and larger issue as year follows year for police forces up and down the country.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I start also by paying tribute to my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her tireless work in supporting police officers in the many different roles that she has in addition to her work in this House. It was particularly important to hear about the work of police treatment centres, although they clearly do not have the capacity to deal with all officers who are affected. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his opening remarks, talked about only being able to imagine what police officers go through. I hope to enlighten the Committee about some of those experiences.

I have Amendment 4 in this group, but I support all these amendments, though perhaps with a qualification on one of them. My experience in the police service was not, in many respects, very different from that of others who have served or those who continue to serve, except perhaps that I was the most junior officer on my relief or response team, as it would now be known. For 18 months, as the junior officer delegated, I was the one who dealt with all the sudden deaths. My first appearance in court was at the Coroner’s Court, when the husband of an elderly couple had taken an overdose of prescription medication. Having worked night duty until 4 am, I was allowed to “slide off”, as I had to be at the mortuary at 9 am to identify the body. I had not seen a dead body before that night—I was 19 years of age—and I was unprepared for the sight and smell of at least half a dozen other bodies that had been opened up for examination by the pathologist when I arrived at the mortuary. It is an important role for a police officer to identify the body that he or she found as being the same one that the pathologist is about to perform the post-mortem on. I will not go into graphic details, but the Committee needs to get a flavour of the trauma that police officers are exposed to.

Noble Lords might think that the first case is the one that sticks in one’s mind, but whether it is the open-top car that overturned at speed, with no protection for the passengers in the back from the road surface, or the pensioner not seen for weeks in the summer, with swarms of flies on her badly decomposed body that was sticking to the bed when the undertakers tried to remove her, or the charred bodies in a number of fires that I attended, the impact on one’s mental health is considerable and cumulative. I can still picture and smell those scenes; I remember the taste that they left in my mouth.

It is not just the horror of such scenes; it is the emotional impact as well. There was a young man in his early 20s who had hung himself from a coat hook on the back of a door. There was a young mother, whose normal session with her psychiatrist had been cancelled because of Christmas; finding a name and address in her handbag next to her body at the base of a tower block, I went to the address, knocked on the door and was invited by her husband into a room where her young children were playing under the Christmas tree with the toys that the mother had bought them. If that was not bad enough, when I suggested that we ought to go into a different room so that I could tell the husband the tragic news that his wife had committed suicide, he asked me, “How did she do it?”. Experiences like that, as noble Lords can hear, I still vividly remember.

It is not just the deaths. I remember a young man who had a broken glass slammed into his face. We had to take him to hospital in the police van, as there were no ambulances available—some things do not change. I remember the terrified look on his face as he shook uncontrollably from the shock. Another man jumped from the fourth floor and landed on spiked railings. We held him up for what seemed to be an eternity, while the fire brigade cut around the railings; they could not use oxyacetylene torches because the heat would have transmitted to his body. Then we had to hold him in the ambulance between two trolleys, with the railings still through his body.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

8: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness
(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 are amended as follows. (2) After regulation 13 insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness (1) A legally qualified person within the meaning of regulation 28(4)(a) and (6) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 shall be appointed to scrutinise the information provided pursuant to regulation 13. (2) On each occasion where information is provided in writing under regulation 13 paragraph (1) or (2) the legally qualified person appointed under paragraph (1) shall determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for—(a) the time already taken; and(b) realistically anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2) the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and shall have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay having regard to complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and affect upon confidence in the police disciplinary system; and(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided under regulation 13.(4) Unless the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2)(a) and (b) then—(a) all investigation into possible misconduct or gross misconduct shall be terminated forthwith; and(b) no disciplinary proceedings may be initiated in respect of the matters under investigation.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) After regulation 19 insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness (1) A legally qualified person within the meaning of regulation 28(4)(a) and (6) shall be appointed to scrutinise the information provided pursuant to regulation 19.(2) On each occasion where information is provided in writing under regulation 19(1) the legally qualified person appointed under paragraph (1) shall determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for—(a) the time already taken; and(b) realistically anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2) the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and shall have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay having regard to complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and affect upon confidence in the police disciplinary system; and (f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided under regulation 19.(4) Unless the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2)(a) and (b) then—(a) all investigation into possible misconduct or gross misconduct shall be terminated forthwith; and (b) no disciplinary proceedings may be initiated in respect of the matters under investigation.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amends the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 to provide for a mechanism for scrutiny and consequences where there are delays in disciplinary proceedings being brought against police officers.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, there has been much criticism of the police complaints and misconduct process from the perspective of members of the public being unable to achieve justice, but much less has been said about the impact on the officers under investigation, to which I alluded in the last group. When we come to consider Clause 43 and Schedule 4 to the Bill, I will remind the House of the changes the Government brought about in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 to limit the length of time members of the public could be kept under investigation by the police and on police bail. The Government accepted the unfairness of suspects being kept in suspense for months, even years, with the threat of prosecution still hanging over them. This is something many police officers face, with even graver potential consequences than someone who is accused of a criminal offence—potentially losing their livelihoods through being sacked or required to resign from the police service.

When I was a police inspector in charge of a relief, or shift, of officers, a woman who had been arrested and taken to one of my police stations made an allegation of indecent assault by a police officer during a routine search to ensure that she did not have anything that could cause injury while she was being held in a cell. I heard a commotion in the custody suite and went to see what was happening, only to find her spreadeagled on the floor with one officer on each limb. The situation was explained to me: she had resisted being searched, fighting with the female officer designated to search her, and had to be restrained. I asked the prisoner if she was okay and if she was going to behave herself now, and then ordered two female officers to take her into a cell to be searched, much to the concern of male officers, who I ordered to remain just outside the cell door.

Another prisoner, who was present in the custody suite and subsequently interviewed in prison by officers from the complaints unit, corroborated to some extent the female prisoner’s account—a scuffle and then being held down on the floor—although her allegation was actually of indecent assault by a female officer during the search, out of sight of the witness. When the complaints unit took all the female officers who had been on duty that night away for questioning simultaneously and suspended one from duty, I asked that I be interviewed as I was also a witness who had seen nothing untoward.

As a result, I was interviewed as a suspect under caution in a criminal investigation. Although I had already qualified for a promotion, it was delayed for 18 months, and the local area police commander recommended that I face a full disciplinary hearing for lack of supervision, with a recommendation that I be sacked—perhaps related to having recently separated from my wife and having sought permission to cohabit with a man, or perhaps not.

The day that the local area commander retired from the police service, the headquarters complaints and discipline department responsible for scheduling discipline hearings dropped all proceedings against me, and I was promoted. But in the intervening period, my health suffered, my marriage ended and my career was on hold, even though I had done nothing wrong and, arguably, in coming forward as a witness, everything right.

This is but a relatively minor, albeit personal, example of the impact that prolonged police misconduct investigations can have, which, unlike criminal investigations, have no effective time limits placed upon them.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, set out, this amendment seeks to further improve the timeliness of disciplinary and misconduct proceedings against police officers. It seeks to do this by amending existing regulations governing complaint and misconduct investigations by the IOPC, as well as those conducted by force professional standards departments. In substance, they seek to introduce a new system of separate independent adjudicators with powers to close down investigations which have taken longer than 12 months, where they decide that there is no “good and sufficient” reason for delay.

Again, with this amendment, I agree with the thrust of what the noble Lord and others said, namely that disciplinary and misconduct investigations should be conducted and completed in a timely fashion, for the reasons set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Hogan-Howe. Like the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, when I heard “10 years” I was utterly shocked. However, this amendment comes at a time when investigation timescales are already reducing and when the Government have worked hard to reduce bureaucracy in the system and not add to it.

Under the IOPC’s predecessor, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, investigations would on average take 11 months. Since 2018, under the IOPC, that has fallen by almost 30% to just eight months. The IOPC has closed more than 90% of its cases in under 12 months and is making strong progress on the number of cases that it closes in under nine months and even in under six months. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it is in nobody’s interest for investigations to drag on for long periods unnecessarily. We recognise the impact that this can have on everyone concerned.

It might be helpful in terms of explaining the trajectory that the Government introduced a package of reforms in February last year to the police complaints and disciplinary systems. It included new provisions to improve timeliness, with an expectation that investigations will normally be completed within 12 months. If not, the investigating body must provide a written explanation of any delays and steps to bring the investigation to a conclusion. The Government expect the IOPC to go further, and it now has targets in its business plans to complete many of those investigations in under nine and six months, as I said.

There are a number of reasons why cases might take too long, including the complexity of a case, the time- scale being impacted by parallel criminal investigations, and delays in obtaining expert evidence or post-mortem reports. It might be further complicated by delays in obtaining accounts from key police witnesses and subjects. That said, it is not acceptable for investigations to go on for too long, but the trajectory of timescales is certainly downwards.

The noble Lord’s amendment would introduce an additional layer of cost and bureaucracy. It would also risk creating perverse incentives for investigators to rush to meet deadlines at the expense of the quality of an investigation, particularly in those complex cases or if historic matters are at stake.

If an investigation into police wrongdoing was terminated without being concluded and that officer might have had a case to answer for gross misconduct—I can think of very recent cases which are relevant here—this would significantly undermine public confidence and potentially the course of justice. I am sure that is not the intention of noble Lords.

The amendment also risks undermining the independence of the police disciplinary system, blurring the lines between when legally qualified persons are appointed to this role and when the same person is appointed as a legally qualified chair of a misconduct hearing. These individuals would be selected from the same pool. That fundamentally changes the role of a legally qualified chair and jeopardises the independence of their position and the disciplinary system.

In conclusion, the Government have already taken steps to reduce investigation timescales and we will be monitoring the timeliness of investigations, drawing on new data collection requirements that we introduced as part of recent reforms. I hope that, for the reasons I have outlined, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her support for speedy justice. Obviously, this impacts the complainant as well as the officers.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution. It seems very strange standing here and talking about a former commissioner in that way, but I am in police mode at the moment, I think. He made a very important point about firearms officers who volunteer to take on this enormous responsibility and are then treated so badly by the system.

The Police Federation—I am grateful for its support of these amendments—accepts that there will be delays if a criminal investigation is involved. However, there are still significant delays even after the criminal matters have been dealt with, as I outlined in the examples I gave.

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for his promise to come back all guns blazing, as it were, if I bring the amendment back on Report.

It is interesting that there is a parallel with the Armed Forces again. I spoke to a former soldier who was resigning from the police service and asked him why. He said that he was leaving because, in the Armed Forces, when something goes wrong, the most senior officer involved takes responsibility and faces a court martial, while in the police service, the responsibility is pushed down to the lowest-possible level, to alleviate the responsibility of senior officers. That is an aspect of the culture of the police service; I agree with that officer’s conclusions.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, talked about public confidence. If there is no confidence in the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the police complaints system, this will be partly due to the undue delays. Complainants are beginning to think “What are they trying to cover up? Why is it taking so long?”. It is essential that these things are dealt with in a timely manner.

I thank the Minister for her support in principle, but the examples I gave were not complex cases; they were simple, but they still took years. They did not involve expert witnesses, yet there were still delays. These are recent cases from last year.

I am sorry but I do not accept the Minister’s assertion that this amendment would result in a rush to complete investigations. These completely independent people would assess whether there were justified reasons for investigations going on as long as they had. Clearly, if these investigations were not being dealt with in a timely manner, they would have something to worry about. This is about picking up those cases in which there is unnecessary and unreasonable delay. Of course, the same chair would not adjudicate over whether an investigation was going on too long and then chair the discipline investigation.

We are on to something here and I am very grateful to the Police Federation for bringing it to my attention. We may well need to discuss this further on Report, but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 10 in this group. According to the Times newspaper, in an article dated 10 March this year, Chris Philp MP, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and Ministry of Justice responsible, according to the article, for sentencing, said that

“detailed research had found that the likelihood of being caught and punished was much more important in discouraging people from committing crime than length of jail sentences.”

Answering a Parliamentary Question about the deterrent effect of longer sentences, he said, again according to the Times:

“The evidence is mixed, although harsher sentencing tends to be associated with limited or no general deterrent effect. Increases in the certainty of apprehension and punishment have consistently been found to have a deterrent effect.”


I subsequently discovered that this was the Answer to a Written Question on 19 February from the Conservative Member for Rother Valley about pet theft—of which more on another day. The Bill certainly is the gift that keeps on giving.

Noble Lords around the Committee will be aware that we on these Benches have consistently said that longer prison sentences do not deter criminals and now, according to the Government, harsher sentences have limited or no deterrent effect. So why do we have Clause 2 in the Bill? Noble Lords may be surprised that, as a former police officer, I am not supportive of this measure. Something needs to be done about assaults on emergency workers, but an increase in the maximum sentence is not what is needed. What is needed is a change in attitude among the general public, in society and in the courts towards assaults on emergency workers in general and on police officers in particular. It appears to me to have become accepted by many that being assaulted is part of the job of a police officer or an emergency worker. But no one should be expected to tolerate abuse or assault because of the work they do, whether they are a Member of Parliament or an emergency worker.

The type of assault covered by this clause is common assault. Anything that causes a significant injury, even if it is not permanent, such as a bruise, can and should result in a charge under Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is already five years. We are talking about relatively minor physical harm. Can the Minister tell the Committee how many cases of assault on an emergency worker to date have attracted the current maximum penalty of 12 months in prison—or a sentence of imprisonment at all?

The reason for my amendment, in effect for the Sentencing Council to review its guidance for the existing offence where the existing maximum penalty is 12 months’ imprisonment, is to ensure that the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service reflect the seriousness of this offence in their decision-making, rather than what we see week after week reported on social media, where assaults on emergency workers in general and police officers in particular are treated by the CPS and the courts as part and parcel of the job. That sends a message to criminals and the general public that you can assault emergency workers with impunity, because in court you will be just be given a slap on the wrist—if it even gets that far. What is the point of increasing the maximum penalty for an offence to two years when the Government themselves acknowledge that harsher sentences have little or no deterrent effect and the courts, which can currently send someone to prison for up to 12 months, rarely if ever do so?

The Government may say that in some cases severe penalties can have a deterrent effect—but an increase from one year to two years for an offence often committed in the heat of the moment during the course of a confrontation between a police officer and a member of the public is unlikely to be one of them. Far better that the Government mount a publicity campaign stating that it is completely unacceptable to attack emergency workers who put their lives on the line every day to protect and serve the public, than that they make a minor adjustment to the maximum penalty that is likely to go unnoticed by those it is targeted at, either as a deterrent or in court following conviction, unless there is a significant change in the attitude of judges, prompted by a change in the sentencing guidelines.

On Amendment 11, proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, clearly, prison officers are as vital a uniformed force as police, fire and rescue services, the ambulance service and the coastguard, and they are afforded similar protection. I quite understand how others working in prisons feel that they are more vulnerable and, as the right reverend Prelate said, they feel they have a target on their back because they are excluded. He gave the appalling example of an assault on a prison chaplain that resulted in bruising to the chaplain. But, again, I say that that offence could have been prosecuted under Section 47, where there is an even greater penalty available than for an assault on an emergency worker. So we are not supportive of the increase.

On Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, of course, if such substances are actually thrown at a prison officer or other emergency worker, it would amount to assault and therefore it would be covered by existing legislation around assaults on emergency workers, with a similar penalty to the one the noble Earl is proposing in his amendment. So we feel that there needs to be a change in attitude towards the apparent acceptability of assaults on emergency workers, rather than simply a cosmetic increase in the maximum penalty.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord and I are in agreement that the problem is that we are not prosecuting these offences, rather than the outcome in the courts. Because, for the prisoners, it may be that even another three-month penalty for my new offence would be enough to deter them—or, using the existing penalties, as the noble Lord said, it is the probability of being prosecuted that matters.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I first pay tribute to her Majesty the Queen as we enter her Platinum Jubilee year. Her example of a lifetime of public service at the highest level is extraordinary. I am also greatly looking forward to the maiden speeches of the noble Baronesses, Lady Fullbrook and Lady Fleet—the first of many valuable contributions to this House, I am sure.

As we consider the home affairs, justice and culture aspects of the Queen’s Speech, I remind the House of the comments of my noble friend Lord Newby, who said last week:

“The Queen’s Speech contains many Bills of second-order importance but none offering fundamental change”.—[Official Report, 11/5/21; col. 16]


I would go further. The Government seem to be continuing along the same path, following policies where the broadsheet analysis of the right-wing tabloid headline shows the negative unintended consequences of government policy.

One of our strongest sectors is culture, yet the only legislation in that space is the online safety Bill, which is an inadequate reaction to protecting children and other vulnerable internet users who are being exposed to things online that they would be protected from in the physical world. Meanwhile, there is nothing to encourage or facilitate our musicians and performers, who are facing the disastrous twin impacts on their livelihood of a global pandemic and restrictions on their ability to tour in the European Union.

We on these Benches believe in freedom and fair play—what some might call traditional British values. That includes the freedom to succeed no matter who you are or what your background or backstory is, and the freedom of the individual from unnecessary interference by government. Yet this Conservative Government seek to unfairly discriminate, further marginalising minorities and the poor, further limiting challenges to government overreach, and pursuing populist policies where the evidence clearly shows that they do not work. This is a Queen’s Speech of promising headlines with unintended negative consequences.

Proposals to ensure that speakers are not “no-platformed” in universities make it more likely those with radical views—ones that need to be heard, challenged and debated—are not invited in the first place. The electoral integrity Bill is a solution in search of a non-existent problem, and is likely to disproportionately disfranchise the poor and ethnic minorities.

Whether through the extension of treason offences, or longer and longer prison sentences for existing offences, not only are the Government pursuing a policy that has proved to be ineffective in deterring criminals, they are adding to overcrowding in prisons, making rehabilitation more difficult and radicalisation easier. Sedition has its roots in the perceived unfairness of society, and draconian punishment is one of those unfairnesses.

In their immigration proposals, the Government seek to penalise legitimate asylum seekers, contrary to our international obligations on refugee resettlement. This is not because they do not have a valid and lawful right to seek sanctuary in the UK, but because they arrive here by what the Government consider the wrong route. For the majority of those desperate enough to put their lives at risk by crossing the channel, there is no alternative safe and legal route to take. There is currently no way for those being bombed in Syria by their own President, or those caught between warring factions in Yemen, to claim asylum within their own country. All UK resettlement schemes are currently closed, with no plans or timetable for reopening them, nor for establishing new ones.

Instead of first establishing or re-establishing resettlement schemes and setting targets for the number of asylum seekers to whom the UK will give sanctuary, the Government are spending millions of pounds on barbed wire and enforcement patrols on the French coast. They are forcing legitimate asylum seekers into the hands of people traffickers—the only people who know how to get around the increased security measures.

One people smuggler, quoted by the Guardian, said:

“We thank your government for our full pockets.”


If you say to voters in the red or blue wall, “Look at these illegal immigrants crossing the channel”, you encourage xenophobia. If you say, “This is the only way these desperate people, who are not safe in their own country, can seek sanctuary here”, you encourage understanding. It is a choice, and the Conservative Government, through their immigration proposals, are choosing the former.

In the year of the 40th anniversary of the Brixton riots, this Conservative Government choose to ignore the recommendations of the Scarman report and instead condone enforcing the law over maintenance of the Queen’s peace, as we saw at the Clapham Common vigil. At the same time, they fail to address the unfairness, discrimination and waste of scarce police resources on disproportionate stop and search.

Placing further restrictions on protests might seem reasonable in the light of the Extinction Rebellion protests last year. I know from years of experience as an advanced public order-trained senior police officer that it takes several degrees of magnitude more police officers to enforce a ban on a demonstration than it does to work with organisers to ensure compliance with conditions. Outside London, the majority of police leaders consulted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary said that it was not a lack of legislation but a lack of police resources that was the limiting factor in policing protests.

What are the consequences? Following the tragic case of Sarah Everard, the Mayor of London claimed that women and girls were not safe on the streets of London. The commissioner of the Met barely qualified that statement last week, when she said that the streets were

“not safe for everyone all of the time.”

The streets of London are not safe because police officers are increasingly being withdrawn from their beats to enforce bans on demonstrations and because they are targeting stop and search on black people, looking for drugs. You are eight times more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs if you are black, but no more likely than white people to be found with drugs. The overwhelming majority of stop searches are for drugs, not for knives. No wonder the black community still feels “overpoliced and underprotected”, as a black clergyman told the Macpherson inquiry into the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence.

We all want the freedom to be able to walk our streets in safety and for our women friends and family to walk safely down any street at any time. For this to happen, we must restore a visible policing presence, as the National Police Chiefs’ Council said yesterday. We do not want even more of our police officers sitting in police vans, ready to enforce a ban on a peaceful protest —which is the likely consequence of the Government’s proposals. We do not want our police officers wasting their time stopping and searching innocent people in the vain hope of finding a small quantity of drugs. We want violent criminals to be in fear of the police, not for women and girls to be in fear of men.

Fair play is not just about protecting the most vulnerable. It is part of what makes us proud to be British. Fair play is not just about ensuring lawful protest and that black people feel welcomed and protected. It is about focusing scarce police resources on ensuring everyone’s freedom to walk the streets in safety. Freedom and fair play are what make our country great. This Government’s proposals are in danger of undermining that greatness.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 21st April 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)]

Does anyone else in the Chamber wish to speak? No? I call the next speaker on the list, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, has said, with the best will in the world, much of the legislation that this House passes will be ineffective if judges do not understand the issues. Sadly, in some cases—albeit a limited number—it is clear that they do not understand the issues surrounding domestic abuse, in particular, coercive control, rape and sexual abuse, despite current training.

To the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, I would say that there is a difference between outputs and outcomes. I am not sure whether this is an appropriate analogy, but I know from my own experience of race relations training, for example, that the cultural shift needed is difficult to achieve. The proof of the pudding is in the eating and, at times, the training of the judiciary has failed the test. Despite the Minister’s assertion, I fail to understand how mandating such training without dictating the specific content can be contrary to the principle of judicial independence, as my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames has said.

However, we are grateful for the reassurances that the Government have given as a result of the concerted efforts by the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, we on these Benches support the intention behind the noble Baroness’s amendment. The case for improved training is well made. The amendment’s wording does not dictate what the training should be but puts the requirement for it in the Bill. Around the House, I think that we can all agree on the need for updated, quality training and to ensure that it happens.

I have said many times that this is a good Bill and will be a good Act of Parliament, but it is important that everything is done to ensure that all aspects of the law are correct. That includes ensuring that our judges and magistrates are properly trained. We owe that to victims, because domestic abuse is something that we now talk about in the country and in the House. That was not the case many years ago and we should not just assume that judges and magistrates completely understand the issues. That is why it is important that we get the training right.

I accept entirely the point the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, makes about judicial independence. I think we all support that, but there have been one or two occasions at the other end of the building when other parts of the Conservative Party were not so keen on judicial independence, when the judge made a decision that they did not like—we should get that on the record. It is not always the case that there is a great call of support for judicial independence, but I will leave the point there. I do not in any way bring the noble Lord into that; I have the highest respect for him.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

I must ask at this point: does anyone in the Chamber wish to speak? No? In that case it is over to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, it really is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for reasons that will become apparent, not least because we are three non-lawyers in a row.

On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, wondered whether I was accusing the Government of being misogynistic, following on from what the noble Baroness has just said. I say very clearly that that is not what I said or intended to say. I shall clarify. The essence of misogyny, as I understand it, is hatred of women who fail to comply with the sexist stereotype of a compliant, subordinate woman—hatred of women who stand up for themselves. I am not accusing the Government of hating women, but in my opinion there are echoes of that view of women being subordinate in their approach to this issue.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, has said, on the face of it the Government’s refusal to extend the so-called householder defence to victims of domestic abuse who use disproportionate force against their abusers in self-defence in the same way that a householder is allowed to use disproportionate force against an intruder appears to smack of the view that men should stand and fight but women should run away.

I do not intend to go over the arguments that I made at previous stages of the Bill; suffice it to say that I do not believe the Government’s arguments hold water. As a result, I am led to the conclusions that I have expressed. I would not be averse to the Government repealing the so-called householder defence, but I believe that to allow predominantly male householders to avail themselves of such a defence while not extending it to predominantly women victims of domestic abuse is inconsistent and incompatible.

While I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, about Lords Amendment 38, in my view the Government’s approach is again inconsistent. The law specifically provides a statutory defence to victims of modern slavery when those victims are compelled to commit an offence, even though there is an existing common-law defence of duress. When it comes to victims of domestic abuse who are compelled to commit an offence as a result of such abuse, the Government argue that the existing common-law defence of duress is sufficient. Either the existing common-law defence of duress is sufficient for both victims of domestic abuse and victims of modern slavery or it is not. In my view, the Government should not be able to have it both ways.

Clearly, these anomalies need to be addressed. Motion D1 provides for an independent review of defences for those who offend due to domestic abuse, which we support. The review of sentencing as suggested by the Government does not appear to us to go far enough.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws set out in detail the case for her amendments in Committee and on Report, and it is disappointing that they have been rejected by the other place. In response, she has tabled Motion D1 in her name. As we have heard, she is seeking an independent review to look at the issues that we have been talking about throughout our consideration of these matters. I think that is the right way forward.

I am conscious that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, is resisting the new Motion from my noble friend, but she made the point, as have others, that if the Government are resisting the issues raised in the amendment, he ought to address the question of whether they could be looked at by the review of sentencing—or is that a step too far for the Government?

There is a huge issue here. I recall the debates that we had when my noble friend and others presented harrowing cases. There is a real point here: if there is an intruder in someone’s house then, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, often a male can defend himself there and has a defence, but a woman attacked by her partner in her own home, which should be a place of safety, cannot rely on such a defence. That cannot be right.

The Bill is seeking to address the whole issue of domestic abuse in all its various facets. It is a good Bill, but it would be an even better one if we could make sure that all the gaps were plugged here. The fact is that women in their own homes, their place of safety, can often find themselves in very dangerous situations. If they have to defend themselves and end up injuring or killing their partner, we should understand that and ensure that they have the proper defences to take account of the difficult situation that they have found themselves in, often over many years. After all, these things escalate; they do not happen overnight.

My noble friend has identified an important point here, and I hope that when the Minister responds he can address it. We need to find a way to look at the issues that my noble friend raised in the review of sentencing, as he referred to in his earlier remarks.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

Does anyone else in the Chamber wish to speak at this point? No? I therefore call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Commons reason for disagreeing with Lords Amendment 40 relies on a government review of a report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. In light of the two recent reports by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary on the policing of protests, I now have serious concerns about HMIC’s political independence. As a result, any Commons disagreement based on a government review of immigration control, let alone one based on an HMIC report, provides me with no reassurance whatever.

Motion E1 would ensure that the personal details of victims and witnesses of domestic abuse were not used for immigration control purposes. Victims of rape or sexual assault, as well as victims of domestic abuse, who have gone to the police have been deported as a result of coming forward as vulnerable victims of serious crime. Perpetrators of rape, sexual assault and domestic violence threaten victims that, if they go to the police, they will be deported.

Can the Government help with what I understand to be their position on how the sharing of information between police and immigration enforcement can benefit victims of domestic abuse? Is it their position that were a victim to be subject to coercive control on the basis of their immigration status, sharing information with immigration enforcement could establish that the victim’s immigration status was in fact compliant, removing the mechanism of coercive control? If that is the Government’s argument, how is that sharing of personal information without consent compliant with GDPR? It is outside the exemption provided by paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018, which provides an exemption only for the maintenance of effective immigration control, or the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control.

As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has just said, it matters not what a victim’s immigration status is, if the victim fears that the consequences of reporting a crime of which they are the victim or witness might be their deportation. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London has said, there is one other question for the Government: what is more important, ending violence against women, girls and other vulnerable victims of serious crime, or immigration control? If the Government oppose Motion E1, they are sending a very clear message that they care more about immigration control than protecting vulnerable victims of crime. We on these Benches will always put ending violence against women, girls and other vulnerable victims first, by voting with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, if she divides the House. The noble Baroness has taken full account of the concerns of the other place and there appears to us to be no reason not to support her alternative amendments.

[Baroness Wilcox of Newport (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I make it clear at the outset that if the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, divides the House then the Opposition Benches will strongly support her. This amendment would provide for the circumstances where victims’ data cannot be shared for immigration purposes if they come forward to report abuse. However, and importantly, it provides that, for this section to come into force, there must be a vote in both Houses to approve it, after either the Government have published their review and Parliament has debated it, or after 1 July if the Government have regrettably not lived up to their word and published their review by then. This amendment rightly and democratically gives Parliament the ability to hold the Government to account on taking action after they publish their review. It is needed to allow victims to feel able to report abuse without fear, so that dangerous perpetrators are reported and stopped.

One of the consequences of putting immigration control above the safety of victims is that perpetrators can commit these crimes with impunity—a risk not only for survivors but for wider communities. Better trust in the police to protect victims of abuse and investigate crime for migrant women will improve responses for all survivors, and indeed the public.

This revised amendment is a thoroughly reasonable backstop. It gives the Government the time they have asked for to publish their review, but it gives Parliament the power, and indeed the responsibility, to hold the Government to account and to demand action on this issue if there is no subsequent implementation. I wholly recommend the amendment to the Minister and to the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has withdrawn. I have no notification of unlisted speakers, but does anyone in the Chamber wish to speak? No. In that case, I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I start by joining other noble Lords in paying tribute to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who has been a passionate campaigner on these issues. I was going to say that she had stepped down from the Front Bench, but she has stepped up to bigger and better things in the House, and I personally will miss her greatly.

Lords Amendment 41 would have provided a route for victims of domestic abuse who are subject to immigration control to be given the opportunity to apply for leave to remain—not given leave to remain but given the opportunity to apply—by allowing them to stay in the UK pending the outcome of their application and to be supported financially during this time. Many of these victims are reliant on their abusive partner for support, making escape from domestic abuse almost impossible. Initially, the Government said the reason they objected was that they thought people might falsely claim to be victims of domestic abuse in order to seek leave to remain in the UK. Again, we have to ask: what is more important, protecting vulnerable victims of domestic abuse or immigration control? The Commons reason is simply

“Because the Amendment would involve a charge on public funds”.


The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester has presented an alternative amendment, a very modest amendment, that seeks to address all the concerns the Government have previously expressed. There is a £1.5 million 12-month pilot supporting such victims of domestic abuse, and the amendment simply ensures that, during the pilot period, victims are not turned down because of a lack of funds. It then sets a timetable for the introduction of a permanent solution once the results of the pilot have been evaluated. The amendment comprehensively sets out the evidence necessary to show that someone is a genuine victim of domestic abuse. This alternative amendment is the very least the Government should do for these particularly vulnerable victims of domestic abuse, and we would support the right reverend Prelate were she to divide the House.

Lords Amendment 43 would have ensured that all victims of domestic abuse received equal protection and support irrespective of their status, including their immigration status. The Commons reason for disagreeing was that it would

“involve a charge on public funds”.

Indeed it might—but it would also have been a significant step towards the UK finally being able to ratify the Istanbul convention. The noble Baroness, Lady Helic, has proposed an alternative amendment that would at least ensure that local authorities consider the needs of all victims, including migrant women, when they make strategic decisions about tackling domestic abuse. This cannot be the landmark Bill the Government intend it to be unless it puts the final pieces into place to enable the UK to ratify the Istanbul convention. I recall an expression my mother was fond of: “Don’t spoil the ship for a ha’porth of tar.”

I was hoping that this Bill could be, like the Modern Slavery Act, a magnificent piece of legislation of which all sides of the House could be justifiably proud. We have already vastly improved the Bill in this House; it would be a shame if we now left it less than watertight.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

As we have heard, Lords Amendments 41 and 43 were both disagreed by the Commons because they would involve a charge on public funds. The Commons did not offer any further reason. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, have now tabled Amendments F1 and F2. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, provides that local authorities “must have regard” to Article 4(3) of the Istanbul convention when they are preparing their strategy for accommodation-based services under the Bill. Article 4(3) of the convention provides that protection for victims must be secured without discrimination based on any ground such as race, religion or migrant status. We support the aim of this amendment, which also serves to remind the Government of their commitment to ratify the vital Istanbul convention, for which they have not yet set a timeframe. Perhaps we will hear something definite on this point in the Government’s response to this amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

3rd reading
Thursday 11th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we on these Benches want to do everything we can to make the UK safer. What we sought to do in the Bill was to protect civil liberties and the rule of law. We have questioned the presumption that longer sentences, and people spending more time in prison, will make UK citizens safer. Instead, we have been trying to create a system in which prisoners stand the best chance of being deradicalised and rehabilitated.

As the noble Lord has said, terrorism prevention and investigation measures are supposed to do exactly what it says on the tin—to prevent terrorism while an investigation takes place. The changes the Government sought to bring about would have made it possible to extend TPIMs indefinitely, including what could amount to house arrest, by removing the overnight restrictions on curfews. Unless the compromise amendment forced on the Government by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, survives ping-pong, indefinite detention without trial beckons.

The Bill extends compulsory lie detector—polygraph —tests not only to convicted terrorists on licence from prison, but to subjects of TPIMs orders who are not convicted, and should have the right to silence. Instead, those unconvicted suspects face a term of imprisonment for not answering questions. The long-established right to silence has been eroded.



It is not all bad. As a result of the briefings arranged by the Government, as the Minister said, I am now convinced of the benefits of the limited use of polygraph tests for those released on licence from prison and I am reassured by the efforts being made to manage the risks presented by terrorist offenders on release from prison, although I still believe that they could be enhanced by extending the remit of the Parole Board, as sensibly proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. On a personal level, I am very grateful for the open and engaging way in which both Ministers have interacted with us, for the engagement with like-minded noble Lords across the House and to our own and Labour’s staff members, Sarah and Grace, for the considerable help and assistance they have provided.

Finally, I would be lost without the help and support of my noble friends, in particular my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and my noble friend Lady Hamwee, whose contributions in the Chamber are just the tip of an iceberg of dedication, superhuman effort and selfless support for others.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for such clarity in raising some of my concerns. My enthusiasm for the Domestic Abuse Bill is somewhat muted by the worrying trend from the Government more broadly to use civil protection notices and orders to expand the coercive powers of the state, criminalising a greater range of behaviours without the bother of reaching the burden of proof of criminal law.

To be honest, I was surprised that those who usually speak up on civil liberties in this place seemed rather quiet on this, which is why I was glad to see this amendment. I know that the issue of domestic abuse is emotive and sensitive, and that we all want to do what we can to oppose it, but due process is important too, so I warmly welcome this amendment and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising it.

It is a crucial amendment, because it aims to ensure that a criminal standard of proof is applied to a breach of a domestic abuse order. That is just not clear as the legislation is written. It seems an important protection for justice and the rule of law. The danger of any hybridisation of civil and criminal instruments is that criminal penalties can be given out without satisfying the criminal burden of proof, which means that someone can effectively be found guilty of a crime and labelled as a proven abuser without a legal test or representation. That feels far too subjective in the Bill, as it stands.

Of course, I understand that breaches of orders must have consequences. They are not just a piece of paper; they are not just there for show. The amendment seeks to clarify how the judgment of a “reasonable excuse” for a breach in the legislation, or that it was “beyond reasonable doubt”, is arrived at. It must be the role of the courts, but it is just not clear.

Dispensing with the criminal burden of proof can have some unintended consequences that are not in the interests of the victim either. Some campaigners fear that the police may choose to use breaches of an order as an easier alternative to proving charges for more serious criminal offences, such as assault or criminal damage. A lower threshold may imply that something has been done by the authorities—as it were, ticking a box—but perhaps more should be done. If the police go about choosing an easier tick-box solution, without the nuisance of gathering evidence that can be tested, that is a bad outcome, so we must ensure that order breaches are not used as an alternative to pursing criminal charges where appropriate.

It is also nerve-racking that some breaches of an order may be relatively minor and very far from criminally threatening to anyone, least of all the person the order is protecting. Some fear that alleged victims may be deterred from reporting breaches if that automatically criminalises their partner or their ex-partner, who might perhaps be the parent of their children.

The worry is that those who the Bill seeks to protect are being sidelined in the process and potentially disempowered. Their agency is potentially undermined by decisions taken by the police or third parties who can use breaches of an order to criminalise alleged perpetrators, regardless of what the victim wants or of however minor the breach. If that were to happen, the main loser would ultimately be due process. I therefore support this amendment wholeheartedly and look forward to the Minister clarifying this or reassuring us that this is not a way of avoiding a criminal burden of proof.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I want to go one step back and start with domestic abuse prevention notices. These can be given by a relatively junior police officer, despite what the legislation describes as a “senior police officer”—I was a police inspector at the age of 23—on the basis that he has reasonable grounds to believe that P has been abusive towards another person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected and reasonably believes that the notice is necessary to protect the person from abuse by P. If P breaches the notice, P can be arrested and must be held in custody before they can be brought before the court. That is a lot of power invested in a relatively junior and potentially inexperienced police officer, with serious consequences for P. A practical alternative might be to seek the authority of a magistrate, in a similar way that the police might seek a search warrant, which can be done at short notice, on a 24/7 basis. Did the Government consider such an alternative?

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, domestic abuse prevention orders can be made by a court on application, and must be applied for if P is already subject to a domestic abuse protection notice. The orders are made on the basis that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities, the civil standard of proof, that P has been abusive towards a person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected and the order is necessary and proportionate to protect that person from domestic abuse, or the risk of domestic abuse, carried out by P.

The order can be made in the absence of P, and it can impose a range of prohibitions and requirements. If P fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the order, he commits a criminal offence and can be imprisoned for up to five years. Normally an accused person is convicted of a criminal offence only if the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and while I accept that a breach of the order might be so proved, the basis upon which the order is given is on the balance of probabilities.

When this House debated knife crime prevention orders, we discussed whether the breach of what is effectively a civil order, granted on the balance of probabilities, should result in a criminal offence, rather than a fine or a term of imprisonment for contempt of court without a criminal conviction being recorded against the perpetrator. In that case, the Government claimed that it was the police who said that a criminal sanction was necessary, rather than a civil penalty, in order for perpetrators to take them seriously. What is the Government’s reason this time?

As we discussed then, Parliament changed a similar regime introduced under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, whereby breach of the civil order resulted in the criminalisation of many young people with no previous convictions for breach of an anti-social behaviour order or ASBO. Parliament replaced ASBOs with anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices—a purely civil process—by means of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

On the basis of hearsay, potentially a malicious allegation, someone could be given a domestic abuse protection order, breach of which may result in a criminal conviction and a term of imprisonment. Can the Minister please explain why it is necessary for a criminal record to be created when there is a breach of the civil domestic abuse prevention order when it is not necessary in relation to anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am speaking to this amendment on the basis that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said that she will not be moving it to a vote, and that what she is seeking is, essentially, for the Minister to read into the record the contents of the letter the noble Baroness received, in which the Minister explained the nature of the process when people breach the DAPO.

I thought I would address a couple of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, when she opened her contribution, in her typically provocative way, by saying she feared that the state was expanding its coercive powers. In some ways, the situation is more extreme than she or the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said.

I remind the House that I sit as a magistrate in family and criminal cases; in particular, I sit on domestic abuse-related criminal cases. In domestic abuse criminal cases, if we find a perpetrator not guilty, we still occasionally give them what is now called a restraining order. We do that because although the necessary standard of proof has not been met, the alleged victim is clearly vulnerable, so we put a restraining order in place in any event. In the family court, we use non-molestation orders.

The purpose of the DAPO is to supersede restraining orders and non-molestation orders, but we very frequently put non-molestation orders in place without the alleged perpetrator present. The alleged perpetrator will be told of it and given an opportunity to come to court and argue against the imposition of a non-molestation order, but the reason the process is as I have described is to protect the woman, as it is usually. I understand that the purpose of the DAPN and the DAPO is to supersede the arrangements we have in place.

I understand the points the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made about the appropriateness of these sorts of orders when compared to ASBOs and community protection notices. They are points he has made before and they are interesting. Nevertheless, as I said in my opening, I see that the purpose of this short debate is for the Minister to put on the record the contents of the letter he has written to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to make crystal clear the standard of proof that would be necessary to get a conviction for breaching these orders.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I start by addressing directly the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I have spoken before about the abusive relationship that I was in 20 years ago. What I have not talked about is the intimate video that my then partner recorded and subsequently kept in his father’s safe in France. People may question why anyone would allow such a video to be recorded, but in a coercive and controlling relationship, compliance is rewarded and defiance is punished. When what you most want is the love of your partner, and you know that not doing what he wants could result in alienation, abuse or physical violence, you acquiesce to things that you would not normally participate in.

I lost count of the number of times he threatened that, if he I left him, he would make the video public. It was not until I went on a residential training course beyond his immediate control and started talking to a female colleague that I realised how unhealthy the relationship was and how unacceptable his behaviour was. I resolved to end it. When I told him the relationship was over, after the initial fear from his threats to kill me, followed by the relief I felt when he finally removed his belongings from my home, the dread that he would deliver on his promise to release the intimate video became even more intense. That is why this amendment is needed.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, have said, revenge may also be a motivation and further reform may be necessary. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for raising the issue of threatening to disclose private sexual photographs and films with an intent to cause distress, and to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for accepting her amendments. Threatening to disclose such material can be used as a means of coercive control both during a relationship and after it has ended, so we on these Benches support these important changes.

[Baroness Wilcox of Newport (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I must begin by applauding the frankness and honesty of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in his speech. It is truly humbling to hear him speak so bravely about his own former coercive partner.

In bringing this much-needed amendment to the House, the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, has recognised the changes that have occurred in society since the widespread introduction of mobile phone technologies and social media coverage. It has changed irreversibly the way in which we communicate, and the inherent dangers of the misuse of that communication have become increasingly prevalent. I warmly support her tenacity in getting the amendment through the process. Clearly, her colleagues and former colleagues in Government have listened and acted on her arguments. It will make a difference.

As a former teacher of media studies, I had no idea, just five years ago, when I was last in the classroom, how exploitative or dangerous the medium would become. The threat to share intimate or sexual images and films is an increasingly common tool of coercive control, which can have enormous negative impacts on survivors of abuse. While the sharing of intimate and sexual images without consent is a crime, threats to share are not, leaving survivors of this form of abuse without the protection of the criminal law.

During my reading for this topic, I was powerfully moved by a key report, Shattering Lives and Myths, written by Professor Clare McGlynn and others at Durham Law School, which was launched in 2019 at the Supreme Court. It sets out the appalling consequences for victims of intimate images being posted on the internet without consent.

Threats to share these images play on fear and shame and can be particularly dangerous where there may be multiple perpetrators or where so-called honour-based abuse is a factor. The advent of new technologies enables perpetrators to make these threats even where such images do not exist. But there is no clear criminal sanction for this behaviour. Lack of support leaves victims and survivors isolated, often attempting to navigate alone an unfamiliar, complex and shifting terrain of legal provisions and online regulation. The Domestic Abuse Bill is the most appropriate vehicle to make this change. Victims and survivors would benefit almost immediately and it would help them prevent further abuse and get away from their perpetrator. This amendment will close that gap in the law.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I agree with every word that we have heard so far, and I have signed all three of these amendments—I think that they are superb and have been carefully and expertly drafted. It is deeply unfortunate that the Government have not adopted them as part of their unusually co-operative approach in this Bill.

The need is very clear: the deeply sad Sally Challen case was only one proof point of the lack of legal protection available for survivors of domestic abuse. Women get a terrible deal in the criminal justice system. Most are there for non-violent offences, and many are there for really minor things like not paying their TV licence. However, sometimes, violence does happen, and, where that is related to domestic abuse, there needs to be a sufficient legal defence to recognise the reduced culpability.

It is obvious that judges and, sometimes, lawyers do not understand coercive control and other abuses. The excellent report from the Centre for Women’s Justice, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, referred to, is called Women Who Kill—I will give a copy of the executive summary to the Minister afterwards to make sure that he reads it. It lays out the response of the criminal justice system to women who kill abusive partners and the way the law itself, and the way it is applied, prevent women from accessing justice.

Women who have been abused by the man they kill are unlikely to be acquitted on the basis of self-defence. Of the 92 cases included in the research for the report, 40—that is 43%—were convicted of murder. Some 42—that is 46%—were convicted of manslaughter, and just six, which is only 7%, were acquitted. The use of weapons is an aggravating factor in determining the sentence, and the report found that, in 73 cases—that is 79%—the women used a weapon to kill their partner. This is fairly unsurprising, given women’s relative size and physical strength and their knowledge of their partner’s capacity to be violent.

However, as other noble Lords have pointed out, this contrasts with the legal leeway given to householders if they kill or injure a burglar. Therefore, we need legislative reform to extend provisions of householder defence to women who use force against their abuser. It is discriminatory to have a defence available to householders defending themselves but not to women in abusive relationships defending themselves against someone who they know can be dangerous and violent towards them.

In the week that Sarah Everard was abducted and, we suppose, killed—because remains have been found in a woodland in Kent—I argue that, at the next opportunity for any Bill that is appropriate, I might put in an amendment to create a curfew for men on the streets after 6 pm. I feel this would make women a lot safer, and discrimination of all kinds would be lessened.

However, once convicted, women’s chances of successful appeal are extremely slim. Society’s understanding of domestic abuse has come such a long way, even in the last few years, yet a jury is forced to apply outdated ideas of self-defence, such as responding to a threat of imminent harm, which have no relation to the realities of domestic abuse.

The Government have said that they are persuaded on the issue but will

“monitor the use of the existing defences and keep under review the need for any statutory changes.”

I simply do not believe that that is true. It is not appropriate for the sort of crimes that we are talking about. As such, can the Minister please tell me which Minister is charged with this review, how many civil servants are involved and when will they report?

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee has already set out our support for all three of these amendments but I want to address the Minister’s remarks in Committee on Amendment 50.

I have seen misogyny described as the hatred of women who fail to accept the subordinate role ascribed to them by a patriarchal society, who fail to conform to the misogynist’s belief that women should be no more than compliant and decorative, whose role is to serve the needs of men. Out of such a false and outdated narrative comes the idea that physically stronger men should stand and fight while physically weaker women should run away. I am very sad to say that this appeared to be the Government’s position when we discussed these amendments in Committee.

In Committee, the Minister said correctly that what is sought is an extension to the current provisions to enable victims of domestic abuse to have the same level of protection as those acting in response to an intruder in their home. That is, the degree of force used in self-defence by the defendant would have to be grossly disproportionate rather than simply disproportionate.

The Minister suggested that judges have developed common law defences and that we should trust them to apply these to domestic abuse cases. However, the Government did not trust the judges when it came to someone acting in response to an intruder in their home, passing primary legislation to change the acceptable degree of force to include disproportionate force in such circumstances by means of Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.

The Minister took up the challenge I put to him to demonstrate the difference between this amendment and Section 76. He said that in the case of an intruder, the householder is put in a position where they are acting

“on instinct or in circumstances which subject them to intense stress.”—[Official Report, 3/2/21; col. 2285.]

He also noted that the amendment did not appear to deal with the defendant’s option to retreat. Section 76 makes it clear there is no duty for a householder to retreat. With the greatest respect to the Minister, I suggest that it would appear from the Government’s response that neither he nor those advising him have been the victim of domestic violence. I have, and I can tell the Minister that when you are cornered in your own home—the one place where you should feel safe—by an abusive partner who is using physical violence against you, you are subjected to intense stress and there is a distinct possibility that you will react instinctively.

As I said in Committee, in my experience, having been physically threatened by an intruder and having been physically assaulted by my then partner, the intense stress is far worse and sustained when the person you rely on for love and affection snaps and attacks you or subjects you to abuse over a prolonged time. My own experience of domestic violence is that retreat just encourages further violence. Why should a victim of domestic violence retreat but the victim of a burglary stand and fight?

As noble Lords will have gathered by now, I am not a believer in domestic abuse being defined as a gendered crime—that it is overwhelmingly male violence against women. In my case, it was the fact that my abusive partner was far stronger than me that meant he felt able to attack me. However, two-thirds of victims are women and the overwhelming majority of them will be victims of male violence. Men are, on average, physically stronger than women and abusive men may even seek out weaker women to facilitate their abuse. Women are therefore far more likely to have to resort to the use of a weapon in what would otherwise be an unequal physical contest when they are attacked by a male partner. Their use of force is therefore more likely to be considered disproportionate, albeit understandable.

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[Baroness Bertin (Con) [V]]

My Lords, given the hour I will be very brief. I thank the Government and my noble friend the Minister for listening and laying their own amendments to close the loophole I raised in Committee. It is a very small gap, but one it is right to fill. Doing so sends the right signal domestically and internationally. The UN said in a recent report that the home is still one of the most dangerous places for women. In many countries, sex is still seen as an automatic part of the marriage contract. No data on marital rape is collected in many countries, where not only is it not a crime but social pressure means that it is rarely reported or discussed. We have been pioneers in this area of law; it is right that this country be able to uphold the high standards of our legislation at all times.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for identifying this gap whereby marital rape is not an offence in some countries and therefore British nationals would not have been convicted had they committed marital rape in them. I am very grateful to the Minister for responding to the identification of that gap and closing it effectively.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses marital rape, whereby rape could be committed by a UK citizen in a country that does not consider it a crime and, presently, no prosecution could be brought. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, brought the matter to the attention of the House in Committee and has been successful in persuading the Government of the merits of her case and the importance of closing this loophole.

I offer her my sincere congratulations on her success. Her actions will protect women and girls from the horrific crime of rape and ensure that no rapist or perpetrator of these vile crimes can evade justice through making use of this loophole in the law and hide behind the fact that marital rape is not a crime in a small number of countries. This is a good example of the House of Lords doing its job well. An important issue was raised, well argued and supported across the House; the Government considered it carefully and responded positively, bringing forward their own amendments to address the issue.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I make a short intervention to support the amendment so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marks; it is carefully put and more than adequate. I support it because it is important that a close look is had into the workings of these important sections. One year should be sufficient, with the emphasis on consultation, which is vital to get an independent reviewer to take the temperature of how the Act is working.

In my many visits to prisons in my professional career, I was deeply aware of how prisoners live cheek by jowl. Particularly in the absence of other subjects of conversation, I would have thought, as a lay man, that prisons were fertile ground for radicalisation. It goes without saying that expert advice is needed. We are considering longer sentences, reform and rehabilitation, radicalisation and segregation—all vital subjects—and we should look at how the Act is working. With those few words, it is a pleasure to commend the amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames has outlined, our Amendment 16 in this group calls for a review of the impacts of Part 1of the Bill. Why is such a review needed? The Explanatory Notes to the Bill describe its purpose as being to better protect the public from terrorism, effectively by two main means: ensuring that serious and dangerous terrorist offenders spend longer in custody, and supporting their disengagement from extremism and their rehabilitation.

I am pleased to note there is no longer any pretence that longer sentences act as a deterrent to terrorist offenders. There was no such claim from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, either, when he introduced the Bill to this House on Second Reading. That will save some time.

The two premises on which the Bill is based appear to be these: that the public are better protected from terrorists if terrorist offenders are in prison longer; and that a range of tailored interventions while they are in prison will lead to their disengagement from extremism and their rehabilitation. In short, the longer they are in prison, the less likely they are to pose a threat to the public and the more time is available to deradicalise and rehabilitate them.

The first and most obvious problem with the first premise is that you cannot detain every suspected terrorist for the rest of their lives, despite the Government’s attempts in this Bill to achieve exactly that for some terrorist offenders. With an increasing number of exceptions were this Bill to be passed unamended, you cannot normally lock up suspected terrorists indefinitely or so curtail their freedoms as to effectively deprive them of their liberty indefinitely. We will come to the indefinite deprivation of liberty without charge or trial when we come to the changes to the terrorism prevention and investigation measures.

The Government’s current Prevent strategy, at paragraph 3.5, says that

“radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.”

Such propagandists exist in our prisons. The Government’s argument that the longer someone is in prison, the more time there is to support their disengagement and rehabilitation can also work against their deradicalisation and rehabilitation.

First, it provides more time for them to be radicalised, or further radicalised, by propagandists in prison. There is clear evidence that this is happening. On 25 January, the Times reports the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, as saying that there was an increasing “drumbeat” of links between prison and terror attacks, with offenders not being properly punished for owning radical material, preaching extremism and inciting violence. The Times notes that the man given a whole life sentence last month for murdering three men in a park in Reading in a terror attack last year was befriended by a radical preacher while serving an earlier prison sentence. Secondly, if these vulnerable people believe that the sanctions imposed on them are disproportionate, or that the system that led to their imprisonment was unfair, the ideology promulgated by these propagandists is made to appear even more attractive and compelling.

No one would argue against a proportionate sentence of imprisonment for someone convicted in a court of law of a terrorist offence, as my noble friend Lord Marks has just said, or that, for a limited time, a suspected terrorist who is believed to present a real and immediate threat should not have their liberty to carry out a terrorist attack prevented while evidence is gathered upon which to base a trial in a court of law. However, paragraph 3.6 of the same Prevent strategy says:

“There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.”


Disproportionately long sentences of imprisonment and indefinite deprivation of liberty without charge or trial would reinforce this rejection of our cohesive, integrated, multifaith society and parliamentary democracy. They would undermine any sense of belonging to this country and any support for our core values. Indeed, they begin to call into question some of our core values.

What evidence is there that it is easier to develop a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values while someone is in prison, compared with when they are on licence in the community? The Times article I quoted previously reports the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation as saying that encouraging and inciting terrorism were being

“successfully combated in the community”,

unlike the failure to address these issues in prison. Although he is to conduct a review of what is happening in prisons, it appears to be limited to examining how terrorism is detected, disrupted and prosecuted behind bars and whether improvements can be made, rather than the comprehensive review called for in our amendment.

For all these reasons, there is serious doubt whether Part 1 of the Bill will achieve what the Government intend by it; therefore, our Amendment 16 is necessary. Other amendments in this group call for a review of the financial impact of the Bill and the impact on the prison population, both of which could hamper the effectiveness of any deradicalisation or rehabilitation strategy and any attempt to prevent radicalisation or further radicalisation in prison. Reviews are called for on the specific impact of the Bill in Northern Ireland and on the National Probation Service, and we support these amendments as well.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we have had a wide-ranging introduction to this group from both the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Paddick. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said in his introduction, the amendments in this group call for a series of reviews of different aspects of the system. He expressed his misgivings and uncertainty that the system as it currently operates is succeeding and concluded his remarks by saying that a more sophisticated approach is needed.

Amendment 16 is the first amendment regarding the independent review of provisions, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has spoken. The second in the group, Amendment 34 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, is concerned with the financial impact of the changes. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a financial impact assessment of the Act within three years of it coming into force, and this would include the financial impact of extended sentences, extended licence periods, and any additional staffing resources needed as a result of the Act.

Amendment 36 in my name calls for a capacity impact assessment. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish an assessment of the capacity of the system as a whole. In their 2016 White Paper, Prison Safety and Reform, the then Government committed to £1.3 billion to create 10,000 new prison places by 2020 and to renovate the existing estate. The 2020 target was later changed to 2022; so far, only 206 new prison places have been built, with 3,360 under construction. The main reasons for those failures and delays were the delays in agreeing and receiving funding to build new prisons. This meant that the construction work began later than planned. In addition, HMPPS was not able to close all prisons and replace them with new ones, due to high demand, which meant it received less money from the sales of old prisons.

Amendment 38, also in my name, proposes a review of the legislation as it affects Northern Ireland. All measures in the Bill as they pertain to Northern Ireland would be reviewed annually with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive; a report would also have to be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament. This would ensure that the Government worked constructively with the Ministry of Justice and Northern Ireland Executive, and that all the Bill’s implications were subject to regular review through the prism of Northern Ireland.

Amendment 39 proposes a review of the National Probation Service. This would require the Government to commission and publish a review of the impact of the Bill on the National Probation Service within 18 months of it coming into force. The review would have to consider, among other things, the level of probation support offered to offenders, as well as the number of specialist staff employed by the National Probation Service, and their skills.

I have received some briefing material from Napo—formerly the National Association of Probation Officers —which makes the point that the probation service is in crisis and that many of the offender management teams are struggling to maintain a balance between experienced staff and newly qualified staff. It is not uncommon to find teams in the community where the most experienced officer has only two to three years of post-qualification experience. As recruitment increases, as it is projected to increase, the pressure on the frontline staff will grow, with more probation officers being moved into management and training roles to support the trainees. The point made by Napo is that a properly remunerated and supported expansion of the probation service is needed to face the challenges ahead.

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[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I support this amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, who has asked some very important questions. I say immediately that I valued very much the teach-in that I attended on Microsoft Teams on the working of the polygraph, and I thank the Minister for arranging it.

We are in a new field in this context, and an issue of this kind, when it is embedded on the face of the Bill, demands very close attention. I raised the issue briefly in my speech at Second Reading, and I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, when he states that we are on a learning curve. Having assisted my Minister, Barbara Castle, many years ago, in piloting through the House of Commons the breathalyser legislation to tackle drink driving, which was a very controversial issue at the time, I would be the last to oppose innovation per se, and I do not oppose this proposal. All I am anxious to know, in the fullness of time, is how it is working.

I learned at the teach-in that the polygraph is a useful tool in the management of offenders. It only gives an indication of past conduct, but it could be used to pick up warning signs on what might be done in the future, and is a significant tool for the management of offenders. The important point above all else was that an offender could not be recalled for failing a polygraph test. I believe that the Minister confirmed this in his reply to an earlier amendment. It is not a magic bullet and it is not 100% accurate. The examples given of its use, in the course of the teach-in, involved such questions as, “Have you had contact with other terrorist offenders?” or “Have you used the internet for any purposes contrary to your licence conditions?”. The polygraph cannot predict future conduct, only past conduct.

At the teach-in, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked whether the polygraph was used in other jurisdictions such as Canada, Israel and the USA. The reply was that it tended to be used for vetting purposes. It was not clear to me whether it could be used for other purposes. If I am wrong in my understanding of the observations that we have heard on this very helpful tool from a panel of experts, the Minister will correct me. However, the limited use of the polygraph is made clear in subsections (1) and (2) of the proposed new clause. It is important to put on the face of a Bill, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton has put in the amendment, the need for a pilot to be in use within six months, with a report to Parliament, in the terms of the amendment, within 12 months,

I will not take up the House’s valuable time in repeating the details that are set out in the amendment itself. All I will say is that, given the kind of problem that we face in the management of offenders, we should not shut our eyes to the possibilities of the actions now proposed. How important it will turn out to be will be a question of degree. Therefore, I support this amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I wish either that this group had been grouped with the previous group or that I had spoken in the previous group, as we seem to be going over the same ground. Can I also push my luck, at the invitation of the noble and learned Lord, as an out and proud non-lawyer and wonder out loud whether lawyers feel somewhat threatened that there might be a machine more able to tease out whether someone is telling the truth or not, or even to tease out a disclosure, than a lawyer? I do not believe lawyers need to worry. I feel this group and the previous one turned into an extension of the teach-in. But I shall press on.

Amendment 20, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, to which my noble friend has added her name, calls for a review of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders based on a pilot scheme. I take a slightly different view to my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Marks, probably because they are pure Liberal Democrats, unlike me, who am contaminated by 30 years’ experience as a police officer.

Yesterday, in discussion on the use of polygraph testing in the Domestic Abuse Bill, the Minister talked about how polygraph tests were used. I join other noble Lords in saying how helpful the teach-in on polygraph testing provided by the Ministry of Justice was, and I thank the ministry for it. In that presentation, if I recall correctly, we were told that the tests are 80% to 90% accurate, on the basis of tests carried out on sex offenders. The tests measure physiological changes that occur if someone is trying to think of a wrong answer about an experience they have had in the past. People usually instinctively think of the truthful answer before they offer a dishonest alternative, and this produces physiological changes that the tests pick up. The evidence suggests a dishonest response cannot be used in court, and it is not used to recall someone to prison, but it might prompt further investigation by the police. Failing the test is not a replacement for any other form of risk assessment.

From the notes I made at the time, which take me back to giving evidence in court as a police officer, polygraph tests also prompt disclosures that might not otherwise occur. If such a disclosure indicates the subject has breached their licence conditions or is a threat to the public, this can result in prison recall. In short, disclosures can result in immediate sanction, but failing the test can only lead to further investigation.

Although polygraph tests have been used on a large number of sex offenders and have, therefore, been thoroughly evaluated, it will be more difficult, even with a pilot, to evaluate use with terrorists, as there are far fewer of them. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford mentioned the right to silence, recalling what we were told in the teach-in. The difference here is that these are convicted offenders on licence, who have no right to silence. However, the science is the same whether we are dealing with sex offenders or terrorists, and polygraph tests are useful where there is a pattern of behaviour rather than a single act. It is, therefore, anticipated that their use in terrorism cases will be similarly effective. There has already been considerable experience of using polygraph tests and evaluating the results, somewhat at odds with the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. But in agreeing with the noble and learned Lord, I think that it is true to say there has been very limited, if any, experience of using polygraph tests in connection with terrorism offences.

I feel sure that the Government will use polygraph testing with terrorists and, as we will hear in a later group, those subject to TPIMs, on a trial basis, as they intend to do in relation to domestic abuse. But the opportunities to evaluate their effectiveness with terrorists will be more limited, because, as I said, the numbers are considerably smaller. I am sure the Minister will say whether I got that right.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, on the face of it the purpose of this amendment, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is to provide for a pilot of polygraph testing for terrorist offenders in the UK and for a report to be prepared and laid with a recommendation on commencement before the provisions are commenced. I appreciate, however, that the debate has gone a little broader than that, and I will try to respond in my remarks to all the points put to me. I should say at the outset that I am impressed by the note-taking ability of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which has obviously not diminished with time. I hope that the notes which he took are consistent with not only what he was told at the meeting, as I am sure they are, but with what I said on the previous group and what I am going to say on this group as well.

Polygraph examinations have been used successfully in the management of sexual offenders by the National Probation Service since 2013, following an initial pilot. Offenders involved in the pilot stated that, although they did not like being tested, for many it helped them modify their behaviour and comply with other licence conditions. While I therefore respectfully agree with the comments of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Morris of Aberavon, that we are on a learning curve, we are in fact someway up the curve, if I may put it in those terms. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was right to remind us of Clause 35(1), which provides for regulations in this context. The breathalyser is a good example, as put before the Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, of how we must always in the criminal justice field avoid being shy of using technology where it is available. The question is how it is to be used; it is in that context that I come to the questions put to me by the Members of the Committee.

Having put that provision in place for sexual offenders, the independent evaluation of mandatory testing on sexual offenders carried out by the University of Kent produced extremely positive results. As the Committee is aware, we have since rolled out polygraph testing in that context. We must therefore be wary of two things. First, we must be wary of the trap of saying that because something might or might not be used in “The Jeremy Kyle Show”, it should form no part of the criminal justice system. “The Jeremy Kyle Show”, which I think has now stopped, can look out for itself. My concern is to ensure that we have proper provisions for polygraph testing in the criminal justice system.

The second thing we must be careful of, if I may respectfully say so, is not to fall into the trap of thinking that anything which comes from the United States of America is inherently suspect in the criminal justice field. I would gently point out to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the American Polygraph Association’s standards are those of an international professional association for polygraph examiners. That association carries out research and provides accredited training for examiners. It also provides mandatory professional development training, which all examiners must complete every two years to maintain their accreditation. Its standards are used by examiners across the world, and the Government want to ensure that those standards are maintained for examinations conducted on terrorist offenders.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, we wish to see the current arrangements for terrorism prevention and investigation measures remain as they are, despite having concerns about them existing at all. As the name implies, these measures were designed to prevent terrorism while an investigation takes place. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has explained, intelligence is often received in relation to suspected terrorists that cannot be used in a criminal trial, either because it is not legally admissible or because it would reveal the source and potentially put the source’s life in danger. That needs to be balanced against Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, enshrined in British law by the Human Rights Act 1998. It requires that, in the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations or for any criminal charge against an individual, everyone is entitled to a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law—this despite what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has said about control orders withstanding such challenges in the past.

The answer to these potentially conflicting obligations is TPIMs, which are supposed to be a means of protecting the public while an investigation secures the evidence necessary to convict a person of a criminal offence. They were not intended to be indefinite house arrest without trial. As we will see in the groups that follow, the Government seek to overturn this principle of a time-limited safeguarding tool during an investigation into effectively indefinite deprivation of human rights without trial.

The conditions imposed by a TPIM can be draconian, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said. The subject can be told where to live and have to tell the authorities about anyone else who lives with them. They may need to get permission to stay somewhere else, they may not be allowed to travel outside a specified area without permission, they may have to surrender their passports and they may be prohibited from going to a particular place or area without permission or without being accompanied by a police officer. The authorities can have complete control over the subject’s bank and credit card accounts and they can be told that they cannot possess cash over a certain amount. The authorities can have complete control over the sale or transfer of any property that the subject has and complete control over transferring money to anyone, as well as complete control over use of phones, computers and any other electronic communication device owned or used by the subject or by anyone else who lives with the subject—these measures affect not only the subject but their innocent loved ones as well.

Authorities can have complete control over who the subject meets or communicates with and over where the subject works or studies. The subject may be required to report to a specified police station at specified times and to have their photograph taken at whatever time and location the Secretary of State requires and they can be electronically tagged. On the one hand, noble Lords will understand why the authorities might want to impose such conditions if the person is believed to be a terrorist threat, but they will also understand that TPIMs amount to interference with some of the most fundamental human rights of the subject.

These restrictions on someone’s freedoms and human rights have echoes of the sort of restrictions imposed by ISIS when it declared territory it once held a caliphate. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said in a Guardian article written when this House was considering the Counter-Terrorism Bill on 13 October 2008,

“we should fight to protect the liberties the terrorists would take from us, not destroy them ourselves.”

The first element the Government want to change through the Bill, which is covered by this group of amendments, is the standard of proof required before someone can be subjected to a TPIM. Originally, as we have heard, in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 the Secretary of State had to “reasonably believe” that the subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. This was changed by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to the Secretary of State having to be satisfied

“on the balance of probabilities”

—the standard required for a court to be satisfied in a civil case. The Government want to change this standard of proof to

“has reasonable grounds for suspecting”.

A police constable may arrest someone when he has reasonable cause to suspect, and I can tell the Committee from my own personal and professional experience that this is a very low bar indeed. Of course, we are not talking about a police officer detaining someone for a few minutes or a few hours but about restricting someone’s human rights for up to two years, or indefinitely, if the Bill passes unamended. That is a shocking and frightening prospect.

If noble Lords’ common sense and sense of justice are not engaged by my arguments, perhaps they will be convinced by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, whom other noble Lords have mentioned. He has said:

“I am not aware of cases where the authorities would like to have imposed a TPIM if the standard of proof had been lower … If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; cols. 6-7.]


That is actually seven words, but I think we understand what he meant. To which, no doubt, the Government will deploy the same argument successive Labour Governments used in trying unsuccessfully to extend the period that a terror suspect could be detained by the police without charge, initially under Tony Blair’s premiership to 90 days, and subsequently under Gordon Brown to 42 days. Operational partners argued that, although limits on the period a subject could be detained without charge had not been a problem up until then, they could envisage a situation where it might be an issue in the future. I suspect that is similar to the arguments the Government will deploy here. Both times, Parliament resoundingly defeated the proposals.

It is important that we consider the reputation of this country throughout the world for the effective protection of human rights. We should not allow such draconian limits on people’s civil liberties to be imposed on the basis of such a low standard of proof—lower than any court employs, even in civil cases.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in his Amendment 27, offers a compromise, which he is developing a reputation for, trying to steer between what is arguably necessary and reasonable and what he, not without precedent, thinks the Government might accept. He suggests in his amendment that, for the first year, while intelligence-gathering is in its infancy, a TPIM might be imposed on the Government’s standard of “reasonable grounds for suspecting”. After a year, the authorities should have been able to gather sufficient evidence for the Secretary of State to be convinced on the existing balance of probabilities. I see where the noble Lord is coming from but, with the greatest of respect to him, I am with the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on this one rather than with the former.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, was not only a member of the Labour Governments to which I have just referred but, from memory, was fairly central to the attempts to extend detention without trial. His Amendment 28 would substitute the standard of proof required with

“on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds”.

I look forward to hearing his explanation of how this differs from the existing and government-proposed standards of proof, as, I must confess and with the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, when I wrote this speech on Sunday morning I had neither the energy nor the required determination to work it out for myself. Having finished at midnight last night, I have even less energy this evening.

The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation thinks that we should leave the standard of proof where it is. We agree, which is why we believe that Clause 37 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, as ever. I am sorry that he did not have the energy to get to my amendment, but I completely understand why that would be. The difference between my amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that mine seeks to unpack what the standard of proof would be; it requires an objective standard of “probable grounds”: in effect, balance of probabilities, but more spelled out. The difference between the amendments is that, in effect, the noble Lord’s amendment would give a year when the lower standard—namely, reasonable suspicion—could apply and thereafter insist on the balance of probabilities. The real difference is that first year of grace which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would give to the Government or the Secretary of State to have a lower standard of proof.

Our position on this side of the House is that the TPIM powers have utility to the Government for fighting terrorism. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, indicated clearly the intrusive effect of TPIMs on those subject to them; for example, having to move to a different location, not being entitled to go to particular places, or not being able to associate or communicate with particular people. These are powers of utility for the Government. They are, however, intrusive and infringe against what would otherwise be people’s rights. Before those rights are taken away, it is for this House to decide what the right balance should be between those individuals’ rights and the protection of the public.

All those who have looked at it in any detail, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and his successor as the terrorism reviewer, take the view that the higher standard of proof from that which the Government currently propose—namely, the balance of probabilities—has not caused them any difficulty in imposing TPIMs where they want to. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it, there is no need to lower the standard to keep the public safe.

In addition to the point that no change is required, a significant change is being made to the ability to roll over TPIMs indefinitely, so the consequence of the proposed amendments to the existing law being suggested by the Government in this Bill is to lower the standard of proof for no purpose and to do so on the basis of indefinite restrictions on individuals’ liberty.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester was, in my view, correct to say that the right approach is to ensure that the Government have the right powers but also to ensure that people are confident that they are being properly imposed. If people do not have that confidence, it will cause difficulties down the line.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

I have received one request to speak after the Minister and I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation but I am somewhat confused. He cites the evidence given by assistant chief constable Tim Jacques and the three examples that he gave. I will carefully read his evidence in Hansard and what the Minister has said the assistant chief constable said.

From what the Minister was saying, the assistant chief constable was saying why TPIMs were necessary. It was because—I think I am quoting the Minister accurately—there was not sufficient evidence to reach the criminal standard of proof, but the criminal standard of proof is “beyond reasonable doubt”. From the examples that the assistant chief constable gave—as I say, I shall go back and read them carefully—I thought there was definitely evidence that the person may be involved in terrorism on the balance of probabilities. There would therefore be no reason in the three scenarios that the assistant chief constable gave for issuing a TPIM against those three people, on the current evidence.

The Minister has apparently ignored the history of this Parliament and its views on so-called future proofing, when it comes to the deprivation of people’s liberties and the severe imposition of restrictions on people’s human rights, as evidenced by the former Labour Government’s attempts to extend the period that terrorist suspects could be detained by the police without charge. Parliament does not take kindly to, “Well, okay, we accept that there is no evidence that a change in the standard of proof is necessary in this case, but it might be in the future, so we’re doing it just in case”. We cannot deprive people of their liberty to the extent that TPIMs do on the basis of “Well, it might be required in future”.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, there were a number of questions in the noble Lord’s intervention there. I certainly encourage him to reread the evidence given by ACC Jacques on 25 June 2020. Asked specifically about the proposal to change the burden of proof, he said:

“The Security Service points to three instances where it thinks this would have utility from an operational perspective.”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Public Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 20]


He then outlined the three scenarios that I have just repeated—but it is certainly worth looking at his evidence in full.

We are not ignoring the views of Parliament; that is why we are here in Committee, rightly scrutinising this Bill. But I repeat that we are talking about a burden of proof that has previously existed and been enacted by your Lordships’ House and the other place; it was repeatedly tested in the courts and found to be compatible with the ECHR, so I am not sure that I agree with the characterisation that the noble Lord gives.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as I said on the previous group, we wish the current arrangements for terrorism prevention and investigation measures to remain as they are. I also said on the previous group that TPIMs were designed to be a temporary measure to protect the public from terrorism while an investigation gathered evidence to put before a criminal court. Currently TPIMs are in force for one year and can be extended by another year only once, although the Home Secretary can impose a new TPIM if necessary. Clause 28 allows a TPIM to be extended indefinitely. We do not believe that Clause 28 should stand part of the Bill, and Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation agrees.

As I described in the previous group, the restrictions that can be imposed under a TPIM can in some respects be similar to imprisonment, and in other ways more draconian than imprisonment. The Government do not normally seek to restrict those who can visit you in prison, or take control of your bank account. In important respects, it can be akin to detention without charge.

On the subject of detention without charge, my friend, the late Lord Lester of Herne Hill, also a former member of the Labour Party, said in a debate on a previous Counter-Terrorism Bill on 13 October 2008:

“To those noble Lords who say that the threat of terrorism is so appalling that we must do anything to counter it, logically their position is—or should be—in favour of internment”—


something that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has just mentioned—

“without any time limits, until the evidence has been forthcoming. That is what, at the height of the Second World War, Winston Churchill described as,

‘in the highest degree odious’,

and I think he was right … That is why this Committee has a peculiar responsibility today to strike a fair balance, as has been said, between the need to protect the lives of our people against a serious threat of terrorism and the need to uphold our tradition as a country which respects the rule of law”.—[Official Report, 13/10/08; col. 519.]

I think that they were both right. Were all the possible conditions available under TPIMs to be imposed, they would amount to internment. If they were imposed without time limit, it would amount to a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, has said:

“The Bill is conspicuous for its lack of safeguards. Safeguards are appropriate however carefully the Home Secretary and her officials consider TPIMs, and however much resource constraints inevitably limit the appetite for more and longer TPIMs.”


He suggests that the Home Secretary should be required to seek the court’s permission for any extension beyond two years, in the same way as she currently does when a TPIM is first made. Our Amendment 29 seeks to impose such a requirement on the Secretary of State.

The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation goes on to suggest that, at the very least, an upper limit be placed on a TPIM. The master of compromise, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, suggests in his Amendment 30 that there should be a four-year limit, double the current limit but short of indefinite, as the Government seek. I have to say that the noble Lord’s speech this evening was authoritative and convincing.

We believe that this is not a question for compromise but a question of principle. TPIMs are and should remain a temporary means of safeguarding the public during an investigation, and not a form of indefinite detention without trial.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

My Lords, I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I have two questions. First, he spoke about Section 9 hearings and the appeal route under Section 16 making our amendment unnecessary. Can he tell the Committee how many times TPIMs have been revoked or restrictions eased as a result of each of these types of hearing?

Secondly, terrorism prevention and investigation measures are, as their title describes, temporary means of preventing terrorism taking place while an investigation tries to establish evidence to convict the person in a criminal court. Control orders, on the other hand, have been used in the past for public protection. If the Government are changing the nature of TPIMs and abandoning them as a temporary measure to enable an investigation to take place in safety, why do they continue to call them TPIMs? Why not now call them control orders, which are in fact what the Government are trying to use here?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I will take the questions in reverse order. Prosecution is always the preferred method of disrupting those involved in terrorism-related activity. That will continue to be the case even under this Bill. Under the TPIM Act 2011, the Home Secretary is required to keep prosecution under review. That will not change with the amendments we propose to the Bill. If it becomes clear that there is an avenue for prosecution, the Home Office will support the police and the Crown Prosecution Service in bringing that prosecution against the individual and seek to remove the TPIM notice if it is no longer necessary and proportionate.

On the noble Lord’s first question about the number of times that appeals have been raised, if he is happy it would be better if I write and provide that information to him and the rest of the Committee so that I can be certain that it is up to date and accurate.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, requiring a TPIM subject to relocate can have significant consequences, particularly, for example, if he or she has school-age children. It is a well-established fact in the rehabilitation of offenders that social ties are powerful in preventing reoffending. Relocating to another part of the country, presumably, would have the opposite effect.

Clearly, if there is a national security issue that requires the TPIM subject to be relocated somewhere they are not easily in contact with people they should not be in contact with, relocation should be considered. But to allow relocation simply to save police resources seems neither necessary nor proportionate.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

This amendment does not address head-on the power under a TPIM to require somebody to relocate. This amendment is only touching on whether the Secretary of State should by notice have power to vary a relocation measure, in part, because

“the variation is necessary for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources.”

While I recognise the intrusive effect that relocation can have, I accept that there may be cases where national security demands it. I am interested to hear from the Minister what test is to be applied where a variation of a relocation order occurs when it

“is necessary for reasons connected with efficient and effective use of resources.”

I do not know, but I suspect that this concerns the perception that someone should relocate for national security reasons. Where they relocate to might be affected by the circumstances in which such an order might be enforced; the amount of resources that would be required if it was to be enforced where they normally live becoming disproportionate; or the amount of resources that would be required where they had been located becoming disproportionate. If that is right, I would have expected the measure in new subsection (1A) in Clause 39(2) to reflect something about proportionality. But there is nothing in it, and I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I hope he will indicate that resource relocations will occur only when it is effectively necessary to provide for national security.

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[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as we have heard, Clause 40 will allow the Secretary of State to extend the overnight curfew on a person subject to a TPIM to the maximum: every hour of every day. If the clause passes into law, it will mean that a person who has not been convicted of any offence can be condemned to full-time house arrest indefinitely, possibly until their death.

It so happens that we are all experiencing a very mild form of this regime right now during the Covid pandemic lockdown. I say a mild form because we are allowed to go to work. We can get out for exercise, to buy food, to seek medical advice or for a host of other exceptions. We know that this confinement, with all its exceptions, will last for only a few weeks, or at most months. Even so, cabin fever is rife and the increase in mental illness in the community is very real and alarming.

Imagine, if you will, how it would be if this serious constraint on our way of life and infringement of our liberties was permanent and without any of the opportunities to get out of the house that we have under lockdown. It would be unbearable. In some ways, it would be worse than a long prison sentence. In a maximum security prison, you still get some exercise outside your cell every day. But this is what the Government intend to be able to do to people who may well be innocent, whose incarceration has occurred without the Government even having to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt or on the balance of probabilities.

Under Clause 37, a Minister would merely need to suspect that they may be a terrorist—a truly flimsy threshold of proof, which is so insignificant as to be pointless and non-existent. Nevertheless, on this flimsy basis, Clause 40 allows a Minister to condemn a quite possibly innocent person to indefinite full-time detention in their home. Can the Minister please give a meaningful explanation or operational case for this change? In doing so, if he is going to deploy the flexibility argument again, could he explain who needs the flexibility, to do what and why? It is seriously unconvincing to me.

This change to the TPIM regime is cruel, inhumane and unfair. It must be seriously damaging to the subject’s mental health and that of those around him or her. This House must expunge this clause from the Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, we believe that the existing TPIMs are sufficient and are at the limits of what a country that has a reputation for upholding human rights should tolerate. The extension proposed in Clause 40 would extend the requirement to remain at or within a specified residence from “overnight” to what could amount to total house arrest. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said, that is a requirement to remain at or within the specified residence between any hours. “As are specified” is yet another step too far, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger said.

On Amendment 31, I commend the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Bach, for their relentless attempts to get police and crime commissioners more involved in operational policing decisions, including operations that may have national security implications. I accept that stop and search may be considered controversial, but it does not involve issues of national security of this nature, and I am not convinced that their amendment is necessary or desirable in this case.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we have had two different debates in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, moved that Clause 40 should not stand part of the Bill, and I can do no better than the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and his three questions, which I thought were very apposite and to the point. I will listen with interest to the Minister’s answers to those three questions.

My noble friends Lord Hunt and Lord Bach then spoke to their Amendment 31. As we have heard, the gist of the amendment is to formalise a relationship between the Secretary of State, PCCs and local chief constables to give more direct input by PCCs. In the words of my noble friend Lord Bach, PCCs are responsible for the “totality of policing” in their area. As we have heard, they are already involved in controversial matters such as stop and search and covert activities. Of course, I support my noble friends in trying to give the PCCs more formal involvement in TPIMs in their own areas.

I look forward to my noble friend Lord Bach playing a greater part in the proceedings of our House. He has for many years brought great insight into his many roles on the Front Bench, and occasionally on the Back Benches, but he will improve that even further when he comes back as a PCC. He may, of course, have to do extra time; we wait to see. I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say, and I will support my noble friends.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

I have received one request to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, unfortunately, the imperfection of the current system of remote participation means that one has to put in one’s request to speak “after the Minister” before the Minister has finished speaking. If the Minister in his last few sentences answers the question that you were going to ask, your question becomes obsolete, as is the case here.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to respond to the debate.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn from this group, so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I do not have anything to add on the substance of the amendments which my noble friend Lady Hamwee has outlined. However, I would like to go back to something that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford raised in relation to the use of polygraph tests on convicted terrorists who were subject to licence: the right to silence. Quite rightly, the noble and learned Lord who was the Minister at the time said that, because these people would be convicted offenders under licence, they had no right to silence. But TPIM subjects are not convicted offenders on licence; they are unconvicted. That is the whole idea of a TPIM, and so they do have a right to silence. The question for the Minister is: would it be a breach of TPIM conditions, which is a criminal offence for which the person could be sent to prison, if they refuse to participate in a polygraph test or if, in a polygraph test, they refuse to say anything?

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I think that, on the last grouping, the question which lay behind this amendment was answered—but let me just check. Clause 42 covers the drug testing measure. My first thought was whether a subject could be caught up in being tested and fail the test because someone else in the house was using drugs which were detected, perhaps under his fingernail. The amendment raises the issue of reasonable suspicion, but I think the noble Lord has confirmed condition D—that the Secretary of State reasonably considers, in this case, drug testing necessary for the purposes we have talked about. It is the “reasonableness” of that consideration; I think he has confirmed that that will apply. So that he can confirm it again, I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, our Amendment 30E relates to subjecting the subject of a TPIM to drug testing for class A and class B drugs only, at a police station by a constable only. I have rather different questions from those of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. The question I cannot find an answer to—and I cannot think of one myself—is, “Why?” One might cynically argue that a suspected terrorist high on cannabis might be too chilled out to conduct a terrorist attack; conversely, if the Government fear a suspected terrorist might do something stupid, for example being emboldened under the influence of a class A or class B drug, why not test for alcohol?

Bearing in mind the restrictions on the subject’s movements and communications and on who they can associate with, where do the Government think the subject of a TPIM will get his supply of class A or class B drugs? Indeed, if the subject is taking class A or class B drugs, under the noses of the police or security services, does this not raise questions about what else he might be getting his hands on, such as explosives? In short, what is the point, other than placing further restrictions, being even more intrusive and making the subject’s life even more difficult?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I have nothing to add to the points made by the previous two speakers.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the only thing that I will add to what my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said about this amendment is an assumption that, even if the subject of the TPIM provides the authorities with all the details of his or her communications equipment—computers, mobile phone and so forth—it would be possible that they could end up borrowing a device from somebody else in his or her household. That is what the authorities are seeking disclosure of, to ensure that they keep track of all the communications the subject of the TPIM is engaged in. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, the provisions contained within Section 43(2)(a) reinforce the fact that TPIMs can impact to a highly intrusive extent on innocent people living with the subject of the TPIM.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

This amendment is probing the additional power given by Clause 43 of the Bill to allow the Secretary of State to seek disclosure of

“such details as may be specified of any electronic communication device possessed or used by the individual or any other person in the individual’s residence.”

Its purpose is readily understandable: namely, if the purpose of TPIMs is in part to prevent the subject of the TPIM communicating with anybody or receiving communications from anybody, the authorities should have the ability to look at all the electronic devices to which he or she has access.

However, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have both pointed out, that means, for example, that the wife, husband or children of a subject become subject themselves to an intrusive order. I would be very interested to know whether the authorities are going to take a different approach to the question of the subject of a TPIM’s own electronic devices, as opposed to those of his family or those belonging to those with whom he lives. What is the standard going to be? Necessary and proportionate? Strong case? I would be very interested to hear what it is. Just before I depart, I will pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Although I have not agreed with every one of their amendments, they have shown indefatigable probing of this Bill and incredible good nature throughout.

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This leaves the completion of the review wholly in the air—a statutory kicking of the can down the road. It follows that both the amendments in the group fill a gap. The amendment in the name of my noble friends would again insert a time limit that ought to be met in the public interest. My noble friend Lord Paddick, speaking on an earlier group, posed the question of why. On this group, I pose the question: when?

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I completely agree with my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford’s comments on the suspicions that many communities have about the Prevent programme, which is why, in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, this House required the Government to undertake an independent review and report on the Government’s strategy for supporting people who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. A timetable was set in the 2019 Act for the Government to make arrangements within six months of that Act being passed and to report within 18 months. As my noble friend said, Clause 47 attempts to remove any timetable for starting, let alone completing, the independent review of Prevent.

As my noble friend said, and as I said at Second Reading, the most important and effective way to keep people safe from terrorist attacks is to prevent those at risk of becoming involved in terrorism-related activity doing so in the first place. It is vital that we know how effective Prevent is at identifying those at risk of being radicalised and diverting them away from potential terrorist activity, and that this is done as quickly as is reasonably practicable. Unless problems are identified and addressed, lives could be put at risk.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, suggests what might be described as a challenging and optimistic target of completing the review by 1 July 2021 in his Amendment 32. With the difficulties the Government have experienced over who should lead the review and the potential challenges ahead, there is a danger that a review within this timetable might not be thorough enough.

On 26 January, less than two weeks ago, the Government appointed a replacement independent reviewer of Prevent, William Shawcross. Mr Shawcross’s previous comments on Islam and the Iraq war have raised concerns in some quarters but, assuming he remains in post, the alternative timetable in our Amendment 33 should be achievable. This would give the Secretary of State six months to make arrangements for the review and for Mr Shawcross to lay before Parliament the report and any recommendations within a period of 18 months, beginning with the day this Bill is passed. I might be biased, but we prefer our Amendment 33.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, both amendments in this group would add a new statutory deadline for the completion of the independent review of Prevent. I certainly share the Committee’s firm commitment to the success of that independent review. It was clear in this short but important debate that our common objective is for a thorough and effective review to take place—one that will help us to learn how best to safeguard those who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

However, we must allow the new reviewer sufficient time to conduct such a thorough and effective review. These amendments would limit his options for reasonable flexibility, shorten the timeframe that he is given and put at risk his ability to do his job properly.

As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, the review restarted two weeks ago, on 26 January, with the appointment of William Shawcross as the new independent reviewer. Our aim has been for the review to be completed by no later than August this year, but we will agree the precise timetable with Mr Shawcross shortly. We want to enable him to complete the review as swiftly as possible while affording him the consideration that his important task requires.

Of course, the uncertainties posed by the ongoing pandemic, such as the prospect of further ongoing restrictions on travel and face-to-face meetings, could, self-evidently, have implications for the reviewer, as well as for his team and all those who wish to provide input into the review. I am afraid that we therefore have to consider the potential impact of that on his ability to take evidence, including the vital work of engaging with different parts of the community. As the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Paddick, highlighted, that work is vital, as is, for example, the reviewer witnessing for himself Prevent delivery in action so that he can deliver the thorough and evidence-based review, with practical recommendations for improvement, that we would like.

The Government believe that August this year is achievable, but this is of course dependent on the views of the new reviewer. He is independent, so I cannot speak for him at the Dispatch Box. We therefore recommend that the legislation affords the reviewer flexibility, should he feel that he needs it, to ensure that the valuable work of this review is not undermined. But we certainly hear what all noble Lords have said about the urgency, and I hope that they can hear that we share that. For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the imperfections of remote working have again unfortunately intervened. I did ask to speak after the Minister on the last group, and I hope the Committee will indulge me if I ask one question of the Minister about the former group. The Government are saying that they hope the new independent reviewer of Prevent will produce his report by August this year. In our amendment, by my calculation, we are setting a deadline of August next year. Perhaps when the Minister responds to this group, he could also answer the question of why a 12-month deadline beyond what the Government are proposing themselves is not considered a reasonable time for that review to be undertaken.

Turning to this group of amendments, Amendment 37 requires a review and report on the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists. Amendment 40 calls for a report on which agencies are included within Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—or MAPPA—for the purpose of managing terrorist offenders. Both amendments are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.

In December 2017, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, published his independent assessment of police and MI5 reviews into the Manchester Arena attack and three other incidents in London—all of which involved lone terrorists—which killed a total of 36 people. The report made 126 recommendations, later consolidated into 104 things that could have been done better by counterterrorism officials.

In 2019, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, published a stocktake of progress on the recommendations in his 2017 report, including multiagency centres for managing the risk posed by those suspected of being engaged in terrorist activity, which presumably includes lone terrorists. I am not sure to what extent the review and reports the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is calling for overlap with the work of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. Perhaps the Minister can advise the Committee.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

I apologise to the noble Lord. The delay in getting messages to the iPad on the Woolsack meant that I did not get the message that he wished to speak on the last group. But I now call the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford for doing the heavy lifting in looking at these amendments and reassuring me that there is nothing ugly lurking in the pile. I am grateful for the undertaking from the Minister to write to us with further details.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for moving these amendments and for pronouncing “Tredegar” correctly. I am sure that the noble Lord who hails from, or has a connection with, Tredegar, will be happy with his pronunciation as well. I have looked at these Scottish provisions. I agree that they are technical, and I really have nothing to add.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am minded to say, “Like the last lot”—but I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for his offer to write with details. I would just say that I think it is rather cruel and inhumane to expect three government Ministers to be forced to remain to the end of the evening; perhaps they can come to some better arrangement on a future occasion.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I too am grateful to the four Ministers for the care and good humour with which they have dealt with it all. Of the three amendments, Amendment 66 looks entirely technical. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, says, Amendment 67 deals with a situation where you have a non-terrorist sentence and then, consecutively, before or after, a terrorist sentence. I cannot work out how you deal with that situation for the purposes of licences as a result of this amendment. Hopefully, that will be explained to us—for reasons that may be entirely my fault, it is not entirely clear to me from the wording of the amendment. As I understand it, Amendment 70 again deals with the position of consecutive sentences; and again, the effect of that is not entirely clear to me. It might be significant, because what we are dealing with are very long sentences. So I hope that the noble and learned Lord will explain this when he comes to write his letter to us. I am very much obliged.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bertin (Con) [V]]

My Lords, as a member of the Joint Committee that undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft domestic abuse Bill, I know that the extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions of the Bill are intended to fulfil the UK’s obligations under Article 44 of the Istanbul convention. I welcome the fact that these provisions will bring the UK closer to ratifying a convention that we signed in 2012 and which will protect women and girls from violence and abuse.

My amendments concern a very specific issue—marital rape—where I believe the Bill as presently drafted may leave a potential loophole. I recognise that the drafting of the amendments may itself be imperfect, and my noble friend the Minister will no doubt speak to that, but I would like to explore whether the Bill could be strengthened so that people from this country cannot exploit laxer laws elsewhere.

In this country, the common-law presumption of a marital exemption from the offence of rape was overturned by your Lordships’ House in the case of R v R in 1991. Some countries similarly do not have any exemption for marital rape, and in others marital rape is explicitly criminalised, but there is a small minority of countries in which marital rape is not illegal. As drafted, the Bill appears to require that a prosecution for rape and other sexual offences committed against adult victims outside the UK may be brought in the UK only when the offending behaviour is also an offence in the country where it happens, but that requirement could prevent us prosecuting someone for marital rape committed outside the UK, if such behaviour is not included in or is exempt from the equivalent offence in the other jurisdiction.

This may be a small gap. I certainly hope that there would not be many, if any, cases of marital rape perpetrated by a UK person in a country that does not consider such behaviour to be a crime, but I believe that, if there is potential for this to occur, we should act to prevent it. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence, in England and Wales, for a UK national or resident to commit sexual offences against children outside the UK, in an effort to clamp down on so-called sex tourism. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to this Bill makes it an offence, in England and Wales, for a UK national or resident to commit sexual offences, under Sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, against people aged 18 or over at the time of the offence, extending extraterritoriality to serious sexual offences against adults as well as children.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has explained, the idea is to ensure that the Government comply with the Istanbul convention but, as she pointed out, for somebody to commit an offence, it has to be an offence not only in this country but in the country where the offence took place; in some of those countries, marital rape may not be criminalised. Therefore, I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has identified a potential loophole. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for tabling these amendments and spotting this loophole in the Bill. It is good to have this debate today. As she has said, marital rape can happen in a country where it is not illegal locally, and we would then not be able to prosecute the offence here in the UK. Nobody in this Committee wants that situation. I hope the Government will confirm that they either accept her amendments, or accept that she has identified a very serious loophole and bring in their own amendments on Report.

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[Baroness Donaghy (Lab) [V]]

I am very pleased to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Members may have seen recent reports in the media covering the experience of elite female athletes being subject to harassment and intimidation when doing training runs in the street. They cannot go to their athletic tracks to train at the moment because of lockdown. As has been said, this is not about wolf-whistling; it is about violence and harassment, mainly against women. If those athletes were competing in an Olympic stadium, they would be cheered to the rafters for their success, but because they are training on the streets and are anonymous, somehow they are objectified and are easy prey.

During White Ribbon Week, I asked the Minister to accept the two year-old Law Commission’s report recommending that misogyny be made a hate crime. This is now a matter of increasing urgency. The police forces that have been adopting policies to record gender hate crimes are to be congratulated, but this needs to be adopted generally. Superintendent Andy Bennett of Avon and Somerset Police said:

“We know women are less likely to report hate crime committed by strangers in public, which could be because discrimination is normalised for many women.”


As the noble Lord, Lord Russell, said, Nottinghamshire Police was the first force in England and Wales to start recording hate crimes against women and girls. Sue Fish, the former chief constable of Nottinghamshire Police, said:

“Some of the feedback we had was that women, for the first time, described themselves as ‘walking taller’ and with their ‘heads held high’.”


According to the White Ribbon Campaign, one in five British men thinks that feminism has gone “too far”. Online misogyny can also be a gateway to wider divisions in society. A HOPE not hate report shows that some young men who interact with men’s rights activists online are on the first step to more extreme racist or far-right groups and regard more rights for anyone—such as people of colour, the LGBT community and people with disabilities—as a threat to their status. The chief executive of HOPE not hate supports this amendment. He states that misogyny is a recruiting tool for hate groups and a means to radicalise, especially among the very young. These online groups radicalise young men who go on to commit acts of aggression designed to intimidate, humiliate and control women.

Having better-quality information throughout all police forces is not just another paper exercise. It helps to increase understanding of the causes and consequences of violence against women and girls, and it gives women more confidence that their issue will be taken seriously. It may even go on to protect more women from violence and intimidation. I hope that the Minister will accept this amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this afternoon, many noble Lords have described misogyny outside the scenario of domestic abuse—such as elite athletes training in the street, as the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, just said. I hope to explain that, while I agree that the recording of misogyny as a hate crime is a good thing, it may confuse things when it comes to domestic abuse.

As has been explained, Clause 70 requires the Secretary of State to

“issue guidance to chief officers of police about the disclosure of police information by police forces for the purposes of preventing domestic abuse.”

This amendment is about including in that guidance that the police should record any crimes where the offender demonstrated hostility or prejudice based on sex, or where it is perceived that the crime was motivated by hostility or prejudice towards persons who are of a particular sex. This, in effect, would require police officers to record misogyny as a hate crime, although as it is worded in gender-neutral terms it would also require them to record misandry as a hate crime. I am confused about why misandry would be a hate crime, but we will move on. It then tries to bring this within the scope of Clause 70, which is about preventing domestic abuse, by mentioning taking account of evidence about the relationship between domestic abuse and misogyny and recording misogynistic crimes that, in the opinion of the police, have also involved domestic abuse.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this has been a comprehensive debate. As noble Lords have explained, Amendment 148 would insert a new clause to ensure that those whose immigration status would exclude them from benefits and the right to rent can receive support and find a place to live if they are the victim of domestic abuse in circumstances that would otherwise leave them destitute and homeless. It sets out clearly what evidence must be produced to show they are a victim of domestic abuse.

As noble Lord, Lord Rosser, explained, abusers use survivors’ immigration status as a means of coercive control. As noble Lords have said, no one should be prevented from escaping domestic abuse because they cannot afford to leave or because they have nowhere to go, not least those who are additionally vulnerable because of their immigration status. Amendment 151, led by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, requires the Secretary of State to make changes to the Immigration Rules to extend the number of victims of domestic abuse who can apply for, and be granted, indefinite leave to remain. It proposes that they should be granted limited leave to remain for not less than six months to enable this, or longer if the application is awaiting a decision, including access to support and accommodation during that time. As noble Lords have said, it is likely that victims of domestic abuse could be in danger were they to be forced to return to their country of origin, as the example graphically described by the right reverend Prelate demonstrated. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, has said, while the current pilot is welcome, it is not necessary. We know all we need to know to take the issue forward—a point reinforced by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece have explained, Amendment 160 gives effect to Article 4(3) of the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence—the Istanbul convention—that requires all victims of domestic abuse, irrespective of their status, to receive equal protection against domestic abuse and equally effective support and, as such, encapsulates the essence of Amendments 148 and 151. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, has said, if Amendments 148 and 151 were agreed to, we could ratify the Istanbul convention. As he said, either this is a landmark Bill, or it is not. I agree with the noble Lord: this all comes down to money—money that the Government appear to be unwilling to spend.

It is concerning that the Home Office has responsibility both for providing support for domestic abuse survivors and for enforcing immigration legislation. With only 5.8% of refuge places available to survivors who have no access to public funds, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, has said, something clearly needs to be done. With those affected numbering in the low thousands, it would not take much to implement these recommendations, and we support them. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, failing to take action would make it feel as though the state were complicit in these women’s suffering.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group centre on support for migrant victims of domestic abuse. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and my noble friend Lady Helic for proposing the new clauses.

All Members of the Committee will share the view that anyone who has suffered abuse, regardless of their immigration status, should first and foremost be treated as a victim. Where we differ, perhaps, is on how support is best provided to meet that end. Amendments 148 and 151 seek to provide, for all migrant victims of domestic abuse, at least six months of leave to remain, a route to indefinite leave to remain and access to publicly funded support. Amendment 160 seeks equally effective protection and support for all victims of domestic abuse, irrespective of their status, while also referring to Article 4(3) of the Istanbul convention.

If I have correctly understood noble Lords’ objectives in tabling these very thoughtful and well-intentioned amendments, they are seeking to expand the existing destitute domestic violence concession and the domestic violence rule to cover all migrant victims of domestic abuse: to place the DDVC in the Immigration Rules, as well as lifting immigration restrictions, for any migrant victim of domestic abuse. The Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill recommended that the Government consider similar changes to the DDVC and DVILR. However, its recommendations did not include proposals to incorporate the DDVC scheme in the Immigration Rules.

As noble Lords will be aware, in response to the Joint Committee’s recommendations the Government committed to a review of the overall response to migrant victims of domestic abuse. That review has been completed and its findings were published on 3 July 2020. We were grateful to the specialist sector for the views and evidence provided during the review. However, it was unclear which groups of migrants are likely to be most in need of support, how well existing arrangements may address their needs, how long they might need support, and how they could be supported to move on from safe accommodation. It was clear, however, that a robust evidence base is needed to ensure that funding is appropriately targeted to meet the needs of migrant victims.

My issue with Amendment 151 is that it is based on a misunderstanding of the rationale for the DDVC and the domestic violence rule. Both were, and are, intended to provide a route to settlement for migrant victims who hold spousal visas. The system was designed in this way because, had their relationships not broken down as a result of domestic abuse, these victims would have had a legitimate expectation of staying in the UK permanently. Neither the DDVC nor the domestic violence rule was designed to support those without this legitimate expectation. This Government are concerned that expanding the scope of both would undermine the specific purpose that gave rise to them and introduce a route to settlement that might lead to more exploitation of our immigration system—or indeed of vulnerable migrants.

For this reason, at Second Reading in the House of Commons, the Safeguarding Minister announced that the Government would invite bids for grants from the £1.5 million support for migrant victims scheme. Such grants will look to cover the cost of support in a refuge or other safe accommodation for migrant victims of domestic abuse who are unable to access public funds. The Government will use the scheme to better assess the level of need for these victims and inform spending reviews about longer-term funding, which is very important. The competition for the scheme was launched on 15 December and closes on 8 February—today. The scheme will then run until 22 March, which answers the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

As I have indicated, our review has highlighted that a better evidence base is needed for migrant victims who are not eligible for the DDVC. Since 2017, the Government have provided over £1 million from the tampon tax fund to support migrant victims with no recourse to public funds. While clearly this fund has helped to deliver much-needed support for a number of individuals, and much has been learned, regrettably we require a more complete and reliable evidence base to enable us to make those long-term decisions. We particularly want to establish a robust dataset that we can interrogate about the circumstances in which support is most needed, the duration of support needed, what kind of support works best, and how individuals exit from support to regain their independence. We would like to do this work to ensure that the information that we need is available to inform future policy-making and that the decisions taken are sound.

I turn to Amendment 160. The support for migrant victims scheme and the associated evaluation work clearly illustrate that the Secretary of State is taking steps to ensure effective protection and support for all victims of domestic abuse. This scheme will be available to all migrant victims at the point of need while their eligibility for the scheme is assessed and other routes of support are explored.

The Government have been clear that migrant victims of domestic abuse should be treated first and foremost as victims, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, and others, said. Data collected through the course of this scheme will provide the information that we need to assess current provisions and ensure that effective protection and support is available to migrant victims of domestic abuse. Therefore, while I am grateful to my noble friend and appreciate the sentiment and intention behind her amendment, we do not believe that this is necessary in light of the action that we are already taking. The provisions in the Bill apply equally to all victims of domestic abuse, whatever their status, including the ability to apply for a domestic abuse protection order or the provisions in respect of special measures and the prohibition of cross-examination in person.

A number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lady Helic and the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Health and Lord Griffiths, have talked about the Istanbul convention. It is important to recognise that legislation is not needed to comply with Articles 4 and 59 of the convention. As set out in the latest annual report on our progress towards ratification of the convention, which was published on 22 October last year, the position on whether the UK is compliant with Article 4(3) of the convention to the extent that it relates to non-discrimination on the grounds of migrant or refugee status, and with Article 59, relating to residence status, is of course under review, pending the evaluation and the findings from the support for migrant victims scheme.

On the suggestion in Amendment 148 that the no recourse to public funds condition is lifted for all victims of domestic abuse, the Government believe that this is the wrong response. It is not subject to further definition in any way and would be a disproportionate and costly method of providing support for migrant victims. It is worth recognising that the principle of no recourse to public funds was established as far back as 1971, and no Government have sought to reverse that position. Successive Governments have taken the view that access to publicly funded benefits and services should reflect the strength of a migrant’s connections to the UK and, in the main, become available to migrants only when they have settled here.

These restrictions are an important plank of immigration policy, operated, as I have said, by successive Governments and applicable to most migrants until they qualify for indefinite leave to remain. The policy is designed to assure the public that controlled immigration brings real benefits to the UK, rather than costs to the public purse. It does this by prohibiting access to public funds other than to those with indefinite leave to remain, refugees and protected persons, and those granted discretionary leave.

Nevertheless, exemptions from those restrictions are already in place for some groups of migrants. These include refugees or those here on the basis of their human rights where they would otherwise be destitute. Those on human rights routes can also apply to have their no recourse to public funds condition lifted if their financial circumstances change and there is a risk of destitution, imminent destitution, risk to the welfare of a child or exceptional circumstances. Equally, as I have said, migrant victims on certain spousal visas can already apply for the destitute domestic violence concession to be granted limited leave with recourse to public funds.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, for so clearly and comprehensively introducing her amendment. Amendment 149 would insert a new clause that seeks to extend the protection from any coercive and controlling behaviour that occurs post-separation. The noble Baroness concentrated on economic abuse, but that is not the only form of ongoing abuse.

I was in a relationship that became increasingly abusive over a period of five years. The first time I noticed something was happening was when a friend, a former partner, sent me a birthday card. When I explained who it was from, my then partner tore it up and threw it in the bin. His controlling and coercive behaviour continued and got worse, and he eventually resorted to physical violence. When we split up, he threatened to kill me and threatened to write to my employer to try to destroy my career. I continued to live in fear of what he might do until, 18 months after we had split up, he colluded with a Sunday tabloid newspaper to expose intimate details of our private life, including making public my HIV status, as well as making false allegations that the newspaper eventually admitted were libellous. Fighting the issue in the courts would have resulted in me losing everything if I had lost that case. His actions did not amount to harassment or stalking.

Coercive and controlling behaviour can continue long after separation, with victims of domestic abuse continuing to live in fear of what the perpetrator might do next, and the law needs to reflect this. Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 applies only if the perpetrator and victim are in an intimate relationship or if they live together. This amendment would ensure that it would apply to all those who are “personally connected” as defined by Clause 2 of this Bill, whether they live together or not. As such, it would also include the circumstances that Amendment 157 seeks to cover, where a relative is exerting controlling or coercive behaviour, whether or not they live together.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, explained, his amendment is specifically aimed at protecting older and disabled family members. I strongly support Amendment 149 and welcome the focus which Amendment 157 brings to the abuse of older and disabled family members.

[Baroness Bertin (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in this important debate; he speaks movingly and powerfully on this issue. I support Amendment 157, for which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt set out the argument very well, but I will speak primarily in support of Amendment 149, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, to which I have also put my name. I also wish to thank her for all of her work in this area, and for eloquently speaking to this amendment, setting out in forensic detail why it is needed.

David Challen, son of Sally Challen, wrote movingly today in the Times. He said that leaving an abuser can be the most defining moment of a victim’s life. The fear of what will happen when they separate from their abuser is often overcome by an instinct of survival and the hope that they will be protected. However, as the law stands on coercive and controlling behaviour, victims who leave are not protected.

It is obvious that coercive control does not end when a relationship does and that very often the exact opposite happens, and the abuse escalates. As many noble Lords have said, this is particularly true of economic abuse, which does not require physical proximity to perpetrate, but can have a crippling effect on victims as their abuser seeks to make their life as hard and as financially unstable as possible. We also need to remember how often children are caught up in the continuation of this kind of abuse, with child maintenance very often being turned off and on like a tap. It is therefore absolutely right that the definition of domestic abuse in this Bill will include economic abuse and also recognises that the abuse can continue when the couple split up. We now need to take this opportunity, as others have said, to amend the Serious Crime Act 2015 to bring coercive control in line with the far better drafting of this Bill.

Not accounting for post-separation abuse is a serious shortcoming of the offence. Given that separation, as we have heard from other noble Lords, is a time at which women are at heightened risk of homicide, this shortcoming is dangerous, too. The Government made the point that existing legislation on stalking and harassment already addresses post-separation abuse. Like others, I absolutely do not accept that. These crimes are not the same and to suggest otherwise shows a lack of understanding about all these offences. I also do not believe that the Government’s outstanding report on controlling and coercive behaviour should stand in the way of this vital opportunity before us.

If the law on coercive control stays as it is, what kind of signal do we send to victims? It is this: “Stay put and we can charge him, but if you leave, we can’t touch him.” This makes no sense at all and must change. Failing to recognise that these abusive behaviours can occur post separation creates a dangerous gap in our understanding of this crime and would leave too many victims without the proper justice they deserve.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have tabled this probing amendment because I am trying to address the woeful underprosecution of domestic abuse and domestic violence in our courts. I do not think that the courts are quite set up to secure justice for survivors. Part of the problem is the intrusive nature of court into the survivors’ lives. The nature of domestic abuse means that deep and intimate details of a survivor’s life and their abuse can be exposed to the public eye. These intimate details can be exploited by the tabloid press or be the subject of trolling on social media. The higher the profile of the abuser or survivor or the more extreme the abuse, the more likely they are to face that media circus.

This should not be happening. Intrusion into survivors’ lives has to stop; they are revictimised and exploited by this publicity, which is incredibly damaging. Other survivors see this and it makes them less likely to report crimes that have been committed against them. It forces people to maintain secrecy for fear of becoming the latest victim of a media circus.

The courts are not currently set up to help survivors avoid this media chaos. There is scope for a survivor to seek a reporting restriction, but this is limited to situations where the restriction would help improve the quality of evidence or the level of co-operation given by a witness in preparing the case. This is not necessarily a survivor-focused approach; it is actually focused on helping the court to have the best available evidence, rather than the rights and protections of survivors. I hope that the Government will work with me to improve this. There must be some way to find agreement on the need to protect survivors, while allowing them to tell their story and obtain justice. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for introducing this amendment. The openness of judicial proceedings is a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This underpins the requirement for a prosecution witness, including the victim, to be identifiable not only to the defendant but to the open court. It supports the defendant’s ability to present his case and to test the prosecution case by cross-examination. In some cases, it can encourage other witnesses to come forward, particularly if the victim has made false allegations in the past.

However, the principle of open justice can sometimes be a bar to successful prosecutions, and we know that domestic abuse survivors are less likely to report abuse if their name is going to appear in the press as a result. I speak from personal experience again. When I was a victim of domestic abuse, I was not prepared even to report my abuser to the police out of shame and fear that it might become public knowledge.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 3rd February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Redfern (Con) (V)]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow my noble friend Lady Newlove and I warmly congratulate the Government on introducing the Bill. In doing so, I am pleased to have the opportunity to voice my support for its aims, in particular the proposals to reform the family court and provide protection measures for victims suffering domestic abuse. Even going to court is a harrowing and daunting process which can cause significant distress when a victim comes face to face with their perpetrator, even when the engagement is indirect. Measures must be in place to ensure the provision of separate entrances to the court building, as we heard earlier, and separate waiting rooms.

We know that domestic abuse comes in many traits. It is based not only on physical violence but on emotional, coercive, controlling or even economic abuse. Perpetrators of abuse should be inhibited from cross-examining their victims in person. Perpetrators should be prevented from directly or indirectly engaging with a victim during family court proceedings, particularly as many victims fear false accusations of parental alienation, which clearly has prevented many telling their personal stories. Protective screens in a court setting help to shield victims from their alleged abuser and prevent intimidation, as do live links, evidence-giving in private and greater emphasis on reassuring abuse victims, particularly children, who are always victims. These new measures will help to achieve the best result for those children.

Having received many briefings and personal testimonies, victims eagerly await new protective measures, so that the reporting of victims being re-victimised and retraumatised within the family court setting is stopped. The Bill must deliver a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to transform our national response for domestic abuse victims and, in achieving the right support for those victims, will go a long way to helping them rebuild their lives. Importantly, they will be listened to.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I agree with the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Redfern, in a broader context. On the particular issue in this group, I have listened very carefully to the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, reinforced by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. The noble Lord talked about a risk assessment before cross-examination if someone has a history of abuse. Presumably he is referring to somebody with a history of abuse but whose convictions are spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, talked about repeat offenders. Repeat offending is very common when it comes to domestic abuse, but I wonder whether a perpetrator with a history of abuse, a repeat offender, is less likely to have spent convictions or cautions.

The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act is an important piece of legislation that allows offenders to move on from their previous offending, but my understanding is that if a court decides that justice cannot be done without the conviction or caution being taken into account, the court can take account of a spent conviction. This potentially means that a court could prevent cross- examination of a victim of domestic abuse if it decided that a spent conviction or caution was relevant.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s understanding of the legislation as it is. We have no objection to the Government’s amendments in this group.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will begin with the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, so ably spoke, and will then turn to the government amendments, which deal with various technical and drafting changes to the same clause.

As has been explained to the Committee, Amendment 114, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, would remove a qualification of the automatic prohibition on cross-examination in family proceedings by those convicted of, cautioned for or charged with specified offences, and their cross-examination by the victim or alleged victim. The removal of this qualification would mean that spent convictions and cautions under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 would continue automatically to trigger the prohibition, irrespective of how old they may be or how circumstances might have changed. I respectfully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act is a very important provision. It enables a line to be drawn and people to move on.

It is in that context that, at the moment, the form of the Bill is that spent convictions and cautions should automatically trigger the prohibition only where evidence in relation to the conviction or caution is admissible in relation to the current family proceedings. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, reminded us, and as the Government fully acknowledge, the damage caused by domestic abuse may often last for decades, sometimes a lifetime, and well beyond the point at which a conviction or caution is spent. One must also consider the point made by my noble friend Lady Redfern, that the court process is daunting, especially for victims of abuse. Therefore, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is right to test the adequacy of Clause 63 in guarding against cross-examination which remains inappropriate despite convictions or cautions being spent. I am sure that all Members of the Committee will have been moved by the personal testimony of my noble friend Lady Newlove, when she explained the effect that such cross-examination can have.

However, the Government believe that Clause 63 provides adequate protection in such circumstances. We must bear in mind that the automatic prohibition on cross-examination is also triggered where a protective injunction is in place—that is the force of the new Section 31S—or where prescribed evidence of domestic abuse is provided to the court; that is the force of the new Section 31T. Moreover, and of greater importance here, given the sometimes more historical nature of abuse, is what we intend should become Section 31U of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. This is an important provision, which provides context against which the noble Lord’s amendment should be considered.

New Section 31U is in deliberately broad terms and provides for a wide discretion to meet the particular facts and circumstances of the case before the court. It enables the court, either in response to an application or of its own motion, to prohibit cross-examination where it would diminish the quality of evidence or cause significant distress, so long as to do so is not contrary to the interests of justice. Any such direction will remain in place until the witness is discharged, unless it is revoked by the court in specified circumstances; for example, if circumstances have materially altered. Therefore, to answer the point made by my noble friend Lady Newlove, we consider the Bill sufficient in cases of spent convictions, because that provision enables the court to impose the ban if it appears to the court that the two conditions in new subsection 1(b) are met. That provision would therefore also deal with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, concerning cases of past injunctions or restraining orders. New Section 31U is a very broad provision that enables the court to respond to the facts of a case and ensure that a suitable order is made. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it is important that the court has this ability, for the reasons that I have set out, under new Section 31U. I hope that this gives the Committee, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, what they sought, which, according to my note, was clarity and assurance. I hope that I have provided both.

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I clearly support these amendments to give women the protection they deserve, and I hope the Government will too.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of the Shaws, has so clearly explained—and I pay respect to her enormous experience over decades in this area—Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 raises the threshold from disproportionate to grossly disproportionate before the force used by a householder for the purpose of self-defence can be considered unreasonable.

The fear generated by being attacked in your own home—the visceral reaction, the instinct to defend yourself and your property in such circumstances—is considered so strong that using disproportionate force to defend yourself is considered to be reasonable in the domestic setting. While it can be argued that there should be no distinction and that reasonable force in the circumstances should be enough, Parliament decided that being attacked in your own home sets apart this kind of self-defence from other situations. The Minister will not be surprised to hear me use the same expression as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy: what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. What was seen, at least by the tabloid newspapers, as the “Englishman’s home is his castle” provision in Section 76 of the 2008 Act should equally apply to what will in most cases be a woman defending herself against domestic abuse.

I have personally been in both these scenarios. I have cowered behind my front door as a violent stranger tried to kick down the door of my flat; thankfully, the police arrived before the door gave way. I have also cowered as my violent partner kicked and punched me. The fear caused by not feeling safe in your home is truly terrifying, especially when you are being physically attacked. The fear I experienced was similar in both cases, but the latter was far more frightening. Being attacked by a random stranger does not hurt as much as being attacked by someone you have allowed yourself to be vulnerable with, and who has subjected you to coercive and controlling behaviour over a number of years.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, I have been keen to ensure that male victims and those in same-sex relationships are not forgotten. Even here, we are talking about someone who is physically weaker being attacked in their own home by a stronger person. In most cases, but not exclusively, this will be male violence against women. If she is to defend herself against a much stronger man, her options are limited and she may have to resort to using a weapon—for example, as the only way effectively to defend herself, or simply because of the instinctive reaction to grab whatever is available, such as a kitchen knife.

It is not difficult to envisage how such a use of force might be considered disproportionate but understandable, particularly if you fear for your life in circumstances such as we heard described when considering the previous group of amendments, and which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, explained. It might be considered disproportionate, but not grossly disproportionate. Can the Minister explain why this amendment should not be accepted, in the light of the higher standard of acceptable force available to a householder under attack from a burglar?

Awareness has recently grown of how prolonged and sustained abuse can turn a victim into an assailant. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, Amendment 139 and the subsequent amendment would bring the law into line with these recent developments. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester has explained, a trauma-based approach needs to be adopted. There clearly needs to be a change of culture in the criminal justice system in this respect, as well as a change in the law.

The mental health impact on women prisoners has been clearly set out by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, Amendment 140 is almost identical to Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. In the same way that I believe the burden of proof lies on the Minister to show why Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 should not apply to victims of domestic abuse in relation to Amendment 139, I ask the Minister why Amendment 140 should not apply to victims of domestic abuse when a very similar statutory defence is available to victims of slavery and trafficking. The Government must come up with very strong counter-arguments if these amendments are not to be accepted.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, we on these Benches fully support Amendments 139, 140 and 145, in the names of my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and others. The issues addressed in these amendments have been raised in the other place by my honourable friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, Jess Phillips, and others during the Bill’s consideration there.

The amendments, as noble Lords have heard, are modelled on existing law and should not cause the Government any trouble whatsoever; I look forward to the Minister’s response. My noble friend Lady Kennedy explained the problems women face when they have killed a partner, having been the victim of abuse for years and years and then find themselves in the dock. The amendments seek to address that and reflect the realities of domestic abuse.

Everybody has been very complimentary about the Bill—it is a very good Bill, long overdue and we wish it success—but to become really effective legislation, it must incorporate these amendments or government amendments with the same intent. It is reasonable to afford the victims of domestic abuse who act in self-defence, often in their own homes, reasonable protection. They are compelled to defend themselves, having suffered years of abuse. As my noble friend Lady Kennedy reminded us—we have heard it many times before—on average, two women a week are killed by their partner or former partner. That is an horrific figure.

Amendment 139 would provide domestic abuse survivors with the same legal protection as householders have in cases of self-defence. Members have referred to such cases. Amendments 140 and 145 are modelled on Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and would give victims of abuse a statutory defence where they have been compelled to offend as a result of experiences of domestic abuse.

We have heard excellent speeches in this short debate from all noble Lords, particularly from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester. I endorse all the comments of noble Lords. My noble friend Lord Bradley, in particular, made a compelling speech. He raised the issue of mental health, its effect on women prisoners and the need for proper context to be taken into account when deciding to prosecute cases. I look forward to the response from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. If he cannot accept these amendments, I hope he will tell the Committee that he understands the issue and will go away and reflect on it, and maybe come back on Report.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister. I have two questions which rather puzzle me. First, he talked at length about praising judges for how they can quickly and flexibly adapt the common law of self-defence to new cases and how beneficial it is for it to be dealt with in that way, rather than with rigid primary legislation. Can he therefore explain why Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 was thought necessary?

Secondly, the Minister talked about the option to retreat in domestic abuse cases. Referring to the two scenarios that I spoke about from personal experience, I certainly had the option to escape out of the flat—luckily it was a ground-floor flat—when somebody was trying to break the front door down in the burglar scenario, but when my abusive partner had me up against the kitchen wall, I had very limited options to retreat. I cannot see how the option to retreat is more valid in the burglar situation than it is in the domestic abuse situation. Perhaps the Minister can help me.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for those questions. First, Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act dealt with a specific circumstance, whereby Parliament considered that that instance ought to be reflected by way of a specific statutory defence. The question for this evening is whether there is a suitable read-across into the matters we are discussing. For the reasons I sought to explain, I suggest that there is not.

Secondly, as to the option to retreat, I hope I made it clear that I was not saying that there is always an option to retreat in domestic abuse cases; I was making the point that there is generally very little option to retreat in the householder case. Again, that is an instance where you cannot simply read across to the domestic abuse case. I hope the noble Lord is content with those responses, but I am very happy if he wants to take those points up with me hereafter so that we can discuss them.