Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I too welcome the noble and learned Lord to this House and congratulate him on his maiden speech and appointment as Advocate-General for Scotland. If noble Lords think that he has been put into bat a little early, I can reassure him that I made my maiden speech the day after my introduction; needs must when the devil drives.

First, I should perhaps explain my experience on these issues. When I was in the police, we used to call most covert human intelligence sources “informants”, who were mainly criminals recruited and run by “handlers”. The way in which handlers used, rewarded and authorised informants to participate in crime was controlled by “controllers”. I used to be a controller. I also had the enormous privilege of visiting MI6 and GCHQ to be briefed on the work of all the security services as part of this House’s consideration of the then Investigatory Powers Bill, including examples of who their CHIS were and how they were recruited and used.

Secondly, I came to my own conclusions about this Bill, having read the Investigatory Powers Tribunal judgment dated 20 December 2019 that prompted it. I am grateful for the briefings from Justice, Reprieve and the NUJ, among others, some of which I agree with and other aspects I do not.

There are two fundamental issues in the Bill on which the Government have, to date, not been as clear as they could be. The first is that it is not just about one issue, and it certainly does not simply maintain the status quo, as the Government have suggested. The reason for the Bill is to give absolute legal clarity that handlers can authorise their covert human intelligence sources to participate in crime. They have been doing that with little difficulty for decades but the Investigatory Powers Tribunal’s split decision called into question whether there was any legal authority for the police and the security services to authorise CHIS to commit crime. If providing that legal authority was all that the Bill did, it would maintain the status quo and I would have no argument with it.

Of course there are peripheral issues that the Bill provides an opportunity for us to address, but on providing legal authority for participating informants, as we used to call them, or criminal conduct authorities as they are now called, there is no argument and I will support the Bill in that respect.

The Bill, however, goes much further—unacceptably far—and makes everything that the covert human intelligence source is authorised to do by the criminal conduct authority “lawful for all purposes”, including immunity from civil liability, and including any conduct that is incidental to what CHIS are authorised to do. For example, had the Bill been in force at the time, the undercover police officer who was authorised to form a relationship with an environmental activist could have argued that sleeping with her was “incidental to” what he had been authorised to do, and that he therefore could not be sued.

The status quo is the following: the Crown Prosecution Service examines what happens in such cases after the event, and independently decides whether a crime has been committed, whether there is a 51% or more chance of conviction, and whether prosecution is in the public interest. Rarely—the Government’s position is never—does the Director of Public Prosecutions grant immunity to a CHIS prior to the event. To date, the status quo has rarely, if ever, caused any problems. It has been put to me that the status quo does cause problems, in that sometimes, when a handler asks an informant to participate in crime, the criminal concerned backs away because they want a promise of immunity in writing, and the handler cannot give it. We need to examine carefully and in detail whether such a cast-iron guarantee is necessary or desirable.

This Bill as drafted would allow a police officer or member of the security services, with no independent judicial oversight, to grant total immunity to a criminal to participate in an armed robbery, for example. Rarely, if ever, would immunity not be given prior to the CHIS being asked to participate in crime—a complete reversal of the status quo. At the moment, the CPS almost always decides that it is not in the public interest to prosecute in such cases, but the Bill makes anything done in accordance with a criminal conduct authority not a crime. What is in law a criminal act becomes a lawful act for the person authorised that would no longer rest on the public interest test. This is not preserving the status quo by any stretch of the imagination.

The Government will tell us that that is akin to granting immunity to those involved in the interception of communications and, indeed, immunity is to be provided by the same section of the same Act that makes properly authorised communications interception “legal for all purposes”. However, interception of communications has to be authorised by a Minister of State in advance, having already been approved by an Investigatory Powers Commissioner against someone suspected of the most serious criminality.

However, under this Act, authorising a criminal to take part in an armed robbery, in which innocent people could be seriously injured, will not be done in advance by anyone outside the police. Even officials in the Home Office, potentially on instruction from government Ministers, could otherwise grant immunity to someone to commit crime, with no prior judicial oversight and little post-event scrutiny. Is that what we want?

The second major issue about which the Government have not been clear is who these covert human intelligence sources are. In their briefings, the Government have placed the emphasis on CHIS being undercover police officers or officers of the security services working undercover. The majority of covert human intelligence sources are criminals, members of terrorist organisations and drug gangs, or those inside other organisations that the police or security services have a legitimate interest in. This legislation, as drafted, will predominantly protect criminals, not undercover cops.

Other safeguards are needed, such as to prevent CHIS from acting as agent provocateurs and to protect child CHIS. We must carefully scrutinise which authorities can grant immunity. Other matters, considered in the other place and recommended by NGOs, such as prior authorisation and limitations on what crimes can be authorised, would be necessary only if the immunity provision remains part of the Bill. It should not remain part of the Bill. This is not a party-political issue; this is a rule of law issue. We have a lot of work to do.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said in her opening remarks, these amendments are about maintaining the status quo—the public interest defence. She described additional safeguards against a rogue prosecutor—potentially of self-defence, necessity and duress—but of course these mechanisms are already in place, and they are put into the amendment to provide clarity.

I am very glad to have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Richie of Downpatrick, with her valuable experience in Northern Ireland. As the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, said in her very powerful remarks, the co-signatories to the amendment are from very different backgrounds. I remind the Committee that I was a police officer for over 30 years and was at one time a controller of informants—covert human intelligence sources, as we now call them.

As I said, these amendments, to which I have added my name, are about keeping the status quo by ensuring that there is a legal power that allows public authorities to authorise CHIS to participate in crime but leaving the question of immunity from prosecution to prosecutors, looking at all the circumstances after the fact.

At Second Reading, the Government made two arguments against maintaining the status quo: first, that it is “undesirable” for the police, for example, to authorise people to commit crime, and, secondly, that it is “unfair and unreasonable” for CHIS to operate under the possibility that they might be prosecuted. In other words, the status quo is not desirable, not fair and not reasonable.

Let me deal, first, with the argument that it is “undesirable”. Can the Minister please explain to the Committee the difference between it being undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal and it being undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to make criminal activity legal? Or, to put it another way, what is more or less desirable—a public authority telling someone to commit crime or giving a public authority the power to say something that is a crime is not a crime?

Is it not fundamental to the rule of law that the law applies to everyone equally and that it is clear what is and is not a crime? The Government propose to make legal an act that would otherwise be a crime, and to make the criminal law apply to everyone, except CHIS, who are authorised under CCAs. For example, Section 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000 would in effect change to “a person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation, unless he is authorised to belong to it by a criminal conduct authority, in which case he does not commit an offence”. The law, in effect, becomes “it is an offence/it is not an offence, and it applies to some people but not all”.

The effect of accepting these amendments is to say that, of course, belonging to a terrorist group is an offence, but it is clearly not in the public interest to prosecute this person because he was asked to belong to, or to continue to belong to, a proscribed organisation by an agent of the state, and that was necessary and proportionate. Immunity from prosecution should be based on an independent prosecutor deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, not on an agent of the state saying that this crime is not a crime, as many noble Lords have said.

At Second Reading, the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams—said:

“It is also undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1115.]


Paying criminals to pass information to the police is undesirable, and paying terrorists to pass information to the security services is undesirable, as is paying those employed by hostile foreign powers to commit treason by passing information to the UK—it is all undesirable, or murky waters, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said on the last group—but, however undesirable those things are, they are necessary. Although it may be undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal, it is necessary, and it is not as undesirable as the alternative. To quote the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for whom I know the whole House, including the noble Baroness the Minister, has the highest regard:

“The Bill would give power to police superintendents to confer immunity on members of the public, and of their own organisations, for the commission of crimes. That proposition is startling, and the potential for abuse obvious.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1064.]


I shall now deal with the “unfair and unreasonable” argument. At Second Reading, the noble Baroness the Minister said that

“it seems unfair and unreasonable for the state to ask an individual to engage in difficult and potentially dangerous work while leaving open the possibility of the state prosecuting them for the exact same conduct. That tension has existed for many years.”

It has, but we need a reality check here. What might seem unfair and unreasonable to the Government, and indeed to some noble Lords, is not the same as what might seem unfair and unreasonable to undercover operatives, who, whether they be criminals or undercover cops, have willingly volunteered to do this work not for years or for decades but, I am sure, for well over 100 years.

If a handler thought that it was unfair and unreasonable, he would not authorise a CHIS to participate in crime; if a CHIS thought it was unfair and unreasonable, he would not participate in crime. What the noble Baroness the Minister seems to want to address is a sense of unfairness and unreasonableness which the Government have but which is not shared by the overwhelming majority of those who are directly affected—the handlers and the undercover agents.

The second question that has to be asked is: what is the possibility of the state prosecuting them, and is the status quo a real deterrent? The noble Baroness the Minister—again, at Second Reading—talked about what would happen if a CHIS were to undertake criminal activity that fell outside the strict parameters of a CCA:

“The prosecuting authorities are in a position to consider whether to bring a prosecution. This has been done before and will be done again if required.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1115.]


So the answer is, “It has been done before and will be done again if necessary”, but it has not been done so often as to put off either undercover police officers or criminals from participating in criminal activity at the request of their handlers, who have willingly engaged on the understanding that, provided you stick to what you have been authorised to do, the CPS is unlikely to prosecute.

There have, no doubt, been rare occasions when a criminal has asked for a written guarantee of immunity and has backed away when it could not be given, but the system has clearly not been seen by the overwhelming majority of those involved—neither the handlers nor the undercover operatives—as unfair or unreasonable, no matter what we might think, otherwise they simply would not do it. In any event, any guarantee of immunity would be conditional only on the CHIS doing precisely what he is authorised to do, which in itself presents problems, as we will see in future groups.

I argue that the potential unintended consequences of what is proposed in the Bill on the question of immunity, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, pointed out, are too high a price to pay just to make us feel better, because we feel it is unfair and unreasonable not to give immunity up front. CHIS engage willingly in criminal activity at the request of their handlers, despite the possibility of prosecution. The proposed solution, to a problem that does not exist, is startling and the potential for abuse obvious, which is why I support the amendments.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who brings experience that none of the rest of us who have spoken in the debate have. It has been a powerful and significant debate. It arises because, under the Bill, a consequence of authorising criminal conduct is that it is rendered “lawful for all purposes”, which creates an immunity both from criminal prosecution and from civil liability for the person carrying out the authorised crime.

As this debate has identified, that gives rise, in effect, to two issues. First, it is a departure from the existing arrangement whereby the effect of the Upper Tribunal’s decision in the third direction case was that the relevant authorities had the power to authorise the criminal conduct, but the power to authorise it did not render it immune from prosecution. In consequence, it was a matter for the relevant prosecutor to determine whether or not the fact that the CHIS was acting in accordance with the authority given to him meant that the CHIS—I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack —should not be prosecuted.

From the point of view of the Government—and very much of this debate—reasons have to be given why that principle is being departed from. The arguments fluctuate between, “It’s a useful power to have, for the prosecutor to determine”, to, “Actually, it makes no difference”. Can the Minister give an authoritative answer to the question why it is immunity now, rather than depending on prosecutorial discretion? In particular, is it because it makes no difference? Has it made a difference in the past and, if so, why is the principle being departed from?

Noble Lords speaking in this debate have asked penetrating questions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, in effect, “Tell us why the policy is being changed.” We on this side of the House want to hear answers to those questions before we make up our minds on this issue. The second and separate issue—here, we believe there is definitely a defect in the Bill—is that the consequence of the “lawful for all purposes” approach is that there is plainly no remedy for the victims of the conduct authorised by the criminal conduct authorisation. That is fundamentally wrong.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

I have received one request, so far, to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for his remarks. He is right that there is widespread support for placing the involvement of covert human intelligence sources in crime on a statutory footing. The issue is immunity, to which these amendments are directed. Will the Minister clarify? He says that the change that this Bill brings about around immunity is to provide greater certainty and protection. It is an assertion, but the noble and learned Lord has not produced any evidence about why greater certainty and protection are needed.

The Minister went on to say that noble Lords have accepted that leaving a CHIS under the threat of prosecution is unfair and unreasonable. I do not know whether he was temporarily distracted, or whether he did not understand what I said, at length: while we and the Government may think that it is unfair and unreasonable, clearly CHIS and their handlers, in the overwhelming majority of cases in the past, have not felt that it is unfair and unreasonable, because they have carried out this activity without a promise upfront of immunity from prosecution.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

6: Clause 1, page 1, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) In section 27(2) of that Act insert—“(c) is not criminal conduct authorised in accordance with the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2020.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment will ensure that victims of crimes authorised under this Bill can seek civil redress.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 6, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak also to the other amendments in this group.

Section 27(2) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 states:

“A person shall not be subject to any civil liability in respect of any conduct of his which … is incidental to any conduct”


that, for the purposes of this Bill, is authorised by a criminal conduct authority. Our Amendment 6 removes this immunity from civil liability. My support in the last group should make it absolutely clear to the Committee that I feel that that is the solution to this problem. It would be only in the very unfortunate circumstance that those amendments are not incorporated into the Bill that I would revert to this amendment.

This part of RIPA was intended to deal with the interception of communications. This might involve placing a listening device in a car or a room or intercepting phone calls, text messages or emails. This could be done only if it was authorised in advance by an Investigatory Powers Commissioner and by the relevant Secretary of State, and against only the most serious criminals, such as terrorists. While intercepting communications is a serious matter, the physical or financial harm to the—suspected—very bad person targeted is likely to be minimal.

The criminal conduct authorities—CCAs—under this Bill authorise undercover operatives to commit crimes in which innocent members of the public could be involved and seriously harmed. A frequent scenario in the past would have been recruiting a member of a gang of armed robbers, who was allowed to participate in an armed robbery during which, by either accident or design, the undercover operative working for the police may have harmed the security guard, potentially very seriously.

Noble Lords will also be familiar with—and other noble Lords have already mentioned—undercover police officers befriending and entering into sexual relationships with environmental activists. Despite the Government’s implied promise at Second Reading that such things would never happen again, in fact, what the Government have said is that an undercover operative would never be “authorised” to have sex with someone they were tasked to enter into a relationship with, not that it would never happen again.

There are two clear and distinct issues here, where someone may seek civil damages. One is where the handler authorises a CHIS to engage in a crime in a way that is not lawful, necessary or proportionate. The other is where the CHIS, whether an undercover officer or, potentially, a member of a terrorist group who passes information back to the police, goes beyond the authority of a CCA.  This could be something

“incidental to any criminal conduct”

they have been authorised to do.

An undercover police officer could argue that he had no choice but to become intimately involved with the activist he was tasked to befriend, and that even if the sexual activity was not specifically authorised, it was “incidental to” the conduct that he was authorised to engage in. To grant him, and potentially the police force concerned, immunity from being sued for damages in such circumstances is repugnant. This illustrates that RIPA was never intended for, and is ill suited to, granting immunity under criminal conduct authorities. 

The Government will say that, even if the CHIS evades civil action, the police force that tasked him, for example, will not. However, that seems to be cast into doubt by what the Minister said in the first group about the extent of the immunity granted, in that that immunity would extend also to the person tasking the CHIS. Again, there are two distinct issues with this.  The first is that if the conduct authorised under a CCA is “lawful for all purposes”, it seems to me that the police force, too, is immune from civil action. The second is that—I speak from personal experience in the police service, as others have—racist and sexist behaviour in police forces reduced only when police officers and their police chief found themselves personally liable for their behaviour. If they had not acted in the course of their duties as a constable, the chief constable could deny vicarious liability, and the officer would be personally liable for any damages. It is the threat of legal action, whether criminal or civil, that ensures that handlers and CHISs keep within the law. Removing civil liability from a CHIS would remove another important check on their behaviour.  

We cannot support Amendment 8, for a number of reasons. First, it says that criminal conduct under the authority of a CCA is lawful for the purpose of the criminal law. Clearly, we do not agree with that. As I have argued in the previous group, we do not believe that that should be the case. Secondly, it requires the authorising body to indemnify the CHIS against having civil action taken against him. For the reasons I have just explained, the personal liability of the CHIS in such circumstances is an important check on their behaviour. 

Amendment 71 would allow a complaint to be brought before an Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which may award compensation. But there is normally a time limit of one year after the taking place of the conduct to which the complaint relates, which seriously reduces the scope for compensation to be applied for, compared with the normal seven-year limit for other civil actions. I do, however, believe that the proposal has some merit, and perhaps with further adjustment it may be more acceptable. I beg to move.

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, with his eloquence and experience. I shall speak to Amendment 8.

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. This committee scrutinised the Bill, received expert opinion on it and made the report referred to earlier, most recently by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. This report raises many issues of human rights that will need to be teased out and possibly resolved as we go through this Bill.

Amendment 8 is there so that victims of criminal conduct carried out under criminal conduct authorisation can access compensation. This is from paragraphs 104 to 110 in chapter 8 of the report. The report notes that the Bill as introduced is potentially incompatible with human rights legislation. Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires the UK to secure the rights of all those within its jurisdiction, including victims of crime. Where crime also amounts to a human rights violation, the victim has a right to an “effective remedy” under Article 13, mentioned earlier. A victim also has a right, under Article 6, to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.

Since the Bill would render all authorised criminal conduct “lawful for all purposes”, it would prevent a victim of authorised crime vindicating their rights by bringing a civil claim for compensation. It would seemingly also prevent a claim for compensation under the criminal injuries compensation scheme.

My amendment mirrors the regime in Australia, which, as the report states,

“provides indemnification for any participant who incurs civil liability in the course of an undercover operation.”

In other words, a civil claim can be brought against the perpetrator by the victim, and compensation secured, but the state will then step in to indemnify the perpetrator against his or her losses. The effect of this provision would be to ensure that the person authorised to carry out criminal conduct

“would not suffer the consequences of civil liability, but it would also ensure that the victim of the conduct would obtain civil redress while secrecy is maintained.”

This Bill has been described as promoting the concept of “one size fits all”, framed more eloquently by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. It is simply not acceptable or possible to do that. In relation to my Amendment 8, I have mentioned specific issues on human rights legislation, which is the core of the report I have quoted today. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am happy to confirm that.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. In speaking to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I do not want to get into an argument over who has more respect for whom, but I have the utmost respect for him and his experience as a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. There is a fundamental disagreement he has surfaced with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and me over what was described in a previous group as the tension in the fact that a CHIS committing a crime is potentially subject to criminal prosecution and being sued for civil damages. I note that the noble Lord does not believe that is right, whereas the noble Baroness and I think it is.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a lengthy and complex debate, and I blame the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for that; we tried to split this group to make it more manageable, but his will prevailed.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, amendments in this group are on prior authorisation by a judge; by an investigatory powers commissioner; by an investigatory powers commissioner unless it is urgent; by an investigatory powers commissioner if a criminal conduct authority is to be used to identify a journalistic source; and by a Secretary of State. Another amendment requires that an investigatory powers commissioner be notified

“as soon as … practicable, and in any event within seven days”

and that the police authority be involved in holding the chief constable to account as a result of the investigatory powers commissioner’s annual report on the use of CCAs.

It is understandable that noble Lords want prior notification—and why the police should not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, said, mark their own homework. On the advice of one noble Lord, I read the code of practice that goes with this Bill. I have held both ranks that could grant a criminal conduct authority under this Bill. In urgent cases, that is an inspector, who can not only grant a criminal conduct authority but also grant immunity from prosecution. I was an inspector at the age of 24. I was also, subsequently, a controller of covert human intelligence sources. I spent 18 years as a uniformed officer. On the Friday I left the office as a uniformed chief inspector and on the Monday morning I was a detective chief inspector in the role of a controller. The Government may say that all the people involved in the matters considered by this Bill will be experienced and highly trained, but that is not always the case in my experience.

We should listen very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated why prior authorisation is not practical, a point also made by the Minister for Security in another place and by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. From my experience I agree, although the description of MI5 handlers and agents as beyond reproach is not, in my experience, universally applicable to police handlers and informants.

Any prior authorisation would instruct CHIS to operate within strict parameters, which may no longer be necessary or proportionate once they are deployed, or may not be adequate once they are deployed, because they are being deployed into rapidly changing scenarios in an uncontrolled environment, often involving chaotic individuals. The most common use of CHIS in policing, for example, is to counter drug dealing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has said, you cannot turn an agent on and off like you can a listening device.

Even the most experienced undercover officer may have to necessarily and proportionately go beyond the strict parameters of a CCA because the situation has dramatically changed in ways unforeseen by the handler. If he were to strictly adhere precisely to a CCA, he could put himself in danger of losing his life. As we will hear in later groups, children are increasingly being used as covert human intelligence sources, some of whom have chaotic lifestyles. Sometimes they are drug users or drug dealers. To expect such people to operate within the strict and precise boundaries of a CCA in such turbulent situations is not only unfair and unreasonable but completely unrealistic. To determine the strict parameters of a CCA to cover every possible scenario, in the middle of a rapidly changing situation, and when the legal immunity of both handler and CHIS depends on it, is unfair and unreasonable to both handler and CHIS.

Those proposing prior authorisation by judges, Investigatory Powers Commissioners and government Ministers may say that any conduct outside the strict parameters of a CCA will be looked at by the prosecuting authorities and a decision made whether to prosecute using the public interest test. In that case, why can the prosecuting authorities not look at all the actions of the CHIS and the handler and decide whether to prosecute?

Amendment 46, for which there seems to be a good deal of support around the House, suggests that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner should be given notice where a person grants a criminal conduct authorisation as soon as practicable and, in any event, within seven days—but, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, so what? What power does the Investigatory Powers Commissioner have to intervene? What happens if the handler corruptly tasks an informant to commit crime? As the authority has already been granted, both CHIS and handler have legal immunity, even if the handler informs the Investigatory Powers Commissioner six days later. A wronged party may be able to claim compensation from an Investigatory Powers Tribunal but criminal offences may have been committed for which the perpetrators should be prosecuted. That is why we have added to Amendment 46, to the effect that legal immunity is dependent on the CCA being approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If the actions of the handler or the CHIS are not within the limits set out in the Bill, neither are immune from criminal prosecution or from being sued.

I understand completely why noble Lords do not want a criminal conduct authority to be granted without prior judicial or ministerial authorisation because of the potential for abuse. However, as others have said, it is not practical. We believe there is a way to prevent abuse without prior authorisation of a CCA, including protecting journalistic sources, which we will come to in a future group. We have listened very carefully to this debate and have come up with a new amendment; because we were part way through this debate we cannot debate that amendment in this group, but we will come to it in a couple of groups’ time. What must not happen in any circumstances is the granting of legal immunity without judicial oversight. That is what our Amendment 47 attempts to do.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Amendments 14 and 75 in my name and the name of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark provide that authorisations may not be granted under this section until a warrant has been issued by a judge. An application to a judge must be made in writing and provide details, including the reasons why it is required, who it covers, the length of time it will be active for, and previous applications covering the same individual. Our amendments also provide that a person who grants a criminal conduct authorisation must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days of granting the authorisation. We seek to strengthen both prior and post-authorisation oversight.

Amendment 77 in the name of my noble friends Lady Clark of Kilwinning and Lady Whitaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, calls for prior judicial approval before an authorisation can be granted

“for the purposes of identifying or confirming a source of journalistic information”,

and is in line with our amendment providing that authorisations may not be granted until a warrant has been issued by a judge. Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Butler of Brockwell, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, is very similar to our Amendment 75 requiring a person who grants a criminal conduct authorisation to inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days of granting the authorisation. However, all the amendments we have been discussing in this group reflect a strong feeling that the oversight arrangements set out in the Bill for the statutory power by public authorities to grant criminal conduct authorisations are inadequate and do not provide reassurance that the likelihood of this power being misused or exceeded is reduced to a minimum.

What exactly has been happening under the present arrangements is far from clear, although we are assured that they have enabled threatened terrorist atrocities and other serious crimes to be thwarted and our safety to be secured. We have no reason at all to doubt that. However, we do not know the extent to which powers have or have not been misused or exceeded since there is no means of that information consistently coming to light. Without proper oversight to act as a firm check there is a risk that some may become somewhat overzealous in how they exercise and interpret the powers they are given under the Bill, including what might be regarded as acceptable covert human intelligence activity, and against what and whom.

We believe there should be prior judicial authorisation, with authorisations not being granted until a warrant has been issued by a judge. Having to obtain a warrant before action can be taken is nothing new. Bearing in mind the potential gravity of the decision to authorise criminal conduct, the necessity to obtain a warrant beforehand seems even greater than it is in relation to other existing actions or activities requiring a warrant at present. It is a prior safeguard and check to minimise the likelihood, in what is self-authorisation by an agency or other body, of a potentially ill-judged or just plain wrong authorisation of criminal conduct, with all the consequences that might have.

Objections have been raised that sometimes authorisations are needed in a hurry but equally, access to a judge, as happens in some other spheres, can be arranged in a hurry—a point made by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. Urgency can arise because of a rapidly developing situation that could not have reasonably been foreseen, but it can also arise because a public authority has left things later than it should have done before seeking the criminal conduct authorisation. Perhaps the Government can, in their response, give some indication of roughly how many such authorisations are currently granted on average each year, how many are needed urgently and what the definition is of urgently. Can the Government also give a general indication of the extent to which authority to commit criminal conduct is given, in a typical year, to those who have been previously involved in or who are currently engaged in unauthorised—[Inaudible]—said that all authorisations

“are granted by an experienced and highly trained authorising officer, who will ensure that the authorisation has strict parameters and is clearly communicated to the”,—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1045.]

covert human intelligence source. The phrase “experienced and highly trained” sounds fine, but what do the Government intend it to mean in practice in relation to the granting of criminal conduct authorisations under the Bill? What is the definition of an

“experienced and highly trained authorising officer”,

a description the Government were happy to use at Second Reading? How much experience is meant, and in what? How much training is meant, and in what? How many experienced and highly trained authorising officers will there be in each authority that will have the power to grant criminal conduct authorisations, and how frequently are they likely to determine whether to grant such authorisations?

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I am very happy either to write to the noble Baroness and outline what I said in more detail or meet with her before Report.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for what she has said. I accept what she and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said about it being a senior officer. In urgent cases, however, the police officer who actually grants the criminal conduct authority would be only at inspector level, which is not very senior. Criminal or civil liability would probably rest with the handler because the handler is the one who made the request to the senior officer—but I am glad that that has been clarified.

The Minister dismissed our Amendment 47 on the basis that it looked like prior judicial approval. It is not prior judicial approval at all and it deserves to be looked at. The Minister said that retrospective oversight is the best solution, but once a criminal conduct authority has been granted, so has legal immunity. So what if the CHIS has been corruptly tasked to commit a crime and commits a crime that should not have been committed? With only retrospective oversight, that CHIS and that handler are still immune from prosecution. How can that be right?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

If I understand the point from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the CHIS is authorised to commit something that is later deemed unlawful, my understanding of it—I will stand corrected if officials tell me differently—is that the person who authorised the unlawful conduct would themselves be liable for the deployment of the CHIS. Clearly, what the CHIS did would also be looked into post facto, but the person who authorised the deployment would be liable for that conduct in the deployment, I think.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]]

My Lords, unlike, I think, every other speaker to these amendments so far, I do not support them. I see in them, once again, attempts to impose yet more conditions that may affect the effectiveness of the operation of undercover support and sources doing what I thought was generally agreed to be vital work in the interests of enforcement and the life of people in our country. I say at the start that a number of these things, and the worry about how these powers may be exercised, do not pay respect to the fact of the code of practice, which many have said should be required reading for everybody taking part in these debates. The importance of that code of practice is that it is going to have to be approved by both Houses of Parliament. That will be a very important protection, because it is under that code of practice that authorising officers issuing CCAs, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, will obviously be required to act.

I make no apology for repeating what I said on an earlier amendment in quoting James Brokenshire, the Minister for Security, when he gave the astonishing figures for a single year in London alone. The use of undercover sources resulted in 3,500 arrests, the recovery of more than 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, the seizure of more than 400 kilograms of class A drugs and the recovery of more than £2.5 million in cash. It also enabled, which I did not mention, the National Crime Agency to safeguard several hundred victims of crime, including from child sexual exploitation and abuse. Those figures alone, just from London in one year, surely leave nobody in any doubt of the importance of this vital source of support for preserving an orderly and law-abiding society. I make this point because, under the code of practice, which includes this question, others are seeking to add the word “serious” to “crime”. How does an authorising officer react when an informant comes and says, “There is a group of people who are starting to get together, I am not quite sure what they are up to, but I think there is a real risk that it could turn, later on, into something much nastier”?

When one looks at those figures I quoted from James Brokenshire, how many lives have been saved; how many people’s lives have not been disrupted; how much misery and poverty that might otherwise have entailed has been prevented? For these reasons, I am not persuaded of the need to add “serious” to crime; I think it might inhibit the operation of a properly authorised issuer of a CCA, who obviously has to use his judgment, and has to persuade the IPC as well that his judgment is correct and is in line with the code of practice.

I should also say a word about preventing disorder. We are living in extremely difficult and dangerous times at the moment. We know that the power of social media now makes it possible, in an instant, practically, to organise major demonstrations which may, in fact, be based on that new and horrid ingredient “fake news”. These may disrupt many people’s lives and may cost people’s lives. Although there are many very worthy causes—whether it is Black Lives Matter or Extinction Rebellion—pursuing very understandable and admirable objectives, none the less we also know that around the fringes of those organisations, or in the confusion that some of their demonstrations cause, other sources of crime can easily emerge and it often makes opportunities for gangs to commit many more crimes as well. So I would not delete “preventing disorder”, provided it is properly covered within the code of practice.

The other thing I would just add is about economic well-being. I totally support trade unions—I always have done and, as Secretary of State for Employment, I was obviously closely involved—and legitimate trade union activity. However, we all know that, within our lifetime, we have had one or two instances where that has not been the case. One instance was the miners’ strike, when Mr Arthur Scargill said that one of his objectives was to bring down the Government, and he was not averse, in the process, to accepting money from the Soviet Union in pursuit of that objective. It is to the credit of Neil Kinnock, now the noble Lord, Lord Kinnock, if I may say so, that he would not support him at that time, because Mr Scargill had not put the issue to a vote of the whole trade union movement.

I think we have seen here, and I understood at the beginning of this, that virtually all noble Lords recognise the vital importance of undercover source information and for there to be a proper system, a statutory system, under which they would operate. That is what I wish to see. I wish to see a thoroughly effective code of practice, thoroughly trained issuing officers and rapid and close contact with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as they carry out their work.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I accept that it is difficult to separate these issues, but I will leave discussion of economic well-being and the activities of trade unions and trade unionists until the relevant groups.

As drafted, the Bill defines very broadly when a criminal conduct authorisation is necessary, and this group of amendments focuses on the new Section 29B(5)(b) inserted into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by Clause 1(5) of this Bill. It states:

“A criminal conduct authorisation is necessary … if it is necessary … for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder”.


Crime and disorder have very wide definitions, as noble Lords have set out in this debate.

As we have already debated, tasking a CHIS to participate in crime is a very serious step for any authority to take, with all the implications for the rule of law and the potential for abuse that we have already debated, and because of the potential danger it places the CHIS in, about which we will discuss more in a later group. In many situations it could have far more negative consequences for innocent people than the interception of communications, and we should not forget that we are amending legislation that was originally intended to cover, when drafted, only the interception of communications.

The legislation covering such interception limits the use of its powers to cases of serious crime. Even in my limited seven years in this House, I have lost count of the definitions of serious crime in different pieces of legislation. It could be argued that, if we wanted to limit the power to grant a CCA to cases of serious criminality, we could choose whatever definition of serious crime we liked.

The noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Hain, have decided in their Amendment 22 to define serious crime as indictable offences only, but I am glad to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, is attracted to our definition rather than the one in his own amendment.

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has clearly articulated, we have gone with the definition already used in RIPA—for the sake of consistency, at least within the Act itself. The principle, however, is the same: that this power to grant a criminal conduct authorisation should be limited to serious crime.

The Government may say that, in addition to being necessary, the granting of a CCA must also be proportionate, and it would not be proportionate to deploy CHIS if the criminal activity was minor. The same argument applies, however, to the interception of communications in RIPA, where “necessity” is already limited to serious crime, as defined in our Amendment 31.

The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, talked about the code of practice. There is, however, a definition of serious crime in RIPA despite the existence of the code of practice for the interception of communications. The noble Lord also talked about the impressive array of offences that had been detected as a result of the deployment of CHIS, including those relating to firearms, drug-dealing and child sexual exploitation. All those examples would fall within our definition of serious crime.

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, even though geese and ganders are different in some important respects. RIPA limits the interception of communications to serious crime, so this Bill should limit the issuing of criminal conduct authorisations to serious crime using the same definition.

The second issue is more difficult and more controversial, starting with the fact that the prevention of disorder is not one of the necessary grounds for the interception of communications. The Government are already on the back foot here, in that large-scale disruptive disorder can have very serious consequences for society yet there is no power to intercept the communications of organisers of disorder in order to prevent it. None the less, there is an argument for both the interception of such communications and the deployment of CHIS into groups that are planning to cause widespread disruption that could seriously affect public order, cause damage to property and the economy, prevent people going about their day-to-day business, and create fear among innocent bystanders.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I have received a request to speak from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for what the Minister has said and appreciate that she has to stick to her script, but it gives the impression on occasion that there is no point in making contributions to debate because what I have said appears, from what she has said, to have been completely ignored. I will repeat exactly what I said. I said that of course the Government may say that in addition to being necessary the granting of a CCA must be proportionate—the issue that she mentioned—and it would not be proportionate to deploy a CHIS if the criminal activity was minor. That is almost word for word what she said. However, I went on to say that the same argument applies to the interception of communications in RIPA, where necessity is limited to serious crime, as defined in our Amendment 31. That second point seems to have been completely ignored by the Minister. I accept that that is probably because she has, understandably, just stuck to her script. It comes back to the point that I made, which is: what is the point of making speeches in debates if what noble Lords say is ignored by the Minister?

The Minister said that these amendments would limit how CHIS could lawfully be deployed and seek to restrict their deployment, and authorities would be less able to investigate crime. This Bill is about criminal conduct by CHIS, not their deployment. It is about giving authority to agents and informants to commit crime, and grant complete legal immunity to CHIS in those circumstances. There is a world of difference between deploying a CHIS and authorising them to commit crime, and then granting them immunity from prosecution. Yet the whole basis of her argument, from what I understood her to say, is that there is no difference between the two. In which case, what is the purpose of the Bill?

I say again: why is the interception of communications limited to serious crime if there is no need to limit the deployment of CHIS, who are going to be authorised to commit crime? Why should they not be limited to serious crime? That is a question that the Minister has failed to answer.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord, with whom I am actually good friends, makes a valid point: what is the point in making speeches if points are ignored? I often find that I make the same points over and again, and they are completely ignored because such is the will of people to make their opposite points. However, on this occasion, he is absolutely right. I did not address his point about RIPA and it being confined to serious crime. In the interception of communications, we are dealing with machines. In the deployment of humans, we are dealing with something else. I apologise to him for not answering his point.

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Many in this House are here only because of their involvement in politics, which is a fundamental right in a free society. The legislation before us is an inadequate framework that includes few safeguards. The backdrop is a history of recent police abuse and failure to respect human rights. Legislation is required to create a framework and this Bill is an opportunity to do that. However, as currently framed, it is inadequate and provides few safeguards. Therefore, I would be grateful if the Government could outline the circumstances in which they believe it is acceptable to undertake surveillance of those involved in political activities.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I start by making it absolutely clear that I do not blame the Minister or those who have written her brief. All I am saying to the House is that Members of this House involved in this debate have hands-on experience of these issues. I include the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, in that. I ask the Government to listen very carefully to those with that experience; that is all. I can confirm that the Minister and I are friends.

The amendments in this group seek to prevent the use of criminal conduct authorisations in connection with the activities of trade unions or legitimate political activity, or to compile lists to exclude people from employment because of their involvement with trade unions or their activities. Others seek to ensure that they are not used disproportionately against minorities and to find out how the Government intend to respond to the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

There are difficulties with Amendments 28 and 29. What happens if a trade union, or its members, is involved in criminal or seditious activity, such as, as was suggested earlier, the activities of Arthur Scargill and the National Union of Mineworkers? Who defines what political activity is legitimate? If members of a trade union have been involved in criminal activity, are there not circumstances where they could legitimately be discriminated against by employers?

We have sought to take a more general approach. In an earlier group, I mentioned our Amendment 56A in this group. It might have been better in the group where we discussed prior judicial authorisation, but the amendment did not come to me until midway through that debate. That is why it is in this group. However, it addresses exactly the issues that the noble Baroness just spoke about. Therefore, it is legitimate for it to be in this group.

I believe there is consensus around the House that agents of the state, in particular the police, should not be able to authorise covert human intelligence sources—an informant or agent—to participate in crime, granting everyone involved legal immunity in the process, without more rigorous and independent oversight. Otherwise, the sort of activity that the amendments in this group seek to prevent could take place.

As we have already debated, the problem with the prior judicial authorisation of a criminal conduct authorisation, which has to define very precisely what exactly the CHIS is or is not allowed to do, is that the agent or informant is often being sent into an uncertain, rapidly changing scenario in an uncontrolled environment, often involving chaotic individuals. Straitjacketing the agent into an exact set of actions, stepping outside of which would remove his legal immunity, is not practical, not least if the CCA has to be referred back to a judge, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or even a Secretary of State before the criminal conduct authorisation can be changed. These are often fast-moving situations, involving complex human interactions that cannot be paused while a decision is made.

It is essential that covert human intelligence sources are not tasked to commit crime in a way that is not legitimate, whether by mistake or corruptly. The draft revised code of practice is not reassuring on this point. For clarity, I will set out what could happen in practice: a handler, who is in in contact with the informant and wants him to participate in crime, makes an application to an authorising officer—in urgent cases, a police inspector or equivalent and, otherwise, a superintendent. Paragraph 5.8 of the draft code of practice says:

“authorising officers should, where possible, be independent of the investigation. However, it is recognised that this is not always possible”.

There could be a situation where a drugs squad sergeant investigating a drugs gang gets urgent authority from his own drugs squad inspector to authorise an undercover drugs squad officer to engage in a drug deal in which the sergeant, the undercover officer and, arguably, the authorising officer are all immune from legal action. It is not difficult to see the potential for abuse in such situations. Noble Lords will be able to imagine a similar scenario, where the target of the operation is a legitimate peaceful protest or the proper activities of a trade union.

Amendment 56A in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee seeks to resolve this conundrum. It seeks to ensure that, if it is intended that an agent or informant is to participate in crime, the

“nature and extent of the deployment have been approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner”

in advance, not the precise details of the criminal conduct authorisation. It is pre-approval, if you will: a CCA cannot be granted unless and until the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has agreed to the mission, in general terms, on which the CHIS is about to embark.

The amendment does not require the prior approval of the exact and precise terms of the criminal conduct authorisation. Instead,

“the purpose and extent of the deployment, and … the type of criminal activity”

likely to be involved must be explained, in general terms, to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who must approve the use of the agent or informant in the intended way. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner could, for example, approve the deployment of an agent into a terrorist organisation, but would, in all likelihood, refuse the use of a CHIS to spy on the legitimate activities of a trade union.

We suggest that this would provide the reassurance that many noble Lords seek by ensuring that a covert human intelligence source should not participate in crime without prior judicial approval, but without the Investigatory Powers Commissioner becoming involved in trying to understand the personality of the CHIS and those he will interact with, or becoming involved in the exact detail of the criminal conduct authorisation prior to the event. It would give the handler the flexibility he needs, but ensure that the CHIS is deployed only for a legitimate purpose. Such prior approval of deployment would apply only where it is intended that the agent or informant will be authorised to commit crime.

Clearly, there needs to be provision for urgent cases, which the amendment attempts to give, but what constitutes an urgent case also needs to be defined—although there is guidance in the draft code of practice about this. The question of legal immunity needs to be dealt with separately, but I urge the Government to seriously consider this compromise, and I hope that the Minister will undertake to discuss this amendment with me before Report.

As with all activity by the state and its actors, the impact on minorities should be monitored, and we support Amendment 78. However, we feel that it is too early to expect the Government to set out how they will respond to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, as this will depend on its findings.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave a very graceful explanation of his previous intervention. Perhaps I should do the same and at the same time apologise to civil servants. If we accept what the Minister has said —that such actions as sleeping with campaigners to infiltrate those campaigns was illegal then and is illegal now—that still means that four Met commissioners sat in front of the body holding them to account and refused to commit to that. What does that say about our senior officers? We always have to bear this in mind, and I have been involved in this struggle for the past 20 years.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received one request to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I have just one question. She said that the scenario I suggested could not happen because police forces had dedicated source units. Can she point to where in the Bill or in the codes of practice it says that that has to be the case? If not, the Bill or the code of practice is defective.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord will appreciate that not every Bill contains every minute detail of issues such as this, but I hope that, with my having made the statement on the Floor of the House, the noble Lord is satisfied that there cannot be conflict. However, I would be very happy to speak to him about this before Report.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I share the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about seeking clarity as to who is covered not just because a criminal conduct authorisation authorises somebody to commit a crime, but because they have, as a consequence, both civil and criminal legal immunity. As we and other noble Lords have argued, immunity from prosecution should be decided after the event by the independent prosecuting authority—disagreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. However, these amendments raise important questions, not least about legal immunity.

The first person covered, without doubt, is the agent or informant—the covert human intelligence source. If the CHIS is asked or ordered to participate in crime then if anyone is to be given legal immunity, it should be him. The question then becomes: is a handler who asks or orders a CHIS to commit crime, whether or not the request or order is legitimate, also covered by legal immunity? This arises from the fact that he can request or order a CHIS to commit crime only if he, in turn, has been given authority to issue such a request or order by the authorising officer. If the authorising officer has told the handler that he is permitted to request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the handler also have legal immunity, in that it is then the authorising officer’s decision, not that of the handler? Then, if the authorising officer has agreed that the handler can request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the authorising officer too not be covered by legal immunity?

What the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, was aiming at with his amendment came as something of a surprise. I do not understand how, under the terms of the Bill, a corporation can be authorised to carry out crime. Surely, it has to be an individual—the covert human intelligence source himself or herself—who is authorised, not a corporation. While I accept that some work of the police service, for example, or the security services may be outsourced, surely that corporation would have to be listed as an authorising authority in the Bill if that were the case.

There would be unintended consequences of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, if the only person who can be authorised to commit a crime is an undercover police officer or a James Bond-type character in the security services, and not a criminal who is helping the police or, indeed, somebody in a foreign country who is simply an employee of an organisation that interests the security services and who passes information back, not an employee of the security services. That would surely leave a big hole in what the Bill attempts to achieve. We cannot support Amendment 53. However, I am very interested to hear the Minister’s response to my question, and that of other noble Lords: who is covered by the CCA? Is it the CHIS who commits the crime, the handler who tells him to commit the crime, the officer who authorises the handler to tell the CHIS to commit the crime, or all three?

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 39 in the names of my noble friends Lady Massey of Darwen and Lord Dubs removes from the definition in the Bill of authorised criminal conduct the words

“by or in relation to”

the specified covert human intelligence source. It replaces those words with a more detailed definition; namely, that it is conduct by

“the covert human intelligence source”

or by a person who holds a rank, office, or position in the public authority that is granting the authorisation and is assisting in the behaviour of the covert human intelligence source. As my noble friend Lord Dubs said, this amendment was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Under the terms of the Bill, authorised conduct is not limited to the conduct of the covert human intelligence source. The code of practice says that a criminal conduct authorisation may also authorise conduct by someone else in relation to a covert human intelligence source, with that someone else being those within a public authority involved in or affected by the authorisation.

If the Government do not accept Amendment 39, they need to set out in their response the reasons why they consider it necessary to provide for the authorisation of criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source; the parameters of that criminal conduct by someone other than the CHIS that can be so authorised; and the safeguards in the Bill to ensure that the person authorised to commit criminal conduct—who is someone other than the covert human intelligence source—is not also involved in any way in the authorisation process to which that criminal conduct relates.

I shall listen with interest to the Government’s response to Amendment 39 and to the pertinent questions raised by my noble friend Lord Sikka in speaking to his amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

I have received a request to speak after the Minister, and hand signals suggest it may be the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation. I am not sure I explained myself well enough to her in terms of who is covered by legal immunity. It is not if the CHIS goes beyond the CCA, but if the CHIS remains within the CCA. So, if the CHIS operates exactly in the way the handler has told them to, and the handler tells them only what the authorising officer has authorised them to, but it is not necessary or proportionate, it is corrupt or a mistake, who is covered by the CCA? Who is covered by the immunity, even though the CHIS has not gone beyond what they were asked to do?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I say again that each situation will be different, but I understand the noble Lord’s point that if the CHIS is acting as instructed, but the handler has gone beyond where they should have gone, it would be the handler’s authorising officer who would be liable for that activity. There would be an investigation, but at that point, we are talking about a theoretical case. If it was the handler who had acted beyond their purview, the handler would be liable for that handling activity, or the authorising officer. It is late, I am tired, and I have suddenly forgotten my thread.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, is not participating in this debate, so I call the next speaker, who is the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too signed the amendment, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has very adequately introduced. When I think back to my experience in the Metropolitan Police Service and the instructions that we had, acting as an agent provocateur was clearly and explicitly prohibited as that relates to covert human intelligence sources committing crime. However, unless I have missed it, I cannot find in the Bill or in the draft code of practice any explicit reference to “agent provocateur”.

To repeat what the noble Baroness said in different terms, an agent provocateur is someone who commits a crime or encourages others to commit a crime that would not have been committed had it not been for the actions of the CHIS, or it relates to a situation in which the CHIS commits a crime and then blames the organisation for that crime, which members of the organisation had no intention of committing. In other words, the crime would never have taken place had it not been for the presence of the CHIS.

I look forward to hearing from the Minister where I have missed that explicit instruction, either in the Bill or in the codes of practice. I stress to her that, although I understand that this scenario could not happen under existing guidelines in the police service, we in this House want reassurance either in the Bill or in the codes of practice that it is prohibited.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, my contribution on this amendment will be fairly short. I hear the point that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti makes and I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this issue is not mentioned in the Bill. Therefore, I am not quite clear whether the amendment is necessary. It would help us if, when the Minister responds, she could say something about the detail of the authorisations in a CCA.

Behind all the amendments today are concerns and worries about what may or may not have happened in the past. People want reassurance going forward, but they are not seeing it. I see that theme across all our discussions today. At some point, the Government will probably have to go a bit further to provide that reassurance, although I do not know how they will do that.

All these issues have been raised because of concerns that people have had in the past. As my noble friend said, we do not know whether we can stop this in the future, but I hope that the Minister can go a bit further. I cannot see any particular issue but, if I am right, the reason behind an authorisation would have to be recorded and shared with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That is the issue on which we need reassurance, as we move forward and give people new powers.

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[Lord Judd (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank unreservedly the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, for the way in which he introduced this amendment. It was a challenge to us all. In protecting the values of our society, of which we like to speak so often, and in protecting the young and the vulnerable, there have to be some absolutes. I am glad that some of the other amendments have drawn attention to other vulnerable people who have been through nightmare experiences, and to whom the damage from being used in this way can be quite incredible.

We have to take seriously—again—the point that I have made several times this afternoon. I am afraid that we could be giving those who seek to undermine our society a victory, because they have provoked us into a situation in which we have acted against what we know to be essential. Nobody can calculate the damage to young people of being used in this way. Very few can really understand or analyse the damage done to other vulnerable people by being used in this way.

So, if we are going to stand firm for the society in which we believe, we must not allow ourselves to give in on these things; we must have absolutes. I therefore counsel those who have moved important amendments raising very serious points about “exceptional circumstances” to consider that probably, in this situation, there are no exceptions. We have to make our stand absolute and, in that way, we can win the battle for humanity that we are determined to win. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Young, for having challenged us so clearly.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee will not welcome me trying to summarise what has been said, and I could not do justice to the excellent contributions that we have heard, not least from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, who completely summed up the position with a very compelling argument, using the analogy with torture that the ends do not justify the means—in the case of this Bill, using children as CHISs and authorising them to commit crimes.

A number of noble Lords said—and the Minister may be about to tell us—that it is a very small number of children who are actually involved in this sort of activity. But the whole reason for using child CHISs that the Government use to try to justify it is that the growth in child sexual exploitation, the growth in county lines drug dealing and the growth in human trafficking mean that they need to use more children as CHISs. These are not going to be small numbers for very long—that is the point I am trying to make.

The noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, in her excellent speech, asked us to consider placing one of our own 15 year-old or 16 year-old sons or daughters into such a situation. But I ask the Minister to imagine being put herself—let alone a child—into a criminal gang and being asked to try to carry off an act where she was pretending to be part of a gang and at the same time passing information to the police, or being asked to commit a criminal offence.

Many of these children, as other noble Lords have said, are vulnerable, either because they have substance misuse problems, because they are looked-after children or simply because their decision-making is immature because of the physiology of the brain, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, said. This is a horrifying situation in which to place anybody, let alone a child. As my noble friends Lady Doocey and Lady Hamwee said, this should not apply just to children who are vulnerable; there are many vulnerable adults who, arguably, are more vulnerable than some streetwise teenagers. We are, again, very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, in that respect.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

49: Clause 1, page 3, line 2, at end insert—
“( ) A criminal conduct authorisation must be reviewed monthly by the person by whom it is granted.( ) A criminal conduct authorisation ceases to have effect on the date it provides, which must be no later than four calendar months after the date it is granted.”Member’s explanatory statement
Under this amendment a criminal conduct authorisation would be reviewed monthly and expire after four months.

[Lord Paddick (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have debated at length, authorising a CHIS to commit crime and granting immunity to that CHIS and maybe others involved is a far more serious thing to do than simply deploying a CHIS. We felt that to expect such an authorisation to last for 12 months—and, in the code of practice, with no mandatory review within that 12-month period but purely at the discretion of the authorising officer—was too much; it is far too long for a criminal conduct authorisation to be in place and not be reviewed.

We cast around for what a reasonable period might be and went back to what I referred to before: the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000, amended by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) (Amendment) Order 2018. The initial order changed the period for authorising a juvenile CHIS from one year to one month. The 2018 order amended that to four months with a monthly review, recognising how much more serious it is to deploy a juvenile CHIS than an adult CHIS. Therefore, bearing in mind how serious a CCA is compared with the deployment of a CHIS in other circumstances, we felt that a four-month cut-off for a CCA with monthly reviews was the appropriate limitation to be placed on a CCA in line with the authorisation for juvenile CHISs. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

I will speak briefly in full-blooded support of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and an amendment that seems to me like a no-brainer. The worst abuses of undercover policing, as are emerging in the inquiry, have related to people who have been embedded for a long time without adequate review, and obviously the risk of abuse is greater the longer a person builds their legend and is embedded without proper review.

Given that all time limits are arbitrary, it is right that we look for something relatively short, given the gravity of the line that is being crossed with this legislation for criminal conduct. The noble Lord has come to a very decent compromise with the monthly review and the four-month maximum on licensing people to commit crime.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I hope to provide the clarity that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, seeks and persuade the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this is not necessary in the Bill. The current authorisation period of 12 months is consistent with the authorisation for the use and conduct of CHIS, which will need to be in place before criminal conduct can be authorised. Keeping the Bill consistent with the powers laid out in Section 29 will ensure that this power remains operationally workable for the public authorities listed in the Bill.

In the updated CHIS code of practice that accompanies the Bill, it is clear that a criminal conduct authorisation should be relied upon for as short a duration as possible. There is also a requirement on authorising officers to undertake regular reviews to assess whether the authorisation remains necessary and proportionate, and is justified. An authorisation must be cancelled when that is no longer the case.

Authorisations will be specifically and narrowly drafted and, in many cases, the specificity of the authorisation will mean that the criminal conduct authorised is in effect narrowly time-limited. However, there will be occasions when this conduct necessarily extends longer than a four-month period; CHIS who are members of proscribed organisations is a good example of this.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for what she just said and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support. I do not quite understand the position of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. If 12 months is specified as the length of a CCA in the Bill then why, if we want to change it to four months, should it not be in the Bill? The Minister is saying it is consistent with the period for authorising CHIS, but not the period for authorising juvenile CHIS. It is a much more serious issue than simply authorising CHIS, as we have discussed. Authorising someone to commit a crime and giving them immunity from prosecution is far more serious than simply deploying CHIS.

To say that it makes it easier if the length of time is the same for one as it is for the other is to ignore the seriousness of this deployment—authorising CHIS to commit crime. If you were to follow the noble Baroness’s argument to its logical conclusion, you would not need the Bill to authorise CHIS to commit crime, as it would be just the same as deploying CHIS. No doubt we will return to this on Report but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will be brief. In earlier consideration of the Bill, the House has been concerned with prior authorisation—I repeat, prior. I do not resile for a moment from the importance of prior authorisation and I hope that we will have the opportunity to consider it in due course.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, who has considerable experience in these matters, raises a narrow point relating to post-authorisation for the protection of officers. I should be interested in the Minister’s reply. My understanding is that the noble Lord seeks to deal with threats to the physical safety of the persons named in the amendment in narrow and possibly important circumstances. Its thrust, while dealing with another aspect, is in the spirit of your Lordships’ consideration of authorisation—in this case post, as opposed to prior, authorisation. Hence, my understanding is that he seeks to plug a possible gap by urging upon noble Lords the need for a statutory requirement for speedy, post-hoc authorisation in certain circumstances.

I have two questions for the Minister. First, how likely is such a situation to arise? Secondly, can we properly be told whether such situations have arisen in the past? In the circumstances, while I pay tribute to the noble Lord for raising this matter, I should like to hear the Minister’s reply on the need for the amendment and its practicalities.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, who has great experience of these issues, spoke about our having thus far overlooked the dangers faced by undercover operatives. Little has been said about operational safeguards. Indeed, perhaps I may take this opportunity to mention that I was contacted by a noble friend this morning who emphasised the bravery of undercover operatives, who place themselves at considerable risk in many such situations.

The amendment highlights the limitations of the whole idea of granting pre-event immunity from prosecution within what the Government variously describe as criminal conduct authorisations that are tightly bound, specific, tightly drawn and within strict parameters. What the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has described is all too possible: that a CHIS—whether a highly trained agent, an undercover police officer or a 16 year-old child informant—encounters a situation that, even if foreseen as a possibility, the handler and authorising officer felt unable to authorise and grant immunity for in advance.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

63: Clause 2, page 4, leave out lines 10 to 23
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would restrict the authorities that can grant criminal conduct authorisations to police forces, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the intelligence services.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 63, 65 and 80, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, in this group. They attempt to get to grips with the plethora of organisations that the Bill seeks to authorise to grant criminal conduct authorisations. I remind noble Lords that this is to grant legal immunity to covert human intelligence sources, informants or agents, and authorise them to commit acts that, under any other circumstances, would be a crime, but because these public authorities have said so, they are no longer crimes.

Unlike existing legislation that limits legal immunity to agents of the state engaged in property interference, intrusive surveillance, equipment interference and interception—all exclusively targeted on the most serious criminals and only with prior approval given by an investigative powers commissioner and often a Secretary of State—this Bill seeks to give public authorities the power to grant immunity to anyone, often criminals, for almost any crime that can be imagined with no prior authorisation outside their own organisation. One would hope that the number of public authorities would therefore be extremely limited, and that evidence would be produced to justify their inclusion.

I am taken back to a recent statutory instrument—the Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2020—which added to the list of public authorities that can access communications data; that is, who contacted whom, from where, and when, but not the content of the communication. In the overall scheme of things, it is fairly low-level data. The Home Office had agreed to include more public authorities on the basis of detailed business cases submitted by each authority.

When I asked to see the business cases, I was told that I could, although the Home Office arranged for me to see them only 45 minutes before the statutory instrument was due to be approved on the Floor of the House. Will the Minister allow Members of this House to see the business cases that form the basis of the Home Office deciding which public authorities should be allowed to grant criminal conduct authorities, preferably not 45 minutes before we consider this issue on Report?

Our Amendment 63 would limit those public authorities that can grant CCAs to the police, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the intelligence services, as it appears to us to be self-evident why these organisations may need to grant authority to agents or informants to commit crime. The other public authorities require justification, hence my request that noble Lords be able to see the business case justifying each of the other public authorities, albeit redacted and viewed in private.

Our Amendment 65 specifically singles out the Home Office, although it might be seen as a typical example—an example of a type of public authority—for further scrutiny. On the face of it, it sounds that, in theory, if not in practice, the Home Secretary could authorise a criminal to commit a crime and give that criminal legal immunity, whether directly or by ordering one of her officials to do so on her behalf. Giving power to politicians to authorise criminals to commit crime and to be able to grant those criminals immunity from prosecution, with no prior independent oversight, raises some worrying spectres.

Our Amendment 80 is consequential. At this stage, I will listen carefully to the concerns of other noble Lords and to the response from the Minister. I beg to move.

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has spoken with great clarity and authority on the amendments in this group. I will speak to the human rights perspective of Amendment 63 as set out in the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on the legislative scrutiny of the Bill. Chapter 6 is concerned with public authorities granted power to authorise crime, as stated by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

Paragraph 75 of the report states:

“We accept that the authorisation of criminal conduct by the security and intelligence services and the police may on occasion be necessary … However, the Bill proposes granting the power to make CCAs … to a substantially wider range of public authorities”.


That concerns us. It goes on:

“This provision of the Bill, coupled with the ability to authorise criminal conduct in the interests of preventing disorder and preserving economic well-being … extends the power to authorise criminal conduct well beyond the core area of national security and serious crime.”


There are two key questions here from a human rights perspective. As the report states,

“the first key question is whether the exceptional power to authorise crimes to be committed without redress is truly necessary for each and every one of these public authorities. The second key question is whether the benefit of granting that power would be proportionate to the human rights interferences that are likely to result.”

The Government have provided little justification for the authorisation of criminal conduct by such bodies as the Gambling Commission, the Food Standards Agency and others. The Home Office published brief guidance and a series of operational case studies, which provide examples of authorisation by CHIS in the cases of the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and other hypothetical examples of where CAAs might be used by the Environment Agency and the Food Standards Agency.

The question must be asked as to why the police or other bodies focused on the prevention of crime should not take full responsibility for authorising criminal conduct that may fall within the purview of these organisations. We are all aware that the police, in carrying out their responsibilities, have vast networks of agencies whom they consult in the course of their duties. They know whom to consult for specific issue as and when such consultation is needed. It is inappropriate and irrelevant to name other specific agencies, whose role is not protecting national security and fighting serious crime.

One of the witnesses to the inquiry carried out by the Joint Committee on Human Rights said:

“If the government believes it is necessary for each of these bodies to have the power to grant authorisations, it should be explicit about whether those bodies already possess non-binding ‘powers’ to authorise the commission of crimes and provide more detail as to how, and how often, those powers are used. In the absence of such an account, there is no reason to accept that all of those bodies require the powers the Bill would give them.”


No such detail is supplied by the Government. It is therefore impossible to assess how agencies whose primary function is not serious crime or national security can, or indeed would want to, be involved formally in granting CCAs. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to conclude the debate on this group of amendments.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her words and I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this debate.

I do not think that the Minister addressed the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, from the human rights perspective. What justification is there for public authorities to grant CCAs where it is difficult to see such CCAs being proportionate to the crimes that they seek to address? Authorising an undercover operative to commit a crime is very serious and needs to be proportionate to the harm that it seeks to address. Obviously, it will help when we see the business cases; I am very pleased that the Minister has agreed that we can look at them.

Can public authorities be added by statutory instrument? The Minister said that it will be via the affirmative procedure. I have already given the example of where authorities were added to those that could access communications data and the House was not able to properly scrutinise that statutory instrument because we were not given access to the business cases until the last minute. If that repeats itself, we will not be able to scrutinise adequately the addition of public authorities by statutory instrument.

The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, talked about being very troubled and the Bill going too far, which leads us on to the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater; I look forward to the jousting between the noble Lord and myself on these sorts of issues. The noble Lord said that I gave the impression that there was something very new in what is being discussed here and that it was a well-established practice. If only he were right. The point is that the granting of legal immunity to people who are being authorised to commit crime is a completely new scenario that no public authority in the past has been able to do—except the Crown Prosecution Service, after the event. I accept that this is a very dangerous world, as the Minister started her remarks with, and that 27 terrorist attacks have been prevented as a result of actions—but not, I would humbly suggest, by the actions of the Gambling Commission or the Food Standards Agency.

The Minister talked about the horsemeat scandal and how it had the potential to undermine public confidence in the food supply. How can getting a CHIS to commit a crime be proportionate to addressing an undermining of confidence, in the human rights sense of proportionality? She talked about the Home Office and the power being specifically required for Immigration Enforcement—so why not, on the face of the Bill, authorise Immigration Enforcement within the Home Office, rather than the Home Office in its entirety? In the communications data statutory instrument, which authorises public authorities to access communications data, the Military Police, not the Armed Forces generally, is authorised. Why not authorise just Immigration Enforcement and not the Home Office?

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, asked: why not call in the police to deal with criminality that these other public authorities have responsibility for? The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, gave some very good reasons why that might be the case, such as that it might not be high on the list of police priorities. But that then comes back again to the question of necessity. He felt that they needed to demonstrate a need—we will look to see whether these agencies have demonstrated the need when we look at the business cases—and that training was essential; he was hoping that it would be alongside police colleagues, but the Minister did not seem to think that that would be the case. He raised this other interesting issue about the fact that, if these agencies do not use this power very much—that is, if they are not exercising it—they will need to be trained more frequently because they are not used to using it. This raises more concerns, in my mind, about these other agencies. The noble Lord also talked about safeguards, as we have discussed in other parts of the Bill.

Clearly we will return to this issue on Report. At the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.

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[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for drawing attention to the points I made, and I am sorry if I sounded too aggressive on some of them. The point I did not make, which I shall make now, is on how much crime is committed. One would expect that, in most cases, it would not be the commission of crime so much as association with people while they committed crimes, with the person in question not necessarily being directly involved but having some complicity, which is one of the problems.

The requirements, as I understand them, if they are in that situation and a criminal conduct authorisation is issued, are that it has to be proportionate, it may not be issued if what is sought to be achieved can be done in another way, and it has to be part of an effort to prevent more serious criminality. Those three conditions are perhaps not mentioned very much but are important.

I have left out some issues that I might have discussed. We have just talked about possibly leaving the Department of Health and Social Care out of the Bill. Think of this moment when organised crime, throughout the world, is seeing how it can get into the vaccines business in one way or another. The challenge that that will pose will feature in our news broadcasts and papers in the days ahead. It will obviously be a big issue. One recalls that the NHS was practically brought to a grinding halt from its systems being hacked and disrupted.

There is this, as well, if it is not too dramatic. At the time of Brexit, when we may be moving towards no deal, there is an idea to take from HMRC its ability to keep every possible assistance. In trying to deal with some of the problems it will have, it will need all the help it can get.

My concern about these amendments, and referral to the police or judges to overview the operations of CCAs, is that a clear structure is set up. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner is a very senior judge and the judicial commissioners are very senior. My concern all the way along is that nobody has challenged how vital covert intelligence sources can be, in a range of different fields. The question is whether we can still keep those covert sources coming. The more we expand the range of people who have access to that information, the bigger the danger of leaks, and then there will be fewer sources available in the future. That is why I think the structure set up of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his judicial commissioners, with a tribunal and an annual report to Parliament on its operations, has important safeguards. Going much further than that starts to undermine the security of the information and imperil the safety of some brave people, who are giving evidence to help keep our country safe, in a range of different fields.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, with whom I completely agree on maintaining the status quo on the involvement of covert human intelligence sources and the ability of the police and security services to authorise these people to engage in crime. I have no argument with him on those issues. But, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the issue for us is the police granting immunity from prosecution or from any legal action at all.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 79, but I will take the amendments in this group in order. Amendment 75A from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is intended to require the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to identify unlawful or improper conduct through a CCA to the police for investigation. I have a great deal of sympathy for what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve, but I am not sure that her amendment achieves what she sets out to.

The amendment talks about conduct that is not authorised by the criminal conduct authorisation, but we are also concerned with conduct that is unlawful or improper that is authorised by a CCA, by accident, inexperience or corrupt practice. This does not appear to be covered by the amendment. Of course, if it is the result of police malpractice, referring the matter to the police may not be enough to ensure that it is properly dealt with.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Finally, Amendment 32 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would make it explicit in RIPA that a person harmed by conduct under an authorisation—I believe the word used in RIPA is “aggrieved”—would have the right to seek redress from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. We first raised the issue of victims having redress through the tribunal in the House of Commons and we will support the amendment if it is taken to a vote. I await with interest the Minister’s response, not least to the assurances that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, seeks.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and to hear him speak in positive terms about his noble friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Before I address the main issues raised by Amendments 1 and 2, let me will clear the decks. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 32 in this group, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned, and my noble friend will deal that amendment later in the group. I have put my name to Amendments 1, 2, 21, and 22.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, proposes Amendments 21 and 22, which seek to clarify the legal extent of immunity that the Bill confers, because, despite debates in Second Reading and Committee, and numerous meetings and email exchanges between Members of your Lordships’ House, the Minister and the Bill team, it is still not clear to me and to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, exactly what the Bill seeks to achieve in terms of immunity. At the very least it shows how complex the Government’s proposals are. We support the noble Lord’s amendments.

Amendments 3 and 4 seek to limit the legal immunity provided by the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, seeks to limit it to criminal liability. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, wants to ensure that criminals do not profit from the crimes they are asked to commit. We will support these amendments if the House divides on them, but they are both about damage limitation and will, I hope, be pre-empted by Amendments 1 and 2.

All these amendments, and those in the following groups, simply highlight the can of worms that the Government are opening by going way beyond the status quo by giving public authorities the power to grant legal immunity. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, Amendments 1 and 2 would remove the ability of public authorities to grant legal immunity to covert human intelligence sources prior to the criminal activity they are being asked to participate in. This would maintain the status quo, where the actions of agents or informants who are properly tasked by public authorities to commit crime are referred to the relevant prosecuting authority, which invariably rules that it is not in the public interest to prosecute them.

We on these Benches accept that that it is undesirable but necessary to use covert human intelligence sources and that, on occasion, these agents or informants need to be tasked to commit crime. We accept that, because of a legal challenge, it is necessary to put the tasking of covert human intelligence sources to commit crime on a statutory footing.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, set out the dangers of the changes the Government propose. I will take a slightly different angle. A reason often used by Governments for not accepting attempts to change existing law is that they are not necessary. We suggest that the Government have been unable to provide any evidence that a change in the law to provide covert human intelligence sources with legal immunity prior to their being tasked to commit crime is necessary.

In Committee, the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland said that

“noble Lords have accepted—and they have not needed to be persuaded—our position is that it is grossly unfair and unreasonable for the state to ask an individual to engage in difficult and dangerous work to frustrate serious crimes while leaving open the possibility of the state prosecuting them for that very same conduct”.

Will the Minister today admit from the Dispatch Box that her noble and learned friend was wrong to say what he did? I, along with many other noble Lords, have said explicitly and openly before the Minister made those remarks that we do not accept the Government’s position that this it is “grossly unfair and unreasonable” to leave open the possibility of prosecuting covert human intelligence sources in such circumstances.

The noble and learned Lord went on to say that covert human intelligence sources operate “in the public interest”. Many police informants act out of self-interest and for financial gain. I have, as a senior police officer, reluctantly handed brown envelopes stuffed full of £20 notes to criminals to pay them for acting as covert human intelligence sources. They were paid an amount agreed in advance for acting on police instructions. What these informants did undoubtedly was in the public interest, but that was not their primary motivation, as the Minister has suggested.

The noble and learned Lord went on to say that

“we must accept that we have lost intelligence and failed to recruit undercover operatives because we have not been able hitherto to give them confidence that the state will not prosecute them for the things that the state has asked them to do.”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 171.]

Why must we accept this? Because the Minister said so? Because he has been told by operational partners who have a vested interested that this is the case? Parliament set a very useful precedent on 9 November 2005 when operational partners, backed by the then Labour Government, said that they needed to detain terrorist suspects for up to 90 days without charge. Large numbers of Labour MPs rebelled and joined a united opposition to reject what operational partners, backed by the Labour Government, were asking for. We should do the same today.

We have asked the Government for evidence of how much intelligence has been lost, as the Minister claims; we are told that they cannot produce any evidence. We have asked how many times operational partners have failed to recruit undercover operatives as a result of the status quo; we are told that the Government cannot produce any evidence. We have asked how many times a properly authorised agent or informant has been prosecuted for doing exactly what they were asked to do; we are told they cannot produce such evidence. We have said, “Okay then, just give us one example of where a properly authorised CHIS has been prosecuted for doing exactly what they were asked to do. If it is sensitive, redact the sensitive detail and show us in private if necessary.” They cannot even do that.

I suggest that, if we are to make such a monumental legal change, we should have evidence to support that decision. So, what evidence is there to support the Government’s case for so dramatically changing the law, so that a police officer can tell an informant to commit a crime, and for that criminal activity to no longer even be a crime—for that informant not to have legally done anything wrong at all, even if innocent people are hurt in the process? The Government’s case is simply their assertion, “It’s not fair.” Seriously? Do the Government think we should so radically change the law because it’s “not fair”?

I will quote the Minister again, who said that

“my respectful conclusion is to say that the continuation of the status quo is not desirable.”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 173.]

Not desirable? Police officers have to secure the prior authority of both an Investigatory Powers Commissioner and a Secretary of State before they can listen to someone’s telephone conversation—and then only if the target is suspected of the most serious criminality. This Bill allows police officers to give an informant total legal immunity to commit any type of crime, with no prior independent authority or oversight, to combat even minor offences. That is the definition of “undesirable”.

Parliament rejected the unsubstantiated claims of operational partners in November 2005 and we should reject them now. We support Amendments 1 and 2.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

What a pleasure it is to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who has demolished the Government’s case for handing out immunity like sweeties to criminals. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not call these people covert human intelligence sources; they are police spies, and we have to be clear about that when we use this language, so that people outside your Lordships’ Chamber can understand what we are talking about.

I shall speak in support of Amendments 1 and 2, which I have signed, but quite honestly, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said, all the amendments here are simply damage limitation. I am staggered that the government lawyers have actually allowed this legislation to be presented to your Lordships’ House. It is appalling. I liked the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Her stance on this is not factionalism; it is a principled stance by a lawyer who understands civil liberties and human rights, and we could all learn from that.

I will focus specifically on my Amendment 4. It might seem a little less powerful or important than the other amendments that we are coming to today and on Wednesday, but I think it is quite important. We will be authorising criminals—or officers, or police spies, or whoever they are—to make money by criminal activities and then keep that money. I would like those profits to be recoverable through the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I would like a proper, clear answer from the Minister on this. I have asked multiple times since Second Reading but have not yet had an answer on how the Government will recover the profits made by a police spy under a criminal conduct authorisation, or CCA.

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The amendments we are supporting provide for effective pre-judicial and post-judicial scrutiny of criminal conduct authorisations while still enabling such authorisations to be given when the degree of urgency precludes prior judicial authorisation. In so doing, the amendments provide the balance between the need for flexibility over the procedure for giving authorisations and the importance of prior judicial authorisation to minimise the prospect—in what is otherwise self-authorisation by an agency or other body—of a potentially ill-judged or incorrect authorisation of criminal conduct by a covert human intelligence source, with all the consequences that might have.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is again a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. We agree with the arguments he put forward for the need for additional safeguards, beyond what is contained in the Bill. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 17 and 43 in this group.

Amendment 43 provides for a senior judge to undertake a review of the use of informants and agents and their participation in crime; in other words, to get answers to the questions, “Why do we need this Bill?” and “How far should it go?”, questions the Government have been unable to provide any evidence for. Contrary to what the Minister claimed in Committee, this review would not duplicate the oversight that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner provides in his annual review of the current use of the powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. Instead, it would answer the questions we have been asking at every stage of this Bill that the Government have been unable to answer.

How widespread is the practice of using agents or informants who have been tasked to participate in crime? Who has been involved? Have they been brave men and women whose sole motivation is the public interest, or have they been people who lack civil responsibility, who do it for money and who have been engaged in very questionable activity—or is it both? The evidence we have heard on this point, arguably from equally reliable sources, has apparently been contradictory. To what extent has immunity from prosecution been a factor in the loss of intelligence and in potential covert human intelligence sources being deterred from helping public authorities? The Government have been unable to tell us, but this review would be able to answer the question—fundamental to the provisions of this Bill—of whether they are all needed. It would also answer the other crucial question: are the safeguards adequate?

That brings me to our Amendment 17. We have heard from Members of your Lordships’ House who have had hands-on, practical, operational experience of the issues covered by the Bill, of whom I am only one. I hesitate to use the word “expert” after I was once described as an expert on drugs—a rather dubious accolade—so I shall use the term “practitioners”. What we have heard from practitioners are the operational difficulties of prior judicial or ministerial authorisation. Practitioners have highlighted the differences between the existing provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act—which relate to the interception of communications—and the new provisions, which relate to the use of covert human intelligence sources tasked to commit crime; I will refer to them as “participating informants”.

The former usually involve the use of technology, such as the planting of a listening device or corrupting the software of a mobile telephone or a computer. The stream of information can be turned on and off remotely, without the target even knowing. The latter involves placing someone in an uncontrolled, unpredictable, often volatile situation, where the participating informant often interacts with dangerous criminals and often must use their own initiative to deal with rapidly changing and unpredicted scenarios with no real-time contact with their handlers or authorising officers. The former is passive and controllable intrusion. The latter is interactive and often uncontrollable.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, told us in Committee that he had been

“converted to the idea of prior judicial approval”

in the case of communications interception—as he has just restated—but that, again, tasking a CHIS

“requires decisions of a quite different nature based on immersion in the human complexities of fast-changing situations. Those decisions depend on close personal knowledge of a person’s character, which will often be unreliable and volatile, and on assessments of the underworld group in which that person is embedded. The authorisation of criminality is simply one part of that complex human relationship.”

The noble Lord also said that judges were good at assessing

“the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects”.—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 198.]

Our Amendment 17 is the result of listening to practitioners—and to those like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who has experience of being an Investigatory Powers Commissioner—and coming up with a compromise. The amendment allows the practitioners to do what they are good at: use the close personal knowledge of the participating informant’s character, assess the underworld group in which that person is to be embedded and define the crimes that the participating informant is to be authorised to commit.

However, once the informant has been granted a criminal conduct authority by the authorising officer, that now participating informant cannot be used or deployed unless the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has authorised use or deployment. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must consider the purpose and extent of the deployment and the type of criminality, in general terms, that it is anticipated the informant will be participating in. If the informant is not to be used to commit crime, IPC authority is not required. It is only once the informant is authorised to commit crime that IPC authority is needed.

If I may use this analogy, if you want to deploy a missile, you need one level of authority—in this case, the authorising officer. If you want to arm the missile with a warhead, you need another level of authority—in this case, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If the purpose or extent of the deployment changes, or the type of criminal activity in general terms changes, the IPC has to re-authorise the use of the participating informant. Contrary to what some critics have said, it would not be the case that, once given, IPC authority would give the authorising public authority carte blanche to use the participating informant at will.

The amendment allows judges, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his judicial commissioners, who must hold or have held high judicial office, to do what they are good at: consider the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects, including the potential for collateral damage or injury. If it is necessary to deploy the participating informant urgently, prior approval is not required but notification must be given as soon as reasonably practicable and, in any event, not less than seven days after deployment.

Our amendment attempts to square the circle. How can you have prior judicial authorisation without getting the Investigatory Powers Commissioner involved in the sordid details of participating informants but at the same time safeguarding against the kind of malpractice we have seen in the past, such as that described by the noble Lord, Lord Hain: infiltrating anti-apartheid groups, the Lawrence family support group, legitimate environmental groups and trade unions?

I believe that Amendment 17 provides prior authority by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in a way that would be more practical in an operational setting. Amendments 22 and 33 lack the power to stop a CCA without Amendment 34; in any event, they do not amount to prior judicial authorisation, which is what many noble Lords have been calling for. As Amendment 17 authorises the deployment once the CCA has been granted, and not the criminal conduct authority itself, I believe that it is consistent with Amendments 5 and 16—that these amendments, if passed, would not pre-empt Amendment 17, which would also not pre-empt any other amendments in this group.

In Committee, the Minister said:

“We have been consistently clear that we want this important legislation to command the confidence of Parliament and the public and are thus willing to consider proposals which provide greater reassurance on oversight but do not impact operational effectiveness.”—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 651.]


As a former police officer, I can say that this amendment fits the Bill. I intend to test the opinion of the House when we get to Amendment 17.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

7: Clause 1, page 2, line 27, after “detecting” insert “serious”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment will limit the crime whose prevention or detection is the basis of a criminal conduct authorisation to serious crime.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 7, I will speak also to Amendments 8, 9 and 10 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

The primary force of this Bill comes from inserting a new clause into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 deals with the interception of communication warrants that have to be issued by a Secretary of State. It states that the Secretary of State shall not issue an interception warrant unless she believes it is necessary, and it goes on to define “necessary” in subsection (3):

“Subject to the following provisions of this section, a warrant is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is necessary—(a) in the interests of national security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; (c) for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.


There is a paragraph (d), but it is not relevant today. This definition of “necessary” appears at other places in the 2000 Act, including Section 32, on the “Authorisation of intrusive surveillance”.

Section 81 deals with general interpretations and subsection (3) sets out the tests, either of which need to be satisfied if a crime is to be considered a “serious” crime, and they are:

“(a) that the offence or one of the offences that is or would be constituted by the conduct is an offence for which a person who has attained the age of twenty-one and has no previous convictions could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more; (b) that the conduct involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose.”


In previous groups, we have set out why we believe covert human intelligence sources committing crimes is more serious than other forms of intrusive surveillance. Agents or informants are difficult to pull out of a situation if it suddenly changes, whereas listening devices can be switched off. Agents or informants are often placed at continuing personal risk in a way that technicians deploying listening devices are not. Listening devices are deployed against serious criminals, but innocent bystanders are more likely to be caught up in the criminal activity of agents or informants.

The list goes on, and yet this Bill allows criminal conduct authorisations to be granted in order to tackle any sort of crime and any level of disorder. Of course, CCAs have to be necessary and proportionate, but so does the deployment of listening devices, the interception of communication and the interference of equipment as set out in the other parts of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. But in those cases, in addition to being necessary and proportionate, they also have to target “serious” crime.

The Government make great play of the fact that these new provisions should be consistent with existing provisions in this area. In that case, they should agree to our Amendments 7 and 10, which limit the granting of criminal conduct authorisations to serious crime as defined by the 2000 Act. Preventing disorder is not mentioned in any of the existing provisions of the 2000 Act. We believe that a clear distinction needs to be made between, say, lawful protests, marches and demonstrations, and serious disorder. Our Amendment 8 seeks to achieve this.

Amendment 9 takes a slightly different approach, as things have moved on from when the 2000 Act was drafted. The issue of the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom has been considered by this House more recently. In the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, in various places—including subsection (2)(c) of Section 20, which deals with the grounds on which targeted interception warrants are granted—the necessary grounds include it being

“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.

The same definition applies to obtaining communications data, bulk interception warrants, bulk equipment interference warrants and, in fact, every provision for the granting of authorisations in the 2016 Act.

This House considered the same issue in relation to the powers granted to border security officers to stop, question and detain under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Under part 1 of Schedule 3, an “act” is defined in paragraph 1(6) as hostile if, among other things, it

“threatens the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in a way relevant to the interests of national security”.

The same definition, including the additional phrase

“in a way relevant to the interests of national security”,

appears in relation to the power to make and retain copies of articles.

We had exactly the same discussions when it came to those Bills, which post-date the 2000 Act, as we are having now: that the economic well-being of the United Kingdom needs to be qualified to include where that is relevant to the interests of national security. In relation to the 2016 and 2019 Acts, the Government accepted those arguments and changed the legislation. In case the Minister raises it, the definition of “serious” crime in the 2016 and 2019 Acts is almost identical to that in the 2000 Act.

The Minister will have to come up with a convincing argument as to why this Bill is different from both the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Quite clearly, consistency with the 2000 Act was not accepted as a good enough reason when it came to the 2016 and 2019 Acts. If the Minister fails to produce a compelling reason not to accept our Amendment 9, I intend to test the opinion of the House.

On Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I simply repeat what I said in Committee. For as long as I can remember, the use of an agent provocateur was explicitly prohibited in police guidance on participating informants, and yet it appears nowhere in this Bill, nor in the draft statutory codes of practice.

The only argument that the Minister came up with against this amendment in Committee was that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to a fair trial, an existing principle of English and Scottish law, and that the use of agents provocateurs could affect a fair trial. He also pointed out that Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows a court to consider and exclude such evidence. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, convincingly responded to the Minister in Committee, agents provocateurs may be used in circumstances where there is no trial. For example, agents provocateurs may provoke a legitimate organisation to do or say something that undermines its credibility in the eyes of the public, short of a criminal offence, or they may provoke criminal offences that would otherwise not have been committed where no one is arrested or charged. The Government’s argument appears to be that agents provocateurs are acceptable provided that no one faces trial.

Amendment 11 is necessary, and we will support it if the noble Baroness divides the House. I beg to move Amendment 7.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for putting the argument for my Amendment 11, which is supported by him and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I intend to press that amendment.

Forgive me, but I am not being rhetorical here: I do not think this amendment should be controversial in substance. I think the only difference between the Minister and me on this issue will be on whether the amendment is necessary to deliver my intention or whether the protection already exists in the legislation.

I shall briefly make the argument to the Minister. One of the grounds for authorising criminal conduct in what will become Section 29B is

“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

We have just said that that belief must now be reasonable. Let us say that I work for one of the security agencies or indeed a police force, and I take the view that a particular environmental movement proposes the most extreme measures in the fight against climate change and that the agenda promoted by this organisation—perhaps not today but in five years’ time—is so extreme a green position that it will severely damage the economic interests of the United Kingdom. I also perhaps believe that, while that movement is yet to become extreme in its direct action, that may well happen in future, and I believe that it is in the economic and possibly even the national security interests of the United Kingdom to head this movement off at the pass and discredit it in the public eye before the damage is done.

Therefore I authorise an agent—a CHIS—to commit crime, not because it is necessary to keep their cover but to discredit the organisation, which to date has not been involved in violence or anything that is actually criminal. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, put it, I then authorise a crime. The agent commits a crime, and the undercover agent is the only person in that group who has committed a crime, but the crime has such consequences that it discredits that peaceful protest movement in the eyes of the media, the public and the Government. It possibly justifies if not a criminal prosecution then perhaps the banning of that organisation. Article 6, and criminal court rules against entrapment and so on, will not help because there is no trial.

It seems to me that currently in the Bill there is nothing to prevent an agent provocateur who is used to incriminate peaceful protest. This is not an academic issue; it is an issue of grave concern to trade unions, the environmental movement, the Black Lives Matter movement and others involved in peaceful dissent. This has been a problem in our country and elsewhere in the world throughout the history of peaceful protest, so I urge the Minister to consider accepting the amendment. It would do no violence to the stated intentions of her policy or the legislative scheme that she is intending to pass.

Finally, I echo the kind words of my noble friend Lord Rosser towards James Brokenshire, who may be in the other House but whom I have experience of being in very heated debates with for the media. He is a kind and gentle man worthy of this House who could teach a lot of us a few things about tone and civility. I am sure that I join the whole House, remote and present, in sending thoughts and prayers and every possible good wish for his speedy and complete recovery.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

Does the Minister wish to reply? No? Okay—I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions, but, first, I send my best wishes to the right honourable James Brokenshire. James and I have known each other for a very long time—since my policing days—and he is such a lovely guy. I really hope that he recovers completely from the terrible situation that he is in.

I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Beith and the noble Lord, Lord Judd, for their support. The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, gave no reason why the ISC did not want these powers limited to serious crime, when so many other aspects of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act are limited to serious crime, and arguably this is more serious than those powers.

I was a little confused by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who gave two examples of very serious criminal offences, which are of course covered by those aspects of the power that refer to the prevention and detection of crime. We are talking here about something that has an impact on the economic well-being of the UK that is not a crime, because if it was a crime it would be covered by that other aspect. I am sure that they were very important cases, but they were cases of crime, not simply impacting the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.

It sounded as though the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, was talking about the deployment of covert human intelligence sources, rather than authorising those CHIS to commit crime. I do not understand this from what anyone has said, including the Minister: if something threatens the economic well-being of the UK but is not a crime—if it was it would be covered by one of the criteria of preventing or detecting crime—how can it be necessary and proportionate, unless it also involves an issue of national security, to authorise somebody to commit a crime to deal with something that is not a crime?

On that basis, because there has not been a satisfactory response, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 9. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 7.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

9: Clause 1, page 2, line 30, at end insert “so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would allow a criminal conduct authorisation to be granted on economic grounds only if it is also relevant to the interests of national security, reflecting equivalent provisions in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for the leading role he has played in achieving consensus around Amendment 24. I start by reminding the House of the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, in his summary of a similar group of amendments in Committee. He used the analogy of torture, where the ends do not justify the means, in the same way that using children as informants or agents is difficult to justify under any circumstances. Regrettably, banning the use of children as covert human intelligence sources is outside the scope of the Bill. He went on to recall the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who suggested as an alternative to using children using people over 18 who look younger, as the acting profession often does, particularly when dealing with adult themes.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out that there is a very fine line between grooming and persuading children to act as covert human intelligence sources. My noble friend Lady Doocey quite rightly pointed out that these children are already vulnerable and exploited, particularly in the case of county lines, without the need for them to be further exploited by the police. We do not send children into war, so why do we send them into potentially more dangerous situations as CHIS, as a number of noble Lords have asked this afternoon? A very experienced police handler of informants told me that, in his experience, even adult CHIS are open to manipulation, let alone children. If you are a child, a non-documented migrant or a victim of human trafficking caught by the police committing crime, you are likely to look for any available way out. You do not need to be blackmailed in such a situation; you are likely to grab at any opportunity, including being tasked to commit crime as a participating informant, a point made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Young of Hornsey, in Committee. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, we are talking about the power imbalance between the police and these vulnerable people, including children.

The Minister’s response in Committee was to cite a High Court judge, Mr Justice Supperstone, who was convinced by the police that it was okay to use children in this way. They appear to have been less successful in convincing the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham. When I was seeking promotion to the most senior ranks in the police service, on a six-month course at the national Police Staff College, we were told that we were moving from superintending ranks, where we had to operate within the existing paradigm, to ACPO ranks, where our responsibility was to change the paradigm. Despite the High Court’s decision, we need to change the paradigm. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, says, the court did not consider the active involvement of children as CHIS in crime.

The Government, in response to our deliberations in Committee, have come up with their own alternative. I am as unimpressed as the noble Lord, Lord Young, with this attempt. First, in relation to authorising the use of children, it amends secondary not primary legislation—much easier for the Government to subsequently change and impossible for us to amend. The only change to primary legislation is on post-event reporting. The government amendments, particularly Amendment 26, prohibit the use of children under 16 to commit crimes against their parent or guardian, but not 17 and 18 year-olds: this is already the case, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said. It creates the position of a “relevant person” who is responsible for the risk assessment and for ensuring that an “appropriate adult” is present if the child is under 16. This risk assessment and the presence of an appropriate adult are already required in legislation. In the case of 17 and 18 year-olds, the appropriate person has only to consider,

“whether an appropriate adult should be present”.

Again, that consideration is already required.

Saying that a child criminal conduct authorisation should be limited to four months instead of 12 is also not a real change. Child CHIS can only be authorised for a maximum of four months and a CCA cannot be granted unless the child has been authorised to be a CHIS, so a review after four months is already inevitable. Overall, I would summarise the proposed alternatives the Government are putting forward as too little, too late.

Amendment 24, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has been a long time in the planning. I join with the noble Baroness in thanking Stella Creasy MP and Just for Kids Law. It covers vulnerable adults as well as children—the case for which was made strongly by my noble friend Lady Hamwee this afternoon—which the government amendment goes nowhere near. The presence of an appropriate adult would be mandatory for all children and vulnerable adults under this amendment, instead of being compulsory only for under-16s, as in the Government’s alternative. It sets out the very limited circumstances when a child could be used, where the best interests of the child must be paramount. The child or vulnerable adult is not to be put at risk of physical or psychological harm, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed. The Minister may say that these restrictions are so limiting that it may result in children and vulnerable adults not being used at all. That is a risk we should be willing to take.

In the absence of Amendments 12 and 13, we support Amendment 24 as the best of the available options, though I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, that it does not involve the independent prior authorisation contained in her Amendment 14. However, as I have just said, it does include informing the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as possible. If anyone thinks that 16 might be an appropriate age for drawing the line, I would urge them to watch the film “County Lines”, directed by Henry Blake. It brings out the horror of the impact of county lines drug dealing on teenagers, including older teenagers, and powerfully makes the case for immediately removing children from these circumstances. Important points were made by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, about the lifelong impact of adverse childhood experiences such as involvement in county lines. Regrettably, contrary to the assertion of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, Amendment 12 does not prevent using a child as a CHIS; it only prohibits tasking them to commit crime. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out, some adults are at least as vulnerable as some children.

Amendment 24 is a compromise, but it is comprehensive in that covers both vulnerable adults and children, and we support it strongly for the reasons so clearly expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his kind words about my right honourable friend James Brokenshire. I inform the House that he read all the lovely comments from Monday’s debate and was very touched by them.

Also, in response to my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, I apologise for the late arrival of the letter. I hope he has had a chance in the course of this debate to look at it.

This has been a very thoughtful debate on an incredibly important issue. I have listened very carefully to the points made by all noble Lords throughout the preceding debates on the safeguards that should apply to children. At this stage, I must say to my noble friend Lord Cormack, who bemoaned the advent of certain behaviours over the last 20 or 30 years, that I am afraid to tell him that they go back far longer than that. I also thank all noble Lords who have engaged with me on this issue directly, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Rosser, who gave up their Saturday afternoon, together with Stella Creasy, to speak to me and my right honourable friend James Brokenshire. I must say that I think we all found that conversation very helpful.

I hope that all noble Lords will recognise the substantial amendments that the Government have put forward to ensure that robust safeguards are in place in legislation for the very rare circumstances in which a juvenile CHIS may be tasked to participate in criminal conduct. Noble Lords have been told that the courts have found these safeguards to be inadequate. That is not the case at all. The High Court considered the safeguards for juvenile CHIS in 2019 and expressly found them to be lawful. In fact, Mr Justice Supperstone explicitly rejected the contention that the scheme is inadequate in its safeguarding of the interests and welfare of juvenile CHIS. He also set out his view that it was clear that the principal focus of the framework for juvenile CHIS is to ensure that appropriate weight is given to a child’s best interests and that the practical effect of the enhanced risk assessment is that juveniles are

“only utilised in extreme circumstances and when other potential sources of information have been exhausted.”

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, asked whether a child impact assessment has been conducted, and the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, suggested an independent review of authorisations of juveniles. This has happened. The independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner conducted a review of all public authorisations of juveniles and the conclusions of that review were reported in March 2019 to the JCHR. The IPC was satisfied that those who grant such authorisations do so only after very careful consideration of the inherent risks and concerns around the safeguarding of children. The public authority’s duty of care to the child is a key consideration in the authorisation process. The IPC also highlighted that juvenile CHIS are not tasked to participate in criminality that they are not already involved in and that becoming a CHIS can potentially offer a way to extricate themselves from such harm. The decisions to authorise are made only where this is the best option for breaking the cycle of crime and the danger for the individual.

In moving the government amendments today, I will not move Amendments 35, 38 and 49, which relate to devolved activity in Scotland. This is because, as I hope noble Lords have seen in the letter I issued earlier today, the Scottish Government are unable to support the Bill. Respecting the Sewel convention, the Government will not legislate without the consent of the Scottish Government. Therefore, at Third Reading I will bring forward amendments to remove from the Bill the ability to authorise participation in criminal conduct for devolved purposes in Scotland. Authorisations necessary for the purpose of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom relate to reserved matters and the relevant public authorities will still be able to grant authorisations for these purposes for activity in Scotland through the powers contained within this legislation. An authorisation necessary for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime or preventing disorder is not in itself reserved. An authorisation granted for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime or preventing disorder may therefore relate to devolved matters, and it will be these matters to which the Bill will not apply.

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[Viscount Brookeborough (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I had not intended to intervene—[Inaudible]—discussed in the context of CHIS operating in non-terrorist criminal organisations and rather less of those in terrorist groups. Because the Bill covers both at once, I feel there is a danger—[Inaudible]—extent that it might seriously inhibit the latter, which is the fight against terrorism. I therefore cannot fully support the amendment as a whole, but I would support proposed new subsection (c) on sexual offences on its own if I could do so.

The major difference between non-terrorist crime and terrorism is that the former—[Inaudible]—of death. Terrorism always has death and destruction as its aim. I know little about the former apart from what I have read in the press and heard in the very excellent debates on the Bill. However, I have some knowledge of—[Inaudible]—we remember the serious nature of the criminality that terrorist groups seek to carry out. The intelligence that CHIS gather prevents large numbers of deaths and serious harm to the public.

There have been, I believe, some misconceptions in these debates about the terrorist world. There has been mention of informer—[Inaudible.] All agents are informers, but not all informers are agents. The single-use informer is a person who is short term only and would probably be paid off or given another life after the operation, such as the dismantling of a drug-dealing gang. This is because he will have been exposed by the arrest—[Inaudible]—operator in a large organisation that provides ongoing information that can go on for years or even decades. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested that a CHIS operating under one of these authorisations is called a participating informer. Perhaps that was so in the areas of his experience, but it was not so in mine, when—[Inaudible]—these types of agents, strategic agents in a terrorist group or short-term criminal informers.

In Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, said:

“Let us suppose that in becoming a member of a terrorist organisation, a CHIS is required to fill out a membership form … The handlers may therefore assist”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 151.]


in filling the form out. I hesitate to disagree with such an eminent noble and learned Lord, and while I do not doubt that this might be the case for other groups, I am not aware of any terrorist organisation that produces a membership application—although the IRA had a green book that was given to people once they were inducted.

[Inaudible]—in Northern Ireland for 23 years of the Troubles. More recently, I am well aware of the agent-handling protocols from the Troubles era and that they have been adapted and improved for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. For centuries, perhaps for all time, there have been spies and intelligence gatherers at state level, where it is basically strategic intelligence within a pyramid of government structure. This is, if you like, the Le Carré world. Spies rarely have to commit crimes, such as planning and carrying out a bombing—[Inaudible]—in the last 60 years is worldwide terrorism and the need to have long-term deep plants or active terrorists who have been turned.

[Inaudible]—that states have. Terrorist organisations are very flat in structure and every person from the top to the bottom is—[Inaudible]—for want of a better word. They are active terrorists. It is also important to realise that it is very difficult to—[Inaudible.] In 40 years of the Troubles, there were only, I believe—[Inaudible]—figures of such people. We saw what happened when Robert Nairac thought he could become a member of a family. As a result, most CHIS are turned terrorists or at the very least members of the same communities. They will have committed and will almost certainly continue to commit crime—[Inaudible]—a big part of the induction process in the first place. There are no convenient forms to sign, and any reluctance to take part, from initiation onwards, is suicidal.

Imposing these legal limits, as laid down in the amendment, could put CHIS in the terrorist world at substantial risk. After being inducted into a terrorist organisation, every part of that individual’s life from then on contributes, one way or another, to the terrorist aims, death and destruction—criminality of the highest order. Becoming a CHIS cannot change that much. However, the outcomes of their provision of intelligence saved many lives.

I shall give a true example of a small event. An agent turned up at a meeting of his IRA ASU—active service unit—in the county where I live. He was told to deliver a car bomb immediately. He could not refuse. He delivered the car and, luckily, the TPU—the timer power unit—gave him time to call his handler from a call box before the bomb was to blow up, thereby avoiding loss of life. If I may say so, that is not the most extreme case.

Of course it is right that CHIS activity should be regulated and the Bill does just that. There are protections in place such as the Human Rights Act. However, there may be times when participation in serious crime is necessary and at short notice. Any refusal to be involved would result in the loss of an agent, and no further information from that source. It may have taken years for him to become so deeply involved. This is real life in that terrifying world. The running of the protection of such people is vital and complex. There has to be a way in which to manage them. Inserting increasingly tight legal limits on what they can and cannot do is not the way forward, as those limits may be largely unenforceable in those circumstances.

I will not go into examples of the protection. However, there is an analogy which shows the value of sources. The Enigma was a provider of intelligence, albeit a machine, rather than a person. When the code was broken, the first signal referred to an immediate attack on a convoy by U-boats. It struck me that that was a similar situation to those of some agents. Turing’s colleagues said quickly, “We must warn the convoy.” He said, “No. We cannot risk such a valuable source for the future, or that will be the end of it.” That is one of the problems for the CHIS.

Terrorism is—[Inaudible]—operations alone. The use of many long-term, deep-intelligence CHIS creates a cancer within the terrorist organisations that does so much damage to them that, although they do not admit defeat, they begin to realise that they cannot win. That turning point is sought after by Governments worldwide, and very much due to CHIS.

In the months prior to the ceasefire in Northern Ireland, over 90% of planned terrorist operations failed or did not take place, largely as a result of long-term deep CHIS. I and my family were among the beneficiaries of such intelligence. I believe that this and some of the other amendments will inhibit the fight against the worldwide terrorist threat.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen. I have added my name to it.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seems to have blown the Government’s reliance on the European Convention on Human Rights out of the water. Even if he was wrong, which I very much doubt, I fail to understand the difference between a list of offences that can be deduced from the convention and an offence listed in the Bill. The Government’s argument seems to be solely based on the danger of the CHIS being tested by asking them to perform prohibited acts. Yet as the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Cormack, have said—the amendment being based on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985—the Canadians seem to have had no such qualms or difficulties.

In any event, is the cat not out of the bag already? Do criminals read Hansard? That is about as likely as they are to read primary legislation, in my experience. We have the list of prohibited offences published as a proposed amendment. The Minister is saying that those offences would be prohibited anyway under the ECHR, so what is to be lost? I understand the reservations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, about the wording of the amendment, but if the Government do not give an undertaking to bring this matter back at Third Reading, it can be approved on ping-pong, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

17: Clause 1, page 3, line 2, at end insert—
“(8A) Where a criminal conduct authorisation has been granted, the covert human intelligence source so authorised cannot be deployed unless the conditions under subsection (8B) have been fulfilled.(8B) The conditions are that—(a) notification has been given to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner of—(i) the purpose and extent of the deployment, and(ii) the type of criminal activity it is anticipated the covert human intelligence source would participate in, and(b) the Commissioner has considered the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects, including the potential for collateral damage or injury, and has approved the deployment.(8C) In the event of urgency, prior approval is not required but notification must be given to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event not later than seven days after the deployment.(8D) A notification under subsection (8B) or (8C) must be given in writing or transmitted by electronic means.”

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

I beg to move and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick [V]]

36: Schedule 1, page 7, line 9, after “is” insert “reasonably”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would insert a requirement that belief in the necessity and proportionality of a criminal conduct authorisation, and in the existence of satisfactory arrangements, be reasonably held.

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[The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)]

The noble Lord, Lord Mann, has scratched. Accordingly, I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her kind remarks about my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I can assure her that my noble friend will be watching and listening intently as we come to the end of this Report stage.

We support Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Clark of Kilwinning. The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, ably and comprehensively explained the amendment, which means that I can be brief.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is absolutely right to bring forward her amendment to the Motion. I might want to criticise the details, which I do not intend to do, but she is right to do so. In fact, it would have been inconsistent with her rigid approach to the Bill for her not to do so. So, to that extent, I support her right to table the amendment; there is no question whatever about that. It gives me an opportunity to further vote for the Bill because I will not support the amendment to the Motion.

The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, just made a point about the open society. This is a problem and there is a disquiet here. As an open society, we need to protect our openness. However, when that openness is the very thing used to undermine and smash our open society, we have to say no. We have to have a process that defends our open society and is consistent with the rule of law. The Bill is perfect for that. I have no doubt that in future the Bill will be amended, but the language that has been used about it is extravagant and misleading.

I see that on Twitter it is described as the “Spy Cops Bill”. It has nothing to do with spy cops. It is completely different and that can be misleading. If I was a CHIS in Scotland, I would be a bit concerned at the moment about becoming a whistleblower because I am not sure whether the Scottish Government are fully behind the process.

Perhaps I may briefly also express thanks. I have not been involved in the detail but I took up the Minister’s opportunity for a discussion with the Bill team and some of the advisers, which I found useful. Indeed, as a result, they published more information. The case studies, which I used extensively on Report, should have been deployed even more. There has been a communication issue regarding the Bill, which I find a fault because the Government have not defended and promoted some of its practical aspects as much as they could have.

The Bill protects covert human intelligence sources. It makes sure that they are not put at risk by being tested by the criminal gangs they may have been sucked into involuntarily, as mentioned in some of the examples used in the case studies. It is not the case that all people knowingly go down that route; they get sucked in by their employers. As a non-expert in this area, I found the newly published guidance incredibly helpful.

My final point is on the pejorative language used, such as when quangos are dismissed as not important. Most of the quangos listed in the Bill are non-ministerial government departments and should not be dismissed by saying, “Oh, it doesn’t matter”. I find that kind of language unacceptable among parliamentarians because it deliberately seeks to mislead the public regarding what the Bill is about. It should stop.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have a lot of respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and we support the spirit of her amendment to the Motion to the extent that we oppose the granting of legal immunity. We believe that the Bill undermines the rule of law—that is, the principle whereby all members of a society are considered equally subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes. As a result of the Bill, that is called into question, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, have said.

Where a police officer or member of the security services tasks a covert human intelligence source to commit an act defined in law as a crime, the person tasked will no longer be subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes. An existing system that has worked effectively for decades, whereby informants and agents are tasked to commit crime and the decision, almost without exception, not to prosecute is taken by the relevant prosecuting authority, after considering all the facts, will be swept aside.

It is to be replaced with what we consider an unsafe and undesirable power, vested in the hands of the police, the security services and numerous other public authorities, to grant legal immunity with no prior judicial authority. The main issue is not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, says in her amendment to the Motion, that there are insufficient safeguards or oversight, although this is arguably true. It is the fact that immunity can be granted at all, making the illegal legal. That is the fundamental issue for us on these Benches. I expect the legality of this aspect of the Bill to be challenged in the courts. That said, the House fully debated this aspect of the Bill, and without the support of the Labour Party leadership, we on these Benches were unable to remove it.

Contrary to the amendment to the Motion in the name of the noble Baroness, this House has clarified the existing position and improved the Bill, to ensure that innocent victims of crimes committed by those instructed to do so by state agents can seek compensation. Contrary to her amendment to the Motion, undercover policing is not being expanded by the Bill, although the Bill has shone more light on this aspect of policing. The number of public authorities that can deploy covert human intelligence sources has been reduced by the Bill. The directed criminal activity of those informants and agents has been placed on a statutory footing, rather than the Bill enabling it to increase.

From the start, we recognised the need to place the tasking of covert human intelligence sources to commit crime on a statutory basis, which this Bill does. We have improved the Bill in some important respects—the safeguards for children and vulnerable adults, for example, despite our fundamental misgivings over immunity. Therefore, with regret, we cannot support the noble Baroness’s amendment to the Motion.

I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their work on the Bill; our Labour colleagues and their staff for their assistance and co-operation on those aspects that we were able to agree on; and those on the Cross Benches who have liaised with us. I also thank my staff and colleagues for their help with what has been a very difficult Bill for me, personally, because of my previous professional experience of this difficult area of policing and because of my knowledge of the very real opportunities that the Bill presents for corruption and malpractice. The amendments that this House has introduced are the very minimum required and we will resist any attempt to remove any of them.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we do not support the amendment to the Motion. This unelected House does not vote down Bills. Our role is that of a revising Chamber. Through making amendments to Bills, we invite the House of Commons to reconsider its position on specific aspects of legislation. That is what we have done with this Bill.

We have debated amendments to the Bill. Some have been agreed by this House, and some have not had its support. From our point of view, we have not won the support of this House for everything we wanted, but important amendments have been agreed and we want the Bill with those amendments to go back to the House of Commons for consideration. This amendment to the Motion, if carried, would thwart that objective and accordingly we shall vote against it.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I shall speak to Motions A, C and E on the basis that each of them relates in some way to an earlier amendment in my name.

Motion A concerns Amendment 1, which I originally moved in Committee. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I would have preferred the requirement that belief be reasonable to have been included in the Bill. However, I welcome the fact that it will at least now be plainly stated in the code of practice at paragraphs 3.10 and 6.4 in terms that improve significantly on the earlier suggested amendment—memorably described by my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd as the “worst of both worlds”. The new paragraphs will say plainly that

“the person granting the authorisation must hold a reasonable belief that the authorisation is necessary and proportionate.”

Something similar has been said from the Dispatch Box, but authorising officers will perhaps have the code of practice more readily to hand than the Official Report. I welcome the new wording and, like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—who, with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, took over this amendment on Report—I do not oppose Motion A.

I turn to Motion C on the availability of compensation for the victims of authorised crimes. Lords Amendment 3, which your Lordships passed on Report by a majority of 91, provided that there was no bar to the criminal injuries compensation schemes in Great Britain and Northern Ireland being available to victims of authorised crimes. Without such a clause, it was at least possible that Section 27 of RIPA, which renders authorised activity lawful for all purposes, would have prevented such recourse. The Commons rejected that amendment, with the stated basis being that it was

“inappropriate to create an exception to the effect of criminal conduct authorisations.”

I am pleased that the Government have thought again. Their new clause is, so far as I can see, simply a competently drafted version of mine. It will mean that, should an act of violence ever be authorised, the innocent victim will not be disqualified from compensation by the fact that the perpetrator was a CHIS. It improves the Bill in a specific but potentially significant way.

Finally, Motion E originates in an amendment from my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. That amendment would have improved my own Amendment 5 on real-time notification, which now constitutes Clause 3 of the Bill, by underlining what I believe in any event would be the practical reality: that the disapproval of a judicial commissioner will normally result in the cessation of all further activities undertaken pursuant to an authorisation. My noble and learned friend’s amendment was not agreed to in the other place, but he has negotiated in its place an acceptable alternative in the form of an amendment to the code of practice. It begins:

“Where a judicial commissioner makes observations in relation to a notification, it is for the authorising officer to determine what action should be taken”—


not whether any action should be taken, but what action should be taken, which implies that some action will be taken.

IPCO must then be informed of that action as soon as reasonably practicable, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner retains full discretion to take what further steps may be thought appropriate—including, as the Minister expressly confirmed on Report, passing the file on to the Director of Public Prosecutions or his equivalent in Scotland and Northern Ireland. As the Minister clarified on 11 January, at cols. 497-98 of the Official Report of your Lordships’ House, if the authorisation is determined not to have met the statutory requirements of necessity and proportionality, nothing in this Bill or in RIPA itself prevents the prosecution either of those responsible for authorising the crime or of the person who committed it.

The consequences for anyone who has unlawfully issued a criminal conduct authorisation are therefore real and give the lie to any suggestion that the real-time notification procedure is without teeth. Successive Investigatory Powers Commissioners have been among our highest-ranking and most experienced judges, well capable of deploying both the bark and the bite. This Bill, read with its code of practice, equips them for both.

In short, we have a solution on each of these three amendments which is largely satisfactory. I thank the Bill team and the Minister for their constructive and courteous engagement with operational partners over many months. The Bill is not perfect—given the intractable subject matter, that is not surprising—but it has been very significantly improved by your Lordships. We can fairly say that we have done our job, and I look forward to seeing the Bill on the statute book.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to the two Motions on which the House will divide. Motion B asks that this House do not insist on its Amendment 2, which placed in the Bill a list of offences that a criminal conduct authorisation could not authorise. This amendment was suggested by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and was championed by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. The Commons disagree because doing this

“would place sources, and the wider public, at risk.”

As the Minister explained, the argument goes that sources could be tested against such a list to discover whether they were a CHIS and, further, that pursuant of testing to see if a person was a source, they would ask other people who were not CHIS to commit crimes listed in Lords Amendment 2.

Those arguments were demolished by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in Committee—and the Government have, to date, failed to address them. Australia, Canada and the United States of America have similar lists and they do not present the sort of difficulty in those countries that the Government claim would occur here. In a blatant act of whataboutery, the Minister responded that these countries were different because we have the Human Rights Act and they do not. On Report, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, comprehensively demolished the argument that the Human Rights Act was sufficient, but that is not why the Commons disagrees with Amendment 2.

What has the Human Rights Act got to do with the Commons disagreement? A list is published in each of the countries—Australia, Canada and the USA—of offences that CHIS cannot be authorised to commit, and the reasons the Commons has given for rejecting this amendment do not arise in those countries. Their CHIS are not tested against the list and there is no evidence that others are tested against it either. We are not talking about a hypothetical situation of “What if there was a list of prohibited offences?” but about the fact that this has been tried in practice for many years in similar jurisdictions and the Commons’ stated concerns do not exist.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, then went on to explain why he believed publishing a list is not a problem in those jurisdictions and why it would not be a problem here. If a gang tested a member by asking them to rape and the gang member refused, it could be that the gang member has scruples that he is not prepared to set aside. I could add to the noble Lord’s example and say that the gang member may be incapable of performing an act of rape in front of an audience or that his sexuality gets in the way of his being able to rape the man or woman he is being asked to rape. There are a host of more likely explanations as to why the gang member might not commit a serious crime other than that he might be a covert human intelligence source refusing to do so simply because he is a CHIS.

To paraphrase the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, also with direct experience of Northern Ireland, he said he found it hard to understand why a shortlist bearing no relation to the types of crime that would routinely be authorised should increase the risk to a CHIS or other members of the public or make it more likely that he would be successfully outed as a CHIS by the criminal group in which he is embedded. As a police officer of over 30 years’ experience, including direct experience of managing police informants, I do not understand either.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 5A and do propose Amendment 5B in lieu—

5B: Leave out lines 27 to 35 and insert—
“(6) If upon notification under subsection (3) a Judicial Commissioner determines that the authorisation should not have been granted—
(a) the person who granted the authorisation must be immediately informed,
(b) the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland must be immediately informed, and
(c) all further activities that will or might be undertaken pursuant to the authorisation are not “lawful for all purposes” under section 27(1).””

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have three things to say. First, I beg to move; secondly, I wish to test the opinion of the House; and, thirdly, please take into account my voice when taking soundings in the Chamber.