Sustainable Aviation Fuel Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 10th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to see the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, back in his place. On behalf of these Benches, I also thank the Minister and the Government for bringing forward these amendments. These important issues were raised in Committee. The Government have listened to the concerns that were raised and we welcome the amendments that have been brought forward. We are grateful that the Government have listened and we are delighted to accept them.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I wish only to congratulate my noble friend Lord Grayling on his amendment and, further, on having persuaded the Government to table alternative amendments that have the same effect as his. We have no objection to those amendments.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, for Amendment 5, which we debated in Committee, and for his contribution. I am very grateful to hear from all noble Lords that the amendments that the Government have tabled deal with the issue that was raised in Committee.

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Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 17, at end insert—
“(2A) A revenue certainty contract may not provide for payments in respect of power-to-liquid sustainable aviation fuel.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that revenue certainty contracts under the Act may not be used to subsidise power-to-liquid sustainable aviation fuels.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, for the benefit of noble Lords who have not become totally enmired in the question of sustainable aviation fuel, it might be appropriate at this stage to spell out that there are, essentially, three sorts of aviation fuel. Of course, everything I say on this topic is, to some degree, a simplification that may be subject to correction and refinement, but broadly speaking there are three sorts. One of them goes by the inelegant name HEFA. I will not tell noble Lords what it stands for, because I cannot remember the very long sequence of syllables that comprise it, but, essentially, it is recycled cooking oil.

There is no real shortage of HEFA in the world. The Government have said that it is not the intention of the Bill for the financial support mechanism it contains to be used to subsidise the production of HEFA. None the less, the Bill allows for HEFA to be subsidised; one of the amendments in my name in this group would preclude that. Another amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, would have a very similar effect to mine, although his is worded much more elegantly and elaborately. Its effect is also slightly more impenetrable than mine but, if one follows the chain of words, it comes to a very similar effect. He and I are at one in saying that the Bill should preclude the subsidisation of HEFA.

There is, higher up the chain, a further form of sustainable aviation fuel, which we can describe as non-HEFA. The difference is that the source material, the feedstock, has to come from sources other than used cooking oil. Municipal waste, for example, would be non-HEFA fuel. There is in place, prior to the Bill, a sustainable aviation fuel mandate that was introduced by statutory order about 15 months ago, under this Government. It requires an increasing amount of HEFA to be mixed into aviation fuel over the next few years, but at a certain point, the mandate says non-HEFA has to be mixed in as well. In other words, the sustainable aviation fuel requirement cannot be satisfied by using simply HEFA and adding more and more HEFA over the years—at some point, some non-HEFA fuel has to be added as well.

As I understand it, it is largely the case that the Bill is aimed at stimulating the production of non-HEFA fuel, which is currently not in production. We will come back at a future stage to whether it is sensible and necessary to subsidise this—at the moment, we are simply discussing what the fuel consists of and what the Bill should be directed at.

Again, while I do not wish to steal the Minister’s thunder, my understanding is that the Government are clear that the main aim of the Bill is to subsidise this non-HEFA fuel. Beyond HEFA, if one goes right to the top of the chain, there is a form of fuel that is not entirely speculative, but is in production in a small, experimental way in the United States and is called power to liquid. PtL, as I understand it—and I speak in a simplified way because I am not technically qualified—captures carbon from the atmosphere and turns it, through some wonderful process, into a liquid fuel that can be mixed in with standard aviation fuel.

It is true that the sustainable aviation fuel mandate that has been in place for 15 months requires that a certain amount of PtL is added in years into the future. That would mean HEFA in the early years, then more non-HEFA, which has to build up, and some PtL added later. That is the progression envisaged by the sustainable aviation fuel mandate.

The Bill would allow the subsidisation of PtL, but I have an amendment in this group which would prohibit that. The whole question of PtL is so speculative that we have no idea what it would cost to subsidise, and it is far distant. I remind noble Lords, who I am sure have been attentive to this, that a sunset clause is introduced in Clause 1(7) and that no contract, by way of a subsidy, can be let

“after the end of the period of 10 years beginning with the day this Act is passed”.

If we are to have long-term subsidies for sustainable aviation fuel—and it may well be 10 years before PtL production is feasible—the Bill will probably be useless for that purpose in any event because, unless amended, it will have expired. My amendment to remove PtL would be a safeguard against the subsidy regime envisaged by the Bill, whose mechanics we will turn to in later amendments, being abused and run away with as we finance and support a very speculative and potentially very expensive fuel.

In the meantime, I understand that the Government take the view that the very small amounts of PtL required and envisaged by the mandate can be secured by import at the due time in the future—again, the Minister can correct me if all this is wrong—so there will be no damage to the mandate if the Bill excludes PtL. That is the substance of these groups of amendments.

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Could the noble Lord kindly repeat the beginning of that statement where he talked about the Government’s intentions on HEFA? It is important that the House hears exactly what the Minister is saying about that.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

Of course; I am very happy to repeat it.

Our intention is for HEFA technology and feedstocks to be excluded from RCM contracts because HEFA SAF has already overcome many of the barriers to investment that the revenue certainty mechanism seeks to address. However, the SAF market is at an early stage and uncertain, so the legislation needs to remain flexible to allow for potential future changes in the market to which the revenue certainty mechanism may need to respond.

I hear noble Lords’ concerns on growing crops for purposes other than food; the sustainability criteria in the revenue certainty mechanism will align with the sustainability criteria in the SAF mandate. This will be implemented through the eligibility criteria within the contract allocation process and will reflect the latest market and technological developments.

We are actively monitoring trends to ensure that the policy keeps pace with technical and commercial developments. Therefore, we have launched a call for evidence on the eligibility of crops in the SAF mandate, which will run until 16 March this year. It asks for evidence on potential benefits, risks and trade-offs of using crops in SAF production. In answer to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay of Richborough, about carbon dioxide, I am sure that evidence on that will be provided as a consequence of that call for evidence.

The call for evidence does not propose any changes to the SAF mandate. Should there be a case to review the feedstock eligibility criteria, it would be subject to consultation, and any changes would require amendments to legislation. We would not want to exclude specific feedstocks in the Bill in case updated evidence proves that they meet the sustainability criteria for eligibility in the SAF mandate.

In answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, on the position of the United States, we note that, but we will run the consultation first to understand the evidence arising from the questions we have asked.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Ravensdale, for tabling their amendments and ask that they do not press them based on the actions already being taken to give flexibility and ensure value for money.

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[Lord Ravensdale (CB)]

I thank the Minister for making that strong statement from the Dispatch Box on the intention to exclude HEFA technology and feedstocks. That is further than the Government have gone before in their statements. It sets out a clear direction of travel for the legislation and the revenue certainty mechanism, and I thank him for that.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, taking the issues separately, we in this House are used to governments seeking powers much broader than they need, and explicitly broader than they are intending to use. The Government seek the power to offer a subsidy regime, the character of which we will come to in the next group. They want the power to extend a subsidy regime to the production of something which requires no subsidy, as the technique for producing it is well established. Neste Oyj, a Finnish company which came to see me a few weeks ago, is producing vast quantities of HEFA already in various European centres.

There is no need for a subsidy for HEFA, and the Government agree. They say that they have no intention of using the revenue certainty mechanism for HEFA; none the less, they want to have the power. That is a bit shabby, although I appreciate that, thanks to the intervention of my noble friend Lord Harper, they are now willing to come to the Dispatch Box and explain why they would want to do this, if they ever should.

On power to liquid, at the other end of the scale, while I and the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, were broadly in agreement on the question of HEFA and crop-based fuels, we were diametrically opposed on the question of power to liquid. It is unfortunate that the Government are giving themselves the ability to launch a subsidy regime for a highly speculative type of fuel that should be subject to much closer parliamentary scrutiny when the Government might want to offer such subsidies. However, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

6: Clause 1, page 2, line 15, at end insert—
“(9) Regulations made under this section must not permit a revenue certainty contract entered into under subsection (1) to have a term exceeding 10 years.”

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 6 requires, perhaps by way of introduction, a few words on the structure of the subsidy and how it actually works. Bear in mind that prior to all this, as I said earlier, a sustainable aviation fuel mandate was put in place by statutory instrument some 15 months ago which guarantees the demand for the product. There is a guaranteed demand: in simplistic terms, it is like saying that everybody in the country has to eat half a pound of chocolate every day.

If that were to be the Government’s policy and they put that in place, you would expect chocolate factories to spring up. Existing chocolate factories might expand; new chocolate factories would come into existence. So, what is the problem? Why is it that putting the demand in place is not sufficient? Why do you need to go further? Why are factories and investors not producing this stuff for which you have put in place a mandatory and growing demand over the years ahead? I do not know the answer to that.

The Government have decided that putting the demand in place is not enough. To satisfy our somewhat rapacious foreign investor friends, they also need to be given a guaranteed price for the product. Not only is half a pound of chocolate going to be eaten every day, but you will have to guarantee the price in order to get the chocolate factories to work.

That is what the Bill does. It is not about putting the demand in place—that exists—it is about guaranteeing the price, and the way to do that is to provide some form of subsidy. Of course, a direct subsidy out of the coffers of the Treasury is almost unaffordable in our current circumstances, but it is also unnecessary because the Government have, as we know, discovered in the field of wind farms and solar panels the device of the contract for the difference.

A contract for difference is a way of guaranteeing a price, and it is done by putting in place a counterparty—separate from the Government, but essentially a government glove puppet—which will enter into contracts with these foreign investors to guarantee them a price. They will negotiate the strike price, but on what basis they will negotiate it, what skills they will bring to negotiating it, how they will be certain they are not going to be given the runaround and end up with a very adverse price—none of these things is put in place or explained to us. They will end up with a contract, which will be in place for a number of years. The effect of the contract will be to increase the price of the fuel. The increase in the price of the fuel is very likely to find its way through to ticket prices. So this Bill has an indirect but none the less fairly ineluctable consequence: it will increase air fares.

When you ask the Government by how much air fares will go up—and we are going to do that later, in group 5—they say they have done an assessment and it will be, per year, which I think means cumulatively every year, £1.50 up or £1.50 down. They do not know. It is a fairly small amount and fairly neutral, but it is almost impossible to discern how they reach that conclusion, or to find it very credible, because airlines are complaining that the HEFA they have to buy already, because the mandate is in place—and they were buying it even before the mandate came in—is turning out to be very expensive indeed compared with standard aviation fuel.

It is wrong that Parliament and the Government should burden future generations for unnecessarily long periods with these additional costs of travel and subsidies. Therefore, I propose that any contract entered into strictly by the counterparty—not by the Government but under the direction of the Government—should have a term of no more than 10 years.

Clause 1(7) of the Bill—I drew attention to this in the last group—envisages a sunset clause after 10 years. It is extendable under Clause 1(8), as the Minister said, but it has a sunset clause in it. That, however, is not a limitation on the length of the contracts that might be entered into during that 10-year period. You could quite lawfully enter into a contract with a life of 100 years within that 10-year period. There should be some limit put on that, because these costs will fall not on oldies like us, whose flying days are passing, but on young people over the rest of their lives and their careers. There may well be no justification for it by then. Who knows, by then we may well be paying people to produce a fuel but life has moved on and the fuel is not necessary. Yet we will have to buy them out of that, and that will fall on air passengers. So, a10-year limit on the contract should be quite enough for any foreign investor to start up this process and get it going. They have a guaranteed price for 10 years and after that they should be on their own. That is what the substance is of this amendment, which I beg to move.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a very interesting amendment, because a revenue certainty contract, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, is wonderful for the suppliers. It presumably links in not just the price but the volumes—which may change from year to year —and the sources. The noble Lord opposite mentioned the issue of Drax and where that material comes from every year. Would there be a 10-year guarantee price for that? As the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said, any old agricultural product that was edible could be covered as well. And we have not yet discussed the worry that many people have about the number of trees and everything else being cut down in the Amazon basin, which could also be covered by this. So, a revenue certainty contract is pretty difficult and this amendment is a good start in at least limiting its scope and time.

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I am disappointed by that answer. One can look at this issue in a number of ways. The way I look at it is that we have a responsibility to future generations not to burden them with excessive costs on a speculative basis. The Government are consulting. They are no doubt consulting with the foreign investors who are considering investing in these plants. If they listen to the foreign investors, the longest possible term is what they will bid for.

We need to be tougher. It is for us to put the case of those who are voiceless in this consultation: the people—in many cases young people, as they will be the ones paying in the future—who will have to sustain this. I am afraid I am not satisfied with the answer given by the Minister. I wish to test the opinion of the House on my amendment.

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[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to a series of amendments that I tabled. I have given the Minister advance notice, and I hope he is going to be able to reassure me on them. I will take them in turn.

Amendment 8 is simply to try to avoid the Government pulling a fast one, raising money from air passengers and spending it on something completely unrelated. I am looking for a cast-iron, on-the-record assurance from the Minister that that cannot happen under the terms of the Bill. We know that on occasions government departments try to slip things under the counter, and I am simply seeking absolute assurance that that will not happen in this case. Amendment 9 basically seeks to achieve the same thing.

Amendment 10 addresses what is still the crucial operational point for this legislation: where and how do you actually apply the levy? The Minister knows that I have had serious misgivings, as have many people, about the plan to try to apply a mechanism that relates to market share in the previous year, to do it the year after and the rest, which I think would be completely unworkable and, of course, distorts the market if you have new entrants or people leaving the market.

The one thing we do not want to do is to end up undermining the existing producers of aviation fuel, which are carrying an extra cost. We do not want to have them closing and going elsewhere because we have not got this right. I remain persuaded that the way to do this is to levy a charge at or around the time of delivery—the time at which it is delivered from the refinery or the terminal to the airline. I appreciate that it may be something you do one month in arrears, looking at the previous monthly invoice accordingly. I do not have a problem with that, but I have a problem with anything looser than that.

I am looking to the Minister to explain tonight how this is going to work. I know the Government are still working on all the details, but we cannot have some abstruse mechanism that tries to refer back years in the past. We need something current and relevant that reflects changes in the marketplace and applies the costs in a timely way to those producing the fuel, so that there is no distortion of the marketplace.

Amendments 17 and 18 are really about the timing of the legislation. We know that we are maybe four or five years away, I hope slightly less, from the first significant SAF plant being operational in this country. We cannot have a situation where the levy starts to be applied now and is just piling up in the background with nothing to spend it on. I am looking for an explanation from the Minister as to exactly how the commencement of this legislation will work. I have proposed in these amendments that it should be six months before the first manufacturing facility comes on stream—the Minister may have an alternative suggestion—but we cannot have a situation where commencement is imminent but the operation of the Bill is years away. Again, I am looking for assurance and explanation from the Minister on this, so that we know we are not charging air passengers today for something that is years in the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 11 in this group, which substantially coincides with Amendment 10 in the name of my noble friend Lord Grayling. I will just take a minute to explain, in my perhaps rather more simple terms, what mischief these amendments seek to address. I gave some idea of the mechanism when we spoke on the last group. It will work like this: contracts will be entered into by a counterparty and a fixed price will be guaranteed under a contract for the difference. That means that if the prices are below a certain price, the counterparty will collect money by way of the levy, and if they are the other way around, it will pay out to ensure that the producer receives a fixed price. We know that economically, ultimately, the levy will be paid by the passenger on the flight, but who is going to be charged the levy?

The Government have decided—we are not disputing this—that the levy should be charged at the highest point in the supply chain, which is the producers of standard aviation fuel, essentially kerosene. They have to mix in the SAF to the required amount, whichever type of SAF it is, and they should be the ones that will pay the levy if a levy is required—that is, if prices are such that a levy has to be paid. We do not object to them being the levy payers, but how is the levy calculated and then applied to them?

The Government’s proposal is that the levy should be calculated a year in arrears and then applied to them as a charge which they have to pay in arrears at that point according to the market share that they had in that year. That is all very well, you might say, and very convenient from the Government’s point of view, because at that point they know exactly how much they have to charge, so there will be no difficulty and no question of having the wrong charge paid and having to make up bits later, or of the counterparty being out of funds by a penny. They will know exactly by the end of the year what should be charged and they will distribute it to the producers according to their market share during that year, which will also be known by that point.

The difficulty for the producers is that they will not know during the year in which they are selling the fuel what they should be charging the airlines to cover the cost of the levy. It is accepted that they should charge the airlines, because that is the way it trickles down to the passenger. They will not know during the year how much levy they are going to have to pay at the end of the year, so they will not know how much they should be charging per litre of fuel that they sell.

They would prefer, as it is easier for them and avoids this complexity, if they were told a price per litre which they should charge. The charge of the levy in addition to the base kerosene fuel could even be apparent on their invoices. Of course, if the Government were to do that, it would expose the counterparty to some financial risk—I see that—because they would have to work on the basis of estimates. They would have to estimate the prices during that period and therefore would be exposed to some financial risk. I imagine that, behind the Minister, there is a middle-ranking official in the Treasury saying, “You cannot take any financial risk that will fall upon the Government or any entity associated with the Government”.

What the Government are proposing is fundamentally unworkable, because the only way the producers can handle this is to protect themselves by overcharging. They will overcharge to compensate themselves for the levy, and so the transparency of the levy travelling through the chain of command, so to speak, down to the ticket payer will be obscured. The producers leave one in no doubt when one speaks to them that this is the only mechanism they will have. There is a real point of workability about the Bill which has not been addressed.

I imagine the Minister will respond by saying, “Oh, but we are having a consultation”. This is a futile protest, but I want to raise this point of protest as I have the opportunity: would it not have been better if the Government had done the consultation and then brought forward the legislation? Why is it that we have to have the legislation before we know the results of the consultation with the industry, so that we do not actually know what is workable? I suspect the Minister will say that, but I am afraid it is not satisfactory that we are asked to pass this legislation with that important question of workability still outstanding. I may be wrong, and it may be that the Government can explain that it is perfectly workable, but nobody has been able as yet to establish what that workable solution is.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, briefly, I support my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment. It is very important, particularly when we come on to later groups and are talking about the ultimate impact of this—which is that it will, in effect, fall on to the end consumer, as all taxes do—that we make sure that this is as simple and straightforward a process as possible, so that we can explain to people what we are doing, why we are doing it and what the cost is. That is always to be welcomed in policy-making.

Further, this should be workable and straightforward for aviation fuel producers. They are the ones that we have chosen to put the mandate on, in giving them the legal responsibility to produce sustainable aviation fuel and blend it with their regular fuel. The current structure transfers the level of financial risk to them. I agree with my noble friend Lord Moylan, in that I suspect that behind this—the Minister can tell us that we are wrong if we are—is the Treasury wanting to make sure, not entirely unreasonably, that there is no risk to the taxpayer. However, in doing so, all that has happened is that the risk has been moved on to the fuel supplier.

As my noble friend Lord Moylan says—I have thought about this as well, and I have listened to the industry—it seems that, for the producers to deal with the risk, they will have to increase what they charge the airlines. So rather than the cost and the risk falling on the Treasury and the taxpayer, it will, in effect, still fall on the taxpayer but just in their guise of an airline passenger who will face a higher ticket price. That is not very economically sensible.

The industry is very clear that the Treasury should not be picking up the costs for this. The only sensible thing would be to have a per unit price. There would be some risk for the Treasury in the short term, but that could be smoothed out over time, and the Government are perfectly able to do that. That would be a much better solution, and I hope that the Minister can at least indicate that that is where the Government’s thinking is. If he cannot do that, I suggest that my noble friend Lord Moylan is correct that we should have done the detail before the legislation, rather than the other way around.

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Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

12: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Impact of this Act on the price of airline tickets(1) Within one year of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a report assessing the impact of the sustainable aviation fuel revenue certainty mechanism on the price of airline tickets.(2) The report under subsection (1) must include an assessment of whether the impact of the sustainable aviation fuel revenue certainty mechanism on ticket prices is greater than £1.50 per ticket per year.(3) The Secretary of State must lay the report under subsection (1) before Parliament.(4) The Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament further reports under this section at intervals of not more than one year for so long as the sustainable aviation fuel revenue certainty mechanism remains in operation.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to assess and report on the impact of the sustainable aviation fuel revenue certainty mechanism on airline ticket prices within one year of Royal Assent, and to continue to report annually thereafter.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, we have worked our way through what the SAF is, and through the mechanism by which it is going to be subsidised and how it is going to fall on the passenger, but how much is going to fall on the passenger? What is it actually going to cost? How is it going to strike? How is it going to hit your pocket?

We are not completely in the dark on this subject. We have The Revenue Certainty Mechanism Cost Benefit Analysis, produced by the department in May 2025. Paragraph 4.23 has a lot of hinting in it, but it comes down to saying about the revenue certainty mechanism that

“the likely impact on ticket prices is between -£1.5 and £1.5, on average, per year”.

I take it that the “per year” means that it will go up, in the worst case scenario, by £1.50 a year—so over a 10-year period, it will be £15.

This is a highly speculative document; it has quite a large amount of numerical material attached to it, but it remains highly speculative none the less. Effectively, it has to guess the price of standard kerosene fuel out into future years, and the cost of SAF under mechanisms that have yet to be negotiated, so we do not yet know what they are going to be. None the less, that is the figure the Government are presenting to Parliament and the public as the cost and the pain of this measure. My Amendment 12, which is of capital importance, would require the Government to ensure that this prediction of theirs is not lost in the mists of time—that this document does not become waste paper.

The Government should be required periodically—annually, as the amendment says—to produce a report showing what this is costing in terms of ticket price. That is not straightforward for producers of aviation fuel to calculate, of course, because they are at the top end of the supply chain and would not be able to know how it worked out; they could tell you what the levy was, but they could not tell you how it translated into ticket price.

So that is what the amendment does, and it is essential because, in all this, we privilege the discussions we have with the foreign investors that are going to build these plants, and the discussions we have, to some extent, with the fuel producers on which the levy is going to fall. It is very easy, as I say, to forget the voice of the consumer and the people who, year after year, will pay more to travel. It is a significant sum if you are a family of four going on holiday, and we should be reminded of that through the Government putting their money where their mouth is, so to speak, and agreeing to report on these effects every year out into the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment, for all the reasons he set out. If you look at the opinion polling on this, the public support aviation and flying and want to continue doing it, and they support it being made more sustainable, so it is important that we are transparent about that. We have seen other areas where the costs of decarbonisation are not entirely clear, such as in energy production, which leads to suspicion and people who are not in favour of it being able to make mischief. It is much better if we can be transparent about it.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, bearing in mind the diligent research of noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on sustainable aviation fuel, I have resisted repeating the general aims of the Bill, but I want to say in respect of Amendment 12 that the Government are committed to keeping air travel affordable for UK holidaymakers and UK air travellers while fostering the development of a United Kingdom sustainable aviation fuel industry.

As the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said, it will take time for contract negotiations, for sustainable aviation fuel plants to be constructed and for the fuel itself to be produced and sold before any meaningful effect on fares can be assessed. The Government’s cost-benefit analysis, from which the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, quoted, of the revenue certainty mechanism that was published last year is the most reliable estimate of the likely impact on passenger air fares over this period. Given that little has changed since that cost-benefit analysis was produced, the amendment is unnecessary, as it would merely produce the same answer. I hope my explanation is sufficient for the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, it was open to the Minister to take up the offer of my noble friend Lord Harper and suggest that any infelicities in the drafting of the amendment—for example, the requirement that the first report should happen within the first year—could be dealt with through his offering to bring forward an amendment himself at Third Reading that was drafted with the benefit of government legal advice, but he has not done so. He has no difficulty with relying on speculative reports that claim to estimate the cost of this measure, but he does not want reports based on actual experience at due time in the future.

As I say, there is a voice that is not being heard in this, except from these Benches, and that is the voice of the consumer. We will not give up on the consumer, and I wish to test the opinion of the House on my Amendment 12.

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[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I rise both to support what my noble friend Lord Harper has just said and to add a caveat. I have great respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, and I find we agree on a lot of things, but it worries me more broadly—and this is not specifically just about this amendment—that when one passes an amendment like this, one creates huge bureaucratic demand. If we look at the practicality of what will be needed, as my noble friend Lord Harper has just described, we are talking about putting together, in effect, an inspectorate, because that is what this would entail—an inspectorate to talk to airlines, an inspectorate to talk to producers, and an inspectorate to have a pretty close watch on the flow of feedstuffs, the supply chain of feedstuffs and the sourcing of feedstuffs.

What we are looking to achieve here is to build a UK industry so that we do not simply end up buying SAF from abroad. The truth is, right now, the limited amount of SAFs used in this country are coming from United States and potentially elsewhere. We do not want that to happen; therefore, we want to create as investor-friendly an environment as possible in the United Kingdom. That is what this Bill is all about. It is what the purpose of the revenue certainty mechanism is, and I am very glad that the principle behind the Bill has attracted cross-party support. To try to put together now a mini-inspectorate—and maybe not that “mini” an inspectorate—to look at all the things covered by this amendment would cost taxpayers’ money and push up the cost of the revenue certainty mechanism.

We talked earlier about how the funds would be used. Certainly, the funds would be eligible to be used for the monitoring of all this, so that is an extra cost on the revenue certainty mechanism and an extra cost ultimately therefore to airline passengers. It is an extra level of complexity for investors, putting a whole range of bureaucratic requirements on them. And, of course, for government, it opens the doors to judicial review. Very often, a broad-ranging amendment that seeks reports and clarifications ends up in the courts, being used by somebody who has a particular point to prove against government. It opens the door to too much activity within the courts and not enough freedom for government to get on with the job. That would be a negative step for the legislation, given that we all want this to happen, want it to work well and want the investment to flow in the country. To create a monitoring mechanism on this scale would not in any way be the right thing to do.

As my noble friend Lord Harper rightly pointed out, simply monitoring the impact on the cost of an airline ticket is one thing, but covering the range and dimensions of activity in this amendment would create too much extra cost and too much complexity and it risks being a deterrent to investment in the UK. So, with apologies to the noble Baroness, I cannot support her amendment.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, to this debate. She is much missed. Normally, when there is legislative matter that calls the noble Lord, Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill, to the Dispatch Box, there is a well-established team that assembles opposite him, consisting of me in my humble capacity and the noble Baroness. It has been a puzzle to me in the course of this afternoon why she appears to have been elbowed aside by the dour but noble Earl, Lord Russell, whose mantra appears to be “Mr No” throughout, whereas now that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, has landed, if I may say that, at this very late stage in the debate, we find that she is here with her customary positivity and proposals for something useful that the Government might do.

The noble Baroness’s proposal is that the Government might usefully produce a report which tells us what the effects of this measure in front of us are. It would not be an easy report to assemble, and I am sure the Minister will explain its impossibility. It would, however, be no less easy for the Government to produce the report I was asking for, to say what the effect would be on ticket prices, but, as my noble friend Lord Harper so clearly explained, that was ruled out completely by Mr No sitting at the other end of the Bench. It has been most entertaining and instructive this afternoon listening to what the Liberal Democrats have had to say, but we are now in a position where splits within the Liberal Democrats are apparent. I say this to offer some consolation to noble colleagues on the other side of the Chamber to know that it is not only the Labour Party that is riven by dissension and uncertainty about the future and that these qualities can be found among the Liberal Democrats as well. I am delighted—

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

The noble Lord talks about splits. Could he remind me which Government signed this country up to mandatory targets on net zero by 2050?

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I will go further than that; I will remind the noble Lord which Government introduced this Bill. Nobody on this side of the Chamber has argued today that we should not have a mechanism for supporting the production of sustainable aviation fuel, so the efforts of the noble Lord to stir the pot and look for split-ism on the part of the Conservative Party are completely misdirected, misguided and failed. It would be a great deal better if the noble Lord were to join in with dumping on the Liberal Democrats for five or 10 minutes, because we do not normally take that opportunity—and relish it and seize it and run with it—in the way that perhaps we should.

Now, that said, I was going to try to draw out some interesting points from the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, who is always to be listened to. I learned much, but not enough, from the noble Lord, whose speech I could not immediately tie to the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, but he appeared to be saying that a byproduct of HEFA was something called HVO—which also had a long name underneath that—and that this could be used for heating homes. If I understood him correctly—which I may not have—that was the thrust of what he was saying, and he wished to see the Government encourage this in some way or other with yet another form of subsidy. Of course, it would be nice to think that beyond the level of the corner shop there was some scope left for private enterprise and a non-Stalinist, non-directed economy in this country, but none the less the noble Lord has found a further opportunity, another little crack in the economy that has not yet been subsidised, that he feels he should pursue.

But what I want to know is, if this HVO stuff exists and does what I think it does—I may have misunderstood the noble Lord—and if it is true that it can be used for home heating and that it is a by-product, it presumably has a value. That value could be captured in market terms, but where has that been included in the calculation of the levy? Does the counterparty take account of the economic value of the by-products of HEFA that may be used in the market and what is the Government’s position on that?

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Tabled by

[Lord Moylan]

15: Clause 17, page 8, line 25, at end insert “except hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids (HEFA) sustainable aviation fuel;”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment excludes hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids (HEFA) sustainable aviation fuel from the revenue certainty mechanism.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, in light of the assurances given by the Minister at the Dispatch Box, and the further undertaking that he gave to my noble friend Lord Harper that government policy on this matter would not change unless there were a Statement by a Minister in the House, I do not wish to move my Amendment 15.

Amendment 15 not moved.

Public Transport: Remote Communities

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The noble Lord is certainly correct to identify that people on the Isle of Wight think that this is a problem. When I wrote the Union Connectivity Review report, although it was not specifically about the Isle of Wight, I had more correspondence from the Isle of Wight than I did from Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales.

This Government are tackling this issue. We set up the Cross-Solent Transport Group and Minister Mather, to whom my noble friend Lord Berkeley referred, has recently appointed Brian Johnson CBE, the ex-MCA chief executive, as the group’s independent chair to, first of all, sort out its terms of reference and then focus on locally led solutions to what the noble Lord correctly describes as a perceived and real problem of connectivity between the Isle of Wight and the English mainland.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, if the Government are so worried about connectivity to the Isle of Wight, why are they introducing a carbon tax on the domestic maritime sector from June this year? According to the operators, this will have a devastating effect on fares not only to the Isle of Wight and the Isles of Scilly but to the many other islands that are dependent on affordable ferry connections to the mainland. Do the Government have any idea of the mayhem this is causing at a time when they are meant to be concentrating on reducing the cost of living?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The noble Lord ought to know that, in respect of ferry transport to the Isle of Wight and the Isles of Scilly, new ships and methods of transport are being procured and built in order both to provide up-to-date transport and to reduce carbon emissions on those services. We reject absolutely the concept that somehow these ferry routes have to survive under conditions of excess carbon emissions when modern ships, and indeed the technology I referred to in respect of the potential new service to the Isles of Scilly, are there for the very purpose of reducing carbon emissions but increasing connectivity.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, I start by apologising for not having spoken at Second Reading.

I will speak to a number of amendments in this group standing in my name and, with the indulgence of the Committee, I will speak also to Amendment 112 in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, who, unfortunately, cannot be in her place today. These amendments relate to Clause 23, which introduces Schedule 5, relating to new provisions in the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, creating, in effect, a new local licensing framework for micromobility vehicles.

Let me say at the outset that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, asked some very interesting questions about the scope of what should be included here, and I look forward very much to hearing what the Minister has to say in reply.

Amendments 105 and 106 in my name also relate to the definition of “passenger micromobility vehicles”. As drafted, the Bill currently allows the Secretary of State to prescribe further categories of vehicle by regulation at a later date, as appears in Schedule 5 to the Bill, on page 139, in addition to an “electronically assisted pedal cycle”. So a “passenger micromobility vehicle” means

“a pedal cycle … an electrically assisted pedal cycle, or … a micromobility vehicle that … is designed or adapted to carry one or more individuals, and … is of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

The “and” there is crucial. We are all aware of micromobility vehicles that are not pedal cycles or electrically assisted pedal cycles, such as e-scooters and things of that sort. They would have to be designated by the Secretary of State in order to be included in the scope of the Bill.

I do not know why that has to happen. I do not see why the Government cannot be clear about what this covers and cover it from the outset, not by way of regulation later, which may or may not happen; the remarks made by the noble Baroness about pedicabs and how long these things take to happen are salutary in this respect. So my reason for tabling these amendments is to probe why those categories are not clearly and properly defined in the Bill at the outset and why we will have to wait for regulations later.

My Amendment 107 addresses the exemption provisions. Schedule 5 permits the Secretary of State, again by regulation, to create further exemptions from what may otherwise be criminal prohibitions. So criminal offences will be created by the Bill, or the Act when it comes into force. On the face of the Act, certain things will be exempt from those criminal provisions—that is fine; not everything has to be criminal, and you might want some exemptions—but the Secretary of State may want to add to them later. Thus, through regulation, not an Act of Parliament, there will be changing and meddling with the criminal law and criminal liability. Even though it is moving in the right direction, I do not think that regulation by the Secretary of State is an ideal way for the criminal law in this country to be changed. So the Government should be clear on what additional exemptions they are thinking of producing, and, if possible, those should be included in the Bill.

Amendment 110 is an amendment to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, which requires local highways authorities to create sufficient space for micromobility vehicles. I have suggested the deletion of “sufficient”. This is probing, to some extent, but “sufficient” creates an unlimited obligation on the part of the local highways authority. What is sufficient? It is sufficient to meet demand. If the demand increases, more space must be produced. The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, seems to think that this might be quite attractive, because it would force out private motor vehicles, which would have no such prior claim on the highway.

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Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

114A: After Clause 26, insert the following new Clause—
“Parking charges and strategic authorities: restriction of powers(1) In section 45 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (designation of paying parking places on highways), after subsection (1A) insert—“(1B) A combined county authority or strategic mayoral authority may not make an order under subsection (1).”(2) In section 55 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1994 (financial provisions relating to designation orders), after subsection (9) insert—“(9A) A combined county authority or strategic mayoral authority may not undertake any activity provided for under this section.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to prevent mayors of CCAs from increasing charges or penalties for vehicle parking, and from using proceeds of those charges, to ensure local communities maintain control of these matters and cannot be imposed upon.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly on Amendment 114A, which is genuinely probing. The effect of the amendment would be to ensure that parking enforcement and the charges associated with it remain with the lowest-tier authority, as they currently are, and are not subsumed into a combined county authority or strategic mayoral authority and with them, presumably, the money that flows from them. A matter of minutes ago, the Minister said that local leaders know their area best, and it should be local leaders who are responsible for enforcement and the funding that comes from it.

If the Government’s intention is that that responsibility and funding stream should migrate away from local authorities that have had it in the past up to these new combined authorities, they should say so now. If that is not their intention, it would also be helpful to know that because, once we have established that clearly, it should be possible to return to the matter on Report with a proper conservative approach.

There are two other amendments in this group, one of which is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, and concerns pavement parking—a matter of considerable concern to people who are blind or mobility impaired in a number of ways. I look forward to hearing the case for that amendment, which I think it is going to be spoken to, and to the Government’s response.

Finally, there is an amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, which, putting it in blunt terms, seeks to extend civil enforcement powers for parking from London to the rest of the country. Again, I will listen very carefully to the proposal, but I am not unsympathetic to it in principle as I currently understand it, and I look forward to what the Minister has to say in response. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 121A on behalf of my noble friend Lord Blunkett who sends his apologies to the Committee this afternoon. He has a long-standing appointment that he could not cancel, so he asked me to speak to his amendment on his behalf. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has expressed, I suspect, a bit of sympathy towards this amendment, and so he should. The Walk Wheel Cycle Trust has provided a detailed briefing on this amendment which sets out a very good case.

Essentially, the amendment would provide the local transport authority or designated upper-tier local authority outside London with the power to prohibit pavement parking in its local area, and provide, where sensible, for exemptions.

The case is very straightforward. Essentially, pavement parking is a threat and a jeopardy to anybody with a disability, and in particular those who are partially sighted or blind, and anyone with a mobility impairment. Polling on the subject suggests that 73% of those with a disability would support local authorities enforcing against pavement parking. For those who are partially sighted, the percentage is even higher.

The truth is that barriers such as pavement parking put people off travelling. According to a national travel survey, disabled people take 25% fewer trips than non-disabled people because they fear the consequences of using pavements that have cars parked on them, so there is a real transport accessibility gap.

Some 41% of individuals who responded to the Government’s consultation on this subject felt that they would leave home more often if there was an end to pavement parking. Pavement parking affects us all, not just those who have disabilities. In particular, it forces people off footpaths or pavements on to the road, which of course can be very dangerous. Another problem that perhaps is not stated as much as it should be is that it damages pavements, causing them to be even less safe to use. Cars parking on pavements reduces walking and wheeling and we should take note of that and make our streets genuinely more accessible, free and easy for all to use.

In London, I understand, there is effective power to tackle pavement parking and Scotland has devolved powers as well, giving local authorities there a very clear steer in the way in which they enforce.

As I understand it, the Department for Transport conducted a consultation on this issue five years or so ago and the public have been waiting a long time for a response. In January this year, the department finally said that it would give these powers to English councils at the next legislative opportunity. I have discovered in my time in the House of Lords that these opportunities do not come along very often, and I suggest that this is probably one of those legislative opportunities. I therefore urge the Minister to give this amendment a positive response and perhaps, between now and Report, we can perfect the words so that the powers can work more effectively, not just for people in Scotland and London but across England as well.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am sorry for sitting down prematurely.

Amendment 238, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, would have no effect because there already exists a long-established and well-established civil enforcement regime in regulations made under Part 6 of the Traffic Management Act 2004. That regime covers matters such as conditions for issuance and levels of penalty charge notices, rights of representation to the issuing local authority, and onward appeal to an independent adjudicator if representations are unsuccessful. The Secretary of State has also published statutory guidance, to which local authorities must have regard under Section 87 of the 2004 Act, to ensure that civil enforcement action is carried out by approved local authorities in a fair and proportionate manner.

With these assurances, I hope that noble Lords are able not to press their amendments.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I will be very brief because, on this occasion, the Minister has brought great clarity to a number of the debates that were initiated in this brief discussion. The sensible thing would be for us to take away what he said and consider, ahead of Report, whether there are any matters that we still wish to pursue. Indeed, I understand that there will be negotiations on at least one of the main topics that were the subject of this discussion. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am rarely disappointed by the words of the Minister on matters relating to transport. I am delighted that he concedes that the Blunkett amendment is close to perfection; I think it is. I rather hope that, between now and Report, those of us who want to see Amendment 121A enacted will have a constructive, warm and friendly cup of tea with the Minister to resolve those few words that need to be sorted out so that, on Report, we can achieve a sublime amendment to which everybody signs up.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I have withdrawn my amendment.

Amendment 114A withdrawn.

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Debate on whether Clause 27 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I hope to be brief. I have two main topics to discuss here. No explanation has been given for including Clause 27, which has the effect of transferring to the Mayor of London powers, which currently rest with the Secretary of State, to give consent for the disposal of land owned by Transport for London.

I start by saying that I do not have a principled objection to giving more powers to Transport for London. In fact, when I think back to the pedicabs Bill, I was the one arguing against the Government’s initial proposal that the pedicab licensing regulations would have had to be approved by the Secretary of State in each case. That argument was eventually heard, so the Secretary of State has no say over the licensing of pedicabs in London; it rests entirely with Transport for London, which is the right place for it to rest. I only wish it would get on and do something about it, but that is another question.

I am not opposed in principle to transferring powers over Transport for London to the Mayor of London from the Secretary of State, but I am concerned about doing so in this case, because the land that belongs to Transport for London is very often necessary for operational purposes, although that is not always immediately apparent to the casual passer-by. The casual passer-by—that might include the mayor, who passes by occasionally—would see that land and perhaps see an opportunity for housing on it. If the mayor is responsible both for decisions relating to housing, as he is, and for decisions relating to the disposal of land by transport for London, he can be placed in a position that not only creates an inherent conflict but can create difficulties for Transport for London over time.

There is a further matter: sometimes the land owned by Transport for London is also accessible by Network Rail, and of course vice versa. We know that Transport for London runs services on a considerable amount of Network Rail assets, so the transfer of land that might be of value for operational purposes to another purpose—let us say housing, although it might be something different—could have an impact that is greater than simply one on Transport for London. It might be something to which Network Rail, for example, or Great British Railways in the future, had an objection—yet the Secretary of State, who would be the normal means through which they would articulate their objection, would not be empowered to take any steps. They would be left as simply one of a number of petitioners at the door of the Mayor of London, asking him to take their interests into account. So I am very cautious about this clause and I wonder whether it has been properly thought through. I do not understand the rationale for it, except in the general sense of, “We’ve got to devolve things, so here’s something we can devolve”. I am not sure this is something that should in fact be devolved.

My Amendment 119, and Amendment 118, which is consequential to it, would replace the duty on councils to implement local transport plans with a duty to have regard to them. This is inevitably a fine balance. I think we have all understood it and seen it in other contexts. But there is a real difference, in practice and in law, between being under a duty to implement and being under a duty to have regard. Being under a duty to implement is a very narrow, rigid requirement that will leave very little discretion for local transport authorities to take account of local circumstances. Again, I come back to what the Minister said a little while ago about local authorities being the people who know their area best. I think there is an argument at least—and this is a probing amendment—for exploring why the Government are not content with an arrangement whereby local transport authorities have a duty to have regard to the local transport plans rather than actually to implement them.

Finally, my Amendment 121 in this group relates to Schedule 10 and seeks to remove paragraph 14. As I understand paragraph 14, it effectively transfers responsibility for concessionary travel schemes from district and county councils to combined authorities, or combined county authorities once those bodies are established. There is an emotional bond in many cases between what I am going to call the bus pass and the local authority, which is of great significance both to local people and to the local authority. In fact, when I look at my own Freedom Pass, I see it says that it is funded by London Councils and HM Government. It used to say—not in my time but in years gone past—that it was funded by my local authority, which was named on the Freedom Pass.

That local link is tremendously important. It is one of the most important and valued services that local authorities supply to their residents. To remove the responsibility to the county authority and with it, no doubt, removing the name of the local authority from the pass, cutting that link, is very dangerous. It leaves in the air the question of who is paying for the Freedom Pass or bus pass that people have. Who is paying for it under these new arrangements? The reason why the local authority is entitled to have its name on it is because it is making a large financial contribution, sometimes the whole contribution. In London, the entire contribution comes from London local authorities. That is why they can have their name on it and is the basis of the bond that exists, but who is to carry that burden in the future? Who will be paying for it? Will that bond continue to be connected with the funder? These are important questions to explore. I would very much like to hear what the Minister has to say about them.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 118A, 118B, 119A and 119B in the name of my noble friend Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. I will come to Amendment 120F in a moment.

These four amendments look at how this Bill divides responsibility between strategic authorities and local highway authorities and the risk that that division creates if it is not handled carefully. As the Bill is drafted, strategic authorities are responsible for drawing up policy through local transport plans while responsibility for implementing most road-related measures remains with local highway authorities. On the surface, that might sound tidy; in practice, it risks creating confusion and delay. This concern is informed by last week’s judgment by the Court of Appeal, the first time that a court has examined equivalent provisions in Section 151 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, which governs the duty of London boroughs to implement the mayor’s transport strategy.

The distinction between policies and proposals is important here. Local transport plans, such as climate plans, contain both. A policy might be to prioritise buses or to reduce speed limits in villages. A proposal is what turns that policy into reality: five miles of bus lane delivered each year or 20 miles an hour limits introduced in five villages annually. I would make it 10 miles an hour through villages, but I understand that people have to get to places.

Under this Bill, local authorities are required to implement policies but only to have regard to proposals. We have also seen amendments that would weaken this even further, reducing the duty to have regard only to policies, not even proposals. That stands in sharp contrast to the position in London where boroughs are under a clear obligation to deliver the proposals in the mayor’s transport strategy. Yet outside London, constituent authorities will have a vote on approving local transport plans, something that London boroughs do not have. Surely, if authorities help to shape and approve the plan, it makes sense that they should also be held to deliver what it contains. If proposals can simply be noted and then ignored, we risk gridlock, not only on our streets but in how decisions get made. Strategic plans will promise change while delivery stalls on the ground.

The pace of delivery now really matters. On climate alone, the Climate Change Committee has recommended a 7% modal shift by 2035 that requires major sustained investment in buses and active travel across most, if not all, local authorities. Electric vehicle sales are off target. Other sectors are falling behind. Transport remains the largest emitting sector. It will need to do more, not less. Reducing motor traffic is also essential for public health to cut pollution, much of which now comes from brake and tyre wear. We need to improve road safety and enable walking and cycling. There is also a strong economic case. All major parties now support denser towns and cities rather than continued building on greenfield land. That will not work without significant modal shift. Without it, congestion will worsen and quality of life will decline. These amendments would ensure coherence between strategy and delivery, reduce the risk of stalemate and give local transport plans the force needed to turn ambition into action.

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[Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his kind comments. I also work on the Local Government Association, where I have a broader purview. In some of the discussions we have heard today, I have been sitting here thinking, “We do that in London, and we need to make sure that other places do it too”. I find that, where local authorities are keen on Vision Zero and moving towards more sustainable active travel, they are going ahead and doing it. It is with local authorities that are not so keen that a bit of politics probably comes into it. You want everyone to be on the same page and acting the same way. I am not going to mention any local authorities that are not on the same page as Lewisham or, frankly, as progressive when it comes to our green agenda, sustainable travel and so on, but last Monday I had to reprimand someone from a local authority and say, “You’ve got to give people information and guidance so that they can decide. You can’t decide for them whether they want to be included in declaring a climate emergency”. In fact, we have moved past the climate emergency; we are on to a climate action plan now, so I had to inform them of that.

Sometimes there are those differences but, as I say, we work closely with the LGA. The noble Lord mentioned an example where we had a Tory Secretary of State and a Labour Mayor of London. There can be sticking points where we want to get ahead and do something. That is why I speak to my noble friend Lord Bassam’s amendment, because we need things to be speedier and we have more capacity in local government and know our areas. We need this to be more streamlined so that we can make those decisions more quickly, such as for a transport and works order, and have connections to be able to speak.

For example, with the Bakerloo line extension going out into Kent, we have those relationships and connections. They are not in the Mayor of London’s realm but outside. More locally, in Grove Park, in the south of my borough, we have a desire and an ambition to have an inner-city national park. There is a patchwork of land owned by Network Rail; we are getting it and other parties around the table so that we can drive it and work together. We have an ambition to have this park, where Edith Nesbit lived and wrote The Railway Children. No matter what part of government we are in, money and financing always seem to get in the way. But, where there is a meeting of minds and a desire to achieve our goals, we can try, incrementally and bit by bit, to work towards that.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I congratulate the noble Baroness on succeeding me as chairman of the London Councils transport and environment committee. Does she agree that the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, in relation to refusing the Mayor of London additional rail routes in London, is that that is the policy of the current Government, who as I understand it intend to maintain the devolved routes as they are at the moment but have a policy of creating no more? One does not need to look to a political explanation of these decisions at all. I assume that, because they are in the same party, there is only sweetness and light between the Minister and the Mayor of London.

Does the noble Baroness also agree that it surely cannot all be sweetness and light in London at the moment, because London Councils has a policy that the boroughs should replace the assembly and have a relationship with the mayor much on the national level being proposed in this Bill, whereby the mayor is chairman of a combined authority? It seems to me that they feel that they are not sufficiently in the room, if they would like to be a great deal more so through a mechanism such as that.

These points are very good. While I am on my feet, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, that my experience of London Councils and of holding the position that the noble Baroness now does is that politics in the sense of pure party politics does not get very much in the way when boroughs are collaborating with each other, the mayor, Transport for London and so on. However, there are structural differences. The truth is that the interests of the boroughs and those of Transport for London, for example, are not always the same. That form of institutional politics is very apparent. Finally, I would say—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

I think the noble Lord was making an intervention. Interventions have to be short, and his is not.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

By the time I have finished, it will be short. I was asking the noble Baroness whether she agreed that none of these considerations is particularly relevant because the problem that I drew attention to in my amendment, with which she does not agree, is not because of a disagreement between the boroughs and the mayor, which could be sorted out by sitting in a room; it is about an inherently internal conflict of interest between the mayor as the person responsible for housing policy and the mayor as chairman of Transport for London now being given the power to dispose of property in place of the Secretary of State.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

Can I just say to the noble Lord that interventions are supposed to be short and I think he is taking advantage of the Committee?

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

With respect, this is Committee and one is allowed to go on a little bit. Although it is in the form of an intervention, I could just as easily have stood up and made a second speech. I think the noble Lord should stop intervening on me quite so much.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I will begin with the proposition tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on Clause 27. I will also say what a pleasure it is to hear my noble friend Lady Dacres of Lewisham on this and other issues. Just deviating from the amendments for one moment, I will say that the noble Lord is incorrect about the devolution of rail, because the Secretary of State is currently considering the devolution of northern inner suburban trains to the Mayor of London from the national railway network.

Transport in London is devolved, with the mayor responsible for managing the capital’s transport network, so it is right that, in line with the wider purpose of the Bill, the mayor should be empowered to consent to operational land-disposal applications from TfL. The noble Lord referred to operational land and therefore it is necessary to consult Network Rail, and that is enshrined in the proposition. This will therefore simplify the existing process and better enable the Mayor of London to unlock land for much-needed housing, supporting growth in the capital. The Secretary of State does not need to get in the way of housing developments on land owned by Transport for London and suitable for housing.

On Amendments 118 and 119, on local transport plans, constituent councils of strategic authorities with responsibility for managing local highways have a crucial role in supporting the delivery of the strategic authority’s local transport plan. Clause 29 is intended to support close working between constituent councils and the strategic authority by requiring the constituent council implementing the policies in the local transport plan to have regard to the proposals in the plan. This duty already applies to some constituent councils and this clause will extend that duty to all constituent councils.

The clause aims to strike the right balance between supporting close working between authorities while not giving the strategic authority undue control over how constituent councils manage their local highway network. These amendments would undermine this balance by weakening the duty placed on constituent councils to implement policies and instead substitute “have regard to” them. As members of the strategic authority, constituent councils have a key role in the development of the authority’s local transport plan. As set out in other parts of the Bill, this includes a vote on whether to approve the local transport plan.

I turn to Amendments 118A, 118B, 119A and 119B. Constituent councils of strategic authorities with responsibility for managing local highways have a crucial role in supporting the delivery of the strategic authority’s local transport plan. As I said earlier, Clause 29 is intended to support close working between the constituent councils and the strategic authority, by requiring the implementation of policies in the local transport plan and having regard to the proposals. As I said, the clause aims to strike the right balance between supporting close working and not giving the strategic authority undue control over the way that constituent councils manage their local highway network.

These amendments would undermine this balance by requiring constituent councils to “implement” rather than “have regard to”, and would therefore give strategic authorities indirect powers over how constituent councils manage local roads. However, we recognise that there are benefits to strategic authority mayors having levers to implement agreed plans. Clause 28 and Schedule 9 therefore give mayors a power to direct constituent councils in the exercise of their functions on the key route network of the most important local roads, helping mayors to implement their local plans.

On Amendment 120A, I know that workplace parking levies can be effective in delivering local transport priorities, as demonstrated—as my noble friend Lord Bassam observed—by the successful scheme in Nottingham, the only such scheme currently in operation in England. It has both reduced congestion in the city and provided funds to support the operation of the light rail system. We therefore hear the arguments for a greater role for strategic authorities, and for mayors to make decisions such as these in their area, but we need to take time to consider the issue fully before making changes to the framework. We need to be certain that any changes are the right ones. I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue, but I urge him to withdraw his amendment, while reassuring him that my department is giving this matter careful consideration.

I turn to Amendments 120B and 120C. Transport and Works Act orders can be used as a single process to obtain the majority of powers to construct and/or operate a range of both transport and waterway schemes. As observed, the Secretary of State is the decision-maker for schemes applied for under the Act across England, operating within a well-established and legally robust framework. The procedure is set out in legislation and would need to be followed regardless of who the decision-maker is. Powers granted through these orders are wide ranging and can apply or disapply legislation. They have significant legal and practical implications. Creating multiple new decision-making bodies would risk introducing inconsistency in the interpretation of policy and the use of powers, creating uncertainty, causing delays and potentially increasing the risk of challenge to the schemes.

However, the new Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 recently introduced changes to this regime to improve the efficiency and predictability of delivering new schemes via this route and, in particular, to address the need for taking decisions quickly where necessary. Secondary legislation will drive further efficiencies. Very careful consideration would be necessary if such powers were to be devolved so that the benefits of the recent improvements that I have just referred to are not undermined and the necessary protections are in place for all parties.

I turn to Amendment 120D on Vision Zero. Noble Lords will remember that bus safety was discussed at length during the passage of the Bus Services Bill. The contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, helped highlight this important issue and ensured that bus safety is included in the recently published Road Safety Strategy. Published on 7 January, it is the first such strategy for 15 years. It sets out the Government’s vision for a safer future on our roads for all road users, not only buses. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, that the whole strategy is based on the internationally recognised safe system approach, a core component of Vision Zero. The safe system principle accepts that human error will happen but ensures that all road users, roads, vehicles, speeds and post-crash care work together to prevent fatalities. It is a shared responsibility. It is right that local areas, including Greater Manchester, Oxford and London, which has also been mentioned, are adopting Vision Zero. The Government welcome other local areas doing so in respect of buses, but it must be right for them.

On Amendment 120E, buses already provide one of the safest modes of road transport in Britain and we remain committed to increasing that safety further. During the passage of the Bus Services Bill, we discussed adherence to the highest standards of safety, monitored by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency and regulated by traffic commissioners. This subject was exhaustively discussed then. There is already collection of data by the department, the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency and the police, carried down to local authority level through the STATS19 framework. Data is also collected from PSV operators who must report incidents to the DVSA thanks to their operator licensing requirements. These datasets already provide a comprehensive picture of bus safety and, as observed during the passage of the Bus Services Bill, to require more frequent or richer data would increase the burden on drivers, strategic authorities and the police. I thank the noble Baroness for speaking to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, on this issue and I hope he will be reassured that we remain committed, as we were during the passage of the Bus Services Bill, to increasing bus safety and are taking real action to do so.

On Amendment 120F, tabled by the noble Baroness, the Government committed in the English devolution White Paper to ensuring that, for non-mayoral strategic authorities, key strategic decisions will have the support of all constituent councils. Adopting a local transport plan is one of those decisions, and the Bill therefore requires the consent of all constituent councils. Existing non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities already have provisions in their constitutions that require local transport plans to be agreed by all constituent councils. We know that those provisions provide reassurance to prospective constituent councils. There is already a duty on local transport authorities to keep their local transport plans under review and alter them if they consider it appropriate to do so, and the Government are committed to providing updated guidance to local transport authorities on local transport plans, which will provide advice to authorities about when they should review and update their local plans.

On Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, at the moment concessionary travel is managed by travel concession authorities, which are also the local transport authority for their area. This means that one authority does local transport planning, secures the provision of public transport services and manages concessions. Reverting to the approach taken before 2011, as the amendment would do, would make travelling locally more difficult due to a range of concessionary travel frameworks as one moves from one area to another. Since that point, combined authorities and combined county authorities have all become both the local transport authority and the travel concession authority for their area, following a period of transition. This has proven effective, with local transport managed at the strategic level across the broader geography. With travel concessions managed alongside local transport functions, there are also streamlined benefits that would not be possible were these two separated at two different levels of local government.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pack, for his Amendment 236. The vast majority of applications to install cattle grids are decided by local highway authorities. Only when there are unresolved objections, or objections following the consultation stage, does the Secretary of State get involved, or where the Secretary of State, via National Highways, is the highway authority. There were no appeals in the years from 2016 to 2025 and only one in 2025, so it is scarcely a huge burden on either national government or the Department for Transport. There were two in 2014 and one in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012, so I submit that this is not a huge problem for government and it would resolve only the unresolved issues arising from the primary consideration by local government. I hope that, in the light of my remarks, noble Lords feel able not to press their amendments.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I am mildly astonished that the Minister has not addressed the perfectly serious question I raised about the potential for internal conflict between the Mayor of London, acting with regard to his housing responsibilities, and his responsibility as chairman of Transport for London. No doubt we will have an opportunity to come back to that later. However, for the rest of it, the Minister has set out the Government’s position relatively clearly. We will have an opportunity to reflect on it at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw my proposition.

Clause 27 agreed.

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Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

115: Schedule 9, page 157, leave out lines 22 to 25
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes why the mayoral CCA is required to have at least one road designated as a key route network road.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, Schedule 9 of the Bill amends the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 and the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. Its effect is to require mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities to prepare, publish and maintain a designation of a key route network within their area. I am not raising profound objections in principle to this, but I have some detailed questions.

Amendment 105 relates to the first paragraph of the schedule. Why must there be at least one road designated, even if nobody wants it? That appears to be the effect of 1(2)(1A)(c) of Schedule 9, Part 1, which states that

“if there is no highway or proposed highway in the CCA’s area that is designated as a key route network road, the mayor must prepare a proposed designation in relation to at least one highway or proposed highway”.

I hope that the Minister can explain why that should be, as it is not at all apparent.

Amendments 115A and 115B work together, seeking to define more closely what the key route network should consist of. At present, the term lacks a firm statutory definition. I assume that, when we discuss a key route network outside Greater London, the Minister has in mind, to some extent, the Transport for London road network in Greater London. That in itself was effectively taken over wholesale from the red route network that was established in the 1990s before the creation of the Greater London Authority and TfL. There has been amazingly little adjustment to that network since it was established. It has been the same roads, more or less, ever since.

There is no limit in this Bill on what roads could be designated. When the red routes were established in London, it was clearly the Government’s intention and practice that they should be the main roads. In this case, the key route network could be any road that the mayor and combined authority choose to designate—even side streets. These amendments, Amendments 115A and 115B, are probing because they are limiting the network to classified numbered roads carrying strategic motor traffic. That seems to be sensible.

There is a related and minor issue, a subset of that. The Transport for London road network carries round the corner into side streets to an extent. That is what it was allowed to do when the red routes were established. It was possible to negotiate with the traffic director for London whether they should take the full amount of their entitlement in those side roads—I think it is 30 metres—or not.

These are important matters of local interest, because you might find that side streets with local parking and other local amenities that residents were used to become the equivalent of red routes, and you have very little say about it as a local authority. That is not good enough. We need this clarified in advance. There two levels of that: why not limit it to the main roads, and what are the Government going to do about the side road issue if they have that in mind, going round the corner?

Amendment 117 is intended entirely to be helpful to the Government. It seems that there is a clash here with the Road Traffic Reduction Act, in which principal local authorities are required to provide the information and do the forecasting and monitoring that the new combined authorities will do in respect of the key route network. The principal authorities are required to do it for roads in their area and, unless they are relieved of that obligation, they will do it for the key route networks as well. So, there will be two levels of authority carrying out the same monitoring, forecasting and reporting functions. That cannot be entirely what the Government intend, but, if it is, it is as well that we should know about it. I beg to move my amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I will speak to Amendments 116 and 117A to 117G in the name of my noble friend Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Amendment 116 probes the Government’s intentions around these powers, particularly in relation to key route networks and traffic regulation orders. As drafted, the Bill would allow mayors to be given a power to direct the exercise of certain road-related powers, including in relation to roads that are not part of the key route network and that therefore remain under the control of local or constituent authorities. The Secretary of State would then be able to issue guidance about how those powers are to be exercised. That raises some obvious questions. In what circumstances do the Government envisage these direction powers being used? What safeguards will exist to prevent them cutting across local decisions that have been made for reasons of safety, public health or community well-being?

Traffic regulation orders are often the mechanism by which councils introduce bus lanes, safer speed limits, low-traffic neighbourhoods or restrictions to protect residents. They are subject to consultation, legal tests and democratic accountability. There is understandable concern that new strategic powers could be used deliberately or inadvertently to undermine these local decisions. This amendment is about clarity and reassurance. Will the Minister confirm that the traffic management 2004 guidance will be revised to include guidance on key route networks? Will the Minister also ensure that such guidance prevents misuse by mayors, such as using KRN powers to undo traffic regulation orders made by local councils?

Amendments 117A to 117G seek to move the duty to report on traffic levels from the local and constituent authority level to the strategic level, on the basis that the latter has the greater responsibility and power to reduce traffic. As the Bill is currently drafted, the traffic reporting duty is tied to the use of key route network roads. This amendment would remove that limitation, so that the duty applies to all local roads within the area of the local transport authority. In doing so, it aligns the reporting duty with the full scope of the local transport plan.

The underlying issue here is one of responsibility. These amendments reflect the simple reality that strategic authorities, not individual constituent authorities, hold the main levers for reducing traffic across an area. Strategic authorities set and monitor the local transport plan. They determine the overall policy for all modes of travel. Through spatial development strategies, they decide where major development goes—decisions that fundamentally shape whether traffic is generated or avoided in the first place. They also promote and deliver the big-ticket transport schemes—trams, busways and other major public transport investments—and, increasingly, they will hold powers over enforcement and demand-management measures such as congestion charging. These are the tools that shift traffic levels at scale.

By contrast, local authorities have far fewer powers. Even where they do have powers, such as in implementing bus lanes or safer speed limits, those decisions are meant to flow from the strategic authority’s policies as set out in the local transport plan. Given that reality, it makes little sense to place on constituent authorities a fragmented traffic reporting duty that is limited to certain categories of road while the strategic authority is responsible for the policies and decisions that affect traffic across the whole network.

Of course, there is a real risk of unintended consequences. The proposed split would create a perverse incentive for constituent authorities to resist roads being designated as part of the key route network. Why agree to that designation if it means that a strategic authority acquires a traffic reduction duty for those roads but not for others? The danger is that this could lead to traffic being pushed off major routes and on to less suitable residential streets, which is exactly the opposite of what most communities want.

I am concerned that there is a coherent approach. Surely that means placing the responsibility for traffic reporting at the strategic authority level, covering all local roads in line with the scope of the local transport plan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for again making his position clear. I suspect we will be coming back to some of these issues on Report, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 115 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

120: After Clause 30, insert the following new Clause—
“Rail devolution: passenger rail servicesA mayoral combined authority has the power to provide, or secure the provision of, passenger rail services within, or within the surroundings of, its area.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives mayoral combined authorities the power to provide or secure the provision of passenger rail services within or within the surroundings of its area.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I shall endeavour to be brief. I have only one amendment in this group. There is also an amendment by my noble friend, Lord Lansley, which, as I understand it, has a similar effect to my own, or at least points in the same direction.

The reason I raise this—I refer to my local government experience—is that anyone with local government experience is seized of the question of vires. We are always worried about whether we actually have the power to do that which we want to do, because, as is well known, if you do not have the power in law, you are probably acting outside your responsibilities and can be held liable for it, and all sorts of terrible things can ensue from that.

Here I am thinking ahead to the Railways Bill, which we intend to amend when it comes to your Lordships’ House so as to give certain rail responsibilities to mayors in certain cities at least. At the moment, that Railways Bill merely gives them the opportunity to be consulted and to request, and we think devolution could go a little further. Thinking ahead to that, one wonders whether the response to that from the Government might not be, “Ah, yes, but even if we were willing to give them such powers, they don’t have the vires to do it. They do not have the legal power to operate a passenger railway service, and it would be inappropriate to bring that into the Railways Bill, where it would be out of scope”. But of course it would not be out of scope of this Bill, which is about exactly that question: the devolution of powers to local authorities. So I thought we would fend off that difficulty if it arose later by making it explicit in the Bill that those local authorities had legal power to run passenger railway services.

Of course, it would not follow at all from this measure alone that they would be able to run passenger railway services. If you want to run a passenger railway service, you have to have a railway and some trains. This Bill would not change that situation at all, but it would give them the legal power should it be made possible for them to have access to trains and to rail in the future. For that reason, I think it is a very sensible measure to include here and I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I thank your Lordships for the opportunity to contribute on this. I fear that those of us who participated during the passage of the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill, such as the Minister and my noble friend Lord Moylan, will be having our Groundhog Day moment on this group because we will be examining, as my noble friend said, the question of whether it should be possible for passenger rail services to be operated by mayors.

My amendment is different from my noble friend’s because I am setting out to examine whether the legislation needs to change to enable that to happen. There has been something of a pre-emption of this debate by the exchanges that took place on the group before last in relation to exactly this question of whether TfL and the mayor should be able to take responsibility for the Great Northern inner suburban services. It raises exactly the point that is the burden of my amendment. So I want to start by asking the Minister: is it possible, as he suggested on the earlier group, for passenger transport executives, accountable to mayors, to run passenger rail services? The Minister is nodding. I shall just explain why I think it is possible and then examine whether that is the case. Maybe we do not need to amend either this Bill or the Railways Bill in due course, but we might need to look at those issues when they come up.

It seems to me that, in the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act, it is provided that the Secretary of State, as the franchising authority, when he or she—it is a she—wishes to procure passenger rail services, must do so only by a direct award of a public service contract to a publicly owned company. A publicly owned company, as we then proceed to discover under Section 30C of the Railways Act, as amended by the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act, is a company owned by the Secretary of State. We know what this now means: it means that Great British Railways will effectively be the franchising authority in the fullness of time—I think we are looking two years ahead or so—of all the passenger railway services other than those outside the present franchising agreement, such as open access operators.

How then could Great Northern inner suburban services be handed to the mayor in any practical sense? The answer is that, under Section 13 of the Railways Act 2005, passenger transport executives may enter into agreements. Section 13(4) says:

“A Passenger Transport Executive … in England may enter into agreements for … the provision, by a person who is a … franchise operator … of … services for the carriage of passengers by railway within that area”.


So TfL could enter into an agreement with Great British Railways to provide passenger railway services extending beyond London. “How far?” noble Lords may ask. Section 13 of the Railways Act 2005 gives us the answer: “within the permitted distance”, which is 25 miles from the boundary of TfL’s area. That takes us out to Stevenage—yes, Stevenage, no less.

I am looking to the Minister to say whether any of this train of thought is not correct. Is it possible for mayors to be given not the franchising authority for the delivery of passenger services in their area but an agreement for the operation of passenger services, to the extent that that is negotiated with Great British Railways and approved by the Secretary of State under Section 13(5)? That operational control, of course, is subject to what we will discuss, no doubt, in due course: the directing mind of Great British Railways. The nature of the operational activities undertaken by TfL must therefore be entirely constrained by the agreement that Great British Railways and Transport for London will enter into. But it seems to me that it is possible to do it now. If it is not possible to do it now, the Bill should be amended so as to enable this to happen, which is what my amendment was originally intended to do.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I want to be absolutely clear in my own mind and check that my noble friend is as well. It is very easy, in London, to think that Transport for London runs those services, partly because they are branded to look like Transport for London, and that therefore, Transport for London is in roughly the equivalent position of a train operating company, but that is not its position. With those services, the Secretary of State’s role as franchising authority has been transferred to Transport for London—Transport for London is not the train operating company, but the franchising authority. All the services are run by train operating companies, which are invited to bid for them. I am not sure that that system applies in other conurbations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Under the arrangement that is struck, is it not likely that the only potential operating company that would be acceptable for such an agreement would be Great British Railways? Great British Railways would be agreeing with a mayor, “You can pay us to run services”, which is more or less exactly what the Bill envisages and which many of us find objectionable. What my noble friend is describing may be accurate and permissible—we will find out from the Minister in a moment whether it is—but it does not take us beyond the Railways Bill, which many of us would like to do. That is the purpose of my amendment.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My noble friend makes a good point. If the Secretary of State were to ask Great British Railways to enter into that agreement with Transport for London, I do not know who would be the operator of the passenger rail services concerned. It might be Great British Railways, because Section 13 of the Railways Act 2005 clearly envisages payment for this. That could be to GBR, in exactly in the same way as it has been in the past to Great Northern or any other operator.

The point is that the agreement under the 2005 legislation enables passenger transport executives to enter into agreements with the franchise operators to run those services. As far as I can see, that is not being taken away, as long as the legal authority is not transferred to the mayor. What my noble friend Lord Moylan is correctly saying about the current legal status of TfL is not what can be reproduced in relation to Great Northern in suburban services, as far as I am aware.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, on Amendments 120 and 120EA, via provisions in the Transport Act 1968, mayoral combined authorities with passenger transport executive functions already have the appropriate powers as envisaged by Amendment 120. These are the combined authorities of West Yorkshire, West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region, North East England and South Yorkshire. They either have passenger transport executives acting on their behalf in relation to rail functions or have had the powers of passenger transport executives transferred to them.

Other mayoral combined authorities do not have these powers. Instead, via the Transport Act 1985, they can secure and subsidise services where the public transport requirements in their area would not otherwise be met. The Government have the powers to confer new functions on strategic authorities, individually or as a class. This includes the powers in Schedule 25 to this Bill, which enable the Secretary of State to confer new functions on strategic authorities on a permanent or pilot basis. Therefore, should an authority require these powers, there are mechanisms in place to achieve it.

Amendment 120EA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, would not be an appropriate mechanism to enable further devolution to establish mayoral strategic authorities. The heart of the matter is that, for example, where services have been devolved, such as Merseyrail in the Liverpool City Region, this has been achieved by the exemption of services from designation by the Secretary of State under Section 24 of the 1993 Act. After the Great British Railways Act is passed, the Secretary of State will not be the franchising authority, so Section 13 of the 2005 Act will not be the appropriate mechanism. I hope that this answers the noble Lord.

It is anticipated that Great British Railways and mayoral strategic authorities will deliver a new place-based partnership model to deliver on local priorities. This will bring the railway closer to communities, enable collaboration and shared objectives and improve multimodal integration and opportunities for local investment. The depth of partnership will vary depending on local priorities, on capability and also, very significantly, on the geography of the railway, which seldom accords with local government boundaries.

The Government are open to considering further devolution of rail responsibilities should an authority make the case for it. I referred earlier to the Mayor of London’s proposal to take over the Great Northern inner suburban services. If operations are devolved, mayoral authorities will have a choice on how the operations are performed—either through Great British Railways or another operator. The Department for Transport recently published guidance on this topic. In making a decision in response to a request for devolution, key considerations will include the financial and commercial implications, the capability and the geography. The impacts on neighbouring services and communities beyond the combined authority boundary will also need to be factored in. I hope that this is clear and enables the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a fascinating discussion—at least, a very small number of us found it fascinating, others perhaps less so. This is an important topic, as everyone on all sides has acknowledged. Having listened to the Minister, I am sure that we will want to come back to it at a later stage. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 120 withdrawn.

Nationalised Passenger Rail Services

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Moylan]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what performance improvements have been delivered by nationalised passenger rail services since 28 November 2024.

[The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill) (Lab)]

My Lords, public ownership is a vital step towards reforming our railways and rebuilding trust and pride. On average, publicly owned train operators perform better on punctuality and cancellations than those yet to come under public ownership. They are already delivering improvements, with lower cancellations on the TransPennine Express and Northern, and South Western quadrupling the number of new trains entering service. I expect all operators, both public and private, to deliver good performance for passengers.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, when the figures were published a month ago, cancellations were reported to have risen by around 50% on South Western services in the months following nationalisation in May last year, alongside a marked increase in delay minutes and late arrivals. Clause 18 of the Railways Bill places a duty on the Secretary of State to promote high standards of railway service performance. Can the Minister explain how the Government intend to incentivise and enforce those standards in practice, given that the proposed passenger standards authority appears to have no direct enforcement powers and the Office of Rail and Road’s remit in this area is being restricted?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The discussion on the forthcoming Railways Bill will happen in this House in due course. Meanwhile, the Government are pursuing reliability very strongly. If a train company is left, by a combination of the previous Government and the previous operator, desperately short of drivers, with 83 of 90 new trains parked in sidings for nearly five years, it takes a bit of time to recover from that position. That position is being recovered from, in respect of South Western. More than 30 of the new trains are now in service, and two-thirds of the drivers have now been trained to drive them. That takes time. It should have been done before, but it is now being done by this Government.

Number Plates Intended to Defeat Enforcement Cameras

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I refer the noble Lord to Hansard for yesterday, when we discussed precisely that issue at Questions.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, as noble Lords have made clear and illustrated, we are living in an increasingly lawless environment on the highway: everything from bicycles at red lights to uninsured vehicles—a number of things have been mentioned. The Department for Transport seems to regard its role as quite separate from that of the enforcement authorities. When the department is devising new regulations or changing existing ones, what engagement does it have with the police but also with local highways authorities, who are there to enforce those regulations, as to how realistic it is and what resources they have to be able to deliver the enforcement?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I refer the Lord to page 40 of the recently published Road Safety Strategy, where there is a lot of text headed by:

“Continuing to work closely with the police and other enforcement agencies to ensure the outcomes of the Roads Policing Review are fully considered”,


and underneath it is text that indicates very clearly that the department is working very closely with the police, other enforcement agencies and highway agencies to get the law enforced on our roads.

Motorway Speed Cameras

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Wednesday 21st January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

If that was a question, all I can say is that the noble Lord has given his own answer.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, the highways agency and the police forces have acted responsibly in this case by paying compensation, but in London responsibility for enforcing moving traffic offences is almost entirely devolved to the boroughs. I believe those powers have been enacted and made available in the rest of the country as well. In cases where cameras are used for the enforcement of moving traffic offences—I appreciate that they do not have very many variable speed limits—what audit are the Government undertaking of the systems being used to ensure that they do not have bugs and problems as well?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

It is important to note that this is an issue because of the interaction of two systems. The technology used for camera enforcement is obviously checked and there is an audit process—I cannot describe it to the noble Lord in detail. The matter we are discussing about enforcement of variable speed limits has come about because of the interaction of two systems, and the noble Lord is describing circumstances about cameras used only either for speed enforcement or, more often, yellow boxes and suchlike.

Great Western Railway: Infrastructure

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Wednesday 21st January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I could do without anybody storing water in the aquifer next to the Chipping Sodbury tunnel and cutting. If they try it, there will be some serious legal action. The water companies have their part to play in managing surface water, just as landowners do and just as Network Rail does. It is an increasing problem, it needs to be treated seriously and a lot of public money is going into dealing with it.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I appreciate the difficulties for the Minister. However, changing the subject slightly, if there is so little money available for rail infrastructure and so many demands on it, why are the Government persisting with this plan that Great British Railways should build its own retail website and app for selling tickets when that is done perfectly well by the private sector already? Is it not time to abandon this vanity project?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

Nobody said that there was too little money. A lot of money is being spent on railway infrastructure. The problem has been that the climate has changed faster than adaptation of the railway infrastructure. The noble Lord is quite wrong about ticket retailing. There are currently 14 websites from train operating companies. They are very confusing. Many people do not think that you can buy a ticket for First Great Western from South Western, but you can. The objective of GBR is to replace this system with one that people can trust and will use to increase rail travel.

Northern Powerhouse Rail

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Monday 19th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Too many northerners still face the choice of staying at home and putting aspiration on hold or moving away in search of a better future. I say no more unfair choices and no more missed opportunities. Today we start delivering Northern Powerhouse Rail, and I commend this Statement to the House”.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, Northern Powerhouse Rail has been with us now for over a decade. During that time its meaning and shape have changed somewhat, backwards and forwards, but nothing very much has been delivered. The Secretary of State in her Statement on Wednesday started with a lengthy castigation of the preceding Government for not having delivered anything despite having originated the concept when George Osborne was Chancellor. One must admit that she has some justification for doing so because the record of the previous Government in delivering major rail projects was not glorious and not something that I stand here with a view to defending.

The other thing that I want to say by way of preliminaries is that this is an ambitious programme and if the Government were to deliver it, the Conservative Party would applaud them—because the people of northern England deserve better rail transport links and this programme would transform what they currently have into something more effective and probably something that would bring greater economic benefits to the area. But that does leave us with quite a number of questions about the Statement made by the Secretary of State, which perhaps the Minister can answer.

When the Labour Party was in opposition, it thought of and presented Northern Powerhouse Rail as an almost wholly new line stretching from Liverpool across to Leeds, but what we have here is not a new line but a series of improvements. The Liverpool to Manchester part of it is to be a new line, but most of it is a series of improvements. Have the Labour Government now abandoned definitively the notion of a new line across the Pennines, which previously they supported?

When in opposition, the Labour Party stated repeatedly that trans-Pennine improvements would not be effective except in combination with the full delivery of HS2—certainly to Manchester and ideally to Leeds. Can the Government say definitively that this view has now been abandoned, that there is no plan for HS2 to be extended and that these improvements that are proposed are the stand-alone project on which they are depending for a transformation of the economy of that area?

My three remaining questions concern money. The Statement announces expenditure of £1.1 billion over the next four years. As I understand it—although I would be grateful for clarification from the Minister—that £1.1 billion is to be spent on preparatory work. By preparatory work I mean studies, scoping and design. I do not mean preparatory work of a physical character. As far as I can make out, none of that money over the next four years is to go on physical works. Am I correct that all the other works that are promised here are to be delivered after 2030 and some even later than that? I am not criticising the need for phasing but asking about the date. Is the £1.1 billion actually going to give us any improvement or will it be simply on preparatory works? Is there nothing to be seen before 2030?

Next, there is a funding envelope promised of £45 billion in total. Now, I ask this question in all sincerity. It happens all the time. Politicians and Governments do it. They say, “This is what something is going to cost”, but they cannot tell you what the something is. Until you have done the £1.1 billion of preparatory works—scoping and design—how can you possibly know what it is going to cost?

We made the same mistake over HS2. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, made the same mistake over HS2 when he initiated it. We had a cost before we had even a line of route. What is the basis for the £45 billion if the preparatory, scoping and design work has not yet been done?

Finally, will the Minister confirm that the £45 billion is to be spent after 2030; that is, wholly by their successor Government? Do the Government not feel the slightest shame in claiming credit for that when they are landing it on another party?

Buses: Safety and Security

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My noble friend is absolutely right. The Bus Services Act 2025 mandates training for all bus drivers, to make buses part of the safer streets initiative to deal with violence against women and girls. The department is actively producing guidance for bus operators and local authorities about how that is done so that every bus driver in Britain has the ability to spot what is going on and deal with it. Some 96% of buses in Britain now have CCTV, which is a means of providing both evidence and reassurance to passengers that their safety is being considered. I am looking forward, as I am sure my noble friend is, to this training being rolled out to every driver in Britain.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, it remains the case that very large numbers of people are injured daily though accidents inside buses, especially elderly people, in large measure as a result of sharp braking. Nothing has been done to reduce this number over the years. The Minister is very aware of it. What can he say that this new strategy that we have the benefit of today is going to do to make a real difference to that number?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I would take issue with the noble Lord in saying that nothing has been done. There has been a lot of individual work. In particular, Transport for London, post his and my time there, has spent a lot of effort and activity in interior bus design and specification of vehicles themselves. But he, too, when he sees the Road Safety Strategy will see words in there about better driving and infrastructure, which was previously referred to, and about the use of Vision Zero, all of which must make a difference in how people drive and, consequently, the effects of braking. Of course, you want vehicles to stop when the vehicle in front of them stops, or there is some hazard, but sharp braking is, of course, as he says, particularly damaging to older people and vulnerable people. We want to avoid it, which is why the Road Safety Strategy has to affect all users of roads.

Channel Tunnel Infrastructure: Reliability

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Tuesday 6th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The noble Lord will know that we used to have far more influence over Eurostar and its commercial policies because we were once part-owners of it, but, sadly, a previous Conservative Government sold their 40% share in Eurostar to what has turned out to be the French state railway 10 years ago. So, we have no commercial influence over what Eurostar does.

If there is a case for what the noble Lord suggests, it would certainly require some examination, but I am not sure that we particularly want to interfere in people’s commercial businesses. What I do want to do is make sure that the infrastructure provided by Getlink, HS1 and SNCF on the other side of the tunnel is reliable, as the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, said, so that the services that currently run and additional future services run reliably.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the attempt by the noble Lord, Lord Snape, to hold a private railway company to account. Can the Minister tell us how we will hold Great British Railways to account when it is in operation, given that it is only obliged to “have regard” to guidance from the Secretary of State rather than to comply with it, according to the Railways Bill currently being considered in another place?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

We are quite a long way from the New Year’s Eve disruption in the Channel Tunnel, but never mind.

The noble Lord knows perfectly well that the principal means by which the Government hold arm’s-length bodies to account is by control of the appointment of the chair and the board. That is a pretty reasonable level of control. If he reads the Bill that is currently in the other place, he will see that there is a variety of mechanisms for the Secretary of State to make sure, on behalf of customers and passengers, that Great British Railways does what the Government want. I do not think there is any defect in those arrangements, but no doubt we will discuss them further when the Bill comes before this House.