Sustainable Aviation Fuel Bill

Report stage
Tuesday 10th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Report

Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland legislative content granted. Relevant documents: 38th and 40th Reports from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

15:34

Clause 1: Direction to offer revenue certainty contract

Amendment 1

Moved by

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, after “of” insert “UK-produced”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and my other amendments to clause 1 provide that a revenue certainty contract can only relate to UK produced aviation fuel (as defined).

[The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their extensive engagement between Committee and Report. Amendments 1, 2 and 4 in my name will ensure that the Secretary of State can enter into revenue certainty contracts only where the supported SAF is produced at a facility in the United Kingdom. This will provide the industry with a clear signal of support. I hope that this measure reassures noble Lords that I have considered the contents of the amendments tabled in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Lord, Lord Grayling. I thank noble Lords for their constructive engagement in reaching this position. I urge noble Lords to support the inclusion of these amendments in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Minister and the House that I was unable to be here in Committee because of a family crisis. I am very glad to be here today and to welcome these amendments. I have no intention of moving my own amendment since the Minister has addressed my concerns. The important thing was to ensure that nobody could game the system: that we knew that we were supporting UK manufacturing and not somebody playing a fast one on us by shipping mostly complete fuel to our country, polishing it up a bit and claiming it was British. The Minister has done that with these amendments and I very much welcome them. I am grateful to him and I support them.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to see the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, back in his place. On behalf of these Benches, I also thank the Minister and the Government for bringing forward these amendments. These important issues were raised in Committee. The Government have listened to the concerns that were raised and we welcome the amendments that have been brought forward. We are grateful that the Government have listened and we are delighted to accept them.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I wish only to congratulate my noble friend Lord Grayling on his amendment and, further, on having persuaded the Government to table alternative amendments that have the same effect as his. We have no objection to those amendments.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, for Amendment 5, which we debated in Committee, and for his contribution. I am very grateful to hear from all noble Lords that the amendments that the Government have tabled deal with the issue that was raised in Committee.

Amendment 1 agreed.

Amendment 2

Moved by

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 12, after “of” insert “UK-produced”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my first amendment to clause 1.

Amendment 2 agreed.

Amendment 3

Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 17, at end insert—
“(2A) A revenue certainty contract may not provide for payments in respect of power-to-liquid sustainable aviation fuel.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that revenue certainty contracts under the Act may not be used to subsidise power-to-liquid sustainable aviation fuels.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, for the benefit of noble Lords who have not become totally enmired in the question of sustainable aviation fuel, it might be appropriate at this stage to spell out that there are, essentially, three sorts of aviation fuel. Of course, everything I say on this topic is, to some degree, a simplification that may be subject to correction and refinement, but broadly speaking there are three sorts. One of them goes by the inelegant name HEFA. I will not tell noble Lords what it stands for, because I cannot remember the very long sequence of syllables that comprise it, but, essentially, it is recycled cooking oil.

There is no real shortage of HEFA in the world. The Government have said that it is not the intention of the Bill for the financial support mechanism it contains to be used to subsidise the production of HEFA. None the less, the Bill allows for HEFA to be subsidised; one of the amendments in my name in this group would preclude that. Another amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, would have a very similar effect to mine, although his is worded much more elegantly and elaborately. Its effect is also slightly more impenetrable than mine but, if one follows the chain of words, it comes to a very similar effect. He and I are at one in saying that the Bill should preclude the subsidisation of HEFA.

There is, higher up the chain, a further form of sustainable aviation fuel, which we can describe as non-HEFA. The difference is that the source material, the feedstock, has to come from sources other than used cooking oil. Municipal waste, for example, would be non-HEFA fuel. There is in place, prior to the Bill, a sustainable aviation fuel mandate that was introduced by statutory order about 15 months ago, under this Government. It requires an increasing amount of HEFA to be mixed into aviation fuel over the next few years, but at a certain point, the mandate says non-HEFA has to be mixed in as well. In other words, the sustainable aviation fuel requirement cannot be satisfied by using simply HEFA and adding more and more HEFA over the years—at some point, some non-HEFA fuel has to be added as well.

As I understand it, it is largely the case that the Bill is aimed at stimulating the production of non-HEFA fuel, which is currently not in production. We will come back at a future stage to whether it is sensible and necessary to subsidise this—at the moment, we are simply discussing what the fuel consists of and what the Bill should be directed at.

Again, while I do not wish to steal the Minister’s thunder, my understanding is that the Government are clear that the main aim of the Bill is to subsidise this non-HEFA fuel. Beyond HEFA, if one goes right to the top of the chain, there is a form of fuel that is not entirely speculative, but is in production in a small, experimental way in the United States and is called power to liquid. PtL, as I understand it—and I speak in a simplified way because I am not technically qualified—captures carbon from the atmosphere and turns it, through some wonderful process, into a liquid fuel that can be mixed in with standard aviation fuel.

It is true that the sustainable aviation fuel mandate that has been in place for 15 months requires that a certain amount of PtL is added in years into the future. That would mean HEFA in the early years, then more non-HEFA, which has to build up, and some PtL added later. That is the progression envisaged by the sustainable aviation fuel mandate.

The Bill would allow the subsidisation of PtL, but I have an amendment in this group which would prohibit that. The whole question of PtL is so speculative that we have no idea what it would cost to subsidise, and it is far distant. I remind noble Lords, who I am sure have been attentive to this, that a sunset clause is introduced in Clause 1(7) and that no contract, by way of a subsidy, can be let

“after the end of the period of 10 years beginning with the day this Act is passed”.

If we are to have long-term subsidies for sustainable aviation fuel—and it may well be 10 years before PtL production is feasible—the Bill will probably be useless for that purpose in any event because, unless amended, it will have expired. My amendment to remove PtL would be a safeguard against the subsidy regime envisaged by the Bill, whose mechanics we will turn to in later amendments, being abused and run away with as we finance and support a very speculative and potentially very expensive fuel.

In the meantime, I understand that the Government take the view that the very small amounts of PtL required and envisaged by the mandate can be secured by import at the due time in the future—again, the Minister can correct me if all this is wrong—so there will be no damage to the mandate if the Bill excludes PtL. That is the substance of these groups of amendments.

15:45

The crucial thing is to narrow the scope of the Bill so that, of the three particular forms of sustainable aviation fuel I have set out, the Bill will focus solely on non-HEFA sustainable aviation fuel. That is the one where it may be argued there is a need for subsidy in the reasonably foreseeable future, excluding the other two options—on the one hand because the Government say that HEFA does not need a subsidy and the Bill is not aimed at it, and on the other because PtL is potentially speculative and expensive, and should be dealt with through a separate statutory and legislative process at the time when it is necessary. In that light, I beg to move my Amendment 3.

[Lord Ravensdale (CB)]

My Lords, I remind noble Lords of my interest as a chief engineer working for AtkinsRéalis. For my Amendment 7 in this group, I have simply retabled my amendment from Committee. As a brief reminder, we have targets in the SAF mandate —coming back to what noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said about power to liquid—and an escalating percentage of sustainable aviation fuel needs to be power to liquid. That is clearly set out in the SAF mandate. This amendment is trying to ensure coherence between the SAF mandate and the projects given support under the revenue certainty mechanism.

This comes back to what the Minister set out about support for UK production. The percentages in the SAF mandate could simply be met by importing power to liquid fuel, so it is important that we set out the ambition for the industry to meet in producing all that fuel, which is already legally required under the SAF mandate, in the UK, aligning that with the earlier government amendments. I recognise that setting this out in the Bill may be going too far, but I would welcome the Minister’s comments on how this could be set out in the allocation framework documents to give industry that steer on power to liquid fuel and the expectations for producing it in the UK.

My Amendments 14 and 16 are similar to those I tabled in Committee, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for signing them. I reflected on the Minister’s responses at that point, but I did not hear any compelling reasons why HEFA sustainable aviation fuel products should be included in the scope of the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, my amendment and his Amendment 15 are very similar and aim at the same thing. Mine deals more with the base product, using established definitions, and his encompasses the totality of HEFA products.

I welcomed meetings with the Minister’s team of officials. The outcome was that the main rationale for retaining HEFA in the Bill is that that recognises that this is a fast-developing market and it is important to retain that flexibility in primary legislation. I accept that, but I still find it hard to imagine a scenario where the Government want to subsidise HEFA using the revenue certainty mechanism. The whole point of the legislation is to help pump-prime those new industries, not to support the well-established industries that we have to provide HEFA fuel.

The Government are taking broader powers than they need under the legislation, so there is a risk that, as we go forward, subsidies could be given outside that intent. However, I hope that the Minister will be able to say something substantive about this in his remarks, on the exclusion of HEFA, and I look forward to hearing what he has to say in that regard.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak in support of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, on crops, and to share many of the concerns raised about HEFA. I declare my interests on the register as an adviser to AtkinsRéalis—there are a lot of us here today.

My concerns are that, first, I do not believe that we should be using crops to make fuel. In a world that does not have enough food and where biodiversity is under threat, where deforestation is happening in areas of the world that provide extra land for agriculture, I do not think that there is any justification for growing food and turning it into fuel. I ask the Minister please to exclude crops. The United States is permitting them, and the European Union is not, and I think that we should fall on the side of avoiding the use of agricultural crops. Agricultural waste is a different thing —the residue from crops, such as straw and corn husks. Agricultural waste is one thing, but actual crops is another, and we should not be using them.

On HEFA, we are where we are, but we have to exercise extreme care, because the truth is that there is not enough used cooking oil in the world to fill the supposed need for that used cooking oil. All too often, the suspicion is that somebody is dumping a chicken wing into a tub of virgin palm oil and saying that it is HEFA—so HEFA is something that we need to move away from as quickly as possible. In any case, we depend on imports from the Far East for it, which may not be sustainable going forwards. Our focus should really be on biowaste and municipal waste and on the technologies that offer a really good path for the future —but let us not use crops and let us be extremely careful with what we do with HEFA. I have a lot of sympathy with what my noble friend Lord Moylan and the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, have said. It is far from clear that this is a genuine product that has the full potential to do what is necessary.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, before I start, I draw attention to my entry in the register as non-exec chair of RVL Aviation, which is in the aviation sector but not involved in the production of sustainable aviation fuel.

I strongly support this move to make sure that we do not include food crops. I have one caveat, which I raised in Committee, and I wonder whether the Minister can update the House. My noble friend Lord Grayling drew attention to the different position that the United States has taken about including food crops. My starting point, as his, is that we should not include food crops. The only caveat that I raised in Committee was that if, in doing so, that enabled us to ensure that the United States continued to support the development of sustainable aviation fuel, given the importance of the United States in the international aviation sector, there might be a case for that. I would be interested to know whether the Minister can update your Lordships on any discussions that have taken place with the United States. If it is not necessary to do that, I strongly support the amendments that are there to make sure that we rule out food crops because, as my noble friend Lord Grayling said, using land to grow crops for food is what we should be doing, and we have seen, in the renewable energy sector, what can happen when you have policy that then drives behaviours that you had not intended, which have outcomes that are environmentally not welcome.

The second point that I raise is that I support the amendments to rule out the use of the revenue certainty mechanism for subsidising HEFA. As my noble friend Lord Grayling said, it is important that we move away from that and develop the new technologies, as my noble friend Lord Moylan said from the Front Bench. The danger of allowing subsidy of things that we are trying to get rid of is that you never get rid of them; any subsidy that there is should be used for the development of new technologies and processes. That is the rationale for having a subsidy regime in the first place. Setting that framework is very welcome.

My final point is on power-to-liquid technology. My noble friend Lord Moylan set out his view that that technology is probably not yet at a point where this Bill would be of any use. My starting position and his is that you have to justify carefully the need for subsidy, so it would not be a bad thing, if that technology is some way away from development, to force the Government to come back to Parliament to rejustify subsidy for power-to-liquid. That would be very welcome. If the Minister can update the House that providing subsidy to develop the technology and get it into production would have a much nearer-term outcome than my noble friend suggested, I might think again. However, in the scenario that my noble friend Lord Moylan set out, his amendments would be very sensible and helpful in testing the Government and forcing them to put on record the state of that technology.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, this second group concerns different aspects of the operation and scope of the revenue certainty contracts. We appreciate the good intentions to influence the mix of technologies and feedstocks supported by this scheme, but we cannot support these amendments, each of which in a different way would introduce arbitrary restrictions that, while well intended, would risk upsetting the balanced, technology-neutral framework that is central to the Bill’s success. They would remove flexibility and could have serious unexpected consequences. The technological framework itself will attract the broad range of investments that will enable the rapid scaling of UK aviation fuel production. It is the creation of the revenue certainty mechanism that will attract investments, which are the literal fuel to bring the technologies we need.

I will address each amendment in turn. Amendment 3 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would introduce a new subsection prohibiting revenue certainty contracts from providing payment for a PtL sustainable aviation fuel. I understand the concern that PtL technologies are still maturing and often come with higher upfront costs, but a statutory exclusion is too blunt a guillotine instrument. It would deny Ministers any flexibility to support promising PtL projects as costs fall and technologies advance, sending an unhelpful signal to developers and investors that this entire pathway is off limits for UK support. Such rigidity would involve diverting PtL investment to other jurisdictions. The Bill as drafted already provides the Government with tools to shape pathways through allocations criteria and contract design without foreclosing future opportunities.

Amendment 7 from the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, would take exactly the opposite approach, requiring the Secretary of State to direct the counterparty to offer minimum volumes of PtL contracts from 2028 onward, increasing annually to 2040. While the objective of accelerating PtL development is commendable, setting the number of strict time-fixed statutory quotas in the Bill would be equally problematic. It would commit the Government to contracting many time-fixed volumes whether or not sufficient viable PtL projects were ready, creating a risk of uneconomic awards or unfulfilled obligations on many occasions. As others involved in financing such large-scale projects know, they are often delivered slightly behind time as supply chains can be overrun. Building so many rigid volumetric obligations into the statute would create legal and commercial uncertainty and could crowd out credible SAF pathways. The Government’s more flexible approach, using competitive tenders and market readiness to guide allocation, remains a more practical and adaptable route.

Amendment 14 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, seeks to define “relevant crops” as starch-rich crops, sugars, oil crops and main crops, adopting the same definitions as used in the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations Order 2007. Amendment 16, in a similar vein, would exclude from support any sustainable aviation fuel derived from such crops.

I fully recognise the environmental concern to avoid diverting crops into fuel production, but legislating directly for this exclusion via statutory definition risks unintended consequences; for example, capturing advanced biofuels that use a mix of waste and feedstocks or deterring innovation where crop residues are responsibly utilised. The same aims can, we feel, be better achieved through policy guidance, sustainability criteria and a certification process already envisaged under the Bill, rather than through rigid statutory exclusion. As drafted, these amendments are overly prescriptive and would constrain technological evolution and government flexibility and discourage investment.

16:00

Amendment 15 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would exclude HEFA fuels from the scheme entirely, yet HEFA remains the most immediate commercially viable pathway for scale SAF production in the next decade. Removing it entirely from eligibility would, in effect, drain the early project pipeline for seed funding just as the revenue certainty mechanism begins operation, weakening investor confidence and jeopardising early domestic delivery. We strongly believe that the Bill must remain pathway-neutral, allowing market competition and policy signals to shape uptake over time as investment grows, companies and industries establish themselves and markets develop.

In sum, while each of these amendments is well intentioned, taken together, they would substitute flexibility with arbitrary constraint, either banning specific technologies or mandating others in a way that would freeze the policy framework in time. We need a revenue certainty mechanism that can back the best projects as they emerge—one that adapts with the market, and not one constrained by today’s assumptions about which technologies or feedstocks will win out. Picking winners or losers in the Bill is a fool’s game and would slow investment, cause dispute and risk leaving the UK behind in a fast-moving international market.

[Lord Mackinlay of Richborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am the director of the Global Warming Policy Foundation, so the House might believe that I am immediately against all this sort of thing, but that would not actually be true. I am certainly in favour of proper CO₂ accounting, hence my support for Amendments 14 and 15.

We cannot do another Drax, dare I say, where we end up with a situation that sounds very renewable and sustainable, but when we peel the surface away, we are actually generating more CO₂ in creating the final outcome than by doing nothing. My concern if we allow crops, particularly if they are imported sustainable fuels that are derived from crops, is we do not have the CO₂ accounting arising in the UK, and we pat ourselves on the back and say how marvellous and virtuous we are, but the reality is that we have increased global CO₂ on an undertaking that is anything but sustainable.

I would like an assurance from the Minister that, as we progress the sustainable aviation fuel future, there is proper mindfulness about the CO₂ effects of what we are doing. One of my grave concerns about the power-to-fuel ambitions is that they require such a huge amount of energy in the creation of the fuel that, by the end of the process, we will have actually created a lot more CO₂. I hope that we have learned something about CO₂ accounting, particularly on the back of the Drax experience, which allows virgin forests from North America to be cut down, presumably powered by petrol. It then goes to drying mills run by gas, is put on a diesel-powered train to a shipping port, comes across the Atlantic by a diesel-powered ship and is then burnt in a power station in the UK, and, hey presto, we say that it is zero-carbon. We have to do better than that as we progress a net-zero future. I do not want to see us conned and just kidding ourselves and the public that we are doing something for the right reasons when actually we are creating more CO₂. I would like that type of assurance from the Minister.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.

Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, seeks to prevent the revenue certainty mechanism supporting power-to-liquid sustainable aviation fuel projects. However, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, noted, Amendment 7 from the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, produces the reverse, in that it would require the Secretary of State to enter into at least one revenue certainty contract with a SAF producer that is using power-to-liquid technology.

We believe that there is value in potentially supporting power-to-liquid fuels because they have a high greenhouse gas emissions reduction potential, lower competition for their feedstocks and lower risk of wider environmental issues such as land use change. Adopting either of these amendments would limit the Government’s negotiation flexibility by setting criteria in advance, which could ultimately reduce overall value for money in the contracts agreed.

The Government will establish a fair and transparent contract allocation process to assess each project’s costs, benefits and risks. It is important that government retains the flexibility to support a range of technologies if they can deliver cost-effective greenhouse emissions reductions and support the SAF mandate obligations—and, to address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, whenever they are able to do so. He cannot predict the future any more than I can, and in any event, there is a sunset clause to the Bill which means that it can be extended in five-yearly increments. We are currently developing our approach to allocation, and we will publish an allocation strategy which outlines our approach to different SAF technologies and how the revenue certainty mechanism will support mandate targets.

On Amendments 14, 15 and 16, our intention is for HEFA technology and feedstocks to be excluded from RCM contracts because HEFA SAF—I am sorry about all these acronyms—has already overcome many of the barriers to investment that the revenue certainty mechanism seeks to address. However, the SAF market is at an early stage and uncertain, so the legislation needs to remain flexible to allow for potential future changes in the market to which the revenue certainty mechanism may need to respond.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Could the noble Lord kindly repeat the beginning of that statement where he talked about the Government’s intentions on HEFA? It is important that the House hears exactly what the Minister is saying about that.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

Of course; I am very happy to repeat it.

Our intention is for HEFA technology and feedstocks to be excluded from RCM contracts because HEFA SAF has already overcome many of the barriers to investment that the revenue certainty mechanism seeks to address. However, the SAF market is at an early stage and uncertain, so the legislation needs to remain flexible to allow for potential future changes in the market to which the revenue certainty mechanism may need to respond.

I hear noble Lords’ concerns on growing crops for purposes other than food; the sustainability criteria in the revenue certainty mechanism will align with the sustainability criteria in the SAF mandate. This will be implemented through the eligibility criteria within the contract allocation process and will reflect the latest market and technological developments.

We are actively monitoring trends to ensure that the policy keeps pace with technical and commercial developments. Therefore, we have launched a call for evidence on the eligibility of crops in the SAF mandate, which will run until 16 March this year. It asks for evidence on potential benefits, risks and trade-offs of using crops in SAF production. In answer to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay of Richborough, about carbon dioxide, I am sure that evidence on that will be provided as a consequence of that call for evidence.

The call for evidence does not propose any changes to the SAF mandate. Should there be a case to review the feedstock eligibility criteria, it would be subject to consultation, and any changes would require amendments to legislation. We would not want to exclude specific feedstocks in the Bill in case updated evidence proves that they meet the sustainability criteria for eligibility in the SAF mandate.

In answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, on the position of the United States, we note that, but we will run the consultation first to understand the evidence arising from the questions we have asked.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Ravensdale, for tabling their amendments and ask that they do not press them based on the actions already being taken to give flexibility and ensure value for money.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

May I press the Minister a little on the point the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made? I listened very carefully both times he said it. The Government’s intention, unless something changes, is to exclude HEFA. Can he commit that if that intention changes and the Government direct some contracts to be issued which include HEFA, a Minister will come to the Dispatch Box to set out clearly and explicitly what has changed and the evidence that supported that change?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a fair point. I mentioned the call for evidence precisely because it would be useful to have evidence from any party that cares to give it about using crops, for example. I am happy to say that in those circumstances, somebody should come back and say something about that position.

[Lord Ravensdale (CB)]

I thank the Minister for making that strong statement from the Dispatch Box on the intention to exclude HEFA technology and feedstocks. That is further than the Government have gone before in their statements. It sets out a clear direction of travel for the legislation and the revenue certainty mechanism, and I thank him for that.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, taking the issues separately, we in this House are used to governments seeking powers much broader than they need, and explicitly broader than they are intending to use. The Government seek the power to offer a subsidy regime, the character of which we will come to in the next group. They want the power to extend a subsidy regime to the production of something which requires no subsidy, as the technique for producing it is well established. Neste Oyj, a Finnish company which came to see me a few weeks ago, is producing vast quantities of HEFA already in various European centres.

There is no need for a subsidy for HEFA, and the Government agree. They say that they have no intention of using the revenue certainty mechanism for HEFA; none the less, they want to have the power. That is a bit shabby, although I appreciate that, thanks to the intervention of my noble friend Lord Harper, they are now willing to come to the Dispatch Box and explain why they would want to do this, if they ever should.

On power to liquid, at the other end of the scale, while I and the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, were broadly in agreement on the question of HEFA and crop-based fuels, we were diametrically opposed on the question of power to liquid. It is unfortunate that the Government are giving themselves the ability to launch a subsidy regime for a highly speculative type of fuel that should be subject to much closer parliamentary scrutiny when the Government might want to offer such subsidies. However, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

Amendment 4

Moved by

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill]

4: Clause 1, page 1, line 25, at end insert—
““UK-produced sustainable aviation fuel”: sustainable aviation fuel is “UK-produced sustainable aviation fuel” if any part of the process for converting any feedstock into the fuel takes place in the United Kingdom.”Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my first amendment to clause 1.

Amendment 4 agreed.

Amendment 5 not moved.

Amendment 6

Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

6: Clause 1, page 2, line 15, at end insert—
“(9) Regulations made under this section must not permit a revenue certainty contract entered into under subsection (1) to have a term exceeding 10 years.”

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 6 requires, perhaps by way of introduction, a few words on the structure of the subsidy and how it actually works. Bear in mind that prior to all this, as I said earlier, a sustainable aviation fuel mandate was put in place by statutory instrument some 15 months ago which guarantees the demand for the product. There is a guaranteed demand: in simplistic terms, it is like saying that everybody in the country has to eat half a pound of chocolate every day.

If that were to be the Government’s policy and they put that in place, you would expect chocolate factories to spring up. Existing chocolate factories might expand; new chocolate factories would come into existence. So, what is the problem? Why is it that putting the demand in place is not sufficient? Why do you need to go further? Why are factories and investors not producing this stuff for which you have put in place a mandatory and growing demand over the years ahead? I do not know the answer to that.

The Government have decided that putting the demand in place is not enough. To satisfy our somewhat rapacious foreign investor friends, they also need to be given a guaranteed price for the product. Not only is half a pound of chocolate going to be eaten every day, but you will have to guarantee the price in order to get the chocolate factories to work.

That is what the Bill does. It is not about putting the demand in place—that exists—it is about guaranteeing the price, and the way to do that is to provide some form of subsidy. Of course, a direct subsidy out of the coffers of the Treasury is almost unaffordable in our current circumstances, but it is also unnecessary because the Government have, as we know, discovered in the field of wind farms and solar panels the device of the contract for the difference.

A contract for difference is a way of guaranteeing a price, and it is done by putting in place a counterparty—separate from the Government, but essentially a government glove puppet—which will enter into contracts with these foreign investors to guarantee them a price. They will negotiate the strike price, but on what basis they will negotiate it, what skills they will bring to negotiating it, how they will be certain they are not going to be given the runaround and end up with a very adverse price—none of these things is put in place or explained to us. They will end up with a contract, which will be in place for a number of years. The effect of the contract will be to increase the price of the fuel. The increase in the price of the fuel is very likely to find its way through to ticket prices. So this Bill has an indirect but none the less fairly ineluctable consequence: it will increase air fares.

When you ask the Government by how much air fares will go up—and we are going to do that later, in group 5—they say they have done an assessment and it will be, per year, which I think means cumulatively every year, £1.50 up or £1.50 down. They do not know. It is a fairly small amount and fairly neutral, but it is almost impossible to discern how they reach that conclusion, or to find it very credible, because airlines are complaining that the HEFA they have to buy already, because the mandate is in place—and they were buying it even before the mandate came in—is turning out to be very expensive indeed compared with standard aviation fuel.

It is wrong that Parliament and the Government should burden future generations for unnecessarily long periods with these additional costs of travel and subsidies. Therefore, I propose that any contract entered into strictly by the counterparty—not by the Government but under the direction of the Government—should have a term of no more than 10 years.

Clause 1(7) of the Bill—I drew attention to this in the last group—envisages a sunset clause after 10 years. It is extendable under Clause 1(8), as the Minister said, but it has a sunset clause in it. That, however, is not a limitation on the length of the contracts that might be entered into during that 10-year period. You could quite lawfully enter into a contract with a life of 100 years within that 10-year period. There should be some limit put on that, because these costs will fall not on oldies like us, whose flying days are passing, but on young people over the rest of their lives and their careers. There may well be no justification for it by then. Who knows, by then we may well be paying people to produce a fuel but life has moved on and the fuel is not necessary. Yet we will have to buy them out of that, and that will fall on air passengers. So, a10-year limit on the contract should be quite enough for any foreign investor to start up this process and get it going. They have a guaranteed price for 10 years and after that they should be on their own. That is what the substance is of this amendment, which I beg to move.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a very interesting amendment, because a revenue certainty contract, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, is wonderful for the suppliers. It presumably links in not just the price but the volumes—which may change from year to year —and the sources. The noble Lord opposite mentioned the issue of Drax and where that material comes from every year. Would there be a 10-year guarantee price for that? As the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said, any old agricultural product that was edible could be covered as well. And we have not yet discussed the worry that many people have about the number of trees and everything else being cut down in the Amazon basin, which could also be covered by this. So, a revenue certainty contract is pretty difficult and this amendment is a good start in at least limiting its scope and time.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Moylan set out the challenge—the thing you have to justify—to put the revenue certainty mechanism in place. It was certainly one of the things that I grappled with, and challenged the industry on, when I was the Secretary of State for Transport and we were developing the beginnings of this policy. As my noble friend said, the SAF mandate sets out some guaranteed demand for the industry producing sustainable aviation fuel. The challenge I always put to those thinking about investing in producing the technology was exactly the challenge that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, set out: if you have guaranteed demand, what is the barrier to producing that product?

We discussed this in Committee. The logic is that, for some of these products, it is new technology that requires significant upfront capital investment, and the judgment is that, if you compare it to other similar sorts of investments that these investors are making, the risk is higher than with those other investments. Therefore, if you do not do something to close that gap, you will not see the investment in the technology, particularly here in the United Kingdom, where we want to see the production take place, at least in part, if for no other reason than resilience.

What you are really dealing with is closing the gap between the risks involved in producing SAF and the alternative products that those investors could invest in. I do not think, therefore, that you need an open-ended contract. You need to put some limits around it. I am sure that the Minister will have some responses on what those limits should be, but a very obvious one would be to have a time limit, so that investors have some certainty: they have guaranteed demand and a period when they will get a guaranteed price. That should enable the risk premium to be reduced and enable the investment and production to take place.

If we start from the assumption that it certainly does not need to be an infinite period and should therefore be fixed, the debate is therefore just about what the length of that period should be. Now, the Minister may want to come back and say that the 10 years proposed by my noble friend is the wrong number or limitation period, in which case I would be happy to listen to the arguments that he makes about an alternative period, but I do not think that the right answer is that it can be any length at all, with no cap on it. I would be much more comfortable if we put a cap on it.

Again, if, at some point in the future, there was a clear justification for changing it, there would be nothing to stop this or a future Government coming back to Parliament to change the position. But I do not want to see open-ended contracts in place, particularly since we have legislated for there to be guaranteed demand. So I strongly support my noble friend’s amendment, unless I hear a very good counter case from the Minister.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I am responding to Amendment 6 in this group, which seeks to cap the length of revenue certainty contracts to a maximum of 10 years. On the face of it, this might appear to be neat and disciplined but, in practice, we conclude that it is both arbitrary and unduly restrictive.

The noble Lord spoke about the need to control costs and we agree with that. It is also important, as we discuss this, to recognise that the Bill covers a range of technologies and huge investments going into them, but it may also include emerging technologies. Ten years is not derived from any settled evidence about what different SAF projects will require; it is simply a round number that seeks to be written into this primary legislation.

Some plants with high upfront capital costs and long asset lives may need longer-term revenue support to be financed at all, particularly in the current high interest rate environment. Others, especially later or more standard projects, could be perfectly viable on shorter contracts, which I am sure is the Government’s intention for many of the projects that will be considered. However, a single statutory ceiling takes no account of any of that diversity in these emerging markets. It is not really for us to know more than the Government and their officials, as they have details that we do not.

This amendment is also restrictive because it removes one of the Government’s key design levers. The ability to adjust contract length between technologies and over time, in response to costs and market maturity, is fundamental to achieving value for money. If we fix 10 years in the Bill, any future Government who judge that a 12-year or 15-year term is necessary to secure a first-of-a-kind project would be unable to do so without further primary legislation. This rigidity could also play into commercial hands, encouraging developers to structure bids around fixed terms in ways that actually undermine the very affordability that is spoken about.

While the intention is understandable, imposing an arbitrary timeline would remove the flexibility and pragmatism that any evidence-led scheme requires. It would, in effect, ask the Government to negotiate with one hand tied behind their back. We do not believe that this amendment is helpful in this emerging market, but we do think it is important that contracts are reviewed. On that, I ask the Minister, in the context of reporting later on, whether the length of caps that are imposed under the Bill is something that he would be prepared to include in the reporting information that will be made available.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 6 would require that the Secretary of State set a maximum contract term for revenue certainty contracts before exercising the regulation-making power in Clause 6. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the overall intention of the Bill, which is to generate a new and growing United Kingdom industry that, I hope—contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said—will be financed in the United Kingdom as well.

We are currently consulting on the detailed design of the revenue certainty mechanism. The consultation provides the rationale behind the indicative heads of terms, which sets out the framework for principal terms and conditions that could be included in a revenue certainty mechanism contract. As highlighted in the Government’s continuing consultation, we propose a 15-year term for all contracts. This aligns with the expected 10-year to 15-year debt repayment period that SAF producers will encounter. It is important that this flexibility is retained and not restricted by detailing a contract length in the Bill.

Final decisions are subject to the continuing consultation, which will inform the detailed design of the full terms and conditions of revenue certainty mechanism contracts. In answer to the question posed by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, I am sure that we can find a reporting mechanism that sets out the actual length of those contracts. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, to withdraw Amendment 6.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I am disappointed by that answer. One can look at this issue in a number of ways. The way I look at it is that we have a responsibility to future generations not to burden them with excessive costs on a speculative basis. The Government are consulting. They are no doubt consulting with the foreign investors who are considering investing in these plants. If they listen to the foreign investors, the longest possible term is what they will bid for.

We need to be tougher. It is for us to put the case of those who are voiceless in this consultation: the people—in many cases young people, as they will be the ones paying in the future—who will have to sustain this. I am afraid I am not satisfied with the answer given by the Minister. I wish to test the opinion of the House on my amendment.

16:32

Division 1

Amendment 6 disagreed.

Ayes: 188

Noes: 258

16:44

Amendment 7 not moved.

Clause 6: Levy on suppliers

Amendment 8

Moved by

[Lord Grayling]

8: Clause 6, page 4, line 19, after “contracts” insert “in respect of sustainable aviation fuel manufactured in the United Kingdom”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the levy is raised for the purposes of manufacturing sustainable aviation fuel in the United Kingdom. Connected with another amendment in the name of Lord Grayling, it seeks to prevent the government from diverting the levy funds to other broader aviation or climate-related policies.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to a series of amendments that I tabled. I have given the Minister advance notice, and I hope he is going to be able to reassure me on them. I will take them in turn.

Amendment 8 is simply to try to avoid the Government pulling a fast one, raising money from air passengers and spending it on something completely unrelated. I am looking for a cast-iron, on-the-record assurance from the Minister that that cannot happen under the terms of the Bill. We know that on occasions government departments try to slip things under the counter, and I am simply seeking absolute assurance that that will not happen in this case. Amendment 9 basically seeks to achieve the same thing.

Amendment 10 addresses what is still the crucial operational point for this legislation: where and how do you actually apply the levy? The Minister knows that I have had serious misgivings, as have many people, about the plan to try to apply a mechanism that relates to market share in the previous year, to do it the year after and the rest, which I think would be completely unworkable and, of course, distorts the market if you have new entrants or people leaving the market.

The one thing we do not want to do is to end up undermining the existing producers of aviation fuel, which are carrying an extra cost. We do not want to have them closing and going elsewhere because we have not got this right. I remain persuaded that the way to do this is to levy a charge at or around the time of delivery—the time at which it is delivered from the refinery or the terminal to the airline. I appreciate that it may be something you do one month in arrears, looking at the previous monthly invoice accordingly. I do not have a problem with that, but I have a problem with anything looser than that.

I am looking to the Minister to explain tonight how this is going to work. I know the Government are still working on all the details, but we cannot have some abstruse mechanism that tries to refer back years in the past. We need something current and relevant that reflects changes in the marketplace and applies the costs in a timely way to those producing the fuel, so that there is no distortion of the marketplace.

Amendments 17 and 18 are really about the timing of the legislation. We know that we are maybe four or five years away, I hope slightly less, from the first significant SAF plant being operational in this country. We cannot have a situation where the levy starts to be applied now and is just piling up in the background with nothing to spend it on. I am looking for an explanation from the Minister as to exactly how the commencement of this legislation will work. I have proposed in these amendments that it should be six months before the first manufacturing facility comes on stream—the Minister may have an alternative suggestion—but we cannot have a situation where commencement is imminent but the operation of the Bill is years away. Again, I am looking for assurance and explanation from the Minister on this, so that we know we are not charging air passengers today for something that is years in the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 11 in this group, which substantially coincides with Amendment 10 in the name of my noble friend Lord Grayling. I will just take a minute to explain, in my perhaps rather more simple terms, what mischief these amendments seek to address. I gave some idea of the mechanism when we spoke on the last group. It will work like this: contracts will be entered into by a counterparty and a fixed price will be guaranteed under a contract for the difference. That means that if the prices are below a certain price, the counterparty will collect money by way of the levy, and if they are the other way around, it will pay out to ensure that the producer receives a fixed price. We know that economically, ultimately, the levy will be paid by the passenger on the flight, but who is going to be charged the levy?

The Government have decided—we are not disputing this—that the levy should be charged at the highest point in the supply chain, which is the producers of standard aviation fuel, essentially kerosene. They have to mix in the SAF to the required amount, whichever type of SAF it is, and they should be the ones that will pay the levy if a levy is required—that is, if prices are such that a levy has to be paid. We do not object to them being the levy payers, but how is the levy calculated and then applied to them?

The Government’s proposal is that the levy should be calculated a year in arrears and then applied to them as a charge which they have to pay in arrears at that point according to the market share that they had in that year. That is all very well, you might say, and very convenient from the Government’s point of view, because at that point they know exactly how much they have to charge, so there will be no difficulty and no question of having the wrong charge paid and having to make up bits later, or of the counterparty being out of funds by a penny. They will know exactly by the end of the year what should be charged and they will distribute it to the producers according to their market share during that year, which will also be known by that point.

The difficulty for the producers is that they will not know during the year in which they are selling the fuel what they should be charging the airlines to cover the cost of the levy. It is accepted that they should charge the airlines, because that is the way it trickles down to the passenger. They will not know during the year how much levy they are going to have to pay at the end of the year, so they will not know how much they should be charging per litre of fuel that they sell.

They would prefer, as it is easier for them and avoids this complexity, if they were told a price per litre which they should charge. The charge of the levy in addition to the base kerosene fuel could even be apparent on their invoices. Of course, if the Government were to do that, it would expose the counterparty to some financial risk—I see that—because they would have to work on the basis of estimates. They would have to estimate the prices during that period and therefore would be exposed to some financial risk. I imagine that, behind the Minister, there is a middle-ranking official in the Treasury saying, “You cannot take any financial risk that will fall upon the Government or any entity associated with the Government”.

What the Government are proposing is fundamentally unworkable, because the only way the producers can handle this is to protect themselves by overcharging. They will overcharge to compensate themselves for the levy, and so the transparency of the levy travelling through the chain of command, so to speak, down to the ticket payer will be obscured. The producers leave one in no doubt when one speaks to them that this is the only mechanism they will have. There is a real point of workability about the Bill which has not been addressed.

I imagine the Minister will respond by saying, “Oh, but we are having a consultation”. This is a futile protest, but I want to raise this point of protest as I have the opportunity: would it not have been better if the Government had done the consultation and then brought forward the legislation? Why is it that we have to have the legislation before we know the results of the consultation with the industry, so that we do not actually know what is workable? I suspect the Minister will say that, but I am afraid it is not satisfactory that we are asked to pass this legislation with that important question of workability still outstanding. I may be wrong, and it may be that the Government can explain that it is perfectly workable, but nobody has been able as yet to establish what that workable solution is.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, briefly, I support my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment. It is very important, particularly when we come on to later groups and are talking about the ultimate impact of this—which is that it will, in effect, fall on to the end consumer, as all taxes do—that we make sure that this is as simple and straightforward a process as possible, so that we can explain to people what we are doing, why we are doing it and what the cost is. That is always to be welcomed in policy-making.

Further, this should be workable and straightforward for aviation fuel producers. They are the ones that we have chosen to put the mandate on, in giving them the legal responsibility to produce sustainable aviation fuel and blend it with their regular fuel. The current structure transfers the level of financial risk to them. I agree with my noble friend Lord Moylan, in that I suspect that behind this—the Minister can tell us that we are wrong if we are—is the Treasury wanting to make sure, not entirely unreasonably, that there is no risk to the taxpayer. However, in doing so, all that has happened is that the risk has been moved on to the fuel supplier.

As my noble friend Lord Moylan says—I have thought about this as well, and I have listened to the industry—it seems that, for the producers to deal with the risk, they will have to increase what they charge the airlines. So rather than the cost and the risk falling on the Treasury and the taxpayer, it will, in effect, still fall on the taxpayer but just in their guise of an airline passenger who will face a higher ticket price. That is not very economically sensible.

The industry is very clear that the Treasury should not be picking up the costs for this. The only sensible thing would be to have a per unit price. There would be some risk for the Treasury in the short term, but that could be smoothed out over time, and the Government are perfectly able to do that. That would be a much better solution, and I hope that the Minister can at least indicate that that is where the Government’s thinking is. If he cannot do that, I suggest that my noble friend Lord Moylan is correct that we should have done the detail before the legislation, rather than the other way around.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to this group of amendments that deal with the design and timings of the revenue certainty mechanisms and the levy. While I recognise that concerns around fiscal discipline, transparency and fairness lie behind them, I do not believe that these amendments are the right way to address those concerns.

We have spent considerable time talking with industry and officials, and I am thankful to the Minister’s officials for taking the time to talk with us. We note that the consultation closed on 8 January. We have reflected to officials the concerns that industry has raised with us, and we are pleased that we had the opportunity to do that. We have confidence that Ministers, officials and industry are all working together, in what is a complex space, to find practical and workable solutions that balance a number of competing agendas. Added to this, I remind the House that these mechanisms will be subject to statutory instruments under the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 8, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, would specify that the levy under Clause 6 can fund contracts only in respect of sustainable aviation fuel manufactured in the United Kingdom. We recognise the intention here and have some sympathy for it, but we believe that the concessions already granted by the Minister in group 1 fundamentally deal with this issue and give greater assurances to the House that the levy will be used only for those purposes.

Amendment 9, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, would narrow the other costs that can be met from the levy to those associated with directly related administration. Guarding against drift of levy funds into unrelated processes is absolutely right, but, in our opinion, the formulation risks overtightening. It could exclude legitimate and necessary scheme-related expenditures, such as certain forms of oversight, enforcement, market-enabling activity and the reporting that we will come on to in the final group. These would be unintended consequences. The Bill already confines the levy to the purposes of the mechanism, and regulations can and should be scrutinised by Parliament, but we believe that these restrictions would be too tight.

17:00

Amendment 10, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, would mandate that the levy is applied to conventional aviation fuel at the point where it was drawn from the refinery terminal or bulk storage facility for supply to the UK aviation market. The aim to align the existing fuel duty system and provide a clear collection point is seemingly sensible. However, ensuring a single mandatory collection point in the Bill would reduce flexibility to adapt the levy design as supply chains evolve, as new fuels and blends enter the market or when, as experience suggests, a different point would be less problematic. The Bill deliberately leaves these detailed mechanisms of collection to regulations following consultation with industry and relevant authorities. Again, we believe that this consultation is a better means of dealing with these details.

Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would reduce the current drafting of the levy obligation with a requirement for suppliers to pay a standard levy expressed in pence per litre and shown on invoices. Transparency, simplicity and a visible pence per litre rate are all attractive features, and we would like to see many such principles in practice. However, writing this specific model into primary legislation at this stage, when active negotiations are ongoing, would lock the Government into one particular form of levy design and invoicing, regardless of how fuel mix changes or whether, in time, a different basis, perhaps reflecting energy emissions content, would be more appropriate. These design choices, balancing regulation and scheme rules where they can be fine-tuned, are better there and not fixed in the Bill. However, we want to see further progress on these matters so that solutions can be found that work for industry and government. We reserve the right to challenge the SI should these issues continue to persist by that point.

Finally, Amendments 17 and 18, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, would alter commencements so that Clause 6, and thus the levy, cannot come into force until a domestic producer is judged to be within six months of operation and holding a revenue certainty contract, and the Secretary of State has laid a notice before Parliament. I have a great deal of sympathy with the concern that underlies these amendments. No one wants money to be collected significantly in advance of there being any realistic prospects of payments flowing to producers. However, the proposed solution introduces a series of subjective and likely to be contested tests into the commencement provisions where a producer is

“expected to operate within six months”

and where the conditions are met at a particular moment. “Expected” is no more legally defined than the length of a piece of string; those are not straightforward or binary assessments and can lead to contested issues in the courts. Tying the start of the levy to these judgments risks injecting uncertainty and legal issues into the Bill.

As drafted, the Bill gives the Government a clear, predictable route to bring the levy into force and the allocation contract under the transparency criteria. We believe that this is the better course of action. Again, reporting requirements secured in the previous group will help to monitor all these issues. I share the aims of value for money, clarity and fairness around the revenue certainty mechanism. We support the aims of the Bill but are concerned that the amendments are too arbitrary and would in many cases have unknown consequences, reduce flexibility and have serious consequences for the Bill’s ability to go forward.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this debate. Amendments 8 and 9, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, seek to address how funds from the levy are used. I am happy to reassure the noble Lord from the Dispatch Box that money raised through the levy will be used only to support eligible SAF plants in the United Kingdom, and that that is already set out in the Bill.

Clause 6 restricts the costs incurred by the counterparty under the revenue certainty contracts and in carrying out its functions under the Bill. Under this clause, the levy funds will be used only to meet the cost of the revenue certainty mechanism scheme. It is important that the counterparty is able to recover its costs, which include the cost of administering the contracts, the levy and the payment of surpluses.

Amendment 10 intends to ensure that there is a specific mandatory point at which the supplier becomes liable to pay the levy. The Government agree with the intention of the amendment but believe that it is unnecessary because Clause 6(7) already provides that a person becomes liable to pay the levy at the same point when they become liable to an obligation under the SAF mandate.

On how individual levy contributions are calculated, it is important that the Bill provides sufficient flexibility to ensure that final levy design decisions deliver our design principles, including simplicity, solvency, affordability and fairness. The Government are currently reviewing responses to their recent consultation on the detailed design of the levy and engaging with stakeholders to deliver these objectives. I remind noble Lords that the regulations made under Clause 6(1), to set out how the levy will work, will be subject to scrutiny under the affirmative procedure, which will give Parliament the opportunity to continue to consider the approach.

Amendments 17 and 18, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, seek to prevent the levy being imposed until a domestic sustainable aviation fuel producer is approaching readiness to receive payments under the Act. I reassure the noble Lord that the purpose of the levy, as set out in Clause 6, is to meet the costs of payments made by the counterparty to SAF producers and to cover the counterparty’s administrative costs. The costs of payments under RCM contracts will be insured only once eligible SAF is being produced and sold by producers who have entered into RCM contracts, which is the outcome sought by these amendments.

The Government are currently reviewing responses to their recent consultation on levy design. Some stakeholders have expressed a desire to build up a reserve fund prior to the first producer payments, which could help smooth out the costs of the scheme and help manage risks of underforecasting required payments. As the Government consider their response to the consultation, it is important that the Bill retains a degree of flexibility around levy design, which will be set out via secondary legislation and will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, intends to introduce a standardised rate for the levy. We are currently reviewing responses to our recent consultation on the detailed design of the levy and continue to engage with stakeholders to help inform the drafting of levy regulations. Within the consultation, we sought views on the publication of a forecast levy rate, expressed in pence per litre, which could help provide greater transparency for the supply chain.

The Bill as drafted does not specify a particular mechanism and allows the Secretary of State to consider a range of options for calculating the levy paid by individual companies. It is important that the Bill retains a degree of flexibility around levy design, which will be set out via secondary legislation and will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Therefore, I do not consider the amendment to be necessary.

To reassure noble Lords, the Government are live to the potential impacts of different levy designs and recognise industry’s desire for certainty and transparency, while ensuring fairness and affordability for the consumer. We recognise that the levy must be dynamic and responsive to the changing market, while ensuring that the counterparty has funds to make payments under the scheme. But, to be clear, this levy will not be used to generate unnecessary funds and will raise sufficient money to cover only the counterparty’s costs under the revenue certainty scheme.

Although final decisions will be informed by the consultation, we are exploring options that deliver this and many of the proposals, and options set out in that consultation could help provide greater certainty and transparency. As I have said, the levy regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, which will allow further parliamentary scrutiny. I hope noble Lords will note the steps the Government have taken in the levy design and that they therefore will not press their amendments.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for a detailed explanation of the situation. I am greatly reassured by what he said. What matters in all this is that we provide the right balance. This is something the airlines are calling for, but we do not want it to unduly penalise fare payers, and to end up with disinvestment in conventional aviation fuel. I am reassured by much of what the Minister said, but I am looking to him and his colleagues to ensure over the coming months that that balance is properly found, so that we do not end up with legislation that has unintended consequences.

The Minister made a point about the reserve. I proposed six months because I believe it essential to have a short period of reserve building, but it must be short—it cannot be year after year. That was the point of my amendment. I am reassured by what he said, and I shall watch with interest what the Government do, but in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

Amendments 9 to 11 not moved.

Amendment 12

Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

12: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Impact of this Act on the price of airline tickets(1) Within one year of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a report assessing the impact of the sustainable aviation fuel revenue certainty mechanism on the price of airline tickets.(2) The report under subsection (1) must include an assessment of whether the impact of the sustainable aviation fuel revenue certainty mechanism on ticket prices is greater than £1.50 per ticket per year.(3) The Secretary of State must lay the report under subsection (1) before Parliament.(4) The Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament further reports under this section at intervals of not more than one year for so long as the sustainable aviation fuel revenue certainty mechanism remains in operation.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to assess and report on the impact of the sustainable aviation fuel revenue certainty mechanism on airline ticket prices within one year of Royal Assent, and to continue to report annually thereafter.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, we have worked our way through what the SAF is, and through the mechanism by which it is going to be subsidised and how it is going to fall on the passenger, but how much is going to fall on the passenger? What is it actually going to cost? How is it going to strike? How is it going to hit your pocket?

We are not completely in the dark on this subject. We have The Revenue Certainty Mechanism Cost Benefit Analysis, produced by the department in May 2025. Paragraph 4.23 has a lot of hinting in it, but it comes down to saying about the revenue certainty mechanism that

“the likely impact on ticket prices is between -£1.5 and £1.5, on average, per year”.

I take it that the “per year” means that it will go up, in the worst case scenario, by £1.50 a year—so over a 10-year period, it will be £15.

This is a highly speculative document; it has quite a large amount of numerical material attached to it, but it remains highly speculative none the less. Effectively, it has to guess the price of standard kerosene fuel out into future years, and the cost of SAF under mechanisms that have yet to be negotiated, so we do not yet know what they are going to be. None the less, that is the figure the Government are presenting to Parliament and the public as the cost and the pain of this measure. My Amendment 12, which is of capital importance, would require the Government to ensure that this prediction of theirs is not lost in the mists of time—that this document does not become waste paper.

The Government should be required periodically—annually, as the amendment says—to produce a report showing what this is costing in terms of ticket price. That is not straightforward for producers of aviation fuel to calculate, of course, because they are at the top end of the supply chain and would not be able to know how it worked out; they could tell you what the levy was, but they could not tell you how it translated into ticket price.

So that is what the amendment does, and it is essential because, in all this, we privilege the discussions we have with the foreign investors that are going to build these plants, and the discussions we have, to some extent, with the fuel producers on which the levy is going to fall. It is very easy, as I say, to forget the voice of the consumer and the people who, year after year, will pay more to travel. It is a significant sum if you are a family of four going on holiday, and we should be reminded of that through the Government putting their money where their mouth is, so to speak, and agreeing to report on these effects every year out into the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment, for all the reasons he set out. If you look at the opinion polling on this, the public support aviation and flying and want to continue doing it, and they support it being made more sustainable, so it is important that we are transparent about that. We have seen other areas where the costs of decarbonisation are not entirely clear, such as in energy production, which leads to suspicion and people who are not in favour of it being able to make mischief. It is much better if we can be transparent about it.

17:15

By being transparent, we would also keep downward pressure on costs, because when the Government are directing those negotiations and revenue support contracts, one thing they will have to help keep the costs under control is knowing that the impact on the end consumer will be transparent and will have to be explained and justified. Transparency and the impact on consumers will be a helpful counterweight to the pressure there will be from investors to deliver a revenue certainty mechanism at a higher price for sustainable aviation fuel. It also means the Government will have to keep under review the benefits of this policy and the extent to which it is or is not delivering sustainable aviation fuel. Having to test that regularly and expose it in public —once a year is not an unreasonable frequency—would have real benefit to the development of public policy.

For both those reasons, I support my noble friend’s amendment and look forward to the Minister’s response. Frankly, I cannot see any good reason why having some transparency is not a good idea. Perhaps more in optimism than experience, I look forward to him saying that the amendment is fantastic and accepting it—or, if he cannot do that, accepting that it is perhaps not drafted as well as it might be and committing to coming back at Third Reading with a better-drafted one that does basically the same thing. I look forward to him saying just that.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 12, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, concerns the potential impacts of this Bill on airline ticket prices. I entirely understand the motivation behind the amendment. Passengers and airlines deserve transparency about how the levy costs will flow through to fares. However, this transparency is already in the Bill, and this amendment is not a particularly good way to improve on it. These Benches accept that there will be reasonable and affordable costs involved in introducing a revenue certainty mechanism, which will reflect the necessary investment to drive the transition to sustainable aviation fuel. However, we cannot support this amendment, for several practical reasons.

Amendment 12 would require the Secretary of State within one year of Royal Assent to publish a report assessing the impact of the revenue certainty mechanism on ticket prices, including whether the average increase exceeds £1.50 per ticket per year, followed by further annual reports for as long as the mechanism operates. The intention is fair, but the proposed process is largely unworkable in our opinion. The mechanism will take time to design, consult on and implement. Contracts will not be allocated immediately, and levy collection will ramp up gradually as supply chains mature. Within 12 months, there would be no meaningful data to analyse, only speculative modelling. A report produced on that basis would lack credibility and offer little value to Parliament or consumers. In the early days, as required by this amendment as drafted, it would provide very little value or information at all. Moreover, the Bill and its associated frameworks already provide robust reporting obligations, so, again, this is not a choice between providing transparency through this amendment or having no transparency.

The Government will lay a report before Parliament on levy design, contract allocation, production volumes and market development. These will give Members regular insight into the performance and the cost trends associated with the Bill.

In addition, airlines, which are best placed to assess the costs passed through to fares, will report on their sustainable aviation fuel uptake and related costs under the SAF mandate and wider aviation reporting requirements. That industry-driven data will provide a timelier and more accurate picture of the real-world price effects than a separate government study could ever hope to achieve.

There are also serious practical and cost concerns. Calculating per-ticket impacts would require access to commercially sensitive data, such as flight occupancy levels, which the Government do not hold and cannot compel airlines to divulge without imposing disruptive burdens. Establishing a separate, perpetual reporting duty would therefore create unnecessary bureaucracy and expense without improving transparency.

The Government expect that airlines will readily report on the impact of the Bill on air tickets. The practical solution is to build on existing reporting channels and refine them through guidance if needed, rather than introducing an additional obligation that cannot deliver meaningful insights at the required pace.

We share the desire for transparency and recognise that costs must be visible and fairly borne for this market to work, but Amendment 12 would not be the right way to do that. The information it seeks will already be available through integrated, industry-based reporting mechanisms. Ministers and officials both expect that this will be reported. I therefore urge the House to reject the amendment and support the Government’s practical approach to these problems.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, bearing in mind the diligent research of noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on sustainable aviation fuel, I have resisted repeating the general aims of the Bill, but I want to say in respect of Amendment 12 that the Government are committed to keeping air travel affordable for UK holidaymakers and UK air travellers while fostering the development of a United Kingdom sustainable aviation fuel industry.

As the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said, it will take time for contract negotiations, for sustainable aviation fuel plants to be constructed and for the fuel itself to be produced and sold before any meaningful effect on fares can be assessed. The Government’s cost-benefit analysis, from which the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, quoted, of the revenue certainty mechanism that was published last year is the most reliable estimate of the likely impact on passenger air fares over this period. Given that little has changed since that cost-benefit analysis was produced, the amendment is unnecessary, as it would merely produce the same answer. I hope my explanation is sufficient for the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, it was open to the Minister to take up the offer of my noble friend Lord Harper and suggest that any infelicities in the drafting of the amendment—for example, the requirement that the first report should happen within the first year—could be dealt with through his offering to bring forward an amendment himself at Third Reading that was drafted with the benefit of government legal advice, but he has not done so. He has no difficulty with relying on speculative reports that claim to estimate the cost of this measure, but he does not want reports based on actual experience at due time in the future.

As I say, there is a voice that is not being heard in this, except from these Benches, and that is the voice of the consumer. We will not give up on the consumer, and I wish to test the opinion of the House on my Amendment 12.

17:24

Division 2

Amendment 12 disagreed.

Ayes: 186

Noes: 251

17:36

Amendment 13

Moved by

[Baroness Pidgeon]

13: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Report on UK sustainable aviation fuel production(1) The Secretary of State must, in respect of each reporting period, prepare and publish a report on sustainable aviation fuel relating to the United Kingdom.(2) The report may include, but is not limited to—(a) the total volume of sustainable aviation fuel produced, supplied to, and used in the United Kingdom during the reporting period;(b) the types of sustainable aviation fuel involved, including the feedstocks and production pathways used;(c) the volume attributable to each type identified under paragraph (b);(d) an assessment of the development and conversion of sites for sustainable aviation fuel production and supply within the United Kingdom;(e) an estimate of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the production and use of sustainable aviation fuel during the reporting period;(f) information reported by air travel providers in relation to their uptake and use of sustainable aviation fuel;(g) any other information the Secretary of State considers relevant to understanding the United Kingdom’s sustainable aviation fuel market, capacity, and trends.(3) The Secretary of State must lay the report before Parliament within six months of the end of each reporting period.(4) In this section “reporting period” means a period of one year beginning with 1 January 2026 and each subsequent period of one year, beginning on the anniversary of that date.”

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, there has been a lot of consensus at each stage of this Bill. The Government have shown that they are willing to listen and make amendments as we have debated. They have consulted the sector on different aspects of this legislation. As we have heard, this is an emerging field in terms of technology and production in the UK. That is why we on these Benches feel it is important that we have full transparency, so that we can understand how the revenue certainty mechanism is working, the impact on the sector and how we are developing this new sector in the UK. This also helps the passenger in terms of information.

My Amendment 13 asks for a report covering a number of important areas such as the volume of SAF produced in, supplied to and used in the UK; the types of SAF; an estimate of the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the production; and the uptake and use of SAF by air travel providers. This is about ensuring that the public and industry can see the impact of this policy and the revenue certainty mechanism. It would ensure clarity about progress towards sustainable aviation fuel targets. This requirement for reporting on progress is a simple measure that we believe would help with the understanding of the Bill.

I thank the civil servants who have met my noble friend Lord Russell and me over recent weeks and listened to our concerns. I hope that the Minister will see the amendment as adding value to the Bill, and I look forward to his response. I beg to move.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, I support this amendment, which we discussed at some length in Committee. The amendments then, which other noble Lords supported, covered the relationship between the sustainable aviation fuel used for aeroplanes and the same fuel used for home heating. I declare an interest as having a boiler in Cornwall that survives very well on home heating.

Interestingly, sustainable aviation fuel produced through the HEFA process generates hydrotreated vegetable oil as a by-product. HVO accounts for approximately 30% of the output, a significant amount that should not be overlooked. HVO can play an essential role in helping to decarbonise the 1.7 million oil-heated households that are off the gas grid. Otherwise they use electricity, which is expensive.

Last month, we had a delegation from the village of Kehelland in Cornwall who have all been trying out HVO in their houses for about three years. They travelled, leaving at 2 am, to meet the Minister at DESNZ to present their response to the consultation that we discussed earlier—a 500-mile round trip shows they are pretty committed. But what is interesting is that, in describing their experience of using the fuel, they highlighted how renewable liquid fuels can cut emissions from home heating by up to 88% compared with kerosene—88% is a figure worth having. They work simply as a drop-in replacement. The Government’s consultation said that, of all those considered, this was the most cost-effective option for off-grid consumers.

However, the consultation still questions the feedstock availability for the fuel, which we discussed in earlier amendments today. It is puzzling that the DfT is confident that there is more than enough feedstock to boost SAF production by 22%. The research done by the industry, the EU Commission and the Irish Government indicates that there is enough feedstock—again, we have discussed that at length. I was pleased to welcome the Government’s confirmation in a Written Answer that the targets under the SAF and RTFO mandates

“are set considering global availability of feedstocks and competing demands between transport modes and across sectors of the economy”.

That seems to highlight that there is enough material for both aviation and home heating, so it would be a great shame if we pitted one sector against the other, rather than try to have a bit more of what you might call cohabitation in-between.

To incentivise HVO production, I believe a renewable liquid heating fuel obligation needs to be implemented—that is the solution—triggered under Section 159 of the Energy Act. That would create the necessary market mechanism, in a similar way to the SAF mandate and the RTFO, to give certainty to the industry to distribute HVO to households at an affordable price. I hope that I can persuade my noble friend when he responds to try to ensure that his department, the Department for Transport, and DESNZ are working hand in hand to ensure that we can scale up the production of sustainable aviation fuel to capture the benefits of HVO for home heating. I must not keep asking him for meetings every day, but, if he would accept, it would be very nice to have a meeting with him and our colleague the noble Lord, Lord Whitehead, the Minister for Energy Security, to discuss the benefits of this approach. The consultation closes today, so it seems to be the right time to meet.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I have to confess to having been a little perplexed when the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, moved Amendment 13, because I had just listened to the speech of her colleague, the noble Earl, Lord Russell. I thought my noble friend Lord Moylan’s proposal simply to publish and have some transparency about ticket prices was perfectly reasonable, but the noble Earl, Lord Russell, set out a whole raft of reasons why that was entirely unreasonable, incredibly difficult, completely unnecessary, bureaucratic and costly and why we should not bother ourselves with it, and he then proceeded not to support my noble friend’s amendment. Although I disagree with the noble Earl, he made some perfectly reasonable arguments, although not ones that I agree with. I am perplexed because his noble friend’s amendment is very comprehensive and would place some really quite significant reporting requirements on the Government in a way that seems to be completely at odds with the argument that the noble Earl just made.

17:45

I will just step through the issue for the benefit of the House. Unless I have misread it, the Bill does not currently include any significant reporting and transparency requirements, except that it requires the registration and publication of contracts. Clause 3 states:

“The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring the designated counterparty to … maintain a register of information in relation to revenue certainty contracts”—

“may” does not make it compulsory—and

“publish revenue certainty contracts or details about them”.

That is welcome, because that means that we will know who the contracts are with and the broad terms of those contracts. I suspect some of the information may not be able to be published because it is commercially confidential. But that is helpful. It does not, of course, enable us to work out the impact on ticket prices or the impact on the consumer, which is what my noble friend Lord Moylan’s previous amendment was trying to deliver.

For each reporting period, which is a period of a year beginning with January of this year and then each subsequent year, the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, wants a report to be produced. In his response to the previous amendment, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said that was completely impractical because nothing much would have happened straightaway, we are at a very early stage and it would be very difficult for the Government to do what my noble friend Lord Moylan asked. But, just a few moments later, his colleague on the Front Bench is suggesting that every year, starting from this year—to which I would have thought all the same arguments applied—the Government must produce this report.

The proposal is not just for a simple report like the one my noble friend Lord Moylan suggested, which would have just set out the impact on ticket prices. That is, presumably, possible because, as the Minister set out, the Government have already produced an analysis of the impact on ticket prices using the information at their disposal in their modelling, so it cannot be that complicated to work out the impact on ticket prices.

The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, wants a report that will

“include, but is not limited to”—

so, actually, it will be quite an expansive report—

“the total volume of sustainable aviation fuel produced, supplied to, and used in the United Kingdom”.

That is quite a significant amount of information. She also wants

“the types of sustainable aviation fuel involved, including the feedstocks and production pathways used”,

and

“the volume attributable to each type”.

That seems to me quite a significant amount of information to be required from multiple producers, including not just producers in this country. It seems to suggest that it should include those supplied to the United Kingdom, so that would require the Government to collect information from producers of SAF overseas as well.

The noble Baroness also wants

“an assessment of the development and conversion of sites for sustainable aviation fuel production and supply within the United Kingdom”,

which seems to be quite straightforward, but also

“an estimate of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the production and use of sustainable aviation fuel”.

That is quite difficult because it means you would have to look at how much SAF has been produced, how it has been blended with existing aviation fuel and how that then flows through to what is a global problem. I am not entirely sure how the Government would carry out such an analysis, but it seems to me significantly more complex than simply looking at the impact on ticket prices, which we were told just moments ago by the noble Baroness’s colleague was too difficult, very complicated and really quite unnecessary, and not welcome for the Government to produce.

The penultimate paragraph in her proposed new clause would require

“information reported by air travel providers”—

by which I think she means airlines—

“in relation to their uptake and use of sustainable aviation fuel”,

which, again, moments ago, we were being told would be commercially confidential and very difficult for the Government to require if they wanted to set out the impact on ticket prices.

Finally, the catch-all is

“any other information the Secretary of State considers relevant to understanding the United Kingdom’s sustainable aviation fuel market, capacity, and trends”.

Not only that but there is a requirement that is even tougher than what my noble friend Lord Moylan suggested in his amendment: that report must be produced within six months of the end of each reporting period, so it gives the Government quite a tight timeline to gather all this information, most of which they do not already have, from a range of providers, including companies based overseas, and then to produce a report.

That does not seem to me a very joined-up approach. On the one hand, the Liberal Democrats are arguing that my noble friend Lord Moylan’s quite modest amendment—to have transparent information in a very consumer-friendly way about the impact on ticket prices—is very difficult to do and very complicated, but, on the other hand, a Liberal Democrat colleague is suggesting a much more expansive form of reporting and proposing that the Government should do that. Perhaps there has been a lack of joined-up communication on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. I am really confused, given the two diametrically opposed positions they have taken on the Bill, which is not welcome, because I think that, just as we are, they are broadly in favour of having more sustainable aviation. It is odd that they have taken two diametrically opposed positions on two different amendments in two subsequent groups on the Bill. I fear, therefore, that I will not be able to support the amendment if the noble Baroness presses it to a Division and seeks to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I rise both to support what my noble friend Lord Harper has just said and to add a caveat. I have great respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, and I find we agree on a lot of things, but it worries me more broadly—and this is not specifically just about this amendment—that when one passes an amendment like this, one creates huge bureaucratic demand. If we look at the practicality of what will be needed, as my noble friend Lord Harper has just described, we are talking about putting together, in effect, an inspectorate, because that is what this would entail—an inspectorate to talk to airlines, an inspectorate to talk to producers, and an inspectorate to have a pretty close watch on the flow of feedstuffs, the supply chain of feedstuffs and the sourcing of feedstuffs.

What we are looking to achieve here is to build a UK industry so that we do not simply end up buying SAF from abroad. The truth is, right now, the limited amount of SAFs used in this country are coming from United States and potentially elsewhere. We do not want that to happen; therefore, we want to create as investor-friendly an environment as possible in the United Kingdom. That is what this Bill is all about. It is what the purpose of the revenue certainty mechanism is, and I am very glad that the principle behind the Bill has attracted cross-party support. To try to put together now a mini-inspectorate—and maybe not that “mini” an inspectorate—to look at all the things covered by this amendment would cost taxpayers’ money and push up the cost of the revenue certainty mechanism.

We talked earlier about how the funds would be used. Certainly, the funds would be eligible to be used for the monitoring of all this, so that is an extra cost on the revenue certainty mechanism and an extra cost ultimately therefore to airline passengers. It is an extra level of complexity for investors, putting a whole range of bureaucratic requirements on them. And, of course, for government, it opens the doors to judicial review. Very often, a broad-ranging amendment that seeks reports and clarifications ends up in the courts, being used by somebody who has a particular point to prove against government. It opens the door to too much activity within the courts and not enough freedom for government to get on with the job. That would be a negative step for the legislation, given that we all want this to happen, want it to work well and want the investment to flow in the country. To create a monitoring mechanism on this scale would not in any way be the right thing to do.

As my noble friend Lord Harper rightly pointed out, simply monitoring the impact on the cost of an airline ticket is one thing, but covering the range and dimensions of activity in this amendment would create too much extra cost and too much complexity and it risks being a deterrent to investment in the UK. So, with apologies to the noble Baroness, I cannot support her amendment.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, to this debate. She is much missed. Normally, when there is legislative matter that calls the noble Lord, Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill, to the Dispatch Box, there is a well-established team that assembles opposite him, consisting of me in my humble capacity and the noble Baroness. It has been a puzzle to me in the course of this afternoon why she appears to have been elbowed aside by the dour but noble Earl, Lord Russell, whose mantra appears to be “Mr No” throughout, whereas now that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, has landed, if I may say that, at this very late stage in the debate, we find that she is here with her customary positivity and proposals for something useful that the Government might do.

The noble Baroness’s proposal is that the Government might usefully produce a report which tells us what the effects of this measure in front of us are. It would not be an easy report to assemble, and I am sure the Minister will explain its impossibility. It would, however, be no less easy for the Government to produce the report I was asking for, to say what the effect would be on ticket prices, but, as my noble friend Lord Harper so clearly explained, that was ruled out completely by Mr No sitting at the other end of the Bench. It has been most entertaining and instructive this afternoon listening to what the Liberal Democrats have had to say, but we are now in a position where splits within the Liberal Democrats are apparent. I say this to offer some consolation to noble colleagues on the other side of the Chamber to know that it is not only the Labour Party that is riven by dissension and uncertainty about the future and that these qualities can be found among the Liberal Democrats as well. I am delighted—

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

The noble Lord talks about splits. Could he remind me which Government signed this country up to mandatory targets on net zero by 2050?

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I will go further than that; I will remind the noble Lord which Government introduced this Bill. Nobody on this side of the Chamber has argued today that we should not have a mechanism for supporting the production of sustainable aviation fuel, so the efforts of the noble Lord to stir the pot and look for split-ism on the part of the Conservative Party are completely misdirected, misguided and failed. It would be a great deal better if the noble Lord were to join in with dumping on the Liberal Democrats for five or 10 minutes, because we do not normally take that opportunity—and relish it and seize it and run with it—in the way that perhaps we should.

Now, that said, I was going to try to draw out some interesting points from the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, who is always to be listened to. I learned much, but not enough, from the noble Lord, whose speech I could not immediately tie to the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, but he appeared to be saying that a byproduct of HEFA was something called HVO—which also had a long name underneath that—and that this could be used for heating homes. If I understood him correctly—which I may not have—that was the thrust of what he was saying, and he wished to see the Government encourage this in some way or other with yet another form of subsidy. Of course, it would be nice to think that beyond the level of the corner shop there was some scope left for private enterprise and a non-Stalinist, non-directed economy in this country, but none the less the noble Lord has found a further opportunity, another little crack in the economy that has not yet been subsidised, that he feels he should pursue.

But what I want to know is, if this HVO stuff exists and does what I think it does—I may have misunderstood the noble Lord—and if it is true that it can be used for home heating and that it is a by-product, it presumably has a value. That value could be captured in market terms, but where has that been included in the calculation of the levy? Does the counterparty take account of the economic value of the by-products of HEFA that may be used in the market and what is the Government’s position on that?

18:00

I do not know which way the Minister will respond to the noble Baroness’s amendment—no, I think I do know; he will say no to it, because it is his métier to say no to amendments from the Opposition Benches, so he will say no to it. But, while he is saying no to it, I wonder whether he could reflect on that very interesting question that, surprisingly, until the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, raised it, we have not discussed in the course of the Bill: whether there are by-products of HEFA that might have a market value and how that value could be calculated and accrued in the formulation of the levy.

I would like to support the noble Baroness’s amendment, because I am generally in favour of transparency, but I am so deflated by the negativity generated by her colleague, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, that I am not entirely sure that I would have the strength or vigour to go through the Lobbies in support of her were she to divide.

Anyway, we are coming to the end of consideration of an important Bill. I hope that the relatively large number of noble Lords who are here feel that they have benefited in some way from listening to this debate. It was a dull matter in Committee—just three or four of us stuck in Grand Committee—but it is nice to know that there are others taking an interest in it today. I started out knowing nothing at all about sustainable aviation fuel, but I feel I know a great deal more now. If noble Lords feel the same, we will all have achieved something to our benefit in the course of Report.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I thought I might constrain myself to discussing the amendment before us. In that respect, I offer my thanks to both the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, who have followed the course of the Bill very closely. I have listened very carefully to everything they said. I am grateful for their scrutiny on this particular subject and I am pleased to have the opportunity to address it in more detail.

I recognise the need for transparent and accessible reporting to monitor the effectiveness of the RCM scheme. I will continue to explore options for reporting on the RCM scheme, including by using existing reporting. For example, we are already publishing statistics on the volume of SAF supplied each year in the UK under the SAF mandate and we will continue to do so. This covers the total volume of SAF supplied to the UK, the fuel type and greenhouse gas savings from the SAF supplied.

The renewable transport fuel obligations statistics and reports, which cover costs and the fuel supplied into the UK, are published regularly. We are taking a similar approach with the SAF mandate. Additionally, a formal review has been incorporated into the SAF mandate legislation, with the initial review scheduled to occur by 2030. This process will facilitate an evaluation of the availability of SAF supply. We will consider further options for reporting, including interactions with the emissions trading scheme reporting on the use of fuel by aircraft. These existing publications will provide an extensive picture of the UK SAF market, as well as the revenue certainty mechanism scheme.

We remain absolutely committed to transparent reporting that is comprehensive, regular and accessible in one location, once the revenue certainty mechanism has contracts in place. In addition to the above, this could include requirements for producers to share information with the counterparty. This would be consistent with how the counterparty for the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero contracts for difference schemes publishes information on contract terms and levy rates. As raised earlier by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, we will include the length of RCM contract terms in our transparent reporting.

The current live consultation on indicative heads of terms for the revenue certainty mechanism contracts proposes potential options. However, we will need to continue to seek views from industry on the mechanism for this reporting, so further work will be required before we can finalise our approach.

In response to my noble friend Lord Berkeley, we continue to work closely with my noble friend Lord Whitehead’s department on the global availability of feedstocks as sustainable fuels. While I cannot commit my noble friend Lord Whitehead to a meeting, I do sit opposite him in our palatial ministerial office upstairs, so I will mention to him my noble friend Lord Berkeley’s interest and I will see what he says.

I hope that what I have said about reporting is sufficient reassurance for the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, not to press Amendment 13.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his response and the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for his support for my amendment. From listening to the debate, I think I am living in a different world from the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Moylan, who seem to have an unhealthy obsession with these Benches’ and my personal contributions, rather than the Bill before us, no matter how dry it might be.

This amendment and the previous amendment that was discussed are completely different, as the Government have recognised. I am grateful to the Minister for listening and agreeing to the intent of my amendment on the effectiveness of the RCM scheme, which looks to make sure that we have some comprehensive reporting in one place, so that we can understand how effectively this scheme is working.

I thank the Minister for listening and responding to our suggestions in this area—both mine and my noble friend Lord Russell’s—and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 13.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

Clause 17: Interpretation

Amendment 14 not moved.

Amendment 15

Tabled by

[Lord Moylan]

15: Clause 17, page 8, line 25, at end insert “except hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids (HEFA) sustainable aviation fuel;”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment excludes hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids (HEFA) sustainable aviation fuel from the revenue certainty mechanism.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, in light of the assurances given by the Minister at the Dispatch Box, and the further undertaking that he gave to my noble friend Lord Harper that government policy on this matter would not change unless there were a Statement by a Minister in the House, I do not wish to move my Amendment 15.

Amendment 15 not moved.

Amendment 16 not moved.

Clause 19: Commencement

Amendments 17 and 18 not moved.