Sustainable Aviation Fuel Bill

Lord Harper Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 10th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak in support of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, on crops, and to share many of the concerns raised about HEFA. I declare my interests on the register as an adviser to AtkinsRéalis—there are a lot of us here today.

My concerns are that, first, I do not believe that we should be using crops to make fuel. In a world that does not have enough food and where biodiversity is under threat, where deforestation is happening in areas of the world that provide extra land for agriculture, I do not think that there is any justification for growing food and turning it into fuel. I ask the Minister please to exclude crops. The United States is permitting them, and the European Union is not, and I think that we should fall on the side of avoiding the use of agricultural crops. Agricultural waste is a different thing —the residue from crops, such as straw and corn husks. Agricultural waste is one thing, but actual crops is another, and we should not be using them.

On HEFA, we are where we are, but we have to exercise extreme care, because the truth is that there is not enough used cooking oil in the world to fill the supposed need for that used cooking oil. All too often, the suspicion is that somebody is dumping a chicken wing into a tub of virgin palm oil and saying that it is HEFA—so HEFA is something that we need to move away from as quickly as possible. In any case, we depend on imports from the Far East for it, which may not be sustainable going forwards. Our focus should really be on biowaste and municipal waste and on the technologies that offer a really good path for the future —but let us not use crops and let us be extremely careful with what we do with HEFA. I have a lot of sympathy with what my noble friend Lord Moylan and the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, have said. It is far from clear that this is a genuine product that has the full potential to do what is necessary.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, before I start, I draw attention to my entry in the register as non-exec chair of RVL Aviation, which is in the aviation sector but not involved in the production of sustainable aviation fuel.

I strongly support this move to make sure that we do not include food crops. I have one caveat, which I raised in Committee, and I wonder whether the Minister can update the House. My noble friend Lord Grayling drew attention to the different position that the United States has taken about including food crops. My starting point, as his, is that we should not include food crops. The only caveat that I raised in Committee was that if, in doing so, that enabled us to ensure that the United States continued to support the development of sustainable aviation fuel, given the importance of the United States in the international aviation sector, there might be a case for that. I would be interested to know whether the Minister can update your Lordships on any discussions that have taken place with the United States. If it is not necessary to do that, I strongly support the amendments that are there to make sure that we rule out food crops because, as my noble friend Lord Grayling said, using land to grow crops for food is what we should be doing, and we have seen, in the renewable energy sector, what can happen when you have policy that then drives behaviours that you had not intended, which have outcomes that are environmentally not welcome.

The second point that I raise is that I support the amendments to rule out the use of the revenue certainty mechanism for subsidising HEFA. As my noble friend Lord Grayling said, it is important that we move away from that and develop the new technologies, as my noble friend Lord Moylan said from the Front Bench. The danger of allowing subsidy of things that we are trying to get rid of is that you never get rid of them; any subsidy that there is should be used for the development of new technologies and processes. That is the rationale for having a subsidy regime in the first place. Setting that framework is very welcome.

My final point is on power-to-liquid technology. My noble friend Lord Moylan set out his view that that technology is probably not yet at a point where this Bill would be of any use. My starting position and his is that you have to justify carefully the need for subsidy, so it would not be a bad thing, if that technology is some way away from development, to force the Government to come back to Parliament to rejustify subsidy for power-to-liquid. That would be very welcome. If the Minister can update the House that providing subsidy to develop the technology and get it into production would have a much nearer-term outcome than my noble friend suggested, I might think again. However, in the scenario that my noble friend Lord Moylan set out, his amendments would be very sensible and helpful in testing the Government and forcing them to put on record the state of that technology.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, this second group concerns different aspects of the operation and scope of the revenue certainty contracts. We appreciate the good intentions to influence the mix of technologies and feedstocks supported by this scheme, but we cannot support these amendments, each of which in a different way would introduce arbitrary restrictions that, while well intended, would risk upsetting the balanced, technology-neutral framework that is central to the Bill’s success. They would remove flexibility and could have serious unexpected consequences. The technological framework itself will attract the broad range of investments that will enable the rapid scaling of UK aviation fuel production. It is the creation of the revenue certainty mechanism that will attract investments, which are the literal fuel to bring the technologies we need.

I will address each amendment in turn. Amendment 3 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would introduce a new subsection prohibiting revenue certainty contracts from providing payment for a PtL sustainable aviation fuel. I understand the concern that PtL technologies are still maturing and often come with higher upfront costs, but a statutory exclusion is too blunt a guillotine instrument. It would deny Ministers any flexibility to support promising PtL projects as costs fall and technologies advance, sending an unhelpful signal to developers and investors that this entire pathway is off limits for UK support. Such rigidity would involve diverting PtL investment to other jurisdictions. The Bill as drafted already provides the Government with tools to shape pathways through allocations criteria and contract design without foreclosing future opportunities.

Amendment 7 from the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, would take exactly the opposite approach, requiring the Secretary of State to direct the counterparty to offer minimum volumes of PtL contracts from 2028 onward, increasing annually to 2040. While the objective of accelerating PtL development is commendable, setting the number of strict time-fixed statutory quotas in the Bill would be equally problematic. It would commit the Government to contracting many time-fixed volumes whether or not sufficient viable PtL projects were ready, creating a risk of uneconomic awards or unfulfilled obligations on many occasions. As others involved in financing such large-scale projects know, they are often delivered slightly behind time as supply chains can be overrun. Building so many rigid volumetric obligations into the statute would create legal and commercial uncertainty and could crowd out credible SAF pathways. The Government’s more flexible approach, using competitive tenders and market readiness to guide allocation, remains a more practical and adaptable route.

Amendment 14 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, seeks to define “relevant crops” as starch-rich crops, sugars, oil crops and main crops, adopting the same definitions as used in the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations Order 2007. Amendment 16, in a similar vein, would exclude from support any sustainable aviation fuel derived from such crops.

I fully recognise the environmental concern to avoid diverting crops into fuel production, but legislating directly for this exclusion via statutory definition risks unintended consequences; for example, capturing advanced biofuels that use a mix of waste and feedstocks or deterring innovation where crop residues are responsibly utilised. The same aims can, we feel, be better achieved through policy guidance, sustainability criteria and a certification process already envisaged under the Bill, rather than through rigid statutory exclusion. As drafted, these amendments are overly prescriptive and would constrain technological evolution and government flexibility and discourage investment.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

Of course; I am very happy to repeat it.

Our intention is for HEFA technology and feedstocks to be excluded from RCM contracts because HEFA SAF has already overcome many of the barriers to investment that the revenue certainty mechanism seeks to address. However, the SAF market is at an early stage and uncertain, so the legislation needs to remain flexible to allow for potential future changes in the market to which the revenue certainty mechanism may need to respond.

I hear noble Lords’ concerns on growing crops for purposes other than food; the sustainability criteria in the revenue certainty mechanism will align with the sustainability criteria in the SAF mandate. This will be implemented through the eligibility criteria within the contract allocation process and will reflect the latest market and technological developments.

We are actively monitoring trends to ensure that the policy keeps pace with technical and commercial developments. Therefore, we have launched a call for evidence on the eligibility of crops in the SAF mandate, which will run until 16 March this year. It asks for evidence on potential benefits, risks and trade-offs of using crops in SAF production. In answer to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay of Richborough, about carbon dioxide, I am sure that evidence on that will be provided as a consequence of that call for evidence.

The call for evidence does not propose any changes to the SAF mandate. Should there be a case to review the feedstock eligibility criteria, it would be subject to consultation, and any changes would require amendments to legislation. We would not want to exclude specific feedstocks in the Bill in case updated evidence proves that they meet the sustainability criteria for eligibility in the SAF mandate.

In answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, on the position of the United States, we note that, but we will run the consultation first to understand the evidence arising from the questions we have asked.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Ravensdale, for tabling their amendments and ask that they do not press them based on the actions already being taken to give flexibility and ensure value for money.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

May I press the Minister a little on the point the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made? I listened very carefully both times he said it. The Government’s intention, unless something changes, is to exclude HEFA. Can he commit that if that intention changes and the Government direct some contracts to be issued which include HEFA, a Minister will come to the Dispatch Box to set out clearly and explicitly what has changed and the evidence that supported that change?

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[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a very interesting amendment, because a revenue certainty contract, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, is wonderful for the suppliers. It presumably links in not just the price but the volumes—which may change from year to year —and the sources. The noble Lord opposite mentioned the issue of Drax and where that material comes from every year. Would there be a 10-year guarantee price for that? As the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said, any old agricultural product that was edible could be covered as well. And we have not yet discussed the worry that many people have about the number of trees and everything else being cut down in the Amazon basin, which could also be covered by this. So, a revenue certainty contract is pretty difficult and this amendment is a good start in at least limiting its scope and time.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Moylan set out the challenge—the thing you have to justify—to put the revenue certainty mechanism in place. It was certainly one of the things that I grappled with, and challenged the industry on, when I was the Secretary of State for Transport and we were developing the beginnings of this policy. As my noble friend said, the SAF mandate sets out some guaranteed demand for the industry producing sustainable aviation fuel. The challenge I always put to those thinking about investing in producing the technology was exactly the challenge that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, set out: if you have guaranteed demand, what is the barrier to producing that product?

We discussed this in Committee. The logic is that, for some of these products, it is new technology that requires significant upfront capital investment, and the judgment is that, if you compare it to other similar sorts of investments that these investors are making, the risk is higher than with those other investments. Therefore, if you do not do something to close that gap, you will not see the investment in the technology, particularly here in the United Kingdom, where we want to see the production take place, at least in part, if for no other reason than resilience.

What you are really dealing with is closing the gap between the risks involved in producing SAF and the alternative products that those investors could invest in. I do not think, therefore, that you need an open-ended contract. You need to put some limits around it. I am sure that the Minister will have some responses on what those limits should be, but a very obvious one would be to have a time limit, so that investors have some certainty: they have guaranteed demand and a period when they will get a guaranteed price. That should enable the risk premium to be reduced and enable the investment and production to take place.

If we start from the assumption that it certainly does not need to be an infinite period and should therefore be fixed, the debate is therefore just about what the length of that period should be. Now, the Minister may want to come back and say that the 10 years proposed by my noble friend is the wrong number or limitation period, in which case I would be happy to listen to the arguments that he makes about an alternative period, but I do not think that the right answer is that it can be any length at all, with no cap on it. I would be much more comfortable if we put a cap on it.

Again, if, at some point in the future, there was a clear justification for changing it, there would be nothing to stop this or a future Government coming back to Parliament to change the position. But I do not want to see open-ended contracts in place, particularly since we have legislated for there to be guaranteed demand. So I strongly support my noble friend’s amendment, unless I hear a very good counter case from the Minister.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I am responding to Amendment 6 in this group, which seeks to cap the length of revenue certainty contracts to a maximum of 10 years. On the face of it, this might appear to be neat and disciplined but, in practice, we conclude that it is both arbitrary and unduly restrictive.

The noble Lord spoke about the need to control costs and we agree with that. It is also important, as we discuss this, to recognise that the Bill covers a range of technologies and huge investments going into them, but it may also include emerging technologies. Ten years is not derived from any settled evidence about what different SAF projects will require; it is simply a round number that seeks to be written into this primary legislation.

Some plants with high upfront capital costs and long asset lives may need longer-term revenue support to be financed at all, particularly in the current high interest rate environment. Others, especially later or more standard projects, could be perfectly viable on shorter contracts, which I am sure is the Government’s intention for many of the projects that will be considered. However, a single statutory ceiling takes no account of any of that diversity in these emerging markets. It is not really for us to know more than the Government and their officials, as they have details that we do not.

This amendment is also restrictive because it removes one of the Government’s key design levers. The ability to adjust contract length between technologies and over time, in response to costs and market maturity, is fundamental to achieving value for money. If we fix 10 years in the Bill, any future Government who judge that a 12-year or 15-year term is necessary to secure a first-of-a-kind project would be unable to do so without further primary legislation. This rigidity could also play into commercial hands, encouraging developers to structure bids around fixed terms in ways that actually undermine the very affordability that is spoken about.

While the intention is understandable, imposing an arbitrary timeline would remove the flexibility and pragmatism that any evidence-led scheme requires. It would, in effect, ask the Government to negotiate with one hand tied behind their back. We do not believe that this amendment is helpful in this emerging market, but we do think it is important that contracts are reviewed. On that, I ask the Minister, in the context of reporting later on, whether the length of caps that are imposed under the Bill is something that he would be prepared to include in the reporting information that will be made available.

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 11 in this group, which substantially coincides with Amendment 10 in the name of my noble friend Lord Grayling. I will just take a minute to explain, in my perhaps rather more simple terms, what mischief these amendments seek to address. I gave some idea of the mechanism when we spoke on the last group. It will work like this: contracts will be entered into by a counterparty and a fixed price will be guaranteed under a contract for the difference. That means that if the prices are below a certain price, the counterparty will collect money by way of the levy, and if they are the other way around, it will pay out to ensure that the producer receives a fixed price. We know that economically, ultimately, the levy will be paid by the passenger on the flight, but who is going to be charged the levy?

The Government have decided—we are not disputing this—that the levy should be charged at the highest point in the supply chain, which is the producers of standard aviation fuel, essentially kerosene. They have to mix in the SAF to the required amount, whichever type of SAF it is, and they should be the ones that will pay the levy if a levy is required—that is, if prices are such that a levy has to be paid. We do not object to them being the levy payers, but how is the levy calculated and then applied to them?

The Government’s proposal is that the levy should be calculated a year in arrears and then applied to them as a charge which they have to pay in arrears at that point according to the market share that they had in that year. That is all very well, you might say, and very convenient from the Government’s point of view, because at that point they know exactly how much they have to charge, so there will be no difficulty and no question of having the wrong charge paid and having to make up bits later, or of the counterparty being out of funds by a penny. They will know exactly by the end of the year what should be charged and they will distribute it to the producers according to their market share during that year, which will also be known by that point.

The difficulty for the producers is that they will not know during the year in which they are selling the fuel what they should be charging the airlines to cover the cost of the levy. It is accepted that they should charge the airlines, because that is the way it trickles down to the passenger. They will not know during the year how much levy they are going to have to pay at the end of the year, so they will not know how much they should be charging per litre of fuel that they sell.

They would prefer, as it is easier for them and avoids this complexity, if they were told a price per litre which they should charge. The charge of the levy in addition to the base kerosene fuel could even be apparent on their invoices. Of course, if the Government were to do that, it would expose the counterparty to some financial risk—I see that—because they would have to work on the basis of estimates. They would have to estimate the prices during that period and therefore would be exposed to some financial risk. I imagine that, behind the Minister, there is a middle-ranking official in the Treasury saying, “You cannot take any financial risk that will fall upon the Government or any entity associated with the Government”.

What the Government are proposing is fundamentally unworkable, because the only way the producers can handle this is to protect themselves by overcharging. They will overcharge to compensate themselves for the levy, and so the transparency of the levy travelling through the chain of command, so to speak, down to the ticket payer will be obscured. The producers leave one in no doubt when one speaks to them that this is the only mechanism they will have. There is a real point of workability about the Bill which has not been addressed.

I imagine the Minister will respond by saying, “Oh, but we are having a consultation”. This is a futile protest, but I want to raise this point of protest as I have the opportunity: would it not have been better if the Government had done the consultation and then brought forward the legislation? Why is it that we have to have the legislation before we know the results of the consultation with the industry, so that we do not actually know what is workable? I suspect the Minister will say that, but I am afraid it is not satisfactory that we are asked to pass this legislation with that important question of workability still outstanding. I may be wrong, and it may be that the Government can explain that it is perfectly workable, but nobody has been able as yet to establish what that workable solution is.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, briefly, I support my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment. It is very important, particularly when we come on to later groups and are talking about the ultimate impact of this—which is that it will, in effect, fall on to the end consumer, as all taxes do—that we make sure that this is as simple and straightforward a process as possible, so that we can explain to people what we are doing, why we are doing it and what the cost is. That is always to be welcomed in policy-making.

Further, this should be workable and straightforward for aviation fuel producers. They are the ones that we have chosen to put the mandate on, in giving them the legal responsibility to produce sustainable aviation fuel and blend it with their regular fuel. The current structure transfers the level of financial risk to them. I agree with my noble friend Lord Moylan, in that I suspect that behind this—the Minister can tell us that we are wrong if we are—is the Treasury wanting to make sure, not entirely unreasonably, that there is no risk to the taxpayer. However, in doing so, all that has happened is that the risk has been moved on to the fuel supplier.

As my noble friend Lord Moylan says—I have thought about this as well, and I have listened to the industry—it seems that, for the producers to deal with the risk, they will have to increase what they charge the airlines. So rather than the cost and the risk falling on the Treasury and the taxpayer, it will, in effect, still fall on the taxpayer but just in their guise of an airline passenger who will face a higher ticket price. That is not very economically sensible.

The industry is very clear that the Treasury should not be picking up the costs for this. The only sensible thing would be to have a per unit price. There would be some risk for the Treasury in the short term, but that could be smoothed out over time, and the Government are perfectly able to do that. That would be a much better solution, and I hope that the Minister can at least indicate that that is where the Government’s thinking is. If he cannot do that, I suggest that my noble friend Lord Moylan is correct that we should have done the detail before the legislation, rather than the other way around.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to this group of amendments that deal with the design and timings of the revenue certainty mechanisms and the levy. While I recognise that concerns around fiscal discipline, transparency and fairness lie behind them, I do not believe that these amendments are the right way to address those concerns.

We have spent considerable time talking with industry and officials, and I am thankful to the Minister’s officials for taking the time to talk with us. We note that the consultation closed on 8 January. We have reflected to officials the concerns that industry has raised with us, and we are pleased that we had the opportunity to do that. We have confidence that Ministers, officials and industry are all working together, in what is a complex space, to find practical and workable solutions that balance a number of competing agendas. Added to this, I remind the House that these mechanisms will be subject to statutory instruments under the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 8, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, would specify that the levy under Clause 6 can fund contracts only in respect of sustainable aviation fuel manufactured in the United Kingdom. We recognise the intention here and have some sympathy for it, but we believe that the concessions already granted by the Minister in group 1 fundamentally deal with this issue and give greater assurances to the House that the levy will be used only for those purposes.

Amendment 9, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, would narrow the other costs that can be met from the levy to those associated with directly related administration. Guarding against drift of levy funds into unrelated processes is absolutely right, but, in our opinion, the formulation risks overtightening. It could exclude legitimate and necessary scheme-related expenditures, such as certain forms of oversight, enforcement, market-enabling activity and the reporting that we will come on to in the final group. These would be unintended consequences. The Bill already confines the levy to the purposes of the mechanism, and regulations can and should be scrutinised by Parliament, but we believe that these restrictions would be too tight.

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, we have worked our way through what the SAF is, and through the mechanism by which it is going to be subsidised and how it is going to fall on the passenger, but how much is going to fall on the passenger? What is it actually going to cost? How is it going to strike? How is it going to hit your pocket?

We are not completely in the dark on this subject. We have The Revenue Certainty Mechanism Cost Benefit Analysis, produced by the department in May 2025. Paragraph 4.23 has a lot of hinting in it, but it comes down to saying about the revenue certainty mechanism that

“the likely impact on ticket prices is between -£1.5 and £1.5, on average, per year”.

I take it that the “per year” means that it will go up, in the worst case scenario, by £1.50 a year—so over a 10-year period, it will be £15.

This is a highly speculative document; it has quite a large amount of numerical material attached to it, but it remains highly speculative none the less. Effectively, it has to guess the price of standard kerosene fuel out into future years, and the cost of SAF under mechanisms that have yet to be negotiated, so we do not yet know what they are going to be. None the less, that is the figure the Government are presenting to Parliament and the public as the cost and the pain of this measure. My Amendment 12, which is of capital importance, would require the Government to ensure that this prediction of theirs is not lost in the mists of time—that this document does not become waste paper.

The Government should be required periodically—annually, as the amendment says—to produce a report showing what this is costing in terms of ticket price. That is not straightforward for producers of aviation fuel to calculate, of course, because they are at the top end of the supply chain and would not be able to know how it worked out; they could tell you what the levy was, but they could not tell you how it translated into ticket price.

So that is what the amendment does, and it is essential because, in all this, we privilege the discussions we have with the foreign investors that are going to build these plants, and the discussions we have, to some extent, with the fuel producers on which the levy is going to fall. It is very easy, as I say, to forget the voice of the consumer and the people who, year after year, will pay more to travel. It is a significant sum if you are a family of four going on holiday, and we should be reminded of that through the Government putting their money where their mouth is, so to speak, and agreeing to report on these effects every year out into the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment, for all the reasons he set out. If you look at the opinion polling on this, the public support aviation and flying and want to continue doing it, and they support it being made more sustainable, so it is important that we are transparent about that. We have seen other areas where the costs of decarbonisation are not entirely clear, such as in energy production, which leads to suspicion and people who are not in favour of it being able to make mischief. It is much better if we can be transparent about it.

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[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, I support this amendment, which we discussed at some length in Committee. The amendments then, which other noble Lords supported, covered the relationship between the sustainable aviation fuel used for aeroplanes and the same fuel used for home heating. I declare an interest as having a boiler in Cornwall that survives very well on home heating.

Interestingly, sustainable aviation fuel produced through the HEFA process generates hydrotreated vegetable oil as a by-product. HVO accounts for approximately 30% of the output, a significant amount that should not be overlooked. HVO can play an essential role in helping to decarbonise the 1.7 million oil-heated households that are off the gas grid. Otherwise they use electricity, which is expensive.

Last month, we had a delegation from the village of Kehelland in Cornwall who have all been trying out HVO in their houses for about three years. They travelled, leaving at 2 am, to meet the Minister at DESNZ to present their response to the consultation that we discussed earlier—a 500-mile round trip shows they are pretty committed. But what is interesting is that, in describing their experience of using the fuel, they highlighted how renewable liquid fuels can cut emissions from home heating by up to 88% compared with kerosene—88% is a figure worth having. They work simply as a drop-in replacement. The Government’s consultation said that, of all those considered, this was the most cost-effective option for off-grid consumers.

However, the consultation still questions the feedstock availability for the fuel, which we discussed in earlier amendments today. It is puzzling that the DfT is confident that there is more than enough feedstock to boost SAF production by 22%. The research done by the industry, the EU Commission and the Irish Government indicates that there is enough feedstock—again, we have discussed that at length. I was pleased to welcome the Government’s confirmation in a Written Answer that the targets under the SAF and RTFO mandates

“are set considering global availability of feedstocks and competing demands between transport modes and across sectors of the economy”.

That seems to highlight that there is enough material for both aviation and home heating, so it would be a great shame if we pitted one sector against the other, rather than try to have a bit more of what you might call cohabitation in-between.

To incentivise HVO production, I believe a renewable liquid heating fuel obligation needs to be implemented—that is the solution—triggered under Section 159 of the Energy Act. That would create the necessary market mechanism, in a similar way to the SAF mandate and the RTFO, to give certainty to the industry to distribute HVO to households at an affordable price. I hope that I can persuade my noble friend when he responds to try to ensure that his department, the Department for Transport, and DESNZ are working hand in hand to ensure that we can scale up the production of sustainable aviation fuel to capture the benefits of HVO for home heating. I must not keep asking him for meetings every day, but, if he would accept, it would be very nice to have a meeting with him and our colleague the noble Lord, Lord Whitehead, the Minister for Energy Security, to discuss the benefits of this approach. The consultation closes today, so it seems to be the right time to meet.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I have to confess to having been a little perplexed when the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, moved Amendment 13, because I had just listened to the speech of her colleague, the noble Earl, Lord Russell. I thought my noble friend Lord Moylan’s proposal simply to publish and have some transparency about ticket prices was perfectly reasonable, but the noble Earl, Lord Russell, set out a whole raft of reasons why that was entirely unreasonable, incredibly difficult, completely unnecessary, bureaucratic and costly and why we should not bother ourselves with it, and he then proceeded not to support my noble friend’s amendment. Although I disagree with the noble Earl, he made some perfectly reasonable arguments, although not ones that I agree with. I am perplexed because his noble friend’s amendment is very comprehensive and would place some really quite significant reporting requirements on the Government in a way that seems to be completely at odds with the argument that the noble Earl just made.