Procurement Bill [HL]

Lord Moylan Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 25th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord. With 28 years of experience in local government, and eight years on the board of Transport for London, I have long had a very strong interest in procurement. I am delighted that so many noble Lords have an equally strong interest in procurement. However, it is somewhat dispiriting that so many Members have strayed off into using this Bill as yet another opportunity to roll out a number of anti-capitalist themes and proposals which will no doubt reappear in Committee and then be duly taken out by a sensible Government when it returns to another place.

My question is rather more radical than those raised by most noble Lords so far: whether we actually need this Bill at all. Of course, we need to scrap the EU regulations, but do we need to replace them at all? In large parts of Europe—I say this without specifying any particular parts—there was a history of municipal corruption in the award of contracts in a non-transparent and corrupt way, and it was right that we should tackle that as a single European Community while we were a member of it. It was also the case that the European Union saw these regulations as a means of forcing the development of a single market. As we are no longer a member of the single market, that consideration is not relevant to us.

When it comes to municipal corruption, I will be so bold as to say that, in this country, we have been remarkably free of it. In my lifetime, there have been a few very significant cases—but only very, very few. We are very fortunate; we have an enviable record of a lack of corruption in public bodies. I was expecting at this point to be jeered at in the wake of the remarks by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. Yet, even if the allegations made and hinted at by the noble Lord were all vindicated, the remedy for them would lie in the criminal law and not in this Bill. This is because we have a full panoply of criminal law dealing with municipal and public body corruption, against the taking of bribes and against misconduct in public office. This is where we should look for remedies to the sort of corruption with which these regulations were originally intended to deal, rather than this Bill, which in my view is almost irrelevant. Indeed, the weakness of the Bill in relation to remedies has already been pointed out by other noble Lords, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.

I ask myself—and my noble friend the Minister can explain this later—why we do not simply scrap the existing regulations, rely on the criminal law as we used to before we joined the European Union, and then perhaps an esteemed body, such as the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, could issue a good practice note on how local authorities should comply with our international obligations. Is anything more than that actually needed?

The bureaucratisation of honesty—which is what we are actually discussing here—has led, over recent years, to the creation of what I call a high priesthood of procurement. By that, I mean people who are dedicated to the process—because this is a process Bill—of honesty rather than to its substance. Having got the grip of the process of procurement, they often refuse to let it go, even though everyone can see—even themselves quite often—that the procurement process is leading to a disaster. I hope that this Bill would at least be drafted in such a way as to avoid the pitfalls of the current system. I know that there have been some war stories, but I will take the opportunity to illustrate what I am saying with some of my own.

Very fortunately for me, back in the 1990s a very wise council officer said to me, “Do you know, I can get any result I want out of a procurement process? The secret, Councillor Moylan, is in how you set up the conditions by which the final decision will be made.” The whole system rests on what conditions you set up. I will give just a few examples. I know of one public procurement project, for services, which allocated 40% of the points to what was called “project compatibility”. When I said, “What does that mean?”, they said, “It means that we can choose whoever it is we want to work with, because they will be compatible with us.”

On another occasion, I was brought in to sit on an architectural panel; I was not involved early on, so I did not have a chance to shape the conditions. It was an architectural procurement—not a construction procurement—for a major public building. Having interviewed the various architects and seen their proposals, when we decided which one we wanted we were told by local government officers, who had brought their own lawyers to control us, that we could not have it because it did not meet the criteria. We asked what criteria it was not meeting, and the answer was financial stability—35% of the points had been given, without anyone being consulted, to the financial stability. Financial stability is important in some contracts, but if you choose a one-man architecture practice to build something for you and he goes bankrupt, you just rehire him; there is no consideration of financial stability when it comes to procuring services such as that. But we ended up with the architect we did not want because we had left it all too late.

I will now come to the question of the new, iconic bus shelter for London. Noble Lords will notice that there is no such thing as a new, iconic bus shelter for London. I engaged with TfL on this before I joined the board, and I said, “We should have a new, iconic bus shelter for London, because they are dreadful—absolutely appalling.” Peter Hendy, who was then commissioner of Transport for London, was good enough to agree that something should be done. I was representing London Councils at the time, so we set up jointly a process in which we invited architects to submit proposals for this wonderful thing. TfL officers ran it as a procurement process.

A large number of wonderful designs were put to us—20 appeared—some of which were so extravagant that they could never have been used. A design panel was put in place to make the architectural judgments, only for us to discover at the end of the presentations that we were not allowed to take design into account because the TfL officers had used the branch of the procurement process that you would use if you were buying a piece of air-conditioning plant. So it was to be judged entirely on the specification of whether it kept the rain out and things such as that. The entire purpose of the exercise was defeated through a misapplication of the procurement process, and we all agreed, exhausted by that point, that basically we would abandon it and come back to it. But we never did, so London still has a wide variability and a high level of ugliness in its bus shelters.

These revelations may shock noble Lords—I do not know—but they would not have shocked anybody engaged in public procurement in most other European Union countries, because they are perfectly aware that most European Union legislation is written with a high degree of rigidity as far as the words are concerned, and a high degree of flexibility as far as the application is concerned. Reference was made earlier to our gold-plating things. It is not that we gold-plate them; it is that we take them seriously in a way that other countries do not.

I say to my noble friend that my worry is simply this. We are quite rightly getting rid of a set of regulations that do not work for us and were designed for certain stances that do not apply to us, but instead of taking the radical approach of asking what the point of them was in the first place and whether we need them, we are in great danger of replicating them but with an English touch—sorry, I should not say English, because I am speaking just after the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and I should have said earlier how delighted we all are that Wales has joined in this great corporate endeavour. My worry is that we simply put a local—a national—touch on them, but we end up with the same problems. We will still be doing obeisance to the high priesthood of procurement, and we will find that we are no further forward and will certainly not be dealing with allegations of corruption because, as I said, those will effectively still be dealt with under the criminal law.

Procurement Bill [HL]

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 4th July 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I hesitate to appear to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Berkely, but I shall humiliate myself by doing so. I venture to suggest that there is a definition of a “private utility” in Clause 5. It is only to be understood in its fullness if read with Schedule 4, at page 84, which specifies what “utility activities” are. If one looks at Clause 5 and Schedule 4, one can see what the Government are trying to do. However, I am not sure that what the Government are trying to do is worth while or appropriate. To that extent, I support the comments of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe.

The background is that we are starting from an EU procurement directive that applied to the whole single market of 27 states, and which needed to take account of the fact that most utility activities in most of those states are effectively provided by arms of the state, whereas in the UK we have blazed a successful path of privatisation, so many utility activities that in other parts of the single market are carried out by the state are carried out here by private companies. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, makes a very important point when he says that those private companies are, in nearly all instances, subject to some form of regulation.

Before I go further, I draw attention to Schedule 4, which specifies those activities. The subheadings, which I know are not technically part of the Bill, include “Gas and heat”, “Electricity”—

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I think electricity is later taken out, as I mentioned.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Oh well. I shall just work on the text I have; I mean, what is one meant to do? There is “Water” and “Transport”. “Ports and airports” and “Extraction of oil and gas” are also mentioned, but it is the first few that matter. It is striking that the rollout of broadband, the internet and such things do not count as a utility; I should have thought that they were characteristically examples of a utility. My noble friend will no doubt be able to give me a compelling rationale why they are not included.

I come back to the point I made a moment ago about the regulator. I read out the subheadings because noble Lords can see that the activities we are discussing are nearly all regulated, funded by the commitment of private capital with an assumption that private capital will be reasonably efficient in procurement, even if simply for the benefit of shareholders. This does not preclude defalcation, fraud, bribery or giving contracts to your best mate but, as I explained at Second Reading, the Bill does not deal with those issues. If they arose, be it in a public authority or a private company, they would be dealt with through the criminal law because they are all criminal offences. One would not pursue them for a trivial breach of a procedural requirement under the Bill; one would go after them for fraud, taking bribes or all these other criminal things, which are nothing to do with the Bill.

All that makes me think that including private utilities is not entirely appropriate. If it were felt that procurement undertaken by private utilities needed some form of statutory control it would be better in a separate Bill that actually focused on the principles, rather than the procedure, allowing private companies to pursue those procedures appropriate to achieving their shareholders’ ends, just as we allow Tesco to do—with the exception of selling cars next door to fruit. I cannot contemplate for a moment why the European Union should take exception to that, but apparently it did. Essentially, we leave Tesco to decide what procurement processes to follow because it is a private company risking private capital. That is the essential ground on which I make my point.

Finally, I turn to transport, because I have more direct experience of it as a utility than I do the others. There are some distinctions to be drawn. I take as an example Transport for London; as noble Lords may know, I served on the board. Transport for London perhaps should be subject to procurement regulations of this character, but Transport for London is in part categorised as a local government body. It is covered by some local government legislation, as well as by its own Act. That might be the rationale for including a body such as Transport for London, or some of its equivalent bodies that have been created around the country.

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[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for expanding fully on these amendments but in the case of some of the categories in Schedule 4, there is no regulator with the power to appoint companies to do things. Ports and airports come to mind; the Government will probably do those. Are we happy that the Government can do that without any sort of regulatory oversight?

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Since that is technically an interruption to my speech—

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

I am sorry.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

No, I am delighted. It adds much illumination.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

We can have more of you.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

You could have more of me, my Lords, but I will simply say that I know nothing about ports. However, I know a little about airports and they are technically subject to economic regulation by the Civil Aviation Authority. It is true that that authority has, through its own risk assessment, decided that only Heathrow Airport will be subject to full economic regulation. Gatwick and Stansted are subject to some, while most other airports are not economically regulated; that is, they can set their own charges and if people do not want to fly into their airport, they will fly to another. It is not entirely true, it is fair to say, that where it matters airports are not economically regulated, because they are. I suppose that the Civil Aviation Authority could always reverse its decision, if it saw fit. It has the power to expand economic regulation to other airports if that were felt necessary. Having added that, I shall subside and look forward to my noble friend’s response.

[The Earl of Lytton (CB)]

My Lords, this is my first intervention on the Bill because on the day of Second Reading I was convalescing at home and not allowed to go anywhere.

On this business, regarding utilities, I am afraid I come at this from a simple property professional’s standpoint. It always used to be gas, water, electricity, drainage and telecoms; those were the utilities on which people relied for the use of buildings and property of all sorts. We seem to have dropped drainage, for reasons I cannot quite understand, when it is merely the dirty-water function of the clean-water provider of drinking water, which is referred to.

I declare my interest as one of those who serve under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, on the Built Environment Committee, as do the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Berkeley. I am very privileged to do that. Last week, when we were talking about the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill, it was noted that the very purpose of the telecoms giants was to try to convince government that they were a utility, should have utility powers and should, encompassed in that, have certain powers of coercion. They have come into that from the private sector, whereas dear old British Telecom, aka Openreach and a few other things, has come at it from the other direction—the hardwired traditional utility standpoint that was protected, with all sorts of powers to acquire wayleaves and so on.

The noble Baroness referred to imperfect policy development. I almost got up and said “Hear, hear” to that, because we need to start sorting out what exactly we mean by these utilities that look in lots of different directions. Some of them are very commercial—some are very controversial—and others come from a highly and necessarily regulated background because they are important for health, stability and all sorts of other basic things that require regulation as to quality and quantity in the essential needs of the public. It is not so much the voluntary needs, and perhaps even less the voluntary needs of business, but the essential needs of the public.

We seem to have an increasing muddle between what may be regarded as that essential element that has to be regulated for the purposes I have suggested and the wider commercial endeavour that goes with it. Because that distinction has been made ever less clear, for reasons that I perfectly understand—the utilities were privatised for reasons to do with funding, and I do not pass judgment on that—like Voltaire’s Candide I stand here noting both cause and effect. This is exactly the situation we are in; utility activities are mired in this very issue. I look forward very much to the Minister’s answer on that. He has a great grasp of these intellectual refinements, and I hope he will be able to enlighten us. I think a bit of a distinction needs to be made here between essential purposes and processes that are essentially voluntary and commercial.

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[Lord True (Con)]

I was asked that at Second Reading. An appropriate authority is a Minister of the Crown or a Welsh Minister. Indeed, the noble Lord’s colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, referred to this when we discussed the earlier group of amendments. We clarified it in some of the amendments that we tabled but were not brought forward earlier. Among them was an amendment to replace “appropriate authority”, although I cannot remember with what exact words—a Minister of the Crown or a Welsh Minister, I think.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I think that my noble friend is approaching his peroration. May I ask him for a little clarity? Take the example of the bus company. Bus companies operating under a franchise—for example, those in London—appear to be covered because they have a special and exclusive right. That appears to be what my noble friend is saying; if I am wrong, please correct me. Even though they have bid competitively for that special and exclusive right, and even though it generally lasts only for a number of years—this is to justify the balance of capital investment that might be required for them to allow—then comes back into competitive tender, they appear to be covered.

Bearing in mind that I am sticking with the text of the Bill as circulated, my noble friend says that Schedule 2(17) exempts them. However, that is not what it appears to do. It exempts a contract rather than a contractor, and says:

“A contract for the provision of public passenger transport services”.


In simple terms, is my noble friend saying that, when a bus company procures a building, a new piece of plant, some equipment or even some buses, it is or is not covered by the procurement regulations, even on the assumption that it falls into the special and exclusive category?

Procurement Bill [HL]

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 6th July 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 11 only. It carries over into our new domestic legislation what is referred to in the European Union legal context as the Teckal exemption. To that extent, it illustrates and gives force to the point made by my noble friend Lady Noakes that we are very much replicating European Union law here. The reason I rise to address it is that I wish to seek a point of clarification from my noble friend the Minister. It arises from my experience—this is an interest that I once declared but I think has now expired—of chairing Urban Design London, a body that benefited from the Teckal exemption. So I have some experience of how it works.

Urban Design London was—I mean “is”; it still exists and operates—an unincorporated association established between Transport for London, the Greater London Authority and London Councils, representing the London boroughs. Its purpose is to generate training for the benefit of local government officers, Transport for London officers and others in good practice in planning, urban design and transport design. I am very proud of it—it is a successful little body—but it was set up as an unincorporated association, meaning that it is not incorporated and not a company.

I am anxious because there are two versions of the legislation that I can look at: the one that was originally circulated and the one that has replaced it. I might say that the one that has replaced it is a great deal better than the original; it clearly shows the influence of the Local Government Association and people who understand these things. The version in the amendment is generally much better. However, I am concerned about the references to the Companies Act in sub-paragraph (2B), to be inserted by Amendment 11. The clarification I seek is that this is sufficiently broadly drawn that the controlled body that benefits from the Teckal exemption does not have to be incorporated and read in a Companies Act structure. I see my noble friend looking round; I will understand entirely if he is not able to give a firm direction to me on that point today. I simply reserve the right, depending on what he says, to bring something back on Report. I am not pressing him too far on that, but it is something that I would like to know.

I have one other point, which is that I am delighted to see that what was a provision in the originally circulated version of the Bill—whereby an appropriate authority may by regulation make provision about how to calculate the percentage of activities of the controlled body—has been dropped. The percentage of activities is relevant, because one of the qualifiers under the Teckal exemption is that 80% of your activities have to be carried out for the controlling party or parties, but “activities” is not defined. In the case of UDL, which was largely a body which employed staff who did things, we took the view as a board that the appropriate measure was staff time, but there might be bodies where “activities” should be measured by turnover, size of contracts or income and expenditure. I want my noble friend to confirm that the clause enabling an appropriate authority to make regulations on this topic has been dropped in the new amendment.

It should be, because these bodies need to be left to make their own responsible decisions about the best and appropriate means of deciding how to measure their own activities. I see no reason for the Secretary of State to be involved in making regulations about it, and if they behave perversely, they will of course be subject to potentially being sued by a contractor who had failed to achieve business that they might otherwise reasonably have thought they would have obtained.

At the risk of being a little tedious, I seek clarification from my noble friend on those two points, and if he is able to provide it not today but after the Committee, that would be more than welcome.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I want to address the change in relation to Scottish law. Before doing that, I will pick up the point made a moment ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, with regard to the influence of European terminology. She will not be surprised to know that I have no problem with the influence of European terminology; if we are to hunt all European influences out of our legislation, it will take a very long time and leave quite a lot of uncertainty around the place. None the less, I take the point she makes with regard to the substance of the implications, and the question of a capacity to influence is a very important consideration. If a capacity to influence exists, that may have an ongoing impact without it being written in black and white. That has to be taken on board.

I want to ask the Minister about the change to get in line with Scottish law. If there is in future a change in Scottish law or a change in the ruling in the courts in Scotland, presumably that could have an implication for the way in which the Bill, when enacted, works out. Does that mean there will have to be a review every time there is a change in Scotland that might impact on this, because we are working within one market and we need to make sure there is consistency running through this? Perhaps I can park that question with the Minister, as it is a relevant one that arises from what he said.

Procurement Bill [HL]

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 11th July 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

37: Clause 10, page 8, line 5, leave out “this Act” and insert “section 11 (procurement objectives)”
Member’s explanatory statement
The effect of this amendment would be to limit obligations on contracting authorities to compliance with the procurement objectives in section 11.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 37 I will speak also to Amendment 460 in my name, which is closely linked to it. They work to a similar effect.

The purpose of these amendments is to go back to the question of what we are trying to achieve in this Bill—what its purpose is. I think we all agree that we want honesty, transparency and value for money in public procurement, in broad terms. However, as I said at Second Reading, it seems that what we are achieving is the bureaucratisation of honesty, whereas we should be focusing on the principles. We are creating a great beneficial bonus for lawyers, as was identified by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, earlier in Committee.

The key to real-world management of procurement is flexibility: to be able to respond to circumstances as they change during a tender. The current system, as I said at Second Reading, operates by setting up some conditions at the beginning over which the contracting authority has very great control. However, the system operates with great rigidity after that, so that it is very difficult to respond to changing circumstances in the course of the tender, or to surprising tenders that might be received.

I gave some examples at Second Reading, particularly the great non-existent iconic London bus shelter. I will detain noble Lords with a couple of further examples because I have been contacted since then by a former local government officer, for whom I have great respect, with two examples from the water sector. One related to a contract in which—I cannot supply the names—the officers had set up in advance the very precise and clear criteria by which to analyse the tenders they received for a waste collection contract. When one of the tenderers said “For certain types of waste, we will pay you in order to collect it”—which can make sense for certain recyclers—the whole assessment system effectively collapsed because it had not contemplated that sort of bid. As far as I am aware, everything had to be scrapped and started again, whereas a sensible approach would have allowed it to be flexibly adapted.

The second was a case where the local authority decided to take a relaxed “Let’s see what the market comes up with” approach to the tender—which can be appropriate as well—which was also for a waste collection contract. Unfortunately for the local authority, the cheapest bidder proposed collecting waste from households only once every four weeks—which was why it was the cheapest bidder. Of course, that was neither environmentally nor politically acceptable, but what could the authority do about it at that stage? All it could do was put pressure on the second-lowest bidder, which had sensibly proposed a two-week collection cycle, to cut its price to make it competitive with the four-week people. That duly went through. The two-week collection was awarded the tender, and within a matter of months the contract had effectively collapsed because, of course, the company could not make it work at the price it had been obliged to agree.

So why is there no flexibility in the system once the initial conditions have been set up? The practical reason is that the moment you say, “This is daft. We should be able to do something about it”, the people whom I described in my Second Reading speech as the high priests of procurement will turn up and say, “Ah, but if you do that, a disappointed bidder may sue you for failures in the process.” That is why you are tied at the outset with iron hoops to the process that you have set in motion.

What we need is a Bill that focuses on principles rather than on process. These two amendments do that by preventing disappointed bidders from suing a contracting authority for process faults; they could sue only for breach of the objectives set out in Clause 11. I remind noble Lords that those are to do with: delivering value for money; maximising public benefit; sharing information; acting with integrity and being seen to act with integrity; and equal treatment of tenderers.

It is important to explain that the approach I am proposing is not necessarily tied to Clause 11, because certain noble Lords are proposing that the Bill be augmented with a further set of principles—the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, adds a set of principles to the objectives in Clause 11. My amendment is perfectly compatible with her approach. If the House decides that the objectives for the Bill and the principles underlying it are not sufficiently and adequately expressed in Clause 11 and that further objectives and principles are required, on Report my amendment could be adapted to fit in with those principles. In this particular debate, I am staying neutral on the various proposals for how to develop the principles; I am totally neutral on the noble Baroness’s amendment, because mine would fit with it if that is the direction that the House and the Government wish to take. It is important to bear in mind that I am not tying this explicitly to Clause 11.

It is also important to bear in mind something else that I said. This is not a Bill for combating fraud, corruption or malfeasance in public office. All those things are criminal offences. If a contracting authority commits those offences, it will be prosecuted not under the terms of this Bill but under the relevant provisions of the criminal law—and quite properly. What this Bill does is create a huge bureaucratic minefield for contracting authorities in which disappointed tenderers can sue for some sort of compensation or damages—not that they do so very often, but it is a chilling factor when it comes to the flexibility that contracting authorities should rightly have.

Now, some people would say that this would radically alter the whole approach of the Bill. I think it is a fairly radical alteration of the Bill’s approach, but I speak with some experience when I say that it would also make it a workable Bill. I hope that my noble friend, if he or she is not immediately inclined to agree, will at least explain why this approach does not commend itself to Her Majesty’s Government.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 43 and 51 in this group and comment on the other amendments. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for supporting Amendment 43. Amendment 43 would reintroduce the procurement principles that were laid out in the procurement Green Paper and put them in the Bill.

The procurement Green Paper stated that the principles of the new regulatory framework for public procurement should be consistent with the Treasury’s Managing Public Money and the seven principles of public life as set out by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. The Green Paper states:

“The Government proposes that the following interdependent principles should be included in the new legislation.”


I shall remind noble Lords of the interdependent principles: they are public good, value for money, transparency, integrity, fair treatment of suppliers and non-discrimination. We absolutely support these principles, as I am sure all noble Lords do, because they are crucial for good business practice. Will the Minister say why these principles are not in the Bill as expected, particularly when we consider that, in the consultation on the Green Paper, the majority of the more than 600 respondents supported the principles for procurement being in the Bill? If we look at the Government’s response to the consultation, they said:

“The Government intends to introduce the proposed principles of public procurement into legislation as described.”


What has changed since then? Why now are those principles not in the Bill?

We believe that these principles are an integral part of procurement and a vital tool for setting out what this legislation wants to achieve and how its success will be judged. In the Bill as currently drafted there is a notable absence of mentions of equality or protected characteristics. The public sector equality duty requires public bodies to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between different people when carrying out their activities. This includes promoting equality and eliminating discrimination through public procurement as well as ensuring that the PSED is adhered to by those with whom public bodies contract.

Furthermore, this is important domestic legislation that asserts that international obligations on procurement in the UK entered into must be compatible with social objectives. We are concerned that the UK has signed a trade agreement with Australia that potentially threatens the inclusion of social criteria in procurement rules. The UK-Australia agreement states that social and labour considerations can be used in the government procurement process only when based on objectively justifiable criteria. This means that social criteria could be challenged by Australian companies via their Government as unjustified. Furthermore, the World Trade Organization’s government procurement agreement that the UK has acceded to does not contain social criteria for procurement. We believe that the current positron needs to be revised and that these principles should be clearly in the Bill.

Moving on to my Amendment 51, it would add proportionality to the procurement objectives. The Procurement Bill covers a wide range of goods, works and services and a range of scales from tens of thousands of pounds to hundreds of millions, but it can be implemented effectively only if proportionality is applied throughout the process. Ensuring the Procurement Bill is proportionate is also key to achieving two of the Government’s key aims in this legislation: to improve value for money and to open up the market to smaller providers, including charities. Proportionality is crucial to the effective procurement of person-centred public services through ensuring that resources are not wasted on overly complex processes when they are not necessary and that the most appropriate provider to run the service can be procured rather than being excluded because of their size or where this is disproportionate to the scale or nature of the contract. Proportionality is referenced in the legislation, but only in specific parts, yet we believe it is relevant right across the entire process.

NCVO, which represents over 17,000 voluntary organisations, charities, community groups and enterprises across England, and the Lloyds Bank Foundation have drawn attention to the fact that this Bill will impact on the services and support that people access. We therefore believe that it is important to ensure that it is appropriate for the commissioning of procurement of people-centred services that are delivered by a range of service providers that also include charities. Charities are often well placed to deliver these services because they are embedded in local communities. They are trusted by local people and often able to reach those whom other services fail to reach.

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister has a difficulty with his throat, and I commiserate with him on that. He also has a difficulty with the Bill. He wants to have a Bill which is highly prescriptive, but his answer to those who wish to amend it is that that would make it too prescriptive. The question is: what are the bounds of prescription, and has he given an adequate defence of them? It may be the heat, but I suspect we are condemned this afternoon to receiving a series of responses from Ministers which are not as adequate and embracing of our original ideas as one might hope.

It has been a very important debate because it is about the principles underlying the Bill. My noble friend said that there was a degree of confusion and contradiction in the debate. There is often confusion in debate when you have a broad range and number of topics to discuss, but I do not think there was any contradiction if one understands that the debate on principles has been taking place on two levels. The first is about what the principles should be—whether they should involve what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, has suggested should be incorporated and whether they should involve a certain interpretation of value for money. We all agree that has to be an element of it, but what does that actually mean? That has been the tenor of part of the debate. I have said that I intend to remain neutral in a sense on that question.

The second level on which we have been debating the principles is: on the assumption that we can agree what the principles are, what role do they then play? What purchase or leverage do they give in the procurement process? In particular, should they be a basis on which disappointed contractors should be able to nitpick through this procedural Bill in order to bring complaints when, in my view, it would be better if they were limited to doing that only if the broad principles of the Bill—which we might have agreed on—had been breached? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, clearly grasped that point, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, heartily agreed that we should ensure that there is a degree of flexibility in the tendering process so that unforeseen circumstances that lead to idiotic outcomes can be handled in a sensible way.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe made a similar point, but I am going to quibble with her very slightly, because she used the word “frequent” in reference to frequent legal challenges to procurement processes. In my experience, they are not very frequent, because what happens is that precise attention to the detail of the process is often prioritised over sensible outcomes in order to avoid those legal challenges in the first place. The structure of the approach that we are taking often leads to poor outcomes in procurement terms precisely to avoid legal challenges, but we congratulate ourselves on having gone through a successful procurement even though we have a suit with a pair of trousers with one leg shorter than the other, or something like that.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

On the business of frequent challenge, I think it would be quite useful to have some information before we discuss this again. My experience—I have worked in the industry, although admittedly not as an executive—is that there are quite a lot of challenges, and they absorb a lot of resources. However, if they are rare, that is important as well.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I heartily second that call for information.

To conclude, my noble friend the Minister said that he thought that flexibility in response to the sort of circumstance that I am describing is desirable. To that extent, he agreed in principle with me and with my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, and it is for him, as we go forward, to show how he intends to instantiate that in his own amendments, so as to give us that sensible, practical outcome. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 37 withdrawn.

Procurement Bill [HL]

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 28th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 9 amends Schedule 2 in relation to exempted contracts. Specifically, it seeks to modify how vertical contracts and horizontal arrangements are allowed to qualify as exempt contracts. I thank my noble friend Lord Moylan for adding his name to the amendment. I should explain that this amendment is in splendid isolation in a group all of its own because I thought that the previous group, which took rather a long time, covered rather too many matters and that the issue I am going to raise would have got lost in it. I apologise for pulling it out separately.

I was prompted to table the amendment by a briefing from the Local Government Association. From our proceedings in Committee, I think that I am in the minority among those who have been following this Bill in that I do not have an association with the Local Government Association to declare because I am not a vice-president or one of those things. However, I did recognise that the point raised by the Local Government Association was important and valid, and that is why I have tabled this amendment, and indeed amendments in two other groups that we will consider on Report.

Before I started on this Procurement Bill, I had little technical knowledge of the vast edifice of EU procurement rules, and I had never heard of the Teckal exemption or, indeed, the Hamburg exemption, which deal with vertical and horizontal arrangements respectively. Those arrangements allow contracts within or between local authorities to be exempt from procurement rules. I now know that these exemptions from the need to engage in competitive procurement processes are important for well-established ways of delivering local authority services. I am generally a competition fanatic, but I can see eminent sense in allowing local authorities to organise themselves internally or in collaboration with other local authorities in a way that delivers services to their local communities without dragging in the full force public procurement rules.

The problem lies in sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 1, which states that a contract cannot be exempt if the relevant goods or services

“could reasonably be supplied under a separate contract”.

I am advised that this test is not currently part of establishing whether the Teckal or Hamburg exemptions apply under the existing body of procurement law under the EU, so it appears that, in reformulating EU rules for the purposes of the UK in this Bill, we seem to have opened up a new source of challenge for local authorities that want to use the vertical or horizontal arrangements. I cannot see why the Government would want to create by this Bill new barriers for local authorities in areas where services have been delivered successfully over a long period. So my Amendment 9 seeks to exclude the application of sub-paragraph (2) to vertical contracts and horizontal arrangements under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the schedule. It would leave the reasonableness test in place for all the other contracts dealt with in Schedule 2 but would allow local authorities to continue with their internal structures and their cross-authority collaboration arrangements unhindered. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to have added my name to this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I would like to start by thanking my noble friend the Minister for all the hard work she has done to bring us this far, and for her sympathetic approach to the House. I would also like to thank her for something that I had not expected to see on the part of the Government. The process of drafting legislation is normally arcane and obscure—it is carried out by civil servants and parliamentary draftsmen before anything ever reaches us. But in this case, in this rare Bill, we have actually seen the legislation being drafted, and redrafted, and redrafted further, time and time again, as it progresses with literally hundreds of government amendments. It has been very difficult to follow what is going on, but illuminating as to how laws are actually made—something which I think Bismarck said the public “should never see”, if that is helpful advice to my noble friend.

In Committee, I gave an example of how the Teckal exemption works and how I had experienced it myself during my many years in local government. The Teckal exemption is the EU legal name for the vertical exemption, where local authorities or public bodies come together in order to establish a subsidiary, controlled entity; and there are rules and limits as to what it can do outside—percentages of work and effort and so on—that show whether it qualifies for that exemption so that the local authorities in question do not have to tender it publicly.

There are further examples that I did not mention in relation to horizontal relations between public bodies and local authorities. I find myself, quite by chance, sitting within a foot or two of the noble Lord, Lord Greenhalgh, who had the privilege and honour of being the leader of Hammersmith and Fulham Council in the past, when I had a modest role to play at an adjacent local authority. One of the things we did was to come together to share many of our services, between ourselves and in some cases with a third local authority.

That was an example of horizontal collaboration so that, for example, highway services, library services and things of that sort became shared. I simply say to my noble friend that I think this collaboration would be ruled out under the reasonableness test. Let us say that you are a local authority wishing to share services—or contract services, in some cases—with the local authority to your west. It is, of course, reasonable that the local authority to your east—assuming that you are not entirely surrounded by one local authority—could equally well provide those services. This is not simply about the private sector being an alternative to collaboration; it would be reasonable for another local authority to provide those services rather than this one. If that was the case, you would be stymied; you would not be able to do it without having a tendering process.

Procurement Bill [HL]

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 30th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lee of Trafford (LD)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to strongly support Amendment 72. There is absolutely no need for a VIP channel or similar. Surely, it just encouraged opportunistic entrepreneurs—to be charitable —rather than genuine experienced manufacturers. Will the Government publish a list of all MPs and Peers who used the VIP channel and on whose behalf they were lobbied?

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to strike a jarring note, although I do not intend to wander into the potentially treacherous waters of the divisibility or otherwise of the Crown. I think the Government have rather got it right on these amendments and noble Lords are barking up the wrong tree.

As I said in Committee and at Second Reading, noble Lords in some cases appeared to have misconceived this Bill throughout as if it were an enforcement measure against criminal or quasi-criminal activity, but it is not and it has never been intended as such; nor does it have that effect.

We come to an amendment that says explicitly that no preferential treatment may be conferred on

“suppliers connected to or recommended by members of the House of Commons or members of the House of Lords”.

To the extent that that is already a criminal act, and corruption is involved, criminal proceedings would be the right thing to undertake and not proceedings under this Bill, which is essentially administrative in character and carries no punitive clauses. The remedy for breaches under this Bill in most cases is for a supplier to sue for damages and the fact that they have been treated badly or unfairly. This is not a Bill intended to combat corruption.

If noble Lords feel it is required to explicitly exclude Members of this House and of another place, why is it not required to explicitly exclude giving preferential treatment to your first cousins, or your family in a broader sense, or your best friends, or people you were at school with, or all sorts of other persons who perhaps should be listed on the face of the Bill?

I briefly come to the procurement review unit—

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Does the noble Lord not agree that Clause 40 allows the Government to set up such a preferential channel?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I think it has been agreed by all Members of the House that in certain emergency circumstances the Government need to be able to take action outside the normal procurement channels. If Clause 40 has that effect, that is fine, but Clause 40 also allows channels to be set up that include someone with whom you were at school, with whom you are best friends, who was your best man, who attended your wedding or whatever. How would we know? These things cannot be set out comprehensively in the Bill. This is a classic case of shutting a stable door after the horse has bolted.