Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 4th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the powerful speech by my noble friend Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee. I am tempted just to say “ditto” and sit down, but that is not the practice in this place, so I will focus on some aspects that differ from the focus that she gave. The importance she attached to the Chagossians enables me to be a bit briefer than I would otherwise have been.

I want to return to a powerful assertion that was made the first time this House considered a Statement on this subject, which was diluted a bit today in the defence put forward by the noble Minister. The original Statement by the Defence Secretary said

“without this deal—within weeks we could face losing legal rulings, and within just a few years the base would become inoperable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]

What is the likelihood of us facing a legally binding ruling? If so, I ask the Minister, from which court is it likely to come?

First, as even the Foreign Office recognises, the opinion of the International Court of Justice was purely advisory, not binding. Secondly, it was based on UN General Assembly resolutions. Such resolutions are not legally binding, especially as they have not been endorsed by the Security Council. Thirdly, when the UK signed up to the International Court of Justice, our declaration specifically said that the Government of the UK excluded the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on

“any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”,

as is Mauritius. Hence, the opinion of the ICJ was triply non-binding, and no future ruling of the ICJ on this dispute could be binding on us.

Ministers never mention these facts; either they are unaware of them, or they do not want us to know. Instead, they segue on to discussing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as the noble Baroness did today, since that also has a tribunal. However, Article 298 of that treaty provides that states may “at any time” exclude “disputes concerning military activities”. Therefore, it is hard to see how the UNCLOS tribunal could reach a binding ruling which would impede our use of the base, still less do so in ways that the Defence Minister originally spelled out when he said:

“Rulings against us would mean we could not prevent hostile nations from setting up installations … on the outer islands … we could not guarantee the safe berth of our subs, patrol the waters around the base, control the airspace directly above or protect the integrity of our communications systems”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]


All that seems impossible to come from a tribunal which excludes, or where we can exclude, military matters.

These are not the only issues which the Government refuse to address. They never mention—even the Explanatory Memorandum on the agreement ignores it—the Pelindaba treaty, to which Mauritius is a signatory. It is signed by all countries counted as in the African region—and Mauritius is one—making Africa a nuclear-free zone. The treaty allows no reservations, at the time or subsequently, so it will apply to Diego Garcia, and it cannot be overridden by our treaty unless Mauritius resiles from the Pelindaba treaty. Do the Americans accept that that will mean that no nuclear weapons-carrying vessels or planes can use the base?

The agreement with Mauritius purportedly relates to completing the decolonisation of Mauritius. There are two relevant principles that have a bearing on the process of decolonisation. The first is the right to self-determination, and the second is the principle of territorial integrity. This agreement elevates the principle of territorial integrity above that of the right to self-determination.

It is bizarre that boundaries laid, and former administrative arrangements imposed on an area, by the colonial power should be treated as so sacrosanct, whereas the rights of the people who were displaced—many of whom would like to return or have the right to return—are to be ignored. It is even more bizarre given, as my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out, the promise in the Labour Party manifesto that it would support the sovereignty, integrity and right to self-determination of peoples in the British Overseas Territories. I wait in the summing up to hear how the Government reconcile their promise made to the British people, and to the peoples of those territories, with what they are doing today.

Why are the Government ploughing ahead? Of course, they refer to the fact that negotiations began under the previous Government, although they were paused by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. At the time they were paused, I found myself discussing this with a Foreign Office official, who I heard mention the agreement. I said, “Isn’t it good that these negotiations have been paused?” He obviously did not approve of the negotiations. He said, “Oh, it’ll make no difference; they’ll continue. It is the settled policy of the Foreign Office, whichever Government are in power, that we shall continue with this process to give away the sovereignty of them”.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

All the legal considerations that the noble Lord has outlined to the House, including those in the latter part of his remarks, pre-date November 2022, when the previous Government started negotiations to cede sovereignty. They took all his remarks into consideration, so why did they start negotiations to cede sovereignty?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

The noble Lord is making a party-political point, as the Lib Dems always do. I am accepting that both parties are allowing themselves to be driven by the settled policy of the Foreign Office. We have to recognise that.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It started in 2022.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Whenever it started, the settled policy of the Foreign Office will probably continue for another 22 years. Anyone who has been a Minister knows that every department has a settled policy that continues unless Ministers come along and determine to overthrow it.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Earlier in 2022, the then Government’s view was that there would be no change to the sovereignty of Chagos. That was a Statement given to Parliament in early 2022. The policy changed under Liz Truss as Prime Minister and James Cleverly as Foreign Secretary to start negotiations to cede sovereignty. If there had been a settled will, it had been the one before the Government changed policy. It was the noble Lord’s Government who changed the policy.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Of course it was, but they allowed it to be changed from pressure from the Foreign Office. We can go into the archaeology of when this surfaced in the form of government policy and when it was internal, but I have no doubt that it was. Whenever I have spoken to Foreign Office officials, they have acknowledged that we are not bound by rulings of the court, nor are we likely to be, and nor are we bound by the obligations of any treaty, but they argue that Britain must none the less abide by even non-binding advisory opinions, since if we do not, how can we tell other countries that they must abide by international law? That is precisely the argument that was forwarded just now by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay.

It is touching that our diplomats believe that countries that might otherwise flout international obligations and rulings will change their ways and become law-abiding if they see us obeying rulings that we do not have to abide by and being purer than pure. I believe that the policy of the Foreign Office, and, above all, the policy of elected officials in charge of the Foreign Office, should be to pursue British interests and not to set about setting examples to other countries and virtue signalling. That is what this is doing, and it is weak for that reason. I hope that the House will in the weeks to come persuade the Government to abandon it.

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[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, and particularly his very thoughtful speech today. I say at the outset that I support the Bill as a necessary consequence of the Chagos Islands agreement, which I also support.

I will not deal with the future of the Chagossians or environmental issues today, important though they both are. I will focus on security, but I think that both the British and Mauritian Governments will need to work hard to meet the justified demands of the Chagossian people.

I will not go over all the ground covered by the Minister in her opening speech, but I want to emphasise the importance of the base on Diego Garcia for our security and, more generally, for western security. A simple look at the map shows why it matters so much for our security, and for western security, in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and why security of the base in the years ahead is so important.

For that reason, I continue to think—and, as I have said before in this House, I thought at the time—that it was absolutely right for the previous Government to start intensive negotiations with Mauritius, with the aim of ensuring

“the continued effective operation of the joint UK/US military base on Diego Garcia”;—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]

that it was absolutely right for the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to decide, after examining the issue, to continue with the negotiations; and that it is absolutely right for the present Government to conclude them.

As I understand it—and I have listened carefully to the Minister—the agreement will provide us and the United States with the certainty we both need over the future of the military base on Diego Garcia for 99 years, plus another 40 years if we exercise our rights under the treaty. It does not surprise me that our Five Eyes partners—the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—have welcomed the deal, recognising its importance for their and our security, nor that India, South Korea and the African Union have welcomed it too.

It would, of course, have been nice to have secured the deal without the cost. Some £101 million a year in today’s money is not cheap, and it would build a lot of hospitals. But surely the question is whether paying 0.2% of the defence budget is a price worth paying for the security it brings. I believe that it is.

Finally, it is worth considering the implications of our not agreeing a deal, of continuing with a contested relationship with Mauritius, the UN and the ICJ, and of ditching an agreement that we have reached with, and that has the support of, our Five Eyes partners. I know it is always risky to peer into the future, particularly given today’s uncertain world, but we can be pretty certain that the ICJ and UN General Assembly resolutions condemning us would continue. It is likely that they will be legally binding on us in the future. Could we just ignore that? Yes, we could, but in doing so, in these circumstances, we would be flouting international law. I believe—and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, is listening—that the United Kingdom should be supporting and respecting international law, not flouting it. That has been, and should remain, our tradition, whether under a Conservative or a Labour Government.

May I also say to the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra—

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

The noble Lord said that we should pursue international law. Does he accept that we have, under the International Court of Justice, an opt-out for disputes between ourselves and Commonwealth countries—or was he going to mention that anyway?

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

I was not going to mention that; I was making the simple point that respect for international law has been, and should remain, an extremely important part of British foreign policy.

I say this to the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra. When I was in the Foreign Office, serving under the late Lord Carrington and Lord Hurd, I was not conscious that there was a Foreign Office policy and not a government foreign policy. I have to say, I did not have the privilege of serving under the noble Lord, Lord Cameron.

The agreement with Mauritius and the treaty we are now considering respect international law, protect British and western security, have the support of our Five Eyes partners, India and others, and, in my view, unquestionably deserve our support.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 8 and 9 are in my name. Amendment 8 says that the treaty shall not come into force until a binding case in an international court requires us to cede sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. Amendment 9 requires the Government to spell out their legal position on why they believe such a ruling to be possible, let alone likely.

The whole basis of the Government’s case is that

“without this deal … within weeks we could face losing legal rulings, and within just a few years the base would become inoperable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]

At Second Reading, the possibility of such a ruling was contested not just by me but by several other noble Lords, on the basis that there is no international court which can rule against our sovereignty in this way. Yet Ministers failed to address that issue and those arguments. Even noble Lords who have held the highest office in the FCDO—mandarins of our diplomatic corps who tenaciously defended this deal—failed to answer or address the question of which court could reach a binding judgment against us.

First, everyone acknowledges that the ruling of the International Court of Justice was purely advisory and not binding on us. Secondly, it was based on resolutions of the UN General Assembly which themselves are not legally binding; nor have they ever been endorsed by the Security Council. Thirdly, when Britain signed up to the ICJ, it specifically precluded disputes between the UK and present or past members of the Commonwealth. So the ruling was triply non-binding, and the ECJ cannot rule against us on this in future because it is a dispute with a Commonwealth country.

Ministers have chosen to ignore these arguments and not dispute them, although it is not clear that they were aware of this situation when they plunged into these negotiations. I rather suspect they were not. They have tacitly acknowledged the truth of these arguments by moving on to assert that the tribunal of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea could rule against Britain and in favour of Mauritius on the issue of sovereignty. As the noble Lord, Lord Murray, spelled out in forensic detail, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has no such power. Britain has invoked Article 298 of the convention, which excludes military matters, so it is outside its wherewithal.

Even when the Philippines brought a case about artificial islands built in the South China Sea, ITLOS ruled that it cannot rule on the sovereignty of the area around those artificial islands—that is not within its purview. It can rule whether the islands are artificial or real and therefore have some territorial waters or not, but not whose they are and who they belong to.

We wonder why the Government got into this position. If the court has no power to rule on matters of sovereignty and the UK insists on exercising its rights under Article 298 of the convention, it just cannot do so. The Government’s silence on all these arguments must be deemed tacit acceptance that they are true. If there is some court or some hidden clause in the agreements that none of us knows about which overrides the points I have made, Amendment 9 will be no problem for them because they can implement it. According to them, within weeks, an adverse ruling will occur in a court which is binding on us. Since they have quite a long time before they can complete even these processes, we will get to know the answer to that conclusion. Alternatively, they could accept Amendment 9 and spell out the legal basis on which they believe an international court—which international court, why and on what grounds—could find against us.

If the Government reject this amendment, we will know that they do not even believe their own case. We will be forced to conclude that they are following, wittingly or unwittingly, the long-standing view of the Foreign Office—expressed very eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, in the Second Reading debate—that, unless we accept even an advisory ruling, we will not be able to persuade other countries to accept legally binding rulings. That is perhaps how diplomats think, but it ought not to be how this House thinks.

We ought to reject that doctrine and be very cautious about allowing ourselves to be driven along by long-standing arguments of the Foreign Office. Thinking back, it was very keen on us giving up the Falklands to the Argentines, so it is perhaps no surprise to find that it is very keen nowadays on us giving up Chagos to Mauritius. But none of them—and none of the great mandarins who spoke in the debate—spelled out why we are legally obliged to do so. It was all on the basis that the Foreign Office position would be easier to maintain logically and would be more persuasive with Governments that, otherwise, we were recklessly following.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

How far back is the noble Lord going to go in his historic examination of British Governments? Is his position that the British Government should never ever cede sovereignty to any former colony? I am thinking of Australia, South Africa or Canada. How far is he going back in saying that it is absolutely wrong to cede sovereignty?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

If the noble Lord wants me to go back further, I think it is a shame that we did not follow the advice of Edmund Burke and reach an agreement with the American colonists to give them independence earlier on.

But we are not talking about giving independence to the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands; we are talking about giving the Chagos Islands to a country which has never ruled them and is 2,000 kilometres away. To do that simply on the basis of long-standing Foreign Office doctrine is, surely, unwise. I hope your Lordships’ House will consider seriously these amendments because, if they are passed, we will know once and for all whether the Government have a strong case or not. If they are rejected, we can be certain that they do not have a strong case for giving away these islands.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I wonder if he could correct some remarks he has been making about people he has given a Chinese name to. I am not quite sure why he thinks that that is so telling. The arguments advanced were drawn from the testimony of Sir Christopher Greenwood, a former British member of the International Court of Justice. If he read his testimony—which, of course, is all available in the report from the International Agreements Committee of this House, which is being totally ignored by him and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan —he would see what the case is, which was set out very fully. It was set out not by the FCDO but by Sir Christopher Greenwood.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am certainly very happy to mention that the noble Lord himself mentioned Sir Christoper Greenwood’s testimony in his speech, but his primary reasoning was that we should accept even purely advisory rulings of foreign courts in order that we be able better to uphold the rules-based international order. I remind him that the chairman of the committee that heard that evidence said in the debate that, although the committee was divided on the evidence it heard, he was inclined to agree with the arguments I had put forward.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 1 by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I take it that he was not entirely serious when he dreamt up this particular innovation, which is right at the start of the Bill, whereby the purpose of the Bill should be presented in the way that the opponents of the Bill would find most attractive. It is a novel constitutional idea. In his reasons for the purposes of the Act, he has included only things that obviously he agrees with, but he has not included, for example, that this will secure the base for the UK and the USA for the next hundred years. There are arguments for and against, as there with any piece of legislation, but to think that you should state at the beginning of a Bill that the purpose of the legislation is what the Opposition would like to see enacted is novel. The only parallel I can think of would be if the sundry privatisation measures that were passed by the Thatcher Government had said, “The purpose of this Act is to sell off at knock-down prices the assets of the British people”. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, would have been in favour of that kind of constraint when that legislation was going through. I do not take this as a serious amendment, and I am sure he will not press it to a vote—it might be fun if he did, but we will see anyway.

One part of the noble Lord’s proposed new clause that is contentious—well, a lot of it is contentious—on which I would certainly like to hear more from my noble friends on the Front Bench is paragraph (d), which suggests that the Bill will

“limit the citizenship rights of the Chagossians”.

I do not think the Bill as it stands does that, and I want to be clear about that, but I think it raises an issue which we will come to later in the Bill, which is of concern to a number of us here, about what further rights for the Chagossians are appropriate, given the appalling way in which—we are all agreed—they were treated when they were basically thrown out of their own island.

My specific query, which if my noble friend cannot answer at the moment I would certainly like to hear later on in subsequent amendments, is that I still cannot understand why the military requires the whole of the island of Diego Garcia without any other settlement on it other than what is required for military purposes. I have asked that question of Ministers. The last time I asked my honourable friend Stephen Doughty, the Minister, he answered by saying,

“it is impossible for that to take place”—

that is, to have permanent settlement of Chagossians on Diego Garcia—

“operationally. It is not suitable or appropriate”.

I am very fond of the Minister, but just saying something is not suitable or appropriate, without any further clarification or explanation, is not good enough, as far as I am concerned.

The best I have got so far is to be told that, operationally, it is very difficult if you have civilians alongside the military, and it is much more convenient to the military if they have it all to themselves. In response to that, I can say only that repeatedly, in all parts of the world, including in my former constituency, civilian workers at a base quite happily live adjacent to the base and do a job that is of mutual benefit to the military and the civilian workers.

I think it would be a huge step forward to be able to say to the Chagossians—there may not be many who would want to do it—that those who would really like to settle in the land of their forefathers on Diego Garcia would be able to do that and work at the base or, if necessary, work in other activities as well. So far, I have not had a good argument against that happening, and I hope that at some stage during the passage of this Bill my noble friends can provide me with one.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I have amendments to this Bill—I think they are in the last group—but I will not address them. I will keep to the amendments in this group, which has strayed into some wider areas. Since the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not seeking the guidance of the Companion, which discourages changing groupings that have already been agreed, we will no doubt discuss all the amendments in detail as we go. I tabled my principal amendment but no others because I chose to respect the work of the International Relations and Defence Committee, which may well have considerations in advance of Report for us to consider.

I will make some short remarks on the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, presented any different, additional arguments in introducing his amendments from those he presented at Second Reading. Therefore, we have heard them before. Other noble Lords agreed with his argument.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

If the noble Lord regards the amendments clearly, he will see that the difference is that I am saying, “Suck it and see”. If you believe there is a possibility of a court coming up with these judgments—they say it will be within weeks—then let us see.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I understand that argument, which the noble Lord alluded to at Second Reading, but it is a curious one when a treaty has been agreed. If he had presented this argument under the previous Administration post 2022, during the negotiations, that may have held a degree of credibility, but I did not hear him at any stage ask the previous Government to abort those negotiations. This is important because he and others who agree with him are suggesting that the previous Government perhaps did not enter in good faith into negotiations based on ceding sovereignty to resolve legal considerations. That was the Statement that the Foreign Secretary made in November 2022. As I said at Second Reading, I assume—the noble Lord may be able to correct me—that the Government would not have made that policy choice in November 2022 without advice from the Attorney-General at the time.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Since the noble Lord is famous for his pernicketiness, I remind him that the Statement in November 2022 referred to the “exercise of sovereignty”, not the ceding of sovereignty.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I see. Presumably he is arguing that it would be joint sovereignty. How would you enter into negotiations with another sovereign state on the exercise of sovereignty if we were going to retain it? I do not understand. This is interesting. Is he now saying that the previous Government entered into those negotiations without the intent to cede sovereignty?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I promise the noble Lord and the Committee that this will be my last intervention. I had no insider knowledge and was not in any way involved, but the possibility, from reading the Statement, was that the negotiations would consider the possibility either of joint sovereignty, as has existed in certain parts of the world, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, said—on a much better informed basis—of retaining sovereignty of Diego Garcia but ceding it elsewhere. There are all sorts of possibilities, and none of us knew at the time. That is why I certainly did not want those negotiations to take place, but I was not involved at all.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Part of the noble Lord’s lack of involvement was in not raising his objections in Parliament at the time. If those negotiations were entered into to resolve the legal considerations then the Statement in 2022 undermines his quite novel argument now.

It is the case that the previous Government entered into those negotiations. I believe that they entered into them in good faith and they knew what the conclusions would be. The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, is of course correct with regard to the 2017 declaration by the United Kingdom Government that they would be able to choose not to adhere to any rulings by the ICJ on the basis of a Commonwealth country, if that dispute started after 1987. It is a moot point whether this dispute started before then; there remain many arguments that it had. However, even if he is right, I am certain that the former Attorney-General—one of potentially three in 2022—would have advised the previous Administration that, regardless of that 2017 UK declaration, the ICJ would, as under its statute, refer to the General Assembly, because that is its purpose, and that there would be a resolution at the General Assembly. That was the entire point of the ICJ considering it, because it was referred to the ICJ by the General Assembly. I understand the noble Lord’s argument, but we would not be in a different place now even if his argument was very robust.

On the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and our little to and fro on the treaty, we have been told on many occasions by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and his colleagues in the previous Administration that treaty-making is a prerogative power. We do not have that short a memory in this House; we recall the Rwanda Bill and the Rwanda treaty. I recall the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, telling us that it was not our role to interfere in the prerogative power of Governments making, implementing or changing treaties. I quote:

“My Lords, we are not aware of any precedent for Parliament mandating the Government in international negotiations conducted under the royal prerogative. The Government were not prepared to accept such a significant … shift”.—[Official Report, 24/7/18; col. 1598.]


That is ultimately what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, puts forward. That quote from Hansard is from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. He was insistent that it was not Parliament’s role to interfere or mandate a Government in the negotiation of treaties under the royal prerogative. He was either wrong then and right now, or he was right then and wrong now. I am sure he will be able to say which when he sums up the debate.

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[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. I asked a very clear, core question: from which international court does she fear a damaging, binding judgment? She will not tell us. She says that she does not know but that the previous Government must have known.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Forgive me, but I did not say that I did not know; I was just about to answer that specific question. I was making a point about the inconsistency and—frankly—ludicrousness of the Opposition doing something that, when they were in government, took up a great deal of time and resource, but which they now contend they never, ever needed to do.

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Moved by

[Lord Lilley]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) Sections 2 and 4 of this Act do not come into force until the duties outlined in section 1(2A) (right to return), 1(2A) (lease renewal), 1(2A) (termination), (Referendum), (Employment rights of Chagossians), (Asylum claimants) and (Consultation) are discharged.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Lord Lilley, seeks to make commencement of sections 2 and 4 dependent on certain conditions.

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[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I will speak in favour of Amendments 2, 13, 25 and 28. Amendment 2 is an all-purpose amendment saying that the treaty should not come into force until other conditions in amendments are incorporated. Amendments 13 and 28 call for consultation, and Amendment 25 for a referendum.

As I have mentioned previously, the advisory ruling of the International Court of Justice was based on a non-binding UN resolution about the process of decolonisation. That ruling explicitly says that a colonial state can sever part of a territory if it is the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned that they be separated.

The Chagossians cite the example of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The parallel between the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and the situation of Chagos versus Mauritius is striking. When the Government consulted the people of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands before ceasing to be the colonial power, they found that there was considerable opposition in the Ellice Islands to being lumped in with the Gilbert Islands. The parallels between that and the Chagos Islands and Mauritius are very striking. The Chagos Islands are 1,339 miles away from Mauritius, and the Ellice Islands are just 800 miles away from the Gilbert Islands. The Chagos Islands have a different ethnic mix. They are basically populated by people from the African continent, whereas that is not the case in Mauritius. Likewise, with the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, one was Polynesian and one was Micronesian. The disparity of numbers is, if anything, even greater in the case of the Chagos Islands versus Mauritius than it was in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands.

After consulting, the British Government rightly decided that they should test the views of the people concerned. They had a referendum, and the vote was very striking. The people of the Ellice Islands voted to separate from the Gilbert Islands by 3,799 votes to 293. This is a comparatively small number of people—fewer, in fact, than the diaspora of Chagossian peoples in the UK, the Seychelles and Mauritius itself. It surely is possible for us to consult with them and seek their views, ideally through a referendum. The Government may say, “Why have a referendum? It’s so difficult. We can’t do it”. But the Chagossians themselves have today given the results of an opinion poll they have carried out, which 3,500 people responded to out of roughly 10,000 potential respondents. That is a very high proportion. Of those 3,500, an overwhelming proportion were against being lumped in with Mauritius.

The Government may well say that it is still only a minority of the total population. That is fair enough. Again, suck it and see—have a referendum of the total. Who would be the potential electors? The Chagossian nationals would be, as defined in this Bill. We have done that bit for the Government, so that is already there. It is clearly possible over a period to consult them if the Chagossians can organise a poll like this fairly rapidly and with such a high response rate.

The Government often argue that the Chagossians are “not really a people and in any case they’re no longer there”. However, there are precedents in history for people being removed from a place and allowed back. The Acadians were shipped out of Canada because they were thought to be unreliable French-speaking Catholics but subsequently were allowed back and are still a distinctive community in that part of Canada. Similar things have happened with the Chechens and the Crimeans more recently, after the Second World War. In history, we all know the displacement that was suffered by the ancient Israelites. It is possible to say that people who have been removed from a territory still have a right to that territory and should be consulted about its sovereignty.

These amendments seek to ensure that we do have a referendum. Failing that, if the Government can convince us that it is impossible in some way to organise a referendum, let us have a thorough and prolonged period of consultation. I would like to hear more from the Government on what they are doing now, having been provoked into it by the amendment to the committal Motion to ask the relevant Select Committee of this House to carry out a consultation. How are they envisaging that being carried out, and how will they define the Chagos consultation groups and so on? I think your Lordships’ House would almost certainly welcome greater information about that process and how the Government see it happening. If they do not satisfy us on this, I think we need to press ahead with Amendments 13 and 28 on the consultation, but ideally let us go ahead and have a referendum under Amendment 25.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I introduce Amendment 29 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who is prevented by a family illness from being here. His amendment draws attention to the contradiction between the principles in this Bill and some of the UN resolutions dealing with when it is valid to partition a territory. The legal case on which the Government rest, as we established in the last round of amendments, is fundamentally UN Resolution 1514, which was the basis of the Mauritian claim that it was wrong to have divided the territory at independence.

This is an extraordinary precedent to set. The idea that if a territory, for reasons of administrative convenience, was at one time governed from somewhere else, that creates a lasting claim, would upend borders on every continent and in every archipelago. It would mean that Aden and Somaliland are again governed from India, and that the Cayman Islands are again governed from Jamaica. If we extend beyond British territories, it would mean that the Philippines were governed from Mexico, and that Bolivia was again governed from my native Peru, which was the seat of the viceroyalty. It would be an extraordinary principle.

Indeed, when read in context, the UN is not arguing that. If it did, it would have opposed the split of Czechoslovakia, the independence of Montenegro from Serbia, and so on. Of course it does not argue that. The three resolutions referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, essentially establish criteria where it is proper to divide a territory for reasons of geography, history, ethnic distinction or nationality—a sense of being a people and wanting to live in your own polity. As we just heard from my noble friend Lord Lilley, all those criteria are plainly met in this case. When the Chagos Islands were ceded by the French in 1814, they were ceded as a separate territory from Mauritius. They are populated by a different population, one that came from the west rather than from the east. The only reason that they were governed from Mauritius was not because they were part of Mauritius but because there is nowhere among those sparse and beautiful atolls suitable for a seat of government. It is similar to some of our continuing overseas territories in the Atlantic today, visited occasionally by a governor because there is no permanent seat there.

This is the key group of amendments—and the crux of the entire debate is the question of consulting the people who have the most at stake. They are the only people who have ever constituted a permanent population of that archipelago and their descendants, the people defined in this Bill as the citizens of the BIOT. My noble friend Lord Lilley gave a very good example: the consultation between the Ellice Islands and the Gilbert Islands at the moment of independence. They felt that they had not enough in common to accept government from each other’s hands, so the Ellice Islands became the monarchy of Tuvalu and the Gilbert Islands became the Republic of Kiribati. The distances here, ethnically and geographically, are much wider. There is not much doubt that if we had carried out a consultation in 1965, we would have had the same outcome as in the case cited by my noble friend.

Why does that suddenly stop being true now? Why does the passage of time invalidate that claim? This is a proposal to hand the Chagossian people to a nation that has never governed them, never seen them as part of their demos, that was very happy to renounce all claims in perpetuity and trouser a cash sum in exchange for doing so, and which has continued to treat the archipelago in essentially pecuniary terms. Why not test the proposition today?

I repeat a point made by my noble friend Lord Bellingham at Second Reading. It is perfectly logistically feasible to conduct a referendum across scattered territories. Last year I voted for our absent colleague—my noble friend Lord Hague of Richmond—to be Chancellor of the University of Oxford. There was a poll that was conducted electronically across five continents, the alumni being dispersed in their tens of thousands. There was a simple enough process. You establish the right of somebody to vote, you establish their identity, you show that they genuinely are an alumnus, then you have the vote. We have established who would be eligible here, and the right of descent that conveys BIOT citizenship.

I refuse to believe that it is logistically beyond us to consult the Chagossian people. I cannot speak for everyone on this side, but I am pretty sure that if the Chagossian people voted overwhelmingly for Mauritian citizenship, opposition to this proposal would dissipate and people would accept it as a valid exercise of self-determination. There is something more than perverse about acting in the name of decolonisation when taking a people against their will and transferring them to the sovereignty of a foreign state, a country whose Prime Minister at the time of the partition said that it is a territory which they never visit and of which they know little.

When I was a Member of the European Parliament, Crawley was part of my constituency. I got to know some of the disparate groups that represent our Chagossian fellow subjects, and it is fair to say that they did not always agree on every issue—like many small communities, they had a broad diversity of opinions on a lot of subjects—but honestly, hand on heart, I do not think I ever recall meeting any Chagossian in this country who wanted to be a citizen of Mauritius. There are reasons for that. The experience of Chagossians in Mauritius was not a happy one: they were confined in slums, and they were subjected to, in their eyes, racism and discrimination. The idea that we are now placing this entire population, against their will, because of a non-binding opinion from a tribunal without jurisdiction is a truly extraordinary and shameful moment.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

That is a constructive proposition. The Government are very willing to engage in that kind of conversation and I note the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, which we will come to later in our considerations—perhaps not this evening, given our current rate of progress.

I point noble Lords to the statement by Olivier Bancoult, the leader of the largest Chagossian group, the CRG. I think it demonstrates that, while there are different views among Chagossians, there is strong support for the agreement from a significant number in the community.

I thought that Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, was really interesting. I am pretty sure this is not exactly what he intended, but in some respects it seems to be trying to replicate that which our elected Members of Parliament are there to do: to represent the views of their constituents, including, in a number of cases, Chagossians. I draw attention to the All-Party Parliamentary Group, which does an excellent job of liaising between Chagossians and Parliament.

In addition, the Government have established a Chagossian contact group, which has wide representation from Chagossian communities in the UK, but also in Mauritius, Seychelles and elsewhere, to give Chagossians the formal role—this is what I think noble Lords seek —that can shape decision-making on the UK Government’s support for their community. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, again reminded us, he will seek to make sure that that group can be as effective as I know noble Lords want it to be. The group met for the first time on 2 September and will convene quarterly thereafter. As my noble friend Lord Coaker and I said in our letter to all Peers, we are exploring opportunities for enhancing that group, including increasing its transparency and frequency. But we are clear that any decisions about the contact group have to be made in agreement with its existing members, and the Government will engage with the group on these questions.

I forget whether we are considering Amendments 29 and 32 or whether they have been degrouped. I think we are doing those. They were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and relate to the UNGA resolutions. I do not think that would be an especially constructive exercise. The treaty expressly states that it constitutes the full and final settlement of all claims by Mauritius in relation to the Chagos Archipelago; it is hard to see how the proposed report would add to that.

In relation to Amendment 49, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, there has never been a claim that all Chagossians share civic identity with Mauritius. As I have said, and as has been said numerous times in this Chamber and in the other place, it is a diverse community with a wide range of views. I said at the beginning of this contribution that the Government have prioritised the needs of security and securing the base on Diego Garcia. I know there are those who disagree with that and I have heard them. That being said, it does not mean that the Government should not do the very best job that we can of engaging with the Chagossian community, and making sure that its diverse range of views are reflected as best we can, as we move forward on the functioning of the contact group, the trust fund and other issues. I commit from the Dispatch Box that this Government will do everything they can to make sure that that happens, and I hope that the noble Lord will therefore seek to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

With the leave of the Committee, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in relation to Amendment 77 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on the process for the establishment of the joint commission. This is critically important because, while the treaty does talk about the process of setting up the joint commission in Annex 3, there is no determination as to whether that person, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said, will be a Member of Parliament, will be accountable to Parliament or will be a civil servant. It would be very helpful if we had more detail in relation to that matter.

It brings me back to my days studying constitutional law at Queen’s University, Belfast, when Professor Brigid Hadfield used to lecture us about the mischief behind the law. She would say, “Read the debate in Parliament to find out what the mischief was”. I was just thinking of her there when I was listening to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. It would be really useful to find out what the Government’s position is in relation to this joint commission, because it could be a very critical part of the post-agreement scenario, where there is accountability to this place. I would really welcome clarity in relation to that matter.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to address Amendments 11 and 12 in my name, which both relate to the terms of the lease. Over the years, I have often heard leaseholders wish they had, or propose to acquire, the freehold. They feel that, as leaseholders, they are in a very inferior position and that the freeholder has the whip hand and, of course, at the end of the lease, the freeholder, like as not, gets everything back and leaseholders potentially lose everything. This is the first time I have ever heard of someone wanting to swap a freehold for a leasehold and, at the same time, claiming that they will be more secure as a result. Of course, they will not—and even less secure, given the terms of this agreement. Amendment 11 relates to whether or not the lease is renewable.

The lease is dealt with in Article 13 of the treaty, which says that it has a duration of 99 years. What happens at the end of 99 years? Is it automatically renewable? No. Under Article 13.5, the UK has a right to first refusal for a further 40 years on the same terms as offered to any third state. There we have it. Mauritius can offer the UK-US base to a third state in 99 years’ time and force the UK and USA to outbid some other bidder—it might be China, India, Iran or any other country with interests in the Indian Ocean around it, such as Saudi Arabia. There are lots of countries that can afford and might like to have this base. We would have to outbid them to retain what had been maintained and invested in for the previous 99 years. I have no reason to suppose that it would not be as valuable in the future then as it is now.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

To give him some more money.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Probably to get some more money. Indeed, we should have dealt with that in the previous session on money. How much more money is he asking for? One understands there are debates in Mauritius saying they have done so well that they should now reopen discussions and get a little more.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not sure if the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, wants a serious response to that last comment. I will respond to the noble Lord’s point that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Yes, this is true, but if the asset is legally contested to the extent that a close ally is no longer investing in it, and third-party friends and allies are possibly unwilling to support its operability, I would say that possession of that asset is worth a lot less than one that has legal certainty, the investment of the United States and the ability to operate it, because third parties will not be questioning the legal basis on which it is held. But we have been through this at some length already.

I turn to the amendments in the group concerning various mechanisms surrounding termination and the extension of the treaty. We will deal with the issue of sovereignty and termination in a subsequent group. On Amendments 6, 12, 79 and 89 about the implications of terminating the treaty, I should remind the House that there are extremely limited grounds for termination once the treaty is in force, both of which are within the UK’s control. The first would be if we did not pay the sums due under Article 11. Secondly, to answer the point made by the noble Lord, it would be in the case of an armed attack, or threat of one by the United Kingdom on Mauritius, or one directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia. This base is, of course, to be operated by the United Kingdom and the United States together.

It is in our interests that the grounds for termination are limited in this way. It means that Mauritius is unable unilaterally to terminate the agreement except in very specific circumstances. These amendments would therefore force us to reopen negotiations on an area in which we have already secured the strongest terms, and which have also been endorsed by our US allies. It is also highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination. It is important that we understand and are clear about that.

On Amendment 11, Article 13 already sets out the basis on which we can extend the duration of the treaty, including our right of first refusal. The treaty will last for an initial 99 years and may be extended for a further 40 years and beyond, by agreement between the UK and Mauritius. Even if no agreement were reached, the UK would have the right to first refusal on the use of Diego Garcia. If exercised, this would prevent the use of the base by any other party. I was asked—I think by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, but it may have been another noble Lord—how exactly this would work and on what terms. I will get a full answer on this specific point. For today, I am relying on the right of first refusal. I will come back to noble Lords and clarify exactly what is meant by this.

I welcome the interest shown by Amendment 77 in the establishment of the joint commission. Its precise structure is still being developed and will continue to be a point of negotiation between the UK, Mauritius and the US. This includes the development of terms of reference as to how the joint commission will function. However, the following principles have already been agreed, as set out in Annexe 3 to the treaty. I think these answer some of the points that were put, although, because we are still negotiating, it is useful to get the responses, understanding and views of noble Lords on some of these things. The joint commission shall consist of one senior representative from each party as co-chairs, and four additional representatives from each party. The US shall have the right to introduce items for discussion in the joint commission and to designate a representative to attend meetings and provide views and advice. The joint commission shall meet at least twice a year, or more frequently on the request of either party. All decisions of the joint commission shall be taken with the agreement of both parties.

While I welcome the opinions of noble Lords on the best means of keeping the House informed on the development of the joint commission, I do not think that a statutory obligation to publish a statement would be the most appropriate means of doing so, although I will think about this a little more.

On this issue of prerogative and the law on Diego Garcia, this applies only to the law on Diego Garcia. We did have quite a complex exchange about this in one of our briefing conversations and it does not apply to the operation of the treaty, so it would not concern non-payment or any of those other issues. It is only about the law as it applies to Diego Garcia. I hope that that is helpful and that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

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Moved by

[Lord Lilley]

10: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert “, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has—(a) sought to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius on whether Mauritius will establish a right for Chagossians to return and reside in the Chagos Islands, and(b) laid before both Houses of Parliament a report on progress on establishing such negotiations with the Government of Mauritius and the outcome of any that have taken place.(2B) Within two months of the report being laid under paragraph (2A(b), the Secretary of State must table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the contents of the report.(2C) In this section “Chagossians” are defined as those eligible for British citizenship under section 4 of the Act, and their descendants.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires that the Government must undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return, with a report laid before Parliament on the outcome of the negotiations. The Government must subsequently table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the content of that report.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Amendment 10 deals with the issue of resettlement. This is a very sensitive issue, one that Chagossians feel very deeply about. But Article 6 of the agreement, which is entitled “Resettlement of Chagossians”, fails to give any right to Chagossians to resettle. The wording of Article 6 is:

“In the exercise of its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, Mauritius is free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago other than Diego Garcia. Such resettlement shall be implemented in conformity with the terms of this Agreement and the laws of Mauritius”.


Let us be clear: there is no right for Chagossians to resettle; there is no obligation on Mauritius to resettle the Chagossians. Mauritius is simply free to do resettlement but it does not specify that that resettlement has to be by Chagossians. It could resettle it with Mauritians—just as, when I used to work in Indonesia, it resettled Javans on the various islands such as Borneo and Sumatra. All we are doing is saying that Mauritius can do what it likes—it can do or not do anything that is to the benefit of the Chagossians, or it can give away their former lands and islands to other people—and we will effectively sanctify that through our agreement to Article 6.

Back in 2015, the British Government looked at the possibility of resettlement and asked KPMG to do a study of how much it would cost and how feasible it was. A year later, KPMG came out with a report which stated that resettlement was possible. It would cost certain sums depending how much resettlement was done. If there was a pilot community of 150 people, that would cost in those days £63 million—in current money, that would be about £80 million to £90 million. If there was a medium-sized settlement of 500 people, that would cost about £200 million in today’s money, and if there was a large community of 1,500 people, which is more than the population of Chagos in 1965, that would cost in today’s money £570 million. That is a large sum, but it is much smaller than the sums we have committed to pay Mauritius over the life of this deal. They are largely one-off sums, whereas we are talking of paying Mauritius initially an average of £110 million, inflation adjusted, plus some lump sums and some bringing forward of money in the early period.

We could certainly start a pilot community of Chagossians back in the Chagos Islands for a fraction of what we are otherwise committed to spend on this agreement, so I understand why Chagossians feel really let down and sold out that we are prepared to pay so much money to Mauritius and to designate none of that to their potential resettlement. We pretend to by having this Article entitled “Resettlement of Chagossians”, but it gives no guarantee that the money will be spent in this way.

The study by KPMG looked into the practicalities. The reason it costs money is that we will have to rebuild facilities. On some of the islands there was a church, a hospital, buildings and so on that have fallen into rack and ruin. They would have to be re-established, and there would have to be transport facilities for the envisaged resettled communities to link up with each other and the outside world, but I again point out that these are not huge sums. This is not impossible. It is something that many in the Chagossian community, in the UK, in Mauritius even more, in the Seychelles and elsewhere would like to undertake, but they are not going to be able to undertake it unless Mauritius says so, and one gets the feeling that Mauritius is not terribly well disposed to the idea, otherwise it would not have negotiated such harsh terms in Article 6, which imposes no obligation on it to do so.

I ask Ministers to think again about this and to go back to the Mauritians and say, “I’m sorry, we have”—as they will have done by then—“consulted the Chagossians. We found how eager many of them are to resettle. Many more are eager to have the right of return to visit the graves of their ancestors, the places where they were born and the churches where they worshipped, and we feel they should be given that right, and if we’re going to settle a trust fund on you, we want to be sure it’s going to be used for those purposes as well as perhaps a chunk of the money we’re paying you in rent”. I hope the Minister will look at that in a positive way, given her evident sympathy for the Chagossians, and tell us that there is going to be a little hint of some more positive news that we can give the Chagossian community. I beg to move.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I will speak briefly in support of the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan, in this group. On resettlement, what we have in the treaty may be described as less than useless. I say that because, to a certain extent, it confers a right that is already there, but it underlines it in such a way and denies others that right. The treaty explicitly says that there is a right for Mauritius to resettle people.

If we have handed over sovereignty to Mauritius, people implicitly have a right to resettle on the other islands anyway but, actually, it very much underlines that Mauritius is completely in control; it is completely in the driving seat. There is a lack of reference to the Chagossians: yes, Mauritius may choose to allow some Chagossians back, but it may choose also to deny them. There is no specific right for the Chagossians.

If, as has been mentioned across the Chamber, we are to try to rectify some of the many ills that we have done to the Chagossian people over the years, having at least some level of right of return is the bare minimum that we should be looking for here. The concern is that, from the point of view of Mauritius, the implication will be that, if it is to allow back some Chagossians, they will be the hand-picked Chagossians who have played ball with the Mauritian Government. If you are a good boy or a good girl, yes, you may be allowed back. If, however, you have been part of the awkward squad, you may have a much lesser chance of being resettled on the Chagos Islands than, for example, Chinese contractors. That is the problem.

These amendments would at least take a step towards trying to ameliorate and rectify that situation. If we cannot give the Chagossians an opportunity or a right, which is completely missing in the treaty and missing in the Bill, we are not giving them anything.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

It is for the Mauritian Government to make that decision. I understand the noble Baroness’s scepticism, especially given our reluctance to undertake this. To serve citizens living in such a remote place with so few services is a considerable thing to do, which is why we are very careful and mindful of the warnings that we have heard about not wanting to give false hope or a false impression, or to make this sound straightforward. That guides us all in our discussions. It is, of course, an incredibly difficult prospect and very expensive. There is the trust fund. I do not know how that would operate and whether it would enable some of this to happen. This is for the Government of Mauritius to determine; we are completely clear about that. The noble Baroness might not wish that to be so, but I point out that the UK Government, for over 50 years, have made it absolutely clear that we would not facilitate return to the islands, for security and financial reasons.

On Amendment 72, it is important that negotiations between the UK and Mauritius on this matter—which I completely accept is sensitive—can take place in confidence. Publishing the records of confidential negotiations such as this would be damaging to trust in the UK keeping matters confidential in the future. That relates not just to our negotiations with Mauritius; it would obviously relate to the prospect of our negotiations with other states on other equally or more sensitive matters. With that, I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 10 withdrawn.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

It is not my fault if the Liberal Democrats do not want to be consistent on this.

The point is that colleagues of the noble Lords to my left have argued in the other place for a referendum, but the Liberal Democrats in your Lordships’ House have done nothing. The noble Lord has tabled just two amendments, only one of which is consequential. When we debated ratification, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, withdrew his amendments to the Motion without a Division. I think that speaks a thousand volumes. It seems that it falls to my noble friends on these Benches to stand up for the Chagossians and ask for the referendum that they rightly deserve. I beg to move.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I support my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment. My own amendment also calls for a referendum. The Government have given priority to the Mauritians—and, indeed, to some extent, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice—maintaining what they think of as territorial integrity over the right to self-determination. That should not be the case. Under international law, the right of a group within a decolonised area to self-determination has priority over so-called territorial integrity. It is very regrettable that that has not yet been conceded.

When we come to vote on this subject on Report, as no doubt we will, I very much hope that this will be an area where there is widespread support across the House. I very much hope that the Liberal Democrats will support a vote requiring a referendum among the Chagossian people over the right to self-determination. We are told that they did so in the Commons. In fact, they were so moved by it and thought it such an important issue that they voted against the whole Bill at Third Reading.

So far, the amendments the Liberal Democrats have tabled cannot be said to be amendments that would require a referendum. Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, would require that

“a Minister of the Crown must engage with the Government of the Republic of Mauritius with a view to establishing a Joint Parliamentary Commission”.

We are getting “could”, “may” and “might” added together.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Will the noble Lord give way?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I will speak to the noble Lord’s amendment first, because I am informing the House about it, and then he can tell me where I am wrong.

Amendment 80 would require that, having engaged with the Mauritian authorities to set up this joint commission, and having perhaps persuaded them to do so:

“The Minister of the Crown must further propose that the Commission’s responsibilities include … evaluating the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including … the right of return”


and

“the right to self-determination”.

We would therefore have to seek the Mauritians’ agreement on setting up a commission and then propose to that commission that it does something to evaluate the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, which would include the right of return and to self-determination. However, this amendment, if we were to accept it, contains absolutely no requirement for the House to support a referendum. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that this convoluted chain of events would lead to such a recommendation.

The final sentence of the amendment reads:

“If the Commission described in subsection (1) is established, within five years of the commencement of the Treaty”,


et cetera. The commission is not envisioned to even get going for several years, and the amendment is probably realistic to recognise this. I am looking forward to a serious Liberal amendment, or their support for serious amendments from me and my noble friend that would require a referendum. I give way to the noble Lord, now that he knows more about what his amendment says.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for intervening when he was moving his amendment. I am flattered by being so courted by the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley. Historians will be aware that the Rough Wooing was not entirely successful in my Border area. I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that I am sure he will be able to clarify. He is aware that the House of Commons voted on Amendment 9 for a referendum. Tabled by my colleagues, it would have required the Government to seek to

“undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return and on a referendum”

for Chagossians on self-determination. Parliament has voted on this already. The Division was 319 votes against and 83 in favour. The Conservatives did not support it. Why?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot tell the noble Lord that. I read the debate and it was not clear that there was much focus on the Liberal amendment. He has read out part of it; it covered lots of other things and they probably thought it was a bit wishy-washy.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I do not think that is quite acceptable. Amendment 9 was voted on, and it included everything that the noble Lord asked of me. Why did the Conservatives not support it?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I do not know. I am not an official representative of the Conservative Party. I am flattered that the noble Lord thinks I control the Conservative Party in the Commons and in this place. I do not do either. I have not had any ministerial role since about 2000. I may give the impression of having power and influence beyond that which I really do, and I am flattered that he should think so.

I would like to see the Liberal Democrats support us. We know that, if they do, we will win, but they seem unlikely to do so. It is clear that they have done a deal with the Government. They will never defeat the Government on issues of substance because, if they do, they will not get as many peerages as they want next time. Let us be quite clear about this. It is as shoddy as that underneath this, I suspect. I hope I am wrong—I may well be. I often am.

It would be a wonderful thing, and we may be able to achieve something for the Chagossians in the shape of getting an amendment on Report—not now, because we are in Committee—which has the support of a majority in this House. If we carry it out, the odds are that the Chagossian people will declare that they do not want to be incorporated in Mauritius and would prefer to remain citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory and British subjects. In that case, we should honour and support their decision when it is taken. I look forward to a Damascene conversion by the Liberal party to this amendment.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, we are almost having another debate on the referendum, which I spoke to on the original amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, earlier. The referendum is probably one of the most important aspects of the Bill, because it is fair and needed and the Chagossians really want it. I am not really interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said about what happened on the amendment on a referendum in the other place, because it was not in the manifesto. As far as I am concerned, we in this Committee should be able to make up our own minds and should certainly not be stopped from moving amendments to the Bill just because the other place has decided something.

It is so just so antidemocratic. I am amazed that the Labour Back-Benchers are going along with this. They are not here—does that mean that they do not actually support the Bill but are having to be loyal? It is a shocking Bill. As the noble Lord said at the beginning, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said at Second Reading, this must rate as the worst Bill that Labour have brought forward—which is quite difficult, as there have been so many awful Bills. They just cannot justify it.

These amendments tonight are very important, and I hope that, when we come back on Report, many more Members will have actually read what has gone on in this debate and recognised that to support a referendum is the right thing to do.

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[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 60, 65 and 68 on the protection and preservation of native and migratory bird species, protection against illegal fishing and, generally, marine conservation. Chagossians support these amendments and want to see His Majesty’s Government implementing them.

First, I will deal with the protection and preservation of native and migratory bird species. Amendment 60 not only represents an environmental concern but a kind of power that, as the indigenous people of the Chagos Islands, they wish to be able to exercise themselves. It sets out the kind of responsible stewardship they want to provide to their own homeland, but the Bill, in Clauses 2 to 4, extinguishes their right to self-government in the islands from which they were forcibly removed by a Labour Government.

The Chagos Archipelago is one of the most important sea bird sanctuaries on earth. It supports some of the largest and least disturbed tropical sea bird colonies remaining anywhere in the world. Scientific surveys by the British Indian Ocean Territory, the Zoological Society and the Chagos Conservation Trust confirm that it holds globally significant populations of species that are in decline elsewhere.

I could go through and name a number of the breeds that are very rare: red-footed boobies breed in very large numbers and tens of thousands of brown noddies, white terns, sooty terns and wedge-tailed shearwaters are nesting successfully nesting on the uninhabited islands that remain free of invasive predators.

Sea birds are not simply wildlife; they are the ecological engine of the entire archipelago. Guano from the large sea bird colonies enriches coastal waters, increasing nitrogen and phosphorus levels that in turn fuel reef productivity. Peer-reviewed research published in Nature shows that reef fish biomass adjacent to healthy seabird colonies can be up to five times higher than the reefs where seabirds have been lost. Protecting seabirds is therefore central to protecting the coral reefs, the lagoon ecosystems and the wider marine food web.

These are not hypothetical risks; they are documented threats to the species of global conservation concern, coming from rats, which can wipe out entire colonies. Light pollution disorientates fledglings. Human disturbance can cause nesting failure. There is a whole range of things. The amendment seeks to create a clear duty to safeguard this irreplaceable natural heritage. It is the kind of environmental care and responsible stewardship that the Chagossians themselves wish to bring to their homeland if they are allowed back and to have self-determination. If this Bill passes in its current form, we will transfer the Chagos Islands to the Republic of Mauritius, a country that is 1,337 miles away and does not even have the capacity, as I said earlier, to reach the islands without assistance from India. We will deny the Chagossian people the opportunity to govern these vital ecological assets. That shows what is at stake. The Chagossian people are asking what needs to be done and what they will lose if we proceed with Clauses 2 to 4. We should not be denying them this as far as the amendment on birds is concerned.

Amendment 65 seeks to introduce a waste management and coastal protection system for the Chagos archipelago. Again, I am sure that noble Lords will agree with this because the ecological consequences are serious and well documented—the risk of ghost nets ensnaring endangered green and hawksbill turtles as well as red-footed boobies, which I have already mentioned, brown noddies and reef sharks. When these nets become caught on the reef crest, they break the coral colonies and accelerate degradation.

It is a most significant protected marine area, covering more than 640,000 square kilometres, including a very large share of the remaining high-quality coral reefs in the Indian Ocean. Seabird-driven nutrient cycles, which sustain high fish biomass on adjacent reefs, are disrupted when plastics and fishing gear interfere with nesting colonies. The Chagossian people know this better than anyone. They have told us that keeping their coastline clean is a matter of identity, stewardship and duty. They want to remove the waste that arrives from other nations and prevent further debris entering their waters. That is an essential part, to them, of caring for their homeland. This amendment is not merely about waste but about justice. It is about whether this House, currently denying the Chagossian people any act of self-determination, will also deny them the ability to protect the beaches, reefs and nesting grounds of their homeland. I hope that this amendment will be supported by noble Lords.

Amendment 68 concerns protection against illegal fishing. It would require the Secretary of State to establish a system of patrols and monitoring to prevent illegal fishing within Chagos territorial waters and the surrounding marine protected areas. It would require the Secretary of State to establish a clear system of patrols and monitoring within the Chagos territorial waters and the surrounding marine protected areas. It is exactly what the Chagossian community have said they would want to do for themselves if Clauses 2 to 4 of this Bill were not going through and the United Kingdom was relinquishing sovereignty. The evidence of illegal fishing in these waters is real and well documented. The Chagos marine protected area spans more than 640,000 square kilometres, an area the size of France. It is formally designated as a fully no-take zone, yet its remoteness has made it a target for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Satellite monitoring, vessel tracking systems and analysis by global monitoring groups such as Global Fishing Watch have on multiple occasions detected foreign longliners operating close to, and in some instances within, the BIOT waters.

Enforcement records maintained by the British Indian Ocean Territory Administration confirm that vessels have been intercepted while illegally targeting tuna, sharks and other species. Past patrols have confiscated shark fins, prohibited gear and long lines, providing clear physical evidence of illegal extraction.

The ecological consequences are profound. Illegal fishing undermines the conservation objectives of one of the world’s most important marine protected areas. Every scientific assessment of Chagos ecosystems concludes that maintaining strong enforcement is essential to preserve its uniquely intact reefs, fish biomass and biodiversity.

There are still many people in the Chagossian community who, from their history and heritage, understand this intimately. They have said that protecting the fish stocks is as important to them as protecting their beaches and nesting sites. They want to be able to participate in patrols to support monitoring and to take responsibility for safeguarding the marine life that their parents and grandparents depended on. They see illegal fishing as a threat not only to biodiversity but to their future ability to sustain themselves when they go back to their islands.

Also, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—we have been discussing the advice that it gave—Article 61 requires coastal states to conserve living resources. Article 62 obliges them to ensure proper management and enforcement. Article 73 grants the authority and responsibility to board, inspect, arrest and detain vessels engaged in illegal fishing. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has confirmed that these articles require states to maintain monitoring, to regulate and, crucially, to enforce. At present, there is no statutory duty in domestic law requiring the UK to maintain patrols or monitoring in the BIOT. This amendment would fill that gap and bring legislation into proper alignment with other international obligations, which noble Lords are very keen always to comply with.

The Government may argue that Mauritius can meet these responsibilities after transfer, but the United Kingdom remains the coastal and administrating power today and its treaty obligations exist today. They cannot be satisfied by assuming that another state will meet them.

These are very sensible amendments which, if passed, would at least give the Chagossians the feeling that the United Kingdom cared about the islands overall, about the fishing, the bird life and about the marine life generally. I hope that noble Lords, when they look carefully at this, will actually agree to these amendments. If not, we will bring them back on Report.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I had not intended to speak on these amendments because there are other far more qualified people who I thought would do so. I served on your Lordships’ Environment and Climate Change Committee when it produced the report in July 2023 on the biodiversity agreement in Montreal. As I recall, that commitment, the Montreal treaty, requires Britain to protect 30% of its marine areas by 2030; it was called the 30 by 30 agreement. We were very proud, and I think it was mentioned in that report, that the largest single area of sea that was being protected was the British Indian Ocean Territory’s sea. We accepted tacitly that it was Britain’s responsibility to protect that, that it was a very important area of biodiversity for the world as a whole, and that it was our responsibility.

It now seems that we have handed that over to Mauritius, but Mauritius has no means of policing that area. It has no boats or aeroplanes that could cover that distance and that area. I doubt whether we had permanent boats stationed there, but if there were problems we could. We have the capacity to send both sea- and airborne reconnaissance aircraft to make sure that things are being properly respected.

I wonder, therefore, whether this treaty which we are now legislating to implement is not in contravention of our commitments under the Montreal biodiversity treaty. Are we abandoning commitments we made there and leaving them, in effect, unpoliced?

Another treaty was passed which we did not investigate and which was investigated by another committee of this House. I cannot even remember the name of the treaty but it was about areas of the sea which are outside national jurisdiction. It would seem that this now covers the BIOT—or does it? I hope the Minister will tell us which of these two treaties it is covered by. Is it covered by the old one, which we had responsibility for but have now given up, despite our international obligations under international law, which are normally sacrosanct, or is it under another treaty, which means that it is now dealt with as if it is beyond national jurisdiction?

These are clearly very important matters. It is a shame that we are discussing them at this time of night when people far better informed than I, who could bring their expertise and knowledge to bear, are not here. Since they are not here, I am raising these questions and hope that the Minister will be able to respond to them.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I am happy to respond. As I understand it, details about the Mauritian marine protected area were published only last week, or it may have been the week before. There will be a new treaty which will be lodged at the UN in a similar way to ours. It will not be a BBNJ issue. I think we will be considering it in this House next week, when we can get into it in a little more detail now that the noble Lord is back into these issues after a bit of a break. Because this would not be biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, it would be the responsibility of the Mauritians and covered by the new treaty. I can talk about that a bit more now.

Amendments 15 and 66 would prevent Clauses 2 to 4 coming into force until the UK Government had published a report on how it intended to preserve the Chagos Marine Protected Area. The MPA will be for the Mauritian Government to implement. They have already announced the creation of the MPA, which they will create once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the marine protected area. Low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians will be allowed in certain limited areas and will be compatible with nature conservation. The UK will continue to support Mauritius in the establishment of this marine protected area and in protecting the globally significant ecosystems of the Chagos Archipelago.

On Amendments 38 and 65, while I appreciate and understand the noble Baroness’s commitment to sustaining the unique and pristine environment around the archipelago, recycling and waste management systems on the outer islands would be for Mauritius to deliver. On Diego Garcia itself, waste management is currently undertaken by the US and monitored by the UK to ensure compliance with environmental standards. This will continue following the entry into force of the agreement, with no identified need to change current processes.

On Amendment 60, while Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, the UK will continue to provide support to protect migratory bird species. Within the agreement, under the international organisations’ exchange of letters, the UK and Mauritius will, for instance, agree separate arrangements to maintain the listed Ramsar wetlands site on Diego Garcia, which provides a unique protected habitat for migratory birds. Further protections will be a matter for Mauritius.

On Amendments 16 and 68, Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, including enforcement. On 3 November, the Mauritian Government announced the creation of the Chagos Archipelago Marine Protected Area. They have confirmed already that no commercial fishing will be allowed in any part of the MPA. They will, however, allow low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians in certain limited areas, which will be compatible with nature conservation.

The UK has agreed to co-operate with Mauritius on maritime security and provide assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty. The terms of this co-operation and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.

Amendment 73 is completely unnecessary. We have been clear on this. The UK has not and will not make any financial payment to the Mauritian Government to establish a new MPA in the waters surrounding the Chagos Archipelago. The UK has agreed to provide support and assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty, protecting the vital military base on Diego Garcia, and the terms of this support and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.

Amendment 76 is no longer required. On 3 November, Mauritius, as I have said, announced the creation of its MPA once the treaty enters into force. Similarly, the points about artisanal fishing apply to that amendment as well. With that, I hope that the amendment can be withdrawn.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I want to say a few words. I have been rather sparing in the Committee debate today, but the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has prompted me to speak.

I have been a passionate supporter of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, I have served on this Parliament’s executive committee of the CPA UK and I have had the great privilege of visiting a great number of Commonwealth nations in all parts of the world, including early this year Malaysia. We have to be very careful, particularly perhaps in this House of Parliament, when we debate a process that has been very difficult on decolonisation. We have to be very cautious with how we approach it and very mindful of the language that we use.

We had 12 years of the Malayan Emergency and I have met the relatives of those who were affected by that. There is not a Commonwealth country that does not have difficult stories, on many occasions. We are still living with this today. I would counsel anybody that, yes, of course, we are free to make any contributions, but we have to be very mindful.

The noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, whom I greatly respect, indicated that perhaps the precedent was this deal. Now, there may be circumstances where a bad deal might be seen by other people as some form of precedent, but I do not think that that is the point that is being made in this group. The point that I hear being made in this group is that the very point of principle that we opened negotiations to cede sovereignty is the precedent. Well, that decision was made in 2022. If we are to see the consequences of decisions taken by a British Government to recognise that negotiations should take place to cede sovereignty, then we have had three years of knowing what the consequences of that will be. I have heard nothing from anybody on this group saying that they have seen the consequences of that decision taken by the previous Administration in November 2022.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I want primarily—perhaps later—to talk about my Amendments 20Q and 20U, but I will say something about my noble friend Lord Hannan’s Amendment 20L to emphasise one particular precedent he mentioned in passing but seems the most compelling and dangerous. Indeed, in line with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I have been rather cautious about discussing this because I did not want to put ideas into people’s heads, but, for two reasons, I will go ahead and talk about it now. First, there is no better way to keep a secret than to pronounce it in the House of Lords; and secondly, as my noble friend Lord Hannan said, there are lawyers in every country looking to see whether this is a precedent that they could use to right some past wrong or to change some past circumstance which they would like changed.

The most compelling comparison is between what we are doing now and the reasons given for doing it and the independence of Cyprus, where we severed off the sovereign bases. They were part of a whole. The territorial integrity of Cyprus was divided between the sovereign bases and the rest. That is exactly what we are accused of doing in the case of the Chagos Islands. It is actually much more true in the case of Cyprus than in that of the Chagos Islands, because Cyprus was always governed as one unit by us whereas the Chagos Islands had separate laws, even if they were transmitted from somebody resident in Mauritius. Therefore, if we are saying that there is compelling reason for us to say we cannot separate the Chagos Islands from Mauritius, of which it has never been part, then surely there are compelling reasons why we should never have separated the sovereign base territories from the rest of Cyprus.

Those bases are hugely important. They played a role time and again in recent disputes and interventions, and in the prospect of interventions in the Middle East. We have been able to help fly from them and intercept missiles from Iran coming towards Israel. In previous conflicts, we used the bases there. They of value not only to us but to the whole of NATO. If we put them at risk by saying to the world that we have no right to have separated them then we would be doing something very foolish.

The only difference I can think of—I am offering a solution to this dilemma, because I do not want the issue of the sovereign bases to be opened up in a dangerous way—is that the decisions in Cyprus were taken before the United Nations General Assembly resolution on which the advisory opinion of the ICJ was based, and therefore it did not apply to them. Of course, advisory opinions are not actually binding—they are wrongly taken as being binding but they are not—but do they apply retrospectively? In many cases when courts rule, they say, “This has always been the case; we’ve only just now ruled it”.

I would like to hear how the Minister proposes to defend the sovereign bases in Cyprus from this precedent. She is obviously not doing this willingly; she is obviously unwilling and she is a wonderful Minister, but she has been given a tough job to do. I would like to hear some justification for this. I do not know whether the precedent in Committee allows me to sit down now and stand up later to deal with my amendments, but assuming I can do that, I will.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I will briefly make two points. First, on behalf of my noble friend Lord McCrea, who has had to leave for a family wedding, I will speak to Amendment 57, which principally brings to the Committee’s attention the role of British legal firms in this issue.

We have been critical in this House of the current and, to some extent, the previous Government. Those criticisms are not entirely without merit on the issue of sovereignty. There has also been further British involvement in any number of aspects, the four most significant legal interventions being two cases in connection with UNCLOS; one relating to the advisory opinion of the ICJ; and one on the drafting of the UN security resolution. In each of these four cases, the Mauritius Government used British firms as their legal representation in order to further their aims. In effect, British firms acted on behalf of a foreign Government to challenge British sovereignty, British defence rights and the wishes of British citizens. We cannot do anything about what happened in the past, but I suppose the amendment queries whether there is an appropriate way forward in terms of that level of support for Mauritius. Raising my noble friend Lord McCrea’s amendment gives the Government an opportunity to respond to it.

I want to deal briefly with the wider point. We do not always see eye to eye, but I agree with at least one phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, used: he said that we have to be careful about words, and words matter. One of the major concerns, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, and others, might be described as the precedent and the ripple effect. It is undoubtedly the case that in the past we as a nation have made mistakes in dealing with overseas territories. In particular, we have sent out the wrong signals on both the Falklands and Gibraltar. It is probably the case that some, at different points within Governments in the past, would have been quite happy to see those territories dispatched to another sovereign territory on that basis. They can best speak for themselves but, fortunately enough, in each case we have drawn back from what might be described as a fatal mistake. The danger with this is that it crosses the line in handing over that level of sovereignty.

Mention has been made of a range of overseas territories. The one thing that largely unites them is that whatever discussions we have had with different Governments, about whatever level of co-operation, they have ultimately respected the self-determination and the inhabitants’ will for sovereignty. That is what at times has drawn us back. I think this goes beyond that and moves towards a situation regarding the wishes of the Chagossian people and their right to self-determination—and that self-determination may, because we do not know definitively, express itself in them saying, “We want to be part of Mauritius”. If that is their self-determination, so be it. I think it is unlikely to be the case; nevertheless, so be it. The concern is the signal that this sends out to the outside world.

The Minister mentioned the arrangements as regards Gibraltar. I think there has been work ongoing with both this Government and the previous Government to try to find arrangements that are in the best interests of Gibraltar. I entirely acknowledge that, while it is sometimes easy to criticise when looking from outside, the Gibraltar Government themselves have been supportive of those actions and have backed the moves made so far.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I just want us to remind ourselves of the history of the British Empire and how Macmillan suddenly said: there are now winds of change and, if we resist, we may lose something very good. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II created this wonderful thing called the Commonwealth. She put in a lot of effort and energy, and those countries that were once ruled are now part of the Commonwealth, and what is interesting is that in most of those countries the national language is English. So there can be a transition that does not destroy a lot of goodness nor give the impression that those territories where the sovereign is still His Majesty the King will simply look at this and say, “They did it, so we can”. You will find that politically, in Jamaica and other places, the Crown has made it very clear that this is a decision of those nations. If they wanted to become independent, that is their decision. They are not going to force themselves on anybody.

I thought the treaty that was entered into with Mauritius was to create a long-term use of Diego Garcia and the archipelago. If we did not, the challenge was soon going to come because of what happened at the United Nations. We would have found ourselves with a big challenge. Even China was interested in challenging British sovereignty, but now a treaty has been signed and has secured this.

Another good thing on which I want to congratulate the Government is that they did not simply sign a treaty so that this base can be used for 99 years. Because sovereignty is now being transferred, they also provided a trust fund for the Chagossians to be better looked after than when the British had sovereignty over the place. This is a win-win situation for the Chagossians and for Britain. We now have security of the base for a 99-year lease. That is quite a long time. I do not think you and I will be here in 99 years, but those who are here may say we did a good thing at the time. As for the fear of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, of what other places may do, it is their right to do whatever they want to do.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity also to speak to my Amendments 20U and 20Q. Amendment 20U would provide that the Bill shall not come into force until the Secretary of State has published

“a report on how the Treaty may increase any political or legal risks”—

that is what we have been told underlie it—

“related to … reliance on third countries required to service the base … risks of litigation from Mauritius regarding the base in Diego Garcia in the International Court of Justice”—

and I hope this will include some explanation of the Government’s reactions to the Mauritian declarations of 23 September 1968 which, as I understand it, mirrored our determination that the ICJ should not have jurisdiction on disputes between previous and current Commonwealth states and ourselves; Mauritius likewise said that any such disputes should be settled reciprocally. Finally, the report should include the

“risks of litigation in an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.

The Minister said a little while ago that we spent many hours discussing the reasons or rationale behind the decision to cede sovereignty. In fact, we have spent many hours dragging out from the Government an explanation of their decision to do so. It is pretty clear that the decision came first, and their justification has been cobbled together in response to each successive challenge that has been put forward to it. The more it has been challenged, the more tenuous the rationale has become. It has been spread out like an elastic band and has become thinner and more transparent. It is very clear that, if we keep on this process, it will eventually break and then the Government will be without any rationale at all.

The Government first suggested that the ICJ decision was purely advisory but Mauritius might come back and somehow get a definitive ruling out of the ICJ. However, that was then abandoned because, of course, we had the specific opt-out when we signed up to the ICJ that it would not be able to consider disputes between ourselves and present or previous Commonwealth countries. One thing has puzzled me. Looking back through the record, I have never seen Ministers refer in words to that opt-out. They have tacitly acknowledged it, because they move on to talking about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Likewise, when we have heard from the great mandarins of the Foreign Office, none of them has ever explicitly let past their lips—if I have read the transcript correctly—the existence of this opt-out. That is a great mystery. When people do not say something, one wants to know why, particularly when they tacitly admit it.

Oh dear, I hope I have not caused the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to leave in disgust. We were hoping he would be able to break this omertà that has forbidden him and his colleagues ever to mention this.

My suspicion—of course it is no more than a suspicion, and the person who could have set that right has left the Chamber—is that the Permanent Secretaries in the Foreign Office and the other mandarins who have spoken in defence of the Government on this never actually told Ministers about this opt-out and they do not like to admit that. Ministers do not like to admit that they did not know about it, because that looks pretty difficult. Maybe in the course of debate we will find that that is an unworthy consideration and they were told explicitly at the beginning there was no possibility of the ICJ reaching a binding judgment on the sovereignty of the Chagos. They tacitly accept that is the case and move on to the possibility of a judgment coming from the tribunal set up under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

My amendment would force the Government to be more explicit about that. What precedents are there for this tribunal ruling on sovereignty? The noble Baroness said that she thought it was very unlikely—I think that was her phrase—that the tribunal would directly rule on sovereignty. I think she is more than right on that, because there are no precedents I can find for it ruling on sovereignty. But then she said that it might rule on other things and sort of assume sovereignty. I would like some examples of that sort of thing happening, if it is a sufficiently big risk for us to be doing this nefarious deed of ceding sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. We have not had that up to now.

The tenuous justification moves on to say that there may be a ruling that would somehow assume sovereignty, but what negative effects would that have? It would apparently put the base at risk, because of its reliance on being supplied from other countries. From which other countries is the Diego Garcia base supplied, and in what way, and how would that be put at risk? Is it supplied from Aden? Would the Suez Canal be closed to British shipping if it was thought to be supplying the base? Would we get labour from mainland Africa to help run the base? Would the Philippines refuse to send Filipino workers to help run the base? When we are given such a tenuous reason, at the end of a long chain of tenuous arguments, we need some substance to it. This amendment would require the Government to give that.

Amendment 20Q would provide that the Bill would come into force only

“when the Secretary of State has published a report into the governance of the Chagos Archipelago under the Treaty, including local administration and democracy”.

The Minister has said that there was never any settled population in the Chagos Islands, nor any system of local administration. I am sure that was said in good faith, and I can well understand that the detailed history of the Chagos Archipelago is not something most of us have studied, but a letter has now been sent to the Minister, and to the committee that has been asked to consult with the Chagossians, pointing out that, in the absence of the British, who sort of came and went, the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands elected a chief to help with the governance and local administration of the islands. Therefore, the settled inhabitants did have a local administration in the past, and we want to know what is going to replace it in future.

We know that Mauritius, while it has no obligation to, will be able to resettle the islands. It may, of course, settle them with Mauritians, not Chagossians. Either way, what system of administration will there be, and will it be democratic or autocratic? I think we should know. My Amendment 20Q would require the Government to spell that out, and to acknowledge and accept that it was a mistake to say that there has never been any system of local administration, when clearly there has.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere for leading this debate. He set out a very strong argument for his amendments in this group, as did my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown.

Amendment 20L, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hannan, is a very helpful amendment in Committee, as it affords the Committee the opportunity to debate the impact of the Government’s decision on the Chagos Archipelago on other overseas territories. While I accept that there are, of course, legal arguments here, we believe that they should be explored fully. I want to focus on the impact of the UK Government’s treatment of the Chagossians, and on our reputation among other overseas territories, which look to the UK for steadfast support and security. How do residents, and descendants of the residents, of other overseas territories feel now that the Government have caved in to pressure from their international lawyer friends on the question of the Chagos Islands?

As my noble friend Lord Hannan observed, the British Indian Ocean Territory is not the only overseas territory subject to legal claims by foreign states. Does the Minister accept that the behaviour of our Government on this issue will have ramifications for the level of trust in the UK held by residents of other overseas territories? We should be standing up for our overseas territories and protecting those who live on them, not caving in to activist international lawyers. In my view, it really is that simple. Can the Minister confirm that the UK Government are not considering ceding sovereignty over any other British Overseas Territories? Will she rule out such a move in future? We want residents of the overseas territories to feel secure, and I hope that the Minister’s words in response to this group will help to give them that security.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, a large number of the amendments that have been tabled seek to mandate the Government to renegotiate the treaty with Mauritius on various points. The noble Lord told me this on many occasions in the last Parliament, so I am sure that he understands the point that I am about to make: treaty-making and international negotiations are a matter for the Government, in exercise of the royal prerogative. It is simply not practical for that to become a matter where Parliament seeks to direct this or that isolated element of what can be intense, dynamic and sometimes difficult negotiations. In this case, I can assure the Committee that the Government have thoroughly considered all aspects of the treaty that the UK has entered into and used all their efforts throughout to achieve the best possible deal for the UK. These requests to reopen negotiations on different points are not realistic and would make the UK appear an unreliable counterparty on the international stage. This treaty has gone through a rigorous assessment and been agreed at the highest levels of the US security establishment.

Our reasons for rejecting Amendment 20U are, essentially, those that I set out earlier in relation to Amendment 20J, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I do not intend to repeat them.

Amendment 20L was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I enjoy the noble Lord’s contributions. His speeches are as entertaining as they are, unfortunately, inaccurate and misleading sometimes. My grandfather fought in Malaya, in the Green Howards, and so it was an unfortunate example that the noble Lord chose to resort to—but I forgive him for this, because he puts so much into his speeches. I assure him and other noble Lords that this deal has been welcomed by both Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, their Governments have both stated that there is no read-across to them, and we should respect what they have to say.

Through Amendment 20M, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, seems to be suggesting that the Government have not complied with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in respect of the treaty. I respectfully disagree with him on this. The treaty was laid in Parliament on the day that it was signed, under the process set out in the Act. CRaG requires that a treaty is laid in both Houses for 21 joint sitting days before it may be ratified. The period expired on 3 July 2025, with neither House resolving against ratification. During that 21-day period, two committees in this House held evidence sessions, including with the Minister for Overseas Territories, and produced reports, which we have responded to. There was a debate and a vote on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, against ratification, which this Government defeated. As a matter of practice, the UK Government do not ratify treaties until the necessary implementing legislation is in place, and that is what the Government are currently doing with the Bill.

Amendments 20P and 20Q appear to misunderstand the archipelago. I feel uncomfortable making this point, as it feels very cold, harsh and legalistic, particularly given the testimonies, many of which we have heard directly from Chagossians in their accounts of what happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not feel comfortable repeating it but this is the legal situation as it is, and it is important to be clear. The archipelago has never had a permanent population. The islands have not been inhabited since the population was removed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, there is no “economy” of the Chagos Archipelago. Once the treaty enters into force, Mauritius will be sovereign and will have jurisdiction over the regulation of commercial activities unrelated to the operation of the base throughout the archipelago, subject to the constraints of the treaty. On the exclusive economic zone around the archipelago, Mauritius has announced its intention to establish a marine protected area and, importantly, there will be no commercial fishing allowed. It will be for Mauritius to decide how any resettlement will work, including in respect of governance of the islands.

Amendment 57, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and spoken to on his behalf, cannot be accepted. The UK’s legal services industry and the English Bar are internationally recognised for their expertise. That includes expertise in public international law, and UK-qualified lawyers act for states all around the world on various matters, facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes. The standing of UK legal expertise should be a matter of pride for this House, not a tool for manipulation by politicians to achieve narrow and short-term advantage. An attempt to place a prohibition on who can utilise our world-leading legal services would undermine access to legal representation—an important element of the rule of law. It is wholly inappropriate for the Government to dictate who can be represented by whom. It risks undermining our standing on the world stage.

I hesitate to repeat the debate we had last week, but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that, had there been no legal risk to our position, why did the United States stop investment in the base at that point? It was because it was sufficiently concerned about the legal risk. Had there been no basis whatever for our concerns on legality, why on earth did the previous Government even begin to negotiate, accepting that they did not manage to conclude a deal? Our view is that there was sufficient legal risk. The noble Lord disagrees, as is his right, but the fact is that the principle of this treaty, and the necessity for it, has been through the appropriate process. It has been voted on in this place and we have voted that this treaty should be ratified. We have already taken that decision in this Chamber. This legislation is about making the necessary changes to UK domestic law to enable us to sign, fully ratify and implement.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way, but I ask her to respond to the point I made: why, even now, does she refuse to let pass her lips any recognition that there was never any possibility of the ICJ reaching a legally binding decision that would affect us, because of our opt-out from the power of the ICJ to decide on disputes between ourselves and Mauritius? UNCLOS is a different matter, but would she let those words pass her lips?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I accept that about the ICJ, but the point is that other countries will act on an advisory opinion even if we choose to ignore it. We have not chosen to ignore it. That is a judgment call. Partly, that is because we think that, by negotiating now, we negotiate from a stronger position than we would have had we waited for other, binding judgments. Those judgments can come from any treaty to which both parties are signed up. That is why we feel—and not everyone has to agree with the Government on this—that there is sufficient legal question that we needed to act and to negotiate. If they are honest with themselves—there is a lack of former Ministers who were responsible for this arguing the point that the noble Lord makes; they argue other points but not this one—there was sufficient legal jeopardy for the previous Government to enter into this process. I hope noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.

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Moved by

[Lord Lilley]

20S: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert “, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has produced a report on the economic partnership under Article 11 of the Treaty and a motion to take note of the report has been approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.”

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Amendment 20S seeks to get the Secretary of State to produce a report on the so-called economic partnership between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, which is set up under Article 11 of the treaty. Parliament should have an opportunity to take note of that and debate it in both Houses.

The reason that is important, apart from the fact that the control of money is the supreme function of Parliament, is that the economic partnership article, Article 11, in the agreement, is very strange. It says:

“In consideration of this Agreement, the United Kingdom agrees … a. to pay Mauritius an annual sum; … b. to capitalise a Trust Fund for the benefit of Chagossians as established by Mauritius; and … c. to grant multi-year funding as part of a development framework for projects to be undertaken by Mauritius across twenty-five (25) years. … The arrangements for such payments, including amounts and modalities shall be agreed separately”.


It then says that this is a “full and final settlement” of the financial aspects of ceding sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

Now, to call this a partnership is a very strange thing. We give them money annually. We give them more money for the benefit of the Chagossians. We give them yet more money for the benefit of the Mauritians. Where is the partnership in all this? If this partnership were ever to be introduced, I hope that Ministers would feel obliged or, out of their natural desire to be helpful, would seek to explain to us why this is a partnership rather than a kind of surrender where we give up the money, we give up the territory and we let them decide—even the trust fund that we set up for the benefit of the Chagossians is “as established by Mauritius”. So the Mauritians are going to determine how this trust fund is used and spent; the Chagossians will have no say in it and will probably get precious little benefit from it.

I hope the Minister will let us in on the secret. What is the quid pro quo in all this? Normally, any partnership means that there are two sides to it. I used to be a partner in a firm, and we were partners; we all benefited from each other. We did not have one side being partners and the other side getting all the benefits. I am genuinely mystified about this. Was it just that this was signed up for when the Government were suffering a fit of generosity? Perhaps the coffers were overflowing with funds. They could not think what to do but give some away to Mauritius for this, some away to a trust fund for that, then more away to Mauritius for 25 years. Where is it all coming from? Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us. I beg to move.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I did not expect to participate in this, but I was having a conversation earlier with my noble friend Lord Minto, who is very knowledgeable about corporate finance. He posed the question: is there anything in this whole arrangement that would stop Mauritius capitalising on the revenue stream that they have coming to them and selling that off to someone else?

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Okay, that might be a good idea. I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment on that basis.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 20S withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Lilley]

20T: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert “, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the duties in section (Joint UK–Mauritius Parliamentary Commission) have been discharged.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected with another in the name of Lord Lilley, seeks to ensure that the sections 2 to 4 of the Act only come into force once the Secretary of State has sought to establish a Joint UK-Mauritius Parliamentary Commission.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 20T and 81K. Amendment 20T just requires that Amendment 81K would happen before the treaty, or parts of it, comes into force.

Amendment 81K proposes setting up a parliamentary commission between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. The proposal is that we seek to agree with Mauritius that this parliamentary commission should reflect equal representation from the Parliaments of the United Kingdom—this Parliament—and the Republic of Mauritius, which one hopes would be acceptable to the Mauritians as fairly rational in these circumstances. More important, what is the function of this commission? It should be to ensure,

“the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including but not limited to … ensuring a right of return … ensuring the right to self-determination via a referendum of all Chagossians on the question of sovereignty is held by the UK”,

and

“access to compensation, resettlement, or other forms of support”.

The Minister has repeated again today this extraordinary affirmation that there is no Chagossian people and never has been—that there has never been any permanent population of the Chagos Islands. I can see why the Minister can say that there no longer is, because we shamefully removed them. But to rely on the fact that we removed them and therefore they are not permanent, when all of us now think it was monstrous that this was done with no possibility of return at the time, and that we should be setting this right, now that we are trying to sort the aftermath of decolonisation, as it is seen, is to my mind extraordinary. How can there have been no permanent population in the past if there are churches, graveyards, signs of habitation, work, agriculture and fishing on several of the islands? Above all, how can we pretend that there never has been any Chagossian population and, at the same time, grant British citizenship to those who can demonstrate that they are descended from Chagossians?

The Minister cannot have it both ways. She cannot say that there has never been anyone there and that we are now recognising that those who have been there, or are descended from them, have the right to British citizenship. It is there in the treaty. I know that when she mentioned this she said it with obvious distaste and embarrassment, but that distaste and embarrassment should have been sorted out with her officials before she got round to saying it again in this Chamber. It is very insulting to the Chagossian people to say that they have never existed.

Given that the Chagossian people have existed, and that we recognise that it was wrong to remove them without in any way trying to provide them with some prospect of undoing that wrong, surely we should, through the parliamentary commission that I propose in this amendment, discuss with the Mauritians, if sovereignty is handed over to them, at least giving Chagossians the right of return and the right of self-determination via a referendum, along with access to compensation, resettlement or other forms of support. If we do that then at least we will go a small way to undoing the wrong that was done in the late 1960s—I think it extended into the 1970s—which all of us now recognise.

It is clearly important that we have some kind of parliamentary commission overseeing this, because the treaty does not do these things. It could allow the resettlement to be extended to Mauritians and not be given to Chagossians, and it could result in the fund that we set up not being paid out to Chagossians—certainly not to Chagossians who have been in the United Kingdom, but solely to Chagossians who now live in Mauritius. It is only right and proper that we have some parliamentary oversight from both sides—from Mauritius as well as from the UK—to ensure this is all properly done. I am sure this proposition is so reasonable that such a reasonable Minister as we have on the Front Bench cannot fail to agree with it. I beg to move.

[The Earl of Leicester (Con)]

I want to add to my noble friend’s words. I will not read the whole letter, but this is a copy of the letter to the Minister from the Chagossian people. They write that the Minister’s words

“cut deeply. They erase our history, our dignity, and the truth of who we are. They echo the very language used to justify our people’s deportation between 1968 and 1973. And they are demonstrably false … For more than a century before our exile, the Chagos Islands were home to a multigenerational, settled population. This is not our opinion. It is documented in church registers of births, marriages, and burials across Peros Banhos, Salomon and Diego Garcia; colonial-era records describing communities with homes, chapels, gardens and workplaces; judgments of the UK High Court in the Bancoult cases; the International Court of Justice; United Nations resolutions; academic research stretching across decades. We were not transient workers. We were a Creole-speaking people, rooted in our islands, with our own traditions, our own culture, and our own community life. To say that our homeland had ‘no permanent population’ is simply untrue … You also stated the islands had ‘never been self-governing’. Chagossians have never claimed to have operated a Westminster-style system. But for generations, in the long absence of resident British administrators, our islands were organised and cared for by local leaders from within our own community”.

This has been confirmed in academic work. Misley Mandarin, who lives here in London now with his family, finishes,

“We ask you not for sympathy, but for recognition. Not for pity, but for accuracy. Not for charity, but for truth. We deserve self-determination. We want to stay British and return to our islands as British citizens”.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord opposite has indicated, it is slightly surprising that the four amendments on establishing a joint UK-Mauritius parliamentary commission or committee have been degrouped. Members are well within their rights to do this and I am glad at least that this time noble Lords have had sufficient notice of what is happening.

I am sensitive to the sentiment of these amendments. I take them to come from a genuine desire for greater parliamentary involvement in the scrutiny of the implementation of the treaty on specific areas that are of concern to the Committee. The Government have always said that they welcome scrutiny, and this remains the case. We are not opposed to the strengthening of links between the UK Parliament and that of Mauritius, although this would be a somewhat novel approach. I think it seems pretty likely that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, took inspiration from the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on this occasion.

There is a question of proportionality and the proper extent of the remit of such a parliamentary commission. Out of respect for the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I propose to discuss this in much more detail when we reach the debate on Amendment 80, which he has tabled. I hope that is acceptable to the noble Lord. I will be very happy to meet with him and other noble Lords to discuss this proposal, and specifically the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in more detail. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 20T withdrawn.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, noble Lords have not had the opportunity to hear from me on the Bill previously. I apologise for not having intruded on previous debates, but I have listened to many of them.

I tabled Amendments 51A, 51B and 51C in pursuance of my continuing interest, over a number of years, in the exercise of prerogative powers and their relationship to parliamentary scrutiny. The combined effect of these three amendments would mean that any Order in Council that exercises a Henry VIII power—that is, to amend, repeal or revoke an Act—would be subject to affirmative procedure, instead of negative as proposed in the Bill, and that any other order, in other words not a Henry VIII power, would be subject to the negative procedure instead of no procedure.

These amendments reflect, and are in accordance with, the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which, in its 37th report on 13 November, said of the Henry VIII power in paragraph 17 that

“the Government has failed to provide a full explanation as to why the power … is subject to the negative procedure … We recommend that this power should be subject to the affirmative procedure”.

In relation to orders that are not of a Henry VIII power character, the committee went on to say:

“We recommend that the power in clause 5(1) when used to do anything other than amend, repeal or revoke an Act should be subject to the negative procedure”.


So my three amendments are intended precisely to deliver the recommendations of the DPRRC.

The Constitution Committee, in its 14th report, also drew attention to the provisions of Clause 5. It observed that Orders in Council that are made in relation to treaties are commonly made by way of the prerogative power—because treaties are made by the prerogative power—and with limited parliamentary scrutiny as a consequence. However, the committee did not dissent from the DPRRC’s recommendations in this case.

Orders in Council in relation to the British Indian Ocean Territories have historically been made by virtue of the prerogative. The terms of this agreement with Mauritius mean that that precedent no longer applies. Article 1 of the agreement recognises—or confers, depending on how you view it—sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, to Mauritius. Therefore, the basis for the exercise of the prerogative power—in other words, the exercise of sovereignty over the territory—is no longer applicable. I shall go on to explain why I therefore disagree with my noble friend on the Front Bench in his argument for Amendment 33.

These provisions provide for the continuation of the law in Diego Garcia. This is in accordance with the agreement in relation to Article 9 on jurisdiction. It follows in my view that the future exercise of the prerogative is sanctioned by this legislation in relation to Diego Garcia and that, as a result, any Orders in Council made should be regarded as statutory orders and, as such, subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have accepted that the orders that have Henry VIII powers should require a parliamentary procedure. They do not, however, provide for a parliamentary procedure for other Orders in Council.

Paragraph 48 of the Explanatory Notes says that this measure is in subsection (5) of Clause 5—in fact it is in subsection (6). The notes say that

“the intention is to maintain a clear distinction between prerogative and statutory orders”.

That is to be achieved, according to the Explanatory Notes, by stating that these powers are not exercised in pursuance of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. This is a very curious place that we have arrived at, since the Government are disapplying the Statutory Instruments Act while at the same time requiring that Orders in Council that are made that have a Henry VIII power attached to them require parliamentary scrutiny and are therefore statutory orders.

Let me be clear about the argument behind my three amendments. The prerogative stems from the exercise of a sovereign jurisdiction, which in relation to the United Kingdom is exercised by the sovereign in Parliament. In other dominions where His Majesty is sovereign, other forms of sovereign powers may subsist, but this treaty and agreement with Mauritius states baldly, in Article 1, that His Majesty is not sovereign in Diego Garcia. No prerogative power can exist without being dependent on this legislation.

Subsection (6)(b), in excluding this legislation from the interpretation under the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, is incorrect. On Report, and in response to this debate, I will be asking Ministers to think very carefully about two things. First, I hope positively, I ask them to change the procedures for the parliamentary scrutiny of Orders in Council so that Henry VIII powers are dealt with by an affirmative procedure, and, secondly, that Orders in Council for any other purpose are dealt with by a negative procedure. I ask them also to think very carefully about the terms of Clause 5(6), which incorrectly seeks to disapply the Statutory Instruments Act 1946.

It follows from my argument that I do not agree with my noble friend on Amendment 33, and I am afraid that I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Lilley in relation to his Amendment 51BA. He goes further than the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee would in applying an affirmative procedure to Orders in Council that are not for a Henry VIII purpose. Neither can I support other opposition to clauses standing part, but I expect that my noble friend was rightly seeking to probe the meaning of Clauses 2, 3 and 5. Of course, if one were to remove them, one would effectively repudiate the treaty. That may or may not be his intention, but I do not propose to speak to the opposition to those clauses standing part.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I am persuaded by the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that his amendments are somewhat narrower but much more justified than my broader amendment. When the appropriate moment comes, I will not press my amendment and leave his standing.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

In response to the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that we are clearer in the Bill about what it does, I have read it a couple of times and honestly do not think that it could not be any clearer. It is a Bill to enact an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago. I think that is sufficient, and if he does not, I am not sure what he is getting at.

The Government rejects Amendment 33 on the basis that the provision in question is not redundant. It is needed to ensure the secure and effective operation of the base. It ensures clarity on which law will apply through the jurisdiction that the UK will exercise under the treaty. Legal continuity and certainty for operations on the base once the British Indian Ocean Territory is dissolved is far from unnecessary.

Let me explain why we have Clause 3. This clause saves the law of BIOT, and law which relates to BIOT, as the law of Diego Garcia and law which relates to Diego Garcia. This has been done as the default, to ensure the continued effective running of the base on Diego Garcia and to make sure that there is no legal gap. Detailed work is being carried out to establish where technical amendments may be needed to this preserved law to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is defined in Clause 3 as the whole area that the UK can exercise jurisdiction over, as covered in the treaty. This includes the island of Diego Garcia and the 12 nautical miles surrounding it. Preserving the existing prerogative power to legislate for Diego Garcia means that we can continue to operate the base and its legal architecture in much the same way that we do today, and it gives the maximum flexibility for the future.

Amendment 51, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seems to be based on a misapprehension. As I mentioned in my response to the amendments related to Clause 3, His Majesty has a prerogative power to legislate for BIOT at present and Clause 3 preserves this power. It does not allow him to make laws for other parts of the realm about BIOT or Diego Garcia. If the noble Lord reads that clause of the Bill again, he will see that I am right about that.

The statutory power in Clause 5 is necessary to enable amendments to Acts and statutory instruments which form part of the law of Diego Garcia and amendments to legislation which forms part of the law of other jurisdictions—the UK Crown dependencies and the other OTs. These other jurisdictions have laws which refer to BIOT or treat it as one of the overseas territories. Amendments to those laws may be necessary to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia.

I see that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—as is becoming classic in his contributions on these occasions—has read the report from the DPRRC. His Amendments 51A, 51B and 51C appear to seek to implement its recommendations. Amendment 51BA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, appears to be less consistent with the recommendations—I think he has recognised that in his remarks—in that it would impose the affirmative procedure in respect not just of Orders in Council, which amend primary legislation, but of those which amend secondary legislation. Without showing too much leg so late at night, we are still considering these suggestions and we will return to them on Report. With that, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.

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Moved by

[Lord Lilley]

63: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Review: impact on nuclear treatiesWithin three months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a review of the impact of this Act on the ability of the United Kingdom and Mauritius to comply with international treaties relating to nuclear weapons.”

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, we are approaching the home straight now, which is good news. A lot of noble Lords have joined the debate at this stage. They will know that the Government attach great importance to adherence to international law. They will probably be aware that we have established that the International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over disagreements between Commonwealth states and therefore none on our dispute with Mauritius about sovereignty, and that we have established that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has no power to rule on sovereignty.

However, there is a treaty which does apply to Mauritius and which no one disputes the existence or authority of, and that is the Pelindaba treaty. It was never mentioned in the early stages of the Government’s declarations about their need to cede sovereignty to Mauritius or their claim that doing so would increase the security of the base. But the Pelindaba treaty is one which the countries of Africa—and that includes Mauritius—signed, creating a nuclear-free zone. I do not think anyone disputes that if the Chagos Archipelago is recognised as part of Mauritius then the Pelindaba treaty will apply to the Chagos Archipelago, and therefore to the Diego Garcia base. It is significant that the Pelindaba treaty says it should be a nuclear-free zone and that therefore Diego Garcia will be nuclear-free.

It is important that we establish what that means. Does it mean that no nuclear weapons can ever be stored, based or transited through Diego Garcia? If so, does the United States know about this? What is their reaction to it? It is less clear whether or not it means that nuclear-powered vessels can use the facilities of Diego Garcia. My noble friend Lady Goldie’s amendment would make that clear, and her amendment is at least as important as mine in seeking to establish the truth of this.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I understand the point that the noble Baroness is making. What I am saying to her is that the Government of Mauritius, the Government of the UK and the Government of the US see no contradiction in what the treaty says, and explicitly lays out, in respect of the ability of Diego Garcia to operate in the way that it has always done, with the lethal capabilities as outlined elsewhere in the Bill.

I hope that is helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness as reassurance that the situation will stay the same as it is now. As I have said, all those three parties to that treaty are confident that that remains the case.

I will say, however, that, although resisting the amendments, I am grateful that they were tabled. They are really important amendments to have made in order for the Government to have put on the record important elements of the treaty and the Bill. We have been able to clarify for the Chamber, and for those who read our proceedings, that the position that we would all want to see will continue with respect to Diego Garcia and that the full capabilities will be maintained.

Let me be absolutely clear: the full operational use of the base is protected to ensure that the base is able to continue in every way that it always has done. I hope that is helpful. On the basis of the reassurances that I have made and the comments that I have put on the record, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

That is very helpful and I entirely respect what the Minister says. He is a man of obvious integrity and commitment to the defence of this country. I am comforted that he is speaking for the Government, and therefore that the Government will maintain the freedom to use the Diego Garcia base to its full capabilities. I am not persuaded that that is necessarily in line with the Pelindaba treaty. That does not worry me so much. It may worry the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, or any future Lord Hermer in Mauritius, but let us hope that they will be ignored. So I will, of course, withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.