Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Kerr of Kinlochard
Main Page: Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (Crossbench - Life peer)(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, over breakfast I read the views of the noble Lord, Lord Biggar, and can confirm that they have not changed over the course of the day.
I begin with an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. He, the noble Lord, Lord Jay, and I spent 10 years in the Permanent Secretary’s office in the Foreign Office, and I certainly never discovered the secret plan to cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago that officials were apparently sitting on. I saw a number of changes of Foreign Secretary, and I cannot remember ever seeing the huddle of officials saying, “Is this the soft one we can manage to persuade that it’s time to cede the Chagos Archipelago?” I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, may have been watching too much “Yes, Minister”. It is sad that he has never been Foreign Secretary, because he has far too high an opinion of officials in the Foreign Office.
I have only three small points to make; I will be very brief, because I spoke at enormous length when we debated the treaty in July. At that time, the Opposition suggested that the treaty should not be ratified, but the House voted that it should be ratified. It cannot be ratified without this Bill; therefore, we should now pass it. That is my first point.
My second point is about the China syndrome. We heard then, and we are hearing again today, even from the Opposition Front Bench, the theory that recognising Mauritian sovereignty somehow opens the door to Chinese influence in the Chagos Archipelago and to a Chinese threat to the base. I have never understood this theory. If the risk were real, why did the Indians warmly welcome the treaty? Why did Secretary of State Rubio in Washington call the treaty a “monumental achievement”? Mr Rubio, like President Trump, is hardly soft on China. Mauritius is one of the only two African countries that have not signed up to the belt and road initiative. Why would the Mauritians enrage the Indians, to whom they are close, by helping the Chinese, whom they seriously distrust? Why would they forgo the payments we would be making? The theory makes no sense, and I strongly suspect that some of those who advance it know that perfectly well.
That brings me to my third point, which is, of course, the emollient one. The pernicious doctrine that the duty of opposition is to oppose, regardless of principle, merit or consistency, is perhaps particularly irresponsible in the sphere of foreign affairs. Mr Cleverly announced in 2022 that we would open negotiations to
“ensure the continued effective operation of the joint UK/US military base on Diego Garcia, which plays a vital role in regional and global security”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
We agreed; I heard no dissent. I did not know about the approaches of the noble Lord, Lord Murray. There was no public dissent from what the Government were going to do.
Under Foreign Secretary Cameron, negotiations continued—11 rounds, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, reminded us. I am rather sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, is not here tonight. It would have been very good to have his verdict on the Bill which results from the work he supervised. The legal issues and the China risk explored by Conservative Back-Benchers today will have been thoroughly explained to him at the time. Indeed, we now know that the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, no less, advised against the course that he was pursuing. There is nothing new in these arguments. They were known to the Conservative Ministers who proceeded with the negotiations.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said that it is one thing to start a negotiation about transferring sovereignty and quite another to conclude one. That is very true, but if I were absolutely determined not to cede sovereignty, I do not think I would start a negotiation about ceding sovereignty. I do not think, if I was strongly convinced that it was a bad idea, that I would have let it run on for 11 negotiating rounds.
We are shortly to hear from the Front Benches. I look forward to hearing from the Liberal Democrats; their concerns about the Chagossians do them credit. Their reservations about the treaty are ones I understand —they are honourable, although I believe they are unjustified.
We will also be hearing from the Conservative Front Bench—the heirs of Cameron and Cleverly. I have the greatest respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, not least because she hails from my part of the world. So my hopes are high that, unlike some of her colleagues, including those on the Front Bench, she will contrive to steer clear of the twin rocks of hypocrisy and irresponsibility.
My Lords, I will try to get this debate back on track and deal with the issues that I think have been confronting us. The debate was ably introduced by the Minister and it has been predictably interesting, presenting some sharply contrasting views. It has also demonstrated a dichotomy between sincerely held views of former and venerable public servants and political views. There has been a further dichotomy within the political classes as to what constitutes responsible decision-making. As my noble friend Lord Murray indicated, even within the same party you can sometimes find a dichotomy of view—it happens, I say to the Minister. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that when it comes to a party having differences of view, I would think the Liberal Democrats could give master classes.
The position of these Benches was laid out clearly by my noble friend Lord Callanan. He also addressed the precipitate and surprising decision of the Government to delay their own Bill by, unusually, not proceeding with a committal Motion. The Minister, with admirable verbal gymnastics, sought heroically, if perhaps not completely convincingly, to explain that decision, but I think the reason is simple: the Government had concerns that the sensible amendment to the committal Motion that my noble friend had tabled was drawing support, and it may well have been that the Government were fearful that support for the amendment or a version of it would prevail and the Government would lose. But that was a judgment for the Government to make. I observe that the amendment was not prescriptive and would have left matters entirely under the control of the Government. What has now emerged is a welcome breathing space for the Government to consider and answer some serious questions about the agreement on which the Bill is predicated. Some of these questions have already been asked, but it will be my pleasure in a moment to add to them.
My noble friend Lord Callanan raised some of the most serious issues arising from the agreement, and it is interesting that the concerns he expressed were mirrored during the debate by a number of contributors. If we look at the agreement and at the trust fund, we find that there is an absence of knowing in detail what the views of the Chagossian people are on these issues. That was raised by a number of contributors, including my noble friend Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has concerns about that.
The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and my noble friends Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham spoke movingly about the treatment to which the Chagossian people have been subjected over decades. I found that moving— I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I am not being hypocritical in expressing that sentiment—and it was very much echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, who graphically described the lack of engagement in relation to current matters.
Then there is the issue of money—in today’s economic climate, a hot potato if ever there was one. The Chancellor is scratching around looking for every penny she can find, defence urgently needs upfront cash and taxes are almost certainly going up, yet the British taxpayer is going to be asked to pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius, a point that was raised by a number of contributors. My noble friend Lady Noakes gave a devastatingly forensic analysis of the costs and the Government’s disparate approach, and I will leave that to the Minister to respond to. Those concerns were echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, and the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme.
Then there was the position of China, and the not imagined but avowed objective of China to strengthen ties with Mauritius because of its strategic advantages, and China’s commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. These clearly cause concern to many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord De Mauley. Even the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, nobly supporting his Government, said, “China is a threat”. I agree. That was again referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I was a Defence Minister for nearly four and a half years, and one of my areas of responsibility was south-east Asia. China is a resolute prosecutor of its own interests, with an overt desire to exercise influence globally. At our peril do we waver in our vigilance.
I am so grateful to the noble Baroness. I just want to say that I am quite sure that the Mauritians would agree with that.
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Kerr of Kinlochard
Main Page: Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Kerr of Kinlochard's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThis is all very fascinating. I hope we get back to Heligoland soon, and maybe the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, but I have to ask the noble Lord: where was he when his Government decided that the straightforward thing to do was to go for the cession of sovereignty?
I was a Member of the European Parliament, and I spoke out quite strongly against that Government. I hope the noble Lord knows me well enough to know that I was never a party line man. I thought it was an appalling thing to do then, and I still think it is an appalling thing to do.
It is clear that the Chinese interests—and indeed those of other countries, which I think goes to the heart of why we are seeing this as a key strategic point of view—go beyond simply trying to create trading relationships. We know that Mauritius has around 1.3 million people, much smaller than even my own beloved Northern Ireland—but President Xi is not beating down the doors for a state visit to Belfast any time soon, as far as I am aware. Whether it is China, India or anyone else, whatever the assurances that are there, what are the practical implications and what can we do to assure ourselves that there will not be a level of mission creep?
I will continue very briefly, as I suppose time is moving on. Amendments 61 and 62 probe the position as regards airspace and maritime assurances. Again, this has been sold particularly on the basis of it being not simply the British position but the US position, so I think we need to see some level of joint assurance in relation to that. There has been a concern—and some level of suspicion, which I seek assurances that the Government can allay—that the position of the Americans has been effectively to go along with this treaty. There was, I think, a level of reluctance. It was reported initially that the Americans had given a level of lip service. I think we want to get a much greater level of reassurance that they have bought into this, rather than simply acquiescing with something that one of their allies has asked for. Specifically, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, there are some restrictions in terms of notification that seem to undermine the security implications.
For instance, if we look at the airspace side of things, there is a 12-mile zone around Diego Garcia, but airspace around the rest of the Chagos Islands is simply with Mauritius. On a maritime basis, we know that the treaty details that the archipelago waters, the territorial seas and the EEZ around the Chagos Islands are all within the control of Mauritius. Where there can be a level of restriction or interference on airspace or maritime boundaries, that can also create a concern. We seek assurances from government that what is being proposed—and this is a question of belt and braces—is actually going to provide the genuine level of defence. If so much else is potentially being sacrificed to bring about this deal, we need to make sure that we have something that is ironclad as regards our defences.
It is probably best to let the Americans be the judge of their own best interests. They seem to be rather keen on this treaty and its ratification. The Secretary of State in Washington, who is also currently head of the National Security Council, called its conclusion a “monumental achievement”. He does not seem to be concerned that it might open the road to Chinese influence; nor do the Indians, who are, of course, close friends of the Mauritians and are as concerned as we and the Americans are about Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. The treaty is seen as a barrier to that, not an opening to it.
Of course, the noble Lord knows better than anyone that Governments do each other favours in these situations, and Heads of Government will sometimes say, “I need you to say the following”, but I am pretty sure the Secretary of State said at the beginning that he was extremely worried by what he described as a serious threat to our national security when the deal was first put forward.
I am not sure what remarks the noble Lord is referring to. I am talking about the position taken by the current Administration of the United States.
I appreciate what the noble Lord has said in relation to the response in the public sphere by the American Government. Whatever one’s views—and there will be a range of views towards the current American Government across this Chamber —it is a fair accusation that they occasionally lapse into a certain level of hyperbole. It is either the greatest thing that has ever happened or the worst disaster. We should not necessarily take an enthusiastic apparent public endorsement as something being a great thing from the Secretary of State or the current President as a full reassurance of the American position.
I think it is probably best to take what they say at face value. They probably mean what they say.
I will now attempt to address the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and surprise her by saying that I think they are extremely sensible. I understand the thinking behind them. I understand her concerns that are encapsulated in Amendments 83 and 85 to 87, but I think the amendments are probably unnecessary. I suspect that the statements the noble Baroness is calling for could be made today. I suspect that we will hear them before the debates on this Bill are over, but it seems to me important that we should hear them, so I understand what the noble Baroness is saying.
I would like briefly to refer to the consistent and cogent arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, for a sovereign base area solution rather than the solution that is written into the treaty. I do not know why the last Government looked at it but decided not to pursue it. I do not know what the reasons were. They were probably, I would guess, topographical—we are talking about a very large area, rather than the two restricted areas on Cyprus—but I do not know, and I think it is a valid question to ask.
The big point, surely, is that we are where we are. We have a treaty, and we cannot ratify it until we pass this Bill. That is why I disagree strongly with the four amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell. He comes straight out and says that he wants renegotiation. He wants the treaty renegotiated in four separate respects, but we are where we are. The treaty exists. If we were to decide to reopen the negotiation, I think we could expect a rather hostile reaction in the United States. The principal concern of the United States is security of tenure and the continuing co-operation of third countries over supply chains. That is what they are concerned about—not our blue eyes but security of tenure of the base. Given that, some in Washington would argue that it is time for the United States to switch sides, to ditch us and do a direct deal with the Mauritians. That argument has been made in Washington and could be made again if we get ourselves into such a mess that, having secured a treaty that the Conservative Government sought and the Labour Government have concluded, we were to decide, after all, that it was not a treaty we wanted and that we wanted to go back to the start and negotiate something different. I can imagine the United States losing patience with us.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
I know that the noble Lord speaks with great insight but the whole point of the amendments, with which I agree—that is why I back my noble friend Lady Goldie in particular—is on the specific issue of security. Yes, as I have said on the Floor of the House before, there were 11 rounds of negotiation but, at the end of them, agreement could not be reached because—I speak from my own insight and experience—back in 2019, that element of security was not assured. When I returned to London, I asked Boris Johnson directly, in good faith—I was not the OTs Minister but I had a good rapport with the then Prime Minister—and he could not give me that assurance. That is what I have pressed for throughout the passage of the Bill.
It has come up repeatedly that there were 11 rounds of negotiations. I have spent a lot of time in business and, as the noble Lord knows, in government. When you are looking for a negotiation and seeking to agree something, the fact that there were 11 rounds would suggest—I know this for a fact—that that agreement could not be reached.
I respect what the noble Lord says and he knows what he is talking about. I also respect what the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, asked for in requesting four statements. We should be asking for statements rather than changes to the text of a treaty. We voted in July for the ratification of this treaty; we cannot ratify the treaty until we pass this Bill, and we should pass the Bill.
My Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendment 54. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I think we are all pleased that we are where we are. It seems very strange to say that we cannot be discussing the Bill—that was almost the way it was put.
My amendment really follows on a little from what the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, talked about. During Committee in another place, concerns were expressed that other countries may seek to lease individual Chagos Islands and reference was made to reports that India and China were in consultation with the Republic of Mauritius. At that time, the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the honourable Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, responded robustly. He stated:
“I want to say on that point that this is absolute nonsense. Is the shadow Minister willing to provide any evidence that that is going to take place? This treaty protects the security of the outer islands and expressly prohibits foreign forces building bases on them—something on which her Government did not succeed in their negotiations”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 686.]
What is this great protection to which he referred?
Noble Lords will find that in paragraph 3 of the first annex to the Mauritius treaty. It states:
“In accordance with this Agreement, in respect of the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia, Mauritius agrees”—
this is point d—that,
“except in circumstances of necessity for a response to a humanitarian emergency or natural disaster in instances where the United Kingdom or the United States of America is unable or unwilling to provide such a response, Mauritius and the United Kingdom shall jointly decide on authorisations permitting the presence of non-United Kingdom, non-United States or non-Mauritian security forces, either civilian or military”.
I cannot see anything there to validate the Minister’s assertion that the treaty
“expressly prohibits”
foreign forces building bases on the islands. What it says is that they cannot do so without the agreement of the UK Government.
For me, this presents two real concerns. First, and most importantly, there is nothing in the treaty to provide any kind of safeguard in relation to the leasing of islands for purposes other than security and defence. This would leave the door wide open for other countries to seek to lease the islands, ostensibly for purposes other than security and defence. The argument made by the Minister in the other place was that the suggestion that there was a problem was nonsense. It seems to me to be very well founded. The extraordinary thing about these provisions is the fact that they relate to islands of immense geostrategic importance, yet the protections in relation to them are effectively non-existent. That seems very complacent to me.
There is nothing to prevent a hostile country leasing an island and either combining security and defence purposes with others, in the hope of hiding the former, or on beginning with non-security and defence purposes and then changing over to them. Can the Minister tell me how that could be prevented? What would happen if an island is leased for non-security and defence purposes, yet it subsequently becomes apparent that it is being used for those purposes and that the country has dug in well and has no intention of relinquishing the islands? How could they be dislodged? Would the Minister here like to respond on that? I found the suggestion from that Minister in the Commons that there are no presenting difficulties quite alarming. It suggested a certain otherworldliness with a high degree of disconnection from political reality.
Secondly, the other difficulty is the completely opaque nature of the protection that is provided and the lack of parliamentary scrutiny. At the moment, we would have no knowledge about when or if approaches were made by the Republic of Mauritius to seek UK agreement for other countries to use other islands, and we need to know that. My Amendment 54 would address this concern by requiring the Minister to develop regulations stating that before the UK can agree to a proposal from the Republic of Mauritius—made under Annex 1(3)(d) of the treaty—that any island other than Diego Garcia be used for security and defence purposes by another country, that proposal must be brought to Parliament and endorsed by a vote of both Houses. Will the Minister give me a reason why that should not happen?
In ending, I will ask at this stage about the point made in the debate on the fourth group about whether the Government were asked to give their consent before the deal between Mauritius and India was done. I am not sure that we got a response to that. It was going to give India a defence presence. I would really like to know how long the Government knew before that happened. Did they know and when did they agree to it?
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Kerr of Kinlochard
Main Page: Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Kerr of Kinlochard's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(4 days, 7 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as we begin our proceedings on Report, let me reiterate our view, as the Official Opposition, that the treaty that the Government have agreed with Mauritius puts the interests of the British people last. It is an abject surrender that we would never have agreed to. It was mentioned nowhere in the Government’s election manifesto, and it stands in stark contrast to their manifesto commitment to protect the British Overseas Territories. The British people were not consulted on the treaty, yet it will see over £34 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money paid to the Government of Mauritius over the treaty’s lifetime. That is a political decision by this Government at a time when taxes to the British public are being hiked to an all-time high.
In stark contrast, the Mauritian Prime Minister said that the money from the Chagos deal will fund debt repayments and tax cuts as part of a budget package that will see 80% of Mauritian workers exempted completely from income tax.
However, it is, of course, not just the British people who have not been consulted but the Chagossians themselves, who have suffered so much over many years and have not had their voice heard in this process either.
I am pleased to say that the Government have rightly shared some more details about the Chagossian Contact Group they have set up, but it should not have taken forceful pressure from the Opposition to deliver that transparency. Even with those details, the Chagossian people have not been formally consulted by the British Government on this treaty. We have only to look at the recent report from the International Relations and Defence Committee on the opinion of Chagossians to know exactly what they think of this treaty.
In the other place, we opposed the Bill at Third Reading, and we still oppose it. But, of course, now that we are on Report, we will work constructively with noble Lords across the House to seek to improve the Bill today.
My Amendment 6 would require the Secretary of State to seek to negotiate a right to extend the length of the treaty beyond 99 years before it can be ratified. When we suggested this in Committee, the Minister explained that Article 13 of the treaty establishes the process by which the treaty would be extended up to a limit of 40 years. One of the problems with that process is that it would require a renegotiation, possibly including additional payments, leaving the British taxpayer exposed to potentially even higher bills at the end of this period.
Ministers tell us that the UK will have the right of first refusal of the terms offered to any third party for the use of Diego Garcia following the expiry or termination of the treaty, but how can the UK ensure that those terms are reasonable? We therefore seek clarity from the Government on what happens at the end of this 99-year period. I hope that this time, the Minister will be able to provide us with more information on the Government’s exact understanding of the workability of Article 13 of the treaty.
My Amendment 40 would require the Government to clarify their understanding of the status of the Chagos Islands should the treaty be terminated. In Committee, the Minister emphasised that the circumstances in which Mauritius can unilaterally terminate the treaty are extremely limited, and we accept that. She also told the Committee that it is
“highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 781.]
That leaves open the question of who might agree to a transfer of sovereignty with the Government of Mauritius. In a circumstance where Mauritius is sovereign and the treaty is no longer in effect, is there a risk that the Mauritian Government may choose to transfer sovereignty to a third party? What guarantees have the Government sought from Mauritius on this? Again, I hope the Minister will be able to provide us with some more detail on those points at this stage in our legislative process.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his excellent amendment in this group. He is right to continue to press the Government on this point, and we share his concerns about the position should the treaty be terminated. I look forward to hearing the replies from the Minister on these points.
Finally, I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, which is supported by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond—two well-respected Members of the House. It is unconscionable that British taxpayers should be forced to continue to fund the Mauritian Government under the terms of the treaty in circumstances where the military base, which the treaty relates to and secures, has therefore become inoperable. Therefore, we firmly support this amendment and, should the noble and gallant Lord wish to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches would support him in that.
My Lords, one criterion which the House may like to have in mind as we consider the amendments before us is whether they would prevent the Government ratifying the treaty. We have to pass the Bill before the treaty can be ratified, and some of these amendments would ensure that ratification could not take place until there had been some renegotiation or a new negotiation.
The House decided, at the end of June, that it wanted to ratify the treaty. The House voted for ratification; the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, argued that it should not do so, but it chose to follow the advice of its International Agreements Committee and voted for the ratification of the treaty. Consistent with the view we have held up to now, I believe that, today, we should not pass any amendments that would require renegotiation.
I read it carefully and I think my amendment covers the concerns in that committee’s report and the concerns raised in the IRDC. That is why my amendment has been drafted carefully. The noble Baroness is right in indicating that limited self-determination is better than no self-determination. The point is that her amendment does not have any limits to it, and it is her inability to square that aspect that I simply raise as an issue. However, that is, with respect, decisions that she and those that will be supporting it will make. I think it is worth recording that Amendment 32 would not give the Chagossian community the right of self-determination about part of the archipelago. That is worth stating categorically.
Amendment 32 also does not address rights. Indeed, what I feel we should be morally bound to address is the right that has been denied to that community for a long period, which is that of resettlement, and the right to be involved in decisions being taken going forward. We can only correct rights that are in our power to do so, and that would be by securing the consent of the Chagossian community before the treaty is ratified in order to ensure that there is statutory underpinning of the permissive elements of the rights that are in the treaty.
It is worth reflecting on the fact that the only rights that the Chagossian community may potentially have ahead of them are those that are provided for in the treaty. Indeed, the letter that I referred to from the former Foreign Secretary in April 2024 reiterated the previous Government’s view that the right of resettlement would not be accommodated. We are close to having rights enshrined for the Chagossian community for the first time in a very long time, but the treaty only goes as far as giving the potential ability for the Chagossian community if the Mauritian Government choose to do so.
Now that we hand over from our parliamentary processes, these Benches believe that it is correct to make the case that those rights should be underpinned in law, so I respectfully hope that the Government will be able to see this and accept it. If not, I will test the opinion of the House, and I do so respectfully, understanding the sincerity of the arguments being made so far by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and others.
Before the noble Lord sits down, could he help me interpret Amendments 19 and 33? Amendment 33 would not delay ratification of the treaty. Its wording is a little odd in places. When we talk about self-determination, we are dealing with concepts, not chaps, so subsection (5) of the proposed new clause should refer to “principles” rather than “principals”. In proposed new subsection (5)(b), working out the difference between the “operation in” and the “opportunities of working in” Diego Garcia is a little complex. I think we are talking about jobs on the base, which could be expressed more clearly.
I see nothing in principle against Amendment 33. But I pause at Amendment 19, because under it, as I read it, ratification would have to be delayed until the referendum called for in Amendment 33 had been carried out. If that is the case, I cannot support it.
I accept the admonishment with regard to the spelling and drafting. I cannot blame the clerks for that; it is my fault. If, in proposed new subsection (5)(b), “participation in the operation in” and “opportunities of working in” Diego Garcia means jobs, I accept that also.
Recognising that the treaty is some distance from being ratified anyway, I strongly believe that other elements need to be in place, in agreement with the Government of Mauritius, before it is ratified. These measures are some of the elements that should be put in place before the treaty is ratified. We will discuss other elements in considering later groups, but between now and ratification, extra measures should be put in place to ensure that the consent of the Chagossian community is given and that their rights are underpinned by statute.
My Lords, we have heard two powerful and moving speeches. I will reference another Miliband—David Miliband, the former Foreign Secretary. One of the very last initiatives he brought forward was the Chagos Archipelago marine protected area. He said at the time that it was by far and away the most important environmental treaty and agreement that any Government had ever enacted. He pointed out that 92% of the UK’s biodiversity is located in the OTs, which is still the case. Some 32% of it is in the Chagos Archipelago.
All the research I did as an incoming Minister at the time completely reinforced the then Labour Government’s decision to launch this initiative and put so much effort and time into it. We are concerned about sea-birds, migratory turtles and coral bleaching, but my biggest concern is around fishing. All the research proved that, if you can put a stop to fishing, you prevent damage to the coral, because modern commercial fishing does untold harm to coral reefs. It will also have a big impact on apex species, such as sharks and rays, which are so important to the environment.
I am sorry to say this, but the Mauritian Government have a dreadful record on environmental protection. We may well give them the benefit of the doubt and say that they will raise their game and suddenly start finding resources to take this matter seriously, but what happens if they go the other way and future Governments in Mauritius, maybe even in 10 years’ time, decide that they can raise a great deal of money from issuing licences to the Chinese, the Taiwanese, the Bulgarians or whatever country wants to fish in these areas? We would have no control over that whatever. Whatever they say now, it could well be ripped up and ignored even in 10 years’ time. What about hydrocarbons? If there are discoveries in this part of the ocean in the region of the archipelago, what is to stop the Mauritian Government issuing licences for exploration of hydrocarbons? In 10 years’ time, when many of us will not be here, we may look back and say: “What on earth did this Government do to take away those vital protections?”
I am very impressed by the noble Lord’s speech. Can he tell us what proportion of the resources of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy are currently deployed in the Indian Ocean protecting the area?
I had sat down, but I am perfectly happy to say that the UK Government take their responsibilities incredibly seriously. As I mentioned, the OTs contain 92% of our biodiversity. I cannot think of one example where the UK Government have not stepped up to honour their responsibilities and put in place every form of protection.