Defence Spending

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Thursday 25th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that question. On the Treasury, the Chancellor has absolutely been involved throughout this entire conversation and is fully supportive, as is the Prime Minister, of exactly what we are trying to achieve. On gifting and the replenishment of munitions and stocks, everything that we have gifted, including in the announcement this week, is within its sell-by date but is no longer really necessary. Replacements are coming in of new, modern equipment. The Army is perfectly happy to gift this to the Ukrainian effort.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I used to work for Peter Carrington and Denis Healey, two great Defence Secretaries. I have been trying to work out how they would have reacted to this Statement. They would certainly have welcomed the increase in defence spending. It is clearly necessary and they would have said so. I think they both would have said that it is not enough but that it is certainly to be welcomed.

Denis Healey certainly would have found it impossible to accept the construction of the £75 billion. Could the Minister confirm that £75 billion is reached only by making the rather ludicrous assumption that the baseline is flat in cash terms, with reductions in real terms in every year of the six-year period? That is the baseline on which one can build annual increments summing to £75 billion. Perhaps he could confirm that is the case. Denis Healey would never have tried such odd accounting.

Peter Carrington would have argued that it is unwise not to prepare the country for a certain amount of pain. The Government are trying to present necessary defence increases as painless. It might be better to admit that there will be a cost, either in taxation or in less money for domestic programmes. The defence of the realm is the first task of government.

It is also absurd, in the week in which President Biden and Speaker Johnson have come forward with a rather substantial programme of assistance to Ukraine, for our Defence Secretary to stand up and say that the NATO partners looked to each other for leadership and the UK Government stepped forward to provide the alliance with the decisive leadership demanded in this knife-edge moment and that, in the build-up to the NATO summit in Washington, he—Mr Shapps—would be doing all he could to get alliance members to follow our lead. This is absurd talk. We should speak softly and carry a big stick. The stick is slightly bigger—not big enough in my view—after this week’s announcement, but we must learn to avoid the bluster and bravado and speak more sensibly.

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, the financial detail is quite complicated and I think it is better if we write and explain how the figures are built up.

It is clearly an ask for the British public. The cake is finite, as I have said before, and defence needs more. It is not an inconsiderable amount of money that we are increasing the defence budget by, and there is a question of how much money you can spend over time. It is rather like building a house, in that you cannot spend it all at once; you have to build up. If you look at where the investment focus is within the next few years, you find that, first, it is on firing up the UK industrial base, including £10 billion for a new munitions strategy. That is extremely important. Secondly, it is on ensuring that our Armed Forces benefit from the very latest technology, through the DIA. Thirdly, it is on guaranteeing long-term support for Ukraine; if we do not do that, it is just going to become more and more expensive. As the Secretary-General said the other day, this is the cheapest time to defeat the Russians. Fourthly, it is on ensuring that expenditure is effective through radical procurement reform, which I have already covered.

King’s Speech

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Wednesday 15th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I intend to get to the King’s Speech via the Guildhall, with a brief exit through Rwanda.

There was much to applaud in the Guildhall speech on Monday. I hope that the Prime Minister is right that Russia cannot win in Ukraine, and I am sure he is right to insist that we must do all we can to ensure it does not. I echo, of course, his condemnation of the appalling atrocity on 7 October and of Hamas. I am also glad that he called for “urgent” and “humanitarian pauses” in Gaza.

Some 120 countries voted in the UN for a ceasefire; I am still not quite clear why we cannot be in that number. I suppose it is because the word is deemed to imply parity of esteem and legitimacy and so cannot apply to a terrorist group. I do not know. I think most of the world simply wants the killing to stop, and it would be in Israel’s interest to listen to that, because current tactics are simply breeding new recruits for Hamas—just as the killing in Beirut 40 years ago was the making of Hezbollah. We need to help, by working on the Qatari Government, who play host to Hamas, or the Iranian Government, who are the funders of Hezbollah, or the Russians, who arm Hamas.

There is a lot of diplomacy to be done, including in Washington. We must recognise that what Washington says matters in Tel Aviv. I hope the Prime Minister has rebuilt really close relations with the White House, because relations were considerably damaged by his predecessor’s courting of the President’s political opponents, and her predecessor’s willingness to alienate both the Administration and Congress by putting the Good Friday agreement at risk. I hope we are through all that.

If I had a criticism of the Guildhall speech, it would be that it risked seeming a little hubristic. To say that we are working

“to shape the world, not be shaped by it”,

and that,

“wherever there’s a challenge, wherever there’s a threat, wherever we can promote peace and security”,

we are ready to act, risks the retort that we can speak very loudly but our stick is fairly small these days. Putin has brutally exposed the illusion of the peace dividend and we have made too many false economies on defence. The Government have done very well to help Kyiv but have yet to come clean with the country about the real cost of security in an insecure world. We are not sufficiently insured. We have to pay a higher premium. The quality of our Armed Forces may still be very high but their quantity is plainly inadequate. Our leaders need to be honest about that, so maybe less hubris.

However, the point goes wider. The King’s Speech also said:

“My Government will continue to lead action on tackling climate change … support developing countries with their energy transition, and hold other countries to their environmental commitments”.


It is true that we led on climate change, but then someone suggested that we “cut the green crap”. It is true that we led on development aid and gave it 0.7% of GDP, but we do not now, and much of what we do is spent domestically on Home Office policies. It is true we have not denounced net zero by 2050, but we have just decided to get there on a changed trajectory, meaning, in the words of the King’s Speech,

“without adding undue burdens on households”.

Therefore, we will pump out more emissions than previously planned, and once again we are not coming clean with the country. Getting there cannot be cost free. As with defence, I believe the country would respond well if the Government told it like it is.

Finally, on Rwanda and the Supreme Court ruling, the House will be relieved to hear that the new Home Secretary in the other place this afternoon did not agree with his Back Bench that the right response to the Supreme Court ruling would be to tear up treaties—the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. The new Foreign Secretary must be aware of how much reputational damage it would cost us if the Government did as advised by their Back Bench. They must know, because they saw how relations with Europe and America were poisoned when the last Prime Minister but one revealed that he had been happy to make an international agreement without ever intending to honour it. I am sure the new Foreign Secretary fully understands that pacta sunt servanda, and I hope he will ensure that the new Government will act accordingly. We are not Belarus. The convention stands for our values; let us not betray them.

Ukraine

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Friday 25th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I was in Moscow in 1968 when the Soviet army put down Dubček, and I feel the same cold horror today that I felt then. However, this is much worse than 1968. In 1991, over 90% of the population of Ukraine voted for independence, with large majorities even in all those regions where there is a strong ethnic Russian population. Our locus to object is far stronger now than it was in 1968. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, mentioned the Budapest memorandum; it carries the signatures of John Major and Douglas Hurd. In it, the Russians promised that they would respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine within its existing borders.

The question is: could we have done more to avert this disaster? I doubt it. Looking at the paranoia and posturing in the Kremlin, I do not think there is much more we could have done. However, there are lessons to be learned of continuing validity as the crisis continues.

First, on sanctions, the best ones are those that deter. However, in order to achieve deterrence, you have to be ahead of the game and you have to go for scale and specificity. The first UK sanctions package totally failed the test of scale, and we are still failing the test of specificity. I do not believe that the Kremlin has paused for a second to consider what we have said about sanctions.

Secondly, we are talking only about sanctioning Russian exports. It is a very difficult thing to do, given that there is a world market in hydrocarbons. What is much easier to do and would have much more impact on the Russians is to sanction their strategic imports. Russia is even more an oil and gas economy now than it was when Putin came in, despite all his welcome early talk of modernising the economy. It has gone backwards. Its manufacturing sector has declined, which means that it is more vulnerable today to controls on the exports of sensitive technology to it than it was then. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was quite right when he spoke of reinventing CoCom—global controls on strategic exports. We seem to be going back to the Cold War—okay, we needed that instrument in the Cold War and we need it again now.

I have very little more to offer. I support everything said by the noble Lord, Lord Sedwill, in a masterly maiden speech. I should like particularly to add my voice to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford. Here I slightly part company with the noble Lord, Lord McDonald.

The detaching of Luhansk and Donetsk from Ukraine wins no plaudits in Beijing. Beijing has never recognised Abkhazia and Ossetia. Beijing is rather against the idea of breakaway provinces. Installing a puppet government in Kyiv will alarm not just the Baltic states, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia but an awful lot of Azeris, Kazakhs, Tajiks and Turkmen. This is not a crisis of Putin versus the West; this is not a crisis of Putin versus NATO; this is a crisis of Putin versus the world. We need now to be talking to all those in the former Soviet empire who are uneasy about the idea of the attempted recreation of the Soviet empire and all those in the developing world who are uneasy about what they see as the invasion of an independent state that voted by an overwhelming majority for independence. They are inclined to hope that maybe the world can do something about it. We need to be talking to all our Commonwealth friends and we need to be talking globally. This is not just Putin versus the West; this is Putin versus the world.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

I am aware that the attraction of trying to attach an obligation to central government is, in the minds of your Lordships, a convenient way of addressing a raft of perceived deficiencies and shortcomings, or issues that have not been addressed. Actually, there is a very good litany of achievements under the covenant that has not required any legislative status as such. I am thinking of things such as the inclusion of veteran-specific care pathways for mental health and prosthetic care in the NHS in England, and of Operation Courage, which brings together all three veterans’ mental health services—the transition, intervention and liaison service, the complex treatment service and the high-intensity service. I am thinking also of the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, which requires the Secretary of State to refer members of the regular Armed Forces in England to a local housing authority if they believe that they may be made homeless or threatened with homelessness within 56 days. We have the Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Act 2018, providing flexible working opportunities for the modern service family. We have a new schools admission code for England, which came into force in September of this year, specifically to ensure that service families are not disadvantaged by the mobility requirement when applying for school places. The Department for Education allocates additional funding in the form of the service pupil premium to state-funded schools in England with service children. The strategy for our veterans lays out our—

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I do not disagree with all the good things that the noble Baroness is describing, which the Government have brought about, but I have not heard her address the central argument of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern: that it might be easier for the Government to persuade others to go on doing good things if the Government bound themselves in the same way as they are seeking to bind others. I suppose the noble Baroness could say that the Government feel bound already, but if so, why not spell it out in the Bill?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am sure the noble Lord has been listening carefully to the argument that I have been advancing, but I have been trying to distinguish between identified, critical core services—in this case housing, education and health, which the Armed Forces community said mattered most to them—and how we address the delivery of these services. In the main, these services are not delivered by central government but by a range of other agencies, and may be the responsibility of devolved Administrations, in turn delivering them through their agencies. The point I am making is that adding an obligation to central government does not seem in any way to address the need that we have identified that has to be addressed: the current disparity in the delivery of services across the United Kingdom. That, quite simply, is what the Bill is seeking to rectify. That is why trying to attach a covenant obligation to central government is something of a red herring—I do not actually see what it is going to deliver.

Before the noble Lord interrupted me, I was simply explaining, by way of illustration, the point I have just been making: exactly what it has been possible for the Government to do without attaching any statutory obligation on them, and I am not even halfway through my list. At the risk of being tedious with your Lordships, I was also going to mention, finally, a new holistic transition policy that co-ordinates and manages the transition from military to civilian life for service personnel and their families when they leave the Armed Forces. The Defence Transition Services also supports those in that position. We have the Career Transition Partnership, and a range of initiatives and support packages covering a wide range of activity, all of which benefit our Armed Forces personnel. I merely adduce that list to illustrate how alternative processes allow areas of concern to be brought to light more readily and addressed more quickly through other means, if necessary, including action to be taken by central government departments and devolved Administrations, where appropriate.

I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, who specifically raised the evaluation process. This would feed into our existing commitment to review the overall performance of the covenant duty as part of our post-legislation scrutiny. That review will be submitted to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee and will also be covered in the covenant annual report. This is in addition to regular parliamentary scrutiny, such as Parliamentary Questions and regular reviews by the Select Committee, or whatever form of inquiry Members of the other place and of this House may wish to undertake. The detail of the evaluation process is still being worked on with our stakeholders, but I hope that this background and the outline of the process provides reassurance that it represents a better way forward and that we are committed to continuing our work to mitigate the impact of service life on the Armed Forces community, wherever it may occur.

Listening to some of the contributions, it occurred to me that there may be a misunderstanding of the role of the Armed Forces covenant. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern recalled an interesting and arguably disturbing situation, in which it is possible that Armed Forces personnel suffered harm. I undertake to look at that instance in detail; he provided a reference for where I can find more information.

However, I say to my noble and learned friend that central government, and the MoD in particular, are directly responsible for the Armed Forces, and the MoD has always looked after the welfare of service personnel. During the Bill’s passage through this House, we have heard how the support provided has improved, expanded and developed over time, particularly in relation to issues such as mental health. Central government and the MoD answer to Ministers, are held to account in Parliament, and may be held to account by the courts of this land. But the covenant is a separate concept: it is a promise by the nation as a whole to the Armed Forces community that they will not be disadvantaged because of their service. It brings in other organisations, such as health providers and local authorities, who are not directly responsible for the Armed Forces community but whose decisions undoubtedly affect them. It is this new duty that will ensure that these organisations consistently apply the principles of the covenant and can be confident of the legal basis for doing so. Based on this fairly lengthy explanation, I hope that my noble and learned friend will not press his amendment.

I turn to Amendment 17, also tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I know that he is motivated by the best and most honourable of intentions, but I am somewhat unclear about its purpose. The new definition contained in the amendment adds nothing to the duties already set out in the Bill. Indeed, perhaps disquietingly, it seems to decrease the scope of that duty, which I know is not my noble and learned friend’s intention.

We are clear that the Armed Forces covenant is a promise by the nation to support our Armed Forces community. The amendment characterises the scope and character of that promise as an agreement between the Secretary of State and servicepeople. But, with the greatest respect to my noble and learned friend, in doing so, it fails to capture its essence: it is a much broader and more widely embracing concept.

The covenant was framed during a time of great pressure on the Armed Forces community. As I have described at some length, it has been delivered highly successfully in the succeeding decade because it captures the spirit of appreciation and voluntary support for that community from people of every walk of life across the United Kingdom. This voluntary spirit is why it is called a covenant and framed as something far greater than the more transactional approach that this amendment could engender. To express the covenant in the way proposed by this amendment goes against the spirit of the covenant and the many successful initiatives that it has produced, built on the widespread admiration and support to which I have referred.

The Armed Forces covenant is described on the government website for the Armed Forces, and on the front of the annual report, as

“an Enduring Covenant Between the People of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Government—and—All those who serve or have served in the Armed Forces of the Crown and their Families.”

That definition is not in statue, but the principles of the covenant appear in the Armed Forces Act 2006. That is why this Bill has been taking forward greater detail, to try to assist the delivery of vital services for our Armed Forces community.

The description I have just given of the covenant far better captures its nature, which provides the framework through which support for our Armed Forces community can thrive and grow. I thank your Lordships for indulging me with patience and courtesy, as these were important points which had to be addressed at length. In view of the explanation I have given, I hope my noble and learned friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

National Security Situation

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Thursday 19th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, who speaks with real authority and from recent experience on the Kurds in northern Syria. It is also a privilege to take part in a debate in which two senior national security experts—the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones—have taken part, and one in which a distinguished former Foreign Secretary has taken part, together with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, who presumably has now inherited from Lord Healey the status of the best Foreign Secretary we never had.

I can speak with no particular authority about Syria—I am an amateur—but I am tempted by what the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, said to go a little further than I did in our discussion on Monday’s Statement, when I could speak only about Syria. My theme is the same as that of the noble Lord, Lord Glasman. It is about realism and how I think we need to be a bit more realistic, so I will end up exactly where the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, did at the end of his speech.

I am not clear what our strategy on Syria is now. The one thing that is clear is that it is failing. We are against the Assad regime. We are also against ISIS, which is being beaten by the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian supporters. We say that we support the Kurds, who were the most effective indigenous anti-ISIS force, but we are doing nothing to stop them being killed by the Turks, who are our NATO allies. Iranian influence, huge in Baghdad now, as the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, said, is growing fast in Syria. The risk of an Iranian/Israeli conflict grows every day, as this week’s Israeli air strikes show, and the proxy Saudi/Iranian war in Yemen continues with very heavy civilian casualties.

What is the UK trying to achieve? Saturday’s strikes were brilliantly executed, I certainly do not agree that Parliament should have been consulted in advance and I have no doubt about the legality of the action. But the Prime Minister went out of her way in her Statement to make clear that they were not about regime change, yet, as far as I know, our policy is to call for regime change in Syria. It has been our policy for a number of years; there have been no signs of it succeeding, but we still parrot the cry, “Assad must go”.

Under Foreign Secretary Hague, we recognised a Syrian Government in exile. Where is that Government now? Under Foreign Secretary Hague, we told the rebel Syrian national army that we would assist them. Where was that assistance and where is that army now?

Breaching our normal practice, we derecognised the regime in Damascus and withdrew our embassy. Assad is still there; we still are not. I see no sign that we have any influence on the Syrian Government. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, said, we need to recognise that Assad has won. Of course his is a loathsome regime; I am absolutely not an apologist for the man and I understand the rationale for Saturday’s strikes. The Chemical Weapons Convention is important and worth protecting, yet I am uneasy about the strikes.

What was it about this breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the Assad regime, unlike previous ones—the Minister spoke of four; Human Rights Watch talks of 50—that triggered a punitive response? I hope it was not just the presence of a television camera. By attacking only chemical weapons sites and stores—no military camps, no containments, no headquarters and no military hardware such as tanks, rockets or artillery—do we risk creating the perception that the regime may kill with impunity provided it does not use chemical weapons?

What were the political and military effects of the strike? I doubt if it won hearts and minds in Syria. Militarily, I was thinking over the weekend about Henry Fox in 1757 attacking the raid on Rochefort under Pitt as breaking windows with guineas. I am uneasy about hit-and-run raids. The middle ground between engagement and disengagement is murky territory. In Iraq, engagement and regime change clearly failed, 500,000 died and the Iranians now call the shots in Baghdad. But in Syria, disengagement, no boots on the ground, proxy forces and bombing has worked no better, with another 500,000 dead in country or on the long, tragic refugee route to an unwelcoming Europe.

I do not know what the answer is. I am not an expert on the region, I cannot answer my own questions, but I have been asking for a couple of years for answers from the Government and I have five particular questions to put today. First, I think we must drop the pretence that present policy on Syria may still succeed. William Pitt’s triumph in 1759 came when he dropped the policy and completely overturned the strategy that he had been following at the time of the Rochefort raid. We must accept that Putin, Rouhani and Erdoğan are in charge, Assad will stay there as long as they prop him up and, if he goes, it is they who will pick his successor. Do the Government agree?

Secondly, that means we have to talk seriously to all three of them. I do not believe any of them wants the disintegration of Syria and, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, I am not sure that Russian and Western interests are always a zero-sum game. The Russians will of course want to retain the influence they have secured and their bases at Tartus and Latakia, but I do not think they want to be sucked into the sort of quagmire that the Americans are in in Afghanistan. I can envisage Russia brokering a compromise between Iran and Israel, with Iran’s Shiite allies being allowed to remain in Syria provided they keep their distance from Israel. That may be wrong, but I should like to know what the Government think. Do they feel that we should be in dialogue with the Russians about Syria?

Thirdly, what about a peace process? We should be realistic about the Geneva process, which plainly does not work, and consider some association with the Sochi process, which might work. Do the Government agree?

Fourthly, since American policy in Syria is likely to remain capricious, since Syria is Europe’s neighbour, not America’s, and since we and the French have historic responsibilities there, I hope that the Government are seeking a common Anglo-French analysis and prescription and will then seek to sell it to wider Europe. A Europe traumatised by the refugee crisis might respond to an Anglo-French lead.

Finally, I hope that the Government will quickly revisit the decision to withdraw the embassy from Damascus. Diplomatic contacts with friends are useful; with foes, they are vital.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

We certainly believe that Mr Assad needs to be a part of the negotiations leading to a long-term solution, as I shall explain. There needs to be a transition to a new, inclusive and non-sectarian Government who can protect the rights of all Syrians and unite the country, but we are pragmatic about how to achieve that.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

In my time in the Foreign Office, recognition was not a seal of approval; the recognition was that somebody was in control. We have a mission in Pyongyang and in all sorts of places where shaking hands might not be what the noble Earl would wish to do, but that is what we are paid to do. We diplomats are paid to find out what the other lot are up to, and it is most important in relation to one’s foes.

[Earl Howe]

I take the point, but I repeat that our view is that there needs to be a transition to a different regime, despite everything the noble Lord has just said. Syria’s future must be for Syrians to decide.

NATO Warsaw Summit

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend is absolutely right. The meeting on 13 July this week is the continuation of political dialogue as agreed by NATO Heads of State and Government. At the same time, we are clear that there will be no return to business as usual until Russia again respects international law. Engagement through dialogue is important. It is right that we have that dialogue. It is in our interests to engage on subjects in a hard-headed, clear-sighted way, but that does not mean a return to the kind of co-operation that existed before Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimea and the destabilising activity in which it has been engaged in Ukraine.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Given our responsibilities under the Budapest Memorandum, what advice did our representative at the summit give to President Poroshenko of Ukraine? Were there contacts with the Turkish Government in which it became possible to make clear that, despite the insults to Turkey which emerged in the referendum campaign, including from a Ministry of Defence Minister, we still regard it as an extremely valuable ally?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, on the latter point, we have most certainly taken every opportunity to reassure Turkey that it is a very valued member of the NATO alliance, and it is important that we continue to do that. NATO has been united in support for Ukraine throughout the crisis period. Meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, most recently at Warsaw, provide political support. Capability and capacity support is delivered through Ukraine’s participation in NATO exercises and through dedicated NATO trust funds, and the UK is co-leading one of these trust funds. We like to think—and I believe it is right to claim—that we have a leading role. We have consistently argued for a strong response to Russia’s actions and continue to be fully supportive of the Normandy format process.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Owen (Ind SD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jowell, on an extremely moving maiden speech. I shall listen to her future contributions with great respect.

A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Bill—TTIP, as it is commonly called—is vital for this country as the Government have only to sign this treaty and we lose all chance of amendment. The problem with the treaty is not that it is a trade treaty—I have supported every trade treaty in my political life—but it binds into a trade agreement a regulatory activity which could have very profound implications for many of us. It is this aspect to which I particularly wish to draw attention.

First, I pay tribute to the UNITE union, which put the money forward to ask Michael Bowsher QC to make a fully detailed analysis of the treaty. Without this, we would still not have the clarity that is needed. I will quote from what he has said. He is the ex-chairman of the EU Law Committee of the Bar Council and I am told—I do not know whether it is true—that he wishes to remain. So, this is not an issue between remainers and leavers, it is a pretty important issue about how we use treaties to avoid parliamentary scrutiny in both Houses. It does not, therefore, surprise me that a similar Motion is being moved in the other place.

The conclusions of the Bowsher report are as follows:

“For the reasons set out in this advice, our conclusion is that TTIP poses a real and serious risk to future UKG decision-making in respect of the NHS”,

in England. We must remember that it is rather different these days in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. He has seen the most recent statements of Commissioner Malmström and remains of the opinion that:

“The content of the draft texts are such that they do not provide a bar to suit against UKG for substantial compensation—either domestically or within the arbitral Tribunal”,

itself a very new procedure,

“for regulatory changes to the NHS. We do not consider that the new ‘right to regulate’ changes this position”.

The second conclusion is that:

“The circumstances in which a viable claim for compensation will arise, and the extent and level of that compensation, is inherently uncertain under a multi-lateral treaty agreement such as TTIP. This is evidenced by the case-law in the Tribunal, as referred to below. Furthermore, remedies under TTIP may exceed those available under domestic contract law, human rights law and European Union law”.

Thirdly:

“It is the uncertainty referred to in (ii) above which we consider will have a direct ‘chilling’ effect on future action by UKG with respect to the NHS.

We consider that the solution to the problems which TTIP poses to the NHS—and which is likely to provide the greatest protection—is for the NHS to be excluded from the agreement, by way of a blanket exception contained within the main text of TTIP”.

That cannot be done by a Bill, but it could be done by an instruction to the Commissioner, who at times has sounded as if she wants some stern guidance from the member states.

“In the event that this cannot be achieved, we consider that the NHS should be the subject of a carefully worded reservation contained within Annexes II and III of TTIP”.

Much reference has been made in dismissing the concerns that are now beginning to be expressed from all parties and all views. In particular, it reposes on evidence given to the House of Commons Select Committee on 16 October.

“The issue here is whether the new right to regulate affords UKG greater protection were it to seek to make major structural changes, to the detriment of foreign investors, to the NHS … However, despite the new right and the statements from the Commission, as set out above, our view is that the new right is very unlikely to afford UKG any greater protection. This is essentially for three key reasons: the ‘right to regulate’ is not new. Its substance has, in effect, already been recognised in arbitral case-law. The new right in Article 2 therefore adds very little”.

Bowsher traces this whole question:

“The Article 2 right itself is vague. Recognition of the state’s right to regulate and to make changes in fields affecting the welfare of persons, including healthcare, is subject to the inherent uncertainty in the interpretation of that right by the proposed Tribunal”.

Bowsher goes through various international cases and concludes:

“It follows, therefore, that the right to regulate provided for under Article 2 is unlikely to provide additional protection to UKG. Were the matter to proceed to a dispute in the future Tribunal the real issue would remain: is the effect of UKG’s measures such that the investor should be compensated? The right to regulate does not provide a bar to compensation”.

He asks whether an incoming Government would be able to make changes to the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which brought into force the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No.2) Regulations 2013, or amend the regulations themselves. He concludes that it would not be possible, saying that,

“we are of the view that the new right to regulate does not provide sufficient protection to UKG to ensure that no future government or Parliament will have its ability to increase the public sector provision of services limited”.

A lot of what we are going to debate, and the questions of whether or not the EU should be our partner and whether or not we should leave, relate to the way in which over successive years but particularly the past 10 years the EU has crept into the nooks and crannies of all aspects of our lives, including now the NHS. I am not going to make the arguments that are different between the political parties about what we should do with the NHS, but I will argue to my dying day the right of a new Parliament to change the legislation of a previous Parliament under a previous Government. Forfeit that right on an issue as important to us as the National Health Service and the tolerances of society start to break down. This is the great advantage of our system of government.

I will say no more about this and will now make a more partisan but short speech about what I think is—

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Owen]

No, I am not going to give way to the noble Lord. I have taken seven minutes and I have two more.

I believe that the choice this country faces now has come about because of a grotesquely mistaken decision that you can introduce a common currency without a common country. It was opposed by the Bundesbank; it was opposed by the Conservative Government under John Major. We got an opt-out but once you get 19 or 20 countries in the eurozone in an EU of 28, it has effectively become an EU-eurozone grouping, and we should stop this belief that we are protected. We will be affected, as the former Governor of the Bank of England said, if the euro crisis continues and there is a euro collapse. The Prime Minister has accepted this. He gave away in his negotiation our treaty amendment rights to protect ourselves over euro changes. He said that we would not use those in order to get euro reform. It is understandable why he said that because it is of very great interest to this country that we get euro reform and an end to this stagnant euro crisis of the past six years.

It is important also to recognise that behind the wish for a single currency is the wish for a single country. It is quite a noble objective. It has been pursued for many decades. It is summed up by federalism or the “United States of Europe”. But in the development of the European Union—and I have watched it very closely since 1962—there will come a point that is not possible to come back from. You will be faced with a decision that you have to join and people will argue why that is. It may be 10 or 20 years down the track. The answer to this is: this is a once in a generation, once in a lifetime choice, just as it was in Scotland. You cannot have referendums repeatedly and we have to make a choice.

Can we really say to ourselves as we vote on 23 June that we are protecting this country from being sucked into a United States of Europe? I believe we cannot say that and for that reason, as well as the changes in Europe that came after the treaty of Maastricht, it is the right moment to say: go and have whatever you can get agreement on—a single state with a single currency in Europe—and good luck to you. But we in this country should not kid ourselves. This is decision time. Failing to take it will find future generations ending up in whatever looks like a European Union. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

My Lords, I want to follow precisely the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown. The Foreign Office that I joined 50 years ago was taught by the Suez disaster to give up some of our imperial pretensions that had been rebuffed in our ambitions by General de Gaulle. The FCO that I left 15 years ago had learned that being influential in the EU strengthened our voice in Washington, in the UN and in the Commonwealth. The British at last felt at home in Brussels, where English had become the common language, where the Brittans, Kinnocks and Pattens held the key portfolios, where we had more senior jobs in the institutions than any other member state, where the Thatcher single market programme was slowly but steadily becoming reality, and where the wider-world expertise of the British and French was seen as an EU asset. In Washington, we were regarded as good guides to EU outcomes because we were thought capable of delivering on our predictions. Our access reflected respect for our leading role on EU external issues. Some of this has already faded with disaster in the Middle East, cuts in defence and diplomacy, and a certain self-isolation in Europe. But much more is now at risk. We are at a watershed moment and need to be clear about what the referendum fallout effects for foreign policy might be.

Modern British foreign policy rests on four pillars. Fundamental is the link with Washington. The values set out in Philadelphia in 1787 were those of the English and Scottish Enlightenment—Franklin lived in Johnson’s London and knew Hume’s Edinburgh. That will not change: Britain at its best will always be in step with America at its, and trumpery on both sides will not stop that. However, influence on American policy is a function not just of sentiment but of perceived power. We are useful to the Americans to the extent that we can convince or cajole our other friends to adopt common, or at least congruent, policy. We cut ice in Washington when we are seen to cut ice over here. To cut ourselves off from our continent would see us cut down to size—50 million and no longer 600 million—when we talk in the States; no wonder the transatlantic foreign policy community overwhelmingly hopes that we will vote to stay.

The second pillar is the Washington treaty, or NATO; the common defence structure to which we would commit all our forces and pool all our sovereignty in time of war. Our defence cuts have gone deep, and lower economic growth post-Brexit could mean that they go deeper still. However, the damage to effective western soft power is more certain. German reticence about armed deployment and French unease about US-led command structures have meant, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, that it has often fallen to this country to forge the link between NATO and soft-power decisions in the Council of EU Governments.

The key multilateral actors have often been British—we have heard from some of them today: Robertson, Owen and Ashdown. One could also mention Carrington, Patten and Ashton. In the Council that I knew best it was to Douglas Hurd that the Juppés and the Genschers turned at key moments; it was John Major who in a morning swung the whole EU behind his 1991 initiative on safe havens for the Kurds. That cannot happen if we are not there. There would be a growing risk of the North Atlantic Council and the European Council drifting apart. Of course, the EU would still talk to us, but its decisions would be taken in its EU formation with us excluded. No wonder the defence establishments, on both sides of the Atlantic, hope we stay.

Pillar 3 is built on the lessons of history. Chamberlain was wrong in 1938; it is not in our interests to regard neighbouring states as far-off countries of which we know nothing. Distracted by Suez, we did nothing for Hungary in 1956. We did nothing for the Czechs in 1968. So, later, I was very proud to serve Governments, of both parties, who successfully championed EU enlargement, delivering on the Thatcher 1988 Bruges call for an opening to the east. I am sad that some in her party now seem to have forgotten that stability and prosperity in central Europe are a vital UK interest.

And I am shocked that a Minister of the Crown, serving in the Ministry of Defence, should this week insult a vital NATO ally, Turkey, claiming that, unless we leave, this country will be overrun by 2020 with Turkish criminals. This is absurd. Surely she must know, as does everyone else, that Turkish accession to the EU is—in my view, sadly—many decades away, depends on Turkey solving myriad internal problems and can be vetoed by any single member state. Why tell such lies? It demeans the debate and it damages NATO.

But the key point is that an EU without us, or at least without a Britain true to itself, would be less open, less liberal, less secure, less aligned with British values and interests, properly defined. No wonder our true friends in Europe hope we will stay.

Pillar 4 is the belief that a rules-based, multilateral order built on the rule of law, on the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions, on aid and trade structures optimised to support economic development, serves us best. If we left the EU, its aid programmes would be smaller and probably less focused on our friends. More importantly, developing-country access to EU markets would probably grow more slowly, particularly for those with closest ties to us. The free trade agreement with South Africa was negotiated by a British Commission official, backed by London but resisted by much of southern Europe.

Looking beyond trade, our ability to help defuse threats of conflict, whether on Iran’s nuclear programmes, Indus waters or the South China Sea, would decline. Why should Iran, India, China or the Security Council listen to us if our influence on both sides of the Atlantic had shrunk? No wonder our Asian friends and our Commonwealth friends, most recently Prime Minister Trudeau last week, have said they firmly hope we stay.

My thesis is that the four pillars of our foreign policy are mutually reinforcing. If one goes, all are weakened. That is why next month’s vote is so crucial, and not just for our prosperity. Our influence across the world would shrink and our friends and allies believe that their interests would suffer with ours if we were to find ourselves with, in Stephen Wall’s phrase,

“our noses pressed to the European glass, gesticulating, unheard, to those inside”.

To quote another historian, perhaps more widely known but less authoritative:

“Suppose Britain voted … to come out: what would actually happen? We’d still have huge numbers of staff trying to monitor what was going on in the community, only … we wouldn’t have any vote at all. Now I don’t think that’s a prospect that’s likely to appeal”.

For foreign policy as well as other reasons, I sincerely hope that you are right, Boris. Yes, that was Mr Johnson, but it was in November 2012. Consistency is the hallmark of small minds, and vaulting ambition can o’erleap itself.

Immigration Bill

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am very sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, appeared to be so dismissive of the many measures that I set out in my opening remarks. I emphasise that those measures include both children in conflict zones and those who have reached the shores of Europe. We want to ensure that those children already in Europe are able to access the help and protection that they need; we simply disagree on the method outlined in the amendment in lieu.

I will emphasise something that I should have highlighted earlier: our position is firmly based on the evidence and advice of the expert organisation in this field, namely the UNHCR. Our approach focuses on family reunification and the wider risk categories of children at risk, rather than just unaccompanied children. The UNHCR has commended this approach, and I ask noble Lords not to dismiss that point. As the world expert in this field, it has cautioned against creating additional routes and benefits that target unaccompanied children, because of the risk of encouraging families to send children ahead alone—in other words, causing children to become unaccompanied, with all the risks that go with it. That would be a terrible thing to do or to encourage. We surely must do nothing that puts more children’s lives at risk. Our new children at risk scheme, which I referred to earlier, is designed specifically to avoid creating perverse incentives like that.

We agree that we have a duty to help vulnerable children across the globe, whether in conflict regions, in European member states or in the UK, to access the help and protection they need. But it is our belief that simply physically transporting some unaccompanied children from one part of the EU to another is not the best or most effective way to fulfil our duty. That is why we are providing the significant support I have already outlined to build capacity in European asylum systems and ensure children are able to access that support.

We also believe it is best to support family reunification —bringing families together—rather than creating perverse incentives for children to be separated from their family, which I fear is what the noble Lord’s amendment would do. We already have several routes for families to be reunited safely. Our refugee family reunion policy allows immediate family members of a person in the UK with refugee leave or humanitarian protection—that is to say, a spouse or partner and children under the age of 18, who formed part of the family unit before the sponsor fled their country of origin—to reunite with them in the UK.

That is the answer to my Commons colleague Stephen Phillips: under that policy, we have reunited many refugees with their immediate family and continue to do so. We have granted more than 21,000 family reunion visas over the past five years. Even where an application fails under the Immigration Rules, our policy requires us to consider exceptional or compassionate reasons for granting a visa outside the rules.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Does the noble Earl not agree that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is right to say that it is not a question of either/or? Of course all these good things that are being done should be done, but the children we are talking about are there, scattered across Europe and at risk.

[Earl Howe]

I do not agree with the noble Baroness, because of the risks that I have already outlined. If we were to go down the path that she advocates, we would put children at additional risk. We cannot possibly do that. We are currently reviewing our family reunion guidance to make clear the sorts of cases that might benefit from a visa outside the rules and will publish that in May.

We have all seen squalid conditions in Calais. That is precisely why we are working closely with the French authorities to see to it that vulnerable children are protected. We are working with the relevant NGOs to ensure that the message that children receive is that it is possible to be transferred to the UK under the Dublin arrangement both from Calais and from social care. I would just say that that can happen in a matter of weeks; it is not a slow process.

Effective communication is of course key. We agree that more can be done to ensure that children are able to access the support they need. The UNHCR already has access to the camps and accommodation centres to inform migrants on the different options of applying for asylum in France and family reunification for those who may have family members in the European Union. That is in addition to the joint UK-France communication campaign in the camps, which informs migrants of their rights to claim asylum in France and gives them information on family reunification.

However, the best way to communicate that is to demonstrate that the system works, and that is what we are already doing. How? One example is our recent secondment of a senior asylum expert to the French Interior Ministry to improve the process for family cases. That has already resulted in a significant increase in the number of children being reunited with family in the UK. In the past six weeks, 50 cases have been formally referred to the UK under Dublin family unity provisions, of which 30 have been accepted for transfer to the UK from France, the majority of whom have already arrived in the UK. Once an asylum claim has been lodged in another member state, we have shown that transfers can take place within weeks.

I think that these results are encouraging, and we are determined to replicate the work of the senior asylum expert in Calais in both Greece and Italy. We are committed to ensuring that the Dublin process works, so that will be in addition to the secondments that we have already agreed and have taken place in both Greece and Italy. We expect to second a further individual to both the Greek and the Italian Dublin units in May.

I have spoken at some length to demonstrate that the Government are committed to making a full contribution to the global refugee crisis—in particular, helping children at risk. The significant aid package within Europe and our practical assistance to front-line member states to ensure that vulnerable children are properly protected where they are in Europe is the correct approach. It is about the children’s best interests. I strongly believe that our drive to resettle children at risk and their families directly from the region will have most impact to safeguard vulnerable children. That is why I am asking the House not to agree to proposed Amendment 87B in lieu.

Afghanistan

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Wednesday 7th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I point out to the noble Lord that we are part of an international ISAF organisation and we have done this with the agreement of our partners. I feel comfortable with that decision.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

Was the Minister responding to the last point made by the noble Lord, Lord King, when he spoke of the need to pursue a political track? He spoke of the need to win the counterinsurgency and to pursue political progress. In the light of what the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, told us, it seems very important to envisage serious contacts and negotiations with all parties inside Afghanistan and a framework that involves all the regional powers and Afghan’s neighbours, including the Chinese, the Russians, the Kyrgys, the Kazakhs, the Iranians and the Pakistanis.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes an important point. We will not bring about a more secure Afghanistan by military means alone. Insurgencies usually end with political settlements, not military victories. As the Prime Minister said, as for talking to the Taliban, a process of reconciliation and reintegration is taking place where Taliban who are prepared to stop fighting and accept the basic tenet for the Afghan constitution can be reintegrated back into society. That should happen. That political track which runs alongside the training of the Afghan Army and the military surge is vital, as is talking to the neighbours surrounding Afghanistan.