Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 12th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, as we heard earlier, this past Wednesday was World Suicide Prevention Day. Suicide is always a tragedy, and its effects profoundly felt by whole communities as well as the immediate family. As legislators, I believe we have a responsibility to affirm every life as having inherent and equal value, regardless of age, health, disability or circumstances. I believe we need to seek to prevent suicide, not facilitate it.

We have a national strategy for reducing the number of lives lost to suicide but sadly, the suicide rate in this country is the highest it has been in over two decades. It is almost unfathomable, therefore, that in the very week we should be shining a light on suicide prevention, we are considering amending the Suicide Act 1961—in Clause 32—to make it legal for the state to give drugs to people to hasten the end of their own lives.

Proponents of the Bill have tried to argue that legalising “assisted dying” will somehow reduce the number of unassisted suicides, but there is robust evidence to suggest that it has the opposite effect. Backers of assisted suicide in the Australian state of Victoria claimed it would prevent 50 suicides of terminally ill people each year. They won the argument. But, since the law was changed, unassisted suicide among over 65s—the largest demographic of terminally ill people—has increased by more than 50%.

You can see why. If the state tells the sick and elderly that suicide is a valid way out, some of those who do not qualify under the terms of the legislation will still feel that they should take that same way out, because it has been normalised. Our commitment to suicide prevention as a society depends on a consistent message that every life has meaning and value and is deserving of protection. Suicide cannot be both something we try hard to prevent and something we assist in some cases. That is nonsensical. For the state to tell certain suicidal people, “You’re right. Your life isn’t worth living”, is an appalling message. It is the ultimate in hopelessness and the very opposite of compassion.

According to the Royal College of Psychiatrists, suicidal ideation in terminal illness typically resolves once a

“person’s physical pain or associated fear of it is alleviated”.

But the Bill ignores our duty of care to these people. It sanctions death by poisoning for those who, with the right palliative care and support, would otherwise often choose to live.

The Bill will put vulnerable people under even greater pressure to end their lives for fear of being a physical, emotional or financial burden on others. We see this in Canada, where the medical assistance in dying law has become, in the words of an ME sufferer called Madeline, a “brutal practicality” for people seeking to escape poverty and social isolation. One 37 year-old homeless man applied for medically assisted death because, in his words, he felt “useless” and thought he was “hurting society”. Another woman, in her 50s, asked to die because she could not get adequate housing. Who wants to live in a society like that? This utilitarian way of thinking becomes normalised once assisted suicide is legalised. Polling shows that over one quarter of Canadians now think that it should be acceptable for people to seek state-assisted death as a solution to poverty and homelessness.

The current law exists to protect those who might otherwise feel pressured into ending their lives, and that is why we must keep it. We should be seeking to strengthen people in hope, respect their agency and give them the care and support they need—not affirming them in their hopelessness and giving them drugs to kill themselves. We need to ask: is this Bill really the best we can do for society’s most vulnerable? The Bill cannot be improved; it must therefore fail.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 30th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps reference to the Companion will help reduce the noble Baroness’s confusion about my speech. The Companion says that, once the Chair has put the Question,

“a general debate on the clause may take place”.

I am highlighting problems with the clause. Clause 1 is the substance of the Bill and an equality impact assessment is fundamental to our understanding of whether it should stand part.

To come back to the letter, it refers to the possibility of generating comparative evidence on the wider matters, but that would not have produced sufficiently robust conclusions. The matter raised was that the EIA did not deal with any detail of all those certain protected characteristics because it focused on access to assisted dying. Access to assisted dying is not relevant to the safeguarding risks that we have all spent some eight days in Committee debating. The letter says:

“We intend to update both the Impact Assessment and the Equality Impact Assessment should the Bill receive Royal Assent, once detailed implementation work has been completed”.


That will be too little too late. It is of no assistance to Parliament in considering the Bill and its potential consequences. Indeed, the whole point of an EIA is that it is done before or at the time a decision is taken. I refer again to the Cabinet Office guide to making legislation. A failure to undertake a comprehensive EIA means a failure to comply with a public sector equality duty, as post hoc analysis cannot generally cure a failure to have due regard to equality implications at the time a decision is being made.

That is what the courts consistently emphasise. R (Blundell) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 2021 noted that post-decision equality analysis is not sufficient to fulfil the duty, as it is supposed to be a real, open-minded consideration of the equality implications, conducted with substance and rigour, not a rearguard box-ticking exercise.

In concluding, I say to the Government that an accurate assessment of how the Bill impacts people who share each of the nine protected characteristics does not betray that position of neutrality. In fact, it is the converse: withholding information is not an act of neutrality but the opposite of that.

The Constitution Committee published a report on the Bill on 11 September, lamenting that supporting documents, including the EIA, “were issued late” or were not available. In the other place, Ministers gave the excuse that the Bill was “highly dynamic” and likely to undergo significant changes during scrutiny, so it was important to wait until the committee concluded its work so that

“we know what it is that we are assessing the impact of”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Committee 30/1/25; col. 282.]

Now we are told that there is insufficient evidence to produce conclusions that are sufficiently robust. I suggest that the Minister review what both the EHRC and the letter submitted by 59 Members of this House have asked her to do and come back with some more positive news at an earlier date.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I beg the indulgence of the Committee to raise what I think is an important point; I hope the Committee does not think it pedantic. I had not intended to speak but was prompted to by the excellent speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, and by my noble friend Lady Coffey’s reference to the lack of insight provided by the Government—I will not criticise the sponsor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. This—our deliberations, scrutiny and oversight of the Bill—is a moveable feast, so we need information in real time.

My specific point is not just about freedom of information but about Written Questions that the Government have received and not answered. On 1 December 2025 my noble friend Lord Kempsell asked His Majesty’s Government a very reasonable Question. He asked, with regard to the Bill and its impact assessment,

“what assessment they have made of the effectiveness of judicial approval as a safeguard in countries with assisted suicide regimes, including the proportion of applications refused in those countries and the reasons for refusal”.

Two months on, that Question has not been answered. That is unacceptable, because scrutiny and oversight require us to have all the information in our hands, including comparative legal, regulatory and medical regimes.

By comparison, the very sensible Question from the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate—I do not want to embarrass him because he is in the Chair—about the use of the Parliament Act was asked on 26 January and answered promptly on 29 January. The point is that there should be equality and a level playing field on Questions asked, irrespective of the position on the Bill of the noble Lord asking it.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am another Member who had not intended to say a single word on whether the clause should stand part; I am rather relaxed about it. The Government Whips must blame their noble friend Lord Rooker, who provoked me into commenting because I agree, once again, with every single wise word he said.

The noble Lord referenced the Delegated Powers Committee, of which he was a distinguished member at one point. I was the chair of the committee when we produced the Democracy Denied? report. It highlighted the fact that every Government over the past 30 years—Tory, Labour, Conservative-Lib Dem and Conservative again—took more and more powers away from Parliament via delegated powers. The delegated powers in the Bill are excessive and have rightly been criticised.

The noble Baroness is also right that no Government in any democracy in the world can function unless there are delegated powers; not everything can be in Bills. The questions here are: how many delegated powers are appropriate; and what will they contain? The trouble is that we have more than 40—48, I think—possible delegated powers, including Henry VIII powers. That seems excessive.

I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for producing some amendments that would implement the delegated powers recommendations, but I think he knows that if he did not produce them, this House, on Report, would implement every single one of the delegated powers recommendations; we would gut those bits of the Bill that did not implement them. So, although he has generously provided some amendments regarding the delegated powers recommendations, he knows full well that this House will implement all of them in any case.

That is all I want to say on the Bill. Delegated powers under all Governments have been increasing and ought to be diminished. Although I have some concerns about the contents of the Bill, I have many more concerns about the 48 powers that will be written by civil servants in the Department of Health. At the moment, they are unable to tell the difference between a man and a woman; I do not want them writing up how I will die in future.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben (Con)]

We have already told the noble and learned Lord what we think about the impact assessment. We have been asking for an updated impact assessment which takes into account the debates we have had and the assessments we have made. The Government have said they will not do that—that is what I am referring to. I want to see an absolutely up-to-date impact assessment based on the debates in which we have expressed and explained real issues which have not been raised before, so that we can, first, know how much it costs and, secondly, begin to ask ourselves, “Is this the priority?”

I will end on this. Is it a priority to provide people with the free chance to kill themselves and not provide people with Marie Curie nurses so they may live the end of their lives in a happier and better place? Anyone who suggests that we get that priority right by funding assisted suicide rather than Marie Curie nurses seems to me to be saying something that the public would not accept. One of the problems with this whole debate is that we have never been prepared to tell the public what the real effect of this is. Therefore, I very much support this amendment—not that I would normally support the kind of position my noble friend raises in his particular way, but he did it most elegantly. I support it entirely because, at long last, we are talking about the facts and what this really means for the people of Britain.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Before my noble friend sits down, he might be interested to know that we have been here before. He will know that, in 2012, as a result of replies to freedom of information requests about the discredited Liverpool care pathway, it was revealed that £12 million was promised to various trusts across the country to hit targets in respect of the Liverpool care pathway. There was fiscal inducement to facilitate the death of patients. So this is not a scare story; we have seen evidence of it within living memory.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that intervention, and it is important. I have been trying to be very careful not to suggest that those in favour of this Bill are in favour of it as a money-saving operation. I do not believe that is true, but I have to challenge them with simply this: once this were in the system, it would be a serious temptation.

There are two big temptations in this Bill. The first is summed up by that old phrase “Where there’s a will, there’s a relative”. There is a real issue about coercion. The second great problem is that you change the fundamental relationship between the ill person and the doctor. You also create circumstances in which it is very likely that it would be cheaper for people no longer to be there. If anyone thinks that that creates confidence, either in the medical profession or in the National Health Service, I do not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to draw attention to Amendment 928 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hollins, who cannot be in her place today. There are two ways of getting additional expertise: one is through consultation and the other is through having additional experts on the panel. Her amendment provides for having a safeguarding expert, a physician and a clinical psychologist on the panel, and she sets out the qualifications for each of those individuals. That would give a greater pool of expertise that could be selected from, appropriate to the needs of the particular person whose circumstances were being considered.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will focus my remarks on Amendment 462B, in my name, and support Amendments 463, 464 and 465, to which I have attached my name. Like my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, this is the first opportunity I have had to contribute to this Committee’s deliberations and, like him, I last spoke on Second Reading.

The amendment requires a public notice to be issued 28 days before the panel intends to sit, which would enable members of the public to attend and potentially engage with the proceedings. I want to say in advance that this a probing amendment. I understand further work would need to be done, probably through regulations, to specify what any notice must entail and consider any further matters around privacy. I am open as to whether 28 days is the right notice period. Amendment 439, in the name of my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch, does a good job of addressing many of these concerns, in a way that aligns closely with existing practice directions in the Court of Protection.

However, those caveats aside, I trust that this amendment probes an important point. Schedule 2.6 states that:

“Panels are to determine referrals in public”,


but the public nature of the panel is surely illusory if interested parties are not notified that a panel hearing is taking place. How would anyone know when and where to turn up? I do not think we can gloss over this as a minor omission. Giving evidence to the House’s Select Committee, at page 143 the Law Society listed this issue among the things it is “really concerned about”. As it explains, it is unclear at the moment where the panels will be held and how people will know about them. That needs to be clarified and further information needs to be provided.

The point was also well made by the late Sir James Munby, the former president of the Family Division, whose comments continue to have an important influence on our deliberations. He described the Bill’s silence on a notification mechanism as “an astonishing omission”. He went on:

“Quite apart from all the other reasons why it might be thought desirable to make such provision in the Bill, the participation of others is necessary if the process is to have that degree of rigour which is essential if it is to be capable of identifying and preventing possible abuses, and in particular be adequate to detect what may be very subtle external pressures, and if it is to command public confidence”.


He was absolutely right. Supporters of the Bill have talked about how they intend this proposed law to bring end-of-life decisions “out of the shadows”. However, as drafted, the Bill provides for individuals to die in secrecy with the intentional assistance of the state. We cannot ignore the impact that this secrecy will have on the grief of families who hear that their loved one has died by assisted suicide only after the event, particularly if they possess relevant facts such as evidence of coercion or mental illness. The Committee may be aware of the tragic death last year of Maureen Slough from Cavan, Ireland. Her family reported their devastation at being informed of their mother’s assisted suicide via a WhatsApp message from a Swiss clinic. The same message also informed them that her ashes would arrive by post. The circumstances behind Ms Slough’s death were even more tragic. First, her brother, a UK solicitor, said Maureen had provided the clinic with “letters of complaint to medical authorities in Ireland in respect of bogus medical conditions” which the clinic allegedly used to support her application. Secondly, the clinic claimed to have received what appears to have been a forged letter from her daughter Megan, acknowledging her mother’s plans. These details, together with the fact that Ms Slough had long struggled with mental illness, suggest that there were potential red flags which may have been identified had the family been duly notified.

While supporters of the Bill may argue that the panel process is designed precisely to avert this kind of situation, I respectfully ask how we can be so sure. Remember that the panel operates on only a civil level of proof—in other words, on probability. To use an example from Ms Slough’s story, it is likely that the panel would have concluded, without hearing Megan’s claim that she did not write it, that the letter was more likely to be a forgery and so warrant further investigation. Perhaps so, but we cannot be sure and that is the problem.

We must also consider the importance of notification in light of the Bill providing no clear mechanism for families to intervene at a later stage once an eligibility certificate has been granted. To refer again to the late Sir James Munby, in his very eloquent words,

“the Amended Bill is entirely silent as to how the panel is to deal with the kind of issue exemplified by the Canadian case of AY v NB … where the patient’s partner intervened and obtained an interim injunction because of concerns about what was happening. What if the patient’s partner and relatives, excluded from participation in the panel process, discover, only after the panel has granted a certificate … facts of the kind which in AY v NB prompted an eleventh-hour intervention by the Canadian judge?”

This is a major hole in the Bill and, as it stands, if interested parties are to intervene, it must be at the panel stage and they must be informed of the panel meeting so that they can apply to submit evidence as necessary.

Finally, I want to address concerns that some noble Lords may have around the amendment’s requirement to publish the names of people referred to the panel and the potential impact this may have on privacy. I have thought long and hard about this. As I alluded to before, there is great merit in the proposal by my noble friend Lady Maclean in Amendment 439. However, one weakness is that it requires the commissioner to notify any other person properly interested in the welfare of the person. There is no clear way of establishing who they might be. How is the commissioner to know which friends to contact? One may just have vital information. Therefore, there is a benefit in requiring a more general notice.

I also observe that there are times where public interest is so great that it outweighs privacy concerns. Marriage, as a public institution, is a good example of this. I based the amendment on its notification requirements. In that context, the interest that we all have in defending that public institution means that a general notice is issued so that anyone can come forward with evidence of coercion or any other legal impediment. In considering public interest, we need to appreciate what is going on here.

In the words of my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead at Second Reading, this Bill gives the state a licence to kill. Whatever our views on the subject, in handing the state this power there is surely great public interest in demanding maximum oversight and safeguards. The panel process should not be seen as totally analogous to the situation in the Court of Protection, where greater anonymity protections would normally apply. It is important to note that most cases in the Court of Protection involve patients who clearly lack capacity and have not consented to the process. Instead, cases usually involve best interest disputes between families and medics. However, in this process it is a basic requirement that the patient be able to consent.

In closing, I add this. Even if the House desires a more anonymised process, we need to debate the details of it. What restrictions would there be on media reporting? Who would determine the circumstances in which these restrictions apply? Perhaps the noble and learned Lord, the sponsor, can address these issues in his remarks. Without answers to these and other questions, the Bill risks the assisted suicide process being more shadowy and less transparent than would apply in cases in the Court of Protection. I do not think that this is acceptable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I thank the Chief Whip for his helpful admonition. I will just say very briefly that the amendment is very much in keeping with the spirit of what both Governments have sought in looking, for instance, at bringing forward pilot schemes in the Court of Protection, where there has been de facto assisted death by the withdrawal of medical treatment by clinicians, particularly for children, where hitherto no details were released of the clinicians, trusts, lawyers or anyone. The Government thought that to be unsatisfactory and inimical to open justice.

On that basis, the Government brought forward more openness and transparency, and my amendment merely continues that. Finally, I will say that it includes only the name of the person involved: secondary legislation by way of regulations would be in place to enable further details to be revealed, if necessary. If I am honest, I cannot really understand the slightly over-the-top reaction from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, because this is a sensible and proportionate amendment.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 13th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that my mother held doctors in great esteem and reverence until the day that I and my rowdy friends qualified, and then the whole mystique was exploded overnight.

My serious point is that I am still mystified by Clause 5, because it remains completely unclear who is having this preliminary discussion. Even if we safeguard against the doctor raising the subject of assisted dying without it being initiated by the patient, none the less this clause is still opaque about who this person is. If, fortuitously, the patient has a good relationship with their GP and is able to raise the matter and have a full discussion, they may be able to cover all the things that are listed in this clause—diagnosis, prognosis, palliative care, hospice, available treatments and so on—but, if it is not their GP, who is the medical practitioner supposed to direct them to? Unlike the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor, they do not have the right written into the Bill to access the patient’s records or make inquiries of the person who is looking after them, so I am unclear about how they are supposed to discharge all these duties.

Also, it does not reflect reality. If somebody is starting to think about possibly seeking an assisted death, they may ask their GP about one part, their priest about another aspect, their next of kin about another aspect, and they will gradually form a view. But to lay it down in statute seems to be putting an additional hurdle in the patient’s way. Surely, at the time when they want to ask about the detail of assisted death, what it might entail and its feasibility, the person to seek advice from is the co-ordinating doctor or the first doctor within the voluntary assisted dying service, who will have had the training and will have some knowledge to be able to say with confidence what the individual should expect. So I strongly support my noble friend Lady Hollins’s view that Clause 5 should not stand part of the Bill, because it seems to be a complete muddle that we have been discussing various aspects of for some time now.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I think the debate that we have had for the last two and a half hours shows this House in a very positive light. It goes to the very essence of what some of us who are sceptical about the Bill believe to be the most crucial issue: how the Bill will impact the most vulnerable people in society. I say in passing how moved I was by the wonderfully powerful and emotional speech from my noble friend Lady Monckton, as well as by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin’s speech on his amendment.

Noble Lords might ask a rhetorical question: why are we spending so much time on this particular group? I will offer an anecdote to your Lordships on why it is important that we have spent this time talking about people with disabilities and learning disabilities, and particularly people with Down syndrome. In the summer of 2024, my 91 year-old father was admitted to Peterborough hospital and spent a number of hours in what is euphemistically called “ambulatory care”—which is the back of an ambulance—before being able to access a trolley for a number of hours. As it happens, he was terminally ill. He died a few weeks later from bladder cancer that had metastasised to the rest of his body, but he did not have a diagnosis of terminal illness.

When I reached the hospital, his belongings were adjacent to where he was. At the bottom of the Sainsbury’s carrier bag that held all his personal belongings was a “Do not resuscitate” form that had been filled in. In fact, I think it was what they call—again, euphemistically—a “respect form”. It had been countersigned by a doctor without any discussion with myself or my two brothers. As your Lordships know, none of us are shrinking violets. My brother is a decorated police officer and my other brother is a world-leading scientist and a professor of psychology. We are all quite smart people, but this form had been completed without any discussion with the family.

Indeed, it was alleged that my father had had capacity to sign that form and had agreed to it being countersigned by a doctor. That was a very significant development. I found myself having to front up a difficult conversation with the clinicians in accident and emergency and the geriatrician who was on duty that day. I thought to myself: what if my father had a learning disability? What if he could not read or write properly? What if he was anxious about dealing with bureaucracy and professional people? I thought about how much more difficult it would have been if he did not have a family: if he had not had three sons watching out for him and protecting his interests. How much difficulty would there have been in him challenging the professional bona fides and authority of a clinician—a medic who is well educated and articulate and knows their profession.

I posit that that is the reason we have spent so much time debating these issues. It is not for people such as my father, who, as I say, was terminally ill, but for the many people who have great difficulty: people who are already in a position where they are sad, lonely, depressed, bereft and distraught after a diagnosis of a terminal illness. Those people need assistance in primary legislation to protect their interests, because otherwise no one else will look out for them. That is not to say that those doctors were in breach of the Hippocratic oath, or that they were not compassionate, empathetic, caring and feeling for my father and many thousands of other people in similar situations, particularly old people. Nevertheless, they are busy and stressed and that form was filled in in good faith.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

In the modern NHS—not the NHS of five, 10 or 20 years ago—a patient can be in the back of an ambulance for hours outside the hospital, and then be put in a corridor before they get to a ward; and they might see a consultant on the ward round only once or twice a week for a few minutes, if they are lucky, and may not see the same consultant again for weeks. That fundamental change in the nature of our health service over recent years, with the huge additional pressure and demand, makes these protections all the more important.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

As usual, the noble Lord makes a very apposite point and reinforces my arguments.

Time is pressing, so if I can beg the indulgence of your Lordships’ House, I will just develop slightly my support for the points that my noble friend Lord Shinkwin made at the beginning of this debate. The danger that terminally ill patients, accustomed to trusting medics who care for them, will sense that they should do what their doctor is telling them when they are only suggesting the option of assisted suicide is greatly heightened where, for instance, learning disabilities are in the mix. My noble friend made reference to Ken Ross of the National Down Syndrome Policy Group, who was quite right when he said:

“People with Down syndrome have a very complex and unique speech and communication profile. They are highly suggestible. Even someone wearing a uniform could suggest a position of authority to them and something they should show acquiescence to. The acquiescence bias risk from people with Down syndrome is extraordinary.”


This was mentioned by my noble friend.

“They could have a seeded view around what they think that person wants to hear and talk about without fully understanding the position”.

I assume that by “a seeded view”, Mr Ross means that the idea is planted in their mind, by a doctor mentioning assisted suicide, that this is what that doctor would prefer. Others, more expert, might put me right.

Other similar points were made by my noble friend Lady Monckton, in her superb speech, about the dangers of someone such as her daughter Domenica, who has Down syndrome, being advised by a doctor new to her that a terminal condition might mean it is best to have her life ended—without any legal obligation to discuss this with parents, other family members or someone independent, as the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, propose. As she said, fear, terror and a total lack of comprehension would sit alongside her daughter’s highly suggestible disposition.

The Commons, in fairness, did ensure that the Bill now has extra safeguards for those with learning disabilities, but these are focused on training and an advocate from the first declaration—far further down the road than the preliminary discussion. Actually, the experience in Australia is that training around the specific bespoke issue of coercion is very limited, and that needs to be looked at. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will address that in his concluding remarks. This is when framing effects will occur and will be the starting point for vulnerable people misunderstanding the options or feeling pressure. By the time an advocate is in place, the person they are working for might have a fixed idea, which the advocate will not want to ride roughshod over. Clause 5 therefore needs strengthening to address this inconsistency, which is a key concern of experts in learning difficulties.

Hence the question that some noble Lords may be asking, about the need for prohibition, particularly where Down syndrome and learning disabilities are in play, because these might be the patients most likely to provoke cost concerns but least likely to discern that this motivation, not their best interest, is the main reason for raising the possibility of assisted suicide. I have to say that that would be a minority of cases, and I am not making that point about the vast majority of clinicians.

In conclusion, it is for these reasons that I strongly support Amendment 162 and others in this group.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. We have heard a lot of comments about the real world and what is actually going on now, today, out there in healthcare. It will be very interesting to hear how the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, responds to all the criticisms and to the way the inherent dangers in Clause 5 have been highlighted.

My Amendment 201 concerns children. A little boy with advanced malignancies said to me, “I'm going to die when my goldfish dies”. He went on to talk through what he wanted when he was dying and how he would play football in heaven with another boy who had died recently. Not long after, his goldfish was found floating. My strenuous attempts to resuscitate his goldfish failed, and he gently died soon after.

That was some years ago. Today, children live off the internet, not just off what they hear from other children. They know about the debate on this Bill—some raise it in “Learn with the Lord” sessions. If a child is asking questions about this, they must be able to express their fears if they are already ill. They often speak with remarkable frankness. Children’s awareness is phenomenal. They deserve gentle, honest planning of their care that also explains why they are ineligible for assisted suicide. Hence my wording, but the wording of the noble Lord, Lord Rook, provides much clearer guidelines for clinicians involved, to allow them to listen but in no way to hint that the child will be eligible.

Assisted suicide is not a medical treatment. It falls outside McCulloch and Montgomery rulings, hence my Amendment 159. As has been said, if a doctor raises assisted death unprompted, the implication is that this is something you should consider—a tacit implication that this might be your best option. Addressing the comments by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, it is a doctor’s duty of care to sensitively explore with open questions and careful listening, to discuss whatever the person wishes to discuss at their initiation. That is patient autonomy and control. Mencap, the Association for Palliative Medicine and the Royal College of Psychiatrists have all warned how patients’ trust gives doctors a dangerous ability to steer decisions if the suggestion comes from the doctor.

Listening with undivided attention is crucial in gentle, honest communication in the face of patients’ anguish. Patients hang on to our every word, so suggesting it as an option signposts them in that direction. It abandons suicide prevention duties under the Mental Health Act and the state’s duty under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The amendments overall have a common theme of making the autonomy of the patient paramount in these discussions, their being able to raise assisted death in their own time, at their own pace and at their instigation. I hope these amendments will be taken heed of.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 20th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I shall touch briefly on two points prompted by both the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and my noble friend Lord Blencathra. In a sense they are a challenge to the sponsor, the noble and learned Lord. I think I am right in saying that he was a lot more definitive in his language in the Committee proceedings last week on 13 March about the need for the independent advocate to be present during discussions with the individual seeking to access the service. His Amendment 549A is more opaque in its language and does not specify that. Given the discussions that we had, particularly last week, about the power imbalance between someone who is less confident, less well-educated—a power imbalance between the decision-maker and the person accessing the service—it is an imperative that the independent advocate attends and is present to challenge some of the assumptions or decisions that are being made.

I want also to consolidate a point raised by my noble friend about training. The noble and learned Lord will know, as he and others have lauded the system in Victoria, Australia, that the training provided around the specific issue of coercion is very limited at tier 1. He has potentially missed an opportunity to focus in on training. If you had an in-person independent advocate and poor training, that would not be great, but you would at least have someone attending. Instead, you have a situation of inadequate training and someone not attending in person. It may be that they can send an email, or do a report, or a telephone call, but that is not the same as being there advocating for that individual.

I invite the noble and learned Lord, the sponsor, to address those specific issues of the opacity of his new amendment. I accept that it has been offered to the Committee in good faith to address some of the concerns and issues raised previously, but there is a specific issue about the wording of his new Amendment 549A and a specific issue of training around coercion, which is very important in this respect.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, we have focused in this debate on the role of the independent advocate, but of course many of the underlying concerns arise with regard to protections for various vulnerable groups and people in situations that expose them to coercion or abuse. It is clear that the text of the Bill as drafted does not specifically address protections for groups such as those with Down syndrome or those subject to coercion.

In fairness to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, he could reasonably argue that the drafting of the Bill should be wide enough to encompass all of these groups on a generic basis without specifically referencing them. If the Bill is drafted with too much specificity, almost certainly somebody will be left out and we would have to come back at a later stage. That is presumably why the noble and learned Lord has introduced his regulation-making power in Amendment 549A, which I will come back to in a moment.

That said, I would suggest that it is not enough just to say that the drafting of the Bill is broad and that, therefore, we cannot debate its impact on specific vulnerable groups. I would be interested if the Minister could take time in her response to set out how the Government have taken into account the specific needs of the groups mentioned in the various amendments. That seems to me to be part of the work to deal with the practicalities of implementing the Bill.

How, for example, in practice does a person with Down syndrome who might have both speech and hearing difficulties communicate that they wish to die? How will medical practitioners and independent advocates assess that that person has come to an informed choice that they wish to die? Assessing the true wishes of people in that situation can be exceptionally challenging, and many such people rely on loved ones or carers to interact between themselves and medical professionals. How, therefore, do these family members or carers fit into the architecture of the Bill? How do they fit in, for example, with the independent advocate? What is the relationship between family members, carers and the independent advocate within the system of the Bill? Those are general questions which I hope the Minister will be able to respond to.

There is one specific point I ask the noble and learned Lord to consider which arises from his Amendment 549A, which would introduce a new clause after Clause 22. This point was prompted by a comment made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. If one looks at subsection (2)(b), the regulations must

“require a specified person to instruct an independent advocate to represent and support a person”

if the section applies. In subsection (2)(b)(ii), it says that it applies if

“the person has not indicated that they do not want an independent advocate”.

I was just comparing that to Clause 20 of the substantive Bill, which deals with the situation of when a person who has made either a first or second declaration wants to cancel the declaration as they have decided they do not want to die. In those situations, the person

“may cancel it by giving oral or written notice of the cancellation (or otherwise indicating their decision to cancel in a manner of communication known to be used by the person)”.

On the face of it, therefore, we are requiring much more from a person—oral or written notice—to cancel if they do not want to die than what is needed if they do not want an independent advocate. If we are going to go down the route of Amendment 549A, instead of saying the person has not indicated they do not want an independent advocate, it really should be that the person has confirmed—by written notice or by some sort of firm confirmation—that they do not want an independent advocate. What does “indicated” mean? It is a very loose word and, I would suggest, a very light test. What is happening here is that a person who would otherwise have an independent advocate to protect them is now not getting one; if that person is not going to get one, then we need more than a mere indication from them that they do not want the protection because, ultimately, this is all about protecting people. The contrast with Clause 20 seems to be somewhat stark, so I look forward to the noble and learned Lord’s response.