Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

So the debate so far has not clarified my mind, but I think that the simplistic solutions that have been offered by some of the speakers moving these amendments need to be challenged. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Horam on raising the big dilemma that faces us all. We do not want the equivalent of Alternative für Deutschland and the extreme-right parties of other countries being strengthened and provoked if we do not get this right.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I speak solely as a lawyer. I did not speak at Second Reading; I would have needed to apologise for and explain that a few years ago. Consistently, we have been permitted to engage at a later stage, and that is no longer so.

I confess that I have been working hard to try to catch up with the legal appreciation of the effect of this Bill. I wish to respond to the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Horam, as a lawyer and in terms of the consistency of the Bill with our international obligations under the refugee convention. Under Article 35, we and our courts are required to have regard to what UNHCR says on the proper interpretation of the Bill in applying it in this country.

Although my views on the Bill overall are still not fully formed, as a lawyer I have come to the clear conclusion that Clause 29 and the clauses that follow Article 31 most directly for present purposes are simply impossible to reconcile with the clear jurisprudence of our courts of the most authoritative nature. For that, reason, I take essentially the same root-and-branch objection to Clause 11 and say to the noble Lord, Lord Horam, that I wonder whether this large proportion of people who, understandably, object to the problems this country has with asylum—and who would wish to exclude, so far as possible, those who are trying to gain refugee status here—would add, “And we don’t care a fig if what we are doing to give effect to that policy flatly contradicts our international law obligations under the refugee convention”.

Intrinsically, the group of clauses to which I refer, including Clauses 31 and 36, bear very closely on Clause 11, which is of course the subject of this group of amendments. The centre of the Bill’s approach, and that of Clause 11, is to try to create a particularly disadvantaged subcategory of asylum seekers, essentially on the footing that they fall outside the protection of Article 31 of the convention. The fact is that Article 31 is addressed both in Clause 31 and, as it happens, in closely similar terms, in Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. So there it is: we are talking about Article 31 of the convention, Clause 31 of the Bill and Section 31 of the preceding legislation, the 1999 Act.

Clause 36, more particularly, seeks to override well-established case law most directly. All this is explained in the series of authoritative legal opinions that have been addressed, certainly to me and probably to other lawyers in the House, by the Bingham Centre, the UNHCR and Amnesty—and by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is a very authoritative body of both Houses.

The Bill now seeks to overcome the effect of a divisional court case known as Adimi. I confess that, way back in the last century, I gave the leading judgment in that case but, much more importantly, it was approved explicitly on the critical questions—of coming here without delay and so forth—by the Appellate Committee of your Lordships’ House, presided over by the late and much-lamented Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in a case called Asfaw. The reference is 2008 1 AC 1061. It is a compelling leading judgment and indicates that the position, authoritatively decided in accordance with UNHCR advice and all the earlier indicia, is not compatible with what Clause 11, by reference to Clauses 31 and 36, seeks to do: to create this category B, to be regarded as illegal entrants to this country. It is on that basis, and not the narrower although well understandable objections to Clause 11 from other quarters, that I shall particularly resist the inclusion of Clause 11 in the Bill.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, in rising to support the proposal that Clause 11 do not stand part, to which I have added my name, I declare my interest in relation to both RAMP and Reset, as set out in the register. Along with colleagues on these Benches, I looked carefully at the possibility of making amendments to Clause 11 along the lines of those proposed, and reached the conclusion that the only thing we could fully support was the removal of the clause.

The proposal to separate refugees into two groups depending on how they arrived in the country, and whether it was their first country of arrival, are inimical to the whole basis on which the refugee convention is built. It is a betrayal of the letter and spirit of it. The idea that asylum must be claimed in the first country of arrival has no basis in international law; this is the view of the UNHCR and of the legal community. If imposed, it would place an unsustainable burden on a small number of nations, most of which are already under immense strain. The whole purpose of an internationally agreed convention is to recognise that the responsibility for the care and support of refugees needs to be carried by the whole global community. We recognise this as a nation by setting up and running resettlement schemes, working with the international community. So to try and declare this for those who claim asylum on arrival here, even if they have passed through other nations, does not logically fit with our recognition of the need for global collaboration and a global sharing of the demands.

I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke, that the danger is that we go into a wider refugee debate rather than debating the clause. The vast bulk of the 80 million refugees have no desire to go anywhere other than back into their own country. That is where most of them wish to go; I have seen that and talked to them first-hand.

However, let us for a few minutes work with the idea of claiming asylum only in the first nation of arrival, and see how this would work with the proposals in Clause 11 for our nation. We are an island nation; therefore, no one could ever make a first arrival here by land—no one in group 1. We are an island nation, so arrival by sea is a clear option, but none of us wants to see arrivals by sea in unsafe boats. So the safe ways must be via ferries, or cargo or passenger ships coming from longer distances away. The likelihood that such journeys could be undertaken in a way that is deemed legal under the Bill is very slim.

Those fleeing persecution, domestic violence, war and the impact of climate change may well have to do so without all the relevant paperwork, and certainly with no valid visa. They might just secure a paid-for passage without all this but it is highly unlikely. It is more likely that they will find themselves having to stow away in a van, lorry or container, or somewhere on the boat, so they will arrive having travelled illegally—hence they go into group 2. The number who would travel in complete fulfilment of the Bill in a legal manner would be minimal—almost no one in group 1.

We are an island nation, so arrival by air is the other clear option. Stowing away on an aeroplane is decidedly harder than on a ship but might just be possible. However, I think we all understand it is illegal, so such arrivals would go straight into group 2. Perhaps someone somehow manages to purchase a ticket and travel with their own passport but with no visa. As it happens, I was nearly refused entry to a plane when returning home from Portugal last autumn because of an issue over my Covid vaccine passport, so how one would succeed without a valid visa is an interesting question. It might just happen; however, on arrival, there is no visa so they could easily be deemed an illegal arrival, therefore in group 2.

Perhaps they have a visa as a student, so entry happens legally. But this student is not simply studying; they are fleeing because they are gay and know that they will be persecuted in their home nation if they come out. That will be made worse for them because they also come from a minority tribe who already feel put down, so on arrival they claim asylum on the basis of their sexuality and the likelihood of persecution. However, this was not the purpose of their visa. This is not theory: it is the story of Azmat, who I, along with several other Peers, met online last week. Such people do not qualify for group 1 but go into group 2.

The UK resettlement scheme and the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme are not open to all the nationalities most commonly accepted as refugees by the UK Government. Vulnerable people requiring protection will therefore become group 2 refugees. People cannot jump a queue where there is simply no queue to join.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Unless the Government have a change of heart, I cannot see that we will not be returning to this on Report, so all the excellent briefing that we have received can wait until then. We have been given such great tutorials and I think that we will receive more. All that briefing has been welcome but may not have been necessary.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I shall continue to limit my interventions in Committee to expressing views that I hold simply as a lawyer. The course I took on Tuesday of last week, when we were discussing Clause 11, gave us an early introduction to the very provisions with regard to reinterpreting the convention that we are now concerned with. I reserve the right, when we come to Report, to come in on what I regard as the more obviously mean-spirited and ill-judged other provisions, which are, as is patent, designed to deter as many as possible of those who would otherwise wish to seek refugee status in this country.

Clause 29, as has already been pointed out, is an omnibus provision that takes you into further and more specific, and therefore more specifically objectionable, provisions, which take the convention apart and reinterpret it piece by piece. As both noble Baronesses have said, that is itself intrinsically an objectionable way to proceed with regard to one’s legal obligations.

There are three further stand part notices in this group. I will not touch on all of them because time is the enemy today, as it will be on Thursday. On Clause 33, the protection from persecution, as the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has valuably pointed out, this clause fundamentally changes the approach to protection from persecution from a focus on meaningful and effective protection against persecution, which our long-established jurisdiction establishes is the correct focus, to a focus on the existence of a reasonable system to prevent, investigate and prosecute instances of where, despite the system, there has been persecution. This refocusing mischievously—and, I suggest, in legal terms, fatally—sidesteps the all-important question of whether the system is likely to protect the individual concerned.

In the interests of time, rather than make comparatively lesser points on the other two named clauses, Clauses 34 and 35, I will pass on. I say only on Clause 35, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that this is directed to Article 1(F) of the convention. Clause 35(2) goes to Article 1(F)(b), concerning serious non-political crimes, and we will come in the next group to Clause 37, which deals with Article 33 of the convention on non-refoulement. Whatever the position on non-refoulement that may be arrived at under the refugee convention, even if, for example, the asylum seeker was found to be a war criminal and so is denied refugee status under Article 1(F)(a) of the convention—see Clause 35(1) of the Bill—it still is not possible to return that person to their country of origin if they would be persecuted. That is simply precluded by Article 3 of the ECHR.

I have had a helpful exchange of emails with the Bill manager. I asked the Minister at our Cross-Bench meeting a question which he referred to the Bill manager; namely, whether any of these provisions in the Bill were intended or calculated to alter any of the well-established and authoritative case law in this country. Except for one point which the Bill manager made regarding Clause 37, which corrects an ambiguity that arose under Section 72 of the 2002 Act, I am unpersuaded that where there is a departure from our case law, as is recognised, it is properly made under this Bill. I finish at this point.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have been here for only eight years, which is not long in your Lordships’ House, but I have never seen so many attempts to delete clauses from a Bill—and of course that is completely the right thing to do here. With this Government, I always look for dead cats being thrown on the table to distract us from something much worse that is happening under the table, but there are so many dead cats in this Bill that I am assuming they are all genuine bits of the Bill that the Government want to pass, which is quite disturbing.

Here the Government are trying to unilaterally rewrite international law, and they are doing so to appease the far right, both in their party and in the country. That is a pointless thing to do; you will never appease the far right. It is an example of the Government throwing away decades of international progress on domestic and international policies only to appease a segment of society who are outspoken and noisy—like the Greens, I suppose, but, unlike the Greens, they actually have malign intent.

We are sending a signal to the world that we are not competent to run our country any more, and certainly not worthy of being part of any international grouping that believes in progress and the rights of the human being.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I hope the noble Lord does not take it amiss if I say, with respect, that he makes the same point as he made earlier. and I understood it. I need to be very careful that I do not get inadvertently drawn into disclosing legal advice, but I hear the point from the noble Lord that he and others would like to see a greater fleshing out of the Government’s legal position. I have said that I will see what I can do to assist in that.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Very diffidently, am I entirely wrong in thinking that, under Article 35 of the convention, some heed is required to be paid to the UNHCR’s expression of its approach to the convention? My recollection is that Lord Bingham said as much in one of the cases I mentioned last week, Asfaw. Is that not right?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Respectfully, what I said earlier is that it is not the arbiter of the interpretation of the convention. I do not think that is inconsistent with the point the noble and learned Lord just made.

I was proposing to sit down, after suggesting to the Committee that we should keep these various clauses in the Bill.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, all of these clauses seek to restrict access to the protection of the refugee convention. I will speak to Amendments 103 and 104 to Clause 31 and Amendment 111 to Clause 37, which are all in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and which I have co-signed. However, I share the view of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that all of these clauses should in fact be removed.

The problem with Clause 31 is that it changes the standard of proof for the test of whether a person is a refugee. It creates two limbs of the test and changes the bar from “reasonable likelihood” to

“on the balance of probabilities”.

Although the refugee convention does not prescribe the standard of proof, UNHCR’s handbook says:

“The requirement of evidence should … not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself.”


So, for 20 years, the UK courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied a “reasonable likelihood” standard of proof in a composite and holistic manner.

Clause 31 overturns this established interpretation of the law by dividing the overall test into a series of sub-questions and applying different standards of proof to different limbs of questioning, to require the person to prove on a balance of probabilities that they fear persecution and the decision-maker to revert to a test of reasonable likelihood in assessing whether the person would face persecution and lack state protection. It is quite a mishmash, and a complex and confusing one—not least for already burdened caseworkers. As we have heard so frequently in this Committee, if the Government really want to fix a broken asylum system, why are they making everything more complex and building in delay?

As the Bingham Centre points out, Clause 31

“allows for rejection of a person as a refugee because they failed one of the steps”

imposing that higher hurdle,

“whereas if the test was taken in its totality, the person may have been accepted as a refugee.”

The process may well lead to exclusion from sheer error because of all these complex, different bits of the test. Either the JCHR Amendments 103 and 104 should be accepted, or Clause 31 should be deleted.

On Amendment 111 to Clause 37, as the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has said, we object to the lowering of the threshold for regarding a crime as particularly serious such that a person can be expelled. It is designed to—and will—exclude many more people from the protection of the refugee convention. Not only is the threshold sentence reduced from two years to 12 months but it changes the rebuttable presumption of “particularly serious” into an unchallengeable assertion.

This is disproportionate; a blanket exclusion is incompatible with the refugee convention, which envisages a crime that is a major threat and expulsion as a last resort. Bear in mind that the Bill seeks to impose a four-year sentence for the mere act of arriving in the UK without permission, which most refugees have to do. That gives you a measure of the lack of proportion in what is supposed to be a serious crime under the remit of the Bill; I am not validating or endorsing any crime, but under the refugee convention it has to be “particularly serious”, and the Government are departing from that.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I confine my brief comments on this group to Clauses 31 and 32, both of which have been touched on, respectively, by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Lister.

Clause 31 is peculiarly objectionable. As has been described, it divides up what should be a single, holistic question into a series of sub-questions and compounds that error by the differentiation in some important respects of standards of proof. It imposes an objectionable higher standard of proof on one critical provision. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights says in its report HL Paper 143—pages 39 to 41—it raises the standard of proof from a “reasonable likelihood” to a “balance of probabilities”.

The overall holistic approach to Article 31 was established as long ago as 1995 in a case called Ravichandran, which reported in 1996 in immigration appeal report 77. I confess that I wrote the lead judgment, but it has been consistently applied by the higher courts ever since. To quote one passage, the approach to Article 1A of the convention should be

“a single composite question … looked at in the round and all the relevant circumstances brought into account”

to see if there is a real risk.

Those promoting this clause should read a devastating critique of Clause 31 last month by Hugo Storey, the immediate past president of the International Association of Refugee and Migration Judges who has just retired from being an Upper Tribunal judge. He has no doubt that it will lead to “prodigious litigation”; in six compelling pages that those responsible for the Bill must read, he explains precisely why.

Clause 32, on the question of the particular social group, has been dealt with. It seeks to overturn Lord Bingham’s judgment in the case of Fornah, in the Appellate Committee of this House back in 2006, which was all about a 15 year-old girl trying to avoid female genital mutilation in Sierra Leone. I was a junior member of that court, and this clause tries, contrary to that clear judgment, to introduce a conjunctive approach to the two relevant criteria. It would be a grave mistake and cause grave injustice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I thought I made it absolutely clear when I said earlier that the court in that case made its decision against the legislative background at the time. Parliament is entitled to change the legislative background. We will want to make sure that we remain consistent with the refugee convention, and, as I said earlier, we believe that we are. There is nothing wrong with doing that. It is simply not the case that we are somehow bound as a Parliament by what the Court of Appeal said in the case referred to by my noble friend. Therefore, with great respect, I disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, where he said that a single holistic question was better and that the higher standard was objectionable. With respect, I disagree on both points.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Does the Minister agree that, if, under this clause in future, somebody were to fail—they could prove only 45% of the relevant limb of the clause—they nevertheless could not be refouled? Certainly, under Article 3 of the ECHR the test is “reasonable likelihood” and not “balance of probabilities”.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

With respect, refoulement is a separate issue and, with greater respect, I will deal with it separately. What we are establishing here is what you need to do to establish your “well-founded fear”. If you cannot establish, on the balance of probabilities, that you are who you say you are, then yes, under this test, you will not satisfy Clause 31(2)(a).

I will now turn to Clause 32, because otherwise I will start to repeat myself. Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention states that a refugee is an individual who has a

“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”,

and Clause 32 lays out precisely what is meant by each of those characteristics, which are sometimes called “convention reasons”. Again, the purpose here is to make sure that all decision-makers, including both the Home Office and the courts, understand and operate to the same definitions. That is, I suggest, a desirable law reform.

On Amendment 105, there is a mismatch between how the concept of a “particular social group” is defined in current legislation, government policy and some tribunal judgments, and also in how the definition has been interpreted by some courts. There is no authoritative or universally agreed definition of “particular social group” among state parties to the convention and, in particular, there is no universal agreement as to whether the test set out in Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention should be applied cumulatively. The UNHCR has issued guidance supporting the view that the cumulative approach is a misapplication of the refugee convention, but, as I said in the last group, that guidance is neither legally binding nor determinative as a matter of international law.

Article 1(A)(2) of the convention does not elaborate on what is meant by

“membership of a particular social group”;

there is no supranational body with authority to give a determinative ruling and, therefore, each state party, including the UK, has to interpret it. We believe that the definition in Clause 32 captures what is meant in the convention by a “particular social group”. We have looked at the broad wording in the convention, the travaux préparatoires—excuse my French—the approach of a number of other jurisdictions, and Article 31 of the Vienna convention, and we believe that setting it out in this way will make it clearer.

The amendment would mean that you would have to satisfy only one of the conditions to be considered a member of a “particular social group”, and that would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It would broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors that could perhaps be changed, such as an individual’s occupation. That is the first point. The second is that our proposed definition accords with the widely used and accepted interpretation of the “particular social group” concept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, noted. It is an EU interpretation; it comes from the approach in the EU qualification directive, which underpins the Common European Asylum System. We are very happy to look at EU interpretations; we do not have a closed mind—when they get it right, they get it right, and being independent means that we can look more broadly. However, with great respect, it is difficult to attack this as something utterly wrong if, in fact, this is the interpretation in that legislation.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I know the noble Lord has listened to a lot of the previous debate. He will know there is no such thing as a first safe country principle under the refugee convention. I tried to explain what the obligation was—namely, not to move on if you have refugee status or protection in a country. The UNHCR has made it clear that there would never have been a refugee convention if there had been a safe first country principle, because countries abutting the problematic countries—for example, Jordan, Iran and Pakistan—have had to accept everyone. No other countries like the UK would ever have had any refugees because we do not abut conflict zones. I am sorry, but this must be rebutted every time it is trotted out.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I will address Clause 36 very briefly, which I discussed last week in the context of Clause 11. I confine myself today to asking two questions.

First, do the Government accept, as I suggest they must, that Clause 36 would overrule the judgments of Lord Bingham and, among others, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in Asfaw, fully affirming what had been said on the relevant issues in the judgment I gave in the Divisional Court in Adimi? This has all been elaborated on today by my noble and learned friend, Lord Etherton.

Secondly, if so, are the Government overturning Asfaw and Adimi because, disinterestedly, they genuinely think those decisions are clearly wrong—or because they think an alternative and more anti-asylum seeker interpretation may arguably be available to them?

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

The idea of people being able to arrive here without going through a third country has been debated before in the course of this Bill—I cannot remember whether it was last week or another time. When we queried how people could get here, the Minister explained that they could come by aeroplane. That might be possible for some, but it is not possible for everyone who might need to be here in Britain rather than somewhere in Germany or France. Perhaps the Minister could give us a better explanation about how people get here, if there are not enough safe routes or aeroplanes.

To me, this is a naked attempt to stop refugees. I do not understand why the Government cannot see this as well. We are taking advantage of our geography and saying, “We’re too far away, you can’t come”. This is ridiculous. As I have pointed out before, we have a moral duty to many of these people. We have disrupted their politics, their climate and their lives—therefore, we owe them. It is not as simple as saying that they want to join their mates.

This Bill should be setting out safe routes and establishing ways to get people to the UK safely and legally. At the moment, we do not have that because the Government are pulling up the drawbridge.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Paliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for proposing the new clause. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said that it was a short one; I respectfully agree, and hope that I can be brief in response without any discourtesy to the noble and learned Lord or, indeed, the other proposers of the clause. One point in his speech on which I think the whole House agreed was when he reminded us that, whatever the question, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will always be able to think of an answer.

Turning to the subject matter of the amendment and the proposed new clause, I first underline what was said by my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford as to the Government’s commitment to their international legal obligations flowing from the refugee convention. Not only is it our intention to continue to comply with all of the legal obligations under that convention but we consider that this legislation does precisely that.

Our starting point is that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the refugee convention but, none the less, the new clause is not something that I can support. Let me set out why.

The refugee convention, as I have said before, and effectively by design, leaves certain terms and concepts open to a degree of interpretation. That is an important feature of international instruments such as the refugee convention, allowing it not only to stand the test of time—some might say that it could now usefully be reviewed, but that is a separate point—but, more importantly, to be applied in and across many jurisdictions with differing legal systems. Necessarily, therefore, there is then a need to ascribe meaning to the terms of the convention at a domestic level. That meaning is determined by each signatory to the refugee convention in accordance with the principles of the Vienna convention, taking a good faith interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the language used in the convention.

Against that background, I suggest that it is absolutely right that Parliament may pass legislation setting out how the UK interprets the refugee convention and the UK’s obligations under it. Having a clear framework of definitions, and setting out unambiguously the key principles, promotes clarity and consistency in how decisions are made; as I have said in previous debates, that is a desirable approach. The mischief that I see in this amendment is that it would risk undermining the clarity and certainty that we are trying to create by effectively giving the courts a chance to look behind the interpretation agreed by Parliament in primary legislation when that interpretation is then applied through policy and subsequent decisions.

On the one hand, we want to give the pen to Parliament, so to speak, to set out a clear understanding and interpretation of the convention; Part 2 of the Bill is very clear as to our intentions in this respect. However, I suggest that this amendment would afford the courts an opportunity to come to a different understanding when looking at the policies and practices which put that system into effect. Of course, I accept that it will be for the courts to interpret the legislation once enacted, and I do not disagree that the courts have a role in overseeing whether policies or decisions comply with the interpretation of the convention as set out in the Bill; that is a given. But it is Parliament’s interpretation that is key here. It is not for the court to set out its own, potentially conflicting interpretation of the refugee convention and the obligations under it.

Therefore, far from creating a certain and consistent approach, this promotes uncertainty with policies and decisions being potentially judged against differing interpretations. If we are content, as I suggest we should be, that Parliament is legislating in compliance with the approach open to all state parties under the Vienna convention—that is, affording a good faith interpretation to the refugee convention—then this clause is not only unnecessary but promotes confusion and uncertainty for all those seeking to apply to, and comply with, the asylum system.

It would also be unusual to put in primary legislation the statement that Parliament, when legislating, is complying with its international obligations. International conventions cover a wide area of legislation, and if we did so here it could create questions as to why we did not do so in other statutes and why other statutes do not provide the same assurances.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, as alerted by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993. That already sets out the primacy of the refugee convention in domestic law. I will repeat what it says:

“Nothing in the immigration rules (within the meaning of the 1971 Act) shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the Convention.”


Accordingly, if the aim of this proposed new clause is that the policies implemented under Part 2 of this Bill through the rules or connected guidance are meant to be compatible, and not incompatible, with the refugee convention, as interpreted by Parliament in this Bill, that can already be challenged by way of Section 2 of the 1993 Act. Our policies and decision-making will continue to be made in accordance with the Immigration Rules or published guidance.

What, therefore, would this proposed new clause add? My concern is that it adds a means for the court to question the interpretation given by Parliament to the refugee convention. I suggest respectfully that this would be contrary to a fundamental purpose of this Bill: for Parliament to define the nature of our obligations under the refugee convention while remaining compliant with those obligations. The proposed new clause potentially leaves the nature of obligations and terms under the convention open to the interpretation of the courts, removing the certainty that we are trying to achieve.

To put it in two sentences, if the aim is to make sure that the Immigration Rules and guidance are compliant with the refugee convention, that is already done under the 1993 Act. If the aim is any more than that, I respectfully suggest that it trespasses on a fundamental purpose of this Bill: that Parliament, and not the courts, should interpret how the UK implements the refugee convention. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, do I understand that it is the Minister’s intention that, if this Bill is passed in its present form, in future no court shall look behind its provisions and consider what, under the convention and with the advice of UNHCR, its proper application and interpretation are? Is that the Minister’s intention?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In so far as the court has been told by Parliament that it can do that in the 1993 Act when it comes to the Immigration Rules, the court can do so. But, with the greatest respect, the courts interpret legislation; they are not there to go behind legislation with an autonomous meaning, so far as the courts are concerned, of what the refugee convention means. What the convention means is a matter for the member states, each interpreting it under the terms of the Vienna convention. With respect, it is not for the courts to second-guess Parliament’s interpretation of the UK’s obligations under the refugee convention.

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[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I will just say a word in support of what the noble Lord, Lord Horam, said, about public opinion. We have to be careful here. A substantial slice of public opinion is concerned about the scale and nature of the inflow of people claiming to be refugees, and the shambles in the channel at the moment is no help. We need to bear that in mind in all our discussions. I do not think that the policy itself will work, and I do not think that the division into this or the other class of refugee will help. But let us not, for goodness’ sake, get carried away by our own righteousness and forget that there are a lot of people in this country who are not in situations as comfortable as ours who look to us to make sure that, in so far as there is an input of refugees, they are genuine.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I would not want that to be quite the last word. The speech made by my noble friend Lord Kerr was not merely powerful, it was compelling and irrefutable. As a matter of law, I have spoken on this before in Committee. I am not going to repeat all that, but do we really believe that the inhabitants of Blackpool, Doncaster or the deprived towns spoken of by the noble Lord, Lord Horam, and reflected in the contribution of my noble friend Lord Green, are so much less understanding, less sympathetic or less kind than the Poles, who are welcoming these vast hordes of people? We are not going to be asked to take that sort of number.

It is a dismaying thought that we really believe that our fellow countrymen, at this crisis in world events, would turn their backs, which is, in effect, what is being suggested. Are we really going to condemn, as Clause 11 is designed to do, rafts of asylum seekers—genuine refugees—to the loneliness, isolation, desperation, destitution and failure to be able to bring their families that it is suggested we now must to stop people crossing the channel, or to appease those in our deprived areas who do not want vast numbers of more refugees? I fervently suggest not. I would have hoped that, in this ghastly moment of history, the Minister would say, “This is not a moment to promote a Bill like this. We must withdraw it and think again”. No doubt, that is above his pay grade: indeed, considering that he is unpaid, that is not a very high bar. However, I really urge those responsible for this grotesque piece of legislation not to try to persist in it at this juncture.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, if those seeking asylum in the UK are genuine seekers of sanctuary from war and persecution, they are entitled to all the rights afforded to refugees under the refugee convention. Even if they are eventually found not to be genuine refugees, they are entitled to have their claim considered and their welfare safeguarded while it is being considered. A number of noble Lords have talked about public opinion. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Horam, who appears to think that this is all about people crossing the channel, Clause 11 would make Ukrainian refugees who made it to Poland and then flew to the UK second-class refugees. If—I say “if”; I am not saying that this is the case—there is concern in public opinion, it is a concern about immigration, not a concern about refugees.

This is a very generous nation. If you speak to people in the towns and cities that the noble Lord, Lord Horam, has mentioned, the vast majority will say, “Of course we want to help those people fleeing the war in Ukraine”. They are concerned about being overwhelmed by immigrants, but only 6% of immigration in recent years has been by asylum seekers. That is why Clause 11 is not right and not necessary. Once asylum seekers have presented themselves and their claim in the UK, they are entitled to have their claim considered without fear or favour, regardless of where they came from and how they got here. They should not be treated differently on that basis. We should take Clause 11 out of the Bill and, when the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, tests the opinion of the House, we will be voting with him.

Nationality and Borders Bill

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Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

This is another of those occasions when saying “From these Benches, we support” and not much more must not be taken as any lack of support for all the amendments in this group, nor any dilution of the points made.

I just want to register concern about Clause 32(2). The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, spoke to this and I record our support, particularly for the amendment that deals with what is meant by “a particular social group”: that you do not qualify unless the group in question is perceived as being different by surrounding society. As has been pointed out to noble Lords in briefings, a trafficked woman would need to show not only that her status as a trafficked woman is an innate characteristic but that trafficked women as a group are perceived as having a distinct identity in the country of origin. That is very difficult to show. Judged by the perceptions of the society in her country? It would be very challenging to find objective evidence on that, and on that being a distinct group. It is very dangerous to suggest that one can tell those things by looking—or, rather more accurately, perceiving.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I spoke at some length on the legal aspects of this group of clauses in Committee and, having had the advantage of being able to indicate an overall view of them in the newspapers earlier in the week, I really do not want to try the patience of the House, and I certainly do not want to weaken rather than strengthen the number of compelling arguments that have already been heard on them in the past few minutes.

However, they are such objectionable clauses that I cannot simply remain silent. I do not criticise the Minister for this, I am a great admirer of his, but on Monday, at 5.49 pm, in the middle of the debate, we finally got a seven-page letter that sought to argue—if only I were still a judge and could deal with the arguments conclusively by rejecting them—the Government’s case for redefining the requirements of the convention.

When we come to Clause 31, the Minister, very fairly, recognises that it would overturn 25 years—a quarter of a century—of settled jurisprudence of the clearest authorities in this country. That is how we have been dealing with it for 25 years. He does not say that it was a wrong approach to the convention; all he argues—as I say, I do not accept it—is that what they are doing provides another possible interpretation of the convention. Is this really the moment at which to reject our established jurisprudence and substitute for it what may or may not—I would say not—be an arguable alternative view of the whole of this.

Clause 31 rejects what has been accepted as the holistic approach: you look at fundamental question arising under Article 1(A) of the convention in the round, you take all circumstances into consideration and you apply the standard of proof of reasonable likelihood—because heaven knows that is the standard which you should be using. You do not carve it up and create endless difficulties, and then say, “Well, actually, part of it has got to be on the balance of probabilities”.

I have quoted this before, and I will end with this: Hugo Storey, a recently retired judge of the Upper Tribunal who has spent his life dealing with these sorts of cases and is the immediate past president of the International Association of Refugee and Migration Judges, said that this clause would produce prodigious litigation and endless problems, and that it is not compliant with the way that the UNHCR wants Clause 31 to be applied. I will not go into the arguments on Clauses 32, 34 and 36—they are all objectionable, for the reasons already given. We really must vote down as many of these as we can.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I wish to say that we agree with the amendments in this group, which seek to address the issue that the Bill is seeking to change existing, long-standing definitions and, frankly, make things worse and harder for many of those who would be involved in, for example, seeking asylum. We support the intention of these amendments, and I will leave it at that.

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Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 4th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It is perfectly obvious that the Commons reasons tell us that it agrees that the legislation should be compliant with our international obligations. The Minister has just told us that everything that we do will be compliant with them. I regret that a number of us take the view that these provisions do not so comply. The decision will ultimately be made by a court. If the Commons is right, that is well and good—fine, there would be nothing to argue about—but, if we are right and the view of the Commons is wrong, the judge would be bound by this legislation to disapply the convention and the protocol. No one would be able to say, “Ah, but the Commons reasons say that it is compliant”. The Commons reasons will not be in the legislation.

It is very simple: we respectfully suggest that the Commons should be asked to think again and reflect on the consequences if the advice that it is receiving is wrong and the advice that we are suggesting is right, and to avoid the problem that its own expressed legislative intention—that the legislation should be compliant—will prove to be wrong. It is very simple—all doubt can be avoided by this amendment.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, my focus in this group will be on Motion C1 of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I crave your Lordships’ indulgence to make one or two introductory remarks.

There could never be a good time for this particular Bill, but we can quite sure that there could hardly be a worse time. Make no mistake: the Bill will affect our standing on the world stage. It seems to me fairly obvious that the Bill was drafted with one particular major objective in mind: to make asylum seeking in the UK as unattractive as one can, to deter and discourage as many prospective refugees from coming here as one can and to refuse such claims as one can.

Of course I recognise that we have special refugee resettlement schemes for a number of substantial groups from around the world, from Syria, Afghanistan, Hong Kong and now—if, alas, somewhat delayed—Ukraine. I also recognise that there is a real and growing problem with a number of refugees—not, of course, those profiting from these schemes—so desperate as to risk their lives in the tragedies of crossing the channel. The draconian measures proposed here will not solve that problem and are not justified—as if aspiring refugees will henceforth say to each other, “Don’t bother coming to the UK. It is very unwelcoming and inhospitable. Just read this Bill”. I do not believe that for all the world and, frankly, I regard it as entirely fanciful. Unless noble Lords believe that this will solve the problem, we should continue to resist at least the most objectionable of the measures being promoted.

As to these, coming to Motion C1, my focus as an ex-judge who used to decide quite a lot of these asylum cases is above all on the legality of these proposals. I truly believe, as do many others, that several of these provisions flagrantly breach our obligations as interpreted by the UNHCR, the body responsible for that under the convention. That is why Motion C1 is all-important. Several later clauses in this part of the Bill purport to define or redefine our obligations under the convention. Of course, as my noble and learned friend Lord Judge says, the Government assert that they do so absolutely fairly and that they give effect to the convention, but that is not the view of a great number of respected bodies besides the UNHCR, such as the Bingham Centre, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and so forth.

On Report, we passed the amendment which Motion C1 is designed to replace and effectively reproduce. Having passed it, we did not go to the lengths of voting down the individual substantive clauses that redefine all the various ingredients of our obligations under the convention. Instead, we inserted that amendment and that is what we must do again. The Government’s objection to it is no more and no less than that it is not necessary, because they are going to comply with the convention anyway. I always think that the weakest grounds for objecting to any clause is that it is not necessary. I respectfully suggest that here it is crucial. I must explain why and noble Lords must forgive me as I do so.

On 28 February, during Report, the Minister then promoting the clause of the Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, rightly said of the proposed new clause—the Baroness Chakrabarti clause, if I may call it that—that it

“potentially leaves the nature of obligations and terms under the convention open to the interpretation of the courts, removing the certainty that we are trying to achieve.”

I then intervened before the Minister sat down, because that rang a great red bell with me. I asked whether I rightly understood him as saying by that that, without this amending provision, the courts would be excluded from considering whether the Bill correctly implements the convention obligations. That he confirmed, rightly observing that the courts

“are not there to go behind legislation”.—[Official Report, 28/2/22; col. 609.]

As I suggest, we then wisely passed the amendment introducing the new clause by 218 to 140, a majority of 78.

We come then—I am anxious not to bore the House, but it is necessary to get this point across—to the Commons debate on the Lords amendments on 22 March. That makes depressing reading when you consider how cursorily—and, dare I suggest, superficially —our various amendments, passed after long, painstaking hours, were summarily rejected. Here, one finds that, in response to the suggestions of some Members that it would indeed be a good idea to leave the amendment in, because some of us were saying that the legislation would otherwise be in flagrant breach, the Minister said:

“I … make the crucial point that we have an independent judiciary in this country, and it is open to people to bring points of challenge where they believe that there are grounds for doing so.”


This the Minister described as a

“cornerstone … evolved over centuries”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/3/22; col. 185.]

I do not for a moment suggest that the Minister was intentionally misleading the House, but the plain fact is that, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, had rightly agreed at Report, Mr Pursglove was quite wrong to suggest that there was no need for this amendment because the courts would anyway deal with the challenge to the legislation based on suggested non-compliance. I repeat: the amendment is vital. The courts otherwise cannot go behind the definitive clauses in the Bill and would have to apply them, compliant or not. Without this clause, the lead argument is pre-empted and foreclosed, as the substantive clauses operate, if I may use the term, as ouster clauses of the courts’ jurisdiction. I urge your Lordships not to accept them.

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Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 26th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Motion B1 as an amendment to Motion B, I also support other amendments.

Extra-parliamentary events since your Lordships’ last consideration make anxious scrutiny today even more important. I refer of course to atrocities in Ukraine and the Maundy Thursday MoU with Rwanda, but also to the unsuccessful Home Office attempts to assert public interest immunity, or secrecy, in the High Court over parts of the subsequently withdrawn little boats push-back policy. Contrary to everything both Houses, voters and desperate refugees were led to believe, the Government always knew that there was no legal basis for repelling a boat containing souls declaring a wish to claim asylum.

The importance of such matters being justiciable in court is therefore clear. From her answers to yesterday’s PNQ, I am glad to say that I do not think the Minister disagrees with that. Nor, to his credit, did the Minister in the other place present any policy difference on that point. He repeatedly asserted ongoing intentions to comply with international law, and specifically to comply with the refugee convention and ECHR together.

I have listened—and indeed pre-empted the constitutional concerns that the Minister just set out—and redrafted to make the refugee convention protection in the Bill no more, but no less, than that already provided for in law by the ECHR, thus making the new Amendment 5D even more respectful of the primacy of the other place and reasonable than its predecessor amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support Motion B1. “Nothing matters very much, and very little matters at all.” So said Lord Balfour of Balfour Declaration fame a century ago. But Lord Balfour was not then faced, as your Lordships now are, with a Bill which most—if not all—disinterested lawyers recognise that, first, without the amendment now proposed, would breach international law under the convention and, secondly, at the same time would nevertheless make unchallengeable the question of this legislation’s legality. Noble Lords should note that if the Bill passes without this provision, the legality of these provisions cannot even be raised before a court of law.

That will be the position unless we have the guts or—let me rephrase that—unless we are sufficiently alive to what surely is our constitutional duty as a revising Chamber to insist on the amendment to pass Motion B1. So, pace Lord Balfour, this really does matter very much.

I hope noble Lords will allow me another few words. I read again yesterday the disheartening, positively dispiriting House of Commons debate last week, which summarily rejected our amendments from the last round of ping-pong. The amendment originally in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was dealt with even more dismissively and cursorily than the first time round. This time, there was no pretence that the courts could decide whether or not this new Bill will be convention-compliant. Previously, the Commons had been—as I accepted last time round—entirely inadvertently misled into thinking that the courts would have a say on it.

It is acknowledged on all sides that the Bill as it stands would overturn a quarter of a century of established English law as to the proper meaning of the convention. Of course, that is also the view of the UNHCR, which advises that we would be breaking international law by passing this legislation without such an amendment as now proposed. Therefore, it is now recognised that if the amendment fails to pass, the Bill will—the words can be used—foreclose or pre-empt the question as to the legality of these clauses. The clauses, in effect, would therefore operate as ouster clauses.

All the Minister in the other place said last week was:

“The Bill—I insist on this in the strongest terms—is compatible with all of our obligations under international law. Our position has not changed and we do not consider it necessary to put this on the face of this Bill.”—[Official Report, Commons, 20/4/22; col. 239.]


In other words, the Bill that we are now asked to approve without the amendment is simply proclaimed by the Government to be compliant. We are asked to accept the mere self-serving say-so—the assertion—that it is compliant, although, as I have said, it is unsupported, so far as I am aware, by any respected body of opinion charged to look into these things: the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Bingham Centre, et cetera, and including, as I said, the UNHCR, which is charged specifically under the convention with the superintendence of the proper interpretation and application of the convention.

That is enough. I am sorry if this imperils our hopes of Prorogation this week, but I urge your Lordships to summon up the blood, stiffen the sinews—not, I think, Lord Balfour in that instance—and to continue to reject and challenge this further melancholy attempt to usurp our law.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too speak in favour of Motion B1, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I declare my interest as a practising barrister who sometimes acts in immigration cases.

As the noble and learned Lord has said, the overwhelming view of lawyers and interested, informed persons is that the provisions of the Bill breach this country’s obligations under the convention on refugees, which this country has signed. Ministers have repeatedly asserted to the contrary that they have failed to respond in any way to the reasoning of the critics.

Nationality and Borders Bill

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Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 27th April 2022 Lords Chamber

I recognise that we may be only a revising second Chamber, but if not to defend the rule of law, what are we for?

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I rise, I hope for the last time—a hope which will be shared by every Member of this House—to support this amendment. There are not many issues that it is worth going to the stake for, but surely the rule of law is one. I have spent 60 years of my life on it and do not propose to stop here. I suggest that your Lordships support this too.

This Motion as now put fully respects the sovereignty of Parliament, just as the Human Rights Act does. It is the one simple provision that is needed to ensure that questions about the legality of this Bill can be brought before our courts and decided by an independent judge, and it is surely the least contentious way of achieving that. Indeed, it is beyond logical objection. In truth, the only objection raised is that it is unnecessary —surely the weakest objection that one can ever produce. If we never passed a provision which was unnecessary, the statute book would be a good deal lighter and the better for it. But here, it is needed, unless Parliament—your Lordships’ House and the other place—is happy to oust the courts’ jurisdiction in the whole area of what constitutes a right to refugee status, to asylum sanctuary.

It did not appear seemly yesterday to intervene during the short contribution of—if he will allow me to call him this—my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. My reverence for him is boundless, not least because 30 years ago he had the sagacity to promote me to the Court of Appeal. However, he surely cannot maintain that, because the Attorney-General advises, as she may well have done, that this Bill is refugee convention compliant, that is that and we should just buy into it without thought: that this would be a sufficient basis for putting the whole Bill beyond the purview of the courts. Think about Miller 2; think about the prorogation order. We were told very plainly, and none of us doubts, that Geoffrey Cox, QC and then Attorney-General, had said that this is perfectly lawful. But that did not put it beyond the courts. If ever there was a case for not putting compliance with international law beyond the courts, this surely must be it.

I will make three short points on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Horam, yesterday, which attracted a rather ungenerous rebuke, although that is by the way. His first point was the general one that this is merely “an enabling Bill” giving the Government “power to do something”. That is surely not so in respect of the important group of clauses we are considering here, which, under the heading “Interpretation of Refugee Convention”, redefine it. Without our amendment, the courts would have no alternative but to apply those provisions, whether or not they are regarded as compatible with the convention. There is nothing by way of this being merely an enabling Bill; it is a declaratory Bill beyond question.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Horam, reminded us of the five-page letter circulated by the then excellent Minister, whose ears must be burning already from the previous debate, and quite rightly, because his loss is a terrible one for us all. The letter set out the Government’s legal arguments for contending that these definition provisions can be viewed as convention-compliant. I have the greatest regard for the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and certainly there is not a soul at the Bar who could have made more persuasive arguments to that effect. But they are just that: arguments. They should not therefore, of themselves, necessarily win your Lordships’ support. Included among those arguments were many that had been roundly rejected in the course of this country building up a quarter of a century’s worth of plain, authoritative jurisprudence that decided the questions of what the refugee convention required, which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, acknowledged are now being overturned by the Bill.

Thirdly and finally, the noble Lord, Lord Horam, at col. 157 of yesterday’s Hansard, said that he fully agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and myself,

“about the 2001 refugee convention”.

He called it the 2001 convention; obviously there is the 1951 convention. He continued:

“I do not want this Government to step outside that in any way. It would be a tragedy if that happened. It should not be allowed to happen; I believe that it will not happen.”—[Official Report, 26/4/22; col. 157.]


But surely he must accept that there needs to be scope, therefore, for somebody to look at it independently once the statute is enacted.

Finally, if we look at the front cover of this Bill, we will see a statement, required by the Human Rights Act, by the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams —which says, under the heading of the European Convention on Human Rights, that it is her view that

“the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Bill are compatible with the Convention rights”.

She may well indeed have been so advised by the Attorney-General, but surely nobody has ever doubted that that means that it is enough in itself; it is not. What the Act says is that you should try to construe it compatibly and if you cannot you declare it—precisely the mirror image of what is now proposed for this self- same legislation.

I urge your Lordships—not at this stage because it is so late in the day and the ping-pong ball has been returned two or three times already—to consider whether we really should quit on the constitutional issue on this vital rule-of-law question. At this stage, I urge the noble Baroness to divide the House on the issue and let it be supported by all those who want this country to abide by the rule of law.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support what was said by the noble and learned Lord. When this matter went back to the House of Commons last night, the Minister there said that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was “unnecessary, inappropriate and unconstitutional”. What the Minister failed to recognise, with great respect, is that whether there has been compliance with the refugee convention has been a matter for the courts of this jurisdiction for at least the last 40 years.