Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I have two amendments in this group, but they are quite distinct from what has been debated so far and distinct from each other. One is concerned with Clause 32(5) and the other concerns Clause 36(1). Because the amendment to Clause 32(5) is a manuscript amendment tabled only today, if I may, I shall start with that to Clause 36(1), because your Lordships will be familiar with the background to that.

Clause 36(1) seeks to define, for the purposes of the convention, the meaning of coming “directly” to the United Kingdom from a country of persecution. The same definition was relevant to Clause 11, because that cross-refers to the provisions of Clause 36, so we have in Clause 36 as a matter of proposed domestic legislation and as a matter of interpretation of Article 31 of the convention the same definition of arriving “directly”. Your Lordships will recall that the issue was whether, as the Government contend, if an asylum seeker passes through an intermediate state on the way to the United Kingdom from the place of persecution—through a place considered to be somewhere they ought reasonably to have applied for refugee status—they have not come “directly”. In fact, the only way they could come directly, if they are surrounded by other countries—Ukraine is a good example—would be to fly.

The House rejected that definition, because it accepted the amendment to remove Clause 11. It expressly rejected that definition of arriving “directly”. Amendment 46 simply takes out the corresponding provision in Clause 36(1), which was incorporated in Clause 11 but would otherwise simply remain at large but, so far as I can see, would have no relevance whatever to anything else in the Bill. If I am wrong on that and there is some purpose in retaining Clause 36(1), although that interpretation of arriving “directly” was rejected by the House when it approved the removal of Clause 11, the House would want to know what it is being retained for: why it is being retained and in relation to what other provisions in the Bill. My amendment would remove Clause 36(1) from the Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

This is another of those occasions when saying “From these Benches, we support” and not much more must not be taken as any lack of support for all the amendments in this group, nor any dilution of the points made.

I just want to register concern about Clause 32(2). The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, spoke to this and I record our support, particularly for the amendment that deals with what is meant by “a particular social group”: that you do not qualify unless the group in question is perceived as being different by surrounding society. As has been pointed out to noble Lords in briefings, a trafficked woman would need to show not only that her status as a trafficked woman is an innate characteristic but that trafficked women as a group are perceived as having a distinct identity in the country of origin. That is very difficult to show. Judged by the perceptions of the society in her country? It would be very challenging to find objective evidence on that, and on that being a distinct group. It is very dangerous to suggest that one can tell those things by looking—or, rather more accurately, perceiving.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I spoke at some length on the legal aspects of this group of clauses in Committee and, having had the advantage of being able to indicate an overall view of them in the newspapers earlier in the week, I really do not want to try the patience of the House, and I certainly do not want to weaken rather than strengthen the number of compelling arguments that have already been heard on them in the past few minutes.

However, they are such objectionable clauses that I cannot simply remain silent. I do not criticise the Minister for this, I am a great admirer of his, but on Monday, at 5.49 pm, in the middle of the debate, we finally got a seven-page letter that sought to argue—if only I were still a judge and could deal with the arguments conclusively by rejecting them—the Government’s case for redefining the requirements of the convention.

When we come to Clause 31, the Minister, very fairly, recognises that it would overturn 25 years—a quarter of a century—of settled jurisprudence of the clearest authorities in this country. That is how we have been dealing with it for 25 years. He does not say that it was a wrong approach to the convention; all he argues—as I say, I do not accept it—is that what they are doing provides another possible interpretation of the convention. Is this really the moment at which to reject our established jurisprudence and substitute for it what may or may not—I would say not—be an arguable alternative view of the whole of this.

Clause 31 rejects what has been accepted as the holistic approach: you look at fundamental question arising under Article 1(A) of the convention in the round, you take all circumstances into consideration and you apply the standard of proof of reasonable likelihood—because heaven knows that is the standard which you should be using. You do not carve it up and create endless difficulties, and then say, “Well, actually, part of it has got to be on the balance of probabilities”.

I have quoted this before, and I will end with this: Hugo Storey, a recently retired judge of the Upper Tribunal who has spent his life dealing with these sorts of cases and is the immediate past president of the International Association of Refugee and Migration Judges, said that this clause would produce prodigious litigation and endless problems, and that it is not compliant with the way that the UNHCR wants Clause 31 to be applied. I will not go into the arguments on Clauses 32, 34 and 36—they are all objectionable, for the reasons already given. We really must vote down as many of these as we can.