Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting)

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

The hon. Member is absolutely right that the amendment would not make it easier for the clinician. My job is not to make it easier for the clinician to determine that someone is eligible for assisted death. It should be a robust, rigorous and well-considered process.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

I find the hon. Lady’s point about the mechanism by which we are making this legislation to be very pertinent. I have been here for almost 10 years. As somebody from a small party, I suspect we are all experiencing how Bill Committees work from the outside, if you like. We need a note of humility. On the one hand, we are all here trying to make this Bill a piece of legislation that is as watertight as possible. That very much then comes over to the Government; I know we are here on a private Member’s Bill because of the nature of the ethical question with this Bill, and I am very comfortable with that, but none the less there is an immense responsibility in the next stages with the questions we raise. Perhaps it might be an idea not to push this question to a vote—although I leave that entirely to the hon. Lady—because that keeps the matter alive. There is an immense responsibility on the Government to listen to the issues that we can only touch upon here and to ensure they are all sewn together.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the right hon. Lady for that really helpful intervention. That is exactly the kind of advice that is extremely useful to us new MPs undertaking this process. I will have to make the decision on that question in a matter of minutes, and it is very difficult, but I will do my best to make the right decision.

New clause 5 seeks to define encouragement for the purposes of the Bill and includes some exclusions. We have already talked about some of the challenges with exactly what encouragement means, and clearly there are certain acts that we do not want to be captured by it. The aim of the clause is just to ensure that it is only intentional, targeted and effective encouragement that is covered. I am very open to working with the Government to ensure that the drafting reflects the intent; it may well be that some other things go in there to address some of the concerns raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire around support being given by families. No one wants to see that included in this definition—I think we all agree on that.

In summary, I hope hon. Members will view these amendments, incorporating undue influence and encouragement into clause 1, favourably, in order to bolster the safeguards in this Bill. It is vital that subtler forms of influence are addressed, to protect patients and to ensure that it is not just the obvious signs of coercion that are looked for. I also welcome amendment 113, tabled by the hon. Member for Broxtowe, which is very much in the same spirit as amendments 23 and 82 and would insert the word “manipulated”. I hope we will debate it because, if accepted, it would certainly improve the safeguards in the Bill.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Olney]

On that note, I will probably not respond to the hon. Gentleman’s comments about coercion, but I will pick up on what the hon. Member for Stroud said about using the Mental Capacity Act every week. I think that probably makes him unusual among MPs, if not GPs. I personally have no experience of using the Mental Capacity Act, which is precisely what gives rise to my anxiety. We in this room need to properly understand what the Mental Capacity Act means, yet most of us do not have the experience that he has in applying it. However, we are all collectively responsible for ensuring that the legislation is framed properly. I can only go on the oral and written evidence that we have received, and I am paying serious attention to all those who have said that they do not think that the Mental Capacity Act is sufficient. I lack the direct experience that the hon. Member for Stroud has of those matters, and that is the best that I can do.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

We are discussing the balance of autonomy against considerations such as capacity and coercion. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 has been in existence for 20 years, so it has the advantage of being familiar. Would the hon. Lady agree that if we were to bring in clinical views from different professions, such as from doctors, social workers and psychiatrists, we would have different definitions in place, which would address some of the concerns about different applications?

[Sarah Olney]

That is an extremely wise observation. I regret enormously that there was not more opportunity, before the legislation was drafted, to have those discussions between experts, advisers and others who really know what the Mental Capacity Act means and whether it is sufficient for this purpose. The best that we can do now is reflect on the evidence that we have received. In many ways, that is what I am hoping to address with my amendment: to redefine “capacity” as “ability”, to transfer the responsibility for defining how ability should be assessed under the Act to the Secretary of State for further analysis and consultation, and then for that to be laid out properly.

When assessing people’s ability to make the decision, we want to take into account their ability to understand, retain, use and weigh information, and to communicate the decision. That will still be at the heart of an assessment of whether an individual is making the decision for the right reasons. A whole range of things might affect a person’s ability to make the decision. I have mentioned many times mental disorders such as depression, which is more common in people nearing the end of their life. Delirium, which is common in people with advanced illnesses, needs to be assessed. There is the complexity of people who have a physical terminal illness alongside a mental disorder; I think particularly of people suffering from an eating disorder, which is primarily a mental health condition but clearly has physical health implications. If the mental health condition is not treated or is resistant to treatment, the physical manifestation of the eating disorder can quickly become a terminal illness. That is a really important point that we need to reflect on.

The feelings of hopelessness that may come alongside a diagnosis of terminal illness may affect a person’s ability to weigh information. Anxiety can amplify their fears of future suffering, and types and doses of medication can affect capacity. All sorts of people can suffer vulnerabilities from external factors such as the lack of realistic alternatives like palliative care services; overt or implicit coercion; personal losses including bereavement; poor housing; financial hardship; and loneliness and social isolation. Understanding and responding to those vulnerabilities is at the centre of suicide prevention, but absent from the Bill.

We have to remember that the Bill would apply to people who are said to be within months of death but may not be, to those who may die within months but otherwise have a very good quality of life, and to people whose trajectories to death vary greatly. In his written evidence, Professor Allan House states that

“careful inquiry is justified because a statement about wanting to end one’s life cannot be simply taken as the result of a straightforward rational decision to choose one type of end of life care over others. Simply checking mental capacity and asking about coercion is not adequate.”

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting)

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

As I set out from the Dispatch Box when we had the money resolution, the Government will publish an impact assessment before Report. Given that this is a highly dynamic Bill, with a whole range of amendments having been tabled, and that it is not really possible to publish an impact assessment on the basis of a Bill that has not cleared a Bill Committee, there is a simple point of sequencing. That is why we are going to publish the impact assessment after the Bill Committee has completed.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

I was glad to hear what the Minister said about the Government accepting the Mental Capacity Act as a basis. We should remember that in 2005, that Act widened the availability of autonomy for individuals. We are discussing that here: how to enable autonomy for individuals. I also really welcome what the hon. Member for Bradford West said about impact assessments. Can the Minister commit now to an impact assessment specifically for Wales? The context of health and social care there is very different from that in England.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 30th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Q There was one thing I wanted to ask about, but it led me to another question, which is to Dr Naomi Richards. It seems that much of what we are discussing assumes that being patient-centric is intrinsic and runs day to day through medical culture. Is that actually the case in your experience? If not, is there something within the culture that needs to change to become more patient-centric in order to enable autonomy?

Dr Richards: I think you probably know the answer is that it is not patient-centric. In Marie Curie’s “Better End of Life Report 2024”, which was a representational survey with bereaved relatives, a third of people did not think that their relative even knew that they were dying. We still have a long way to go in communicating to people that they are in a terminal phase, so that they can find whatever residual value is in that period of time for themselves and their family. So, no, definitely not, but that is what we are striving for. I am sure that that is what all healthcare professionals are striving for.

In terms of assisted dying, it would be so explicit. It is categorically different from other kinds of conversations that are much more open-ended, like goals of care conversations at end of life. This is really quite specific, to the extent that you can actually give doctors a form of words to use, because their request for this procedure needs to be so categorical and there needs to be no ambiguity around that.

In a way, this conversation about assisted dying is actually different because it is very up front, it has to be very categorical and it has to be documented. In that sense, it is extremely patient-centric, and there would be no using euphemisms, which happens in end-of-life care, when what doctors think they have told their patients they do not hear. They have heard something else, because euphemisms change according to—well, you do not even have to go so far as to talk about different communities or cultural groups; they change from one person to another. I think this would require quite specific language. It would bring things into a much less ambiguous kind of territory.

[Juliet Campbell (Broxtowe) (Lab)]

Q My question is to Professor Preston. I will go back to something you said in your last answer, when we talked about how people are treated, and the differences and inequalities across society but also within our healthcare systems and how things are done. This was highlighted specifically during the pandemic. How do you think these inequalities will undermine the principles of the Bill?

Professor Preston: I think it is about having that additional consideration. When additional consideration for, perhaps, social deprivation or about people from minority groups is in the training and is at the forefront of people’s thinking, they can address it.

I will give you an example. We did a study looking at access to palliative care. I know you have heard a lot about there being a postcode lottery and things like that. One of our areas is one of the most deprived coastal communities in the country, and yet it had equal access for people across all areas of society, because they brought in people to target anyone from those socially deprived areas.

Equally, at the beginning of the first wave of the pandemic, at one of the big London hospitals, we analysed the data because we were concerned about access to palliative care services. Were people accessing it during the pandemic? We also looked by ethnicity. What we found was that not only during the pandemic, but pre-pandemic, if you were non-white, it took—I don’t know—three or five days longer to get that referral.

We had an idea that from some of the research we had done on social deprivation, people are making assumptions. It is not about people making horrible decisions, but they are making assumptions: “Oh, they will have a big family—the family will look after them. This will happen or that will happen.”

The nurse consultant, Claude Chidiac, went in and did training for the staff and said, “Don’t assume that just because people come from an Afro-Caribbean family that they have got this big family.” Within a year, when the second wave happened, the difference had gone. It can be at the forefront of training and you can make people really think about it. I would say—I think someone said it yesterday—that there is almost an inverse inequality, because I think those families and those communities will be really trying to protect people from even thinking about going for it.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you. Liz Saville Roberts, Danny Kruger has kindly forfeited a question in order for you to have two, so I will call you first.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Q Thank you very much to Mr Kruger, and to you, Chair.

Professor Lewis, I am glad to say that the Committee appreciates that scrutiny is necessary for Wales-related aspects of this private Member’s Bill. What are the risks of insufficient scrutiny?

Professor Lewis: Because this is a private Member’s Bill, it will not have gone through the process, which a Government Bill would have done, of having discussion between Governments as to how this might be sorted out. That impacts on Wales. So it is really important to have a session that focuses, albeit briefly, on Wales. I am grateful to the Committee.

This is an England and Wales Bill because certain criminal offences are matters on which the Senedd in Cardiff cannot legislate, and that includes offences that relate to suicide. However, apart from that, the impact of the Bill on devolved matters, if it became law, would be substantial—on the health service in Wales, on social services in Wales and on Welsh society generally. It is important that you take account of that. Indeed, certain aspects of the Bill seem to me to require a legislative consent motion to respect the Sewel convention.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Q Could you expand somewhat on which aspects those are?

Professor Lewis: As I am sure you are aware, the Parliament here in London can legislate about anything at all—absolutely anything. However, where the power to legislate is given to the devolved legislatures, the Sewel convention states—in the Government of Wales Act, in section 176, I think—that the Parliament in London will

“not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters”.

That is what is said. Therefore, there are certain aspects of this Bill—I will give you brief detail on that—that, in my opinion, relate to devolved matters. The first is clause 32. This is a very broad clause that would give the Secretary of State very broad powers for the implementation of the Bill within the NHS, including within the NHS in Wales. It seems to me unarguable that that is a matter both on which the Welsh Government ought to be consulted and which would require legislative consent from the Senedd.

The second is a cluster of clauses that impose specific functions on Welsh Ministers and on the chief medical officer for Wales. They are clauses 31, 33 and 34. Once more, from a formal perspective, they seem to require a legislative consent motion, so it seems to me that some thought needs to be given as to how that might happen in the context of a private Member’s Bill.

[Sarah Green]

Q To follow up on what you just said about legislative consent, in October of last year, the Senedd voted against Julie Morgan’s assisted dying motion. In your opinion, what implications does that have for the Bill and its progress?

Professor Lewis: A motion was put forward by Julie Morgan that was supported by three or four Members of the Senedd, which was broadly in support not of this specific Bill, but of the purpose of this Bill, and it was defeated, as you say, after a full debate on the Floor of the Senedd. Formally, legally and constitutionally, that is of no consequence, because it was not a legislative consent motion, and of course, as I said earlier, this Parliament is able to do what it likes. It could totally disregard that. Whether that would be a prudent or an appropriate thing to do, or even what one might describe as a constitutionally appropriate thing to do, is another matter.

I think it reinforces the point that there is a significance in making sure that scrutiny of the Bill has a Welsh focus. You might consider, for example, making different provision in Wales. How do you respect what was a democratic vote in the Senedd in Cardiff? Well, you might consider having different commencement provisions—I am not advocating this, it is just an example of what you might do. Commencement of the Bill in Wales might happen in a different way, on the assumption it was passed. You might put that in the hands of Welsh Ministers and the Senedd, just as an example.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting)

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

Q Would it be fair to say that you would need to know fairly quickly whether or not it would be provided through the NHS for planning purposes?

Professor Whitty: That is a key question, and to me that does seem something that Parliament may want to debate. That is not a question for us, but it is a point of principle one way or the other.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Q I have a question for Chris Whitty. You said you are here representing the chief medical officer for Wales as well. Health has been devolved for over 25 years, of course. What conversations have you had with the chief medical officer for Wales about the differences in how the NHS operates between Wales and England? What are the implications the Bill Committee should know about?

Professor Whitty: First, I have had quite a lot of conversations—not just with the chief medical officer for Wales, but all the other chief medical officers and indeed a much wider range of the medical profession; I wanted to feel that I was giving a central view of the medical profession in terms of the practicalities. My view is that, in a sense, the principles of the Bill are no different between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, although the legislation would apply only to England and Wales were it to be passed.

The operational questions we have been talking about will be either subtly or importantly different between the different jurisdictions for a variety of different reasons. I do not think that is a problem, provided it is in secondary legislation and it allows the different jurisdictions to do things in the way that best suits their own set-up. Again, as we saw during covid, different nations will choose to reach the same end state using slightly different practical routes.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Q May I develop that a tiny bit? In that case, you would see the timeline possibly being different for England or Wales in order to respect and take account of those operational differences?

Professor Whitty: Yes. I think in principle it would be better to be as close as possible, but if there were important practical differences why it was not going to start on the same date, the more important thing would be to get it right rather than to get simultaneous timings.

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

Q I hear what you have said already regarding capacity. Of course, the Mental Capacity Act relies on the capacity principles. They include the presumption of capacity, the principle that a person cannot be seen as lacking capacity unless all practicable steps have been taken to support them to make a decision, and the principle that a person cannot be seen as lacking capacity merely because the decision is unwise.

I also heard what you said about the scaling of decision making, but within the Bill, in some of those scenarios there is no mandating; the word “may” is used rather than “must”. I want to understand your viewpoint on whether it would provide stronger safeguards if those parts of the Bill were tightened to include “must” rather than “may”, and if the reference to capacity were replaced with a separate definition of “ability”, as proposed in our amendments.

Professor Whitty: I am probably not the best person to ask about the exact drafting of the Bill in terms of “may” and “must”, but I can answer the second part of your question, which is really important.

If there were no Mental Capacity Act, there would be an argument, which has been used for a long time, that the Bill would have to define what was meant with a fair degree of clarity. It would not be able to do that with just one clause; there would have to be quite a lot of clauses, if I am honest. All systems of this sort are going to be imperfect. The reason why I think it is sensible to base yourself on the Mental Capacity Act is that it is well used and well understood in practice by practitioners every day. Having a system with two completely separate groups of assessment, one of which has never been tested in the courts or used outwith this Bill, would lead to a whole set of potential complications and ambiguities, which are not there at the moment because we have a well-tested mechanism through the Mental Capacity Act.

People should move away from the Mental Capacity Act with some caution, because I think that will cause as many problems as it solves. It is not clear to me what problem people are trying to solve by doing that, given that the Mental Capacity Act clearly makes the point that the more severe the decision, the greater the degree of capacity that has to be assumed before people can actually take that decision. That is the foundation of some of the disquiet that people have had, but it is central to how the Mental Capacity Act works in practice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jake Richards]

Q There are some amendments being tabled that would offer further clarification and include more things that have to be considered. I have a similar question to the one I asked the previous panel, when I think you were here in the Public Gallery. Would offering further guidance to your members be welcome, or would you again err on the side of trusting their professional discretion?

Dr Green: As Dr Whitty said, I think simplicity is the key here.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Q Dr Green, you mentioned the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies. What issues have your members raised in relation to this legislation?

Dr Green: In terms of the cross-border issues?

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Yes.

Dr Green: I think the concerns are that patients, particularly those from the Crown dependencies, might be looking for some things—for example, report on life expectancy—from doctors on the mainland. I think it is clear that if a doctor travelled to the Isle of Man or Jersey to do the work there, the GMC would be happy for them to do so, but we would want a clear understanding that they would not be at risk of any other legislative problems—from the DPP, for example.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

And of course legislation is progressing in Scotland, which has different definitions from the legislation that we are discussing here.

Dr Green: Correct.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Q With the GMC, do you have any commentary on the fact that health is devolved in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and that we have a different set of jurisdictions in some instances?

Mark Swindells: There are aspects in which the law will differ, including on capacity. As a UK-wide regulator, we have managed to attend to that in our guidance, so that doctors are as clear on their responsibilities as possible when they lie either side of a devolved border. There is a nuanced point with the Crown dependencies. In law, we are a UK-wide regulator, and we know that the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar will choose to use doctors who are on the GMC register. Officially, we do not legally cover those areas, but it does give us some regulatory purchase there. If a doctor wishes to remain licensed to practice on the GMC register, there is a commitment to follow our professional standards.

[The Chair]

I am mindful of time, so this will probably be the last question.

Oral Answers to Questions

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Tuesday 28th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sarah Sackman]

Tackling domestic abuse is a priority for this Government. The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 sets out a broad statutory definition of domestic abuse, which is improving our understanding of the wide range of behaviours that can constitute this abuse. While not constituting a stand-alone offence, domestic abuse is considered an aggravating factor routinely throughout our criminal justice system, and rightly so. That is the reason why that data is not collected, and that is the position we will maintain.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

11. What steps she is taking to improve prison conditions.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Sir Nicholas Dakin)]

The right hon. Lady is right to raise this issue. We inherited historic under-investment in maintenance and a rising prison population. That is why we have already published our 10-year prison capacity strategy and have plans to invest £220 million in prison and probation service maintenance in ’24-25, and up to £300 million in ’25-26.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I rise as the co-chair of the justice unions parliamentary group. The emergency extra money to tackle the squalid state of our prisons is welcome, but given the £2 billion maintenance backlog, the reality is that the extra money will not touch the sides. This shows exactly why the privatisation of prison maintenance is a failed model. Private contractors may win contracts on low bids, but billions come in as extra cost later. Does the Minister seriously think that current prison maintenance providers offer good service and value for money to the taxpayer?

[Sir Nicholas Dakin]

The right hon. Lady is right. We inherited contracts that were already well progressed; for best value and to move things forward quickly, we decided it was important to keep going with that process. However, I can assure the House that we have an open mind regarding private and public sector contracts in the future. The important thing is to get best value for money and get the job done.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting)

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Lewis Atkinson]

Q We have heard from two witnesses—you, Sir Nicholas, and Dr Ahmedzai from the earlier panel—on the question of judicial oversight. While we have you here, Sir Max and Mr Ruck Keene, what are your observations on the proposals from those two witnesses that an alternative to a High Court judge overseeing the process would be some form of panel or tribunal, potentially multidisciplinary? What is your view on that and the legal implications for that?

Sir Max Hill: I would say two things. First, it bears weight that, looking at all the provisions in the Bill, the additional level of scrutiny currently being called judicial scrutiny or approval is absent in all the comparative examples around the world. That already makes this a tighter pre-legislative model than we see in other countries that have gone down this route. That is worth remembering.

Secondly, while I am not a family lawyer—I was, but a very long time ago—I think that the family division of the High Court would be very well-placed to perform the sort of exercise enshrined in current drafting, which is not a rubber-stamping exercise, but a substantive consideration of heavily objective medical opinion arrived at by not one, but two doctors, one of whom is not the treating doctor.

I listen to and accept the question of pressure on the justice system generally. That is something the Committee will be concerned about because, if the Bill passes, we want something workable. I heed what Sir James Munby said. The sitting judiciary, for good constitutional reasons, is highly unlikely to say anything. But there is therefore merit in looking at clause 12, under the heading, “Court approval”, and performing quite a simple exercise, which for me would be going through subsections (1) to (6) inclusive and, where it says “High Court”, replace that with something else. Personally, I have an aversion to the word “tribunal”, which indicates a right and wrong or some kind of fault-based system—that is not what we are talking about here. But a panel, as Nick said, is the way to go—

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: A panel appointed by the Official Solicitor.

Sir Max Hill: Whether appointed by the Official Solicitor or not. Dare I say it—because I am sitting next to a very distinguished one—I do wonder about the recently retired members of the judiciary and the role that they could play under a replacement panel system.

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: That is what I had in mind—the Official Solicitor looking at the retired judges.

Sir Max Hill: Yes, so there is legal professional capacity among the retired judges—not that they would sit alone on a panel. It would bring with it the extra benefit of having suitably qualified medical professionals, like the Spanish model. So yes, I think that could be done. That is not the same thing as saying that the High Court approval model is fatally flawed and could not be introduced, but I do think there is a viable alternative, which is worth looking at.

Alex Ruck Keene: I have only one observation, and I said this in my written evidence but I also want to say it out loud. You have to think very carefully about what purpose any form of this oversight is actually serving societally, if the oversight panel, whether that be a judge or a panel, cannot decline to approve an application if it considers that the reason the individual is seeking assistance in dying is because of service provision failures by the statutory bodies responsible for meeting their health and social care needs. That is a question of principle, and I want to make sure that that is squarely before you.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Q I have a question for Alex Ruck Keene. I noticed the concerns in your evidence about presumption of capacity, and I know that you have written in the past about concerns over different disciplines having different definitions of capacity. Later on in your evidence, you also mention multidisciplinary consideration of circumstances in assessing eligibility. How might that multidisciplinary eligibility assessment alleviate some of your concerns in relation to capacity decisions?

Alex Ruck Keene: We have capacity, but we also have to make sure that it is settled, informed and voluntary, and that we do not have things like pressure or influence going on. It is important to make it clear that we are not just saying that this is about all the weight going on capacity. For instance, if you have social workers involved—if you have, say, palliative care social workers involved, assuming it is a palliative care situation—they are going to be far better informed about what options might be out there than a doctor, potentially, depending on the doctor. Social workers more generally might well have more expertise in picking up signs of coercion or influence than a doctor, but I do not necessarily want to get into, “Some disciplines are good at X” and “Some disciplines are good at Y”—I have come across brilliant examples and bad examples in both zones.

It is partly about multidisciplinariness and also about the fact that you have more than one person trying to talk it through. When I train, I always try to tell people that 85% of capacity assessments are not all that difficult —they are just made difficult because you do not have time or you are not listening—but 15% are more difficult. I think a lot of these will be in the 15% zone, and in that zone, the more people you can have thinking about it, so long as they have an agreed framework within which to think, the more reliable, transparent and accountable the outcome is going to be.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

Q I want to pick up on your evidence, Sir Nicholas, in relation to the panel that we have just been discussing with Sir Max. I have three questions. First, what do you envisage the panel doing under your model? Will it be ensuring that a lawful process has been followed or doing something more than that?

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: The former.

Child Arrangements: Presumption of Parental Involvement

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Westminster Hall

[Dr Tidball]

I do indeed, and I will return to that point later, not least because Jack and Paul Sykes told their social workers that they were scared of their dad. The youngest told them that he was “pure nasty”. Their secondary school was so concerned about the domestic abuse at home that it also alerted social services. Yet, on a two-hour contact visit permitted by a family court and allowed to go ahead by that same CAFCASS officer, Jack and Paul were locked in the attic by their father. Using gasoline, their dad then set multiple fires alight across their home. Paul, aged nine, died at the scene after his elder brother tried to save him. Jack, aged just 12, died later in hospital. The father also killed himself in the blaze.

Jack and Paul Sykes were supposed to return to their mother Claire that night. Instead, the boys died at the hands of a known domestic abuser. Their voices were not heard by social services, nor by the court. CAFCASS never heard their voices either. In fact, the day that Jack was supposed to speak to CAFCASS for a welfare assessment was the same day Claire cradled him in her arms as he died. The only time Jack’s voice was heard was when he was held in the fireman’s arms as he used the last of his strength to say, “My dad did this and he did it on purpose.”

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

The hon. Member is making an immensely powerful argument; that is a tragic tale. Does she agree that, as well as domestic abuse being taken into account, perpetrators of child sexual abuse should be taken into account in relation to parental involvement? I support the campaign of my constituent, Bethan Parkinson. Amending Jade’s law to that effect, to include domestic abuse and child sexual abuse, would be a useful step forward.

[Dr Tidball]

I do agree. I will discuss further proposals later in my speech. Jack and Paul would never have been in the reach of a known domestic abuser, were it not for the presumption of contact. Although schools have a statutory responsibility to report suspected incidents of domestic abuse, in contrast the presumption does not put the children of known domestic abusers first.

Ten years on, this place must hear Jack’s and Paul’s voices reverberate loud and clear, because tragically their voices are not alone. Women’s Aid found evidence of 48 child deaths at the hands of a known domestic abuser that took place following a permitted contact visit between 1994 and 2015. The Domestic Abuse Act, as my hon. Friend the Member for Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr (Steve Witherden) mentioned, recognises that children are victims of domestic abuse in their own right. Child contact is a known risk indicator for domestic homicide, yet we still do not know the true scale of the problem.

The vast majority of court reports are not published, with only 10% of rulings coming to light. Only last month, the sentencing of Sara Sharif’s known domestically abusive father and stepmother for her murder showed all of us that action is urgently needed to change the law. Her life must not be forgotten.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (First sitting)

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Jake Richards]

Well, we have had lots of lists, but Lord Sumption and Lord Neuberger are giving evidence, I believe; Lord Sumption is, anyway. These things can be tested and challenged, so the notion that we need to have others is slightly absurd. We have the law lecturer from Cambridge University as well.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Diolch yn fawr iawn. I put it on record that I am very grateful that we will be able to find time for a legal adviser. It will not be a representative of the Senedd, because it has become apparent that the Senedd itself will not provide a Clerk to advise us. That seems to be a weak point in the process of making legislation: I think that as legislators we should be able to receive advice on the issue that is non-political and is perceived as non-political, so we probably need to address that in future. It will not be a representative of the Senedd, but I will seek within the time to get a legal advisor who is recognised as an expert in this field.

Oral Answers to Questions

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Alex Davies-Jones]

This Government share the concern that more needs to be done to protect women from this appalling form of abuse. That is why we made a clear commitment in our manifesto to criminalise the creation of sexually explicit deepfake images of adults, and I look forward to setting out our position on this in more detail soon.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Four schoolgirls suffered sexual abuse by their headteacher, Neil Foden, who was sentenced in July to 17 years with a two-thirds tariff. The Crown Prosecution Service now tells me that Foden will instead spend half his sentence in prison, because the most serious of his crimes can only be sentenced to 14 years. Will the Minister meet me to discuss how to safeguard the victims, whose abuser was in a position of trust, because they live in fear of his early release?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am aware of the appalling case that the right hon. Lady mentions. It is horrific and all my thoughts are with the victims of those crimes. If she wants to write to me with more details, I will happily look at the case. As she knows, sentencing is a matter for the independent judiciary, but I will look at the case and meet her to discuss it further.