European Union Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Mr Lidington
I know that the hon. Gentleman has at least been consistent in pushing that line, but I have to remind him that his party, when it was in office, and all other parties, agreed unanimously to changes to our procedures and the organisation of parliamentary time that explicitly gave responsibility for those biannual debates on European matters to the Backbench Business Committee rather than the Government.
We have heard this afternoon about the importance of decisions in the EU to everybody in the country, and it would be a good expression of Parliament’s understanding of that point if Back Benchers of all parties put pressure on the Backbench Business Committee to make a debate on Europe a priority, instead of debates on the other matters that the Committee has chosen in response to Back Benchers’ demands. Back Benchers’ priorities should be debated in Back-Bench time, and I believe that most of us present this evening would like the Committee to feel that a debate on Europe was what Back Benchers wanted. I hope the hon. Gentleman will persuade his colleagues of that.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. I am sure that we want to deal with new clause 1, and I am sure the Minister recognises that he is drifting away from the subject. He has been tempted all over the place, but I am sure he will want to deal with what is before us.
Mr Lidington
I simply remind all hon. Members who want to take forward these wider arguments that I said in my written ministerial statement on scrutiny on 20 January, which referred mostly to justice and home affairs, that the Government would
“review the arrangements for engagement on EU issues in consultation with Parliament.”—[Official Report, 20 January 2011; Vol. 521, c. 52WS.]
I invite them to take advantage of that opportunity.
I turn to the detail of new clause 1, which causes me concern because it would result in the United Kingdom having a substantially different policy with regard to information on EU decision making from that on domestic policy making. It would also represent a substantial impediment to the UK’s ability to negotiate effectively in an intergovernmental conference, in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers. As a number of Members have said, it could have a negative impact on our relationship with other member states and the EU institutions, and more generally on the process of good policy making and legislation.
The negative effect on our ability to negotiate at the Council of Ministers concerns me most. First, action to comply with the statutory duty that the new clause would impose on Ministers could reveal sensitive information about the UK’s long-term negotiating approach in a number of areas. I do not believe it is sufficient protection to say that the negotiations would be complete or substantially complete by the time the documents were made available, because it is very rare that negotiating positions taken in respect of one piece of legislation do not have a read-across to positions on other matters that will probably still be live dossiers when that legislation has been agreed to.
Secondly, complying with the new clause would mean that our tactics in negotiations would have to take into account the duty to make negotiating positions on proposed amendments public at a later stage. For example, there are occasions on which we try to persuade other member states to propose, or take the lead on, particular amendments so that we can concentrate our time and energy on different amendments that perhaps have less widespread support. If a Minister knew that he might be criticised if it became public that he had not sponsored a particular amendment, that would constrain our negotiating tactics and weaken our negotiating strategies.
I quite understand that the proponents of the new clause might want to see how a decision is made at EU level and the details of what part the UK has played in that process, but I do not want any Ministers of any Government who are fighting for Britain’s interest in future discussions and negotiations to be doing so with one hand tied behind their back. It is absolutely essential to our national interest that Ministers can negotiate effectively on behalf of our country.
As a number of Members have said, including my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips), the new clause would also have implications for information that we have on record about the positions of other member states. There is even a risk that its requirements could put us in conflict with existing European legislation. As a member state of the EU, we are party to the terms of the access to documents regulation, article 5 of which requires that when any member state intends to disclose a document originating from one of the EU institutions, it must consult that institution before public disclosure. If, under the new clause, we had to release a text submitted at a Council working group that included proposed amendments from each member state, and the agreement of the Council as a whole had not been sought or obtained, we could potentially be at risk of infraction proceedings and ultimately a fine. As the new clause is drafted, it is quite possible that our obligations as an EU member state could be at odds with the statutory duty that the new clause would create.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. Can we conduct the debate through the Chair, please?
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 4—Certain decisions under Article 312 of TFEU requiring approval by Act and by referendum—
‘(1) A Minister of the Crown may not vote in favour of or otherwise support a decision to which this subsection applies unless—
(a) the draft decision is approved by Act of Parliament, and
(b) the referendum condition is met.
(2) The referendum condition is that set out in section 3(2), with references to a decision being read for the purposes of subsection (1) as references to a draft decision.
(3) Subject to subsection (6), subsection (1) applies to a decision under Article 312(2) of TFEU to adopt a regulation laying down the first multiannual financial framework of the European Union for the period following 2013, where that multiannual financial framework would include—
(a) an initial annual ceiling on total EU payment appropriations that was higher than the ceiling on total EU payment appropriations for 2013 in the multiannual financial framework covering 2013, taking account of an adjustment of the 2013 ceiling for inflation,
(b) subsequent annual ceilings on total EU payment appropriations, some or all of which increased from the previous year, or could increase from the previous year without revision of the multiannual financial framework through the procedure laid down in Article 312(2) of TFEU, by more than an adjustment for inflation,
(c) an initial annual ceiling on total EU commitment appropriations that was not lower than the ceiling on total EU commitment appropriations for 2013 in the multiannual financial framework covering 2013, taking account of an adjustment of the 2013 ceiling for inflation, or
(d) subsequent annual ceilings on total EU commitment appropriations, some or all of which were at least as high as the previous year’s ceiling adjusted for inflation, or could be at least as high as the previous year’s ceiling adjusted for inflation without revision of the multiannual financial framework through the procedure laid down in Article 312(2) of TFEU.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the only relevant adjustments for inflation are those used by the EU for the figures involved.
(5) Subject to subsection (6), subsection (1) also applies to a decision under Article 312(2) of TFEU to adopt a regulation revising the first multiannual financial framework of the European Union for the period following 2013, where that regulation would cause the multiannual financial framework to include provision identified in subsection (3) when the framework had not done so before.
(6) Inclusion of provision to enable EU payment or commitment appropriations to be reallocated between the annual ceilings of the same type of appropriation in a multiannual financial framework does not of itself cause a regulation laying down or revising a multiannual financial framework to fall under subsection (1).’.
New clause 5—Certain decisions under Article 311 of TFEU—
‘(1) A Minister of the Crown may not confirm the approval by the United Kingdom of a decision to which this subsection applies unless—
(a) the decision is approved by Act of Parliament, and
(b) the referendum condition or the exemption condition is met.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to a decision under the third paragraph of Article 311 of TFEU to adopt a decision laying down provisions relating to the system of own resources of the European Union, where the decision adopted contains provision for payment to the EU as own resources, without the need for a further decision under the third paragraph of Article 311 of TFEU, of some or all of the revenues from a tax or other levy on natural or non-State legal persons that is established or which may be established by EU law (including by that decision).
(3) The referendum condition is that set out in section 3(2).
(4) Subject to subsection (5), the exemption condition is that the Act providing for the approval of the decision states that—
(a) under the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the European Union in force at that time, revenues from the tax or other levy referred to in subsection (2), or from a tax or other levy that is very similar and which is established or may be established by EU law, are already paid in whole or part to the EU as own resources or may be paid in whole or part to the EU as own resources without a further decision under the third paragraph of Article 311 of TFEU, and
(b) the adopted decision to which the decision relates does not contain provision that is likely to require or allow a significant increase in the amount or proportion of revenue obtained in the United Kingdom in any one year from the tax or other levy referred to in subsection (2) that is or may be paid to the EU as own resources, compared to that required or allowed by the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the European Union in force at that time.
(5) Where a statement as per subsection 4(a) is made that revenues from a very similar tax or other levy to the tax or other levy referred to in subsection (2) are or may already be paid in whole or part to the EU as own resources, the statement for the purposes of subsection 4(b) may state that the adopted decision to which the decision relates does not contain provision that is likely to require or allow to be paid to the EU as own resources an amount or proportion of revenue obtained in the United Kingdom in any one year from the tax or other levy referred to in subsection (2) that is significantly greater than the amount or proportion of revenue obtained in the United Kingdom in any one year from the very similar tax or other levy required or allowed to be paid to the EU as own resources by the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the European Union in force at that time.’.
Amendment 1, page 4, line 8, clause 4, at end insert
‘except where any such provision substantially affects all or any of the political, economic, fiscal, social or constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and other Member States of the European Union.’.
Amendment 6, page 4, line 43, clause 6, at end insert—
‘(2A) A Minister of the Crown may not confirm the approval by the United Kingdom of a decision under the provision of Article 218(8) of TFEU for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in accordance with Article 6(2) of TEU unless—
(a) the decision is approved by Act of Parliament, and
(b) the referendum condition is met.’.
Amendment 8, page 6, line 21, clause 7, after ‘Union’, insert
‘, unless the decision falls under section (Certain decisions under Article 311 of TFEU)’.
Amendment 7, page 6, line 39, at end add—
‘(da) a decision under Article 312(2) of TFEU to adopt a regulation laying down or revising the multiannual financial framework of the European Union, unless the decision falls under section (Certain decisions under Article 312 of TFEU requiring approval by Act and by referendum).’.
Amendment 4, page 8, line 22, clause 9, at end insert—
‘(4A) For decisions under a provision falling within either paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection (2) that are subject to qualified majority voting, otherwise supporting a decision includes, for the purposes of subsection (4), permitting the United Kingdom’s participation in the final adoption of a decision.’.
Government amendment 3.
Amendment 5, page 9, line 3, clause 10, leave out subsection (2).
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Does the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) wish to move his amendment formally?
Mr Cash
I will not move the amendment, but I do not agree with what the Minister has just said.
The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).
Clause 10
Parliamentary control of certain decisions not requiring approval by Act
Amendment made: 3, page 9, line 2, at end insert—
‘(1A) A Minister of the Crown may not vote in favour of or otherwise support a decision to which this subsection applies unless Parliamentary approval has been given in accordance with this section.
(1B) Subsection (1A) applies to a decision under Article 48(7) of TEU which in relation to a provision of TFEU applies the ordinary legislative procedure in place of a special legislative procedure not requiring the Council to act unanimously.’—(Mr Lidington.)
Third Reading
European Union Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. Upper Houses are not relevant to this stand part debate, so let us stick to the clause. I am sure that Mr MacShane will want to come back to that subject.
Mr MacShane
I am tempted to say—though, thank goodness, oral amendments are not allowed in Committee of the whole House—that the increase in MEPs at the heart of this part of the Bill could be allocated to representatives from national Parliaments at some future date. I am just stretching the limits of order—[Interruption.] I am about to sit down, Mr Hoyle. I am inviting the Minister to open a debate about how to make the European Parliament more representative and more reflective of the national will in the different countries that constitute the EU. That might require a small treaty change, but not, I am sure, a significant one, so we would not need to initiate the referendum provisions.
We often knock the European Parliament because of expenses or costs or decisions it has taken that we do not like, which is frankly rather childish. What we need is a more serious debate about making the European Parliament more effective, more efficient and more representative—leaving aside those who want to abolish it or to withdraw completely from it. I invite the Minister to engage with that debate, although he may well hope that once proceedings on the Bill are concluded there will be no more debate about the EU on his side of the House for the next few years.
Mr MacShane
The Verfassungsgericht in Germany, of course, sees the German people—das Volk—as the sovereign, and distinguishes clearly between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. It allocates powers on a subsidiary basis—
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. Again, we really are drifting from the subject, and we must return to it. The right hon. Gentleman said earlier that he was winding up his speech, but he is now broadening it again.
Mr MacShane
Not many Members wish to speak, Mr Hoyle, so I was trying to reply to the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd), but I now invite him to read some expert books on the subject instead.
Kelvin Hopkins
I thank my right hon. Friend, as always, for being so generous.
No doubt we should welcome the extra seat in the European Parliament as a small extension of democracy, but my right hon. Friend is right about accountability. Would it not be a good idea for some powers to be repatriated to national Parliaments, and would it not also be a good idea to return to single-Member, first-past-the-post seats in the European Parliament? Would that not increase accountability?
The Chairman
Order. That has absolutely nothing to with the clause. I think that the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) had better sum up his speech now.
Mr MacShane
Might my hon. Friend possibly accept that on this occasion I really must bow to the Chair and sit down?
Kelvin Hopkins
It has just struck me that my right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) suggested a two-house European Parliament. I am not an enthusiast for that, but in those circumstances could you not have an arrangement similar to that for—
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. We have already ruled on that question.
Mr Lidington
I think the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) is demonstrating that he has political ambitions as yet unfulfilled.
I can now assure the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) that expert advice has reached me confirming that my trust in the Electoral Commission was well placed and that the electorate of Gibraltar were indeed considered in the context of the south-west region and assessed in accordance with the Sainte-Laguë system.
The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East asked me about the different options for selecting the additional MEPs. The protocol allows member states to choose between three options. First, member states could use the 2009 European parliamentary election results and elect the additional MEPs as if the additional seats had existed at the time of those 2009 elections. That is the method that we have chosen.
The second option would be to hold a by-election. In this case, that would mean holding a by-election in the west midlands region for a single MEP at an estimated cost of perhaps £10 million. The third option would be for member states to appoint temporarily one of their national parliamentarians to become the new MEP for the remainder of the current European parliamentary term. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East indicates that the hon. Member for Luton North or perhaps the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) might be candidates in such circumstances.
The previous Government decided in February 2010 that the UK’s additional MEP would be elected by reference to the results of the most recent European parliamentary elections, as though the additional seat had existed at that time. The present Government have continued our predecessor’s chosen approach, and the clauses are framed in that way. That is also the method used by the great majority of other member states that are gaining MEPs. In fact, some member states elected additional MEPs during the 2009 elections on the basis that they could take up their seats only once the transitional protocol had come into force.
Our chosen method avoids the delay and the cost associated with a by-election and would allow us to return the additional MEP as soon as possible after the approval of the relevant provision in the Bill. It also has the merit of being exactly the same method that we use in any case to fill a vacant British seat in the European Parliament after the death or resignation of an elected MEP. Again, these clauses and schedule 2 would apply only until the additional seat had been filled and until the next European parliamentary election, which is scheduled for 2014.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Election of additional MEP
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Emma Reynolds
I say gently to the Minister that if he goes back and reads our manifesto commitment, he will find that we promised a referendum on the constitutional treaty. If he asks his officials, with whom I was working at the time—
The Chairman
Order. We are getting carried away and are drifting. I am sure that the Minister wants to get back to the point.
Mr Lidington
I will leave it to the hon. Lady to try to explain that distinction on the doorstep.
The hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) asked about expenditure authorised by clause 13. We have to understand the distinction between an authority to spend, which is what we are debating, and what the level of any expenditure should be. If we did not have the authorising power, as set out in clause 19, the Electoral Commission would simply not be able, without going ultra vires, to promote public awareness of a referendum or the subject matter of a referendum. The Electoral Commission, like any other Department or organisation funded by the taxpayer, has a budget that is set through negotiation with the relevant Departments and the Treasury, and it will have to make provision from within that budget. If it really feels that it needs more, it will have to come back to the Government to seek agreement for a supplementary authorisation for additional spending, in the way that such things are usually provided for. We are debating a power under the clause for the Electoral Commission lawfully to spend money on a particular set of objectives, and nothing more.
European Union Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Clappison
As I said earlier, I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. I want to make progress and for that reason, and the other reasons I have mentioned, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 33, page 8, line 16, at end add—
‘(7) A Minister of the Crown may not give a notification under Article 10(5) of Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional Provisions annexed to TEU and TFEU that the United Kingdom wishes to participate in an act that has ceased to apply to it pursuant to Article 10(4) of that Protocol, where the AFSJ Protocol would apply to the procedure for dealing with the notification, unless a Minister of the Crown has given an oral statement to the Chamber of the House of Commons on Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to give the notification.’.—(Chris Heaton-Harris.)
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 82, page 8, line 16, at end add—
‘(6A) A Minister of the Crown may not make a formal decision as to whether to exercise the right of the United Kingdom to make a notification to the Council under the terms of article 10(4) of the Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions annexed to TEU and TFEU, unless—
(a) the decision is approved by Act of Parliament, and
(b) the referendum condition is met.
(6B) The referendum condition is that set out in section 3(2).’.
Amendment 83, page 8, line 16, at end add—
‘(6C) A Minister of the Crown may not make a formal decision as to whether to exercise the right of the United Kingdom to make a notification to the Council under the terms of article 10(4) of the Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions annexed to TEU and TFEU, unless the decision is approved by Act of Parliament.’.
Amendment 84, page 8, line 16, at end add—
‘(6D) A Minister of the Crown may not give a notification under Article 10(5) of Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions annexed to TEU and TFEU that the United Kingdom wishes to participate in an Act that has ceased to apply to it pursuant to Article 10(4) of that Protocol, unless the notification in respect of the Act has been approved by Act of Parliament.’.
Mr Jenkin
Amendments 82, 83 and 84 concern what the Minister set out in a statement last week, in which he described the arrangements for the Government to give formal notification of whether they wished the UK to opt out of certain justice and home affairs matters by 31 July 2014. He made it clear in the statement—I think this is welcome—that the Government intend to allow the House of Commons and the other place to table a formal resolution to approve or disapprove of the action the Government take in these matters.
While we are listening to this debate, it is worth reminding ourselves of the magnitude of what we are talking about: a complete rearrangement of the civil and criminal legal system of our country that will move the whole civil and criminal system on to an entirely new basis. I hear what my hon. Friend the Minister says about the number of advocates-general and about maintaining four judges in the European Court of Justice who represent common law jurisdictions, but that is a completely meaningless reassurance in the face of all the other judges and the history of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, which simply is not interested in the common law basis of the jurisdictions of its member states.
Having fought against the Lisbon treaty in principle and most particularly on the basis of its potential to interfere in the criminal and civil law of this country, it is astonishing that the Government, since the election, have, for example, approved the directive establishing the European investigation order. Let us be clear: that allows another member state to oblige the United Kingdom to carry out almost any investigative action in the UK, including searching a house, intercepting telephone calls and obtaining DNA for the purpose of criminal proceedings in the requesting member state. The UK has supported the directive on the right to interpretation and translation of criminal proceedings, ceding jurisdiction in that area to the European Court of Justice. This all happened before the European Scrutiny Committee was sitting, so it was all unscrutinised by this House. Any weasel words from the Government about strengthening the scrutiny of the House of Commons should carry a health warning.
The Government have decided to opt in to the Council decision on the conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, which makes binding on the UK as a matter of European Community law an international agreement between the EU and Georgia and means that the UK cannot conclude its own readmission agreement with Georgia, should it wish to do so. I just point out that had any of those decisions been in an international treaty outside the European Union’s jurisdiction, they would have required an Act of Parliament, but these things are done by the stroke of a Minister’s pen under the powers in the European Communities Act 1972.
European Union Bill (Programme)(No. 2)
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Charlie Elphicke
I agree with my hon. Friend. What will we discuss? A wrecking amendment, tabled by the Labour party, which cheated the nation of a referendum in the past.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. If it was a wrecking amendment, it would not have been selected. I remind the hon. Gentleman that amendments are selected with due consideration.
Charlie Elphicke
I defer to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, and apologise for using language that was perhaps too simple. Of course, the amendment could not be a wrecking amendment; it is an amendment that would bring destruction on the Government’s intent and purpose in the Bill. I hope that I remain in order with that description.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), who makes an important point about the time that is needed to discuss the purpose of referendums and whether we should have a national debate—perhaps a referendum?—on whether to hold an in/out referendum. It seems that we will not have time to discuss that today. I hope that, at some point—perhaps not in the Bill, but sometime—the House will be able to discuss that properly.
Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. Several Members on the Government Benches have referred to proceedings in another place. Page 435 of “Erskine May” clearly states:
“Members are restrained by the Speaker from commenting upon the proceedings of the House of Lords.”
For the guidance, particularly of newer Members on the other side of the House, could you give a ruling on that point?
Mr Deputy Speaker
There should be no criticism of the other House. We can all learn from that.
European Union Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 85, page 2, line 6, at end add—
‘(7A) References to “the Committee” are to the European Union Referendum Committee as established by section [European Union Referendum Committee] below.’.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 86, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, leave out
‘a statement relating to the treaty was’
and insert
‘the treaty and a statement relating to it were’.
Amendment 1, page 2, line 13, leave out ‘or the exemption condition’.
Amendment 92, page 2, line 16, leave out from ‘until’ to end of line 22 and insert
‘the referendum procedure set out in subsection (2A) below has been completed.
‘(2A) The referendum procedure is completed if—
(a) a decision has been taken by either or both Houses of Parliament not to hold a referendum, whether by agreeing with a recommendation from the Committee that a referendum is not required or by disagreeing to a recommendation from the Committee that a referendum is required; or
(b) a referendum has been held throughout the United Kingdom, or where the treaty affects Gibraltar, throughout the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, and a majority of those voting in the referendum are in favour of ratification of the treaty.’.
Amendment 2, page 2, line 23, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment 87, in clause 3, page 2, line 29, leave out
‘a statement relating to the decision was’
and insert
‘the decision and a statement relating to it were’.
Amendment 67, page 2, line 32, leave out paragraph (c).
Amendment 3, page 2, line 32, leave out
‘the exemption condition or the significance condition’.
Amendment 68, page 2, line 34, leave out subsections (2), (3) and (4).
Amendment 93, page 2, line 36, leave out from ‘until’ to end of line 42 and insert
‘the referendum procedure set out in subsection (2A) below has been completed.
‘(2A) The referendum procedure is completed if—
(a) a decision has been taken by either or both Houses of Parliament not to hold a referendum, whether by agreeing with a recommendation from the Committee that a referendum is not required or by disagreeing to a recommendation from the Committee that a referendum is required; or
(b) a referendum has been held throughout the United Kingdom, or where the treaty affects Gibraltar, throughout the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, and a majority of those voting in the referendum are in favour of approval of the decision.’.
Amendment 4, page 2, line 43, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment 5, page 3, line 1, leave out subsection (4).
Amendment 64, page 3, line 3, leave out from ‘4’ to ‘and’ in line 4.
Amendment 65, page 3, line 4, leave out ‘(1)(i) or (j)’ and insert
‘(1)(a), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) (i), (j), (k), (l) or (m)’.
Amendment 66, page 3, line 4, after ‘(1)’, insert ‘(g), (h)’.
Amendment 88, in clause 4, page 3, line 8, before ‘(1)’ insert—
‘(A1) A treaty or Article 48(6) decision which falls within this section shall be subject to the procedure of determination by the Committee and both Houses of Parliament as to whether a referendum is required’.
Amendment 89, in clause 5, page 4, line 10, leave out
‘the required statement before Parliament’
and insert
‘the treaty and the required statement before the Committee and before Parliament’.
Amendment 90, page 4, line 14, leave out
‘the required statement before Parliament’
and insert
‘the decision and the required statement before the Committee and before Parliament’.
Amendment 7, page 4, line 17, leave out subsections (3) to (5) and insert—
‘(3) The required statement is a statement that there will be a referendum on that treaty.’.
Amendment 91, page 4, line 19, leave out subsections (4) and (5).
Amendment 11, page 4, line 24, at end add—
‘(6) If the Minister’s opinion is that the effect of that provision in relation to the United Kingdom is not significant the Minister must seek Parliamentary approval for his opinion.
(7) Parliamentary approval is given if—
(a) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House approves of the Minister’s opinion; and
(b) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.
(8) If the Minister fails to obtain Parliamentary approval for his opinion the significance condition is not met.’.
New clause 9—European Union Referendum Committee
‘(1) There shall be a Committee, to be known as the European Union Referendum Committee, to examine—
(a) any amendment of the Treaty on the European Union or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, whether by simplified or ordinary revision procedure;
(b) any decision already provided for in those treaties, as set out in Schedule 1 to this Act;
(c) any treaty or Article 48(6) decision as defined in section 4 of this Act; and
(d) any decision as set out in section 6(2) or 6(4) of this Act.
(2) The Committee shall report to Parliament in respect of each such treaty amendment or decision as to—
(a) whether it involves a significant transfer of power or competence, and if so
(b) whether it requires a referendum to be held.
(3) When the Committee has reported its view as to whether or not a referendum is required, a Motion shall be moved in each House of Parliament to give effect to that recommendation.
(4) If both Houses agree to recommend a referendum, a referendum shall be held accordingly.
(5) The Committee shall consist of no more than 19 Members, drawn from both Houses of Parliament, none of whom shall be Ministers of the Crown.
(6) The members of the Committee shall be nominated by the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord Speaker of the House of Lords respectively, in accordance with the Standing Orders or Resolutions of their respective Houses, and subject to the approval of their respective Houses.
(7) Members of each House shall be members of the Committee until discharged by their House or if they cease to be a Member of that House or if they become a Minister of the Crown.
(8) The Committee shall elect a Chair from among those of its members who sit in the House of Commons.
(9) The Committee may determine its own procedure, which shall be broadly in line with that followed by Joint Committees of the two Houses.’.
Mr David
The week before last, the Committee enjoyed an excellent debate on the sovereignty clause of the Bill. Perhaps surprisingly, there was a high degree of consensus on the need to ensure that Parliament remains central to our democracy. Indeed, it must be said that even the Government appeared to acknowledge that there was at least a genuine debate on whether Parliament owed its sovereignty to common law or whether sovereignty was a fundamental right. Consequently, we look forward to seeing how the Government rewrite the Bill’s explanatory notes to acknowledge that debate.
That makes it all the more surprising that part 1 of the Bill so profoundly departs from the consensus established in the House that Parliament is central to this country’s democratic process. The Government do that by proposing that most extensions of EU competence or power, even relatively small ones, should be subject to a referendum if the change has a material impact on the UK’s relationship with the EU.
The Government set out in the Bill in mind-numbing detail umpteen scenarios when a referendum might be triggered. The Opposition believe that there is a case for referendums to be held on important constitutional issues. For example, in government, we introduced referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales, and indeed, there will be a further referendum in Wales on 3 March.
Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)
I am sorry, but having written the constitution and having read the Lisbon treaty, I think that it is sheer sophistry to go on like this. May I just—
The Chairman
Order. We are not dealing with the Lisbon treaty. Can we please stick to the amendments before us?
Mr David
With all due respect to my hon. Friend, it was not she who wrote the treaty or the constitution; she made a contribution, as did many people.
We support a referendum on the alternative vote system, and we believe that a referendum should be held if ever there is a European constitution or if any Government favoured Britain’s joining the single currency. I remind the Committee that Baroness Thatcher declined to hold a referendum on the Single European Act, and that the Foreign Secretary voted against a referendum on the Maastricht treaty when he was in opposition.
European Union Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 41, page 11, line 25, at end insert—
‘(1) The sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament in relation to EU law is hereby reaffirmed.’.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 10, page 11, line 30, at end insert ‘and not by virtue of a common law principle.’.
Amendment 52, page 11, line 30, at end add—
‘(2) The Secretary of State shall prepare an annual report on the extent to which in the previous 12 months the provisions of subsection (1) have been challenged or questioned in the courts, including the European Court of Justice, identifying any challenge to the declaration contained in that subsection that the status of EU law is dependent on the continuing statutory basis provided by the European Communities Act 1972.
(3) The report made under subsection (2) shall be laid before Parliament for its approval.’.
Clause 18 stand part.
New clause 1—Parliamentary sovereignty—
‘Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 shall not extend to the construction or interpretation by the courts of the United Kingdom as to the nature or legal effect of parliamentary sovereignty and section 3 shall be amended accordingly.’.
New clause 4—Saving for existing law—
‘Nothing in Part 3 adversely affects or shall be construed as affecting the existing constitutional law of the sovereignty of Parliament in relation to EU law.’.
Mr Cash
The group relates specifically to clause 18, and I shall explain a little of the amendments’ purpose.
Amendment 41 would insert at the beginning of the clause, which covers the status of EU law, the simple words:
“The sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament is hereby reaffirmed.”
Amendment 10 would add to the end of the clause the simple phrase,
“and not by virtue of a common law principle”.
The effect of that would be to prevent the courts from applying a common law principle, which has become entrenched in certain thinking in influential academic and legal circles, and in the Supreme Court. The explanatory notes suggest that it has also become entrenched in the Government’s thinking.
I understand that the explanatory notes may be in the course of being corrected, as the European Scrutiny Committee and one of its main witnesses suggested. However, precisely what effect that will have remains to be seen. Perhaps we can debate that this afternoon. After all, the explanatory notes may have been prepared to aid interpretation of the statute—statute law is open to interpretation by the courts—but will the removal of the relevant words necessarily have the effect of preventing those most distinguished and eminent Supreme Court judges from departing from principles and doctrines to which they have apparently become wedded?
The two new clauses are directly relevant to clause 18 to ensure parliamentary sovereignty in view of the continuing trend towards judicial interpretation along the lines that I have already expressed. It is a matter of grave concern to many of us—far more than may turn up in the Lobbies today—that the courts, on a range of matters, have accumulated greater and greater influence, and, indeed, action, in relation to their judgments on Acts of Parliament. I refer not merely to interpretation or construction of the words but the underlying judicial activism, sometimes of a quasi-political nature. That has caused a great deal of concern, which has arisen particularly in the case of the Human Rights Act 1998. Although we are not discussing that today, there is an analogy because the charter of fundamental rights, which mirrors the Human Rights Act, is part and parcel of the arrangements under the Lisbon treaty. In that area of law, if there were any inconsistency between legislation—many centuries old and based on well established democratic principles—passed in this Westminster Parliament, would the judiciary presume to make judgments about the nature or legal effects of parliamentary sovereignty?
Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)
How does the hon. Gentleman reconcile his call for sovereignty of the House with the fact that, on 1 January, we saw established the European Securities and Markets Authority in Paris, the European Banking Authority in London, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority in Frankfurt and the European Systemic Risk Board, all of which trump national organisations such as the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England? Is this not an unreal debate? This is happening now and is constraining our action, and none of these amendments will make any difference to the fact of those constraints.
The Chairman
Order. It would help if the hon. Gentleman could try to shorten his interventions.
The Temporary Chair (Mr Roger Gale)
Order. I hold to the strong belief that if I wait long enough we shall return to clause 18.
Mr Jones
My mind has been set off with thoughts of my right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) doing various things with dead parrots, but I shall try to resist any temptation to go down that route.
The European Scrutiny Committee was clear about clause 18:
“Clause 18 is not a sovereignty clause in the manner claimed by the Government, and the whole premise on which it has been included in the Bill is, in our view, exaggerated. We are gravely concerned that for political reasons it has been portrayed by the Government as a sovereignty clause in correspondence and also in the Explanatory Notes”.
I would be concerned if, because of what has been said tonight, the explanatory notes are amended during the Bill’s passage, because that might mean we do not have proper explanatory notes, and it might have an impact on our being able to scrutinise the Bill thoroughly.
The Committee also states that the Foreign Secretary was so confident of this clause that he would not appear before the Committee. I think that is wrong. To ensure that the Executive are properly scrutinised, Cabinet Ministers should appear before any Select Committee or inquiry that invites them to do so, and I cannot understand why he chose not to do so on this occasion.
European Union Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 7 months ago)
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Mr MacShane
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The hon. Lady is still very young.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
I think we can rule that point of order out of order.
Laura Sandys
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his very kind words.
The Lisbon treaty was a real break in trust. Big constitutional changes need to go to the public. I used to be chairman of openDemocracy. I believe that we should trust the people and that we need to ensure that the people are part of the big, fundamental decisions. I disagree with many Opposition Members—
Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)
As far as the term “business as usual” is concerned, I must ruefully reflect that it is business as usual in this House, as we are again discussing this interminable topic. It has occupied many thousands of hours of discussion since I was elected in 1992, and many thousands more before that. It is perhaps amusing and depressing to see how little some things change while the pace of European integration seems uninterrupted by whatever votes take place, whatever arguments occur and whatever crises erupt. The present crisis over the governance of the euro is a case in point. The architects of the Maastricht treaty, far from accepting that they have been proved wrong by events, are seizing on the chaos to strengthen the hold of the centre over the rest of Europe, accelerating the pace of integration as a result.
I am bound to ask, as should we all, whether the scene that we observe in the Chamber today was really what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary envisaged when he came up with the brilliant idea of a referendum lock at the Conservative conference in 2009. At that time, I think what he saw looming was the imminence of the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, and the difficulty of holding a referendum on a treaty that had already been ratified. He was looking for something to throw to the crowd, and his idea got a wonderful round of applause at the conference. Little can he have imagined, however, that that simple promise would give rise to a Bill of such byzantine complexity. It has not been universally welcomed in the Chamber, although, knowing the way in which this place works, I suspect that it will find its way into Committee. No one, with the exception of a few aficionados, can have imagined what a mess the future Government were getting themselves into by making such an apparently simple pledge. As recently as 1 November, the Prime Minister told the House:
“I would grant a referendum if there were any proposed transfer of powers from Westminster to Brussels.”—[Official Report, 1 November 2010; Vol. 517, c. 625.]
My hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) made an illuminating speech, pointing out that certain transfers of power are not included in the Bill. The reason why they are not included is either that the Government have already made those transfers and do not want to admit that they should have been made more accountable to this House, or that they intend to make further transfers and do not want to get caught up in the potential for litigation. I would be grateful if my hon. Friend the Minister for Europe made it clear in his summing-up speech when he expects the provisions to come into force. My understanding is that whatever is in this Bill is not intended to apply to this Parliament, but to the next one. I see the Minister nodding. It would be a bit embarrassing to legislate for the next Parliament and create a trap for a future Government that the current Government would not accept for their own behaviour. I guess that that is why these lacunas exist.
The crunch is that it all depends on what is meant by power. A child can have power over its parent, even though it does not have any sovereign or legislative authority. Power has a fluid quality to it: it cannot be held; it travels to people with influence. Power is clearly leeching away from our kingdom and this House, even though I believe that this House remains absolutely sovereign. The fact of power, where it is exercised, and the constraints that it makes people feel when it is exercised, is clearly having an effect.
Two simple tests can be applied to the Bill. The Foreign Secretary himself says that the Lisbon settlement lacks democratic legitimacy, so we should ask ourselves whether this Bill adds to the democratic legitimacy of the settlement between the United Kingdom and the European Union. The answer is that it does not affect it. It affects what might happen in future—we can argue about that, and some argue that it might have a greater effect than expected and that the courts might have to decide how much effect it will have—but it does not constitute a lock, as my hon. Friend the Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell) pointed out, because no Parliament can bind its successor. Whatever is in the Bill can be amended or repealed by a future Parliament. It is not really a lock, but it does not affect anything that has gone before.
The sovereignty clause provides another case in point. In fact, despite the Government’s repeated reference to it as such, it is not a sovereignty cause. It does not contain the word “sovereignty” or “sovereign” and it does not use the words “supremacy” or “primacy”. It merely provides an historical account of what happened—that there was an Act of Parliament, which is how the European Union’s laws apply in this kingdom. It has no effect whatever.
Let me cite the evidence given to the European Scrutiny Committee. Professor Adam Tomkins gave advice that was accepted by the all-party Select Committee. He said:
“Neither clause 18 nor any other provision in the Bill safeguards the United Kingdom from the further development of EU law by the ECJ.”
Now the ECJ, that really is power! How is this House going to regulate the power of the European Court to expand competence and reinterpret the competences of the European Union as it has done down the ages? Well, of course, it cannot. I was touched by the faith in the Bill expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Charnwood (Mr Dorrell), but as Professor Tomkins also said on the limitations of clause 18:
“If this is the attempt by the UK Parliament to reassert or reclaim some kind of sovereignty in the face of the European competence creep, it ‘don’t do what it says on the tin.’”
I am afraid that the Minister has to face that.
In my last minute or two, let me move on to the second test of the Bill. Is it really in the national interest; does it address the national interest? I would regard the Bill as almost wholly irrelevant to the national interest. The hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) pointed out that we should be talking about the rise of China and how we are going to do business with India. We really are contemplating our navels as we discuss this Bill. As the recent Public Administration Committee report says, what we need is a reassessment of our national interest with regard to our membership of the European Union. I do not advocate an “in or out” referendum, but I think that we need to start reassessing whether our current terms of membership are in our national interest and then to start working out how we should alter them to reflect our national interest.
The problem with this Bill is that it neither addresses the democratic legitimacy—or the lack of it—in the current settlement, nor stops the flow of power to the European Union. As we are talking about democratic legitimacy, I should say that that flow takes power away from democracies and gives it to something else, because whatever the European Union is, it ain’t a democracy. The Bill fails to address our national interests and it reflects the muddle that the Government have got themselves into because, as we have heard, the prime purpose of this Bill is political; it was designed to appease sentiment in the absence of a referendum on all the treaties where we should have had referendums: the Maastricht, Nice and Amsterdam treaties, as well as the Lisbon treaty. The Bill will fail to reassure people and will fail to address the increasing disconnect that people feel, not from the European Union, but from the governance of their own country by their own democratically elected representatives. Dealing with that is the real challenge that we face, because that is about despair about us in this place.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Before I call the next speaker, may I say that I am trying to get 11 Members in and I presume that the Front-Bench spokespeople will want 15 minutes each? We can work the sums out for ourselves, but I ask for a little haste and for hon. Members not to take as much time.