(7 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI commend the hon. Member for Caerphilly for his Bill. It has been long in the coming, but it deals with a very important problem, and it is brilliant that he has actually brought it to the House. If I may say so, he has managed it in a formidably diplomatic way, given the sometimes quite difficult arguments that have gone on. My unreserved congratulations go to him.
The hon. Gentleman has done a brilliant job of outlining the point of the Bill, so I will not reiterate that, save to say that it is a difficult and technical Bill. We are balancing rights—the right to sue for defamation versus the right not to be oppressed and to enjoy free speech—and that is not easy to do. It is a subtle problem. Quite properly, the legal profession, the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice want to maintain that balance. They are very sensitive about that, but we should also remember that the right to sue for defamation is pretty much a rich man’s right. Very few of my constituents will exercise it, and very few people in this room will exercise it—perhaps one or two are rich enough. Nevertheless, it is important that it is maintained; I accept that without reserve.
It is understandable that the Ministry of Justice, in its advice on the Bill, seeks to compromise. I generally agree with compromise, but not with compromise between right and wrong. It has to be said that the Ministry will be being lobbied—with how much effect I cannot say—by the Society of Media Lawyers, including such leading lights as Carter-Ruck, Mishcon de Reya and Schillings, the very people who have created the problem that we are now trying to resolve. People have created a multimillion-pound industry out of oppressing the right to freedom of speech and making London the global capital of that. I could pick a ruder word for it, but I will just say that it is the global capital of SLAPPs.
I have one proposal to put to a vote, but first I want to talk a little about the vagaries of the Bill. Throughout all our discussions, the common theme has been, “How will the judge interpret this phrase, or this clause, in the context of what we are trying to do?” We are trying to protect freedom of speech and, at the same time, people’s right to look after their own reputation in court.
New clause 1 aims to give judges guidance on interpretation and tell them what the high priority of the Bill is. I will read out the clause in full:
“(1) The purpose of this Act is to protect and promote the ability of individuals and organisations to participate in public debate, advance accountability, and speak out on matters of public interest, and to prevent the use of the courts to undermine these rights through abusive legal action.
(2) Provisions in this Act should be broadly construed and applied to advance the purpose defined in subsection (1).”
I ask the Committee to see that as effectively an instruction to the judges as to how broadly they should interpret the Bill when it becomes an Act. I will press no amendments other than new clause 1 to a vote, because there is consensus on almost everything.
It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Ms Elliott. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly not only on securing this opportunity, but on working—as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden said—with formidable diplomacy to steer us to the Bill we have today.
The Bill is unusual in having commanded a great deal of cross-party consensus, ever since the first debate that the right hon. Member and I had the privilege of sponsoring in the House two or three years ago. It is not common to move this quickly from a Backbench Business debate to legislation. That is to be commended; indeed, it is why the Back Benches in this place should be strengthened further and given far more opportunities to legislate.
The Bill builds on an amendment that I had the privilege to move to the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. It is outrageous that our courts are being used as arenas of silence to shut down free speech. We have become a place where oligarchs from around the world choose to come, in order to silence truth tellers and journalists who are providing an incredibly important public service.
The Bill is an important step forward, but it is only a step. As the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden says, it cannot be the full solution. In particular, it will not address the plague of pre-litigation action. The number of journalists working in and around this place who tell us of legal letters being sent when they get a whiff of a story to close it down shows that this is a really significant problem. Once the Bill passes, we will need to understand what more can be done to stop the chilling effect of pre-litigation action.
New clause 1 provides us with an important debate. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden is right to say that part of the delicacy of the Bill relates to making sure that judges have full sight of Parliament’s intention. The debates we have in this place will be unusually important in interpreting and applying the Bill in the courts, so he is absolutely right to say that subsection (1) sets out the basic purpose of the Bill: to maximise the latitude for free speech, truth telling, investigations and good journalism, for which this country is rightly famous. If that comes at the cost of the Ministry of Justice opposing the Bill and killing it today, it will be an unfortunate consequence.
I hope that the Committee can unite around a solution that the Government can support, so that the Bill becomes law. This debate is important, and I hope it will run on here and in the other place to ensure we have a balancing test that secures the objectives of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, without incurring a ministerial roadblock in the shape of the Ministry of Justice.
There were two possible approaches to this Bill. One was what we have before us, which is quite complex but seeks to address issues piece by piece; the other was what is known as the Ontario option, which effectively puts in place a parallel to the American first amendment. One of the reasons why new clause 1 is important is that it straddles those approaches. It does not take us down the first amendment and constitutional route, but it does make it clear what we are trying to do.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. A debate on the effects of a British version of the first amendment would be very welcome.
When the Minister replies, he could helpfully inform the Committee about a couple of things. First, it would be useful if he took the opportunity to tell us more about how pre-litigation chilling action is to be policed. Schillings, Mishcon de Reya and all the others are perfectly capable of moving their investment to the pre-litigation phase. They will do their damnedest to find their way around the provisions of this Bill, because frankly they are being paid too much not to do so. I would like to hear from the Minister about that.
Secondly, I would like to hear from the Minister—his words will be important, because they will be read by judges when they interpret the Bill—on whether he will put on the record today, in this Committee, some security around delivering the right hon. Gentleman’s objectives. The Bill aims to maximise the latitude for free speech in this country, an important objective that the Minister needs to share with us.
I have further comments to make, but they are probably best dealt with in our debate on clause 2. There are some important issues around the thresholds at which this Bill kicks in and the permissive environment that might be created for bad behaviour that may fall just short of the prohibitions in the Bill, but may none the less be fatal to the humble journalists and news outlets who do such valuable work.
Before I bring in the shadow Minister, I remind colleagues that electronic devices should be absolutely silent. Somebody’s phone keeps pinging; I do not know whose it is, but could you all check your phones so that it does not happen again?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott.
I will not detain the Committee long. I wish to state my support for the hon. Member for Caerphilly in introducing the Bill, and for the approach that he has taken in steering it forward. However, I will try to address all the concerns raised by various parties—not least the constructive and weighty contributions from right hon. and hon. Members.
As we have heard, SLAPPs are the purview of corrupt individuals seeking to stifle free speech and a free press by abusing our courts and our laws, and to undermine our democracy. No matter who brings the case, SLAPPs must always be recognised as an affront to our renowned courts and legal system, and they should be tackled swiftly.
The Ministry of Justice has been keen to ensure swift passage of the Bill, and I pay tribute to the officials who have provided support to the hon. Member for Caerphilly and other Members in trying to fine-tune it. I gently say to the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill that the Department has certainly not been a roadblock—quite the reverse. We have been doing our best to ensure a swift and smooth passage.
Strategic litigation against public participation is a bullying display of power designed to silence investigations and reporting in the public interest. SLAPPs cause harm not only by stifling public comment but by forcing its removal or editing, leaving a sanitised version of events that may far underplay the true severity of the information covered. They discourage journalists, academics and campaigners from investigating issues in the first place, using intimidation to ensure that matters of public interest remain hidden, and leave the British public in the dark. The effect of SLAPPs is pernicious, and we cannot allow our media to be helpless to act to expose the actions of some people and organisations due to aggressive legal tactics and unlimited resources.
I hope the Minister did not mishear me: I was hoping to ensure that the Ministry of Justice does not become a roadblock in the future. I am very grateful for the work that he has done so far. Will he use this moment to put on the record whether he agrees with subsection (1) of new clause 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden? It provides that the Bill’s purpose should be interpreted as being
“to protect and promote the ability of individuals and organisations to participate in public debate, advance accountability, and speak out on matters of public interest, and to prevent the use of the courts to undermine these rights through abusive legal action”.
Is that basically the intent of the Bill?
Let me take this opportunity to address two points that the right hon. Gentleman has raised. First, on pre-litigation issues, I will have to write to him to ensure that I get correct the rights that the Lord Chancellor, the Department or the courts will have before a matter gets to court. I will make sure that I get the details so that I do not misinform him.
We cannot support new clause 1, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden. As I have said to him, I am more than happy, between now and Report, to sit down and try to flesh out where we can find more agreement, but at this stage we cannot support the new clause. While we support the whole thrust of what he is trying to achieve, we feel that the Bill has actually—
I can give the undertaking that I will work with my right hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill to try to ensure that the Bill meets those objectives. We believe that the Bill creates a balance of rights and responsibilities that ensures that we protect free speech while balancing the rights of both claimants and defendants, so that the bad behaviour that has been documented is addressed. Also, the examples of bad behaviour in the Bill and the explanatory notes are not exhaustive.
I am very grateful for that constructive reply, but I want the Minister to underline and crystallise the point for the Committee: he is saying that the Government support the thrust of the right hon. Gentleman’s new clause.
I repeat my offer to my right hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill: I am happy to discuss how we ensure that we come to an agreement that the Bill delivers what they want to achieve. However, we believe that new clause 1 is not necessary. Of course, if they believe that the Bill still needs it, my right hon. Friend has the right to move it during the remaining stages.
The offer is there: let us try to work together to see whether we can bridge the gap and persuade each other that we are right. At this point, the Department’s view is that the Bill creates a balance of rights and responsibilities while addressing the bad behaviour and listing, but not exhaustively listing, what bad behaviour will be curtailed.
I am grateful to the Minister for his characteristic generosity. He has just told the Committee that he does not think that new clause 1 is needed and that the intention of the Bill as a whole is to support the objectives of the new clause. The new clause is very carefully drafted. It states:
“The purpose of this Act is to protect and promote the ability of individuals and organisations to participate in public debate, advance accountability, and speak out on matters of public interest”.
It therefore falls short of an American first amendment-style provision and, in that sense, has been quite carefully sculpted. I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he does not think it is needed because that is the thrust of the Bill overall, and it is important that that is on the record. I am happy to work with the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden and others to ensure that we have got that beyond doubt.
I have just two points to make on this excellent group. First, I wholeheartedly support the amendments to clause 2 that my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly proposes. The Opposition amendments to the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 were very much a tactical strike on the statute book: here was a Bill that gave us the chance to ensure that we had road-tested similar provisions. Given the narrow scope of that Bill, it was possible to sketch only amendments that tackled economic crime at their core, so I am glad that this Bill gives us the opportunity to go well beyond that and take the holistic approach that my hon. Friend set out in his excellent opening speech.
My second point, which perhaps the Minister or my hon. Friend will address, relates to the concerns that have been well set out by the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition. It gives me the chance to congratulate the coalition on its extraordinary and steadfast work; I am not sure that we would have arrived at quite the same speed without it. The coalition usefully highlights concerns about clause 2(1)(c), the drafting of which appears to suggest that there is a threshold for the “harassment, alarm or distress”—harm, if you like—that can be permitted. That is not something that we would want to support in this place. I realise that it is difficult to get the balance right, but my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse has spoken eloquently about the risks of creating a space in which there is a level of distress and harm that is permitted. It would be useful for both Front Benchers to crystallise how that issue will be tackled by the amendments in this group.
As we have heard, consensus has broken out. It is all very pleasant, unlike some issues that I have debated with the Minister in the past. I welcome amendments 1, 3, 4, 8 and 9, which will reorder the themes so that public interest is referred to before freedom of speech. My hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly has more than adequately outlined the necessity of the clauses, and I support his efforts to improve the Bill’s application.
I am also pleased to see amendments 2 and 5, which will ensure a more objective approach to the identification of intent. As we have heard, requiring the courts to engage in a subjective inquiry into the mind of a claimant or defendant would create uncertainty and might be practically and evidentially difficult to assess. These requirements could create satellite litigation and uncertainty at an early stage and might have the unwanted effect of introducing further delay and driving up costs.
The definition in the Bill should, at a minimum, include an objective element so that it relates to claims concerning disclosures that are or would be made on matters of genuine public interest. That would make the text similar to section 4(1)(a) of the Defamation Act 2013. I know that the amendments have the backing of the Law Society and the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition. The News Media Association, a member of the coalition, says that the amendment is required to allow a judge to define a case as a SLAPP based on a reasonable interpretation of a claimant’s actions, rather than a complex inquiry into a claimant’s state of mind. It agrees that the latter would result in complex, time-consuming and costly legal wrangling that would defeat the object of a Bill intended to dismiss egregious SLAPP cases swiftly.
Amendments 6 and 7 restate sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) of clause 2 for the purpose of clarifying the condition in subsection (1)(c). They have our support.
Clause 2(3) attempts to set out a definition of “public interest” to help with identifying SLAPP cases. That includes matters such as illegality, false statements, public health and safety, the climate or the environment, or investigations by a public body. Concerns have been raised to me that the original drafting lacks clarity and risks creating problems for implementation; it also proves contradictory in relation to the Defamation Act 2013. I therefore support my hon. Friend’s amendment 10, which will go some way towards addressing those issues by making it clear that the list set out in the clause is not exhaustive, and that other matters not specified in the Bill can be considered by the court to be of public interest.
It would not be appropriate to privilege certain types of public interest speech and create an unnecessary and problematic hierarchy. Without amendment 10, the examples in the definition of “public interest” in clause 2(3) would cut across principles in the Defamation Act and in data protection law, making it harder for defendants to use the full scope of defences available at trial. That is because it would naturally be difficult for a court to decide that an article was not in the public interest under the Bill’s narrow definition but then take a different course at trial. We are happy to support amendment 10.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My right hon. Friend encourages me to reflect on our sport strategy, which is coming through. Broadly speaking, there is also the key point about how education changes lives. By changing lives and helping people to get employment when they leave prison, education reduces reoffending and protects the public. Stabilising our prisons and delivering high-quality education in prisons is good not just for prisoners but for the rest of society.
A month ago my constituent was beaten within an inch of his life at HMP Birmingham not once but twice, and not in a dark corner but in the full glare of a video that was then posted on social media. The chaos over which G4S presided at HMP Birmingham was dark, dangerous and violent. It is very hard to square a future in which this prison is returned to G4S with the level of investment and staffing that is needed to ensure it is a safe prison. Will the Minister reflect again on what the shadow Secretary of State said about the need for an independent commission to stand as a gateway, a test, before any decision is made to put this prison back into the private sector that so desperately failed the people of Birmingham?
That is a very shocking, very immediate illustration of just how horrifying what was happening at Birmingham was. The right hon. Gentleman is right that, when something like that happens, not only should we take back control from G4S but we should think very seriously before returning the prison to it. That is why, for exactly the reasons he raises, we are giving the House the assurance that we will be taking over for a minimum of six months—that is a minimum of six months —and we will be very tough and clear in the decisions we reach at the end of those six months on whether we believe the prison is stable enough to be handed back to G4S.
(7 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to take part in the debate, and it is a particular pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stafford (Jeremy Lefroy). He gave a thoughtful and considered speech, the tone and content of which were extremely consensual and helpful. If I may say so, it would be nice if more Conservative Members gave similar speeches.
I accept the referendum result, and I am happy to vote for the amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition tonight because it accepts the result as well. A majority of my constituents voted for Brexit, but more people have contacted me to raise concerns about the Bill—in particular, about the timetable and the potential impact on environmental legislation—than to tell me that they are happy with it.
At the beginning of the year, the Procedure Committee embarked on an inquiry into what was then known as the great repeal Bill. The inquiry was halted by the general election, but in April we published evidence and interim findings, and I want to share some of them with colleagues tonight. The potential in the Bill for the excessive use of delegated legislation is alarming. The Bill is not what people were promised during the referendum campaign, which was greater parliamentary sovereignty. It is a power grab by Tory Ministers, who cannot be trusted, as they have repeatedly shown.
Relying on delegated legislation will not give Parliament proper opportunities for debate, scrutiny or control. Let me remind hon. Members of some of the processes. A statutory instrument introduced under the negative resolution process can become law without debate or a vote. It can even become law before it has been published and laid before the House. The Secretary of State for Justice is frowning, but that is the case. Paragraph 1(3) of schedule 7 sets out that most of the statutory instruments will be subject to negative resolution procedure unless—Ministers are nodding now—they are about transferring powers from European agencies. Last year, a fifth of statutory instruments were in force three weeks after publication. If Ministers were given such a power, there would be nothing to stop them signing laws one day and seeing those laws on the statute book the same day.
Scrutiny by the affirmative and super-affirmative processes is not much better. Such statutory instruments must be approved explicitly, but most go to Committees upstairs, and now the Government are trying to overturn the result of the general election by packing those Committees. Even when such statutory instruments are debated by the whole House, time is limited to 90 minutes, and they cannot be amended.
The drafting of clause 7 is wholly objectionable. It is too wide. Ministers may make regulations as they consider appropriate—not necessary, but appropriate—and regulations may repeal and replace primary legislation. That indicates that it is not the Government’s intention to limit such regulations to technical and non-controversial matters.
My hon. Friend is making a brilliant speech, but is the challenge of the Bill not this: we used to talk in this country about an elected dictatorship, but what is now being proposed is a barely elected dictatorship? Has she ever seen a bigger gap between a Government’s mandate and the power that they seek?
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThat is a point that the hon. Lady has made. I will come to it in a second, but I think there is an issue here that needs examination. The decision about whether to provide legal aid funding in an individual case should not be a political one. It is solely for the director of legal aid casework at the Legal Aid Agency to decide whether a particular case is within the regulations and the laws, which we in Parliament have set.
On the overall position mentioned by the hon. Lady, I want to make it clear that we acknowledge there is a wider issue. It turns on the perception that, as she mentioned, families in very difficult circumstances with complicated cases have gone unrepresented while public bodies and individuals are represented at a cost to the public. The Ministry of Justice and the Home Office are rightly working collaboratively to consider that issue.
As the hon. Lady said, the families at the 7/7 inquest received legal aid exceptional case funding, which was under an earlier scheme. The issue related to the terms and conditions for receiving legal aid. In fact, it is obvious from what has happened in recent days that it is possible to receive legal aid under the current scheme.
Questions have been asked about other possible funding arrangements, and the arrangement used for the Hillsborough families—the Home Office made direct grants for representation at the hearing of inquest—does raise a question. The Hillsborough inquiry was expertly conducted by Lord Justice Goldring, who investigated the case in a very sensitive, effective and thorough way, but there are lessons to be learned about the tragic history of Hillsborough. As the hon. Lady may know, Bishop James Jones, who played a distinguished part in tackling the Hillsborough case, is preparing a report on how it was dealt with, and we want that report to inform how we take this work forward.
The Minister is addressing the points raised well. If, as he says, he is looking at the lessons to be learned, will he tell the House tonight that he agrees with us that there should be parity of funding for the legal costs in this inquest? Does he agree with the parity principle—yes or no?
What is important is that there should be an element of equality of arms in the sense that the work that needs to be done for the families should be done effectively and in accordance with the funding arrangements put in place by the Legal Aid Agency. Let us be clear that for cases that involve an inquest for which exceptional case funding has been agreed, I have never heard the scheme described as not providing enough funding for particular items of work for lawyers. The point is that there are rules about how people can enter the scheme and, as appears from the decision that has been mentioned, such a case has led to funding.
I want to make the point that the coroner for the Birmingham inquest will be His Honour Judge Peter Thornton, the previous Chief Coroner, and I am sure that he will have the confidence of the families. I am grateful to hon. Members who have spoken in this debate, and I think we will all want to pay tribute to the way in which the families have campaigned.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am very sorry to have to rise in my place tonight to bring this debate to the Floor of the House of Commons. For nearly three years I have worked to avoid this debate, and I come here tonight because I have been left with no other choice.
Let me say at the outset that there is no more determined campaigner for the police of my city than me. For 10 years as a Member of this House I have campaigned for bigger, stronger police teams. I have run half-marathons and triathlons to raise money for the West Midlands Police Benevolent Fund, and it has been my privilege on the Floor of the House to praise the bravery of officers such as PC Adam Koch and his colleague who literally risked their lives to save worshippers recently at a Ward End mosque. I am motivated tonight by their courage, because I believe our police are so important to our communities that they deserve to have the best team around them, but I am motivated too by an injustice that I want to bring to the attention of the Government.
Because the police service is a human and not a divine organisation, sometimes there are shortcomings, but if we want the best police service, it is important that we do not stand by when there are shortcomings; it is important that we act. For three years now I have been seeking to help a constituent of mine to act. My constituent’s case is sub judice, but I can give the House the essence. My constituent’s son, a boy she loved, died in police custody—a tragedy the pain of which I, as a father of three children, cannot possibly imagine—but this tragedy is deeper and darker for the alleged culpability of police officers who were paid by us on that night to keep my constituent’s son safe.
I am very glad my right hon. Friend has brought before the House this issue of people who die in custody. I have informed the Minister of the case of my constituent Philmore Mills. His case is very unusual. He was in hospital in a lung ward, and on 11 December 2011 the staff were made anxious by his behaviour. They called the police and the police restrained him, and he died under police restraint. The inquest into that death is due on 1 April—two and a half years later—yet his family still do not know if they are going to have legal aid for representation at that inquest and they are thus made more anxious still. Their dad was in hospital with a breathing problem, yet he died at the hands of the police. They should be legally represented without having to pay.
Order. May I remind Members that they should be very careful about reference to live cases because of the sub judice rule?
Thank you, Mr Speaker; I am also grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) for her intervention.
In the months that followed the death of my constituent’s son, the family and I sought, together with the Independent Police Complaints Commission, to ensure that the police officers involved were judged. I am sorry to say that they were judged to have been so negligent, and to have fallen so far short of their sworn duty, that they were found guilty of gross misconduct.
Now, the family are approaching the last trial of their strength: the inquest. It will be their final opportunity to find the truth of why and how their son died. Yes, it might bring grief, but I hope that it will also bring closure. The inquest is also important for our community, because it could provide critical insights that would help us to ensure that others need never suffer the same fate.
Despite my representations and the arguments that we have put forward, the family have been told that they must pay to have questions put on their behalf during the proceedings. Like me, they are outraged. The original bill was going to be nearly £7,500. It is true that their costs have now been reduced, but our system has become perverse. The fact that the family are having to provide a smaller cut of their savings cannot be judged a great success.
I thought that my right hon. Friend would like to know that the Home Affairs Select Committee will be opening an inquiry into the issues of deaths in police custody, and policing and mental health, later this year. It will also look into legal aid provision for the families involved.
That is very welcome, and I hope that my right hon. Friend and his Committee will be able to draw the right conclusions and, perhaps, use some of the evidence from the case that I am raising here tonight.
My point is very simple: when a family have lost their son while he was in the custody of the state, and when servants of the Crown have been judged guilty of gross misconduct, it is a gross injustice to tell that family that they must now help to pay their costs at the inquest into how their son lost his life.
I know the objections to my arguments. There are few in the House who know the pressures on the legal aid budget as well as I do. As Chief Secretary to the Treasury, I too had to negotiate reductions to that fund. However, if we cannot fund an inquest into a death of which the state appears to be culpable, we have got it wrong. Our article 2 obligations demand a thorough investigation of state action and culpability in cases such as these. Like me, the Minister knows that, following the case of Main in 2007, a wider public interest test must be satisfied if legal aid is to be awarded. A death in state custody, especially when Crown servants have been found negligent, must surely satisfy that test. We in this House agreed to that principle when we passed the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Section 51 of that Act extended the principle of public funding for advocacy at inquests such as these.
As a parliamentarian, I want to know what happened on that night. That is the wider public interest test that is being satisfied here. I want to know whether we need changes to the law, or to the organisation of the police service. I want to know that, so that I can help to bring those changes forward. I do not want this House, this Government, or this Minister to be kept in the dark. I do not want the comfort of ignorance. I want to know why my constituent’s son died, and I want to know what we must do together in this House to ensure that none of our constituents ever has to face the same fate.
I have had a similar case in my constituency. The inquest has now taken place, Mr Speaker. James was in his 20s, and he was mentally ill. He was restrained and, unfortunately, died in police custody. When the police force in question has access to unlimited legal advice and expertise at no quantifiable cost, is it not an outrage that the parents, who are so vulnerable at a time like that, should be asked to seek advice from a local solicitor who is not an expert in mental health or deaths in custody?
Let me deal with a point directly. The family did not choose to be in this position; the Coroners Act 1988 demands an inquest. We in this House are the people who insist on the position my constituents are now in, and we do so for a very good reason: we want to know what happened. Our predecessors in this Parliament felt so strongly about the unchecked actions of an arbitrary state that they deposed the monarch and fought a war to insist on the liberty of the individual and a measure of their protection—we want to know what happened.
There were 5,998 deaths in police custody in the 11 years from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2010. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there must be a method for families to access support in suspicious cases and that legal aid is an important part of that support for grieving families?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Some will say, “We should not get too worked up about this. The inquest process is inquisitorial not adversarial. It is just a gentle canter around the facts.” But when we are dealing with death in custody, it is different. How can we tell? It is because the public servants represented at the inquests will not just have one lawyer; they will have teams of lawyers, paid for by the taxpayer, on their side. We have to ask ourselves: how can we allow such a profound inequality of arms in the inquest room? How can we pretend to ourselves that that is even remotely equal, fair or right? There is now growing evidence, not just in my home city of Birmingham, but across the country, that wrongful legal aid decisions are being made in cases such as this. Many in this House will have seen the tragic case confronting Alex Kelly’s family, which was highlighted in The Observer on Sunday, and INQUEST, an organisation I wish to praise to high heaven, has brought to me a number of other cases where bad decisions are being made in our name.
In the short time remaining to me, I want to put five questions to the Minister. I appreciate that he will not be able to answer all of them tonight, so I hope that he will follow up in writing and that the House will be able to return to this subject, perhaps in the light of the report by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) later in the year. First, will the Minister meet me to discuss the legal aid decision in my constituent’s case? The case clearly meets the threshold of having “wider public interest'” set out in section 2.4 of the Legal Services Commission’s funding code criteria, which refers to the “potential” of the proceedings
“to produce real benefits for individuals other than the client”.
Secondly, when will the Lord Chancellor bring into effect section 51 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which will extend advocacy support to those who died in custody? No stand part debate was held on that measure and, to the best of my knowledge, the Minister was not in the House to vote on the Bill on Third Reading. I do not believe the Conservative party or the Liberal Democrats opposed this legislation when it was brought to the House, so will the Government give us a date for bringing in section 51 as soon as possible?
Thirdly, will the Minister confirm that it is ministerial policy, and not simply administrative discretion, to seek a contribution from the family in inquests where a death in state custody has occurred? Fourthly, will the Minister tonight agree to a review of the way families are offered support and funding for inquest costs, not least because there is now evidence that the process is out of control, with the most invasive questions being asked of families in order for them to prove they do not have the resources to help contest these cases? Finally, will the Minister tell us how many families have been asked to make a contribution since 2010? What is the total bill that families in this country are now paying for cases such as this?
When I asked my constituent what she wanted from tonight’s debate, her answer was as generous as she is compassionate. “Hopefully,” she said, “we can change this for other people so that they will not have to suffer what we have suffered.” When all is said and done, the question at the heart of this debate is simple. It is the story of a mother’s loss, a mother’s love and a mother’s search for justice. Will we, in this House, stand on a mother’s side, or will we stand against her? When we begin work in this House each day, we pray for strength and wisdom to make the right decisions. I hope that we can now call on that strength and wisdom and make the right decisions in the case of my constituent and her lost son.
The hon. Lady seeks to tempt me into territory into which I cannot go. What I will say is that as far as her constituent’s case is concerned, the process is still ongoing. As I understand it, a decision on legal aid has not been made, and dialogue is still going on. I trust she will accept that.
Although I cannot comment on the decision concerning Mr Butler’s family, I understand from the Legal Aid Agency that there was an issue concerning financial eligibility and whether it was appropriate for the family to pay a contribution, which is something that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned. I hope I can assist the House by explaining how the means test is applied to inquest cases. Legal aid for the representation of bereaved families at inquests is means-tested, like nearly every other element of the civil legal aid scheme. It is important that we focus our limited resources on those who need them the most, and the means test is an important and long-standing part of the legal aid system which has been in place since well before this Government came to power.
There is discretion to waive the financial eligibility limits for inquests if, in all the circumstances, it would not be reasonable to expect the family to bear the full costs of legal assistance at the inquest. Whether that is reasonable will depend in particular on the history of the case, the circumstances, the issues raised against state institutions, the applicant’s assessed disposable income and capital, the other financial resources of the family and the estimated costs of providing representation. Contributions from the applicant can also be waived in whole or part.
That is the position under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, but it was also the position under the Access to Justice Act 1999, the legislation that applied to Mr Butler’s case.
The Minister is replying in a courteous and thoughtful manner. He has given us a number of helpful words about the broad principles of the means-testing regime, but I hope he will not elide over the point that when we passed the 2009 Act we decided to include section 51, which accepted that there were wider public interests at play in inquests that delved into deaths in state custody and explicitly provided for full legal aid costs to be provided to families in such cases. The Lord Chancellor has not implemented section 51. The arguments about it have already been rehearsed and the House has passed it. When will it be implemented?
Well, the previous Government made provision for it but they did not implement it. I do not know when it will be implemented, but I am happy to reflect on that matter and write to the right hon. Gentleman. Let me put on the record that the criteria under the Access to Justice Act still apply, as that was the Act that was applicable when Mr Butler’s case first arose.