Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateKim Leadbeater
Main Page: Kim Leadbeater (Labour - Spen Valley)Department Debates - View all Kim Leadbeater's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Ms McVey. When we adjourned at 11.25 this morning, I had just been discussing amendment 201, but I will start again.
Amendment 201 seeks to clarify the wording in clause 9 relating to doctors’ assessments. It provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records applies only to records that appear relevant to the doctor. The effect of the amendment is to make it clear as part of the assessment process that the assessing doctor is required only to review medical records that are considered by the doctor to be relevant to the person’s request to seek an assisted death.
Amendment 422 would add an additional requirement on an assessing doctor to make inquiries of professionals who are providing or have recently provided health or social care to the person and make such other inquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. This applies to the co-ordinating doctor carrying out the first assessment and the independent doctor carrying out the second assessment.
Amendment 423 would require the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult specialist health or social care professionals. These professionals should have qualifications in or experience of a matter relevant to the person being assessed, and they must be consulted if the assessing doctor considers that there is a need. This applies to the co-ordinating doctor carrying out the first assessment and to the independent doctor carrying out the second assessment. The amendment also provides that a record of any consultation with the specialist health or social care professionals must be shared with the other assessing doctor.
As the Bill is currently drafted, the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor are required to ascertain that the person has
“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.
That is set out in clauses 7 and 8. There is also a power in clause 30(1)(a) for the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice in connection with
“the assessment of whether a person has a clear and settled intention to end their own life”.
There are requirements for the assessing doctors to ascertain that a person is making the declaration
“voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person”.
That is set out in clauses 7(2)(g) and 8(2)(e). Amendment 468 would supplement those requirements with a requirement for the assessing doctor to ask a person why they are seeking an assisted death. I hope that those observations have been helpful to the Committee.
I have nothing further to add.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for those points because he helps me to direct my argument. It is essential to discuss the evidence from abroad about the complications that arise from assisted suicide, but the evidence is very patchy: we know what we know, but we don’t know much. There is a complete dearth of evidence, including in Australia. When Australians gave evidence to the Committee, it was put to them, accurately, that there is a great lack of adequate data gathering in Australia, as in other countries too. So when he says there have been no complications in Australia, what he means is that there have been no reports of complications in Australia. As we always need to point out, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
That question was indeed put to the experts from Australia, but actually they were quite clear that there is a huge amount of evidence. Indeed, there is a very robust reporting mechanism in Australia—the best in the world, I suggest—so there is a huge amount of evidence from that jurisdiction.
Let us not rehash the conversations that we had in the evidence sessions, but I would advise Members to review those conversations. Indeed, there is further publicly available evidence, which I am happy to share, of the problems with data collection in Australia, as in other countries. To the point of the hon. Member for Stroud about the evidence of complications that arise in other jurisdictions being irrelevant to our discussions, because of the lack of clarity in the Bill about what drugs would be used to bring about the assisted suicides that we are proposing to legalise, all we can do is rely on evidence from abroad, and I will insist on doing so.
As well as questions about complications and side effects, there is also a crucial question about how long it takes to die. In Canada, a study demonstrated that in 5% of cases, patients experienced a prolonged time to death. Another study showed that 50% of cases in Canada with available data—again, there is a lack of data—were unsuccessful within 60 minutes. It is clearly common in other countries for death to take up to or more than an hour.
The Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers—the people who do it—acknowledged that patients who ingest assisted suicide drugs can experience burning, nausea, vomiting and regurgitation. I am not saying that that always happens, or that it happens in the majority of cases, but it clearly happens. It is therefore appropriate for patients to be properly informed of those risks, if they are associated with the drugs that will be used. We do not know what those are going to be at this stage.
In the Netherlands, where assisted dying or assisted suicide has been legal for 20 years, a third of people with assisted suicide deaths experience some adverse symptoms such as pain, restlessness, shortness of breath, secretions, nausea and vomiting—that is, a third of people experienced some of those distressing side effects as they died, so it is very far from a guarantee of a pain-free death. It is vital that people considering an assisted death are aware of those possible effects, in addition to the primary effect of the drugs which is, of course, to kill them.
There is also a question about the method of administration. People should know that where regimes use the intravenous route of a short-acting anaesthetic, that is also not without problems. People would understand, and potentially argue for, having an anaesthetic as the first part of the cocktail of drugs that will be administered, but evidence from abroad demonstrates that the anaesthetic induction agent, which is usually propofol, a drug that puts people to sleep before surgery, can wear off rapidly in some people, particularly in younger patients, those who are less ill and those who are larger in size.
In around two thirds of assisted deaths with administrations that use that technique, that anaesthetic is rapidly followed by a paralysing agent. The patient cannot then move a muscle and, unable to breathe at all, they die of asphyxia. Unfortunately, there has been no monitoring of patients while they are given those drugs to ascertain whether they regain consciousness as they die. They cannot move a muscle, so they cannot signal distress. We are unclear what the experience of the dying person is beneath the apparent calm that has been induced in them by the paralytic drug that they have been given.
We do know, however, that similar combinations have been used in judicial executions. Post mortems have shown, as reported in The Lancet in 2005, that the level of anaesthetic induction agent in the blood at the time of death was lower than that required for surgery in 88% of executed inmates. Shockingly, in 43%, the concentrations were consistent with awareness, meaning they may have suffered during the execution.
I rise to speak in support of amendments 305 and 306, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.
Under amendment 305, a doctor would have to explain what effects the medicines would have as well as death. I appreciate the points made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, and what other Members have said about effects and side effects. I would first say: we do not know the side effects. There is no research into any of the drugs being used for the purpose that we are looking at—for assisted suicide, euthanasia or whatever whichever jurisdiction calls it. We therefore cannot give a clear view of what the side effects are; they are largely unknown, as I understand it.
In addition, there are different drugs. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud mentioned one drug, pentobarbital, which has caused huge concern. I did not know about the issue in Australia, but I know the evidence from death row in America, after Texas started using pento-barbital; there have been huge concerns and lawsuits there. I am happy to be referred to other evidence. In some cases, the effect of the drug has been described as akin to suffocating or even as being waterboarded or drowning.
Concerns have been expressed about the use of such drugs in other jurisdictions. I agree with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that we should be looking at all such jurisdictions, because this is something new for us. If we are to learn from other jurisdictions where assisted dying has happened and it has been okay for people, whether that is Australia or others, it is equally right that we hear from those jurisdictions where things have not gone right or to plan. That is important.
Clause 9(2)(b) states:
“The assessing doctor must…explain to and discuss with the person being assessed”,
among other things,
“the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life (including how it will bring about death)”.
Amendment 305 would instead require that the assessing doctor explain to and discuss with the person being assessed the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their life, including how it will bring about death and any other effects it would have in addition to death. That is really important.
There are several relevant things that patients should know if they are to be able to make an informed choice. First, they should have as clear an idea as possible what the experience of taking the lethal drug is like. In some countries where people undergo assisted dying, they swallow a cocktail of drugs. Patients whose assisted dying process did not succeed have said that the drugs are bitter tasting. If this is to be the method used in assisted death in this country, applicants should be aware of that, because some people do not take tablets—they just will not do it. If other methods are to be used, doctors should inform patients of what the experience will be like to the best of their knowledge.
The second thing assisted death applicants should know is that they may suffer complications. We know from countries and states that have assisted dying that some patients undergo complications during the process. It has been said before, but I will repeat the point, because it is really important: there can be complications. People may vomit or undergo seizures. One assisted dying recipient took 137 hours to die. That is five days and 17 hours.
We do not know the full number of patients who have died very lengthy deaths in Oregon, because the lethal drugs are self-administered, usually with no doctor present, but just because there is no report saying that things have gone wrong, it does not mean that everything has gone right. Oregon also found that at least nine patients failed to die from lethal drugs. We do not know whether that is the total number—again, because the assisted dying applicants in Oregon self-administer drugs. We can say with certainty that complications exist, although, unfortunately, gaps in the data mean that we do not know how common they are.
Amendment 306 would change the duties of a doctor present during the assisted dying process. Currently, clause 9(2)(c) states that the co-ordinating doctor must discuss with the person
“their wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance”.
If the amendment were accepted, the clause would state that the co-ordinating doctor must discuss with the person their wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance
“including the escalation of medication intervention”.
This is a point of great importance, both for the person seeking assisted dying and the doctor, who would have to be present for the process. It would mean that the applicant and the doctor would have to think through what they wanted to happen if the applicant did develop complications. Should the doctor at a certain point act to revive an applicant—for example, if the person seemed to be suffering extreme pain as a result of a lethal drug? Alternatively, should the doctor remain as an observer and, if it were clinically possible, someone to administer further pain-relieving drugs? Not doing anything is clearly not an option. Both courses of action might seem harrowing to the person seeking assisted dying, but it is something that they should clearly discuss with the doctor, because these situations could really happen.
There are clearly no easy answers to these questions, but if applicants are to take an informed choice over assisted dying and if we want to provide autonomy, they must know that these questions exist and they must discuss them with their doctors. We have talked a lot about autonomy for people with serious illness. Those people will not have autonomy unless they are informed in accurate detail about the possible outcomes of assisted dying, and these amendments would ensure that.
Ultimately, if someone takes a drug to end their life, they will either die or not die and be left in a compromised state. Are they then escalated to A&E, because leaving them in that state is not an option for any doctor—or does the doctor proceed to administer more drugs? What does the doctor do?
My hon. Friend raises a really important point. As clause 9 says, the doctor has an obligation to discuss with the person their wishes in the event of complications, so that conversation would have happened with the patient. To be clear, the doctor cannot intervene to expediate the patient’s death. That is very clear in the Bill.
To be clear, it does say
“discuss with the person their wishes”.
That includes whether they would want the doctor to call an ambulance if things got complicated, or whether they would want to be left—so the doctor would discuss with the patient their wishes in that situation. Fortunately, it does not happen very often.
Yes, fortunately not. I am not convinced that the clause covers it. I will go back to that, but I have just read it because the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley raised it and I support his amendment, and somebody else raised it earlier.
I am not convinced that the complications are covered, because the clause does not set it out. In the usual sense, complications are side effects from medications. We have research and literature given to us and we understand the potential side effects. In this instance, we do not have a yardstick. I do not know whether the Minister can speak about the Government’s intentions—it would be helpful to have an impact assessment—and whether any research has been done in this area.
I am not convinced that clause 9(2)(c) actually covers this point, and I think the amendment would make the Bill much stronger. Ultimately, these drugs have not been tested—and for a very good reason, because they lead to death. We are in unchartered territory. When we are doing things that we have not done before, we cannot just pick and choose what we apply an analogy to. We need to be careful. We really need to consider the options to make this clause in particular much stronger.
I will do so with huge pleasure—thank you, Ms McVey—but I would be more than happy to take up that discussion with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire at another time.
On amendment 142, it is worth noting that options for the method of administration of the substance may change if a patient’s condition alters as they progress through the process set out in the Bill.
Amendment 362 would add to the list of matters that must be discussed at the first and second assessments by the co-ordinating and independent doctors. It would require the assessing doctor to include an explanation and discussion of not only how the approved substance will bring about death, as set out in the Bill as drafted, but the risk and nature of any possible complications, including pain. The Committee may wish to note that the GMC’s “Good medical practice” already states that doctors must discuss with a patient
“the potential benefits, risks of harm, uncertainties about, and likelihood of success for each option”
when discussing their condition.
As it stands, the Bill specifies that the assessing doctor must discuss the individual’s
“wishes in the event of complications”,
which could include medical interventions. However, amendment 306 would go further and specify that medical intervention must be discussed.
I hope those observations were helpful to the Committee.
I will start with amendment 93 tabled by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley. He made a really important point about the language in the clause, and I am very happy to support the amendment.
It is quite clear that, across the Committee, there is no disagreement that a terminally ill person requesting assistance to shorten their death should be given all the information necessary to help them make the clear, informed and settled decision the Bill requires. That should include an explanation of the drugs that are likely to be used—bearing in mind that there may be more than one option available to the person when the time comes, depending on their medical circumstances—and how they would be administered. As such, I am minded to support amendment 142, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe. Amendments 142 and 93 both provide helpful clarity for the Bill.
There are good intentions behind amendments 305, 306 and 362, but I am confident that they are already covered by clause 9(2)(b)(iv) and clause 9(2)(c). I do, however, take on board the point made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley about the concept of side effects. Going forward, it might be helpful to look at that use of language. To conclude, I am minded to support amendments 93 and 142.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
You will be delighted to learn that I have nothing further to add to this debate, Ms McVey.
Amendment 93 agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 305, in clause 9, page 6, line 3, after “about death” insert
“and any other effects in addition to death.”—(Danny Kruger.)
This amendment would require the assessing doctor to explain effects the provided substance would have in addition to death.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I have nothing to add, other than that I will not be supporting amendments 307 and 308. I associate myself with the comments made by my hon. Friends the Members for Rother Valley, for Stroud and for Sunderland Central.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 423, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—
“(2A) To inform their assessment, the assessing doctor must—
(a) consider whether they should consult a health professional or social care professional with qualifications in, or experience of, a matter relevant to the person being assessed;
(b) consult such a professional if they consider that there is a need to do so.
(2B) Where an assessing doctor consults a professional under subsection (2A)(b), the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult specialist health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.
Amendment 415, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—
“(2A) When making an assessment under subsection (2), the assessing doctor must first ensure the provision of adjustments for language and literacy barriers, including the use of interpreters.”—(Jack Abbott.)
Amendment 6, in clause 9, page 6, line 27, leave out “may” and insert “must”.—(Sarah Olney.)
This amendment would require the assessing doctor to refer the person being assessed for a mental capacity assessment if the assessing doctor had doubt as to the person’s capacity.
Amendment 370, in clause 9, page 6, line 29, leave out
“registered in the specialism of psychiatry”
and insert
“a practising psychiatrist registered in one of the psychiatry specialisms”.
This is a drafting change.
Amendment 202, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “capacity”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment corrects a typographical error.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Another independent doctor: second opinion
Amendments made: 203, in clause 10, page 6, line 42, at end insert—
“(A1) This section applies where the independent doctor has—
(a) carried out the second assessment, and
(b) made a report stating that they are not satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 8(2)(a) to (e).”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 421.
Amendment 204, in clause 10, page 6, line 43, leave out from beginning to second “the” in line 44.—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 203.
Amendment proposed: 458, in clause 10, page 6, line 45, after “declaration” insert “and if there has been a material change of circumstances,”.—(Sarah Olney.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 205, in clause 10, page 7, line 11, at end insert
“; but this is subject to subsection (4).
(4) Where—
(a) a referral is made under subsection (1) to a practitioner,
(b) the practitioner dies or through illness is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor, and
(c) no report under section 8 has been made by virtue of the referral,
a further referral may be made under subsection (1).”.
This amendment provides that a further referral may be made under this clause where a practitioner dies or is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor due to illness.
I will speak briefly to this small amendment, which provides that a further referral be made under clause 10 when a practitioner dies or is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor due to illness. In the very unlikely circumstances that the doctor who has agreed to give a second opinion dies or—because of illness or whatever reason—is unable to continue before making a report into the case, it would be right to seek a second opinion elsewhere. I hope the Committee will support my amendment 205.
This is one of the amendments on which the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to ensure that the Bill is legally robust and workable. As the Bill is currently drafted, in clause 11 there is provision to replace a registered medical practitioner acting as the co-ordinating doctor if they become ill or die. However, there is no similar provision to replace a registered medical practitioner acting as the independent doctor should they be unable to complete their role.
Amendment 205 makes provision under clause 10 that a further referral may be made by the co-ordinating doctor to another independent doctor if the second independent doctor becomes unable or unwilling to continue to make a report of their assessment due to their death or illness, provided that the second independent doctor has not prepared a report. It would thereby ensure internal consistency in the Bill in relation to this matter.
This set of amendments relates to the Secretary of State’s ability to make provision, by regulations, for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor if they are unable to continue to carry out the functions of the co-ordinating doctor.
I will turn first to amendment 461. Clause 11, as currently drafted, provides the Secretary of State with a discretionary power to make regulations that provide for cases
“where, after a first declaration has been witnessed by the coordinating doctor, that doctor dies or through illness or otherwise is unable or unwilling to continue”.
Amendment 461 removes the “or otherwise”. The effect could be to limit scenarios in which the Secretary of State could make provision via regulations for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor. The Secretary of State could not provide for replacing the co-ordinating doctor in circumstances other than a doctor’s death or illness, which could include family issues or retirement. That would mean that the person seeking an assisted death may need to begin the process again.
Amendment 310 expands the list of matters that regulations made under subsection (1) may cover. That includes notifying the High Court of substitutions of the co-ordinating doctor, where the co-ordinating doctor is unable to continue to carry out their functions. It should be noted that clause 11 confers only a power, not a duty, on the Secretary of State to make regulations about replacing the co-ordinating doctor. It is not certain that the matter of a substitution of the doctor would be covered in those regulations.
The explanatory statement for amendment 309 suggests that the amendment aims to ensure that a replacement co-ordinating doctor is required to carry out a new assessment of the patient—in other words, to repeat the first assessment made under clause 7. The amendment requires that the regulations that may be made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) make provision for such cases. Although the Secretary of State has a power to make regulations to provide that the co-ordinating doctor be replaced by another doctor, that is not a requirement. The amendment assumes that there will be a replacement co-ordinating doctor, which is not a specific requirement of the legislation.
I will speak briefly about amendment 461. A co-ordinating doctor is central to the whole process set out in the Bill, from start to finish. If a co-ordinating doctor becomes unavailable, a replacement would need to be found. There may be a number of reasons, not restricted to the doctor’s own death or illness, why that could happen. We have already heard a few examples—it could be retirement, maternity leave or anything going on in that doctor’s personal life. A close family member might fall ill or die, or something else might happen in the doctor’s life that forces them to withdraw. We have talked a lot about patient autonomy, quite rightly, but we need to think about the autonomy of the doctors involved in the process as well. It is therefore important that they have the ability to step away, as set out in clause 11. Additionally, I associate myself with the Minister’s comments about amendments 309 and 310. It feels as though those amendments do not necessarily do what was intended.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 206, in clause 11, page 7, line 24, leave out subsection (3).—(Kim Leadbeater.)
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Juliet Campbell
I rise to speak to amendments 407 and 410. Amendment 407 would leave out the word “may” and insert the word “must”, and would require the High Court to hear from and question all persons who made the application for a declaration. It is a probing amendment, which aims to question the guidelines for the judge to question and hear from some people and not all people. I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I seek clarity on what the criteria would be for the judge to question some people and not others.
I hope I can provide some reassurance. This issue is covered by my new clause 21. The amendment, I think, asks why the High Court would not have heard from the patient. My new clause would ensure that the panel—as it potentially would be—will hear from the patient.
Juliet Campbell
I thank my hon. Friend for that explanation.
I move on to amendment 410, which would remove the ability of the court to hear from and question any person other than the person who made the application or the declaration for an assisted death and the assessing doctors. I have strong reservations about using a proxy or giving another person the right to speak on behalf of an individual who wishes to have an assisted death, and I question the scope of those people who could be the proxy to speak on behalf of a person requesting an assisted death. Who exactly would those people be?
One of the arguments we have consistently debated in this Committee is around coercion and patient autonomy. When multiple third parties such as family members or caregivers are allowed to testify, there is an increased risk that an individual might influence the court’s decision in a way that is not aligned to the true wishes of the applicant. In some cases we have talked about pressure from family members or loved ones, for whatever reason—whether their vested interest is financial or something else—to have the applicant hasten their death or have an assisted death. I would not want that kind of pressure to be put on the person and I do not believe any third party should be allowed to speak on their behalf or to be a proxy.
By limiting the scope of the testimony to the applicant and assessing doctors only, the amendment helps to safeguard against such manipulative tactics and ensures that the court focuses solely on the applicant’s own will and the medical assessment of their eligibility, removing the potential for family dynamics or any other outside influence to interfere with the judicial review. It offers a necessary refinement to the Bill for assisted deaths, a request that is both efficient and respectful of the autonomy of all people involved. By limiting the court testimony to the applicant and assessing doctor, the amendment addresses several of the concerns I have spoken about.
Sarah Sackman
As I understand it, both in the context of the High Court—which has the ability to speak to whomever it likes—and of the panel, when we come to debate its role, that is a discretion. It is a requirement to hear from the person seeking an assisted death; it is a requirement to hear from the co-ordinating doctor. However, hearing from others is discretionary, which means that, if it is necessary in order to be satisfied that the eligibility criteria are met—which is what the scheme requires—in that context, under the panel’s or the High Court’s discretion, it may seek evidence from elsewhere. That is what the provision, as the Government reads it, is designed to do.
The amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe puts forward clearly limits that discretion; whether that is desirable is a policy choice, but that is how it is intended to function. As I have said, the Government will continue to remain neutral on these substantive policy questions, but I hope that is useful to members of the Committee.
I think I have responded to the hon. Member for Broxtowe on amendment 407 by saying that the concern will potentially be covered by my new clause 21. On amendment 410, it is also my view that, whether it is the High Court or the panel or whoever we end up having over the course of this Committee, that third layer of scrutiny and safeguarding should be able to hear from other people, not just the patient and the doctor, so I would not support that amendment.
Daniel Francis
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 410, in clause 12, page 8, line 27, leave out subsection (6).—(Juliet Campbell.)
The amendment would remove the ability of the court to hear from and question any person other than the person who made the application for the declaration and the assessing doctors.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Sarah Sackman
Amendments 432 to 434 would remove provisions regarding proxies from the Bill. They deal with proxies in the context of the High Court process. As a consequence, the High Court would be unable to hear from the person’s proxy where the proxy has signed the first declaration, and the person would be unable to use a proxy to authorise a medical practitioner to provide assistance to end their own life. Removing the ability for persons seeking assistance to use a proxy would limit access to the assisted dying process for people who, for example, have a physical impairment, are unable to read or are for some other reason unable to sign the declaration. As I said earlier, the Government remain neutral, but I hope that provides some context and an explanation of how the amendments would operate.
I will be brief, because we will come on to this debate when we get to clause 15. To be clear, the circumstances where a proxy would be involved in this process are literally when somebody is so ill that they are unable to sign their own name, so it is a very limited set of circumstances.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Sarah Sackman
Amendments 312 and 313 would make several changes to the process for High Court approval of applications under the Bill as drafted. Amendment 312 would allow a person who believes that the requirements of the Act have not been met to make that known to the High Court and to be heard before a declaration is made. The proposed mechanism is that the person would enter a caveat in any district registry of the High Court within 14 days of the application being lodged or received.
Of course we will come to later amendments, but under the Bill as drafted, the High Court has the power to hear from and question any person to determine whether the applicant has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and that they have not been pressured or coerced, so there is that mechanism to hear from others through that channel.
Amendment 313 would enable appeals to be made against a decision by the High Court to make a declaration, as opposed to only where a declaration is not granted. As drafted, the Bill provides that any person may seek a judicial review of any decision of the High Court, including the decision to make a declaration, if they are adjudged to have standing.
Amendment 269 would enable any person, other than the person seeking assistance, to apply for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the High Court. The amendment would also enable appeals to be made against a decision by the High Court to grant a declaration, as opposed to only where a declaration is not granted. The Court of Appeal would not be obliged to consider the matters set out in the Bill when forming its decision. It is important to say that whether with or without the amendment, any person may still seek a judicial review of any decision of the High Court, if they are adjudged to have standing.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I hope you are sitting comfortably, Mrs Harris; it is a pleasure to see you this evening. I rise to speak to new schedules 1 and 2, new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21, and their consequential amendments. These provisions relate to the introduction of the assisted dying commission, which would oversee the assisted dying process in England and Wales, and the multi-disciplinary panels of experts, which will operate as part of the commission, should the Bill be passed.
It has always been my view, and I have always been clear, that there should be a third layer of scrutiny and safeguarding in the assisted dying process, particularly given the significance of the change in the law. However, I appreciate that, if we compare the Bill with the many other models of assisted dying around the world, this is very unusual. Most jurisdictions have a process that involves two doctors, as the Bill does, but there is no additional stage.
There are different views as to whether a third layer is necessary; many other jurisdictions have processes that provide a very compassionate, patient-centred and well-safeguarded approach to assisted dying without it. Indeed, some of the most difficult emails I receive are from terminally ill people who are very concerned about the complexity of the process laid out in the Bill. They feel that it is overcomplicated and too bureaucratic to navigate for people who are in their dying days and weeks. I am very sensitive to that. I am also aware that the thorough process set out in the Bill will take time, and there will be people who embark upon it who will die before they can complete it, as happens in other jurisdictions. That is, of course, extremely sad.
I also know that, certainly in this country, people feel strongly that oversight and scrutiny of what we might call the initial medical stages of the assisted dying process are important. The challenge is achieving an appropriate balance between compassion and patient autonomy, and robust safeguarding—plus, of course, medical autonomy.
If there is to be a third layer, what should it look like? As the Bill stands, the third layer of scrutiny is a High Court judge, who would make the final decision regarding a patient’s choice to have an assisted death. I was, and remain, very confident in the ability of High Court judges to have that role, but it is fair to say that there is a range of views on the suitability of the judiciary to fulfil this function—not least from ex-judges themselves. It is important that we as a Committee acknowledge that.
Barrister and former Supreme Court judge Lord Sumption said that
“clause 12 is unnecessary and in some respects undesirable.”
He went on:
“The concern that I have about clause 12 in its current form is that it is not entirely clear what the judge is supposed to do…is he there in order to ensure that the two doctors have done their job and that the ducks are all in a row, or is he there to form his own view on all of those matters, completely independently of those who have already given their certificates?...It seems to me that this is a protection that no other country, so far as I am aware, among those that have authorised one or other form of assisted dying has included.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 172-173, Q222.]
Lord Sumption has been critical of the complexity of the process set out in the Bill as drafted, describing it as
“over-engineered, bureaucratic, and coldly inhumane”.
He told us in evidence that he disagreed with the inclusion of the need for High Court approval of a person’s application for an assisted death.
Former High Court judge Sir James Munby has written various articles in this regard. In his piece “Assisted dying: what role for the judge?” he asks:
“Should the judges be involved at all in this process? Is what is proposed a proper judicial function?”
He continues:
“Is this, indeed, truly a judicial function at all? Many would say that it is not. Where else in our judicial system does one find a judge, sitting judicially as a judge, whose function is not to decide some disputed issue or…to resolve some controversy but only to certify, as it were, that some decision taken by a private individual complies with the law? That, it might be said, is not what judges do and not what judges are for.”
He also expresses his concerns around conscientious objection and the challenges of ensuring
“an open and transparent process that may deter those for whom the scheme is designed, and a secret process destructive of the integrity of the scheme and corrosive of the judicial function.”
I absolutely agree that this is a very tricky balance.
The hon. Lady cites James Munby, who correctly identified the problems with the High Court process as it was designed and exists in the Bill. Is she aware that he also strongly objects to the amendments? He thinks that the newly proposed scheme fails on all the same tests, and he regards it as just as unsafe as the previous one.
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is fair to say that there is a range of views on this subject from the judiciary. Ex-judges have commented, and I will come to those comments shortly.
In his evidence, the chief medical officer, Professor Sir Chris Whitty, said that the best safeguards were the simple ones and warned that patients could find themselves in “a bureaucratic thicket” at the end of life if there is too much to navigate. I am very sensitive to that. Responding to his comments, Lord Sumption said:
“I do agree with that…one suggestion that I think would make a significant difference…is the removal of the clause 12 stage.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 182, Q236.]
That shows the difference of opinion among former judges.
I have made this point before, but I will do so again: it is very welcome to have these extra professionals involved in the process. Does the hon. Lady not recognise that it would be so much more appropriate to have them involved early on, at the assessment stage? We all want it not to be just a rubber stamp, but they are currently to be involved at the approval stage, at the end of the process, essentially fulfilling a judicial function of deciding yes or no. Why are these professionals not involved earlier?
I disagree: they are involved earlier. I have talked about the amendments we have already made around health and social care professionals. We have tabled those amendments, changed the Bill and added that provision on the basis of the evidence we heard. Remember that either doctor can speak to any other health or social care professional they wish. I would say that, actually, a multidisciplinary approach is taken throughout the Bill and, by ending the process with the panel, that is reinforced.
The hon. Member for East Wiltshire said in his radio interview on 12 February, “I do welcome”—as he has confirmed today—“the additional role of more experts in the process”. Hopefully, irrespective of our different views, that is something that the idea of the panel can coalesce around. Despite the hon. Gentleman’s opposition to assisted dying, I hope that, in the interests of strengthening the Bill, he will be able to support the amendments today, because that is the job of this Committee—to strengthen the Bill, not to try to stop it, however strongly people may feel about the issue.
A significant part of the strengthening is through additional patient-centred safeguards. I firmly believe that the introduction of the assisted dying commission and the addition of the multidisciplinary expertise and oversight provided by the panels are a crucial part of that. The panel will look at the detail of every individual case and scrutinise the doctors’ reports. It must hear from and may question the co-ordinating doctor or the independent doctor; it may hear from and question both; and it must hear from and may question the patient themselves. I mentioned that in relation to the amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe earlier. It is the default.
This was a difficult decision. I appreciate that to make the patient undergo another level of personal scrutiny could be viewed as cruel. Indeed, a number of people have said to me that they feel it will be too burdensome on the patient during what is already a deeply emotional, highly personal and stressful time, when they are likely to be in pain and having treatment. I acknowledge that. Again, this is about finding the very difficult balance between avoiding an unduly stressful bureaucratic process and ensuring that the patient is making, as the Bill says, a “clear, settled and informed” decision. There is a very strong argument that in order to do so, the panel should hear from the person themselves. That is the decision I have taken, addressing the concerns of colleagues who have tabled amendments to the same effect. Indeed, Lord Munby said of the Bill as it stands that
“the absence of any requirement that the judge ‘must’ hear from and question the patient is a quite extraordinary lacuna.”
I appreciate, though, that there will be exceptional circumstances, which we know may be the case if the patient is very ill and in their last few weeks of life.
The panel may also ask any person who appears to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person as it considers appropriate. It can basically ask to hear from anybody it wishes. That would obviously vary from case to case. Every case will be different, as we have discussed, and flexibility is really important. Only if all three members of the panel are satisfied that all the criteria have been met will it issue a certificate of eligibility. It must refuse to do so if it is not satisfied. The decision of the panel has to be unanimous. If there is any doubt from any of the panel members that the criteria have been met, the patient cannot proceed.
The patient then enters a 14-day period of reflection, before making their second declaration. It is worth reiterating that, as has been said previously, a significant number of patients get to that stage and never actually continue with an assisted death, but the comfort it provides enables them to live out their final weeks and days with a sense of reassurance. As families have described, a weight is lifted. Indeed, Professor Michael Dooley, who is the director of pharmacy at Alfred Health and the head of Victorian voluntary assisted dying pharmacy services, and who some of us met yesterday, told us that in that state in Australia some 90% of assisted dying patients also still access palliative care. That shows the holistic approach that can be taken.
There is of course another very important role for the commission, which is in relation to the monitoring and reporting of cases—something I feel very strongly about. The details are set out in my amendment 455 to clause 34. The commission must produce an annual report, which must include details about the application of the Act. That report must include details in relation to persons who have protected characteristics, and details of any other description of people specified. That would include data on demographics; statistics on the populations and characteristics of the patients who have chosen an assisted death; their age and gender; geographical analysis; data regarding the illnesses and diseases; how many cases were rejected; and how many patients did not complete the process and so on. When completing the annual report, the commissioner must consult the chief medical officers for England and for Wales, and anyone who represents the interests of people with protected characteristics.
The Law Society, which is neutral on assisted dying, says that if the law were to change, the system must have
“robust, accessible and independent safeguards”
as well as
“strong independent monitoring and review mechanisms”.
I agree. The introduction of a multidisciplinary panel of experts to consider all applications for an assisted death, overseen by a commissioner in the form of a High Court judge, sitting or retired, really does achieve that, and embeds a truly robust, multidisciplinary approach, which I am confident will put patients at the centre of the assisted dying process and provide additional scrutiny, safeguards and protections.
As I make progress, I will speak to that point, but I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern. I will return to my speech and expand on the point when I arrive at that juncture.
Sir James goes on to say that there are even graver problems with the panel procedure. I appreciate that his paper was published before new clause 21 was tabled, but it does not address all the concerns he raised. He referred particularly to new clause 16, but it is relevant to note that the problem he identified is left untouched by new clause 21. Sir James says of new clause 16:
“It says very little about the procedures to be adopted for testing and, if need be, challenging the evidence”.
He goes on to say that
“it says nothing about who should exercise that function; nor about the nature of any independent evidential investigation and nothing about who is to undertake this and who is to pay for it.”
Finally on this point, he says that new clause 16
“says nothing about what, if any, public funding arrangements there will be for the applicant, the two doctors, and any other parties or expert or lay witnesses.”
The first point raised by Sir James is an extraordinary one. The panels will bring together three people: a lawyer, a consultant psychiatrist and a social worker. They will sit on what is a quasi-judicial body. The latter two will not necessarily have any experience of questioning witnesses and assessing evidence as part of a quasi-judicial process. The first person—the lawyer—will have such experience. What is going to happen? Are we just hoping that they will successfully make it up as they go along? Is there not a danger that in some cases the non-legal members of the panel end up deferring to the wishes of the lawyer, who has more experience in these matters?
I appreciate the point my hon. Friend is making, and it is a shame that we did not hear from James Munby in evidence. I understand why he says that: he is looking at it through a judicial lens, because he is a judge. But this is not a judicial entity. It is a panel—it is not a court—and the range of expertise on it is actually a strength, not a weakness.
As I have stated before—I will make reference to that very point later—I would argue the safeguards are just not robust enough.
There should be a mechanism for trained and experienced people to find witnesses who might have relevant information. This could relate to another criticism that Members have made of the panel system: there is no provision for the Official Solicitor to act on behalf of the applicant. Sir James Munby argues that we should strongly consider this, saying that
“there must be a rigorous procedure in every case for testing and if need be challenging the evidence, including an independent evidential investigation, perhaps by the Official Solicitor, of the kind discussed in Conway. There are two reasons why this is essential in every case…Without this, it will not be proper for a judge to be involved in the process as a member of the panel.”
He goes on to make it plain that by “judge” he means the legal member of the panel.
I appreciate that this is slightly difficult to get our heads around, but we have legal expertise—we potentially have a judge, a sitting judge, a retired judge or an eminent KC—but they are not there in their capacity as a judge. I understand that that is tricky for people to understand, but they are there because of their skillset. That is the important distinction.
That is the very distinction I am trying to highlight further, because the panel takes away the judicial oversight. Yes, they have expertise—there is no question about people’s expertise—but Sir James Munby says clearly that these people will not be sitting in their capacity as judges, as my hon. Friend just outlined, but just as experts. That does not provide judicial oversight. That is not what the panel does.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that is the whole point: Sir James Munby said he did not think that was the job for the judge.
I will go into this in even greater detail in later speeches, but I will say now that although the process was not fit for purpose, Sir James Munby also says that this one is not fit for purpose. Neither process gives us the legal aspect—if anything, the Bill has been watered down. As I make progress, I will outline how I think Sir James Munby’s evidence is clear that the safeguard has been watered down. I appreciate the mood in the room while I insist on talking about this, but it is very, very important, because when we voted in the House to send the Bill to Committee, one of the biggest reasons why we did so was judicial oversight. Many Members have said that they let the Bill get to this stage because of that.
I think that by making some progress I will answer that question.
Turning to Sir James Munby’s question about what, if any, public funding arrangements there will be for the applicant, the two doctors and any other parties, experts or lay witnesses, each time a panel meets we will be asking three senior professionals to give up many hours of their time to scrutinise applications, listen to and perhaps question witnesses, and then decide whether to call further witnesses. I could ask many questions about funding, but I will ask just one at the moment. Both Ministers will be well aware that courts and tribunals in England and Wales face lengthy delays—in some cases, delays of years. Will the Government commit to adequately funding the panel so that applicants do not face lengthy delays?
Another question about the resourcing of the panels is just as important: can we make good on the commitment in the Bill to provide a consultant psychiatrist for every panel? I think the answer may well be no. We spoke to the Royal College of Psychiatrists during our evidence sessions, but at that stage my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley had not tabled the amendments that would create a panel including a consultant psychiatrist, so we did not ask the professional body whether it would be able to do so.
I have had private conversations with my team of senior psychiatrists. We asked whether England and Wales had enough consultant psychiatrists to serve on each panel. They said it was extremely unlikely. I would like to understand whether my hon. Friend consulted the Royal College of Psychiatrists before she tabled those amendments. If she did not, that seems an extraordinary omission.
Ministers keep saying that the Government will release an impact assessment only when the Committee has finished amending the Bill. I say again: that seems to me a most unsatisfactory approach to a Bill that would lead to such a huge change. Surely the Minister could ask civil servants to prepare a preliminary estimate of how many applicants there might be in England and Wales. It should probably be phrased as a likely minimum and likely maximum number. That would be extremely helpful. Surely the Government could do the preliminary work on whether the psychiatric profession in England and Wales is capable of meeting that demand. I say this in the light of my understanding that the present state of the country’s judiciary contributed to the removal of the judge in the first instance.
Just to be clear, that was not the reason for the change. We need to be very clear about that. The reason for the change was that it strengthens the Bill.
That was not my understanding; I will come back to that point, because I am sure I have references to where that has been talked about. There is also the question of whether panels should be heard in public. Under new clause 16, the legal member of a panel would decide whether it should sit in public.
Finally, I return to Sir James Munby’s paper on this question. As I have gone through in some detail, he raised significant concerns about panel procedures set out in new clauses 14 to 17. Unfortunately, it seems to me that most of those concerns have not been addressed by new clause 21. Sir James was a very senior judge, who headed the family division of the High Court, and is someone we should listen to with the utmost attention on these matters. He said:
“I appreciate that some may point to the multidisciplinary membership of the panel and to an assumption that the function and process of the panel may (it is said) be inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Plainly, it might be thought, it is an advantage that the panel has a multidisciplinary membership, and it is often said that three heads are better than one. Yet it would be a mistake to think that either of these features of what is now proposed are sufficient to overcome the very real problems I have identified. They are not. What remains crucial is the substance, not mere appearances. If the panel is to perform its function effectively and do more than just ‘check the paperwork’—if it is to be the real safeguard intended by its proponents—then its processes must be much more thorough than is currently proposed.”
I will speak briefly about an important point that the hon. Member for Spen Valley made. I want to get it on the record that I disagreed with something that she said. We heard a lot in the evidence sessions about the desirability of a multidisciplinary approach or a multi-professional team, and I listened particularly carefully to Dr Sarah Cox, who gave oral evidence to the Committee on 28 January on behalf of the Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland. She made important and interesting points regarding the desirability of the involvement of multidisciplinary teams in relation to her area of expertise: palliative care.
I am anxious that the panel that the hon. Member for Spen Valley is now proposing is being presented as a response to the comments of Dr Sarah Cox in relation to multi-professional teams, when it is clear that she meant something quite different. My interpretation of what she said was that the initial assessment should be done by a multi-professional team; what is being proposed here is something that happens much later in the process.
To be clear, the point I have tried to make with regard to the evidence that we received was just that there is a need for a multidisciplinary approach, wherever it happens.
I am glad to have had that clarification; however, it is really important to reflect on the fact that Dr Sarah Cox said that it would be considerably preferable to have the input of a multidisciplinary team at the earliest possible stage. That is not what is being proposed with these new clauses.
The point is that it has to happen at every stage, and I think the evidence that we heard was that it does happen. I know from the experiences of family and friends of mine who have had cancer that it does happen. There is a multidisciplinary approach; there is an oncologist, a nursing team and a doctor. That does happen, and nothing in the Bill will take away from that.
I thank the hon. Member, but I think she is responding to a slightly different point from the one that I made.
There was further written evidence from Dr Doré, the honorary secretary of the Association for Palliative Medicine, on 25 February. He wrote:
“To clarify any misunderstanding, the current Bill does not align with the standard multi-professional team…decision-making process used across the health service.
Under the Bill, patient assessments are conducted solely by two doctors without input from a wider MPT. While an amendment proposes the involvement of a panel—including a social worker and psychiatrist—this panel is introduced only at the end of the process and does not participate in the patient’s direct assessment.
We wish to make it clear that the point that Dr Cox was making in oral evidence was that having two independent doctors, working alone, is not an adequate model to safeguard either patients or professionals, and that stipulating that the initial assessments must be carried within a multi-professional team model would strengthen the Bill.”
Does the hon. Member not agree that by accepting amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member for St Albans, we have early intervention with psychiatric analysis at a very early stage, when either of the doctors feels it is necessary?
I am grateful for amendment 6 and to my hon. Friend the Member for St Albans for tabling it. I put on record, however, that I do not think that the panel that we are discussing addresses my earlier concerns. I wanted to make that absolutely clear by highlighting the further evidence from the Association for Palliative Medicine. The panel proposed by this group of amendments does not address its concerns, or the concerns of many other people who were saying that there needs to be a multi-professional team.
My hon. Friend is making an excellent and powerful speech. I thank him for putting the human being back at the centre of the process; sadly, in this Committee we can forget to do that. Early on, we had Nathaniel Dye here, who is a terminal cancer patient. He has just had a 12-month prognosis. The thought of making that man jump through hoops and over hurdles breaks my heart. I understand that we have to do it, but these are the people that we are actually talking about when we discuss the Bill.
Jake Richards
I agree, and I hope to deal with some of the points that my hon. Friend made in her important speech. To mandate that a barrister instructed by the Official Solicitor, or indeed the panel, has to put questions to a person who may have only a few weeks left to live is not only highly inappropriate, but unworkable. What instructions is this barrister working from? Do they have to suppose that somebody who clearly has capacity does not? If not, do they ask questions about the circumstances of the person that would be asked by the panel in any event?
My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West suggested that the Official Solicitor would be working for the person. Well, the person is coming to this panel seeking assistance, so what on earth is the Official Solicitor or their legal representative going to ask of the person they are taking instructions from? To what extent would they be allowed to go on a fishing expedition, delving deep into a person’s relationships to assess any evidence of coercion? That goes back to my original point: what are their instructions? Who is asking them to do what?
I see the force in the amendments from my hon. Friend as to burden of proof, but I deem them inappropriate. The criminal standard does not fit neatly with the more complex issues at play, such as capacity. The Mental Capacity Act states that where there is a doubt about a person’s capacity, the burden of proof is on the person seeking to establish a lack of capacity, on the balance of probabilities. That is the correct approach. In any event, if the panel has any doubts as to capacity, surely it will be obliged—as is set out in amendment 6 to clause 9, which the Committee has just accepted—to seek further psychiatric assessment. It is important to note that the panel will have powers to instruct further expert assessment and reports.
If we implement the criminal standard, the doctors who are part of the process— not only the co-ordinating doctor and the individual doctor, but treating doctors, because we should always remember that someone who is terminally ill will almost certainly be receiving treatment in the NHS—will be working to a completely different burden of proof from the panel’s. The criminal standard does not fit neatly with the innately inquisitorial nature of the panel’s role. That is important. It is very easy to look at the definition of the balance of probabilities and find weaknesses in it, but when we consider what actually happens in practice, I submit that those weaknesses are not often there.
The panel will have a conversation with the professionals and with the person and will consider the response. If doubts creep in, it will not just stop and make a decision on the balance of probabilities; it will continue to search. The more serious the doubts it encounters, the more evidence it will need for those doubts to be overcome. That is how the law has developed on the balance of probabilities in all other areas, and no doubt it will be the same in this area. Importantly, unlike with many other tribunals or courts, the decision must be unanimous, so if the social worker spots something that the psychiatrist or lawyer does not, the case will go no further.
What about the role of third parties? As I have set out before, this is a personal decision, but I also accept that no man is an island—a phrase often used by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire. The process has to strike a real balancing act: allowing third-party information to be considered, but in a proportionate manner that respects individual autonomy. To my mind, the views of third parties are not relevant. Their views on whether the person is making the best decision for themselves are not relevant. This is not a welfare decision. Equally, it must be right that third parties—family members and others—can ensure that the panel has sight of the relevant information. Even after a certificate of eligibility has been given, the co-ordinating doctor will continue to be responsible for assessing new information, and their duties will continue until the final moments, as the Bill sets out.