Courts and Tribunals Bill

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

It has been a positive debate in terms of the exchange of ideas, and there have been some fantastic contributions. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Members for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet) and for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) for the very personal way in which they made their cases. There is consensus that for victims, the current waits are terrible and an experience that they should not have to go through. It is not only damaging for them as individuals, but some of them drop out as a result. We see perpetrators who would have been found guilty walking away and escaping justice, and we see defendants who would have been found innocent having to wait too long to have the accusations over their head removed.

[Catherine Atkinson]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Mullan]

Not yet.

We must have a serious discussion about why that is. It was disappointing for those who sought to put forward a credible analysis of what has happened that the Justice Secretary and most Labour Members did not mention the word “covid” once. In reality, the backlogs in the Crown court under this Government before covid were lower than those we inherited from the previous Government.

It is fair to say that for many years—25 years, as we heard from the hon. Member for Congleton (Sarah Russell)—it has been accepted that not enough political attention has been paid to our justice system. The question is, what do we do about it? There is no single answer to that question, because there is no single problem. A whole variety of things are going wrong in our justice system. We are seeing late pleas because of insufficient early advice, faulty courtrooms, a lack of reports from probation services, and problems with prison transport. All those problems, and others, cause the delays and other issues.

The central recommendation of the Leveson report was for more sitting days— 130,000—and that will require more venues, more court staff, more prosecution staff, more solicitors and more barristers. However, as I have mentioned, there are simpler things that we can do ahead of that, and we need look no further than Liverpool Crown court under the leadership of Andrew Menary. At a time when the national average wait from charge to trial is 321 days, that court manages an average wait of 206 days. As far as I am aware, neither the Justice Secretary nor any of his team has visited Liverpool Crown court to speak to the judge and hear how he does that. In fact, he achieves it partly through the use of early guilty pleas. Nationally, we lose court time because too many people—31%—plead guilty on the day of a trial. In Liverpool, the proportion is just 6%. Those are not bold reforms. They are not measures that allow a Secretary of State to give a grand speech and consider himself a great reformer. It is just hard work, or what one Member described as “pretty boring” stuff that gets the job done.

As was pointed out by the hon. Members for Warrington North and for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), these reforms will not only fail to achieve what the Government claim they will; they will be an overbearing, destructive distraction from that sort of hard work. And what will the Government gain? Certainly not what they claim in the impact assessment, which is full of assumptions and fantasies, and certainly not anything that might be described as modelling. The Government want us to believe that 24,000 Crown court days will simply be converted into 8,500 magistrate days, but they have no evidence for that claim. They want us to believe that trials without juries will be 20% shorter, but they have no evidence to support that claim either.

[Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)]

Has the shadow Minister seen today’s statement from the Institute for Government, which has backed the Government’s modelling and overturned its previous position? He might want to reflect that in his comments.

[Dr Mullan]

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman read the entire statement. What the institution actually said was that the modelling

“relies on several assumptions—some of which are highly uncertain.”

Did he read that part of the statement? I do not think he did, because it claims that there will be reductions of only 2% in trial time as a result of these reforms.

What are we being asked to give up? We are being asked to give up 800 years of English legal history. A sledgehammer is being taken to the cornerstone of our system, and to fundamental rights. Thousands of accused people risk spending years in prison, losing their livelihoods, losing their families, losing their homes, and not being able to make the simple request for a forum of their peers to make that decision—a part of the justice system that is trusted and supported more than any other. That is perhaps why it is being defended so robustly by those within it. Just today, thousands of retired judges and retired and working legal professionals asked the Justice Secretary to think again. What has been the Government’s response to that? It has been to denigrate the role of jury trials.

We have had the appalling sight of the Lord Chancellor comparing three years in prison to a scraped knee. We have heard the Minister for Courts say that being accused of an offence of sexual assault, which could be considered either way at the moment, was not serious—an accusation that, if proven, would lose someone their livelihood. It is shameful and desperate stuff from a desperate Government. In contrast, what did the Prime Minister say? He said:

“The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.”

Now he asks us to upend that balance in a historically unprecedented way.

Of course, we can talk about the facts and figures, as woeful and thin as they have been, but at the end of the day, these decisions come from political instinct and a deep sense of what is right and wrong. That is not shallow; it is based on knowledge and years of experience —the sort that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) have. That experience told them, before they saw the figures, that the Government’s approach was not going to work. They have been proven right by the figures.

Is it any surprise that the Prime Minister does not understand this? Time and again, we have seen that he is absolutely devoid of any sort of deep political instinct. His only instinct is to chop and change his mind as it suits him on any particular day. No wonder he has been, more than any other Prime Minister in recent history, an agent of the civil service. He has forgotten the golden rule that civil servants advise and Ministers decide. The Conservatives have said yes to more resources, to efficiency and to the hard work of getting things done, but we have said no to eroding a fundamental right, no to more overbearing state power, and no to gutting and scouring away the mechanism by which all of us watch the watchmen.

The Courts Minister tells us that the Bill has been introduced on a point of political principle, whereas other Members have argued that it is a matter of necessity and resource. Too often, Labour Members have said yes to a Prime Minister to whom they should have said no. They have an opportunity tonight to say no to the Prime Minister when it counts. Let us hope they have the courage to do so.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Sir Brian Leveson. We must stick to the timings of the programme order that the Committee has agreed, so we have until 9.55 am for this panel. Will the witness please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Sir Brian Leveson: My name is Brian Leveson. I was a practising criminal lawyer from 1970. I became a silk in 1986. I went on to the High Court bench in 2000, and the Court of Appeal in 2006. I was the senior presiding judge for England and Wales between 2007 and 2009, the inaugural chair of the Sentencing Council between 2010 and 2013, president of the Queen’s bench division from 2013, and latterly head of criminal justice. I retired at the compulsory age of 70 in 2019. I am now the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I have spent the last 15 months seeking to review criminal justice, a subject which I rather thought I had left behind.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

Q I am Kieran Mullan, the shadow Minister and MP for Bexhill and Battle. I want to take you back to the process of your appointment and ask whether, prior to your appointment, you had any discussions with Ministers or officials about your views on the right to elect and the use of jury trials.

Sir Brian Leveson: No, although I recognise that, in 2015, I looked at efficiency in criminal proceedings. Everybody says that was a wonderful time—no, it was not. I published a report that dealt with efficiency. It was not to incorporate anything that involved legislative change, but in chapter 10, “Out of Scope”, I discussed what Sir Robin Auld said in 2001. Anybody looking at that material would have seen that I was seriously concerned about the way in which criminal justice was proceeding and progressing, notwithstanding the backlog then because of an absence of police officers. What I visualised has actually come to pass.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I want to ask about the process of your review. Did you undertake any visits to Crown courts, and if so, which ones?

Sir Brian Leveson: Well, I have been visiting Crown courts for 50 years. I personally visited Liverpool Crown court, and I am sure I went to another Crown court, but my team went a large number of Crown courts. I was assisted by three advisers: Professor David Ormerod, who is I think the foremost criminal academic lawyer in the country; Chris Mayer, a former chief executive of HM Courts Service; and Shaun McNally, a former director of crime at HMCS and a former chief executive of the Legal Aid Agency. I had plenty of expertise. I did not need to visit courts; they did. I spoke to a lot of judges, though.

[Dr Mullan]

Q You mentioned that you visited Liverpool.

Sir Brian Leveson: Yes.

[Dr Mullan]

I do not want to assume what you may or may not know about Liverpool, but are you aware that Liverpool does not have a backlog in its courts?

Sir Brian Leveson: I am very aware of Liverpool: I am a Liverpudlian. I practised in Liverpool. I know all the judges in Liverpool extremely well. It would be a mistake to think that Liverpool is a microcosm of the country, for lots of reasons. Liverpool has a single Crown court. There are 20-odd courts in one building. It was opened in 1984—I was present. It has its problems, but it is still a very highly functioning court. There is one Crown Prosecution Service area. There is essentially one police force, although there is a second in Cheshire. There is one chief probation officer. Much more importantly, there is a small local Bar where everybody knows everybody else and they all get on with it. That is not the case in other parts of the country.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Are there any lessons that could be drawn out for the rest of the country? You have given us some that you think cannot be.

Sir Brian Leveson: Yes, and I have made recommendations. It is critical that the systems join up: the police, the CPS, the defence community, the courts, the judiciary, and the prison and probation services. They all have their own budgets, their own problems and their own priorities. One of the recommendations I made in part 2 of my review—which is not considered in the Bill, obviously—was the creation of a criminal justice adviser whose only responsibility was co-ordinating the work of each of the agencies to try to make them work together. That is where it has worked in Liverpool. But doing that on its own would not be sufficient.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I want to move on to the references in your report to the modelling. I have various quotes from part 1 of your report, to refresh your memory of what you said. In paragraph 11, on page 34, you say:

“I have no doubt that the MoJ will want and need to conduct more detailed modelling, including through impact assessments of any recommendations taken forward.”

It is a common theme throughout the report that you say, repeatedly, that you expect that the Ministry of Justice will want to undertake more detailed modelling than the modelling you undertook. Are you aware of what, if any, more detailed modelling the MOJ did undertake?

Sir Brian Leveson: That is not my responsibility. What I wanted to say about modelling was this: it is bordering on the speculative to think that you can model all the changes to get one set of results. I am very conscious, for example, of the modelling in relation to the time saved by a bench division. You will know, and doubtless quote it at me in a moment, that the modellers suggest 20%, which I believe is pessimistic. Let me say why I think that is so, because it is very important that the Committee understands this.

How can modelling be undertaken in relation to systems that have never operated? The first question is, “What time would be saved?” The modellers—the analysts—looked to the court service: “How many minutes would be saved by not having to do this with a jury? How many by doing that, and the other?” They also spoke to some judges. I believe they came up with a figure that is far too pessimistic, as I said.

Let me explain why. The dynamic of a criminal trial conducted with a jury is very different from the dynamic of a trial conducted without a jury. Take family work, for example. The judge gets involved. If there is a jury, he finds no facts—every fact that anybody wants to elicit or develop, unless it is inadmissible, they can—but if a judge is conducting a trial, he or she will say, “Well now, what’s the issue in this case? Let’s get down to it,” and, “I’ve got that point; what’s the next point?” That changes the dynamic of the trial entirely.

Indeed, I have spoken to district judges who try rapes in the youth court and are also sex-ticketed recorders, so are trying rapes in the Crown court, and they say to me that trials in the Crown court are twice as long as for the same sort of acquaintance-type rape in the youth court. Canadian judges talk about 50%; I am concerned to achieve fair justice, and I need to speed that up because of the backlog.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I will take you through some further questions.

Sir Brian Leveson: Fine.

[Dr Mullan]

On the right to elect, your report—we are not talking about further work that you are not responsible for—says:

“It has been assumed that disposals per day in the magistrates’ court are in line with the current average.”

So if we change the system, disposals will remain at the current rate. If we are trying more complex, more serious cases, is it reasonable to assume that the disposal time will be the same as for those currently seen for less serious cases?

Sir Brian Leveson: Why do you say they are more complex? They are not necessarily more complex at all.

[Dr Mullan]

If they are being given sentences of potentially up three years versus, for example, six months, you do not think that will have any impact on the time, complexity or seriousness of the cases?

Sir Brian Leveson: I am not suggesting it will not have any impact; I am suggesting that the time cases take is not necessarily governed by the nature of the charge or, indeed, the eventual sentence. In the 1970s, I could conduct two trials in a day; nobody ever conducts a trial in a day these days.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I am being pressed for time, so I have just one final question.

Sir Brian Leveson: Keep going.

[Dr Mullan]

The most specific element of modelling that the MOJ undertook was something called a structured elicitation workshop, which found that the time saved would be between 10% and 30%. At the lower the end, that is half of the 20% estimate that you put forward. Would you accept that?

Sir Brian Leveson: No. I think that is wrong. As far as I am concerned, there will be a considerable time saving and, much more importantly, there will be a cultural shift. At the moment, if you can put your trial off until 2028, what is not to like?

[Dr Mullan]

Q Okay, so it would be fair to say that your report points to the need to do further modelling, the MOJ has undertaken that modelling, and you reject the modelling that your report says the MOJ needs to undertake to better understand the impact.

Sir Brian Leveson: I do not accept that characterisation at all. I believe that savings in a Crown court will be dramatic, for cultural and involvement reasons, in the same way that family judges get through cases more quickly. If you ask those who are opposed to any change what they think will happen as a result of change, they are going to be—

[Dr Mullan]

Sorry, but to correct the record: those people were not opposed. There was an MOJ-orchestrated workshop of neutral parties and judges, and they said it would be 10% to 30%. That is massively different to your estimate.

Sir Brian Leveson: Judges?

[Dr Mullan]

Yes. A whole series of stakeholders were invited by the MOJ and they potentially strongly disagree with your central conclusion of 20%. I have no further questions.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

Q Sir Brian, I would be grateful if you would elaborate for the Committee on the point you made about cultural change. Your view, expressed in the report, is that you think that a judge-only or Crown court bench division would save 20% at least—at a conservative estimate. You refer to a cultural change; can you elaborate and explain what you mean by that?

Sir Brian Leveson: Yes. At the moment, there are undeniably defendants who are gaming the system. They are charged with a crime, they are told their trial will not be until 2028 or 2029, and they are happy to put it off.

I gave an example in a debate on this subject. I said that in 1970 I would say to defendants in around November, “Well, this is a very strong case. If you are guilty, you are much better admitting it. You get a discount for pleading guilty and you can explain it, which will contain litigation.” More than once defendants would say, “Well, Mr Leveson, I am guilty, and I will plead guilty, but I want to spend Christmas with my kids, so I will plead guilty in January.” Now they can say, “I would like to spend Christmas 2028 with my children.” That was an anecdote from me, but after the debate a defence solicitor from London came up to me and said, “That example you gave—I am having that conversation every day of the week.”

We need people to confront what they have done. I do not want anybody to plead guilty who is not guilty and has seen the evidence. I am not asking to change the guilty plea rate, but in the early days, you pleaded guilty on the first or the second occasion you appeared at the Crown court—now there are many examples of that happening on the fifth or the sixth occasion you are in the Crown court. Each one of those takes a considerable amount of time. That is what is sucking up part of the time.

There are lots of other challenges to the system, which if you have had what I do not say is the benefit or privilege of reading both parts 1 and 2 of my review, you will see that I try to elaborate on there. I am concerned that we need to change the dynamic so that people address allegations that are made against them at the first opportunity, rather than hoping that the victim will withdraw, the witnesses will forget or the case will just fade away. That is the point I am talking about with cultural change.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Claire Waxman, Professor Katrin Hohl and Dame Vera Baird. It is good to see you and to have you back here, Vera, albeit in a different guise.

I will follow the same procedure as I did in the previous panel, but I want to get more Committee members in, as I know that Members on both sides of the Committee missed out. I ask Dr Mullan and the Minister to try to keep the Front-Bench questions tighter, so that we can get more participation from all parts of the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I think the witnesses were in the Public Gallery for the introductions, so I will skip straight to my questions. Claire, you have expressed your support of the structural reforms, including the reduction in access to jury trials. Could you take me through your policy formulation process when making such a decision to support a particular policy point?

Claire Waxman: Of course. My role is very much focused on listening directly to victim survivors and families bereaved by homicide, so any changes in legislation and proposals are sense-checked with them. I have been listening to victims since 2020, when the pandemic hit, and have seen the direct impact of the long delays, with cases now going well into 2030. There is a human cost to that. We often say, “Justice delayed is justice denied,” but justice is not abstract for victims. When we delay justice, what it really means for victims is a lack of security and safety, and an inability to process what has happened, to get closure and to move on with their lives; all those are denied. We trap victims in prolonged years of uncertainty, which compounds and prolongs their trauma. I have spoken at length publicly about what that looks like for victims.

You will hear from victims shortly, and a letter signed by 18 victims who have actually been in the criminal justice system and sustained long waits for justice was sent last week. I have spoken to victims, and they want this to end: they want a way out, and they are desperate. They are saying that if having a judge-only trial in a case will mean that they will come out of the system more quickly, they want to see timely justice. Without that, we are seeing a reduction in access to justice, an increase in victim attrition—and not just post-charge, as we have seen an increase of more than 5% in the last five years—and a third of trials breaking down because victims have withdrawn as they cannot sustain staying in the system.

We are also seeing it impact the pre-charge phase. Last year, as London’s Victims’ Commissioner, I published the London victim attrition review, finding that on average 40% of victims withdraw from the system, and that delays are playing a part in that—not just delays in investigation, but the thought of having to wait years to get into court.

[Dr Mullan]

Q So you feel you are reflecting what victims want.

Claire Waxman: Yes.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Are you familiar with the letter to the Deputy Prime Minister from a coalition of more than a dozen violence against women and girls groups, including the End Violence Against Women Coalition, London Black Women’s Project, the Centre For Women’s Justice and Welsh Women’s Aid, who oppose the changes to jury trials?

Claire Waxman: Yes, I am absolutely aware of it.

[Dr Mullan]

Q My next, very simple question is: do you accept that there is a diversity of opinion among those representing victims about whether it is the right step to take?

Claire Waxman: That letter was actually around victims who have been criminalised, so it is a different issue; they are dealing with victims who are defendants in the system, not victims who are complainants.

[Dr Mullan]

Welsh Women’s Aid?

Claire Waxman: Yes, they are talking about criminalisation, which is an appalling failing of our criminal justice system.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Sorry—we have to be really tight—you think Welsh Women’s Aid does not necessarily speak for victims?

Claire Waxman: In that letter, the focus is on the criminalisation of victims, which is awful. The overlap of criminalisation and victimisation needs to be dealt with way earlier on in the system.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Sorry, we have to be really tight with the questions. Do you think, if I were to ask Welsh Women’s Aid, they would say, “We support the changes to jury trials”?

Claire Waxman: In that letter, they are saying they are not—[Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Kieran, can we just ask a question and get the answer?

Claire Waxman: You would need to ask Welsh Women’s Aid. They have signed up to a slightly different tone of a letter, which is around the criminalisation of victims coming into the system as defendants. It is very different to the victims I listen to—

[Dr Mullan]

Q You have made that point.

Claire Waxman: Victims are complex—

[Dr Mullan]

Sorry, but you have made that point. I am asking you a very specific question. Do you think Welsh Women’s Aid supports the change to jury trials?

Claire Waxman: We know they do not, because they have signed that letter—

[Dr Mullan]

They do not—thank you. That is fine. I have finished.

Claire Waxman But that is at odds with a number of the victims I speak to, just to be clear.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q My first question is for Professor Katrin Hohl. There are measures in the Bill that address the admissibility of evidence in RASSO cases. How will those measures ameliorate the position for victims of those sorts of crimes?

Professor Hohl: The measures in the Bill that address sexual offences broadly fall into two groups. The first group clarifies and tightens admissibility rules around sexual history evidence and previous reports of sexual violence that may be portrayed as so-called “victim bad character”, tightening that threshold to better protect victims from unnecessary, intrusive and unfounded lines of questioning. We very much welcome those.

There is also a set around special measures, which effectively clarify how they should apply. Those are also very welcome, and my understanding is that they are largely uncontroversial; they seem to be welcomed across the board.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Kieran has asked me to come back in, but please keep it tight.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I want to pick up on this discussion of the letter, which I think you characterised as coming from the perspective of women and girls as defendants in the system, not victims. I want to read you part of the letter:

“The Government’s proposed reforms will likely create significant operational disruption and practical challenges that pull resources from more effective measures to reduce the backlog. This would prolong the uncertainty that leads many survivors to withdraw support for the prosecution of their abuser.”

Do you accept that the letter does, in fact, also talk about the impact on victims of the jury trial changes?

Claire Waxman: If you read the letter, it focuses on the victim coming in as a defendant, but it is also—

[Dr Mullan]

Q Sorry, I have just read you a direct quote about them as victims. Do you accept that it is in there?

Claire Waxman: You have to read the whole context of the letter—you have pulled out one bit. The whole context of that letter really focuses on listening to women who are wrongly being criminalised, as opposed to victims.

[Dr Mullan]

Q People will have heard the quote and they can make up their own minds.

Claire Waxman: I would urge you to read the letter that has been written and signed by 18 victims, instead of disregarding it—it is really important to read it.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I have read it, and I have just read you a quote. If you do not want to take a common quote at its face value, that is fine.

Claire Waxman: Can I just remind you that we have victims in the room, and I think that is really important?

[The Chair]

Order. We cannot have a row going on.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Dame Vera, you talked about Charlotte’s powerful testimony. Would you accept that Charlotte has said it is wrong to use the voice of victims to advocate purely for reforms, as though all victims agree with them, and that she is opposed to the reforms?

Dame Vera Baird: Yes, but she is on her own—

[Dr Mullan]

Oh dear!

Dame Vera Baird: Kieran, you are not listening to what Claire says—she is right. The women’s movement is very disappointed with the Bill because it does not tackle the issue of criminalisation of women. They think that dealing with delays in the list is a very poor substitute, and they will not have it. They want to stand up at last for a proper defence of coercively controlled women who are put into crime—goodness knows it has been long enough coming—but that does not appear in the Bill. The women’s movement is very upset about that, and in my view that has driven this. I do not doubt—

[Dr Mullan]

Q I think it is very unfortunate for you to refer to Charlotte as being “on her own” in that way. It is very disrespectful.

[The Chair]

Order.

Dame Vera Baird: No, it is not at all disrespectful. Natalie Fleet, who has also been abused, takes the opposite view. She does not want to be weaponised, Kieran, and that is a very sound point. None the less, her example is appalling, and nobody could doubt her. The man was acquitted, but a judge believed her, so what is your argument now? Judges are not fair.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

Q May I ask for a clarification? Is Charlotte on her own in her views? Is she the only person who holds the views she has expressed?

Dame Vera Baird: Of course not, and I did not intend to say that. I have been trying to think, since we discussed it, about how I would feel if my experience were being used for a political cause, and it had been a very nasty experience. I might feel the same sort of—I do not know whether it is resentment or disappointment, or whether it is that it was inappropriate. I can well understand that, but many other victims do not agree that this will not help.

Women are waking up every morning, for three or four years, dreading the day when they will have to relive what happened to them in rape cases, or a man who has been very badly beaten up might wake every morning, worrying that he will have to relive it. It goes on and on like that, because there is a right to demand—as, I am afraid, I would phrase it—a trial for relatively small offences. I do not make little of them, but those will be in the queue. If Charlotte’s case is coming up next Monday, all the cases that have elected for trial before hers will be in the queue in front of it.

[Dr Mullan]

indicated dissent.

Dame Vera Baird: I see Kieran shaking his head, but there is no other way. There is a limited opportunity to give priority to cases. Obviously a very important point is whether the defendant is in custody. Most rape defendants are not in custody, because it is a “one word against the other” case, so they cannot be given any real priority for that reason. We end up very regularly with cases that took as long as Charlotte’s. That is really awful for a large number of victims. It also gives very little to the people who want this right: 64% of people who elect for trial plead guilty before they get to trial. You have to ask why they are electing for trial if they are going to plead guilty, but they have blocked up the jury list all of that time. This is about freeing up the jury list.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Q In the previous panel, Sir Brian asked how we could model something that had never been trialled. As a panel, would you support a pilot of what the Government are suggesting, so we can take the qualitative data and see whether it makes a fundamental difference, or we should go now and not, for example, put a sunset clause in?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Impressively brief. If we can have those kind of pithy answers—and pithy questions, by the way—we can get through our questions and cover as much ground as possible.

[Dr Mullan]

Q First, I am very grateful for you coming today to give evidence. We often debate things and hear from third parties but nothing is more important than hearing from people, such as yourselves, who have direct experience, even if we do not necessarily agree with the policy outcomes that might flow from that. Because it is so important, can you open with the experiences that you think are most important to get across to the Committee? Then we are clear that everybody has had an opportunity to make the points that are important to them. Farah, I know that you are representing an organisation, but perhaps you could start.

Farah Nazeer: I am conscious that there are victim-survivors here as well, so I will be brief. In the Bill, we are pleased to see the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. That is absolutely critical. We know that the vast majority of survivors of domestic abuse do not go into the criminal justice system. Only one in five women will ever report to the police, so they find themselves in the family courts. The repeal will make a huge difference to them.

We now need to see the culture around that change. We have had a pro-contact culture in the family courts for a very long time. We can see through our experience working with vast numbers of survivors every day that the vast majority of judges are not as aware as they should be of domestic abuse and coercive control—they are not trauma-informed. We need to see judges trained to be able to apply this effectively.

We also see that, across all those other safeguarding contexts for children, such as health and safety, police and schools, there is mandatory training required, and a framework and infrastructure. Strangely, there is not the same infrastructure here, where you are actually talking about children’s lives and wellbeing. I previously heard a comment about how we cannot mandate judges to have training, but perhaps you should be mandating, because you do so in every other safeguarding context.

For further context, the majority of people affected by domestic abuse are children; we have more children in our refuges across the country than we do adults. It is a huge safeguarding matter, and I would encourage the Committee to think about mandatory training for judges.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Jade, do you want to come in?

Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: I come from an angle of delay being a key factor. While my case was dropped 13 days before trial, from report to court it would have been 1,317 days, which is now becoming quite the norm. I regularly hear fellow victims advising on very similar situations, and how they feel about that and how it changes their perspective on wanting to navigate the justice process. If people are telling us that they would not necessarily come back into the system, for me, that is the clearest possible signal that change is not optional but very much overdue.

We published a letter last week in response to the Bar Council’s letter, just to try to centre lived experience in this conversation and debate, which felt like it had been predominantly missing. In statements of support, a couple of victims have described the process of waiting for court and the delays as “extreme harm”—that was from Victoria. Sarah advised that she felt “suffering, gaslighting and anxiety”.

Charlotte said that report to court was “total agony” and that we need to reduce the suffering. Jane advised that it felt like years on “eggshells, in limbo”. She said:

“Waiting years with no guarantee of getting justice is like torture.”

Charlotte—another Charlotte—advised of the delays that:

“They shape our lives, our ability to move forward, and our trust in justice itself.”

Those are important and strong statements from women describing that process. That is the angle that I come from.

Charlotte Meijer: We have also handed the letter over to one of your colleagues, so that the Committee can read it. I was seen in a magistrates court, so having the recording of magistrates courts that is in the Bill is incredibly important. That transparency, which I did not have, will really change victims’ lives, whether that is just to understand what happened in their trial or to hold people to account.

I did not have a good experience with my judge, but I am still pro my case being seen by a judge. I am so glad that my perpetrator chose that—although there is an issue with that in itself, as they should not be able to choose, and I am glad to see that being taken away. I am so glad I was seen in front of a judge, because to me a judge is educated in all aspects—or should be, as there is a definite need of training, as has been said—while 12 strangers off the street all have their own biases. We know that one in four men are generally perpetrators, so that could be three on the panel that is judging you and your case.

For me, having transparency really changes things. We talk about justice and the system being closed, so if we have more recording and transcripts, it will really help people. There is something that is not in the Bill that I would love to see; I have fought for the last three years for sentencing remarks to be made free, which we did earlier this year, but I believe that is not going to extend to magistrates courts. If they are now being recorded, my belief is that they should also be free in that way.

One thing that I think is also really important in this discussion, where there is so much pushback against more cases going to magistrates courts, is that coercive control essentially involves rape—it involves coercive sex—and yet it is seen in a magistrates court. When we talk about how only the worst crimes are being seen by juries, and they need to be seen by juries, what does that mean about all the other crimes, including domestic abuse and coercive control, that are being seen in magistrates courts? Are we saying that they are not getting fair trials as it is? We believe that they are, so why is there such pushback at the moment about more cases going to magistrates courts? Magistrates are laypeople as well, so there is still that accountability from the general public.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Thank you very much. Morwenna?

Morwenna Loughman: Thank you for having us all here. I waited two and a half years for my rape trial to go ahead. It was delayed twice—each time, the day before we were due in court. The second time it was delayed, it was actually confirmed, and then five hours later, on email, we were told that it was not going ahead. He had lied his way out on bail and breached his bail conditions 23 times. During those two and a half years, I lost my job, I lost my home and I developed acute PTSD, a side effect of which was a repeated vomiting syndrome, which meant that I had to go to hospital to have my oesophagus repaired.

I am also here to speak about juries not being bastions of infallibility. The treatment of the jury that I experienced was one of attrition. In particular, the foreman came out at one point and asked the judge, “If she’d been raped so many times, why did she not leave earlier?”

I would also like to talk about the treatment of victims while they are on the stand. During cross-examination, I experienced pervasive and repeated use of rape myths and stereotypes in a way to deliberately mislead the jury against me.

[Dr Mullan]

I am really sorry for the experiences that you have had, and certainly for any role that we played in government in not better addressing these delays and the challenges that you faced. The consequences of that are really powerfully illustrated by the things that you have talked about, so thank you for sharing that. I really hear all the evidence that you have given.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q Let me echo the shadow Minister’s thanks to you for being here. I appreciate that you have spoken in Parliament on other occasions, but I do not underestimate what it takes to repeat those stories again and again so that people like us can be educated on what that first-hand experience feels like.

Charlotte, I wanted to pick up on something that you said. You talked about transparency and about the benefit that the recording of proceedings in the magistrates court would have. We are committed, as part of these reforms, to recording all proceedings in the magistrates court. Can you describe and explain what difference you think that might have made in cases like yours?

Charlotte Meijer: Definitely. After I gave my evidence in my trial, I left. The gallery was not somewhere I could sit safely. It was a tiny bench. His best mate and his sister were sat there, so I could not really go and sit between them.

I had said to the CPS and the police that I might want to come and hear the verdict. I was not given that opportunity, unfortunately. I got a call from my independent sexual violence adviser to say that the verdict had been made and that he was found not guilty. From that day, I really wanted to understand what had happened. For me, it was a very clearcut case of coercive control. I cannot go into too much detail, because he was found not guilty, but there was a huge age difference and there was a power imbalance and so forth, so I never understood how he was found not guilty.

The judge also made some comments. She said that, because I waited eight months to report, I was unreliable, and that I had clearly spoken to other victims of domestic abuse, so I knew what to say. Those comments really stuck by me. For my healing, and for me to be able to move on, I just needed to understand what was said in court, so I went to ask for the transcripts, of which of course in the magistrates courts there are none. It is definitely twofold: I wanted to understand what happened for my healing, but I also still want to hold that judge to account, because the things she said are not true and should not be said by someone who should be in a position of power and education.

I also think there is an important argument to be made around transparency, because people do not feel that the system is transparent—and to be fair, if it is not recorded, it is not. If you cannot sit in the gallery, if no one can watch and if there are no transcripts, then it is not. It is important to have the ability to record everything so that people can listen back, whether that is for their healing or for their understanding, or to hold people to account. We need to be able to hold people who are in power to account.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I know that Kieran and Jess wanted to come back in. Kieran Mullan first—briefly, please.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I want to ask about something called the unduly lenient sentence scheme. I will start with you, Morwenna, as a person who went through the Crown court process, because it is not applicable in the magistrates court at the moment. Were you aware of the unduly lenient sentence scheme when the sentencing was given?

Morwenna Loughman: I was aware of it. He is actually appealing the length of sentence at the moment, but has not yet been granted leave to do so.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I guess I am focusing on the perspective of victims and victims’ right to appeal. As I mentioned, with magistrates court cases you do not have a right to say that you thought the sentence was unduly lenient. I think that is because, when the scheme was set up, the maximum sentence was six months—perhaps there are questions about the ability and meaningfulness of that.

Obviously, an increased sentencing length means that someone could be sentenced for three years in a magistrates court, without a right to appeal that sentence. This question is to all three of you. Do you think it is important to ensure that, even if we increase sentence lengths in the magistrates court, victims have the opportunity, in certain circumstances, to appeal sentences that they think are unduly lenient?

Charlotte Meijer: Yes.

Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: Straight and to the point: yes.

[The Chair]

Excellent. That is the best answer we have had—definitive and short. Great.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Q69 Before we start hearing from witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill? No. We will now hear oral evidence from the Bar Council of England and Wales and the Criminal Bar Association. We have until 2.30 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

Kirsty Brimelow: My name is Kirsty Brimelow, a King’s counsel. My practice, until my election as chair of the Bar Council, where I started on 1 January this year, was in criminal law, public law and international law. In particular, I have worked on reforming sexual offences legislation across Europe and also conducted and led training to improve practices in court for victims, particularly in sexual offences globally. I am now chair of the Bar Council, which means I lead around 18,000 barristers across England and Wales.

Riel Karmy-Jones: My name is Riel Karmy-Jones. I am a criminal barrister with over 30 years’ experience, and I am also chair of the Criminal Bar Association. I became King’s counsel in 2015, and a significant part of my practice has revolved around prosecuting cases involving serious sexual offences and vulnerable victims. I was senior counsel to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, and led the investigation into the Roman Catholic Church—specifically, the English Benedictine congregation. I have spent a considerable part of the last 30 years working on cases with victims, so they are very much at the forefront of my mind when I give this evidence.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

Q Good afternoon to you both, and thank you very much for coming. Ms Karmy-Jones, I want to pick up your remark about having victims at the heart of your thinking. You will have heard evidence, either through the earlier hearings or in the public debates surrounding this issue, that some victims’ advocates are insisting that these reforms are necessary to support victims. Has that give you any pause for thought about the positions that you have taken? If not, why not?

Riel Karmy-Jones: We start from a presumption of innocence in a criminal case, so if I say “victim” and “complainant”, no disrespect is meant. Hearing any victim speak about what they have been through is shocking and has a huge impact on all of us at the criminal Bar, but we are the ones who, day in and day out, deal with them and have to explain to them why things have gone wrong.

One of the things that I heard this morning gave me pause for thought, in the sense that some of our processes are poor. Clearly, the processes in place are not being properly followed. That does not change my approach to the Bill, because fundamentally there is a disconnect between clauses 1 to 7, on the right to jury trial, and clauses 8 to 16.

As I will be arguing, we have issues with clauses 1 to 7 and think they should be struck out. We largely support clauses 8 to 16—the victims measures. They are good measures, and in fact there are some things that we would propose to strengthen them further. I would encourage you to look that way. This Bill is about making cases move more swiftly, and jury trials do not impact on that question, as even Sir Brian Leveson acknowledged this morning.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Do you think it is unfair to characterise people like you, who oppose those elements, as being in any way not concerned with victims—as being anti victims’ rights or experiences?

Riel Karmy-Jones: Absolutely. I have sat and held the hands of many, many victims of really serious sexual offences. I have talked to them before, during and after the cases. Trust me when I say that those who prosecute these cases feel very intensely about the victims, so that would be a complete mischaracterisation—and frankly, it has hit the criminal Bar very hard and made us quite angry.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Do you want to add anything to that, Ms Brimelow?

Kirsty Brimelow: It is really sad that some of the political messaging has been positioning barristers against victims. It is barristers who prosecute in the courts every day and give voice to victims and complainants in court, enabling their evidence to be heard. It is the barristers in court who apply the law and safeguards around those witnesses so that they are not subject to inappropriate questioning—I know we will come on to that.

The key to your question is that nobody wants to see complainants—victims—waiting, and having the trauma of waiting. That is what we are focusing on. In doing that, we take into account the non-governmental organisations that represent the violence against women and girls sector. Rights of Women was the lead NGO on a letter a couple of weeks ago—it decided to write it independently, without having been approached. It set out its concern about reducing jury trials. Its concern is not only that there are victims of violence who become defendants but, as it sets out clearly in the letter, there is, unfortunately, discrimination and a lack of trust in the criminal justice system.

Overall, the jury system is seen as the only part that still works, so why are we focusing on that? We want to focus on all those aspects that will reduce delays now, rather than hacking at a constitutional cornerstone, which also reflects community participation.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Right. You mentioned the letter. It also refers to these reforms as a potential distraction from some of the hard work that you talk about. You may have heard that this morning the Victims’ Commissioner characterised that letter as being purely about the perspective of women and girls in relation to their being defendants. Do you think that is a fair and accurate characterisation of that letter?

Kirsty Brimelow: No, it is not, because that is not actually what it says. The letter sets out that they are against curbing jury trials because of the lack of trust in the criminal justice system, and that impacts those from minoritised communities in particular. We know from the statistics that black defendants and women by majority elect to go to the Crown court. Those are the ones who have trust in the jury system. That is the objection within the letter. I am sorry to see that she is mischaracterised in that way, because that is not what the letter is about.

The letter does say that it is a crude approach to characterise victims as simply those who are complainants: victims can also end up as defendants, and we have had many examples of that. I had a case at the end of last year representing a woman who was subject, clearly, to coercive control and, in part, physical abuse. She ended up a defendant, and the jury heard from her about how she ended up getting in the position she did alongside the man who was controlling her. They acquitted her; they convicted him.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

Q I am going to direct my questions to Ms Brimelow. I think we agree that the delays in our criminal justice system are a scandal and that something needs to be done about them, don’t we?

Kirsty Brimelow: Yes, of course. That has always been the position.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Q We will now hear evidence from Claire Davies KC, Samantha Hillas KC and Caroline Goodwin KC. We have until 3 pm for this panel. Could the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Claire Davies: I am Claire Davies, King’s counsel. I am leader of the south-eastern circuit, which covers London and the whole of the south-east of England. My main practice is in criminal law.

Samantha Hillas: My name is Sam Hillas KC. I am leader of the northern circuit, which is in the north-west of England, from Chester to Carlisle. I am a family barrister.

Caroline Goodwin: My name is Caroline Goodwin KC. I practise in criminal law. I am the leader of the north-eastern Circuit. We cover a very large geographical area, from Newcastle through to Sheffield, encompassing Leeds and York and so on.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Given your experience of seeing how proceedings flow in the courtroom on a day-to-day basis, I want to talk to you about modelling and the estimates of how much time will be saved. In relation to the proposed new Crown Court bench division, Sir Brian Leveson’s report says:

“Modelling assumes cases sent to the CCBD are 20% quicker to try than Crown Court cases with a jury and that the same proportion of cases ultimately plead guilty. However this… 20% assumption is highly uncertain”.

Do you agree that the central assumption is highly uncertain? What are your views about how will this operate in practice?

Claire Davies: We agree it is uncertain. When you go into a court trial process involving a jury, the types of cases that will go before these courts are generally the three to four or maybe five-day trials. When you look at those, the jury involvement is such that the only time that you would really save, so far as we can see, is in the swearing in of a jury, which takes 15 to 20 minutes, and maybe a factual summing up from the judge, which tends not to be very long in these cases. We therefore see the saving as minimal, because to maintain open justice, the evidence must be heard in court. That is very important for the public to understand what happens in our courtrooms.

Sir Brian Leveson suggested this morning that judges would be more interventionist, saving more time and getting to the point. While one can see on the one hand that that is an attractive argument, it simply cannot happen because the defendant and the witnesses are there and the public needs to know what the evidence is. It is all very well saying that a judge can read the papers effectively, and that they do not need to elaborate on it in court and can get to the issues, but that would defeat the very important principle of open justice, so we do not agree that the time savings will be as significant for those reasons.

[Dr Mullan]

Q The other thing that Sir Brian says—this is in relation to the Crown court bench division, but it is replicated across all his major recommendations—is:

“Should the MoJ consider pursuing this course of action, it may wish to consider undertaking further detailed analysis in order to understand the potential time-saving fully.”

Besides the stakeholder engagement exercise, are you aware of any of the “further detailed analysis” that Sir Brian said was necessary before coming to any conclusions about the time savings of the policies?

Samantha Hillas: No.

[Dr Mullan]

Thank you.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q It is good to see you all again. We have had a number of engagements over the past year, so it is good to be able to engage once again. You have heard a number of different witnesses from a number of different angles on the scandalous delays in our criminal courts. As circuit leaders, I expect you agree with me that something needs to be done to address it. I am looking at Claire, because I know the problems are especially acute in the south-east. I am right about that, aren’t I?

Claire Davies: Yes, and I agree that something has to be done.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)]

Q Thank you for coming today. My question is for Claire Davies. The open caseload is 80,000 and is projected by some potentially to rise to 200,000. In your evidence so far, you have not been able to identify a timeframe for the measures that you would prefer to be the focus at the moment. Do you think that victims would view that with concern, given that we have all agreed that justice delayed is justice denied?

Claire Davies: Of course they are going to view it with concern—it is common sense that anyone would be concerned—but we need to have the opportunity, which we have not been given, to demonstrate that in fact it will not reach that high with the measures that we support.

Efficiency in our system has long been lacking, despite repeated efforts, and this Government have shown that they will invest, and substantial investment is what is needed. We are not afraid of change—we make that absolutely clear. A lot more use could be made of technology in our courts; remote courtrooms could take the shorter hearings away from the trial courts so that they can concentrate on what they should be doing and have the full use of a court day to maximise that.

It is a combination of features in the trial, but the matters that we have proposed—you heard this morning, as well, that we encourage the use of specialised courts—would have a dramatic impact. You have to remember that new sentencing provisions came into force on 22 March, and we believe that they will also have a dramatic impact on the current caseload. The ability to give suspended sentences for a longer period of up to three years will have an impact, as will efficiency measures and, most importantly, the investment that the Government have made in relation to uncapped sitting days. All of that, combined, will have a dramatic impact, to the point that losing, or curtailing, the right to jury trial—because we are not losing it completely. We make that clear and accept it. We say that it is not necessary to lose the legitimacy that juries bring to our court system.

The judiciary have made great strides in their diversity, but they are still not representative of the communities they serve. The equalities statement makes clear the way that people elect those of different ethnic backgrounds. Given all of that combined, we would urge that clauses 1 to 7, which deal with repealing or restricting the right to a jury trial under certain circumstances, are not brought into force. There are many more ways in which action can be taken.

[Dr Mullan]

Q What is your comment on the fact that the Government are asking us to support and understand the estimates of Sir Brian Leveson based on his experience, and to accept modelling that is uncertain, but when you and thousands of others sign a letter criticising them, using that same experience to justify your views, we are told, “That’s not credible. Surely, you need to listen to Sir Brian.”

[The Chair]

You have 30 seconds to respond.

Claire Davies: Frankly, the answer is that we are the ones who are in court day in, day out doing the job. With the greatest of respect to Sir Brian, he is not doing the job in the current day and age—we are.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Following the Divisions in the Chamber, the timings for this afternoon will be adjusted. I will announce at the start of each panel when the questioning will start and end. We already heard your introduction before the votes, Claire. If you do not mind, we will jump straight into the questions.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Thanks ever so much for coming, and for your patience with the parliamentary procedure. I know that these things are really challenging sometimes, so I want to thank you in advance for talking about difficult things. Also, rather than being dependent on what we may ask you, I want to give you the opportunity to lay out two or three points that you really want to get across to us today.

Claire Throssell: Thank you for the question, and I have four points that I really want to get across this afternoon. First, I want to make it clear that presumption has no place when it comes to children’s safety. Presumption has no place when it comes to children’s lives. Presumption has no place when it comes to our lives.

What happened to Jack and Paul was based on a series of presumptions under practice direction 12J, and you have to ask the question: why did a professional working for CAFCASS, after being barricaded in her office, presume that Jack and Paul were safe to go on a visit? Why did she presume that I was exaggerating, despite me telling her and a court—let us be clear that I did—that he was capable of killing? Why was it presumed that it was okay to ignore my voice? Why did they presume that two children would be safe when they had clear evidence in front of them that they would not be?

We are talking about presumption, and people say, “Yes, the practice direction is there in the Children Act 1989.” Let us be clear: there are 68 children who have died under that Act. There are 68 children who have died under practice direction 12J. I say again: presumption has no place when it comes to children’s safety.

I am going to show some evidence now, and I show these pictures not to shock or upset people, but to show the reality of presumption of contact. I would like to show you two photographs, the first of which shows Jack and Paul. They were never child A and child B in a serious case review. They are child 18 and child 19 in a Women’s Aid report that looked into how many children have died at the hands of known perpetrators of domestic abuse.

This 12-year-old boy, Jack, died believing that he had saved the life of his younger brother, because I never told him differently—I held both my sons in my arms as they died. Jack’s voice was never heard; the day he was supposed to have his interview with CAFCASS was the day that he died in my arms. The only time this boy’s voice was heard was on a landing, when he spoke to a fireman and a doctor. Although he was dying, he used as much of his strength as he could to tell as many people in that property, “My dad did this, and he did it on purpose.” This was taken by the police as a dying testimony. Why did they not take his words in life? Why did they take his words in death?

This second photograph of Jack is again evidence of what happens with presumption of contact. The first photograph of Jack was taken in the July, and this second photograph shows Jack in the October. CAFCASS and a court presumed that this boy would be safe. Social services presumed that this boy would be safe. This boy died believing that he had saved the life of his brother, and more importantly, he thought of everybody else but himself. When people should have protected him, he went back for his brother. He gave his brother his hand. He gave his brother his strength. He was there for his brother, but who was there for him at 12 years old? Not the court that ordered contact because of the culture in the family courts that contact is in the best interests of the child—that they should see both parents.

Jack had nobody, and he thought about me—he made sure that everybody in the property knew that I was not to blame. As a parent, I am ashamed of that, because it was my role to protect them. Let us be clear that I have to live with the fact that they died only because a domestic abuser wanted to punish me. A family court allowed him to do that, but these two beautiful boys only lost their lives because of me.

When we talk about repealing presumption of contact, let us look at it: over 30 years, children have died. In 2014, Jack and Paul were child 18 and child 19. Let us face the fact that, in 2026, we are at 68 children. That is not good enough, because every child deserves to live. Every child deserves to have a childhood, and their childhood should not be allowed to be torn apart piece by piece by seeing a perpetrator of domestic abuse—by seeing a person who just wants to hurt them, humiliate them and punish an ex-partner.

Children have one childhood. Children at risk of harm only have today; they do not have tomorrow. You have a chance—a lifesaving opportunity—right here, right now to make a difference to children’s lives, not just today, not just tomorrow, but for generations of children to come. It is no surprise that there are many people in their 20s with mental health issues. Mental health has never been as bad as it is right now in young people. And why is that? It is because they are made to see a parent who is hurting them. They are made to see a parent who is harming them. It might not be physical, and it might not be the ultimate act, like it was for Jack and Paul, but if a child comes back from a visit and they are different from how they were when they went on the visit, let us be clear: that is child abuse.

Children are supposed to have a voice. Children are supposed to have opinions. But all too often there are too many other voices in this complex system that are louder than the child. We hear about parental rights all the time, but around children’s rights there is a deafening silence. We have an Act that protects them: the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. They are supposed to be seen as victims in their own right, and yet, up and down our country, their rights are still being walked over—not only their rights under the Domestic Abuse Act, but their human rights too. They have the same rights as we do. They are people; they are humans; they are themselves. Their basic rights—to live, to thrive, to live in privacy, to live in peace—are being broken in courts up and down the country. That is not good enough. They are the future of this country, and if we get this wrong, what does the future of our country look like? What have we got for the future? They are not being allowed to live as they want to live. They are not being allowed to be free. They are certainly not allowed to thrive. If you go to school, college or university and you have suffered that morning, how are you going to learn? How is that conducive to achieving in life and being who you could be?

I used to tell the boys, “Be the best that you can be today.” They only had today. Right now, with this Bill repealing presumption of contact, we can give every child in this country the tomorrow that not just Jack and Paul, but 66 other children will never see. This issue is bigger than Jack and Paul, but they were my reality. They were my children. They were the better parts of me.

But 66 children are anonymous. Successive Governments have made them a child A or a child B in a serious case review, to gather dust in a file in Whitehall or around here, just brushed under the carpet. Serious case reviews—lessons must be learnt. I can ask everybody in here, “What lessons have we learnt?”, because every year we are losing more children, and we are losing more children because of practice direction 12J, because of presumption of contact. There should never be presumption—not in law, not when it comes to safety, not when it comes to lives. You would not go in a court and presume that somebody is guilty.

[The Chair]

Thank you so much for that; thank you for sharing.

[Dr Mullan]

I know that these words will not necessarily shift your view, but I do not think anybody in this room would think that any of that was your fault, or that you should share any of the blame for what happened to your children. Your testimony is really powerful.

[Sarah Sackman]

Thank you, Claire, for sharing such a powerful testimony. I think I first met you during a Westminster Hall debate, which was called by your tireless and fearless MP Marie Tidball, the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge. Your testimony is compelling and it is why we are bringing forward the provision in clause 17 of the Bill to repeal the presumption of parental contact. We know that will not protect every single child, but it does send quite an important message about what we in Parliament say, which is that the courts should always have at the forefront of their minds the best interests of the child, and that alone. I just want to say thank you.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Wonderful. Thank you very much.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Hello, Mr Downey. I am Dr Kieran Mullan, the shadow Justice Minister. I want to begin by asking you about what read-over we might get in relation to challenges you have had with court backlogs. Do you have experience of waiting times and backlogs that increased from an ordinary level and were brought back down again? What did you do to secure that?

Doug Downey: Absolutely. As we went into covid, we were developing backlogs, and then of course through covid we had more. I can share some specific numbers with you if you wish. For a sense of scale, we have about 250,000 cases a year that come into the system, and the backlog made that grow quite significantly. We are chunking our way through it, if I can put it that way, and employing technology processes and increasing capacity across the system.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Has there been any change over that period in the use of jury trials? Have you used them more or less?

Doug Downey: We have not made changes to the jury trials, but we have made changes to compensation for jurors and how we get responses from jurors electronically versus in paper, and we changed our jury rolls. But in terms of what juries apply to, we have not made changes during that period.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Would it be fair to say that you had an increase in the backlog and then a decrease, without making any changes to the extent of the use of jury trials?

Doug Downey: We have not used that as one of the levers. To give a sense of scale, about 96% of our trials are judge-alone, so in terms of making a change, it would be to add more juries, which I would suggest, based on the data and experience we have, would move us in the wrong direction on the backlog.

[Dr Mullan]

Q We have covered jury trials and changes around that, but if you were going to pick one or two other things that you did that you think had the biggest impact on reducing your backlog, what would they be?

Doug Downey: Increasing capacity across the system. We have different levels of court: the Ontario court and the superior court. The Ontario court has a complement of approximately 300 judges. We have added 52 to that complement. In addition, when we add a judge, we add seven full-time staff, whether it be Crown prosecutors, victim service workers or whatnot. In total, we added about 700 full-time staff over that period. Building that capacity has helped. The challenge we have is the increasing rate of intake. There are theories on why that is, but it is a fact that we are dealing with.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q It was very good to have the chance to meet not just you, Mr Downey, but many of the judges at the superior court of Ontario on my recent visit to Canada. I am glad that you are able to join us. I want to ask you about two things: the efficiency and the pace with which judge-alone trials are conducted, as compared with jury trials, within your system, and your perceptions of the fairness and integrity of those judge-alone trials. As you just explained in response to the shadow Minister, judge-alone trials in the criminal court have been a feature of the Canadian system for decades, I understand.

Doug Downey: Absolutely. They have been in place for quite some time. They produce a number of benefits for the system. It is not just the length of trials; it is the expertise that can be brought to bear by an experienced judge. To become a judge, you have to have a minimum of 10 years’ experience at the Bar. It can also create scheduling advantages, because you do not have to schedule contiguously; you can have a break in a trial and come back a few days later, and not have to manage the jury in that sense. There are cost consequences, but there are also scheduling and efficiency consequences that we harness. More than 95% of our cases are judge-alone, but there is a mechanism by which the individuals can choose judge or jury. We put that in the hands of the accused. By and large, they choose judge.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. We have only 15 minutes for this session, so I would like to go into our questions now, but hopefully we will cover the other points you want to make.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Hello. I am the shadow Minister. With witnesses such as you, I think it is important to be really clear about the areas about which you can and cannot comment. Does that make sense?

Chief Constable Hatchett: Yes.

[Dr Mullan]

Would I be correct in saying that it should not be inferred from anything you say today about the issues that need to be addressed, the challenges that victims are experiencing and the challenges in policing that you support, for example, a reduction in jury trials? The National Police Chiefs’ Council does not have any views on that.

Chief Constable Hatchett: No, we do not.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Thank you. Are there particular parts of the process that you have observed and want to raise? Police officers often attend court and are often witnesses. In your experience, what are the processes that fall down? What makes you sit there shaking your head and wishing it had not happened? What prevents you from getting a conviction secured or a court hearing brought forward?

Chief Constable Hatchett: Obviously, there are the adjournments and the upset to victims and witnesses, including police witnesses. I just want to make the point that for the whole time the adjournments are taking place—you are sometimes looking to 2030—the risk in the community is being managed by policing. Whether the person has a tag or is on court bail, with or without conditions, they are being managed in the community by policing.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Let me move away from the court to policing, which obviously is the area that you are most familiar with. What one or two things could policing do better, or be allowed to do differently, to enable you to shorten the timeframe on your side of a victim’s journey?

Chief Constable Hatchett: I am really conscious that the Bill takes it from the point of charge and into the court system. We are working with the Crown Prosecution Service and in policing to see how we can decrease the time from the point of the recording of the crime to when we actually get a charge. There are initiatives going on with the Crown Prosecution Service, so maybe more will come into policing for charging. Some work is being done on redaction and on rebuttable presumption disclosure. There are a number of pilots going on to see how we can streamline the system to make that part as short as possible, recognising that no matter what we do there—and there is complexity in policing in terms of the investigations, the digital forensics and the third-party evidence that all adds to the delay—once there is a charge, there is a challenge in how you get through the process as quickly as possible, so that we do not have victims and witnesses who are not prepared to give evidence because of delays.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q It would be helpful for the Committee to understand the impact that the delays, which I think we all agree are intolerable, are having on policing generally. If you could speak to some of your first-hand experience of that, it would be helpful.

Chief Constable Hatchett: I talked briefly about the witness care units, which have had an increasing demand placed upon them since 2019-20. There are two other areas. There is greater demand on investigators. We are managing a growing number of caseloads for an extended period of time. If you think about the requirement of the prosecution team, we are obliged to continually review evidence, so the longer it takes to go through the court process, the more reviews are required. That requires rework. That also could mean changes to the officer on the case or the prosecutor, which then asks for additional work. From an investigation perspective, there is an impact on policing.

The management of risk in the community also falls to police, as I mentioned. You will have individuals who are remanded by police. They are remanded into the court process; a proportion of them will be then taken to prison, so they will be managed within the prison estate. However, the vast majority of the individuals will not go into the prison system. They will either be on conditional or unconditional bail. A proportion of them—about 9,500—are on a court tag. That means that they would have gone into the prison system if not for the fact that they had tags with conditions associated with them. Then, if there are breaches in relation to the tags or the conditional bail, that adds on to policing, which is then expected to manage those individuals, arrest them and take them back into the court process.

It is not just the investigations, and it is not just the victim care side of things; it is the management of risk in the community. We sometimes do that with risk assessments, and we do it with multi-agency public protection arrangements and multi-agency working, but there is still that risk, and we are managing that risk for longer.

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[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. We will have until 5.24 pm. Will you please briefly introduce yourself to the Committee?

Daniel Flury: I am Daniel Flury. I am the operations director in His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and I am also the senior responsible officer in HMCTS for the implementation of the outcomes of the Leveson reports.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Similarly to the question that I asked of the chief constable, it is important that we understand the constraints on your evidence. This is stated Government policy; would I be correct in saying that it is not within your remit to criticise or say that the stated Government policy was wrong?

Daniel Flury: It is not within my remit, no.

[Dr Mullan]

Q So we cannot take anything you say as being objective on the overall question of whether or not we should do this policy—you have to support the policy. In terms of the modelling, you will have seen in Brian Leveson’s report that he frequently refers to his assumptions being estimates, and to the Department’s need to do further detailed modelling. Could you point us to the further detailed modelling that the Department undertook in response to those requests from Sir Brian? Where is that further detailed modelling that the Department undertook?

Daniel Flury: That modelling is not undertaken by HMCTS. It is undertaken by the Ministry of Justice, and there are analytical teams. We produce projections and assessments on a routine basis—things like projections around the Crown court caseload, prison populations and so on. The findings and outcomes of the Leveson reports, and whatever happens with the Bill, will be factored into those projections, which are updated on a six-monthly basis, in terms of caseload projections, and are routinely shared with Ministers, and occasionally published.

[Dr Mullan]

Q We are talking about the forward-looking modelling. For example, as you said, you have the data for what we do now and how we do it. But we are proposing reforms. If we wanted to say that a judge would do the consideration and summing up of evidence and the writing up of his thoughts on why he came to a decision, there is no evidence within our system for how long that might take?

Daniel Flury: No—we have obviously never operated in this way, or this potential way, before. As all projects and programmes do, we are currently relying on assumptions. I know that teams have tested these assumptions with a whole variety of people who work in the criminal justice system—judges and so on—but they still are assumptions.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Do you think that the Institute for Government’s classification of some of those assumptions as highly uncertain would be a fair classification?

Daniel Flury: I would not like to comment on that. The analysis is primarily undertaken by the Ministry of Justice; I am here representing the courts service and the operational side.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Okay. This question is more directly about your role. If you were to draw up a list for the Minister of the top five things that you thought would make a big impact on the delays that you are experiencing at HMCTS, what would be the top two, and where would structural reform of the courts, a new court bench, and removal of the right to elect sit on that list?

Daniel Flury: The top two things are uncapped sitting days, and long-term certainty over sitting days. That is what we have been provided with in HMCTS. But as I am sure the Committee has heard, on the current projections, even sitting at uncapped levels and having certainty over three years is not enough to reverse the Crown and magistrates’ caseload. We need something else if we are to arrest the growth in caseload.

[Dr Mullan]

Q As you picked two things that have been agreed, what things that have not been agreed would be on your list of further things that would help?

Daniel Flury: On the principal sources of delay, you have mentioned the police and the effectiveness of trials, and we see lots of ineffective trials because of an absence of an advocate—an advocate is engaged in a case elsewhere. The situation with the Prison Escort and Custody Services—the delivery vans—is well known, and well documented in the Leveson report. Finding a way to improve that is pretty near the top of the list.

[Dr Mullan]

Q You have given two, which is great. Would you agree that neither of those has anything to do with jury trials?

Daniel Flury: Yes.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q Thank you for being here, Mr Flury. You have clearly mentioned that certainty on uncapped sitting days is hugely valuable to the system. You have mentioned a number of the areas where efficiencies, as I understand, are being made and developed with HMCTS, including prisoner transfer and better case co-ordination. We know that there are also plans to introduce blitz courts from 1 April. Would you care to expand on any of that to explain how HMCTS is gearing up and getting ready to deliver greater efficiencies in the system, so that it can bring down the backlog?

Daniel Flury: I can, but may I begin by saying a bit about why certainty is so important for the courts, in particular? We go through this annual round—what we call the concordat process—where we discuss with the MOJ and the judiciary the amount of funding that HMCTS gets. That has been an annual process, so we operate on an annual cycle.

Now that we have certainty over three years, it means quite a considerable amount to us. It means that we can confidently list over the next three years, so we can say to recorders whom we are trying to book now, “Look, this case is going to get on, and this date is going to be sat. We have the money to do this.” Having that certainty to book Crown court recorders and to recruit both staff and judges is a really important step for us.

I will come back to the question about the other things that we are doing to improve efficiency. We are about to roll out case co-ordinators, which is another recommendation in the Leveson report. These are people in the Crown court who will actively manage the case, and who will be able to make decisions on behalf of the judge using delegated powers. They will really corral the system together to drive efficiency and drive readiness in a case.

There is a whole variety of what we call blitz courts, which I would almost describe as a bet on the system. We try to brigade a number of cases that we know will either plead guilty or be discontinued by the Crown Prosecution Service. Under the direction of the judges, we list those cases, knowing that they will be disposed of there and then. This essentially brings those cases forward on the hope and expectation—we use data to establish what could plead out—that it will give us an opportunity to clear them from the caseload. The product of that is not only reducing the caseload but indicating to the system, particularly the defendants, that their case is not going to languish for three or four years in places like London. It means that it will come on, and they have a far greater incentive to plead guilty knowing that the trial is a bit more proximate.

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[Tristan Osborne]

Q To pick up on Paul’s point about over-listing and capacity, looking at the Bill from an operational perspective, what one aspect of it would you say would make a material difference in reducing the capacity problem you have identified—over-listing and overcapacity making it difficult with staffing numbers?

Daniel Flury: The consequences of the Bill for the Crown court, other than the jury trial element, will be relatively small. It will not really affect its day-to-day workings; there will just be a portion of cases that will be heard without a jury. In terms of the processes in the Crown court—how it operates and how judges list—we are not expecting profound changes at all. As I said, the real change arising from the Bill is the expansion of the magistrates court, and the real challenge for us in HMCTS is the need to recruit legal advisers and magistrates to expand the court and make its operations more efficient.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Looking at these plans coming forward, do you have what you might call a risk register within the Department? Do you have a system for rating the different elements and how risky you think they will be to deliver?

Daniel Flury: As I said, to deliver the components of this Bill and its changes to jury trials, a number of relatively minor IT changes are needed. We need to change—

[Dr Mullan]

Q Sorry to interrupt you, but I just want to get to the specifics of the question. I guess what I want to ask you is what you think is really important about the magistrates element, and how you are currently risk-rating your ability to deliver it. Is there a low probability that you will be able to deliver it without issues, or a high probability? How are you risk-rating that programme?

Daniel Flury: Our biggest risks around this programme are retaining legal advisers and recruiting magistrates. We need 7,000 magistrates over the next three years and 100 more legal advisers each year. We have mitigations in place, especially on magistrates.

[Dr Mullan]

Q But how are you currently rating them? Thank you for telling me what the risks are, but do you think you have a low risk of failure to deliver, or a high risk?

Daniel Flury: It is a medium risk.

[Dr Mullan]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

Linsey, did you have a very quick question? You have seconds.

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[The Chair]

We will now hear from Sir Richard Henriques, His Honour Clement Goldstone KC and Lord Burnett of Maldon. We have until 5.59 pm for this panel. Thank you all very much. Could you briefly introduce yourself for the record?

Lord Burnett of Maldon: I am Ian Burnett, Lord Burnett of Maldon. I was Lord Chief Justice until October 2023.

Sir Richard Henriques: I am Richard Henriques, a retired High Court judge. I was called to the Bar in 1968.

Clement Goldstone: I am Clement Goldstone. I was a resident judge and the recorder of Liverpool until 2019.

[Dr Mullan]

Q My opening question for all three of you is this: what are the best and most positive features of jury trials, and how and why do we use them in our system?

Lord Burnett of Maldon: Public involvement.

Sir Richard Henriques: I do not disagree with that, but it is also the fact that the world at large is able to observe justice and what is going on. In the present context, they will be extremely unhappy.

Clement Goldstone: I agree and have nothing to add.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Very good. I want to pick up on your experience in Liverpool. I am sure you are familiar with this, and it has been discussed in Parliament, but the Liverpool Crown court does not have a backlog—it sees cases within the time limits. Based on your experience there, how were you able to achieve that, what else might the wider system learn from it, and what things can we not learn as they are not replicable?

Clement Goldstone: First, every Crown court has a backlog—they need one to function. Why was Liverpool a success? It was a success, first of all, because it is an excellent single court centre; secondly, because it has a very positive interactive relationship between the bench and the Bar and the Bar and the bench; and thirdly, because the staff are always willing to go the extra mile, which is probably because of the way they interact with the judiciary.

The fourth reason, which I know is something inherited by my successor, is that, as recorder, I believed that if you want to bring out the best in people you give them responsibility. Everybody wants to be part of a success story, as Liverpool in that way was. What has happened over the last seven years since I retired is that the same standards have been maintained—albeit, it must be said, in much more difficult and trying circumstances than when I was in the position.

[Dr Mullan]

Q The first example you have given is structural and not replicable across the whole country, but the other points you have made are all things we could support and implement more widely than just Liverpool.

Clement Goldstone: There needs to be a cultural change.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Lord Burnett, when, as Lord Chief Justice, you were considering how to improve the efficiency of the service and the experience of victims, did you ever consider reductions to the jury element of trials? If you did, what were your conclusions?

Lord Burnett of Maldon: I have spoken publicly on many occasions about my personal belief that there is a need to rebalance the work between magistrates courts and Crown courts. I was aware of the detailed work done 25 years ago by Sir Robin Auld. He made certain proposals which, even then, although I was not a criminal barrister at the Bar, I took an interest and many of them struck me as being quite sensible.

During covid, I had detailed discussions with the then Lord Chancellor, Sir Robert Buckland, about adjusting the way we did trials, because it seemed to me that it was not a sensible approach to assume that covid would be over within weeks or a few months, which is what most people were doing, I’m afraid. Robert Buckland floated the idea of trying either-way cases in the Crown court with a judge and two magistrates—something I personally have favoured for a long time—but it did not fly politically; I think that is the best way of putting it.

[Dr Mullan]

Q You talk about a judge and two magistrates as something you favoured, and that is what Sir Brian recommended, but it is not what the Government are proposing. They are proposing a judge sitting on their own. Can you see any disadvantages to that proposal versus the one that you supported?

Lord Burnett of Maldon: Again, the Government well know my view on this—I see the Minister nodding. It seems to me that if one is going to reduce the involvement of the general public, as members of a jury, in the relatively low-level cases that go to the Crown court, maintaining public involvement through the magistracy is a good course to follow. It also has the great advantage of simply replicating a constitution and jurisdiction that exists in the Crown court at the moment. When there is an appeal from the magistrates court against conviction or sentence, including an appeal against conviction in an either-way case, it is heard in the Crown court by a judge and two magistrates. They take very little time. Both Sir Richard and Judge Goldstone are much more experienced, over many more years, in what happens in the Crown court than I can pretend to be, but those cases take very little time and the judge, on behalf of the court, gives an immediate judgment, just as in the Crown court generally the judge gives an immediate summing up. That struck me as being a much better course.

[Dr Mullan]

I will come back to you if I get time.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q I would like to ask questions of the panel in relation to the practicality of what is being proposed, but also the principle. This is a question for all of you. Do you accept that in our system pragmatism has always determined which prosecutions are heard with a jury and which are determined by judges or magistrates?

Sir Richard Henriques: Not much pragmatism as gravity, I think. The more serious cases will remain, pursuant to Sir Brian’s review, with juries. I heard the question “Are you trying to do away with juries?” earlier this afternoon. It is critical that the public do not think that we are doing away with juries. What is happening is a matter of pragmatism, as you say. Something has to change. The backlog has gone from 17,400 cases exactly six years ago to 80,000 now, and cases are being listed for four or five years’ time. Something has to be done. For my part, I agree with Lord Burnett: I would have preferred a judge and two magistrates. But something has to be done, and if judge alone is the only option, I am 100% in favour of it. I have no doubt that it will work and that it will save far more time than the Bar contends it will save. It will save a lot of time.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from JUSTICE, APPEAL and the Institute for Government. We have until 6.29 pm for this evidence session. Thank you for attending today, and for waiting. Can the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Fiona Rutherford: I am Fiona Rutherford. I am the chief executive of JUSTICE, the UK’s law reform and human rights charity.

Emma Torr: I am Emma Torr. I am a barrister and the co-director of the charity APPEAL, the Centre for Criminal Appeals, which represents people who have been convicted of a criminal offence in England and Wales.

Cassia Rowland: I am Cassia Rowland. I am a senior researcher and criminal justice specialist at the Institute for Government.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Thanks very much for coming. I want to start with some questions for Fiona and Emma. Am I right in thinking that you were both signatories to the letter from what we might call the violence against women and girls grouping to the Deputy Prime Minister, which said that we should not move forward with these proposals? Is that correct?

Emma Torr: Correct.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I do not know whether you heard the evidence this morning in which the Victims’ Commissioner characterised that letter as predominantly being on behalf of women and girls who end up as defendants. When I read a specific part of the letter that said, “Well, actually, it’s also about victims,” the Victims’ Commissioner said that I was unfairly representing the letter. I wanted to give you both an opportunity to talk about whether, when you put your name to that letter, you included women and girls as victims as part of your considerations.

Fiona Rutherford: I certainly did. I cannot speak on behalf of the other organisations, but certainly from my behalf, that is exactly my understanding.

Emma Torr: I would agree with that.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I want to ask you something else; I do not mean to put you on the spot, but this is in the public domain. You might know that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) has said publicly online that he understands that some of the organisations that put their name to the letter, or wanted to put their name to the letter, were put under pressure by either officials, Ministers or advisers at the Department not to do so, or to withdraw their names. Are you familiar with any of that? Have you heard anything about that in any way, shape or form?

Fiona Rutherford: We have not participated in any of the conversations that may well have happened with or without Ministers or officials.

Emma Torr: Not within my knowledge at all, no.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Moving on to the substance of what you say in the letter, can you tell us a couple of the points that you think are most important in relation to why—although I am sure you really care, as we all do, about the issue of backlogs and the experience it is creating for victims—you feel that the reforms on restricting the right to elect, creating a new bench division and reducing the use of jury trials are not the right way forward?

Fiona Rutherford: We have already heard from Daniel Flury in relation to the way that the magistrates courts are simply not structurally set up in many different ways. We know that magistrates typically undertake 13 sitting days on average. They also receive only three weeks’ training. If we are talking about moving into a situation where the sentencing powers are going to get far higher, that is of significant concern.

We all hope that there will be recruitment of magistrates, bearing in mind they have been cut by over 50% in the last 15,16 or 20 years. We know if the recruitment that is being talked about is successful, those people will be highly inexperienced, whether they are the legal advisers or the magistrates who are making decisions themselves.

To counter what I think was by said by the previous panel, of the appeals that come from the magistrates court to the Crown court when there is a concern about conviction or sentence, 40%—nearly half—are overturned when it is to do with an appeal against conviction, and 47% are overturned when it is an appeal against a sentence. There is a question mark about the accuracy of the way in which magistrates are making decisions.

We have heard about diversity among magistrates, and it is true that magistrates are more diverse than the judiciary, both in terms of gender and age. However, socioeconomically, there is a big gap for both the judiciary and magistracy. When looking at, for example, the number of applications to become a magistrate, only 3% of those people who applied are from manual labour jobs, which of course, again, will not be commensurate or replicative of the people who are going through the system.

You have already covered unrepresented defendants. That will only increase in relation to the existing legal aid issues. It will fundamentally mean that the defendants in those positions—particularly with very difficult cases—could be cross-examining their victims. If there is no lawyer to put that barrier in the way, then I can only imagine that the impact on those victims will be tremendous, particularly in very difficult cases.

We have talked about minorities and disproportionality. There was a fantastic question from the Committee earlier. We know that there is greater confidence among the public, particularly minority communities, in jury fairness over and above anything else. The Deputy Prime Minister has already written this down and has found that out from his own research. Racial disproportionality in the criminal justice system is and will continue to be a problem if we do not continue to try to work through that and keep juries as the clearest and fairest way of doing that.

Emma Torr: The proposal to reduce the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court has been presented as part of a package of measures to reduce the backlog in the criminal courts; however, removing the automatic right of appeal will introduce a multi-step process, which will only increase the workload of both the magistrates and Crown courts. To give a very brief outline of how it works at the moment, the defendant or the solicitor can fill out a very simple form, which results in a quick rehearing at the Crown court. As we heard from the previous panel, that works very well. It takes a couple of hours at most and even less for sentence appeals.

What the Government are proposing in the Bill is a multi-layered process. That involves consideration of grounds of appeal, articulation of those grounds in an application, consideration of that application by a Crown court judge—with or without a hearing—followed by a potential remittal to the magistrates court if there is to be a rehearing if leave is granted. That will add to the workload of not only the courts but criminal solicitors who work under legal aid and are chronically underfunded and overstretched in capacity.

One important thing to consider when talking specifically about the right of appeal from the magistrates courts is that the Law Commission very carefully considered this in its 700-page consultation paper last year and took views from a number of different stakeholders. Its independent analysis was that the removal of the automatic right to appeal will increase the workload of the magistrates court and the Crown court.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I have a question for Cassia from the Institute for Government. Thank you very much for the work you have been doing on this. You have been quoted left, right and centre in Parliament. You produced an initial report and then a second one. Your second report was characterised in Parliament, for example by the hon. Member for Gloucester, as moving away from your previous criticism and that you now accept the Government’s model and think that what the Government have said is accurate. Do you accept the Government’s modelling and think what they have said about what will be achieved is now accurate, fair and reasonable?

Cassia Rowland: The approach that the MOJ has taken in thinking about the modelling totally makes sense and is very similar to what we did. I want to make it really clear that our numbers are the same in our first and second reports. We are looking at the numbers in a slightly different way from the MOJ. The 19% overall saving in the Crown court is specifically for the Crown court. Our figure that is a 10% to 13% saving takes into account the increase in demand in magistrates courts as well. That is a big part of the difference. I just wanted to clarify that.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Is it accurate to say that you reject the Government’s central assertion about the time saving?

Cassia Rowland: There are a lot of uncertainties behind the modelling. Some of that is inevitable because we do not have the information available. In particular, the bulk of the savings come from moving cases into the magistrates courts, rather than from the bench division, the judge-only-trial element, and there are quite substantial questions as to how feasible it is to move that many cases into magistrates courts if the Bill passes and as to the amount of time that those cases might take once they are in magistrates courts.

[Dr Mullan]

Great. Thank you very much; I appreciate that.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q I, too, have questions for the IfG and I agree—thank you very much for both your reports, which are incredibly helpful. As you have just acknowledged and as you acknowledge on page 2 of your supplementary report, there is actually a good deal of consensus both on the merits and soundness of the approach, which we in Government had externally quality assured based on the available data. I think you would accept, as we do, that some of the behavioural changes likely to flow from a reformed system are, as Sir Brian himself said earlier in evidence, quite difficult to model because they are not currently in place.

Cassia Rowland: That is absolutely true. We do not know what is likely to happen on plea rates or dropped cases. A lot of cases are dropped at the moment, partly because of the length of delays. The modelling makes certain assumptions about how that might change, but there is a lot of uncertainty there. There is definitely uncertainty in both directions, but what we do not and cannot really capture in modelling in the short to medium term is the effect of the reforms themselves and the disruption that that potentially creates in the system, in the form of short-term productivity and performance problems.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Plan B. We have until 6.44 pm for this panel. Could you please briefly introduce yourself for the record?

Tim Crosland: Good afternoon, I am Tim Crosland. I was previously a Government lawyer, working mainly on criminal justice issues. I am now at the climate justice charity Plan B, and I also helped establish the civil liberties movement Defend Our Juries in 2023. That was before this Bill was born, but in anticipation that it would not be long before legislation like this came along that threatened to remove trial by jury from protest cases.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Thank you, Tim. I am Kieran Mullan, the shadow Justice Minister. To pick up on your final remark, what was it that made you think this issue could be coming down the track?

Tim Crosland: There had been a pattern of jury acquittals in protest cases. In April 2021, the Shell six, who had spray painted “Shell Lies” on Shell headquarters, were acquitted by a jury. In January 2022, the Colston four, who toppled the statue of the slave trader Edward Colston into Bristol harbour, were acquitted by a jury. In November 2022, members of Palestine Action, who had defaced Elbit Systems—suppliers of drones to the Israel Defence Forces—were acquitted by a jury. In January 2023, members of Insulate Britain were acquitted by a jury for blocking roads. It goes on, and we were seeing the reaction to that. It was nothing to do with the efficiency of the courts; it was the reactions from companies like Shell and Elbit, the meetings with Ministers, and the call, “How do we stop this happening because this is deeply embarrassing?”

[Dr Mullan]

Q To be frank with you, I was unhappy with the acquittals in all the cases that you have given examples of, so I am not necessarily sympathetic to the aim that you are putting forward. How important do you think it is that the system allows someone like me to be frustrated and not agree with what the jury end up doing or with what the judges and the establishment might think is right, versus what ordinary members of the public do, as a check and balance against people like me?

Tim Crosland: It is a vital component of democracy. The classic example that comes up a lot is Clive Ponting. This is going back few decades—I remember it. In the 1980s, he was a civil servant who heard an account of what happened to the General Belgrano being presented to the public and Parliament that he knew was not true. He knew that the Belgrano was driving away from the British forces when it was sunk, so he leaked that information and was prosecuted for breach of the Official Secrets Act. The judge said, “You have no defence in law.” If it was down to the judge, Clive Ponting would have been convicted as a criminal and jailed.

The jury saw somebody who had acted to get good information to the public, so they disregarded the judge’s ruling—a principle known as jury equity—and Clive Ponting was acquitted. That sent a powerful message to politicians about the standards that the public expect: standards of honesty and integrity. If we do away with the principle of jury equity, we do away with a vital democratic safeguard.

[Dr Mullan]

Q To pick up on what you said—“do away with”—I think you will agree that we are talking about not the removal of jury trials, but a significant and historically unprecedented reduction in their use.

Tim Crosland: What I said was do away with jury equity. Jury equity—the principle that a jury can acquit a defendant irrespective of the directions of the judge—only applies to cases where people are unlikely to receive a sentence of more than three years. It applies to cases of conscience where people have acted in the public interest, at least in their own self-understanding, and that is what they want to present to the jury. Those people are very unlikely to get long sentences of beyond three years imprisonment. In reality, this measure will do away with the principle of jury equity altogether.

[The Chair]

We have a quick declaration before the Minister comes in.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from the Ministry of Justice. We have until 7.04 pm for this panel. Could the Minister introduce herself for the record?

Sarah Sackman: I am Sarah Sackman MP, and I am the Minister of State for Courts and Legal Services.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I want to start with a question that I raised with some of the earlier witnesses. It has been suggested that the Ministry in some way, through civil servants, Ministers or advisers—I do not know who—placed pressure on groups that were either signatories of the letter against the Government’s proposals or were persuaded not to be. Can you confirm that in no way at all did anybody connected with Ministry of Justice seek to exert any influence on those signatories, either to withdraw from the letter or not to sign it in the first place?

Sarah Sackman: We are having, including today, an incredibly open and robust debate on an issue of real national importance. We have had robust debate in the Chamber and we have heard from witnesses with very different perspectives, some of whom are clearly against these proposals—I welcome their contribution to the debate— and some who favour them. There is clearly a spectrum of opinion, and I welcome that debate; I have never shied away from it. Over the last year, on behalf of the MOJ, I have personally engaged with stakeholders, including—this is probably the most engagement I have had—with people and groups that oppose the measures we are bringing forward. They include the Bar Council and the Criminal Bar Association, for example, with which I have good relationships, although we disagree quite significantly on these proposals.

In respect of the letter, which was signed by 70 groups, all of those groups can speak for themselves. In advance of the letter being published, engagement took place with those groups to hear them out. Many of them maintained their objections, particularly Rights of Women, which led the objection. But it was important to have that engagement and dialogue on where there were areas of consensus and where we could work together. I would never—you heard the exchange I had with JUSTICE—put pressure on anybody to withdraw their objection. If people have objections, those objections need to be heard. There needs to be constructive engagement, and we have sought to have that in this debate. I think that people would agree that that is what has taken place.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Okay, thank you for confirming what you did personally. But obviously other people would have been meeting these groups, so can you clearly answer this question: did anybody from the Ministry of Justice do or say anything that these groups might have reasonably said was putting pressure on them not to sign the letter?

Sarah Sackman: Look, I genuinely cannot state every conversation that was had, because I do not know. What I can say is that a number of the groups who led the letter, Rights of Women—I hope it will not mind me saying—being one of them, attended a meeting with myself and Minister Jones. We had a good, full and frank conversation, and that letter then went to publication. You can see what the arguments are, and you have deployed them in your arguments, as well you might—if I were in your shoes, I would do the same.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Sure, but do you think that people might be concerned that you cannot say that no one had any pressure applied to them?

Sarah Sackman: What I know is that as a Minister, I seek, along with other Ministers, to set the culture of my Department. We keep the channels of communication open with all the stakeholders that you have heard from today, including many who are robustly not just opposing but campaigning against this. I was counting, and I think I must have engaged with the Bar at least 10 times since I became a Minister. I expect my officials to follow that lead, and that is the steer that they get from me: that we want to engage and have those conversations.

In advance of the particular engagement I am talking about, I held and led a number of stakeholder engagement sessions where I explained the rationale for the measures and what we were doing for victims. A number of those groups’ signatures ended up on that letter, so I did not persuade them, but the engagement was there—and it was open, convivial and constructive.

[Dr Mullan]

Q I have asked you twice, and you have given the answer, and people can make up their own minds about what can be implied from that.

Moving on to some extent, I can say to you, “This modelling says this,” and you can point to other modelling that says otherwise; I can say that court judge X disagrees with you, and you can point to a judge who agrees with you, and we can go back and forth. I am not seeking to do that, because I do not think it would be particularly productive.

I will instead try to pique your intellectual curiosity about the challenges for any Minister. Let us say we all agreed with your proposals in principle and that, if you were able to secure the changes you are seeking, they would be positive. The question is how you secure reform in Government—particularly major systems reform—successfully, and the challenges and unintended consequences that can arise. Have you spoken to any current or former Ministers who have embarked on a major reform programme similar to this? What lessons or points did they raise about how it can go wrong?

Sarah Sackman: There is no doubt that reform is challenging, but defending a status quo that—I think of the words used earlier—is producing shameful outcomes should shame us as a society. The first job of the state is to provide a justice system that is there for the citizen, whether accused of a crime or a victim. We are not doing that at the moment, in my view.

As you know, I was appointed a Minister on becoming an MP in July 2024, and I have always tried to approach that with a degree of humility, taking soundings from those with greater experience—including, by the way, Ministers from the previous Government, with whom I do not share politics but whose experience I respect. Over time I have met the likes of Alex Chalk, Jeremy Wright and Dominic Grieve and spoken to them about the state of our justice system and the challenges they faced in Government. Of course, I have also spoken to Ministers in the previous Labour Government, who did a huge amount as a reforming Government.

I am always somebody who asks questions. I hope I am intellectually curious and that I have asked questions of those who have administered the justice system, and so know how resistant it has been to reform. I will be really blunt and candid with you: I know when we have undertaken some reforms in the justice system—for example, before my time, the attempted digitisation of the civil justice system—billions of pounds of taxpayer money were spent and, frankly, it was a flop. It is still not digitised. You still go to county courts and they are covered in paper. A number of—I do not want to say bodies, because that is a bit crude—attempts at reform have been made in the past, and they have failed. I am realistic about the challenge we are facing, but I am also clear that the status quo is broken and that if we do not act, it would be a dereliction of duty.

[Dr Mullan]

Q Do you also agree that people who have the interests of victims at the heart of their thinking and positions on this can reasonably oppose your proposals, and that that does not in any way reflect a lack of concern for victims or the experiences they are going through?

Sarah Sackman: Of course I do. I have always said—and the Deputy Prime Minister has made the same point—that in reforming and rebuilding this system, we have sought to put victims at the heart of what we are doing. You will know that we are doing a lot on the victims code, through investment in victim services and how the reforms reflect that centring of the victims. Of course, victims are not a monolith. I met and spoke to Charlotte Nichols, who opposes aspects of these reforms and has her own experience as a victim. There is no universal victims’ voice, but there are very powerful victims’ voices we have heard today saying that we must improve and work together to get a better system to deal with those shameful delays.

[Amanda Hack]

Q Following on from the shadow Minister’s question about what good reform looks like, we have had a period of reform in the justice system. What would be your measure of success? We know the system is creaking under pressure, so what would success look like?

Sarah Sackman: There are two tests that I set myself, and neither is going to be easy to achieve within this Parliament. The first essay question is: can you deal with the intolerable delays? Can you ensure swift justice? That does not mean summary justice. That does not mean rushing through the cases, but it does mean getting through the caseload quicker so that people are not waiting for years. At the end of this Parliament, I do not want people waiting years for justice. That is the first test. It is the timeliness, which is the essential ingredient of fairness.

The second thing is: we are in a crisis, but we have an opportunity—with justice being the focus of our Parliament and our national debate for the first time in a very long time, and with real investment from the Treasury—to create something better. Our justice system has remained largely unreformed since the 1970s. There are lots of things that people might like about the 1970s, not least the music, but there were lots about our social values and our societal norms that were very different then. It was a different place for women, for black and minority ethnic communities, for gay people and lots of other communities. I do not think the system that was designed then is the one that we would design now.

We heard earlier from Katrin Hohl, who is leading work for the Government to embed some of the Soteria measures, which have been so good and progressive in the police and the CPS, into our courts. I know it can sound like a cheesy cliché, but my objective is the idea of building back something better, and designing a system that is not just sustainable and capable of dealing with the delays question but, in terms of its design, centres victims and is fair, particularly to women and black and minority ethnic communities. That is my objective: can we get a more progressive justice system?

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I will first call Dr Kieran Mullan.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I am sure we will get to hear from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington shortly.

The proposal in clause 3 is being framed as a mere administrative adjustment—a common-sense fix for a system under strain. The Government’s plan to introduce a Crown court bench division, where a judge sits alone without magistrates to decide the fate of those accused of either-way offences, is being sold to the public as a remedy for the backlogs that currently paralyse our courts. But we must be clear from the outset that the crisis in our courts is not the result of the jury system. The backlog, which sees tens of thousands of cases waiting for a hearing, is the result of long-term challenges and the unprecedented impact of covid on our justice system.

Eroding a defendant’s right to a trial by their peers is not a fix; it is a fundamental reconfiguration of the English legal system. Across the Bill, we see a pattern emerging: a shift away from what we are clear is the gold standard of justice towards a swift model. The evidence supporting it is dangerously thin, and we must resist the permanent eroding of a right that has stood for hundreds and hundreds of years.

The right to a jury trial is often described as fundamental. It is not merely a traditional quirk of our system; it is an important constitutional safeguard. The core of the Government’s plan, as outlined in their impact assessment and the Second Reading briefings, is to remove the right to elect. Currently, if someone is charged with an either-way offence—crimes like theft, assault or certain drug offences—they have a right to choose whether they are tried by a jury in the Crown court or by magistrates. The Government’s plan to strip away that choice in clause 3, under a new bench division model for when the sentence outcome is likely to be three years or less, will remove even the role of lay magistrates from the decision.

The briefing provided by the organisation JUSTICE, which I have referred to several times, makes a compelling case against that. JUSTICE points out that the right to elect is a long-standing protection that ensures that a defendant can seek the judgment of a diverse group of citizens when they feel the state’s power is being unfairly applied. By removing that right, we are effectively saying that the state knows better than the citizen how they should be judged. This is not unheard of, as we have talked about before, but clause 3, combined with previous clauses, represents it being done at a scale never seen before.

This is a dangerous path. When we move cases from juries to a bench division, we are moving from a system of community participation to a system of professionalised adjudication. The jury is the part of our constitution where the greatest number of ordinary citizens have a direct, hands-on role in the administration of justice. It is the primary way that the public grant their consent to the upholding of criminal law. If we remove the public from the process, we risk the law becoming something done to people, rather than something that belongs to them.

The Government’s narrative suggests that a judge-led bench division will be just as fair as a jury, only faster. But it ignores the fundamental and unique aspect of fairness delivered by a jury trial, which they acknowledge by continuing to maintain jury trials for what they describe as the “more serious” offences. A jury is, by definition, balanced. It consists of 12 people from different backgrounds, with different life experiences and different biases, in the crucible of the jury room. Their diversity is its greatest strength; a single judge, no matter how well intentioned, cannot possibly replicate that breadth of perspective.

There is also the phenomenon of being case-hardened: when a professional judge or magistrate hears 50 similar cases of theft or assault in a year, there is a natural human tendency to begin seeing patterns rather than individuals. Evidence that might seem fresh or potentially exonerating to a jury can seem like the usual excuse to a professional who has heard it hundreds of times before.

Juries bring fresh eyes; they are not jaded by the grind of the system. They are instructed to look only at the facts of the case before them. That is why juries are considered—by the Opposition, at least—to be the gold standard. The evidence submitted to the Committee warns that we lack clarity as to why the Government are so eager to discard this standard. If the jury is the best way to ensure an accurate and fair verdict, the burden of proof for removing it must be exceptionally high.

Furthermore, the bench division model threatens to undermine the lay element of our justice system. Originally, as recommended in the Leveson review, the idea was that a judge would sit with two magistrates. That was intended to maintain at least some form of community involvement. However, clause 3 moves towards judge-only trials for many cases, discarding even the judge-plus-two compromise.

I will now address the primary argument made by the Minister in her opening remarks. The Government claim that moving to the bench division will significantly reduce the backlog. However, the Institute for Government has produced an insightful analysis, which we have referred to frequently, suggesting that the evidence for those savings is incredibly weak.

The IFG points out that the vast majority of Crown court time is not actually spent on the types of trials that the Government want to move to the bench division. The cases being targeted are the less serious ones, which already take up less time than more complex cases such as murder, which will remain subject to jury trial. According to the IFG’s modelling, if judge-only trials are 20% faster than a jury trial, the total impact on the overall Crown court backlog would be a reduction of 2%. When we consider the constitutional cost of us losing, at this unprecedented scale, the right to access a jury, that is simply not sufficient.

The backlog is not caused by juries being slow; it is more often caused by ineffective trials that are postponed because witnesses do not show up, because solicitors or barristers are unavailable, or because courtrooms are not fit to operate in. These are systemic failures, and moving a trial from a jury to a judge does not make a witness appear or fix a broken courtroom.

The Bill proposes a threshold of cases likely to attract a sentence of up to three years being diverted to the bench division. Predicting a sentence before a trial is never an exact science, and that is something that magistrates actually have more experience of than judges. That unprecedented scenario—without the safeguards that we sought to add through a right of appeal, which the Government rejected—will create huge questions of impartiality and bias.

A three-year sentence is not a minor matter. Three years in prison is a life-altering event. It can mean the loss of a home, a career and a family. To suggest that a person facing such a consequence does not deserve what they consider to be the fairest possible trial betrays that principle of fairness in our justice system when the consequences are so severe.

There is also the issue of the absence of a sunset clause. If these measures are truly a temporary response to tackle an emergency backlog, they should include a sunset clause that ensures that rights are restored once the crisis has passed. As I have said previously, changes were made during world war two and then reversed when the war was over. The fact that the Government have resisted such a clause suggests that this is not a temporary fix, but a permanent land grab by the state. Once the right to a jury is surrendered for either-way offences, it is highly unlikely that any future Government will be in a position to restore it.

We must see the Crown court bench division for what it is: a policy of convenience, not a policy delivering justice. It is a policy that ignores the findings of the IFG, which would require us to focus more heavily on other elements of the system. It is a policy that ignores the warnings from JUSTICE, which highlight the erosion of the defendant’s right to elect and its impact on public confidence and fairness in the judicial system. It is a policy that even ignores the original, more balanced recommendations of the Leveson review, which at least sought to keep lay magistrates involved.

We are told that we must modernise and that we must be efficient. The purpose of a criminal trial is not to process cases as quickly as possible; it is to arrive at the truth through a process that the defendant, the victim and the public have trust in. If we allow the Government to erode the jury system in the name of the backlog on this occasion to this extent, we are sending a message that this constitutional right is highly conditional, and that it can be traded away whenever the state finds it too expensive or too cumbersome to maintain. As the Minister frequently points out, lots of countries do without it; “Why shouldn’t we?” will be the next argument.

Instead of stripping away rights, the Government should be more focused on the areas that we can all agree on: prisoner transport, early legal advice, more efficient listing, Crown Prosecution Service reviews of cases in the backlog, facilities that work and IT that works. We do not fix a house by tearing it down to its foundations because the roof is leaking; we fix the roof. Jury trials ensure that our laws remain grounded in the common sense of ordinary people. Let us apply some of that common sense to tackling this issue. Common sense will lead us to oppose clause 3.

--- Later in debate ---

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I do apologise, Ms Jardine.

The report by the Deputy Prime Minister, as he is now, was conducted almost a decade ago. It highlighted concern about the sentencing decisions of judges, so it is often cited—understandably—as a reason to be cautious about judge-only trials. New clause 29 would ensure that a review of judge-only trials will be conducted after a year, and should there be disparities in the conviction rates for those of an ethnic minority background and/or for white British persons living in lower-income households, measures can and will be put in place to prevent such disparities from arising.

It is also right that a further review is conducted between 35 and 36 months after enactment, as the new clause suggests, both to check the initial findings and to take account of the fact that things can change. In the review conducted by the Deputy Prime Minister, for example, it was found that where CPS charging decisions were concerned, a defendant’s ethnicity did not affect the likelihood of their being charged. However, subsequent research conducted by the University of Leeds, in which the outcomes of decision making in 195,000 cases between 2018 and 2021 were examined, identified evidence of disproportionality in CPS decision making. Specifically, defendants from minority ethnic backgrounds were significantly more likely to be charged than a white British defendant for a comparable offence.

Additional research by the independent disproportionality advisory group and scrutiny by the CPS itself has led to an action plan to tackle the disproportionality that was found to exist, and to deliver change. There is precedent for ongoing review of disparities in outcomes within the criminal justice system where ethnicity is concerned, and precedent for action being taken to address such disparities.

Recent research by the University of Birmingham identified concern about racial bias within juries, particularly when there is no representation of ethnic minorities among the 12 people serving on a jury. This research cited a case in which an attack on the victim was caught on CCTV, yet in May 2022 a jury with no black members acquitted most of the perpetrators. The researchers concluded that their study raised important questions about whether the public in England and Wales see juries as being fair and just in relation to racial minorities, and that juries in England and Wales remain extremely lacking in diversity; that is what the study found. Another problem the study identified in that case was that the concerns of victims’ families about racial bias among the jury were never investigated.

[Dr Mullan]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Linsey Farnsworth]

No. I will make some progress; we need to make progress today.

The researchers found that more than 90% of respondents in the survey they conducted believed that discrimination on juries should be reported to trial judges and properly investigated, yet there is no mechanism under current law that allows juries to do so.

Appeal, a not-for-profit organisation, has submitted evidence opposing some elements of the Bill. However, in a paper that it prepared in 2024, Appeal set out concerns relating to majority decisions, as opposed to unanimous jury decisions, and the impact of racial bias. The case of R v. Connor et al was cited, in which questions from the jury suggested that there had been a focus on the defendant’s race and a letter from a juror after conviction confirmed racial bias in the jury’s deliberations.

Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides for confidentiality in jury decision making. However section 8A, enacted in Scotland, permits the Lord Justice General to allow information about deliberations from the jury room to be disclosed for the purposes of research. That provides an opportunity for the same to follow in England and Wales. Recent statistics show an increase in hate crime, including crime based on race and religion, rates of which spiked after Brexit and, recently, following the Southport murders. Now more than ever, we must be conscious of the impact that discrimination could have on the fairness, or otherwise, of jury trial.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

No, because let’s face it: in the jury trials we are talking about, people are not getting sentences of more than three years. There is hardly going to be a King’s counsel dealing with those cases—it is not even going to be a leading junior who will deal with those cases. A lot of the barristers will be middle ranking; the KCs will not be dealing with these types of cases. There are enough members of the Bar to fill the capacity issue.

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Member for Gloucester pointed to what the Bar Council said, but let us be fair and talk about what it said in its completeness. It may well have said that the people currently practising dropped out, but the Minister quite directly asked how it was going to train these people up and get back to that point, and it made the point that the people who have dropped out of practising criminal law have not evaporated into thin air. They are still there; they are just practising in other areas of law, and when the situation is right for them, they can just come back into practising criminal law.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

That is absolutely correct. Of course, one of the reasons why some people left the criminal Bar is the fact that the legal aid funding was not great, but I assure Members that if they did not have other work to do, they would come back to the Bar. There are enough barristers and solicitors in the legal system for that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I entirely agree. The state of some of the courts in this country is sad. They are completely neglected, which creates a lot of challenges.

[Dr Mullan]

We are leaning heavily on the points made by the Criminal Bar Association. The Government seem quite rightly to be extremely concerned about the training of future barristers, but the Criminal Bar Association has made the point that that training often takes place in what the Government are describing as less serious cases. That is where the more junior people get the experience they need to work on the more serious cases. If those cases are not available, how do the Government expect barristers to be trained to the level required to take on the more serious cases with a jury trial?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I agree with the hon. Member.

I want to set out why we have a backlog and what we can do. Everybody has talked about various things that we could do, such as triaging the cases more effectively and more routinely, like Liverpool Crown court and some of the others that have seen a considerable reduction. There are the issues of transporting prisoners on time and internet connections in court. We have discussed a number of things that can lead to a reduction in the backlog.

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I thank her for tabling new clause 29. The reason why we need it is that, years ago, the importance of jury trials was recognised by the current Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, and the fact that the new clause has been tabled shows that we believe they are important. We really should not be restricting jury trials. It is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Tristan Osborne]

We are absolutely seeking to reduce the number of cases going before jury trials. It comes back to the thresholds. We have seen a long history of changes to thresholds, as well as changes to those serving on juries. In the early part of the 20th century, women were allowed to sit on juries for the first time, and it was only in the mid part of the last century that we allowed people who did not own property to sit on juries. There has, then, been an evolution in both the composition of the jury and the thresholds that are applied. For example, in 1977 Callaghan changed the law so that some cases—including of theft, burglary and criminal damage offences—could be dealt with in magistrates courts, and many of the debates we are having today happened at that time as well.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

The hon. Member for Wimbledon pointed out that we are talking about a 50% reduction; can the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford tell us the percentage reduction in relation to the points he is making?

[Tristan Osborne]

I do not have the answer for the Callaghan reduction, but my point about the thresholds is that previous Governments of both colours have looked at thresholds, had conversations similar to those we are having today, and concluded that it was a sensible and necessary step—both under Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher.

Sir Brian Leveson, who was independently commissioned, indicated that

“there are certain circumstances where a trial by judge alone is appropriate…based on the need for cases to be resolved in a more timely manner, in a forum most proportionate and suitable to the alleged offence or offences.”

My argument is that the threshold that Sir Brian Leveson defined is the one that I agree with.

[Dr Mullan]

The threshold that Sir Brian recommended was two years, not three years, and the forum that he recommended was a judge with two magistrates, but we are doing just one judge. The hon. Member should be more careful in making claims about what Sir Brian recommended to support what he is saying, because we are not doing what he recommended.

[Tristan Osborne]

The point is that the premise of his inclination was that it is appropriate for thresholds to be changed. Although there will absolutely be principled disagreement between different advocates about where that threshold will be and the appropriateness of who will oversee those cases, be that a bench or a single judge, the reality is that there is consensus, I hope, that thresholds have changed through time. The thresholds in the Bill are a proportionate response to the overwhelming challenge of a court backlog that we inherited from the previous Government. In my view, clause 3 allocates mid-level cases effectively and ensures that demand in Crown courts is reduced. We know the consequences if we do not do this.

To the critics saying this is not fair, the reality is that our constitution says that everyone is entitled to a fair trial, and I believe that everyone in our courts system, be that the 90% who are engaged with magistrates courts, or those who go to Crown court, is dealt with fairly. As has been mentioned, I do not want to create an artificial divide between cases that are heard in one or the other; both are deemed fair, and we believe that people sentenced in magistrates courts are given a fair trial.

The thresholds in the clause are fair and reasonable, and we have to consider this as a wider package of reforms along with the digitalisation of the court system, the modernisation of the estate and improvements to transport and infrastructure, all of which play a part. Fundamentally, it goes back to my central point that those things alone will not bring about the reduction in backlogs that we all want to see.

[Dr Mullan]

I will not speak at length—much to the delight, I am sure, of Government Members—but I want to pick up on a few key points that have been raised. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate and for Isle of Wight East for their extensive review of clause 3, and also the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is not in her place.

Let us be clear about all the things we have highlighted that are lacking. We are talking about a significant erosion for 50% of those who currently enjoy jury trial, and we have made it clear that the evidence for the necessity of that is lacking. In earlier sittings, we talked about the backlog already falling in a number of regions, even though we are so early on in the process of trying to tackle this issue. Today alone, 11% of Crown courts are not sitting—they are sat empty—and it was the same yesterday and it was even higher last week, so there are clearly other things we could be doing.

There has been criticism of the retrospective element of the measures in clause 3, which the Opposition, at least, have agreed is unacceptable. Different standards will be applied because we have not been able to amend the measures on reallocation, so there is a different standard for allocation and reallocation. That is doubled with the lack of appeal, on which we were not able to make progress.

We have covered the lack of community confidence that will arise from these measures. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington has tabled new clause 29, which we think is sensible, to try to go at least some way to addressing the issue of community confidence. However, I am not convinced that, even if the Government accept the new clause, we will get any change as a result. Let us say we do the review in a year from now and it finds there has been a deterioration in these issues, will they unpick their reforms? I am not confident that they will.

We have had suggestions that the cross-examination of the defendant is inappropriate. Of course, the reforms will lead to more defendants being cross-examined, unrepresented, in the magistrates court. We have had a suggestion that the changes are not substantial. I made it clear in my intervention that, under any sensible reading of the facts, most people would consider a 50% change to be substantial.

We have laid out, in a clear and detailed way, all the different ways in which clause 3 is wrong and fails on its own merits. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and make some necessary changes.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

A number of the points just made were covered in earlier debates. I do not intend to rehearse the Government’s case for why the reforms we are introducing, based on the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts, are needed, but we think that they are. The central insight of the independent review was that, absent structural reforms, we simply will not get the shameful delays under control. The three-year threshold that we picked is highlighted in the IRCC recommendation 30, with a three-year sentence being the appropriate basis for allocation to a judge-alone trial.

[Dr Mullan]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sarah Sackman]

I refer the hon. Gentleman to pages 243 and 245 of the independent review. If we want to come back on the detail, we can, but I am going to make progress.

I have dealt with retrospectivity. I want to spend a bit of time on new clause 29, which my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington spoke powerfully about. She is absolutely right to highlight the disparities in outcomes across our criminal justice system. This is not something new. The problem was not created by our reforms, but it is something that we seek to transform in the transformation of our courts. We know that, for too long, there have been lower levels of trust and confidence among many minoritised communities. I am keenly aware that those groups experience disproportionality in our criminal justice system. That comes across not just in our courts but in remand decisions, sentencing outcomes and the fact that people who are black or of mixed ethnicity are statistically more likely to be a victim of crime than people who are white.

I welcome the new clause and the intent behind it, as laid out by my hon. Friend. As I said on the first day in Committee, the Deputy Prime Minister committed to an independent review to properly monitor the impacts of not just judge-only trials but all the court reform measures in the Bill on precisely the communities that my hon. Friend is concerned about.

I welcome the opportunity we have had to debate the scope of the review. What I will take away is the fact that some deep thinking needs to be done about having good baseline data, about the scope of the review and whether it could perhaps go even further than what is proposed in new clause 29, about timing to make sure that the datasets can tell us something meaningful about the impacts of the reforms, and about the appropriate feedback mechanism so that Parliament, and future Parliaments, can consider the disproportionality that exists within our system.

It will be important to benchmark the impacts of reforms against the current system. The Ministry of Justice already publishes extensive operational metrics, including on case timeliness, conviction rates and sentencing outcomes, and they provide the insight that we have been debating into the performance of criminal courts today. We have to ensure that we are looking at the right things. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I have been discussing an important point. It is about ensuring not just that justice is done, but that it is seen to be done and people can have confidence in the system.

--- Later in debate ---

Since the Secretary of State’s words were written, progress has been achieved. The criminal justice datasets include the equalities data published by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Judicial Appointments Commission, and all that rightly shines a light on the disparities that exist within our system. We attempt in this legislation to provide transparency and accountability, whether through the recording of magistrates proceedings or the efforts to make transcriptions available—our feet are being held to the fire on that by Members across the House, but it is important—and transparency and accountability are core principles that run through the Bill. There is also the giving of reasons when a judge takes the decision. It is so important that they justify the conclusions they reach so that the justification can be scrutinised. Of course, there is also the review clause that we will look to introduce at a future stage.

[Dr Mullan]

As I alluded to, it seems like the Government are convinced of the need for a review clause. If the review is undertaken and it finds that the reduction in jury trials has led to greater disparities in the justice system, will the Government commit to reversing the measures?

[Sarah Sackman]

An important point was discussed in earlier exchanges with the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. While I absolutely accept that marginalised communities experience lower confidence in the criminal justice system, the current data, certainly as regards triable either-way offences and conviction rates—both for men and women, and for black, Asian, mixed race or white individuals—shows that those disparities do not actually exist based on the conviction rate data. All that is set out, and Members can find that on page 51 of the equality impact assessment.

We do, though, need to get a really good sense of the baseline. If the review shows a deterioration of the position, and if the cause of that deterioration is found to be the measures themselves, then of course future decision makers, policy makers and Parliaments will want to respond and mitigate the effects. That is not to be understood as my saying we are going to rip up the Bill, because we believe that what is in the Bill is fair, and guarantees fairness at every level of the criminal justice system. But we want data and information precisely so that if disparities are exposed by the review, and if there is a worsening position, then whether it is me or someone else lucky enough to fulfil this role, someone will no doubt respond. That is exactly the point.

To my mind, this is an opportunity not just to understand and monitor the impacts of the Bill, but to develop a better understanding of outcomes across the criminal justice system, and how we improve them. Given our commitment to undertake a review of the wider reforms, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington not to press the new clause to a vote.

I want to pick up a couple of other points, which we may pick up later. We discussed at some length the application of the law as it stands to the existing caseload and the allocations decision. During Thursday’s Committee, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle raised questions with me about three-strike offences. In order not to take up further Committee time, I will write to the hon. Member to address those point, and I am happy to make that correspondence available to the Committee and the wider public. However, I can confirm that clause 3 does not alter the existing statutory framework for those offences.

In a similar vein, we had an exchange about situations where allocations are not amenable to judicial review, and we discussed the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. I intend—not least because we have also had correspondence from the Bar Council in relation to this issue—to write separately in relation to those questions. I will ask the Chair to publish that letter on the public register of written evidence, so that all Members can clearly see the Government’s understanding of the position.

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister can probably anticipate what I am going to say: this situation is highly unsatisfactory, considering that we will again be asked to vote—not have a view or give an opinion, but be asked to vote—on the system of allocation and reallocation in relation to complex and lengthy trials. Members may have seen the evidence provided by the Bar Council, which makes absolutely clear its view that the Minister was wrong in her assessment that the decision to allocate will be subject to judicial review. That was my view, the view of the Bar Council and the view of the hon. Member for Wimbledon, with his expertise. It is not satisfactory to be told we will vote again later today not knowing what the Government’s clear position is. What the Minister said is now surely under very significant doubt, given what the Bar Council has told us. The Minister should have been able to come here today—rather than writing to us later—to give us the facts. We have had a big gap between Thursday and today, and we should not be left in the position of being asked to vote without the full facts.

[Sarah Sackman]

I was about to get to the essential position, which is that what I said on Thursday is twofold. What we were debating was in the context of whether there was an appeal route in relation to the mode of trial decision—the allocation decision. I have been absolutely clear that nowhere in this Bill is there any specific route to appeal, and I have never sought to suggest otherwise.

Taking a step further, the law points against there being a jurisdictional power for judicial review on an allocation decision. Where the Bar Council’s letter discusses the availability of judicial review, it sets out that section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act significantly limits the circumstances in which judicial review will be available for decisions affecting the conduct of a Crown court trial. That is the point that is raised in its letter, and to which I will provide a line-by-line response, but the Government essentially agree with that position.

As I have said in Committee—if any of this was not clear, let me be clear about it now—there is a very high bar. There might be exceptional circumstances, which might well be tested when this legislation, if it comes forward, comes into force. For example, if a Crown court judge clearly acts outside the parameters of the legislation by allocating a case that is clearly excluded under these provisions from being judge-only—because it is, say, complex and lengthy or indictable-only—that may fall outside of this rule, but it is certainly going to be only an exceptional case.

The best thing for me to do is write, so that Members can see what those reasons are and see what the Government’s position is. Essentially, we think that what is set out in the Bar Council’s letter as regards the availability of judicial review—there is no appeal route, and I have never suggested otherwise—correctly states the law.

[Dr Mullan]

Just so the Committee is clear exactly what I said and what the Minister said in return, it was in response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington, who asked what it would take to get me to accept the Government’s position. I said:

“If the Minister wants to intervene on me and say, ‘I am absolutely certain that there would be a right to judicially review the allocation decision by a Crown court,’ I will be satisfied. I am asking for the Minister to stand up and say that she is absolutely certain.”

The Minister replied:

“If, at a PTPH, a judge makes an error of law, that is amenable to judicial review. Full stop.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 16 April 2026; c. 271.]

That is completely different from what the Minister has just said now, where she is making it very clear that this will be extremely in its provisions.

The appropriate thing to do is not to vote on amendments and clauses of this Bill when we are not clear on the position. It is open to the Minister to defer and to seek to reallocate the proposals before us today, instead of again asking us to vote when she is telling us that she will send us a further letter with a full, detailed explanation of the position. That is not the way we should be doing things on a matter as important as whether we will remove an expansive existing right to judicially review an allocation decision that sits with the magistrates court.

[Sarah Sackman]

As regards the last point, Ms Butler, I am ultimately in your hands as to how you want to deal with it. I have said how I am going to deal with it, and what I consider the position to be vis-à-vis the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the availability, or lack thereof, of a judicial review route. There is no appeal route. An allocation decision in this context is final, and deliberately so, because we want to speed up the system. There are other appeal routes when one gets to questions of verdict.

I have said that I will set that out. I do not want to rush Members or not provide them with the full information, and I am seeking to be as transparent as I can be. As I said, we will write to the Committee, so that everyone can have the full information. I do not think the issue radically changes the substance of our debate, but given the position the shadow Minister has taken, I will not force the point. I would rather that we ventilate the issues fully, Members get the letter and we then vote accordingly.

Ultimately, I have made it clear that there is no specific appeal right or route to challenge the mode of trial allocation. There are, however, a number of safeguards, including a judge hearing from both parties and giving reasons for the decision. Those all safeguard the allocation process, but if there is any lack of clarity that I have contributed to, albeit inadvertently, in relation to how JR interacts with the Senior Courts Act, let me set the information out, and Members can have it before we proceed.

[Dr Mullan]

On a point of order, Ms Butler. I am being reasonable. On the matters on which the Minister said she would write to us—the three offences and whether there will be amendment in that respect— I have accepted a letter. However, it is not appropriate to ask us to vote when we are unclear about the implications of these changes. We have already had to do that once, and it is not appropriate to ask us to do it again. We can debate the clauses, which relate to the potential loss of an important right, but we do not necessarily have to vote on them. I have never said there was a right of appeal; I have never described it as a right of appeal. I have said that there is a right to judicial review of an allocation decision. It is not right that we proceed without knowing the full implications of that being taken away through the Bill.

[The Chair]

It is up to the Minister how we proceed. We could suspend the sitting—[Interruption.] We are going to suspend the sitting and sit in private.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We continue with the Question that clause 3 stand part of the Bill.

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move, That the debate be now adjourned.

We have had some discussion in private, and I think it will be helpful, while not revealing what was said in private, to illustrate the Opposition’s thinking on the matter. As I explained during our previous sitting on Thursday—there has been a significant length of time since—I was of the understanding that moving the allocation decision away from the magistrates court to the Crown court would lead to a substantial reduction in access to judicial review of allocation decisions. This is not about appeal—we argued separately for appeal. Rather, the point of contention is about the right to judicial review. In that debate, the Minister, I am sure inadvertently, potentially misled the Committee by suggesting that that was not true, and I was called patronising by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy, the Parliamentary Private Secretary sitting behind her, when I suggested that that was the case.

The Bar Council has submitted evidence to the Committee that supports my argument that there would be a substantial change in access to judicial review. That is directly relevant, not just to clause 3, which we are being asked to vote on, but to the next clause. The Minister accepts that she needs to write to us with further clarity on this issue, so she is conceding that it is not clear, but we are still being asked, by the Government Whip and the Minister, to vote on this measure. That is highly unsatisfactory. I want us to vote with a shared understanding of what the implications are. If the Minister agreed that there would be a significant reduction in access to the right to judicial review, we would have that shared understanding, but I do not believe that she is willing to concede that point.

On the basis that it is unclear what we are voting on, I am afraid that it is simply not appropriate for us to be asked to vote on clause 3. That was not my intention; I was of the understanding—I accept incorrectly—as I think the Minister also was, that we could shelve the vote and continue the debate, so that progress on the Bill was not curtailed. However, the Clerks have advised us that we cannot shelve the vote, so if this is the only available option to prevent us from voting without the full facts, I think it is appropriate that we adjourn the debate until such time as we get them. To reiterate, this was not my intention; I had expected that we would continue the debate and then have an option—[Interruption.] Does the PPS want to say something? No. On that basis, I think that we should adjourn.

[Sarah Sackman]

I oppose the Adjournment because I want us to make progress. Everyone is here to continue the important work of line-by-line scrutiny. I do not think that anything that I have said, to assist the Committee and Members across the House, should undermine that approach, so we should proceed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kohler]

To my mind, that would appear to be a clarification.

[Dr Mullan]

I think the Minister is accepting that there is no obvious route to judicial review, which is completely contrary to what she said to us on Thursday. I think anyone would interpret that as a significant reduction in rights compared with the existing status quo, so with that clarification from the Minister, I am happy to continue.

Question put and negatived.

Question put, That clause 3 stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 4, page 10, line 16, leave out “one or more of the offences is an offence” and insert “all of the offences are”.

This amendment would limit judge-only trials to situations where all of the offences are listed in Schedule 3ZA.

Clause 4 relates to the allocation to the Crown court bench division of complex or lengthy cases. The amendment relates to how the mixture of cases presented on an indictment would affect the allocation decision. It addresses a clear overreach and would limit judge-only trials to situations where all the offences of which someone was accused are listed in new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

As it stands, a case may be directed to be judge-only where only one of the offences on the indictment falls within the schedule list, with only very limited exceptions in relation to murder and related offences, and sexual assault and related offences. It is important for Members to realise just how potentially expansive new schedule 3ZA is. If just one of these offences appears on someone’s list of charges, they will lose their access to a jury trial. They include conspiracy to defraud, cheating the public revenue, offences under the Taxes Management Act 1970, offences of false accounting under the Theft Act 1968, insider dealing, money laundering and bribery—a whole range of offences whereby, just one of which will remove access to a jury trial.

Someone could be accused at the same time of offences as serious as serious physical assault, grievous bodily harm, burglary or theft. Those offences may be many years apart; there may be a series of offences, dating over a number of years. That means that someone may lose a right that the Government otherwise accept they should have access to. Someone could have a serious offence of theft, with a likely sentence that, as we know, can be over the three-year benchmark. They could be facing a sentence of four years, which the Government otherwise agree should allow them to have a trial with a jury, and they will lose access to a trial by jury in relation to one of the other offences.

The test is not about the seriousness of the offences; it is a test of complexity. Someone may have a less serious but complex case, in the Government’s view, and lose access to a right to jury trial. I cannot see how the Government can possibly argue that that is fair. This is a matter of coherence and fairness. Our position is quite clear: only when all the offences, instead of just one of the offences, are those listed under proposed new schedule 3ZA should someone lose access to their right to a trial by jury on the basis of clause 4.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for his amendment, which would require cases to be eligible for an order under proposed new section 42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 only where all offences listed are schedule offences. We consider that such a method would be overly rigid and would limit the application of clause 4. In reality, most complex and lengthy cases involving fraud and financial crime often prosecute a mix of principal and ancillary offences, some of which would not appear on the schedule of eligible offences. For example, sometimes theft offences, which are not included in the schedule, are prosecuted alongside fraud or money laundering crimes.

Imagine a large-scale conspiracy to defraud and false accounting, perhaps involving multiple offenders operating through a network of shell companies. The prosecution case relies on hundred, perhaps thousands, of pages of electronic banking records, company accounts, internal emails, encrypted messaging data, and expert accounting evidence that traces the movement of funds through dozens of linked corporate entities across multiple jurisdictions. This is in every sense a highly technical and inherently complex case, which is likely to last several months. But there are counts of theft-adjacent offences of, say, handling stolen goods on the indictment. Those counts are not incidental: they are related to the fraud. They provide the fact finder with a holistic picture of the alleged offending. The judge considers the counts to be clearly related and properly joined for trial. If clause 4 were constrained in the way proposed by the amendment, that plainly suitable case—long and exceptionally complex—would be excluded even from consideration for judge-only trial, because those additional connected counts are not listed in the schedule.

Requiring every offence to fall within the schedule would exclude cases that meet the policy intent of clause 4, thereby preventing the court from applying the provision precisely where it is most needed, solely because of the presence of additional non-schedule counts.

[Dr Mullan]

As I mentioned, the Government have chosen to exclude all sexual offences. If that is the logic that the Government seek to apply, why have they chosen to not apply it to an adjoined offence that is a sexual offence?

[Sarah Sackman]

The Government have deliberately drafted clause 4 in a manner that focuses on the overall nature of the case, rather than applying an artificial count-by-count test. The necessary question that we are asking the court to apply is whether, taken as whole, it justifies an order for a judge-only trial, given the policy intent that lies behind clause 4, not whether every individual count meets a particular threshold. Such an approach also risks incentivising artificial charging decisions or indictment charges to determine the eligibility for mode-of-trial decisions, rather than focusing on the effective management and efficient conduct of the trial.

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend is right. Flexibility is not a weaking of the safeguards; it is what actually allows the statutory test in clause 4 to operate properly and in appropriate scenarios.

Judges will already be required to consider the technicality and length of the case when making an order as to whether to allocate to a judge-only trial. Cases including indictable-only homicide and sexual offences are excluded from the outset because we regard those as cases where a jury trial is in the public interest. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Mullan]

I want to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Amber Valley. She has engaged sincerely throughout this debate, so I do not think her comment was a deliberate. We are not saying that someone has to be charged with everything to be eligible; we are saying that anything that they are charged for on that basis that excludes them from a jury trial should only be those offences. We are saying that if someone is charged for insider dealing and the judge decides that the case is complex or lengthy, under the legislation they will get a single-judge trial. The proposed legislation says that if they were also charged with grievous bodily harm, then that case, which would ordinarily continue to have a jury trial, would be seen without a jury. That would mean that just because someone happens to be charged with one of those offences alongside another one, they lose their access to a jury trial on both offences.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The point that the shadow Minister is making is that the clause is a substantial expansion of what we understand the legislation to be doing in terms of a judge-only trial. Somebody could be charged with 10 offences. One of those could be related to a lengthy fraud case, but the rest of the offences would mean that they would still get a judge-only trial, which is a significant expansion of what we believe this Bill is trying to do.

[Dr Mullan]

Absolutely, and there is not even anything in the Bill about proportionality. There is nothing. If someone is charged with one of the offences and the trial will be complex and lengthy—which is different to it being serious—that is it. Whatever else someone is charged with, they have already lost their right to a jury trial. That is a huge expansion.

I intervened to ask the Minister to explain why they have chosen to exclude sexual assaults. If someone is charged with GBH, then they lose their right to a jury trial, but if they are charged with a sexual assault, which in the sentencing guidelines may lead to them having an even lower sentence than a serious GBH, they will continue to have a jury trial, and a fraud offence would continue to be seen by a jury instead of a judge. It is completely contradictory. There is no logic behind the Government’s position. If they had a throughline as to why sexual assault, which is an absolutely terrible offence, is being set to one side, but something as serious as GBH, which can carry a sentence of many years and is also terrible for victims, then there would be more logic to it. But the Government have crafted an approach that is simply unfair and, as the Lib Dem spokeswoman pointed out, represents a massive expansion in all the different types of offences and sentence lengths that could potentially lose access to a jury trial, just because they also happen to be charged with an ancillary offence related to complex fraud. I am afraid there is no rational basis to that at all.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

In the last couple of weeks, there have been press reports about a particular case that was charged in 2019. I will not go into that because it is going to reopen, but clause 4 would mean, for example, that somebody who has been abusing and defrauding the elderly—perhaps many different elderly people—over many years and has caused significant harm not of a sexual nature, and who is therefore charged with multiple offences, gets a judge-only trial and is not tried by a jury. If there was a sexual offence, they would get a jury, but if they had been harming multiple people and defrauding them, they would be tried by a judge alone. Does he agree that that feels quite perverse?

[Dr Mullan]

It is another example of what we have talked about: the move away from what we would consider to be natural justice. The scenario the hon. Member points to is not bizarre; there are offenders who target elderly women, for example, and will use all sorts of different methods to abuse them, from financial to sexual. I have seen cases of that nature. We see people who, at the same time as physically and sexually abusing a family member, were taking money from their bank account and falsely representing them to claim benefits, which again would be covered by the clause. It covers a whole range of offences, in all sorts of patterns. The Government call our amendment too rigid when, actually, the rigidity is quite clearly in the charging and allocation decisions; it is all on the Government’s side. They are being entirely rigid. If someone is subject to one of these cases and the judge thinks it is complex or lengthy, they will lose the right to a jury trial, end of story. I do not think that is a position that the Minister should feel comfortable advocating, and it is why we intend to press our amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

To conclude, the question is not whether juries can handle complex cases, but whether we are prepared to remove a fundamental safeguard instead of fixing the system. These clauses do not address the cause of delays or solve the backlog, but they do risk undermining confidence in our justice system, while offering at best uncertain and marginal gains. Therefore, I again ask the Government to reconsider this clause. Let us adopt some of the safeguards, as well as some of the ways we can reduce court delays, so that we can continue with our jury system, which is genuinely known as the best in the world.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of Opposition amendment 46, which is in my name, as we debate elements of the Government’s proposals to remove jury trials and make use of the new Crown court bench division in relation to potentially complex and lengthy trials.

To make sense of this debate, we must consider how the measures will apply. As we touched on earlier, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce the time taken to hear particularly lengthy and complex cases by permitting judge-alone trials and therefore—they say—freeing up additional Crown court capacity. The cases must involve at least one fraud or related financial offence listed in proposed new schedule 3ZA, which includes fraud by false representation, cheating the public revenue, money laundering and other offences, and would not involve an indictable-only homicide offence or sexual offence, including attempts or conspiracies to commit such offences.

We can already see, when considering the written evidence we have received, why there are rightly many questions about how the provisions will operate. In amendment 46, we therefore propose a requirement to ensure that defendants have a route in the law back to a jury trial. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence of Dr Natalie Hodgson, from the University of New South Wales, and Dr Matt Thomason, from the University of Nottingham, which was particularly helpful. They point out:

“Currently, the proposed s.42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not define what is meant by “lengthy” or “complex”...Similarly, the proposed legislation provides no detail as to what judges can and should consider in determining whether ‘it is in the public interest’ for the trial to be conducted by judge alone. The Explanatory Note makes clear that ‘the court will retain full discretion’ as to whether it is appropriate to order a trial by judge alone.”

That is giving judges enormous power over these decisions.

Dr Thomason and Dr Hodgson also say:

“In contrast, we note that in New Zealand—which has a similar provision permitting judge-alone trials in cases ‘likely to be long and complex’—the relevant legislation sets out with greater specificity what a judge should consider in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex…In particular, the New Zealand legislation specifies that a Court must not order a judge-alone trial unless all reasonable measures and arrangements have been taken to shorten the length of the trial, but the ‘duration of the trial still seems likely to exceed 20 sitting days.’”

So New Zealand was capable, in its legislation, of drawing a line in the sand as to what it considered to be a lengthy trial, but we do not seem to be doing the same.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The hon. Member is making a really interesting point about what we perceive to be lengthy or complex, as the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden tried to do with her amendment. Amendment 29 seeks to define a lengthy trial as one going beyond the five-month point, but Geoffrey Rivlin KC collected data over six years from Southwark Crown court—the primary venue for complex financial crime trials—which showed that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two typically lasting more than that, and only two cases in total lasting over six months. Does the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle agree that it would be helpful for the Minister to clarify what she believes “lengthy” or “complex” to be? The judiciary will also be asking that.

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The Minister is always keen to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, and as I said we have a clear lesson from another jurisdiction that is specific. In our system, my understanding is that the practice directions for complex cases are that the prosecution and defence should do everything possible to make sure a trial does not last longer than six weeks. So that is another example where we might expect the Minister’s view.

Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say:

“The New Zealand legislation also specifies that judges should consider the following factors in deciding whether the defendant’s right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.”

Those include

“the number and nature of the offences with which the defendant is charged…the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of evidence likely to be presented…the imposition on potential jurors of sitting”

for a long time and

“any other matters the court considers relevant.”

Again, that is much more specific than the measures we have before us.

The written evidence continues:

“In New South Wales, Australia—where judge-alone trials can be ordered when a defendant elects a judge-alone trial and the judge considered that a judge-alone trial ‘is in the interests of justice’—the legislation specifies that, without limiting the factors a Court may consider, ‘the court may refuse to make an order…if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards’ such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, or dangerousness.”

Again, that cuts to the heart of the difference in our approach. We have talked about matters of dishonesty and the different elements of an offence that we might seek to prove. Even if a trial is highly complex, if it comes down to a judgment about reasonableness, behaviour and the choices people make, that is where a jury trial comes in. The approach in the Bill has a comparative lack of clarity and specificity, and that is why I have tabled amendment 46, which would weight things back towards the defendant, who at this stage is still innocent until proven guilty.

Even if the general right to elect for a jury trial is restricted for certain offences, defendants must be allowed to elect for one where they can demonstrate that a summary trial would violate the principles of natural justice. That is vital for individuals with a previously unblemished character or those whose livelihoods are directly imperilled by a conviction. The evidence from the Institute for Government and JUSTICE, and from recent parliamentary debates, is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach to efficiency risks compromising the integrity of the justice system it seeks to serve.

In relation to similar Opposition measures on previous clauses, the Government said that if they supported us, they would lose the court time they were seeking to secure. Let us remind ourselves of how questionable those claims are. The Institute for Government believes that the Government’s claims are highly uncertain, and others have questioned whether the claimed savings will ever actually be made; we will visit that later—for example, when we discuss the summing up the judge will need to make. The backlog is largely a product of longer-term issues related to, for example, judicial vacancies, prison transport, lack of early pleas and all sorts of other reasons not related to jury trials. So the efficiency gain is marginal, and we must ask whether it is worth the constitutional cost.

By forcing complex cases or those with high personal stakes into a bench division, we are essentially prioritising a spreadsheet of data over citizens’ rights to be judged by their peers. A natural justice exception would act as a safety valve, ensuring that speed does not override the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Why does it matter whether a judge or a jury hear a case? In many instances, the legal outcome might be the same. However, the process of reaching the outcome is where natural justice resides.

In his paper “For Mercy’s Sake”, Geoffrey Robertson KC emphasised the importance of jury equity—the ability of a jury to look beyond the strict letter of the law to the broader circumstances of a defendant’s life. He is right to argue that a jury possesses the unique capacity to dispense mercy where the law, in its rigidity, cannot. For a defendant of previous good character or one whose career hangs in the balance, the collective common sense of 12 citizens provides a bulwark against the mechanical application of statute, which may result in an outcome that is legally correct but morally disproportionate.

That is the essence of my argument: for a first-time offender, the move from a clean record to a criminal conviction is a life-altering transition. In some cases, the evidence may be nuanced or the impact of a guilty verdict may be uniquely devastating, such as the immediate loss of a professional license or employment. In previous debates, we referred to the fact that MPs might suffer those consequences, as would doctors, judges and all sorts of other people. When the defendant can show that the consequences of a trial are so profound that they require the ability to exercise their right to a jury, rather than just a professional bench, the law should accommodate that request.

When we speak of natural justice, we speak of the right to be heard in the manner that is fair. If the defendant can demonstrate that their case involves something that a professional bench might treat with case-hardened cynicism, the system must remain flexible. The Law Society highlights that public trust in the legal system is inextricably linked to the jury, and that the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. If defendants feel that they have been processed through an administrative division, rather than tried by their peers, the moral authority of the sentence is diminished.

Critics will argue that an exception for natural justice will lead to every defendant claiming they are a special case, thereby clogging the system further. That is a misplaced fear; we already have established legal tests for interests of justice in other areas of the law, such as the granting of legal aid or the admissibility of evidence. In fact, just yesterday, the Government accepted a reform to expand the eligibility to apply to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, when it is in the interests of justice to do so.

In an earlier sitting, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden helpfully approached similar issues with an amendment that was more specific about the situations in which we might agree that natural justice should allow for a jury trial—for example, when the defendant is of good character, has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence, or will be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, or where being convicted of the offence or offences for which they are to be tried would likely result in significant reputational damage or their employment or professional qualifications being adversely affected. As I discussed in previous debates, those are all scenarios in which we think not having a jury trial would be against the interests of natural justice, and which our amendment seeks to curtail.

To conclude, the Bill in its current form is too blunt an instrument in relation to the decision to remove the jury. The tests set by the Government are not well defined and are too heavily weighted against the rights of the defendant. That is why our amendment introduces a stronger requirement to consider the matter from the perspective of the, until proven guilty, innocent defendant and what represents natural justice for them. By incorporating this safeguard, we preserve the mercy and common sense that Geoffrey Robertson KC so eloquently defends. Yes, justice must be efficient, but above all it must be fair. Let us not sacrifice the principles of natural justice on the altar of administrative expediency. Let us allow defendants who can show just cause to elect for a jury they deserve.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will not press my amendment to a vote. In fact, Ms Butler, I notify you and the Committee that I am not asking to vote on any of my amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the Minister for her response. My amendments are short and easily identifiable. I think the offences I have suggested should be included within the categories of certain murders and homicides, but as I said earlier, I will not press the amendments to a vote.

[Dr Mullan]

rose—

[Sarah Sackman]

Forgive me, Ms Butler, is it possible that I have not addressed the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle?

[The Chair]

Amendment 46.

[Dr Mullan]

indicated assent.

[Sarah Sackman]

Finally, let me address amendment 46. As Members will get sick of hearing me say, the courts are facing an unprecedented challenge. Although relatively few in number, cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. In that context, and in line with the recommendation of the independent review of the criminal courts, we have taken the decision to introduce judge-only trials for lengthy and complex cases. The policy is intended to create an additional, tightly defined and controlled discretion for a very small number of cases where the burden on jurors and court resources is excessive, ensuring that cases are dealt with efficiently while maintaining fairness and judicial rigour.

[Dr Mullan]

I am in danger of not knowing my figures, but I think the impact assessment suggests that 25% of cases in the list of offences will be included, so I am not sure whether it is reasonable to describe that as a small proportion—I do not know whether the Minister said “proportion” or “number”. How many cases does she think it will involve?

[Sarah Sackman]

My understanding of the time saving—we measure it in the context of Crown court sitting days—is that we are looking at around 500 sitting days, which no one is suggesting is a huge number. As I said, the reality of how we expect judges to apply the provision in these cases is that jury trial is the default. The provision in clause 4 is fairly narrowly drawn, so we do not expect that lots of cases will be captured by it, but we expect that lengthier fraud and financial crime cases that come within the provision will result in significant time savings—significant when every little helps, to put it that way. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.

As I have said previously, the principles of natural justice—the way in which the amendment is framed—are preserved in the framework provided by these reforms. We think that makes the introduction of an additional, open-ended safeguard unnecessary.

The right to a fair trial, protected under article 6 of the European convention, is preserved here. Judges will be required to apply the statutory test carefully and under the proper safeguards of clause 4, considering suitability and public interest on a case-by-case basis. It is not a category approach; it is based on the individual nature and facts of the case. Judges will also, in accordance with the established principles of fairness and open justice, have to give reasons for those allocation decisions, which we think will also ensure a level of accountability. We think that judges, in accordance with their judicial oath, will do this transparently, fairly and well. For those reasons, the amendment would not add to a procedural safeguard, and I urge the hon. Member not to press it.

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Division 15

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 6

---

Conservative: 3
Liberal Democrat: 2
Green Party: 1

Noes: 9

---

Labour: 9

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out from “is” to end of line 2, and insert

“a right of appeal against a decision to make an order under this section on the grounds of natural justice.

(5A) where an appeal is made under subsection (5), it must not be heard by the judge who made the original determination.”

This amendment would add a right for defendants to appeal against the decision for a judge-only trial for lengthy and complex cases.

Much of our discourse has focused on whether judge-only trials should exist at all, but as with the previous amendments, we must also address the critical procedural omission in the drafting of this clause: the absence of a clear interlocutory right of appeal for a defendant against a decision to allocate them to a judge-only trial. The Government’s stated aim is efficiency, but efficiency without a safety valve of oversight often leads to systemic instability. By denying a defendant the right to appeal an allocation decision before the trial begins, we are not streamlining justice but creating a procedural blind spot.

We believe that providing an immediate right of appeal is not only a matter of fairness, but the most efficient path available to the court. As we debated in relation to clause 3, on the Crown court bench division, the lack of such a mechanism risks baking in errors that can be rectified only through costly and time-consuming post-trial appeals.

The pursuit of headline-ready speed must not eclipse the logistical reality that a trial conducted in the wrong forum is a wasted trial. If an allocation decision is found to be flawed only after a conviction, the state incurs the double cost of the original judge-led hearing and a subsequent jury retrial. If a case is allocated incorrectly, the defendant currently has no immediate recourse, and they must undergo the entire trial in the bench division. If, on appeal against conviction, it is determined that their allocation was indeed improper, the entire proceeding is voided.

An interlocutory appeal lasting perhaps one or two hours is a negligible investment compared with the risk of a three-week trial perhaps being overturned on a procedural technicality regarding allocation. By resolving the question of the right forum at the outset, we ensure that when a trial does proceed, its verdict is final and resistant to procedural challenge. That is the true meaning of efficiency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

The amendment would effectively introduce a new right of appeal against a decision to order a judge-only trial. Once again the Government does not consider that to be necessary in the interests of fairness, or appropriate given the time saving this Bill seeks to achieve. We are seeking, by the process set out in clause 4, to encourage procedural finality and to avoid delay rather than setting up additional procedural layers to add complexity and delay.

Of course, all that should not come at the expense of overall fairness. That guarantee of fairness is expressed in a number of ways: because we consider the different modes of trial that might be afforded to a case to be fair; because a judge sitting alone will be required to give reasons for the allocation itself and then for the substantive verdict, whether a conviction or an acquittal; and because that in itself can be subject to an appeal in the Crown court in the usual way. We regard that as an important safeguard in terms of fairness, but we do not want to encourage mode-of-trial allocations—which we think that judges will do well, transparently, efficiently and having heard from both sides—to be relitigated. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East for his remarks. I will paint a scenario for the Minister and ask whether she thinks it is one she will end up regretting if she does not accept at some point, if not at these stages, the idea that appeal is actually serving her own interests in reducing the backlogs. The scenario is that the Bill has passed, has been operating for a year or even two, and there have been multiple complex and lengthy cases heard without a jury under the schedules in this clause—potentially saving, in the Government’s own arguments of its merits, many days of crown court time—but then one of those people appeals post-conviction and successfully argues there was some error of judgment in the judge’s decision to allocate them a trial without a jury.

My understanding of the law is that that would set a precedent and that anybody in those same circumstances allocated a trial without a jury would then be entitled to say that the law as then written by the Court of Appeal should apply to them. We could have a situation where dozens and dozens of cases were then ordered to be retried with a trial by jury. That would not only fail to have made the savings the Government wants to achieve, but make the situation even worse, leading to many more Crown court sitting days being taken up by these cases.

The Court of Appeal approach on allocation will allow the case law to be built up quickly, ahead of trials and convictions, to bring the clarity that judges will need to make sure their decisions are not successfully challenged in the Court of Appeal. We made that argument in relation to clause 3, but it is even stronger in relation to clause 4, because it is just so much more subjective and open to interpretation, and there is so much more room for judges to make decisions that the Court of Appeal find erred against what the Minister is intending through her legislation.

This amendment is a genuine attempt to save trouble down the line. I hope—even if not at this stage—the Minister reconsiders her view that these appeals are necessary. We know that people are not allowed to make meritless appeals. They have to have legal advice from somebody, telling them, “Yes, you have a reasonable case to be made”, and so this will not become some frivolous thing. We have talked about the magistrates court and the Government seeking to restrict that, but even without that restriction, the vast majority of people do not seek to exercise an appeal right—when they already have that right and exercising it comes at a low opportunity cost—even though the Government’s argument is that it can be used as appeal for appeal’s sake.

The idea that an appeal right would flood the courts with those types of cases does not stand up to much scrutiny. Even if that were the case initially, as the case law developed, it would become harder and harder for people to make appeals on this element of the process. On that basis, we will push the amendment to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 16

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 5

---

Conservative: 3
Green Party: 1
Liberal Democrat: 1

Noes: 9

---

Labour: 9

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 4, page 12, line 27, leave out subsection (5)(a).

This amendment would prevent the court unilaterally overriding a reason to issue a revocation order so that a case allocated for judge-only trial under this section could be tried by jury.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 48, in clause 4, page 13, line 11, at end insert—

“(g) the interests of natural justice for the defendant.”

This amendment would ensure that the interests of natural justice for the defendant are relevant to the decision to revoke an order for a judge-only trial for the offences listed in Schedule 1.

[Dr Mullan]

In earlier sittings, I spent some time testing the basis on which the Government are asking the Committee to accept the changes proposed in the Bill, particularly in relation to the claimed benefits and how the system will work in practice. That is particularly relevant in the context of clause 4, where the justification for removing jury trials rests on the assessment of complexity and length, and therefore on how those judgments are made and revisited in practice. During evidence, I asked Sir Brian Leveson about the modelling underpinning the proposals. His report points to the need for further modelling, but when that modelling was discussed, it was clear that there is uncertainty about the figures and what the impact will be.

That is important context for these amendments; if there is uncertainty about how the system will operate and what it will deliver, it becomes even more important that the framework we are putting in place is clear on how decisions are to be made and what factors will be taken into account. Throughout our discussions, I have also tried to focus on how the provisions will operate and what they will mean for people going through the system, particularly those who are not legally represented and who may find it difficult to navigate more complex procedures. The amendments are aimed at those practical questions.

Amendment 50 relates to a point that is fundamental to how the framework will operate in practice. The Bill sets out conditions under which a judge-only trial order may be revoked, including where the case is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy. That reflects the Government’s central argument that a jury trial is displaced only because certain features of the case justify it. However, the Bill then provides that, even when those conditions are met, the court may none the less decide not to revoke the order if it considers that

“it would not be appropriate to do so”.

I want to be clear about what that means in practice. If the justification for removing the jury is complexity or length, what is the position when that justification falls away? What is the court expected to do at that point? Is the expectation that the case should ordinarily return to a jury or that, once the decision has been made, it should remain judge-only unless something else actively pushes it back? The Bill does not answer that question, and that matters because, throughout our debates, I have tried to emphasise that it is about not just what is written in the Bill, but how its provisions will operate day to day in real cases.

As I set out in earlier debates, we have a whole range of factors here, and many of them must be weighed rather than applied as straightforward rules. That inevitably leaves a significant role for judicial interpretation. Judicial discretion in itself is not a problem, but when Parliament sets out a structured framework with specific conditions, it is important that those conditions actually do something and have a clear consequence. Otherwise, we risk creating a system in which the criteria exist on paper, but the outcome is ultimately determined by a broader and less clearly defined set of judgments, and that is precisely the concern here.

We are told that if a case is sufficiently complex or lengthy, it may be tried without a jury, but we are also told that if it is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy, the court may nevertheless decide that it is still not appropriate to return it to a jury. The Committee is entitled to ask, “What weight are we really giving to those original criteria?” In earlier debates, I made the point that courts will look at the legislation, and indeed our debates, to understand what Parliament intends. If we leave this question too open, it is not clear what guidance the courts are expected to follow in practice. If a defendant is told that their case is no longer sufficiently complex to justify a judge-only trial, but that it will nevertheless continue without a jury because it is considered not appropriate to change it, the basis of that decision will not be clear to them.

This amendment is relatively modest but important. It seeks not to remove judicial discretion entirely or create an inflexible system, but to ensure that, where Parliament has set out the conditions for revocation, those conditions have a clear and meaningful effect. If the basis for removing the jury no longer exists, that should carry real weight in the decision that follows. Otherwise, we are in danger of creating a framework in which the justification for removing the jury and the decision to keep the jury become disconnected.

Amendment 48 relates to the factors that a court must consider when deciding whether to revoke a judge-only trial order. The Bill sets out a number of considerations, including delay, the interests of victims and the impact on court business. Those are clearly important issues. We have heard a great deal of evidence in Committee about the impact of delays, particularly on victims, and I do not think anyone would dispute that that is a serious concern.

In my role as shadow Justice Minister, I have focused on the experience of victims in all different elements of the system, including the effect that long delays can have on them. Looking at the list of factors in the Bill, I am interested in what is not included. It is striking that, in the statutory list, there is no explicit reference to the interests of natural justice for the defendant. That omission matters.

In earlier debates, we have been clear that these questions are, in part, about weighing exercises—balancing different factors—and that there are, in reality, more and less fair ways of doing things. We have also discussed that defendants are not all in the same position. The system already recognises that in other ways, whether through good character, prior convictions or the wider consequences that a conviction may have on someone’s life. We treat individuals differently, because fairness requires us to do so. That is why the framework matters.

If the court is directed to consider certain factors, those factors will shape how decisions are made in practice. If fairness to the defendant is not explicitly part of that framework, there is a risk that it will not be given the weight it should be. That is particularly important in this context, because we are dealing with decisions about whether a person should continue to be tried without a jury.

In debates on earlier clauses, I made the point that jury trial is, in some respects, a superior form of justice, even if we accept that it is not practical in every single case. That necessarily means that moving away from it is not a neutral step; it is a step that has consequences for fairness. When the court is deciding whether that position should continue and whether a case should remain judge-only or return to a jury, it seems entirely reasonable that fairness to the defendant should be part of that decision—not assumed or left to implication, but explicitly recognised.

Amendment 48 would not remove any of the existing factors. It would not prevent the court from taking into account delay, the interests of victims or the impact on the wider system, but it would ensure that, alongside those considerations, the court was also required to consider the interests of natural justice. Given the nature of the decision, that seems to be an essential part of a balanced framework.

These amendments are intended to clarify how this framework will operate in practice. They are about ensuring that the conditions set out in the Bill have a clear effect, and that the factors guiding courts’ decision making reflect the full range of relevant considerations.

[Sarah Sackman]

I will address amendments 50 and 48 together. The cases that we are considering in the context of clause 4, which involve fraud and serious financial crime, are, as I have said, among the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court, routinely running for many weeks and often months. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts—that is not unusual.

Like earlier clauses, clause 4 makes clear provision for orders for a judge-alone trial to be revoked where the circumstances of a case change. That is, again, an important safeguard. For example, a charge on the indictment may be dropped, suggesting that the case becomes less technical, but that is not always clear cut. Money laundering, tax evasion and fraud charges can fall, but cases may none the less remain complex and lengthy in nature due to the volume of digital material, financial accounts or, indeed, the number of defendants involved.

That is why the policy is intentionally designed in a discretionary manner and defines what is required for a judge-alone order, but ultimately a judge, seized of the facts of the case, is best placed to determine whether the conditions are met for each case. Judges must have discretion to determine whether an order is or no longer remains appropriate. In deciding whether to revoke an order, the court must also consider named factors such as delays to the proceedings and the impact on Crown court listings. I am pleased to hear that there is consensus, in this context, about the relevancy of the factors that are prescribed. I do not think that anybody here would disagree that we want judges to have regard to the efficiency of our system and the impact on individual cases.

For all cases under a judge-alone order, it is important to underscore that if an excluded offence is added or the court considers that it is in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, the order will always be revoked and the case sent to be dealt with in that way, with a jury. Where a jury trial has started already, an order can never be made. That would clearly cause disproportionate disruption within our courts.

In relation to the points around natural justice, the right to a fair hearing, the rules against bias and the duty to act fairly, we consider that those are already upheld within our reforms and therefore do not require the specific provision that is provided for in amendment 48. As hon. Members have heard me say, the fact that a trial happens without a jury does not in itself offend the principles of natural justice.

We have also designed the test for revoking an order, as set out in clause 4, to ensure that relevant interests are properly balanced by the courts. Importantly, parties are given the opportunity to make representations on reallocation, meaning that the defence can draw the court’s attention to how the factors in the Bill intersect with a defendant’s interests, including the issue of delay. At the same time, as we have heard, clause 4 requires the court itself to have regard to the interests of victims when deciding whether reallocation would be appropriate. That ensures that interests are properly weighed by the court, alongside the other factors set out in the Bill. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Mullan]

To reiterate, as in clause 3, we risk creating an unfair dual standard for defendants. The Government accept that such defendants should have rights to a jury trial, but they will potentially be denied one unnecessarily because of the circumstances changing throughout their trial, rather than at the outset. Can we create two identical legal tests for the outset versus in the trial? No, but we can certainly make a better effort than we have.

This issue ties back into the question of appeals. If we do not make the process fairer, there is a greater likelihood that defendants who experience failure to reallocate when the circumstances change—who sit there knowing that, if they had been in those circumstances at the outset of the trial, they would have had access to a jury trial—will be encouraged to appeal, post conviction, against the decision not to allocate them to a jury trial. Therefore, again, on the Government’s own test in relation to efficiency, there is a benefit to having a more effective and more balanced test for reallocation during trials. On that basis, we will push our amendments to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 18

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 4

---

Conservative: 3
Liberal Democrat: 1

Noes: 9

---

Labour: 9

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 4, page 13, line 30, leave out “trial beginning on or” and insert

“cases whose first hearing in the magistrates’ court takes place”.

This amendment prevents the provisions in section 4 coming into effect retrospectively.

We previously discussed the issue of retrospectivity in clause 3, and the exact same questions arise here. As drafted, the Bill provides that the new regime applies to trials listed to begin after a specified day, regardless of when earlier stages in the case have taken place. Subsection (6) makes it clear that this applies regardless of when the preparatory hearing was ordered, for example. That means that cases already in the system may be brought into the new regime before they are heard. We have already considered this issue in debates on earlier clauses, where I raised concerns about how changes to the procedural framework affect people who are already part way through the process.

Defendants do not approach their case in a vacuum. They make decisions at different stages about how to approach it, how to prepare and how to engage with the system, based on the entire framework that applies to them at the time. In this context, that includes the expectation that their case will be heard by a jury. Where a defendant has proceeded on that basis and the case has progressed through the system with that understanding, it is not a small matter to change that position part way through. To change the basis on which a case is to be tried part way through proceedings is not simply a technical or procedural adjustment; it alters the ground beneath the defendant’s feet, and that point goes directly to fairness.

The Government may argue that this is simply a procedural change, and that the case remains in the Crown court with the same offences and the same sentencing powers, but that does not fully address the issue. We have already discussed the meaningful distinction between a trial before a jury and a trial before a judge sitting alone. The Minister has accepted that there is “something special” about a jury trial. If that is the case, removing it cannot be treated as a neutral step. It follows that changing the mode of trial after a case has already entered the system is not simply a question of procedure, but a change that affects how the case is determined.

There is also a practical dimension to this. I have referred to the position of defendants who may have made decisions in expectation of a jury trial. That may affect whether they elect a particular route, how they prepare the defence and how they approach the proceedings as a whole. It has also been pointed out that defendants awaiting trial may be doing so on remand, expecting that their case will be heard in a particular way. Had they known that the framework would change, they may have taken different decisions at an earlier stage. That illustrates that this is not simply an abstract concern; it has real consequences for individuals.

There is also a broader question of how such changes will operate in practice. Applying a new regime to cases already in the system introduces an additional layer of complexity. It raises questions about how existing cases should be treated, how decisions already taken are to be revisited and how the courts should manage that situation practically. We have already heard concerns that this could lead to additional steps in the process, including further consideration of allocation and, potentially, challenge. That has implications for the efficiency of the system. If all the cases currently sat in the backlog to which this applies are subject to a further additional hearing in addition to the new cases coming in, that will create a burden on the courts.

On fairness, it is difficult to justify changing the basis on which a case should be tried after it has already progressed through the system. On practicality, it is not clear that retrospective application will achieve the objectives that the Government have set out—particularly if it introduces additional complexity. In debates on earlier clauses, I also made the point that retrospective measures require a particularly strong justification. We previously talked about the guidance to the House and how stringent those tests are. We have heard an unconvincing case, in my view, that such a justification exists here.

The amendment therefore takes a straightforward and proportionate approach. It would ensure that the new regime applies only prospectively to cases entering the system after the change, rather than to those already under way. That respects the position of defendants who are already part way through the process, avoids the fairness concerns that arise from changing the framework mid-stream, and provides greater clarity about how the system will operate. Given the nature of the change being made, that is a distinction that I think the Committee should take seriously.

This is a question about how changes to the system are applied in practice. The amendment is intended to provide clarity about that and to ensure that the framework is applied consistently to cases moving forward, but not retrospectively.

[Sarah Sackman]

On amendment 49, consistent with our approach to the allocation of cases within the existing caseload but where trials are not yet commenced in relation to allocation to a Crown court bench division, we follow the same approach in relation to questions of allocation with the creation of a judge-only forum for cases of the nature we have been discussing in relation to clause 4—namely those of a lengthy and complex nature. We follow the same rationale and principles that trials should be treated and heard in accordance with the law as it stands at the commencement of trial.

As I said earlier in the debate, applying the measures in the Bill to cases in the open caseload will enable us to bring forward and thereby accelerate caseload reduction, which is one of the main—if not the primary—objectives of the Bill. That approach to the application of the law to the existing caseload is consistent with precedent. For example, Parliament previously legislated in 2003 for judge-only trials in cases involving jury tampering and that applied to trials begun after commencement, regardless of when the case first entered the system. I grant that what we are seeking to do here is bolder and more extensive, but it is the principle of whether trials should be heard in accordance with the law as it stands when the Bill is brought into force.

That also means that we avoid a situation where there are two different procedures running in parallel in the Crown court as a result of arbitrary cut-off dates. Although I do not seek to overstate the impact that that application of the legislation will have on the relatively small number of cases that we are talking about in this context, it is important that we derive, in the delay reduction, every little benefit that we can from the measures that we are bringing forward as soon as we can, because of the extent of the delays. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Mullan]

The only point I would add is that, as the Minister has accepted, this is a relatively small number of cases, so the test of what is justifiable is actually disproportionately weighted against the Minister in these cases, in comparison with the earlier cases on clause 3. People’s rights and expectations remain the same, and from their perspective will be undermined by these measures, yet the benefit that the Government will actually secure from them is relatively minor, as the Minister accepts. I refer to the fact that 11% of Crown courts are sat empty today, and for a very minimal gain we are putting forward measures that make it difficult for people to exercise their rights in the legal system in a fair and reasonable way. On that basis, we will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I am going to make some progress— I know the hon. Gentleman has raised this with me. Those responsible for drafting the legislation do not need to add further definitions of what we mean by “complex” and “lengthy”. That is well understood. As I said, given the other safeguards and considerations related to the kinds of cases that will be suitable, we think that the discretionary approach that judges will apply will suffice.

[Dr Mullan]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sarah Sackman]

I will not; I am going to make some progress.

As Sir Brian’s report clearly outlines,

“this is a principled reform based on the need for cases to be resolved in a more timely manner, with a forum well suited to the demands of the case.”

He suggests that allowing a judge to hear these cases alone—in tightly defined circumstances, of course—can cut hearing time by at least 20%. As we have said already, we heard from various witnesses about how that time saving would be achieved. That is a gain for the system and for capacity in the Crown court that can be used to progress other sorts of cases. That is not an abstract assumption. There is not an absence of evidence here: we have heard from those with judicial experience, as well as from international comparators such as New South Wales, where complex cases have been found to be 29% quicker when tried by judge alone.

Let us be clear about what we mean in practice when we talk about long jury trials. Imagine someone being told they are required to serve on a jury in the Crown court, not for the typical two weeks’ jury service, but for at least several months. Imagine receiving that letter and that news. Although we are very grateful for people who do that—I know how willingly so many citizens participate in juries—I have, as the Minister for Courts, received lots of correspondence about the burden that lengthy trials can impose. If someone is self-employed or in insecure employment, the time away can mean a significant loss of income. If they are a carer, it can mean scrambling around to find, or having to pay for, alternative support for a loved one. Even for many in stable employment, it is not just inconvenient; it has a real impact on personal life and finances.

That is why, as policymakers, we need to be proportionate and, dare I say it, judicious about how we use this special resource. Yes, I use the word “special”, and I do not resile from it—sitting on a jury is a special thing. However, we have to use that resource where it is right, proportionate and appropriate to do so. Reducing the need for members of the public to sit as jurors on very long and intensive trials means that fewer people will face that disruption and loss of earnings.

The nature of crime and evidence has changed. It is no longer a couple of paper files and a handful of witnesses; Sir Brian Leveson is clear that modern cases of the sort we are talking about can involve vast volumes—terabytes—of digital material held on servers and hard drives, and highly complex financial records. All that complexity means that directing and explaining the evidence at the pace of the slowest juror, which is the pace that an advocate has to go at, presents additional delay. I am grateful to Sir Brian for making that point clearly in his report.

The scale of “The Crown Court Compendium”, which is the guide that judges use to direct juries in criminal trials, is such that it now runs to some 560 pages, demonstrating the extraordinary time and effort that judges now need to devote to guiding juries in these complex trials. That support is plainly valuable and shows the great effort the system has already made to account for the huge change over the last couple of decades in the complexity of such cases. It also powerfully illustrates the real impact on timeliness, and Sir Brian’s observations only reinforce why it is right that we address the challenge head on. If it was true when Lord Justice Auld talked about the rationale for a judge-only trial in these sorts of cases over 25 years ago, it is certainly even more true now.

As I have said, the crux of the legislation is not whether a judge or a jury is better at understanding evidence or ascertaining the honesty or dishonesty of a defendant; it is about being honest with ourselves about the time that we have, ensuring that trials run as efficiently and effectively as they can, and preserving jury trial for the cases where it makes most sense and matters most. It is important to remember that this is not wholly new territory. Our justice system already recognises limited exceptions to jury trial, most notably where there is a risk of jury tampering, and those trials are conducted fairly by a judge sitting alone.

The clause does not bring about wholesale change to jury trials, which the Bill preserves for the most serious cases; it creates an additional, tightly defined and controlled, discretion for a small number of cases where the burden on jurors and court resources is excessive. It means that no case can be moved into the judge-alone route without a rigorous, transparent assessment against the statutory tests, with both the defence and prosecution having the opportunity to make representations, ensuring that decisions are fair and balanced. A case can only ever qualify if it involves a scheduled fraud or financial crime offence, and even then, a judge must first have ordered a preparatory hearing—something that happens only where a case is genuinely complex or lengthy.

We have also drawn hard lines. The gravest crimes can never be heard under this policy. That is why we have carved out all indictable-only sexual offences and homicide offences, such as rape, murder and manslaughter, which are all excluded. If any such offence is added to a case, the order must be revoked and the case must be sent for a jury trial, without exception. Where a jury trial would be in the public interest, a judge cannot hear the case alone.

The clause is about three crucial things. First, it is about making a reasonable ask of the public in respect of their important civic duties, and not asking them to bear a disproportionate burden on themselves, their jobs or their loved ones. Secondly, it is about taking every responsible option available to us to get the criminal justice system moving again, because justice delayed is justice denied. Thirdly, it is about modernisation. The world has changed, and the nature of these crimes and the evidence that is involved have changed. What made sense in 1971, or even 25 years ago, is not always what works best today. In that reforming spirit, the clause presents a modern, balanced and proportionate approach. It is exactly the sort of thing that is needed in the light of the current pressures on the system. For that reason, I commend clause 4 and schedule 1 to the Committee.

Amendment 51 would remove the power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences in proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 by order, and the Government cannot support it. A fixed and closed list would not reflect the reality of modern crime. Fraud and financial offending continue to evolve rapidly, and new forms of criminality and new legislative offences across all aspects of crime will inevitably emerge in the coming years. If Parliament were required to revisit primary legislation every time a new, appropriately relevant offence was created or identified as suitable, that would significantly reduce the agility and effectiveness of this framework. Criminal cases are increasingly shaped by technological change, new technical and digital instruments, and increasingly sophisticated ways of handling evidence. A system that cannot adapt risks becoming obsolete almost as soon as it is enacted.

I have heard concerns that this power amounts to Government overreach, and I want to be clear that it does not and that this is not an unconstrained Executive power. The schedule can be amended only via the affirmative procedure, which requires debate and approval by both Houses of Parliament. That ensures proper democratic oversight, while ensuring that the law can keep pace with the ever-changing nature of crime without unnecessary delay. This is not an unusual approach to criminal legislation. Parliament has adopted similar delegated powers elsewhere in criminal legislation, including provisions now consolidated in the Sentencing Act 2020.

For those reasons, the Government believe that this power strikes the right balance between keeping pace with modern crime and remaining firmly anchored in parliamentary oversight. I urge the shadow Minister not to press his amendment to a vote.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in opposition to clause 4 and in support of amendment 51 in my name. I remind the Committee that this is not a new debate. As the Minister touched on, it is an idea that has been postponed, debated and largely rejected several times over the last few decades. Each time, the conclusion has been that the jury is not the problem in fraud cases, but a vital component of the solution.

The Government’s current justification rests on two pillars: that fraud causes are too complex for ordinary citizens, and that removing the jury will create significant efficiencies to help clear the record-breaking court backlog. Although we all acknowledge the severity of the backlog, we must ask whether these specific measures are evidence-based or merely an attempt to appear tough on administrative delays at the expense of the right to trial by one’s peers. The Bill will allow a judge to order a trial to be conducted without a jury if they are satisfied that the complexity or length of that trial would make it a heavy burden on a jury. As the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion pointed out, it would be good to get clarity on whether a judge may make such a determination on the basis of complexity or of length individually, or whether they must do so on the basis of both complexity and length—that was a fair question.

Complexity is highly subjective. For one judge, a case involving intricate cryptocurrency ledgers might seem manageable for a jury, but for another, it may seem impenetrable. By making the right to a jury trial contingent on a judge’s personal assessment of what a typical citizen can understand, we introduce an element of judicial lottery. Furthermore, fraud is fundamentally about honesty and dishonesty, which are concepts that ordinary people are well placed to judge. When we professionalise the verdict in fraud causes, we move away from a community-based standard of morality towards a technical, legalistic one that may lack the public’s moral buy-in.

I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence provided by the City of London Law Society, which points out:

“The government’s rationale for judge-only trials in ‘complex or lengthy cases’ rests on two assumptions: that juries struggle to understand complex fraud cases, and that judge-only trials will be significantly more efficient.

Neither assumption is adequately supported by evidence.

There is substantial research and practical experience demonstrating that juries, when properly directed and assisted with appropriate case management, are capable of understanding and deciding complex fraud cases. Modern trial techniques have been brought in to address issues that arose in the past, significantly enhancing jury comprehension.

Juries have been involved in many hundreds of fraud trials, following the evidence and reaching rational decisions. The Leveson Review noted that in the Jubilee Line case (one of the longest running in British legal history and one which pre-dated many of the changes that have been introduced to help improve the jury’s understanding), jurors reported ‘a very good understanding of the evidence’, with ‘some commenting that it was not all that difficult’.

More recently, in R v Hayes & Palombo, the Supreme Court opined that a properly directed jury would have no problem assessing dishonesty in the context of a complex financial service-related case.

The assumption that juries cannot cope with complexity is unproven and patronising. It fails to recognise that juries regularly include individuals with professional expertise, financial literacy and analytical capabilities, and that issues of intent and dishonesty are familiar and well understood by the jury.”

The society states that we should also note

“that the cases that have been preserved for jury trial under the Bill are also likely to include complex expert evidence (such as forensic medical or science-based expert evidence or statistical analysis), which undermines the argument that complex trials should be left to a judge alone.

The hypothesis that judge-only trials are more efficient also relies on the assumption that time will be saved by counsel not having to simplify evidence when presenting to a judge rather than a jury. However, this fails to take into account that, without the requirement to simplify charges and evidence, this is likely to encourage increased charging by the prosecution and increased applications for more complex evidence to be presented to judges.”

While judges are experts in the law and legal matters, there is nothing at all to say that they are any more or less expert in cryptocurrency or complex financial matters than a member of a jury. In total, the society continues:

“This will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of and time to produce written judgments.”

In total, this will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of time to produce written judgments.

--- Later in debate ---

The Opposition support amendment 51. If the Government insist on retaining clause 4 and schedule 1, then there is a compelling case for removing the power of the Secretary of State to add further offences to the list by regulation. I am particularly concerned by that unconstrained power. If the Government have currently singled out fraud, money laundering and terrorist funding as the special class of lengthy and complex cases, there is no obvious stopping point. Terrorism, murder, rape and drug trials can also last many months and be highly complex, especially where there are multiple defendants or contested expert evidence.

[Dr Mullan]

If the schedule said complex and lengthy fraud cases, then the Minister might be able to argue that it is constrained, but the schedule is just “Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases”. It actually opens the door to any number of types of offence being added purely because they are complex and lengthy. I think of, for example, the Lucy Letby trial, which was clearly complex and lengthy, but something that clearly needed to have a jury in terms of public confidence. That could end up included by schedule 1.

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks.

In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already

“appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.”

That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as

“a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.”

That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge.

For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too.

Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later.

I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.

[Dr Mullan]

As I have talked about in earlier debates, uniquely in this situation we already know what the Lord Chancellor wanted to do. From leaks, we know that five years was the test, in terms of these proposals. The Opposition are being fair in suggesting that this is potentially the thin end of the wedge.

[Rebecca Paul]

I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do.

Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51.

Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here.

On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.

[Dr Mullan]

I talked before about how judges will look to what Ministers have said around a measure in trying to interpret it, so if a judge is not clear what was meant by this, and pulls up Hansard to read what the Minister has said, surely they will take from the fact that the Minister has talked about the disruption to a juror’s life that they should have that as the test. What is disruptive to one person’s life is very different from what is disruptive to another’s.

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with my hon. Friend; he actually pre-empts the point I am about to get on to. I thank him for taking me on to that. It should be fairly obvious to most people that there will be a wide range of views as to how much time a person can take out of their ordinary life, bearing in mind that people are not called for jury service at the drop of a hat. They are not told, “You must cancel all your plans next week”; there is a degree of warning.

Most people take quite a wide view on how much time they can afford to give, depending on what is going on in their life. For some people, taking two weeks or even a week out is very disruptive. This theoretical person that the judge has to imagine would make an argument that it is appropriate that the trial should not take place with a jury, because they do not have a week in their busy life to just hand over.

Alternatively, others may say that they see it as a civic duty and a fundamental contribution they make to society to be available for jury trial if called. Perhaps they have never been called and they have reached a ripe old age, and they are happy and prepared to take a month or two out of their life to devote to making a decision on whether someone is guilty.

[Dr Mullan]

Currently, when a person sits on a jury, it is understood that, outside of the most extreme circumstances, they will be there for as long as the case takes. However, if the public get the sense that they can debate what asks are reasonable or unreasonable, I would not be surprised if jury members, in trials that go on a little bit, start sending notes to the judge to complain. They might say, “This has gone on for a week, and I didn’t think I’d be here for that long. I understand that if a trial goes on for too long, it shouldn’t be heard by a jury. This is going on too long. Judge, will you look at that?” That will open a whole can of worms about something that at the minute is extremely constricted in people’s minds.

[Joe Robertson]

Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury?

Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.

[Joe Robertson]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected.

“Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers.

Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.

[Dr Mullan]

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate has given one example, but another, with which I expect people will be familiar, is the LIBOR trials. They were very complicated and sophisticated, and the appeals were successful because of a judge. It was the judge’s misdirection to the jury that led to the LIBOR trials becoming another example of cases collapsing. If anything, the evidence shows that it is the judges who are the issue here, not the juries.

[Joe Robertson]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Obviously judges are not infallible. That is not a criticism of judges—judges know that they can make mistakes. On the mindset of the person, I am unclear as to whether the Government or indeed anyone on the Committee, regardless of party, thinks that there is anything more complex than what is in a person’s mind—a mind that cannot be unlocked or opened. We can ask this person what was in their mind, but they want to be acquitted, so we must take a value judgment on whether they are telling the truth or not. Surely the most complex thing there can possibly be is what is in the mind of a human being. A very complex set of spreadsheets or cryptocurrency that only half of us understand is complicated, but there is perhaps nothing more complicated than the motivation and mindset of a human being.

That is specifically what juries are for—to make that sort of judgment on whether it was reasonable for someone to do something. That is why we have 12 members, so that they must come to a view unanimously, or certainly as a large majority. A judge is not in a more privileged position—no one would argue that they are—to decide what is and is not reasonable. They are in a more privileged position to make decisions about the law, and indeed they do make decisions about the law in jury trials and direct the jury on matters of law.

It is incredibly uncertain what “complexity” means. I know what the Minister thinks it means, and I do not criticise her. It is a perfectly reasonable view of what it means. My point is that it is not the only view. She thinks—I paraphrase; I do not seek to put words in her mouth—that it is complex financial evidence, presumably written evidence in many cases, in a fraud trial or crimes related to money. It is perfectly possible to have a great volume of evidence but, as the case unfolds, a detailed understanding of that paperwork may no longer be the issue on which the case turns. Does having a large volume of written evidence and a long list of witnesses make a case complex, or does it depend on what the witnesses might say or exactly what is in those papers?

The Minister has spoken about juries moving at the pace of the slowest member. Is her test for complexity the mindset of the slowest member of a random 12 selected from the British public, or is it the average—one might say reasonable—person? She could help judges making this decision by setting that out in the legislation.

This is not merely a theoretical, academic discussion on the criminal law of this country. I can point to another country. The Minister has taken pleasure in using other countries as examples to justify many provisions in the Bill, as though England and Wales can learn from other jurisdictions. I do not disagree with that premise. I will give her the example of New Zealand, another common-law jurisdiction. It has a similar provision, whereby a judge has to exercise a similar sort of decision making about whether a trial is likely to be “long and complex”, rather than its likely complexity. Set out in its legislation is a legal test. The Minister says that there is a test of complexity in the Bill. I tried to intervene on her to say that there is not.

This is what a test looks like. The law of New Zealand directs a judge to consider, in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex,

“the number and nature of offences with which the defendant is charged”.

We understand what that means. It also directs them to consider

“the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of the evidence likely to be presented”

and

“the imposition on potential jurors of sitting for the likely duration of the trial”.

It has a catch-all, which is not unusual in legal drafting:

“any other matters the court considers relevant.”

The judge in New Zealand has a test to apply: whether the case is likely to be long and complex. There is absolutely no reason why the Government could not have included a test in the Bill—it does not have to be the same test—to assist the court and give certainty, which would help defendants and victims and would improve efficiency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

Several points have been raised in this debate. First, on the definition and the application of the eligibility test, when I was explaining the rationale behind the provision for judge-only trials in complex and lengthy cases—a realisation of one of the key recommendations of the independent review—I was talking about the importance of considering not just efficiency, but jury burden. While it is of course a relevant policy factor, I was not suggesting that that in itself is the test to be applied.

The terms used in the legislation have been the subject of criticism from a number of hon. Members. I consider that those terms are straightforward and well understood. The notion of a complex case is used in other contexts. Currently, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Serious Fraud Office can send serious and complex fraud cases to the Crown court, subject to section 51B of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, so there is existing practice. Those are terms with which the judiciary are familiar. If it proves in due course that guiding factors and the Criminal Procedure Rules would be of assistance, that can be looked at. However, I do not think that the definition itself presents the cataclysmic problems that hon. Members suggest.

[Dr Mullan]

To make it really clear, what is the minimum length that the Minister thinks would constitute a lengthy case?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am not going to second-guess how the judges will apply this. As I say, that is for the judiciary and the courts. I am not going to put an arbitrary time length on it; I do not think that is needed.

The second point that hon. Members made was that the provision risks becoming too wide-ranging if a future Parliament or Secretary of State wishes to add to the offences. I addressed that point in my earlier remarks. I do not think that that is a real risk.

Another point that has been made is that none of this will have much of an impact, because we are talking only about a narrowly defined set of cases. I fully anticipate that while the system gets to grips with the use of this legislation, there will be a very small number of cases to begin with, but these are by definition the lengthiest cases and they take up a large amount of the courts’ time. The savings that we are talking about, which are set out in the impact assessment, may sound modest, but in a system under extreme pressure those small shifts matter. Every case heard by a judge sitting alone—as was deemed appropriate in these sorts of case not just by Sir Brian but by Lord Justice Auld and others—saves valuable Crown Court and jury time that can be deployed to serious cases that need a jury. In the context of the emergency in which we find ourselves, I make no apologies for seeking every little impact. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I just want to pick up on some points. The point about the scale of the issue was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, who pointed to 200 sitting days. She highlighted the criticism from others suggesting that the list of offences was “the work of a moment”, which is probably a fair description of what is going on.

As we have heard, trying to understand what “complex and lengthy” means has proved difficult. A telling point was the Minister’s insistence that it will be obvious to judges. Other jurisdictions have set out a minimum in legislation, but as the person legislating she is not able or willing to give a sense of how long she has in mind. On her suggestion that judges are better placed to understand this stuff, I say with no disrespect that over 70% of judges are aged over 50. I think some apprentices I have met at IT firms in my constituency might have a better understanding of the issues relating to cyber-crime than some of our judges.

The Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, made it clear that it is not a supposition, nor does it take extensive reasoning, to suggest that future Governments will be able to make use of these powers in exactly the way that we have described. That is not a matter for debate; it is about the statutory framework that has been put in place, which will definitely be available to future Governments on the basis of the maximalist, expansive approach that this Government have chosen. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East has explained how other jurisdictions have done a better job.

We are looking into the details of the Bill here, but goodness knows what will happen when a Minister has to defend these proposals in the Lords, with the expertise and experience of its Members, who include retired judges. Given clause 4’s lack of appeal, its illogical approach to how fraud and non-fraud offences interact, the minimal savings, the flimsy evidence and the lack of definition, which we have covered extensively, the Minister in the other place will have a very difficult time if the Government do not start being a bit more open to the non-wrecking but sensible amendments that Opposition Members put forward.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I remind Members that the House has agreed that the Committee must conclude its work by 5 pm on Tuesday 28 April. We have just passed schedule 1. I have no power to impose a time limit on speeches, and it is for the Committee to decide on how to use its time, but I encourage Members to consider the length of their speeches and interventions in the light of the wish of all Members to consider the whole Bill and the amendments that have been tabled.

Clause 5

Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 52, in clause 5, page 14, line 36, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) The judgment must be given at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is necessary for preparing—

(a) pre-sentence reports,

(b) psychiatric or medical reports,

(c) victim personal statements, or

(d) further legal advice relating to sentencing.”

This amendment would ensure that judgments are handed down on conviction in all but the circumstances covered by the amendment.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Amendment 58, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 3 to 5 into force until he has—

(a) commissioned an independent review to assess the length of time required for a judge sitting alone to deliver a judgment after conviction,

(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the review under subsection (3A)(a), and

(c) made a statement to the House of Commons on the Government’s response to any recommendations from the review.”

This amendment would stop sections 3 to 5 coming into force until the Government had an evidence base for how long these provisions might delay the issuing of judgments after convictions.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendments 58 and 52; I will start with amendment 58.

We find ourselves at a significant juncture in the history of our legal system, and the Government have presented us with a Bill framed primarily as a pragmatic response to the current record-breaking backlog of nearly 80,000 cases in our Crown courts. The central justification for their reforms, specifically the restriction of the right to a jury trial, is efficiency; the Government argue that by moving towards judge-led trials, we can streamline proceedings and reduce the demand on the Crown court by almost 20%.

However, when we are asked to curtail a right that has stood as a cornerstone of our democracy for more than 800 years, we must move with extreme caution. We must ask whether this fundamental change is based on robust data or merely an intuitive sense of speed and individual opinions. It is not only reasonable, but essential to ask the Government to conduct an independent formal study into the actual time savings achieved by judge-only trials before they are implemented.

Amendment 58 focuses on one of the more easily measured elements, which could be properly studied. The Government’s case for reducing jury trials is predicated on the idea that it means the trials will be 20% shorter, yet when we examine the source of this figure, its foundation begins to look unstable. Sir Brian Leveson, whose review informed much of the Bill, stated that the estimate of a 20% reduction is subject to

“very high levels of uncertainty”.

He further stated that

“seeking to model how much time would be saved is extremely difficult.”

That point is reinforced by the Government’s impact assessment. Their attempt to quantify the time saving found that it was likely to be in the range of 10% to 30%—potentially half the time saving that Sir Brian claimed—and even that figure is born of what we might call a light-touch engagement session with judges and others, rather than rigorous comparative data. If the primary justification for stripping away a constitutional right is a 20% efficiency gain, then Parliament is entitled to see clear, verified evidence that that gain is actually achievable.

While the Government promise a transformation of the system, independent experts argue that the actual time saved will be marginal. The Institute for Government has analysed the proposals and suggests that the judge-only trials in the new bench division might save only 1.5% to 2.5% of total Crown court time. Furthermore, the Criminal Bar Association has pointed out that the Government’s impact assessment assumes that the average length of a trial in scope is six and a half sitting days when, in reality, these trials typically last closer to three days. By doubling the realistic length of those trials in their modelling, the Government have likely overestimated the potential savings. When we look at these figures, we must ask whether it is right to curtail a fundamental safeguard for a gain that may be as low as 1.5%, when today alone we have 10% of Crown courts sitting empty for no other particular reason than a lack of efficiency.

The Government’s efficiency narrative is focused almost entirely on the front end of a trial, the time it takes to empanel a jury and deliver legal instructions, and the time they claim is taken up by what some have described in evidence as playing to the jury. It ignores the back end of the process, the delivery of the judgment.

In a jury trial, once the evidence is closed, the jury deliberates continuously and provides an immediate verdict of guilty or not guilty. Importantly, in that time, a judge can be otherwise engaged, hearing other cases and doing other work. From their perspective, the fact-finding phase is over instantly.

A judge sitting alone does not have that luxury. To satisfy the requirements of transparency and guard against appeals, a judge must produce a reasoned judgment that addresses every point of law and fact. In other jurisdictions, delivering a verdict and providing those judgments can be reserved, meaning that they are written weeks or even months after the trial concludes.

Unlike a jury, a judge has a full docket of other administrative duties. We risk a situation where the time theoretically saved is then lost through another route. Without a comparative study of what I will refer to as the judicial deliberation gap, we are making systemic changes based on an incomplete set of metrics.

Additionally, because a judge’s written reasoning provides a detailed map of their logic, we are likely to see a significant spike in appeals. A jury’s verdict is difficult to appeal on the facts; a judge’s written judgment invites scrutiny for any minor error in law or logic, further clogging the higher courts. The Government have spoken frequently about the lack of availability of professionals within the legal system to hear criminal cases, and it will be the same KCs and others who will be stuck in the Court of Appeal on these cases, instead of being in the Crown court hearing cases from the backlog.

For those reasons, we propose a simple, pragmatic pause. We are asking the Government to commission an independent study of the length of time required for a judge sitting alone to deliver a judgment after conviction. This is a matter of sequencing: evidence first, implementation second. In any other field, be it medicine or engineering, we would never implement a change of this magnitude without a pilot study or a comparative dataset.

We picked this element as something amenable to study; there is nothing preventing the Government from commissioning a series of either sitting or retired judges to sit in the public galleries of trials happening in the ordinary way and then to go away and consider what reasons they would present and how long that would take. The Government could then measure and study the reality of that. Of course, that would vary from judge to judge, but a study with sufficient statistical power, with enough people taking part, could give us a genuine insight into how long these things will take.

If the Government are confident that this process will be short and sharp and able to save time, I see no reason why they would not want to know it for sure before proceeding on that basis. If that study showed that that 20% saving was a myth, and that the time taken on the back end cancelled out any gains made during the trial, of course the reforms should be paused or reversed. We should not trade a system that works for one that merely looks faster on a spreadsheet.

Jury trials are not an obstacle to justice; they are a safeguard against its abuse. It is important that we gather the facts and measure the actual time it takes for a judge to provide a reasoned judgment. If the evidence does not support the Government’s assumptions, we must have the courage to stop these reforms before we permanently damage one of our most valued constitutional inheritances.

I now move on to amendment 52. As I have mentioned, we are debating the important element of reforms that are historic in their reduction of our access to jury trials. They are predicated on the idea that that is the sole and only way that we can tackle the backlog in the Crown courts. If we are to accept the Government’s claim that trials without juries are a tool for efficiency, we must hold the system to that standard. For that reason, it seems sensible and necessary to require that, in any trial without a jury, the judge must provide their verdict and their reasons immediately.

Allowing a judge to delay their reasoning is not just a procedural flaw, but a logical contradiction that undermines the very efficiency that the Bill seeks to achieve. The Government’s most frequent argument for restricting juries is that they waste time due to the need to go slowly through the evidence and the unpredictable length of deliberations. The Government promise that a judge, as a legal expert, will streamline the process. However, that argument collapses the moment that a judge says, “I will give my verdict, but you will have to leave it with me while I go away and write it up.” The goal is to save time but, if there is a separate process that requires significant enough time that it cannot be done as part of the trial, where is the saving?

In written evidence, we were warned of what might be called a bottleneck shift, where we might clear courtroom space more quickly, only to move the delay into the judge’s chambers. As the Criminal Bar Association points out, the reasonable time provision is currently too vague. I understand that it is not unheard of in other jurisdictions with judge-alone trials, such as Canada and New Zealand, for parties to sometimes wait months for the full reasons to be given for the verdict. By contrast, a jury provides a benchmark of finality. They do not go home to handle other business for a month; they deliberate while the evidence is fresh and stay until the job is done. As I pointed out earlier, while they are doing that, the judge is free to carry on with other matters.

A case awaiting a verdict is a frozen case. It hangs over the court’s docket. It prevents the defendant from moving to the sentencing or appeal phase and potentially requires the judge eventually to relearn and reacquaint themselves with the full details of the case, perhaps weeks later. We are told that judges are professional triers of fact and that, precisely because of that expertise, we should be able to expect a system that reflects it.

A jury of 12 people must be taught the law from scratch, whereas a judge, who already knows the law, should be taking structured notes and filtering and identifying relevant and irrelevant information in real time. By the time closing arguments are finished, a professional judge has been living with the facts and the law for days or weeks. They are in the best possible position to explain their logic at that moment. When a judge delays a verdict and the reasons for it, they are forced into double-handling the evidence, re-reading transcripts and notes to recapture their original thoughts. That is not efficiency—it is a waste of judicial resources.

The requirement for immediacy is also a vital safeguard of the integrity of the law. There is potentially a subtle temptation for a judge who announces an initial verdict on a Monday, but writes the reasons for it on a Friday, to reverse engineer the logic of their original conclusions, even if inadvertently. Instead of the reasons leading the verdict, the verdict begins to dictate the reasons. The judge may subconsciously highlight only the facts that make their decision appeal-proof, rather than providing a raw, honest account of why they believed one witness over another. Members may well be familiar with the idea of confirmation bias; it is something that we are all affected by. If we make a decision and then come back to it at a later date, we have an inherent human failing of tending to dwell on, have our attention drawn to and be more mindful of things that reinforce our decision, rather than things that take away from it.

Therefore, immediate reasoning ensures that judges are ruling on the evidence as it was heard. If the Government claim bench trials are superior because they are reason-based, those reasons must be robust enough to be stated out loud at the moment of verdict, forcing a level of intellectual honesty that is the only acceptable substitute for the collective common sense of a jury.

Critics may argue that some cases are too complex for an immediate ruling. However, as some of the evidence suggests, very good reasons to delay should be defined strictly and should not include a busy schedule or a desire to write at another time. A very good reason should be limited to genuinely unforeseen situations. Indeed, as amendment 52 provides:

“The judgment must be given at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is necessary”

for specific and well understood purposes, such as preparing medical or psychiatric evaluation reports, victim personal statements that were not available or that they sought to amend, or further legal submissions. However, the substance of why must be given when “guilty” or “not guilty” is uttered.

The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot strip away, to a great extent, the historical right to a jury trial in the name of streamlining the system and allow that system to grind to a halt while a judge reserves a decision for days, weeks or potentially even months.

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[Joe Robertson]

I accept that judges can do all this, and indeed sometimes do all this. Surely, however, the Minister will accept that, given human nature, there is a limit to the extent to which a human being can be so well trained or so professional that they can simply disregard something that they have heard as though they had never heard it. Indeed, that is one reason why we have jury trials. It is also one of the leading reasons why in more complex cases or longer cases—in cases involving murder, or sexual offences, or in all those cases that have to be heard by a jury—we have a jury. It is to separate the decision makers of fact from the decision makers of law and procedure.

[Dr Mullan]

As we are touching on these issues, those of us on the Opposition Benches are happy to say that we have to work harder on judicial accountability and decision making, and we are not afraid to say that we think it is better that juries do these things, because judges err.

There is an irony really, because at the heart of the Bill is another measure in relation to the powers that we give family court judges. My hon. Friend will know that the impact assessment says that the law at the moment basically says that judges already know—based on the law—that the welfare of the child comes before visitation rights. The Government accept that that is what the law says, but they do not trust judges to understand and accept that law. They want to introduce measures that further restrict judges’ decision making. The Government cannot have it both ways; they cannot introduce measures in the same Bill that are based on the idea that judges are not sufficiently enacting the law as written, and then say that we are wrong to have concerns about judicial decision making in these sorts of scenarios.

--- Later in debate ---

The Crown court backlog is at a record high. Everyone in the system—victims, witnesses and defendants—is already waiting too long for justice. In that context, the Government do not believe that it is responsible to delay the commencement of clauses 3 to 5 pending the commissioning and completion of a further review, particularly when we have the views of senior and retired Crown court judges who have been clear that they do not expect the delivery of judgments to involve significant delay. Sir Brian Leveson considered the matter in part 1 of his review and was clear that he did not anticipate that such judgments would need to be lengthy or even in writing. For that reason, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Mullan]

I want to pick up on a couple of points the Minister made, particularly the one that our amendment, in relation to a study, would require primary legislation. That is simply not the case. We specifically identified an element that could be studied without a need to change the law. No law would need to be changed to allow some retired or sitting judges to sit in on a court case and provide the judgment that they would have given had they been hearing it. No legislation is required for that.

The Minister leans heavily on the experienced judges who agree with her, but more than 3,000 legal professionals, including senior retired judges, disagree with her. And of course, to move away from opinions, the Government’s own study, which attempted to turn opinions into a quantitative exercise, found that the savings could be half those that Sir Brian Leveson said are achievable. It found that they could be between 10% and 30%, whereas Sir Brian said they would be 20%.

The Minister said that time would be saved on summing up. I sincerely hope the defendant will get to hear the same things a jury would have got to hear. If they do not, I suspect we will see a further increase in appeals.

The Minister spoke about the time taken. A Bill that will have a seismic impact on our legal system has been introduced without a public consultation or pre-legislative scrutiny, and the Committee time has been less than that given to the Railways Bill. As I understand it, the Bill has been given roughly the same time as the Salmon Act 1986, which introduced the offence of salmon handling, so it is reasonable to ask whether it has been given sufficient time.

If the Minister thinks there will be no real gap in time in terms of judgments, there is no reason for the Government to oppose amendment 52, which says that those should be immediate. Given the controversy and the varying opinions from experts on both sides of the debate, a non-legislative study is a perfectly reasonable thing for the Opposition to ask for. We will press amendment 52 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Siân Berry]

I will speak as quickly as I can. I support the amendments tabled in this group by the Liberal Democrats, which would limit any increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates beyond 12 months; amendment 34, which was moved by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden; and the Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments that would ensure that, if that limit is not accepted, any further changes are made by the affirmative resolution procedure.

I am sure we will all remind the Minister that Sir Brian Leveson specifically made his reforms to jury trials contingent on not increasing the sentencing powers of magistrates. He stated that specifically in paragraph 71 of his report. He also stated:

“My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months.”

That followed, in paragraph 70, another important caveat that the Government seem to have overlooked:

“While removing the right to elect for certain offences may streamline the judicial process and alleviate the burden on the higher courts, it raises concerns about balancing the right of the defendant with the broader interests of justice.”

We have to admit that the Government are taking a risk with the moves they are making. The magnitude and volume of that risk increase with the number of extra cases that are pushed to the magistrates courts through other provisions in the Bill, while the consequences of that risk increase with the higher sentences made possible under clause 6. This is not a step we should take alongside those other steps. They increase the risks to justice.

In oral evidence, we heard from Claire Davies, the leader of the south eastern circuit, who said of magistrates courts:

“There are errors and mistakes made, but if the length of sentence is extended, it will potentially increase that risk.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 51, Q99.]

We also heard from Emma Torr, from APPEAL, who described

“swift and speedy justice in the magistrates court. It is often rough and ready; we are talking about cases being tried by lay justices, some of whom may be experienced but some may not be, and we are also talking about less experienced judges. You often find in the lower court, the magistrates court, that advocates are more inexperienced and tend to be at the start of their career.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86-87, Q185.]

This point was also emphasised by Fiona Rutherford, the chief executive of JUSTICE, who said:

“There is a question mark about the accuracy of the way in which magistrates are making decisions.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 82, Q174.]

These are the risks we are talking about compared with having a judge and jury.

Risks also come from the surrounding bureaucratic situation, which could lead to more defendants being unrepresented. When the shift is made, we will be leaving them without legal aid, because of the changes in the income requirements. We heard from Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE that without this representation there could be additional risks to victims.

The Minister needs to admit that this part of the Bill goes too far. On top of the other things she is doing, she is adding more consequence, not just more volume, to the risk equation. That is a poor step to take. Clause 6 should not stand part, and I support all the amendments.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak to my amendment 53 and to amendment 13, tabled by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester.

Clause 6 includes a provision that seeks to expand the Secretary of State’s power to vary the maximum custodial sentence that may be imposed by magistrates courts for triable either-way offences. At present, the general limit for such sentences stands at 12 months, having been increased from six months in 2022. The Bill proposes that we allow that limit to be further increased, by way of regulations, to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government frame that as a necessary tool for operational flexibility, it represents a significant extension of the custodial powers of our magistrates courts.

The central question we must address is not merely whether the powers should be increased, but how such a decision should be scrutinised by Parliament. The Bill allows the changes to be made under the negative procedure. Through amendment 53, we propose that any future exercise of the power be subject instead to the affirmative procedure, requiring the explicit approval of both Houses of Parliament. As I have said, I also support amendment 13 from the Liberal Democrats, which says the powers should not be increased full stop.

Increasing the maximum custodial sentence a court can impose is not a minor or technical adjustment; it is a substantive change in the fundamental balance of our criminal justice system. When we discuss the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, instead of one, we are discussing one of the most serious powers the state can wield. Magistrates courts are designed for summary trial, which is a process intended for the swift disposal of less serious, low-level cases. Allowing that framework to pass two-year sentences is a major shift. As laid out by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, the evidence we heard explained that such an expansion will mean that more serious and complex cases will be dealt with by lay justices.

For a change of this magnitude, the negative procedure provides an inappropriately low level of scrutiny. To understand why the affirmative procedure is necessary, we must look at the mechanics of parliamentary oversight. Under the negative procedure, a statutory instrument is usually made by a Minister and becomes law immediately upon being laid before Parliament. It remains law unless either House successfully votes to annul it, through a process known as praying against an instrument, within a set 40-day period. In reality, the power to object is rarely used and even more rarely successful. I understand that the House of Commons has not successfully prayed against a negative instrument since 1979, and the House of Lords has not rejected one since 2000. The procedure essentially relies on the absence of objection to grant legitimacy to a change in law. In an area as fundamental as the power to imprison citizens for extended periods, Parliament should not rely on a lack of noise to signify consent. It must require explicit, recorded approval.

The affirmative procedure provides a much more robust safeguard. Under that route, a statutory instrument is laid in draft and cannot become law until it has been actively debated and approved by both the Commons and the Lords. That ensures that the Government must stand at the Dispatch Box, in the same way the Minister has been doing all week, in a Committee Room just like this, and openly justify why the increase in sentencing powers is necessary and proportionate.

That level of scrutiny is essential, because the Government’s current justifications are contested. The Government argue that the powers will allow more cases to be retained in magistrates courts, thereby reducing pressure on the Crown court backlog. However, independent bodies such as the Institute for Government have noted that assumptions about time savings in magistrates courts are highly uncertain. There are serious concerns that magistrates courts, which already face their own peak backlog of over 370,000 cases, simply do not have the capacity to absorb that work. Although the provision in clause 6 will not lead to an immediate increase in sentencing length, it is reasonable to assume that the Government would not have introduced it if they did not have some intention, at some future point, to increase the sentencing powers available to magistrates and therefore to retain more cases in the magistrates courts.

We must also consider the differential quality in justice administered under the expanded powers. As we have heard, critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for—[Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Order. I suspend the Committee for 15 minutes for the first vote and 10 minutes for each subsequent vote. I aim to resume at 8.25 pm.

--- Later in debate ---

[Christine Jardine in the Chair]

[Dr Mullan]

Thank you, Ms Jardine, for taking the Chair as we continue this later sitting. Before we suspended, we were debating my amendment 53 to clause 6 in relation to the use of the negative procedure rather than the affirmative procedure to change sentencing powers. I was talking about the importance of considering the nature of the justice delivered in the magistrates court when making changes to the powers of that court. As I have said previously in Committee, the fact that we have some criticisms of elements of the magistrates court does not mean it should be got rid of—we accept that these must be balanced measures—but it is important for us to consider that when expanding its powers.

Critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for what they describe as “rough justice”. The procedures in magistrates courts are streamlined. For example, the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that even these more serious trials will be completed in a matter of hours. Furthermore, there is a significant disparity in access to legal representation. The income threshold for legal aid in magistrates courts is much lower than in the Crown court. That means that a defendant who would have been eligible for a publicly funded lawyer in the Crown court might be forced to represent themselves in the magistrates court, even when facing a two-year prison sentence. If we are to allow a system where unrepresented defendants face longer custodial terms in shorter hearings, that decision must be subject to the highest level of parliamentary debate.

It is also worth noting that the Government’s proposals depart from the recommendations of the very review they claim to follow. Sir Brian Leveson, in his independent review of the criminal courts, recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument of any kind should actually be repealed. He suggested that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent, rather than leaving it as a “variable” that the Executive can adjust.

Crucially, when we have previously raised the question of the Government varying from Sir Brian’s recommendations, the Minister has prayed in aid Sir Brian saying that the Government could go further in some circumstances. This could not be further from that. He said that the reforms he recommended were “contingent” on the Government also introducing a power to cap the sentences that could be passed by magistrates. The use of Sir Brian as evidence of opinions across the board is reaching farce now. We have the Government disagreeing with Sir Brian on whether there should be a judge and two magistrates, disagreeing with Sir Brian over the maximum sentence for triable either-way cases in the magistrates court, and now they are directly opposing what he wanted them to do in relation to magistrates’ sentencing powers.

It is important that we read what Sir Brian said:

“My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months. Furthermore, I recommend that the legislation be amended so that the Lord Chancellor no longer has the power to reduce the maximum to six months via a Statutory Instrument. The 12-month maximum should be made permanent.”

Here we have another example of the Government wanting us to set aside all our concerns about the erosion of jury trial rights on the basis of Sir Brian’s expertise and experience, at the same time as ignoring it themselves. If the Government intend to move in the opposite direction of expert legal advice, it is only reasonable that they be required to obtain explicit approval from Parliament through the affirmative procedure every time they seek to do so.

We must look at the cumulative impact of the Bill. While clause 6 increases the power of the magistrates courts at the front end, clause 7 restricts the right to appeal those decisions at the back end. The Bill replaces the automatic right of appeal and full rehearing with a permission-based model. That creates a clear and troubling shift: more power is being exercised at the lower level, while the ability to challenge those decisions is being constrained.

With around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts currently successful, it is clear that the system is correcting a meaningful level of error. Increasing sentencing powers while simultaneously narrowing the mechanisms for correcting those errors is a double blow to the rights of defendants. The combined effect makes it even more imperative that any increase in power is not snuck through via the negative procedure. As we have heard from other Members, there is a backlog in the magistrates courts of 379,000 cases. Anything that increases their workload will potentially have adverse consequences.

In summary, increasing the maximum sentence in magistrates courts is a major constitutional change that affects the liberty of the citizen. It is not a matter of administrative convenience that should be left to the fast track of the negative procedure. If the Government are confident that increasing the maximum to 18 or 24 months is the correct solution to the backlog, they should have no objection to making that case openly and seeking a positive vote of approval from both Houses.

We must ensure that our fundamental rights are not treated as administrative details to be checked off on a spreadsheet. For those reasons, I support the proposal that any future increase to magistrates’ sentencing powers must be subject to the affirmative procedure, as well as other amendments that seek to constrain the Government’s actions in this regard.

[Joe Robertson]

I support the position of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. There is a degree of cross-party support on the Opposition Benches; we heard some very good submissions from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, which seems a while ago now.

The Government’s position on many of the contentious issues in Committee has been anchored on Sir Brian Leveson’s report—indeed, why would it not be? It is an independent report that the Government commissioned. But they freely depart from his recommendations, seemingly on a whim, without any substantial justification. This is one of those cases. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that magistrates should continue to have sentencing powers only up to a year, and the Government are effectively doubling those sentencing powers.

This is about more than just sentencing powers; it fundamentally changes what magistrates courts are for and how our criminal courts are structured. The Crown court, whether sitting with only a judge or with a jury, is for more serious cases, with more serious sanctions, because it is able to deal with levels of complexity, be it in relation to evidence or procedure. We have heard about “rough and ready” justice in the magistrates court. That is not a criticism; it is a way of characterising the absolute foundations of our magistrates courts. They do a huge amount of criminal work in this country, but they are meant to be summary courts; they are meant to be courts that act quickly and do not have the rigour or probity of the Crown courts. That is their particular purpose, and it is therefore right that they have always had limited sentencing powers when it comes to deciding whether to lock someone up. Fines and community orders are the sort of sentences that are far more typical of magistrates courts.

Depriving someone of their liberty is a very serious matter. It is one thing to deprive someone of their liberty for months, especially given that such sentences are often reduced—in practice, a year can be reduced to months—but it is another thing to deprive someone of their liberty for two years. That would suddenly make the magistrates courts’ summary-style justice, or rough justice—call it whatever; I do not mean any of those words as a criticism—incredibly inappropriate for the powers that the Government would like them to exercise. The clause therefore does much more than just fiddle with thresholds, or however the Government might want to characterise it—we will soon find out. It fundamentally alters what magistrates courts are for.

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[Joe Robertson]

This is a strange venue to ask for an apology for previous Government legislation from an MP who, like me, has been in this place for less than two years. The hon. Gentleman and I were on broadcast media yesterday; that might have been a better venue for him to ask me to apologise, but I would have rejected his invitation at that time, and I will certainly reject it in Committee. This is not about previous Governments’ views or opinions; it is about the views and opinions of this Parliament.

[Dr Mullan]

This happens all the time. We point out deficiencies in the Government’s position, so Members get their Whips’ handouts with suggestions to “just point out to them what they did on x, y and z.” But the public do not care. That is a zero defence of their position—[Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Order. I think we are getting a bit off track.

[Dr Mullan]

I will be quick. The public care about the Government’s justification for what they are doing, not what we have done. If the Government are leaning on what we have done in the past, it shows how weak their arguments are.

[Joe Robertson]

Indeed, it is quite interesting that the Government’s benchmark is the previous Government. I do not recall them making that clear at the last election. I will leave it there.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 22 tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester. This is another element of the Bill that will not survive contact with the Lords. It is quite clearly unfair.

I want to pick up on some of the points that were made. There are key reasons why the amendment is sensible. In other parts of the debate, Government Members have raised the negative impact of cross-examination by defendants, which they do not think is a good thing. They do not think it is a good thing that victims may be cross-examined by defendants, yet they will not support a measure that would reduce the risk of that happening, and it does happen. The context of all the different parts of the clause is important to bear in mind.

[Rebecca Paul]

Does my hon. Friend agree that Government Members and the Minister have spent a lot of time talking about victims being central to all of the changes, so why on earth would they not support the amendment if it is really about protecting victims from being cross-examined?

[Dr Mullan]

The consistent position is that unrepresented defendants can take up more court time and can cross-examine victims, and that is more difficult for victims. As other Members have touched on, this takes place in the context of the other things that we have been unsuccessful in changing this evening. Sentencing powers are increasing and the right to appeal is being watered down. There is a pernicious erosion of the fairness of our courts at the same time as the yardsticks are being essentially changed in relation to access to legal aid.

This is important in the wider context of what is happening with legal aid. The Minister wants to say all the time that the Government are stretching every possible sinew to do everything else they possibly can to improve the backlogs in the courts. Yet we heard in evidence from the Criminal Bar Association and the Bar Council that the £34 million of legal aid announced in December still has not filtered through into the system and is still not available. We are now in April.

[Sarah Sackman]

Will the hon. Member acknowledge that one of the first things this Government did when we came into power was invest £92 million, focusing primarily on duty solicitors who deal with cases at the coalface, including those involving unrepresented defendants? That money is in play. It is in their pockets. Will he acknowledge that?

[Dr Mullan]

Yes, absolutely. I have acknowledged that on a number of occasions, along with what the Government have done on Crown court sitting days and a number of other ways that I recognise the Government have improved things. The point I have made repeatedly is that the Crown court backlog prior to the pandemic was lower than the backlog we inherited from the previous Labour Government. Again, I think the Minister might get a better hearing from us Conservatives if she was fairer in that regard, in terms of her criticisms of our record—if she actually acknowledged the record in its entirety in relation to the backlogs prior to covid.

I mentioned that £34 million because the Minister cannot have it both ways. She cannot say, “We are doing everything possible,” and then react so vociferously when I point out a clear example of where the Government are not doing everything possible. If they were doing everything possible, that £34 million would be available to practitioners through additional legal aid. So right now, the Government are not doing something that they could do to help increase things such as the availability of legal advice and the number of people choosing to practise in the criminal Bar.

Again, in relation to legal aid, this is a perfectly reasonable amendment. I am pretty confident that the Government will have to announce or concede to this change at some point, and it is purely for party political reasons that the Minister will not concede this point—because it is a Lib Dem amendment. I would eat my hat, if I ever had one, if this Government do not end up conceding this point in the end anyway.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

On a note of clarification, I understand that Opposition Members have mentioned defendants cross-examining victims, but, in fact, the procedures have been changed. For sexual or domestic abuse-type offences, a defendant cannot cross-examine the victim or complainant himself, or herself. Instead, the court will appoint a solicitor or barrister to do the cross-examination for them. I just add that for clarity.

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[Sarah Sackman]

Clause 6 introduces a measure to extend the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to enable the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers to be set at 18 or 24 months of maximum imprisonment for single and multiple triable either-way offences. Currently, magistrates court sentencing powers are set at 12 months. The Government can already vary magistrates’ sentencing powers between six and 12 months by secondary legislation using the negative resolution procedure. That has been done twice, and used to good effect, since July 2022.

However, the Crown court is now facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way offences currently heard and sentenced there can, as we know, be fairly and expeditiously dealt with in the magistrates court. Increasing magistrates court sentencing powers is one of the ways in which we will increase the range of cases that magistrates courts can hear and sentence, freeing up valuable Crown court capacity for the most serious and complex cases. By enabling the powers to be increased in that way, the clause will help us to free up capacity in the Crown court to the tune of 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year, making a significant dent in the backlog.

Magistrates are well prepared to take on that responsibility. They are dedicated and highly trained volunteers who give back to their community, working alongside highly trained legal advisers and an impressive cadre of district judges. The magistrates undergo an extensive selection process and work tirelessly to ensure that justice is delivered swiftly and fairly, currently assuming responsibility for 90% of all criminal cases.

The clause does not increase magistrates court sentencing powers; instead, it enables the Secretary of State to set the general limit in the future at 18 or 24 months. As I have said, any such change would be made through a statutory instrument under the negative resolution procedure, when necessary, to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures across the criminal justice system.

Importantly, the clause also ensures that the aggregate maximum term available for consecutive sentences will track the general limit. It also provides a safeguard that magistrates courts cannot impose a sentence exceeding the offence-specific maximum available on indictment, even if the general limit is set at 18 or 24 months. As such, I commend clause 6 to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I oppose clause 6, which, as we have discussed, grants the Lord Chancellor the power to increase the maximum sentencing limit in magistrates courts from the current 12 months to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government present that as a necessary measure to relieve the backlog in the Crown court, we must look closely at what is being sacrificed in the name of speed.

This proposal is not a minor adjustment; it is a fundamental shift in the nature of summary justice. It would allow magistrates—volunteers who have to sit only 13 days a year and who on average sit 17 to 23 days—to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years. That expansion of power comes at a time when the system is already under immense strain in the magistrates courts, and it is the view of the Criminal Bar Association, JUSTICE, the Bar Council and others that this move is unnecessary and potentially unsafe for the integrity of our legal system.

The central concern shared by legal professionals is that magistrates courts are simply not designed to handle the complexity of cases that may, at some point, carry two-year sentences. As the Criminal Bar Association pointed out in its evidence, the “practices and procedures” of those courts are “necessarily ‘summary’ in nature.” They were built for the swift disposal of what some consider to be minor offences, not for the intricate legal and factual disputes that characterise more serious crimes. The Criminal Bar Association has been blunt in its assessment, calling the extension of summary justice to cases carrying two-year terms a “recipe for rough justice”. That concern is backed by the Government’s own impact assessment, which assumes that magistrates will complete those more serious trials in just a few hours. As the CBA notes, that assumption is

“clearly naïve in the extreme”.

Either the cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve, or the predicted time savings will never materialise.

One of the most troubling aspects of increasing sentencing powers is the legal aid gap. Given that we were unsuccessful with amendment 53, it is important to reiterate the impact of that gap when considering the clause as a whole. At present, the income threshold to qualify for a publicly funded lawyer is significantly lower in the magistrates courts, at £22,305, than in the Crown court, at £37,500.

JUSTICE has highlighted the severe unfairness that this creates. Individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment, who would be eligible for legal aid in the Crown court, will find themselves ineligible in the magistrates courts. We face a reality where a defendant could be facing a two-year prison sentence while being forced to represent themselves, because they cannot afford a lawyer and do not qualify for state support. As JUSTICE warns, unrepresented defendants are often observed to receive harsher sentences, as they do not know how to mitigate. We cannot call a system just if it increases the stakes of a trial, while simultaneously stripping away the means for a professional defence.

We must also confront the impact of these changes on minority communities. The Bar Council and JUSTICE both point to the findings of the 2017 Lammy review, as it is referred to in shorthand, which identified juries as a

“success story of our justice system”,

because they do not appear to discriminate between different ethnic groups when returning verdicts. However, the review found that the positive story of jury equity was not matched in magistrates courts. The Minister has previously spoken about the lack of disparity in sentencing outcomes, for example, but specific statistical analysis showed that black, Asian and mixed ethnic women were more likely to be convicted—conviction is the question we are considering here—in magistrates courts than white women.

We have discussed before how that may not necessarily be a direct causal relationship, as it could just be correlation. However, as the Lammy review points out, it is incumbent on Governments of any colour—Conservative, Labour or whatever they might be—to justify and explain those disparities. As we have discussed previously, we have not managed to justify and explain them, yet we are introducing measures that could potentially exacerbate them.

Beyond ethnicity, the Lammy review noted a great cultural gulf between predominantly white, middle-class judges and magistrates and the defendants appearing before them. By forcing more serious cases into the magistrates court, and removing the right of defendants to elect a jury trial, the Government are moving cases away from the most trusted and equitable part of our justice system into one where public trust, at least for some communities, is already fragile. JUSTICE notes that any reform that reduces choice risks deepening existing disparities and exacerbating distrust for minoritised communities.

The Government’s primary justification is efficiency, but the Bar Council argues that these reforms will likely consume resources without bringing down the backlog. As we have said, there is also a challenge with the backlog in the magistrates courts, which are currently facing their own record high of 370,000 cases. The system is also facing a critical shortage of magistrates and legal advisers. The loss of sitting days due to the absence of legal advisers, who are often trainees, even for better-paid work, is a persistent problem. Some estimates suggest that there are more than 20,000 sitting days-worth of work from professional judges in the Crown court. Expecting that to be absorbed into an overstretched and shrinking cohort of volunteers in the magistrates courts would, as the CBA describes,

“transfer the burden from one over-stretched part of the system to another.”

Finally, we must look at how the clause interacts with the rest of the Bill. While clause 6 increases power at the lower level, clause 7 restricts the ability to challenge those decisions by removing the automatic right of appeal and replacing it with a permission-based model. The Bar Council describes this combination as

“a comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”

At present, around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts are successful, and 47% of appeals against sentence are upheld, demonstrating that the lower courts frequently make meaningful errors. Doubling their sentencing powers, while simultaneously making it harder for a defendant to correct a wrong conviction, is a dangerous path to take.

It is also worth noting that the Bill departs from the recommendations of the very review that it claims to implement. Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent. I draw attention to a previous response from the Minister, when she again raised the possibility that the review invited the Government to go further. We have discussed that this might be a relevant argument to make if, for example, we were talking about a recommendation on which the review did not clearly oppose the Government going further.

If I was Brian Leveson, I would feel a bit like I was being mugged off by the Government, because they are saying, “We agree with what you want to do, but we’re going ignore you on the position that you are fundamentally clear on. Indeed, we’re not only ignoring your specific recommendation, we’re ignoring what you said about the other recommendations being contingent on the Government doing this thing around controlling the sentencing”. It is doubly insulting to Sir Brian to then suggest, as the Minister did, that he would be relaxed about this, and that he invited them to go further. Certainly, no reasonable person would interpret his suggestion in that way.

There is also a question about the numbers. We know Sir Brian’s central recommendation is that we reach 130,000 sitting days. That is the number that he arrived at. We must assume that he has arrived at that number contingent on the Government sticking to his advice that we do not increase the maximum sentencing powers of the magistrates. If the Government are claiming that that will be a further 8,000 sitting days, there must be some juggling with the figures. If the Government are seeking to achieve 130,000, and Sir Brian thinks that is the right number, and the Government’s plan has got an additional 8,000 that Sir Brian never envisioned, does that mean we have 8,000 to play with in some other regard that Sir Brian did not understand? Can the Minister explain how we have ended up with the same figures and the same goal, but in a completely different way, with a further 8,000 that Sir Brian never anticipated or wanted?

We also heard the argument that this is fine because the youth courts do it. We had that argument in an earlier sitting, and I made it clear that there are some fundamental differences. It really undermines the concept of having a specialist court if what goes on in that specialist court is then used to support an argument of general application. That goes against the whole point of a specialist court—we have gone out of our way in that case, because we recognise that the circumstances are special. For example, the types of custody, the implications for criminal records and the style in which cross-examination happens are all different in the youth court and the adult estate. We must therefore recognise that we are in a completely different position.

The Minister also talked about how the negative resolution procedure is already used in this area. The crucial difference is that we are taking a leap to 24 months, in terms of the impact of these decisions. What might have arguably been permissible at the lower end of the threshold does not automatically translate into an assumption that it is therefore appropriate at the higher end of the threshold. It is because the measure will apply towards the higher end of threshold that we think it is inappropriate. We failed to persuade the Government, and as a result this clause remains concerning.

In summary, the proposal to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months is a move towards cheaper, faster justice that is likely to be neither cheap nor fast, and it will certainly not be just. It risks creating a surge of unrepresented defendants, exacerbating racial disproportionality and displacing the backlog into a court jurisdiction that is structurally ill-equipped to handle it. We should not trade away fundamental procedural protections for a marginal gain in court sitting days.

If we want to solve the backlog, we should focus on the low-hanging fruit identified by the Bar Council and others: open all existing courtrooms, more than 10% of which are closed today and were closed yesterday; fix prisoner transport, an issue that costs us thousands of days every year; and properly resource the legal profession. We must reject the 24-month limit and maintain the 12-month cap to ensure that serious custodial decisions remain subject to the full rigour and safeguards of our Crown courts.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Clause 6 expands the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to change the general limit on the custodial sentence that a magistrates court may impose. It replaces the current list of possible maximum terms—six or 12 months—with a new list of six, 12, 18 or 24 months. That will allow the Secretary of State, by regulation, to change the general limit within these set terms.

The sentencing powers of the magistrates court were increased in 2022 from six months to 12 months. This clause would allow the Lord Chancellor to further increase the maximum by statutory instrument to either 18 or 24 months. The result will be more triable either-way cases being heard in the magistrates court. The practical reason we oppose the clause is that magistrates courts are facing their own increasing list—Members can decide whether they want to call it a backlog or a list. I recognise the Minister’s comments that we should not describe the 379,000 cases waiting in the magistrates courts as a backlog and I agree with her assessment that we need a certain number of cases in order for the magistrates court to function.

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[Joe Robertson]

The central issue here, as with so much of this, is the impact that a single provision, or a single intention—in this case clause 6—has on other areas of the criminal justice system, and indeed provisions in the Bill. There is a lot of interplay between clauses 6 and 7—we are about to discuss clause 7, so I will save my comments on that for a few minutes’ time.

The central issue is the unintended consequence, yes, but also the other provisions that Parliament will not get to debate. In this case, Parliament will not get a proper opportunity to debate the fairness of having magistrates courts sentencing up to two years, because the clause effectively creates a power for the Secretary of State to do that job instead. That is why this Committee is having to debate whether it is right that a summary court should suddenly have the power to sentence someone up to two years.

The Government can argue that at least some of the provisions that the Opposition do not agree with are anchored somewhere in Sir Brian Leveson’s report. I would argue that this provision is specifically argued out by Sir Brian Leveson. Indeed, he talked about it being contingent on the magistrates court continuing to have sentencing powers of up to only one year. When the Government appear, in my view, to be doing something that specifically runs against Sir Brian Leveson’s report, rather than is simply absent from it, they need to explain their position. It is not good enough to run the same old arguments. The central argument in all this seems to be efficiency. How much will the Government sacrifice at the altar of efficiency? Efficiency cannot trump all, and certainly not the justice arguments already made by me and others, which I will not repeat.

If the Government cannot explain where these provisions have come from, when they run counter to Sir Brian Leveson’s report, they should rightly submit these proposals through a proper procedure so that they can be debated by Parliament, rather than just giving a power to the Secretary of State.

As I say, I will restrict my comments to the interplay between clause 6 and clause 7, which restricts the right of appeal. We have already heard some good arguments about legal aid, and it does not do much for the Minister, who is quite exercised by the previous Government’s record on legal aid. This is about not necessarily increased funding for legal aid—she says she is doing that already—but the right to it when the state is trying to lock someone up.

[Dr Mullan]

If people end up being seen in the magistrates court when under the old measures they would have been in the Crown court, there will be lengthier trials and, potentially, a more expensive legal aid bill. It may not necessarily even be an issue of resource; it is just about making sure that legal aid follows the cases where they are being heard, which may well even save money.

[Joe Robertson]

That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost.

The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.

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[The Chair]

The way we can best deal with it individually is by being succinct and not repetitive.

[Dr Mullan]

Further to that point of order, Ms Jardine. I seek your guidance. We are discussing issues on which amendments were tabled, but we were unsuccessful with those amendments, so is it not perfectly legitimate for us to discuss all the consequences for the Bill that flow from the fact that the amendments were denied? The Minister may be frustrated and think that that is not a good use of time; we were previously debating things that might not have happened, but now that the amendments have failed, we know exactly what the Bill will do, so it is perfectly in order to go back through the concerns we had. That is my understanding of it.

[The Chair]

I will check with the Clerk, but my understanding is that if an argument has been rehearsed and heard in full and a decision taken, we move on from that argument; we do not go back and re-rehearse it. To that extent, the Minister is right. If you have already debated an issue in connection with an amendment and voted on it, you do not go back and bring it up in relation to a further amendment, unless it is a new aspect that you have not debated before. Does that help?

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[Sarah Sackman]

Members have asked about the intended impact of the clause. As I explained earlier, the reason why we are making this change is that we have confidence in our magistrates and because it would save a significant number of Crown court sitting days.

This is a tried-and-tested approach: the sentencing power of magistrates courts was raised from six months to 12 months for a single triable either-way offence in May 2022, under the previous Government—Conservatives can look to their own record to see the evidence for what we should do—and a review of the impact between May 2022 and March 2023 confirmed that increasing magistrates sentencing powers had helped to reduce to pressure on the Crown court. In that context, there was a 21% reduction in the number of defendants sent by magistrates courts to the Crown court for sentencing, and a further 6% reduction in the number of theft offences sent for trial to the Crown court by March 2023. That shows how recalibrating sentencing powers—[Laughter.] I did not realise it was that funny, but we are getting into the witching hour, so I am going to be kind to everybody. That reduction is just one of the ways in which we think the clause can assist with the backlogs.

I addressed the points about legal aid in my remarks on amendment 22, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. I have set out the justifications both for extending the powers and for the flexible, agile mechanism that the negative procedure affords us.

[Dr Mullan]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am not going to give way. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Sackman]

Thank you, Dr Huq. Amendment 63 seeks to broaden the test for allowing an appeal from magistrates courts under the new reforms. The amendment expands the existing test so that permission will be granted where there is some other compelling reason. That is a test used in civil proceedings in the Court of Appeal civil division. There is not equivalent test for appeals in the Court of Appeal criminal division, which is what our new process for appeals in the magistrates courts is based on.

One reason why a court might hear an appeal due to some other compelling reason is to seek an authoritative binding judgment on a particular issue. A Crown court cannot provide a binding decision as to the law on magistrates courts generally, whereas the High Court can. If the appellant wished to appeal for this reason—in other words, in order to seek a binding judgment on a point of law—they could achieve that by using the existing process of appeals by way of case stated to the High Court. In short, we do not think it would be appropriate for there to be appeals to the Crown court in this context.

Instead, we have replicated the existing grounds for appeal in the Court of Appeal criminal division: whether it is reasonably arguable that an appeal will be allowed. An appeal of conviction will be allowed if it is unsafe, which can be the consequence of the incorrect application of the law, procedural irregularities, or the introduction of fresh evidence. An appeal against sentence will be allowed in the same circumstances as in the Court of Appeal: where a sentence is manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in law or principle. These are well-established tests.

We are committed to ensuring that we create a fair appeals system that provides adequate safeguards for summary justice. In the event that appellants feel an incorrect decision has been made in respect of their application for permission, they have the opportunity to seek a judicial review of that decision to the High Court. I remind the Committee that, as I said earlier, the introduction of recording equipment into magistrates courts to accompany the change in the appeals process will increase the ability to scrutinise the decisions of magistrates courts. I hope I have reassured the Committee of our commitment to a fair and accessible criminal appeals process, and I urge that amendment 63 not be pressed to a Division.

Amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, relate to the right to renew an appeal for permission to appear at an oral hearing if the appeal has been refused on the papers. I will deal with these matters sequentially.

The right to renew an application for permission at an oral hearing when it has been refused on the papers does exist in appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. We decided not to replicate the provision for appeals from the magistrates courts. There will be occasions when an oral hearing may be regarded as necessary in order for a Crown court judge to determine whether to grant permission to appeal. For that reason, we have included a provision in proposed new section 108A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, so that judges can hold an oral hearing if they feel it is necessary or for the purpose of making a determination more expeditiously.

However, the key is whether an oral hearing is necessary in the context. We are keen to avoid an influx of applications to renew permission to appeal at an oral hearing where that is unnecessary. That is particularly important when we consider the high volume of cases that our magistrates courts already consider, and the higher volume of cases that we anticipate they will be considering after the other reforms in the Bill come into play. The volume of appeals from magistrates courts to the Crown court will therefore be higher, proportionally, than the volume of appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. If we include provision for appellants to renew an application for permission that has already been refused, we risk creating a higher volume of unnecessary oral hearings than in the Court of Appeal, thereby placing a significant and unnecessary strain on Crown court time.

I understand that the amendment is driven by the desire to ensure that adequate safeguards are built into the process, and I hope my hon. Friend will be reassured that, as I have said, refusal of permission can still be challenged by applying to the High Court for judicial review.

The second part of the amendment provides that the grounds of appeal may be based on issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as on points of law. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the grounds for appeal as currently drafted in the Bill capture the points raised in the amendment. An appeal of conviction will be allowed if it is unsafe, which can be the consequence of an incorrect application of law, procedural irregularities or fresh evidence.

Appeals of sentence could also be successful on the basis that the magistrates court has made a mistake as to the facts of the case or made a procedural error, as long as, by virtue of that mistake, the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in law or principle. The amendment would not change that position.

For the reasons I have set out, I urge Members not to support amendments 64 to 66. In essence, they are already covered by the Bill.

I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for tabling amendments 54 and 57, which would provide that whenever an appeal against conviction or sentence is made from the magistrates court to the Crown court, the appeal must be allowed, irrespective of whether there is any merit in the appeal. I suspect that was not the intention behind the amendments. If I read them in the spirit that I imagine they were tabled, I think they were designed to remove the permission test, rather than indicating to the Court that it should allow all such appeals.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wimbledon, who is not in his place, for the advice received in relation to amendment 54, which was drafted with the assistance of the Clerks. The Minister is right that our intention was to unpick the barriers at the permission stage that the Bill introduces. I think her point applies just to the first amendment; the other amendments fit because they are about what happens after a successful appeal and how it might be re-instigated. On that basis, I will not press amendment 54 to a vote. We will table a suitable amendment at a later stage.

[Sarah Sackman]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I was pretty sure that that was what he must have meant and that it was not his intention to suggest that we should, essentially, allow and uphold all appeals as an automatic right. I understand, though, his intention to debate the merits of the permission test in the Bill.

I should make one point about the consequence anticipated in the amendments, in terms of appeals being directed automatically to a jury trial. To be clear, that is not how appeals currently operate, whereby a judge sitting with magistrates rehears the case on appeal in the Crown court. The effect of the amendments together could mean that we would see large numbers of appeals of conviction being allowed and sent to the Crown court for a retrial by jury, absent any permission test or filter. That could mean, for example, that low-level summary-only offences, such as being drunk and disorderly, are added to the Crown court caseload and, by extension, the backlog, which would only increase the waiting times for the more serious offences, which we want to get on with more expeditiously.

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s correction, but we take issue with not just the effect of the amendment but the fact that it would mean that appeals would go to a jury trial, because that would extend the right to, or access to, a jury trial, which we do not want to encourage in this context. I anticipate that the intention was to expand the grounds for permission, so that instead of applying a test, any application for permission would be allowed. This would essentially remove the permission filter and return us to the status quo, where there is an automatic right to a rehearing on appeal, absent any filter for the merit of an appeal.

--- Later in debate ---

The current state of play in relation to the appeal volumes demonstrates that, by and large, magistrates are doing a job in which those who work in the system and are affected by it can have confidence. They are doing a good job of applying the law consistently and accurately. Of course, it is vital that the right to appeal is retained where genuine errors are made. This measure is about proportionality and ensuring a sensible use of court resources while maintaining fair and well-established safeguards against miscarriages of justice. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle not to press amendments 54 to 57 and 37. I commend clause 7 and schedule 2 to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. Clause 7 and schedule 2 represent a fundamental and troubling departure from the way that our justice system corrects error. As the Minister said, we have tabled a number of amendments, which essentially form two groups. The first group seeks to reconstitute the existing right of appeal, and amendment 37 aims to stop the Government’s proposal until we have a more substantial and better understanding of how to drive the appeal success rate down, which is our primary aim.

As the Minister outlined, at present a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court, where the case will be heard as a full rehearing before a judge and two lay magistrates. The Bill proposes to replace that long-standing framework with a permission-based model, whereby the defendant must first prove that their appeal is reasonably arguable before a single judge, often based only on written papers and transcripts. I rise to oppose that restriction on access to justice. I will argue that, where an appeal is successful, justice is best served by providing the option of a retrial before a jury.

I will reflect on the Minister’s remarks about how our amendments would operate. I always listen very carefully to what she says and, as I will explain, I think there is some merit in some of her points, so we can reflect on those. The Minister has pointed out the difference between the magistrates court and the Crown court, and processes elsewhere, but my contention is that that is not an accident or happenstance; that is by design, because the magistrates court is very different in many other ways from those other elements of the courts. That is why there is a difference there—for very good reason.

Because efficiency must be balanced with accuracy and fairness, the current automatic right of appeal is not simply a source of unnecessary delay; it is a vital check on a part of our system that others have described as being, to some extent, “rough justice”—a forum in which decisions are swift but carry a higher risk of mistake. The evidence—because let us look at the evidence; this is not just what people might say about it—is that the current system is performing a very necessary function. Around 40% to 42% of appeals against convictions from the magistrates court are successful, and roughly 44% to 47% of appeals against sentences are also successful. That is an extremely high rate of successful appeals. These are not marginal or trivial figures; they indicate, I am afraid, that the lower courts are making meaningful errors in nearly half of the cases in which they are challenged.

The Law Commission actually considered this issue in detail. It rejected the proposals that a permission stage should be introduced and highlighted a number of key points in relation to that. On the importance of correcting error, as I have mentioned, it emphasised the critical role that those appeals are playing. It also highlighted the low volume of appeals. The Minister talked about 4% of receipts in relation to one element; I think 1% of the total number of magistrates court cases are being appealed, so that demonstrates that this measure will make a transformative difference to the backlog.

We can talk about receipts, but the other thing to keep in mind is how long the actual appeals take. Although receipts are one way of looking at it—on a numbers basis—that is also distortive, of course, because appeals are much shorter hearings than the ordinary business of the Crown court.

The Law Commission pointed out that it found no meaningful evidence that this process was being abused, even without that permission stage in place. As we have talked about previously in the Bill, legal representatives cannot support an appeal that is completely without merit. As I have said, due to a combination of the low volume of appeals and the shorter hearing times, our contention is that there would be minimal efficiency gains to weigh against this erosion of an existing right.

Actually, the introduction of a permission stage is something that we welcome, but the work that will have to be done to support it, with the introduction of recordings and making available transcripts, will probably—or could—cost significantly more than will be saved. By introducing a permission stage, the Government are creating a multi-stage system that is complicated and potentially more inefficient than the current situation.

We know that many of those facing imprisonable offences in magistrates courts are currently unrepresented. The Bill simultaneously increases sentencing powers in clause 6 while narrowing the ability to challenge those decisions in this clause. The Bar Council has described this as a

“comprehensive rolling back of safeguards”.

An unrepresented defendant, potentially facing up to two years in prison, will now be expected to navigate the practicalities of reviewing transcripts and preparing permission grounds for appeal without professional help.

The legal aid gap means that many defendants who would have qualified for a solicitor and legal aid in the Crown court will be ineligible in the magistrates court due to the different low-income thresholds—£22,325 versus £37,500. Requiring those individuals to purchase costly transcripts just to ask for permission to appeal is a significant barrier that risks entrenching injustice. If the error rate in the magistrates court remains high, restricting access to the remedy is a recipe for uncorrected miscarriages of justice.

I will move on to our amendments about the case for retrial by jury. If we accept that the current appeal system exposes weaknesses in the original summary trial, we must also look at what happens after a successful appeal. As the Bill stands, if the Crown court quashes a conviction and determines that a retrial is necessary, the case must generally be returned to the magistrates court.

We believe that that is a rigid approach that ignores the complexity, which does not exist at present, of what might have been revealed by the appeal. Because we are introducing a new system of allocation and decisions around allocation, that is a new area of the law that could be contained within appeals. A successful appeal may demonstrate that the case was too complex, or the evidence too sensitive, for a summary disposal in the new division. Returning cases to the same level of court that originally fell into error will do little to restore public confidence.

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[Sarah Sackman]

I am grateful to all the Members who have spoken for the points they have raised. Without repeating myself, they have focused on a number of areas. The first is the concern around access to justice under the new process. We had a good debate on the question of the availability of legal aid in an earlier sitting. As I have said, the Government are committed to fair and accessible routes to legal aid. There are mechanisms such as passporting for those on universal credit. An example given was that the vast majority of prisoners do not have an income. The real picture is that the vast majority of them, unless they have personal wealth, do access legal aid and therefore would be represented and supported by those who are able to give legal advice in what are, of course, high-stakes situations.

As I mentioned in the earlier debate, a hardship mechanism is available where the matter necessitates greater complexity and expenses. I recognise that, where there are litigants in person, there is more to do, and part of the implementation and delivery of these reforms will involve looking at what support can be given to those who find themselves in that position. At the moment, litigants in person in the Crown court on appeal to the Court of Appeal are given targeted information and forms that allow them to formulate grounds of appeal and that make it user-friendly and intelligible to a lay person. That sort of thing will have to be put in place if a permission stage is extended to the magistrates court.

The points that have been made are valid, but I also want to present a realistic picture of the fact that the majority will continue to access legal aid. As I said earlier, the Department has committed to review the position once we know what the final shape of the Bill looks like to ensure that we are not creating a problem in respect of access to justice. However, in the event that there are litigants in person, we also know that we need to strengthen support for them more broadly across the system, not just in the context of these reforms. That will be a vital feature of the implementation.

The second issue raised was about the trade-offs between the efficiency savings versus the introduction of a permission filter to match the sort of permission filter that already exists in the Crown court. While I recognise that the current volume of appeals, in the context of the volume of work that the magistrates undertake, is small, that will grow as the volume of work that the magistrates undertake grows.

The sorts of appeals where success is achieved are precisely the ones that will not be prevented by this appeal test, because it is a low bar; all that has to be shown is reasonable arguability, and a court can identify that straightforwardly. It is not as if, all of a sudden, a huge risk to access to justice is created. However, what is permitted is the filtering out of wholly unmeritorious appeals, the volume of which may grow as the overall volume of cases within the magistrates court expands.

[Dr Mullan]

I direct the Minister to the report from the Law Commission, which said that there was no significant evidence of people abusing the system or lots of unmeritorious appeals. The point is that someone has looked at this in detail, on an independent, non-party political basis, and they do not support the suggestion that there are lots of appeals going through that should not be in there.

[Sarah Sackman]

I will say two things to that. Obviously, that report—as is typical from the Law Commission—is non-partisan, but it predates the reforms we are proposing in the Bill, which will inevitably increase the volume of cases we are talking about. It goes back to the point that, where we have finite resources, if the permission stage filters out only a relatively small number of cases—in fact, that is how I anticipate it will work—then that is all to the good, because even those take up a disproportionate amount of Crown court resources that we can ill afford to have directed to wholly unmeritorious appeals. That is what we are getting rid of.

The other thing is that this test is focused on specific grounds, much in the same way as exists in Crown court appeals. The treatment of that appeal can be directed towards the issue that has been the cause of the appeal, rather than having the whole thing looked at again, which is currently the case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

It is about the combination of those concerns, along with the fact that there are unrepresented people. The Minister is right to say that people who have representation, if their appeals are valid, will be able to carry on, because they will continue to meet the test. The reason the Opposition support the broader approach is because there are people who do not know the detail of the law or how to make a successful application. That is why there should be a freer approach. The concern is about those two things combining.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate pointed out, not only are things being made more consequential—longer sentences and a lower likelihood of a jury trial—but at the same time it is becoming more difficult in the other direction. That feels counterintuitive and not in line with what the Government are saying about making the system fairer. On that point, the Government are moving in directly opposing directions.

[Sarah Sackman]

I have heard that argument, but I do not accept it. I do not think the provision makes it less fair. But I accept that there is work to be done, which does not necessarily need to be reflected in the Bill, to support litigants in person, and to examine the approach and the structure to legal aid, to narrow the gap for those who do not have access to it. That way we can reduce the number of people who have to navigate the system without legal representation.

I will not repeat the arguments that I made earlier. For those reasons, I commend the clause and schedule 2 to the Committee.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move amendment 17, in schedule 2, page 52, line 5, leave out “on payment of a fee” and insert—

“to victims of criminal offence without a fee within 14 days of a request”.

This amendment would make magistrates’ court transcripts free for victims and requires that such transcripts are provided within 14 days of a request.

I first acknowledge that the Government have made steps to improve access to court transcripts after robust negotiations in both Houses and on various Bills, most recently the Sentencing Act 2026, the Victims and Court Bill and now this Bill.

I also put on record the exemplary effort made by my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who has been campaigning to ensure that court transcripts are made available for free for victims of crime, after her constituent was quoted thousands of pounds to access the transcript of her own court case. Nobody should be priced out of seeing their own story.

Why are transcripts important? For many victims, they choose not to attend the entirety of a hearing or trial. Even if they do, there is so much to take in. Being able to process the events of the court case provides a valuable opportunity to better understand why decisions were made and hopefully enables them to move on with their lives.

The Committee had the privilege of listening to the testimony of Charlotte Meijer, alongside other victims, Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott and Morwenna Loughman. I would like to remind Members of a few of the things that Charlotte said. She said:

“For me, having transparency really changes things. We talk about justice and the system being closed, so if we have more recording and transcripts, it will really help people. There is something that is not in the Bill that I would love to see; I have fought for the last three years for sentencing remarks to be made free, which we did earlier this year, but I believe that is not going to extend to magistrates courts. If they are now being recorded, my belief is that they should also be free in that way.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 25, Q49.]

Charlotte spoke about her experience. She did not feel that she could listen to the trial after she had given her evidence, because it was a very small bench and the defendant’s family and friends were sat there. She did not feel like she could go and sit and listen, so she left, but she had indicated that she would like to be there for the sentencing or the hearing. However, she just got a call from her independent sexual violence adviser telling her that he had been found not guilty. She was not given the opportunity to hear that. Charlotte continued:

“For my healing, and for me to be able to move on, I just needed to understand what was said in court, so I went to ask for the transcripts, of which of course in the magistrates courts there are none.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 26, Q51.]

It is important for victims of crime and victims who see their perpetrators found not guilty to have the opportunity to process that by seeing what happened, whether they were in the room or outside it. The transcript can also be a tool for those who choose to apply to the unduly lenient sentences scheme, which I am pleased that the Government have agreed to improve significantly, after working alongside Baroness Brinton in the other place.

I recognise the concerns raised by the Government, particularly about the cost of producing transcripts and the processing time for redaction, which is all currently contracted out. I am pleased that they have agreed to a proactive trial of AI in courtrooms to improve transcripts, and to a move to record all magistrate hearings. I know that that approach has cross-party support; I have been in the Chamber with many Labour MPs and MPs of other parties who have made exactly the same arguments that I am making now, that providing free court transcripts is a key step towards transparency.

The Minister knows that we have worked collaboratively on reducing the scope in other Bills and have called on the Government to provide judicial summings-up and the route to verdict, including for those whose defendants are acquitted, because there is still a process that they need to go through. I am keen to work with the Government on this. I hope that as the Bill progresses through the House, we can continue the good work that has started on court transcripts.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 17, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. I acknowledge the progress that we have made on the issue; it has not been as fast or as good as personally I would like, but it has absolutely been progress. The hon. Member has laid out some of the important points.

The idea that we will record these proceedings and that the transcripts will exist, but that the victim cannot have them, is obviously not sustainable. If they do not exist at all and nobody has them, that is one thing, but when they are available and some people might be accessing them—defendants, for example—it is really not reasonable that victims cannot, for all the reasons that we have discussed in relation to the Crown court. The existence of recordings will make that less of an excuse. Again, the interaction of different elements of the Bill, with longer sentences, restricted appeals and more serious cases being heard, builds an even stronger case for victims to have access to the transcripts.

The hon. Member for Chichester mentioned the unduly lenient sentence scheme. As we talked about in the context of Crown court appeals and the current use of the scheme, it is pretty hard to appeal an unduly lenient sentence if we do not even have access to the route to sentencing that the judge laid out to explain why they gave the sentence that they did. In my understanding, we have a later amendment that asks for an expansion in the use of the scheme in order for it to be meaningful. We talk about the unduly lenient sentence scheme, but people cannot access it in the magistrates court, even though we are about to put more serious cases into that court. At the minute, people are able to access the scheme when a case is heard in the Crown court. For those reasons, we enthusiastically support the hon. Member’s amendment.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have put my name. Later, I hope to speak about the real difference between viewing evidence—seeing it given in real life, or going into the room where evidence is given—and being able to review it more dispassionately later in writing. Given that we are now producing transcripts, the amendment would be an important measure to provide them free to victims who may want to see what has been said in court, without having to attend court and see it in a more triggering, more visceral way, and without facing a financial penalty. It is important that the amendment is agreed to, along with everything else, to allow for a more compassionate way to treat victims.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling the amendment. As she acknowledged, there has been fruitful cross-party working on the issue. I am really pleased to see the progress that we have made, both as a matter of open justice, because timely justice must be fair and transparent, and, candidly, because technology is our friend here and is enabling progress. It must be robust and tested, because the ability of AI to enable redactions where needed has to be properly studied, which is why we have initiated an AI study. But I am pleased with the progress that we have been able to make and that, as a Parliament, we will continue to make.

[Dr Mullan]

I have always struggled somewhat with the question of redaction. If reporting restrictions are in place, what can be shared and so on will be controlled, but anybody can sit in a court and listen to the whole thing, unredacted. I am not quite sure that I understand the absolute focus on transcripts being redacted. If someone could have sat in that court and written down what was said, word for word, why are we worried about its being redacted? The judge is the person who can say, “You can’t report that, beyond what you’ve heard,” but, separately, why are we so much more concerned about transcripts than we would be about open court, where everyone can hear the whole thing?

[Sarah Sackman]

It is context specific, which is exactly why we have a study: to test the level of accuracy. Accuracy is really important; we do not want a lot of judicial time to be taken up reviewing the accuracy of transcripts before they can be put out. That would not be a good use of judge time, which should be spent running trials and getting them concluded. In some contexts, most obviously in family law, redaction is really important.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will not press the amendment, which is self-explanatory, to a vote, but I ask the Committee and the Minister to think about it.

[Dr Mullan]

We now come to a series of considerably less contentious clauses, including clause 8, relating to the admissibility of evidence in our criminal courts. This area of the Bill deals with the sensitive and often contentious issue of sexual history evidence. Of course, we want victims of rape, sexual violence and domestic abuse to experience a justice system that treats them with dignity and protects them from irrelevant, prejudicial attacks. Complainants can be subject to questioning that is invasive and distressing, that may not be relevant or may hold little or no genuine relevance to the legal issues at hand.

Clause 8 seeks to tighten and clarify the rules governing when a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour can be introduced as evidence. The underlying principle is that a complainant should not have their credibility undermined through assumptions, stereotypes or what are often described as rape myths regarding their past.

To achieve this, the clause will replace the current model with a more rigorous admissibility framework. Under the new rules, such evidence may be admitted only if it meets one of two criteria: it must have substantial probative value in relation to a matter of substantial importance to the case as a whole, or it must constitute important explanatory evidence. This shift is intended to ensure that only genuinely relevant material is put before the court.

Furthermore, the clause explicitly requires the court to consider whether the suggested value of the evidence relies on inferences that cannot be properly drawn, to avoid the situation in which evidence is admitted with the defence knowing what inferences be drawn even if it would not be proper to do so. That is another important safeguard designed to prevent the trial process from being distorted by prejudice.

Although the Opposition support the aim of ensuring better protection for complainants, our role in Committee is to ensure that the law is not only well intentioned, but clear, workable and consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am sure the Minister agrees that there cannot be a blanket ban on the admission of this sort of evidence where it meets those tests.

I have a number of questions in relation to the need to ensure that the measure does not create any unintended procedural hurdles. To forewarn the Minister, this will be a consistent question across these clauses, but what assessment has been made to ensure that the substantial probative value threshold is sufficiently precise—not sufficiently high or low, but sufficiently precise—to meet both sides of the coin, and that it is workable in practice? How do the Government intend to monitor the application of the new framework to ensure that it delivers the intended protection for complainants? Is the Minister confident that the drafting strikes the correct balance between protecting victims from inappropriate and invasive questioning and upholding the fundamental right of a defendant to a fair trial?

The need for reform in this area has been well argued, and protecting victims from irrelevant and prejudicial questioning is a goal we all share. However, as I have said, the Committee’s task is to ensure that this clause is the right approach. That is something we should continue to explore throughout the later stages of the Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

It is truly a pleasure to get to a part of the Bill on which I suspect we will agree more than we will not. I think we will all find that rather refreshing after the last few sittings.

Clause 8 seeks to introduce a new framework governing the admissibility of evidence about the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant. I very much welcome the fact that we are now having this debate and looking to address some of the issues we currently see in the justice system with respect to sexual assault crimes. Rape and sexual violence are horrendous crimes that have a lifelong impact on victims. In oral evidence, we heard this directly from some of the brave witnesses who testified, and I thank them for giving their time so generously and for speaking so honestly and courageously. What was made very clear is that they are keen to see change in how the justice system deals with these types of offences. They want to see justice done swiftly and considerately.

It takes a huge amount of bravery for an individual to report these types of crimes and to pursue their attacker through the courts, so we must do all we can to ensure that the process is quick, supportive, effective and efficient for them, while preserving the principles of natural justice. Although I may disagree with some victims on the limitation of jury trials being a way to achieve this, I share the same ambition: to speed up the process so that justice is no longer delayed and denied.

It is important to remember that most of these crimes are committed by someone the victims knows, making the process even more of an intrusive ordeal. It is deeply personal. That is why it is important to treat victims with respect and care, not to diminish their experiences or feelings, and not to make them feel like they are the ones on trial. It is incredibly important not only for justice, but for deterrence purposes, that the state sends a clear message that those guilty of such crimes will face the consequences. This is much needed at a time when violence against women and girls is rife in our communities. If the state can get this right, we should see more victims coming forward and being more willing to undergo the stress of a trial in the confidence that justice will prevail.

In June 2021, the Conservative Government published the findings of an end-to-end review of the criminal justice system response to rape, which they referred to as the rape review. What it found made for difficult reading. In the prior five years, there had been a significant decline in the number of charges and prosecutions for rape cases and, consequently, fewer convictions. One in two victims were withdrawing from rape investigations, demonstrating a big problem. The Home Secretary at the time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), said:

“We are not prepared to accept that rape is just ‘too difficult’ a crime to prosecute. We can, and must, do better.”

The review set out that there are an estimated 128,000 victims of rape a year, that less than 20% of victims of rape report to the police, and that only 1.6% of rapes that are reported result in someone being charged. That means that considerably fewer than one in every 100 rapes actually leads to justice for the victim. That shows the scale of the issue. One of the actions set out was that

“only evidence about the victim that is pertinent to the case should be used at court and a victim’s credibility should not be undermined by pre-conceptions or rape myths.”

In the final recommendations issued by the Law Commission in 2025, it was made clear that the use of evidence relating to the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant—for example, previous consensual sex between the defendant and complainant, or between a defendant and a third party—is highly distressing, humiliating and even traumatising, and is often irrelevant and can prejudice a case.

The admission of sexual behaviour evidence has, rightly, long been restricted through so-called “rape shield” legislation, which applies specifically to a trial where a person is charged with a sexual offence. No question can be asked about the sexual behaviour of the complainant without the leave of the court, and various gateways are considered in determining that. However, the Law Commission has criticised those gateways for being too restrictive, too broad and too complicated.

Clause 8 seeks to address some of the issues raised by the Law Commission, and has incorporated the stage 1 recommendation accordingly. It amends the conditions that must be met before a defendant can adduce sexual behaviour evidence or ask questions intended to elicit evidence of sexual behaviour in criminal proceedings. It ensures that such evidence may be admitted only if it

“has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which—

(i) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and

(ii) is of substantial importance in...the case as a whole”.

However, clause 8 does not include stage 2 of the two-stage framework suggested by the Law Commission, which prohibits the use of sexual behaviour evidence unless its admission would not significantly prejudice the proper administration of justice. The Law Commission has raised that specific deviation in its written evidence. I ask the Minister to give her reasoning for not adopting the second stage, so that we are all clear.

It is reassuring to see the Bar Council welcoming the changes brought by clause 8, which it says

“provide appropriate safeguards for victims and for fairness of trials.”

The Law Society also supports the proposals, along with many other rape crisis and women’s organisations. Having said that, I note that a joint letter from Rape Crisis England & Wales, the Centre for Women’s Justice, Rights of Women, the End Violence Against Women Coalition and Imkaan, while welcoming much of clause 8, raises some specific concerns. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister on those points and whether she intends to make any changes.

[Dr Mullan]

I mentioned this point in my speech, but I will repeat that these clauses interact with the other elements of the Bill that will remove juries. Under the older jury trial system, the judge decides on things that the jury will never hear, so if something is made inadmissible, there is no question at all of it colouring the judgment. Of course, if we remove the jury in potentially more serious cases, we can have all this legislation and all these things that become technically inadmissible, but as we have talked about, we are then relying on the intellectual operation of the judge’s mind. Whether or not people think it is right for them to draw a direct conclusion, it is a matter of fact that judges are a group of people who are more distant and removed from the people we are concerned about. For example, if we are talking about women and girls, judges are more likely to be men. Those are the issues that will become more contentious as a result of the other changes in the Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point. There is a lot that is positive about the clause, but, as he rightly says, we have to think about it in the context of all the other changes. Unfortunately, we could find that the other changes unwind the good that is done by this clause. That said, it is still a positive clause, and I am pleased to see it in the Bill and to debate it today.

Lastly, I want to flag that in its evidence, Victim Not Suspect notes a need to address verification and/or the reliability of digital evidence, which it believes is relevant to the admissibility test and has not been addressed in the Bill. It would be useful to hear the Minister’s view on that matter too. Victim Not Suspect says:

“Without forensic verification, including IP address data, account ownership confirmation from platforms such as Meta, and metadata examination, there is no reliable basis for assessing authorship.”

That is a point of detail, but it could become important in certain cases, so it is worth bearing in mind. There may be scope to improve and tighten that up in the Bill during its further progress, which is why I have flagged it to the Minister.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Yasmin Qureshi]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. The amendments are fairly self-explanatory: they just ask to insert a few words. I will leave it at that.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to have you guiding us through the second part of the proceedings today, Ms Jardine.

Clause 9 is part of a rolling set of clauses about the admissibility of evidence. Our task is to ensure that, while we protect complainants from being retraumatised by intrusive lines of questioning, we also maintain a legal framework that is clear, workable and consistent with the fundamental right to a fair trial.

Clause 9 specifically addresses the use of evidence regarding compensation claims made by complainants in sexual offence cases. Under current practices, complainants are sometimes discredited or have their credibility attacked simply because they have sought compensation for the harm they say they have suffered. It is entirely fair and reasonable, and a valid part of our law, for someone to pursue a criminal case and also seek financial compensation. But sometimes there is an underlying misconception that the act of seeking compensation, on its own and without any more evidence, means that the original criminal complaint may have been fabricated.

To address that, clause 9 introduces the following measures: a leave requirement, which means that evidence about a compensation claim cannot be introduced without the court’s explicit permission, and an admissibility threshold, under which a court may admit such evidence only if it has “substantial probative value” in relation to a matter of “substantial importance” to the case as a whole. The goal is to ensure that irrelevant or purely prejudicial material is excluded, while still allowing genuinely probative evidence to be heard when the interests of justice require it. The law must guard against unfair insinuations, but the admissibility test must be applied with precision and discipline. While the objective of protecting complainants from unfair discredit is welcome, there are practical and legal implications that require clarification.

As I have said to the Minister, some of my questions will be consistent throughout the clauses. Can she elaborate on how she expects the courts to interpret the terms “substantial probative value” and “substantial importance”, and outline how the Government will seek to ensure that the restriction does not prevent a defendant from exploring the full circumstances of the case?

Is the Minister confident that the current drafting provides judges and practitioners with a clear enough structure to apply the principles consistently across different courts without creating a postcode lottery? In terms of monitoring and evaluation, what work will the Government do to ensure that these new measures have the desired impact?

Clause 9 is straightforward: its premise is that a victim should not be put on trial for seeking the compensation they are entitled to under the law. Excluding irrelevant and prejudicial material can help ensure that the trial remains focused on the actual evidence of the offence. However, we must be diligent in our scrutiny to ensure that the drafting delivers those protections without compromising the procedural rigour that a fair justice system demands.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

As with the previous debate, I will set out the rationale for clause 9 and then turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris).

Clause 9 will create a high admissibility threshold for evidence about a complainant’s compensation claims in sexual offence prosecutions. That could include evidence that a victim has made a compensation claim in relation to the offence being tried, the amount of money awarded as compensation, details of the claim or the fact that compensation was refused. The Law Commission report made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offence cases, and that, in some instances, it is used by the defence to insinuate that a victim has fabricated an allegation for financial gain. That kind of reasoning lacks a legitimate basis and risks unfairly undermining victims.

This measure will ensure that such evidence cannot be admitted when its sole purpose is to introduce or perpetuate misconceptions about why survivors come forward. Instead, a judge will be able to admit compensation claim evidence only when it has substantial probative value to a genuinely important issue in the case. These reforms therefore strengthen protections for claimants while maintaining the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

I will respond to the questions from the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. He fairly raises the issue of how we can assess that these tests are being applied fairly and consistently. That will obviously take time as they bed in, but, in many ways, the precise rationale behind these changes is to codify, clarify and simplify tests that already exist for the treatment of evidence in these cases and to assist our judges to use them fairly. There is no doubt that future Ministers and others with responsibility for this issue will want to know that it is working as intended. No doubt studies can be undertaken in the future. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.

I turn to amendment 68. The Law Commission’s review made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offences cases, as I have said. That is precisely why we have introduced the high admissibility threshold in the Bill. The amendment asks for a threshold of merely “relevance”, which is lower than the statutory threshold we propose. If we were to accept it, it would not give complainants any additional protections above the current status quo, despite the Law Commission identifying a clear issue with how this evidence is currently being requested and used. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 69 focuses on the disclosure of evidence to the defence before an application is made to admit that evidence to the courtroom. However, the clause does not change the test that the prosecution must currently apply when considering whether to disclose details of a complainant’s compensation claim to the defence. Instead, it focuses on the stage after the prosecution and defence have reviewed the evidence, and asks the judge to consider whether the evidence indeed has substantial probative value and can therefore be relied on in court.

As the clause stands, the case will remain that the prosecutor must disclose to the defence any material that might be considered capable of undermining or assisting the case of the accused—that is only fair—and that includes the compensation claim evidence. The defence, in cases involving sexual offences, can then consider how they wish to bring that forward. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the amendment to a vote.

[Sarah Sackman]

Clause 10 sets out that evidence or questioning about a victim’s previous allegation of a sexual offence may be admitted only when there is a proper evidential basis for doing so. It also clarifies that certain facts do not, by themselves, mean that a previous allegation was untrue. Those include: if the victim did not report the offence to the police; where an allegation did not result in a charge or conviction; and where a victim withdraws from proceedings.

The Law Commission’s report, alongside the sector campaign “Bad Experiences, not Bad Character”, identified inconsistencies in how courts currently approach previous allegations in sexual offence trials. There have been instances where previous unproven allegations have been raised to suggest, without evidence, that a victim is unreliable by insinuating that such allegations were false. That risks reinforcing myths and misconceptions, making the trial process a traumatic one for the complainant.

This measure will maintain a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Judges will still be able to admit evidence about a complainant’s previous allegations when there is a proper evidential basis for doing so. The clause simply creates a clearer and more consistent statutory test to ensure that such decisions are based on sound evidence rather than speculation. Victims should feel confident that a previous allegation will not be unfairly used against them in the courtroom. Clause 10 strengthens the integrity of the trial process while supporting complainants and survivors to come forward and engage in the justice system.

[Dr Mullan]

As the Minister said, we are considering the next iteration of the question of admissibility, which addresses the evidentiary rules regarding previous false complaints in sexual offence cases. This is a sensitive area of criminal law where the pursuit of truth must be carefully balanced against the need to protect complainants from unfounded attacks on their character. The primary objective is to ensure that trials remain focused on the actual facts of the case at hand rather than being diverted by speculative allegations that a claimant has made false allegations in the past. The Law Society and Bar Council have indicated their support for this measure; they recognise that it brings clarity to the statutory framework governing bad character and credibility.

The central feature of clause 10 is the introduction of a requirement for a “proper evidential basis” before any suggestion can be made that a complainant has previously fabricated an allegation of sexual offending. Currently, there is an ever-present danger that the defendant may attempt to undermine a complainant’s honesty by pointing to past allegations that simply did not result in a conviction. That is related to the challenges that we discussed in the debate on clause 8 regarding the difficulty of complainants when it comes to seeing a case through to the end—either because of the delays in the courts, which we are all concerned about; challenges with the police; or fears or concerns they might have about how their case was treated in the courts. There could be a whole series of reasons why a complainant does not pursue an allegation through to its fullest conclusion, none of which have anything to do with the allegation being false.

Under the clause, the following factors are explicitly excluded from being used as sole proof of a false complaint: the fact that a previous allegation was denied; the fact that a previous case did not lead to a charge or result in an acquittal; any delay by the complainant in reporting the previous matter; and a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support prosecution in the past. By codifying those exclusions, the Bill aims to eliminate the use of unsupported assertions and ensure that the court does not rely on assumptions or stereotypes that are frequently used to imply that a complainant is untruthful. This is a helpful step in reforming the trial processes by ensuring that a defendant’s conduct and not the complainant’s history remains the focus of the jury.

While the principle of clause 10 is sound, its success depends on how the courts interpret and apply the proper evidential basis test. We must ensure that this framework is robust enough to shield victims from speculative and prejudicial questioning while still being fair to the defendant.

I have some questions for the Minister. Can she provide the Government’s thinking on what a proper evidential basis will look like? Do the Government envisage it requiring independent, objective proof of falsity, such as a previous conviction for perverting the course of justice, or will a lower standard suffice? Is the Minister confident that the current wording provides a road map clear enough to prevent judges from applying different standards? I want to address the gap in the data and understand how the measure will be implemented.

In relation to previous complaints, very sadly there are victims of violence against women and girls who have been affected hundreds of times. Will the Minister explain what would happen if some of these “for exclusion” criteria had occurred at an extraordinary rate? If a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support a prosecution relating to a crime that happened hundreds of times, that could in itself be relevant. It would not necessarily be so—they may have chosen hundreds of times not to support a prosecution. However, unlike other elements of the Bill, the clause is highly specific in what it is excluding, so I want to check whether there is any flexibility for the judge so that, in extremis, they can still admit the evidence, or whether there is a hard no, regardless of circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I welcome the support from Members across the Committee for clause 10. A proper evidential basis is defined in the Bill as ensuring that there is material before the court that shows both that the complainant made the previous allegation and that the previous allegation was false. I do not want to elaborate on the test, and thereby in any way tie the hands of the judge hearing the evidence in the case. The tests and the clear structure set out in the Bill will enable and empower the judge to test whether there is an evidential basis for the claim and whether it has probative value and relevance to the issues at hand. The judge will then be able to take a view on whether it can be included and put to a witness.

There will always be cases where the evidence is relevant to the proceedings, both for the prosecution and for the defence. There is certainly no hard rule excluding it altogether.

[Dr Mullan]

Contrary to our other interactions, I think it reasonable for the Minister just to write to me. I read the Bill to mean that these types of things cannot be included at all, so could she at some point to clarify whether that is the case or whether there is some flexibility at the edges?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am very happy to do that. I will make that correspondence available to all members of the Committee and the wider public because it is important that, when judges and others are looking to apply the test, they understand the Government’s rationale and understanding of the provisions.

For reasons that others have articulated, this is an important clause, which recognises something that women’s groups and others have been campaigning on for an awfully long time. It can help to change the culture in our criminal justice system for victims of sexual violence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

Clause 11 will ensure that if a defendant has a previous conviction for domestic abuse—of any type and against any victim—it can be taken into account as evidence of bad character in a further domestic abuse case. That will help courts to recognise relevant patterns of behaviour that might otherwise fall outside narrow offence category boundaries. We know that domestic abuse can take many forms and that patterns of domestic abuse do not always map neatly on to a single type of offending. Recognising those patterns can help juries to understand the context of the offence.

The clause therefore allows previous domestic abuse-related convictions to be admitted as propensity evidence when the statutory test is met. That will include cases in which the previous conviction involved coercive or controlling behaviour, and the current allegation involves a different form of domestic abuse, such as sexual assault against an intimate partner. Our aim is to ensure that courts can consider relevant patterns of abusive behaviour when they provide important context on the issues in the case while maintaining the full range of safeguards that protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

Clause 11 completes the package of evidential reforms set out in clauses 8 to 11. Taken together, the measures provide greater clarity, consistency and coherence to the rules governing sensitive evidence. They help to improve the experience of victims—particularly victims of sexual offences—in the criminal justice system while ensuring that trials remain fair and balanced. I urge that clause 11 stand part of the Bill.

[Dr Mullan]

We now go to the other end of the spectrum and look at this from a different direction by addressing how courts handle evidence of a defendant’s propensity to commit domestic abuse. The provision acknowledges that domestic violence is rarely a series of isolated, vacuum-sealed events; rather, it is often characterised by established patterns of coercion, control and escalation over time, repeated across relationships, although potentially in different ways. When thinking about the precedent in our system, it brings to mind Clare’s law, which we brought in for the very purpose of allowing members of the public to know someone’s domestic abuse history, because we recognised just how common it was for abusers to move from victim to victim.

The primary function of clause 11 is to clarify the rules regarding admissibility in respect of past domestic abuse offending. It establishes that a defendant’s previous conduct can be used to demonstrate an inclination to commit similar crimes, even in instances when the earlier and later offending take different forms. That ensures that the law recognises the underlying reality of abusive relationships, where the specific method of harm may change while the dynamic of power and intimidation remains constant. As we have discussed previously, the prevalence of such behaviour is so great that we have to do whatever we can to support victims.

The Bar Council has noted that while much of such material might already be admissible under existing bad character provisions, clause 11 provides statutory clarity for judges. Of course, the court’s duty is to ensure that a jury does not convict a defendant for a specific charge simply because they have behaved poorly in the past. The evidence has to remain relevant and fair, and to be assessed within the unique context of the case. Nothing about introducing that information stops that from happening, as the jury or judge can weigh it up as they see fit in that regard.

How do the Government intend to ensure that propensity is defined narrowly enough to prevent juries from using a defendant’s past as a shortcut to a verdict? Given the Bar Council’s view that that might already be covered, what did the Minister see as the key gaps between how the law operates at present? What are the direct benefits of clause 11 beyond how things currently operate?

I am personally more hard-line when it comes to bad character admissions and previous convictions. I think the whole system should be much more flexible. We have a tough, rigorous way of finding out if someone is guilty, and we know that previous offending is a massive indicator, across many offence fields, of a propensity to offend again. It is part of natural justice. We all understand that if someone has been found to have done the wrong thing on other occasions, it is quite natural and reasonable for people to give that considerable weight when determining that person’s credibility and reliability, and if they can be trusted.

A lot of court cases come down to the likelihood of something happening—how probable it was that someone did something. The fact that someone has done something similar before is clearly going to weigh heavily on any reasonable opinion former’s mind when deciding whether that person has done the same thing again. We support the clause, which has great merit.

[Sarah Sackman]

I will be brief. What we have tried to do with the definition of propensity—we think this is the benefit—is to provide clarity and a structured process for judges. Of course, it is important to remember that a trial is not a likelihood test. As we all know, it is a test of the criminal standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt, whether it is a judge-made decision or a jury directed by a judge. It is really important, even in the context where bad character evidence is admitted—the issue of propensity is there—that juries are reminded that they have to be absolutely sure that the offence did happen.

A decision cannot be based on the fact that a person did something before and therefore probably did it again. The jury has to be absolutely sure. None of that changes. That standard of criminal proof does not change as a result of clause 11. We hope that, in line with the Law Commission’s recommendations, the measure provides a clear, structured and, above all, consistent series of tests so that, irrespective of where a trial happens in the country, the same approach is taken and there is a shared understanding among judges, juries and practitioners as to what the test is.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Use of screens etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Clause 12 will make it more routine and straightforward for screens to be used in combination with those measures, helping to provide greater reassurance to intimidated witnesses that they will not be seen by the accused while they give their evidence. These are simple but important steps. Reducing the potential for intimidation or distress will help to ensure that witnesses feel more supported and able to give their best evidence.

[Dr Mullan]

Clause 12 addresses an important aspect of protection: the use of screens in the courtroom. We must start from the position that special measures are not a luxury or optional administrative add-on; they are often essential to ensuring that the justice system remains capable of hearing evidence properly. We want to enable people to give evidence in the proper way, and victims and vulnerable witnesses must be able to give their best evidence—we always want people to be able to give their best evidence in court—without avoidable distress, intimidation or re-traumatisation.

For many, the prospect of being in the same physical space as the person who harmed them is a primary barrier to their participating in the justice system at all. Clause 12 will strengthen and clarify current provisions by creating a clearer statutory footing for the use of screens. Specifically, when a witness is providing testimony via live link or through a pre-recorded cross-examination, the clause will require the court to consider whether a screen should be provided. Crucially, the clause clarifies that that protection should operate in both directions: not just preventing the witness from seeing the accused, but shielding the witness from the accused’s gaze as well. That increased clarity is intended to support consistency in practice across the country.

For many victims, particularly those of sexual violence or domestic abuse, the physical presence of the accused is a source of profound distress that can affect their memory and the clarity of their evidence. The current application of these measures can be inconsistent, leading to what practitioners describe as a postcode lottery. By establishing a presumption in favour of screens unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice, the law recognises the practical reality. However, we must ensure that that presumption is not merely a tick-box exercise, but achieved effectively through things such as either-way screens.

We must recognise, as we have at several points in Committee, the challenge presented by the fabric of some of our courtroom buildings and their facilities. Evidence provided to the Committee—this is also highlighted by Sir Brian Leveson—suggests that malfunctioning equipment and poor infrastructure continue to create problems, specifically in relation to using special measures. A stronger use of screens can be mandated but, if the physical layout of the court and its facilities are insufficient, that will hamper the clause’s benefit.

What survey or review have the Government undertaken, or do they plan to undertake, to ensure that there are no physical barriers to the use of screens in this way? I suspect that, on a physical basis, it is easier to have screens just in one direction rather than two, and it probably involves different equipment and facilities. It would be good to get the Minister’s view on any barriers that might practically limit the intention of this measure.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Clause 12 stipulates that when a direction allows evidence by live link or pre-recorded cross examination, screens must also be provided unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice, such as due to preventing the adequate testing of evidence. It also clarifies under a special measure direction that a screen may be used to prevent either the witness from seeing the accused or the accused from seeing the witness. The Liberal Democrats welcome the clause.

Vulnerable and intimidated witnesses are entitled to a number of additional measures to protect them from defendants. When the Law Commission conducted a review of these measures in relation to sexual offences cases, it came up with a number of recommendations, although the Government have chosen not to take forward some of them, such as introducing automatic entitlement for sexual offence complainants or providing complainants with independent legal advice on their entitlement to special measures.

It would be helpful to understand from the Minister why the Government chose not to introduce those recommendations, which would have turned special measures into almost standard measures. The blanket introduction of these measures would save administrative time and cost. I recognise that this is anecdotal, but the judges I have spoken to have said that if they get a request for special measures, they never refuse it.

Surely by reversing the onus and introducing the special measures as standard, we would still provide an opportunity for victims to opt out of those measures if they have a particular desire to see, or to look into the eyes of, their defendant, but if they did not wish to do so, they would be, at the very minimum, provided with protections. If this was the standard approach, it would also give more women—this affects mostly women—the confidence to come forward knowing that their court experience is going to protect them.

On a recent visit to Chichester Crown court—I thank the Minister for committing to reopening that court fully—His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service talked about creating videos for those who are coming to give evidence, with the opportunity to have a virtual walk-through of the court. If vulnerable witnesses and victims were able to watch a walk-through to see exactly what measures could be put in place as standard to protect them, I imagine that would provide much more reassurance than saying, “This is what you are seeing, but there are also additional special measures that you can apply for.”

Introducing these measures as standard would also take away the stigma of being associated as a vulnerable witness. We talk a lot about victims. Some victims do not want to be described as victims; they want to be described as survivors. We talk about vulnerability. If we had these measures as standard, we would be acknowledging that vulnerability is expected, but that there is no stigma around it and that the courts have mitigated it, without being asked to do so.

The measures are backed by various victims groups, such as Women Against Rape, and by the Victims’ Commissioner. It would be helpful if the Minister could highlight whether the Government plan to go further and make these special measures standard.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 13, page 27, line 37, at end insert—

“(7) Disclosure of the details of any connection between the independent supporter and the complainant is required prior to seeking the court’s agreement of the independent supporter.”

This proposed addition is simple. The clause centres on witnesses being accompanied while giving evidence. Essentially, it states that if somebody wants another person to accompany them, they should be able to do so if the court is satisfied that they meet the various criteria. The amendment proposes a seventh criterion requiring that the independent supporter must not be a connected person—that is, a friend, a member of the family or a relative. That is for an important reason: we know that in offences involving domestic abuse or sexual offences, the victims and witnesses can be traumatised, distressed and vulnerable, in which case they can be suggestible when it comes to comments, ideas or suggestions about something that they might not even have seen. That is why the person accompanying the witness should be independent.

I shall illustrate that argument by explaining what happens to children’s evidence when taken as evidence in chief. Often, a specialist lawyer, police officer or even psychologist is present when children give evidence. Sometimes, photographs, diagrams or pictures are shown to the children so as to elicit the best evidence out of them. Whenever such a trial takes place, the notes that a psychologist or other trained person has taken, and the pictures they may have shown to the child to get the best evidence, are adduced in court. There is always a suggestion that the person carrying out the interview may deliberately or inadvertently have put an idea in the head of the child, who may end up saying something that did not actually happen or emphasise that something was stronger than it was.

This small amendment says that this approach should apply to adults as well. It says that the connected person must not be family, a friend or a relative. Often, the first person a victim will talk to will be a friend or family member. I do not think that that would be very good. At the end of the day, we want to make sure that convictions are safe and that the best evidence comes through.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in connection to clause 13 and amendment 70, which are about how witnesses are supported while navigating the potentially stressful environment of the courtroom. Giving evidence in criminal proceedings is inevitably going to be stressful for many people. For victims of crime, including but not limited to victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse—any crime, really—the presence of an individual to support them in the process can mean the difference between successfully completing their testimony and being overwhelmed by the process.

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[Sarah Sackman]

Clause 13 introduces an important new special measure, which will make a real and tangible difference to vulnerable or intimidated witnesses who come before our courts. It enables them to be accompanied by a supporter when giving evidence to reassure them and help them to give their best evidence. Crucially, it creates a rebuttable presumption that a trained professional such as an IDVA or ISVA will be allowed to accompany the witness. These specialists play a vital role in helping witnesses navigate an often stressful and emotionally demanding experience. A presumption helps ensure that this is consistently accessible across our criminal courts.

While section 24 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 already permits witnesses giving evidence via a live link to be supported in this way, and the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025 create a presumption in favour of support from IDVAs or ISVAs, the Law Commission has highlighted that practice on the ground remains inconsistent.

Despite existing provisions, some witnesses who would benefit from the presence of a supporter are still unable to access that assistance. Such inconsistency both undermines witnesses’ confidence and risks adversely affecting the quality of the evidence that they can provide. By improving access to supporters, clause 13 improves the experience of vulnerable complainants and witnesses, while helping to maximise the quality of the evidence that they can give. I commend clause 13 to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I ask the Minister to think about everything I said about the previous amendment. The Minister mentioned that there is a definition in the Bill. However, “definition” is open to interpretation. The Bill just says:

“an individual who performs a role which involves the provision of support to witnesses in criminal proceedings or victims of criminal conduct, where the support relates to those proceedings or that conduct.”

It seems to me that that could be anyone who says that they perform a role in supporting a witness. It is extremely open. The Minister rightly pointed to two specific roles that are well recognised and understood. However, the Bill does not say that—it does not say “IDVAs or ISVAs”; it just says an “independent supporter”. Questions about the previous amendment also apply here: what in the definition means that it could not be someone’s family member? There is not any kind of specification.

My understanding was that there might be further definition in secondary legislation. Could the Minister clarify whether there will be an attempt at further definition, either in secondary legislation or in criminal practice rules? I do not think that the definition is suitably robust at present. The Minister is not using it—because when the Minister is talking, she refers to the two very well-established and recognised roles that we all understand. However, that is not what is happening in the clause.

We are minded not to oppose the clause, but it appears to suggest that anyone can be an independent supporter. It does not even say that the court must test that; it suggests that if someone says they are an independent supporter, they are in. That cannot be what the Government intended. To avoid an unnecessary vote, perhaps the Minister could offer further clarification, unless I have misunderstood and there will be secondary legislation that provides further definition.

[Sarah Sackman]

I seek to assist the Committee, as I do not want us to get this wrong. The purpose of the definition is to exclude non-professional supporters or those who do not habitually perform a role in supporting witnesses. That is the intent. The fact that the court must also be satisfied that the support is not contrary to the interests of justice is an important protection in relation to who can and cannot perform the function. I do not think that necessarily excludes the fact that one could, in theory, have a relative perform it. I am, again, happy to provide that clarification so that there is no issue with the Committee not having the full information.

[Dr Mullan]

I wonder whether the Minister might reflect on that. I think there would be good reason to say that the supporter should not really be a family member. That is not how the system has been operating at present; it has been operating with professionals. I take the Minister’s point about the preceding clause, but the Government should perhaps be clearer about what they expect. I would not be neutral about whether a family member should sit with someone in that situation.

[Sarah Sackman]

I understand the point. In the circumstances, I would prefer to take officials’ advice and check that the legislation is doing what it intends to—providing a consistent practice of professional witness support, while maintaining trial fairness. I do not want to misdirect myself or the Committee.

[Sarah Sackman]

I think all of that is right, but I would prefer to take the matter back to the Department and check that we have a common understanding. I do not want to do this on the hoof if I do not have the full information before me. I think that is the intention—the presumption is that it applies only to professional supporters. I suppose it is ultimately up to the court if a family member sits with the person, if that is deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

[Dr Mullan]

On the basis of that discussion, the Opposition do not oppose the clause. We can explore the issue on a good faith basis. I do not think it is critical to the importance of the Bill, so we are happy to proceed. We would, however, welcome some further clarity.

[Sarah Sackman]

I am more than happy to accede to that. This has been useful, and I am very happy to provide that clarity.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Exclusion of persons from court

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Sarah Sackman]

This clause represents an important and balanced step forward in strengthening the support available to intimidated complainants in our justice system. It will make it easier for courts to exclude individuals who may be causing distress or intimidation from the public gallery, while fully preserving the principle of open justice.

Section 25 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 already permits the exclusion of the public from the courtroom while a complainant gives evidence, yet the Law Commission has observed that the power is rarely used in practice. Concerns about its perceived impact on open justice, particularly the requirement that only a single member of the press can remain, means that courts are often reluctant to apply it. At the same time, we know that individuals present in the gallery, including supporters of the defendant, can on occasion create an atmosphere that is distressing for intimidated witnesses. My hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato), who has huge amounts of experience in this area, told me of an egregious example affecting a constituent of hers who was giving evidence while friends of the defendant were creating an intimidatory atmosphere in the gallery, yet nothing was done about it.

The clause offers a practical and proportionate solution to that sort of situation. It will broaden the categories of individuals who may remain in the courtroom when the public gallery is cleared, allowing accredited members of the press, approved academic researchers and one supporter for the complainant to stay. It directly addresses concerns about transparency and open justice by allowing those reporting or researching the case in the public interest to remain. That is not a novel approach: comparable provisions already operate in Scotland and Northern Ireland, where courts can restrict public attendance while members of the press and a limited number of individuals remain in their place. Their experience demonstrates that it is entirely possible to restrict public access during particularly sensitive evidence without compromising the integrity or openness of the proceedings.

The clause will encourage courts to take a more flexible approach, excluding only those likely to intimidate the witness, where it is not necessary to clear the public gallery entirely. This will increase the likelihood that the measure can be used where appropriate, while maintaining open justice. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

As the Minister points out, this clause interacts with the issue of transparency in the justice system. I recognise that the Minister thinks it attempts to strike a balance by clarifying the categories of people who may not be excluded, such as representatives of news organisations, witness supporters and approved researchers. The aim is to ensure that, while a witness may be shielded, the trial remains professional and legitimate.

However, we do not want the measure to have the unintended effect of narrowing public scrutiny, including by ordinary members of the public, who the Minister will accept are not necessarily there to intimidate or have any impact on the witness—they might not be even connected to the case. It should be assumed that people in this country can just turn up to a courthouse and watch a case, as they currently can, and as I have in the past.

Sad to say, but we have seen recently that practical transparency can be very difficult to achieve. We had the whole debacle with the Courtsdesk archive, which hugely assisted transparency in our legal system. The Opposition certainly do not feel that the Government’s initial response to that demonstrated that they were as committed to transparency in the justice system as they should be. It was only the effort of Opposition Members and media campaigners that secured a U-turn. We must ensure that these powers are used only when the interests of witnesses genuinely outweigh the public’s right to witness proceedings—although I note that the clause does not create an automatic entitlement for persons to be excluded.

We have discussed the availability of transcripts, and it would not be unreasonable to link the two issues. If people are excluded, I do not see why that could not become a trigger for making available those elements of the evidence that the public are for that reason unable to hear at first hand. I do not think the Minister is suggesting that the people in the gallery cannot hear the evidence; it is just about the impact on the witness of them being there. If that is happening and we accept that that is a break from the norm, it would be reasonable to say that transcripts of the elements that were not open to public scrutiny should be more widely available.

If the powers are enacted, it is important that the Government monitor their use going forward. They should have a clear position that they would be open to reforming or even removing the powers if they think they are not operating as intended.

We will not oppose these measures, but the Lords will want to look at them and ensure that we are excluding as little as possible. I accept the Minister’s point that, at the minute, nobody is getting excluded because of worries about how the provision operates, but that does not mean that we should just accept a new way of doing things when it could be better refined. If the Minister could clarify the point about transcript availability, it would demonstrate some good faith by ensuring that people can see for sure that we are not attempting to stop people from hearing what is going on in a courtroom.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I seek clarification from the Minister about the reference in clause 14 to

“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.

Earlier, the hon. Member for Reigate raised the practice of live tweeting from court proceedings. I would appreciate it if the Minister set out her understanding of who would come under “a representative of a news gathering or reporting organisation”. With the rise of social media, and with more people getting their news online on things like X, we can have lots of news organisations with self-professed journalists or online commentators who are acting in the interests of providing online journalism, but who do not hold any form of accreditation or any official role as a journalist. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain who legitimate members of the press will be under this measure. Will they have to be recognised journalists? Will they have to have a press pass? Or can they say, “I’m here, in the interest of journalism, to live tweet the events because I am a self-employed journalist”?

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[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is great to see you back in the Chair to help us to make our way through the Bill, Ms Jardine. New clause 28 is a probing amendment, and I shall not press it to a Division when the time comes. To give the context for why I have tabled the new clause, I will lay out the experience faced by a young child—I cannot give many details of the case, as the Committee will appreciate.

This young child was below school age when they became the victim of and witness to abuse. They gave clear evidence on video at the time that it had happened, and while the case was investigated and awaiting trial in court, they continued with their childhood. Their mother helped them to move on from the abuse, and she says that the memory of what happened not being constantly brought back was a key part of their recovery. However, during the court case some years later, they were made to rewatch the video. By hearing their younger self talk about the abuse, they were, essentially, properly traumatised for the first time, as they for the first time properly understood, with a real, more mature understanding, what had happened to them in detail.

That case made me realise that the process of being cross-examined and watching back original, video-based evidence in chief, even just while the prosecution team refreshes their memory of their evidence, can do victims real harm. Although I can see why it may be necessary to cross-examine a witness on what happened, based either on their memory or facts stated in the evidence, I feel strongly that putting them through the additional trauma of rewatching it themselves is not necessary and should certainly not be routine, and that that should be in the law or guidance.

My new clause would amend sections 27 and 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which are intended to relate to special measures and directions. It would ask that witnesses not be obliged to watch video recordings of their earlier evidence, and would allow transcripts, as a potentially less traumatic alternative, to be submitted for cross-examination. It would also ask for notice of questions for cross-examination to be provided in good time. Although I understand that there is no legal obligation for the videos to be rewatched, I know that it is happening even when concerns have been expressed. I want to make sure that it is clearer in the law or relevant guidance that no witness or victim is obliged, against their will, to relive the crimes committed against them.

As I said, the new clause is probing. I am grateful that the Minister has looked into the issue, and has today committed to updating the guidance. I have corresponded with her departmental colleagues who are leading a review of the victims code, passing to them more details than I can mention here on that particular case and some ideas for how relevant guidance around special measures could be amended, as that could take the place of changes in primary legislation. I hope that my bringing this point to the Committee is constructive, and I thank the Minister for her attention.

[Dr Mullan]

As we have heard, clause 15 clarifies the use of pre-recorded evidence for cross-examination and re-examination, which is often referred to as section 28 evidence. Our courts frequently rely on recorded testimony to spare witnesses the trauma of a live trial, so the rules governing the editing and presentation of that evidence must be clear and robust.

Clause 15 provides clarification on the circumstances under which a video recording may be edited before it is admitted as evidence in a trial. Editing may be required if certain procedural requirements were not met during the recording being taken, or if specific portions of the material are deemed inadmissible or contrary to the interests of justice. The clause requires the court to perform a delicate balancing act, weighing any potential prejudice towards the accused against the desirability of presenting the whole, or substantially the whole, recorded examination.

A clearer statutory footing for editing is welcome, but it must be applied with consistency and transparency. If recorded evidence is to protect witnesses properly, the rules for its use must be as rigorous as those for live evidence. We must acknowledge, as we discussed earlier in respect of screens, the highly variable state of court technology. In my time on the Justice Committee, I visited courts and heard that they sometimes did not have the screens necessary to show evidence. There is a huge difference between a poky little TV of low granularity and a proper screen for showing video evidence to the jury.

Sir Brian Leveson’s review and others have highlighted that malfunctioning or substandard equipment can derail trials or create grounds for appeal when it comes to the use of pre-recorded evidence. Without reliable hardware and skilled technical staff—I also heard about the challenge when something goes wrong and there is no one available to fix it—the legal clarification in clause 15 will remain theoretical rather than practical.

My final point is about the guidelines, which the Minister talked about. We must ensure that they are sufficiently detailed, rigorous and standardised, so that, notwithstanding the further clarifications in the clause, they are suitably consistent in their application.

What are the Government’s current plans to address the technological challenge on the court estate in relation to section 28 recordings? What steps will be taken to ensure that all parties have time to review and potentially challenge edited versions of recordings before they are played to a jury? The ability to challenge is vital to ensuring consistency and fairness.

[Sarah Sackman]

On the hon. Gentleman’s last point about the reliability of the kit in courtrooms, that is critical not just for evidence via video. We have an ambition for greater use of video right across our criminal justice system, not just for vulnerable witnesses but in other ways that have been touched on. We have talked a lot about prisoner transportation being a challenge for the system; one way to address that is by having less demand for it, unless it is needed in the interests of justice and fairness.

The increased use of video could be of real benefit but, of course, it has to be reliable. That is why the Government’s capital investment in increasing the budget for His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—I saw some of that equipment in action in Harrow court—will make such a difference.

When we are talking about vulnerable witnesses, who are given the option of section 28, the quality of their evidence can be impacted if it is inconsistent or glitchy, or if the way it appears in a courtroom is somehow distorted because it is too big or too small, or whatever. All those things will be important, which is why the significant investment agreed with the judiciary through the concordat process over the next three years will make such a difference, and why all the court transformation and reform measures are being accompanied by significant inward investment, as announced by the Deputy Prime Minister.

I should say that HMCTS, the performance of which I routinely review with the Deputy Prime Minister, conducts regular audits of facilities and brings that to our attention so that we can see where the roll-out is happening, which courts are lacking facilities and which need to be prioritised for investment.

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[Dr Mullan]

Forgive me if it is published, but if not, perhaps the Minister could write to the Committee on the current state of video technology across the court estate, to support the Bill’s progression.

[Sarah Sackman]

I am very happy to provide that information, to the extent that we hold it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Application of special measures to victim personal statements etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Sarah Sackman]

The clause makes it clear in legislation that special measures are available when a victim chooses to read their victim impact statement aloud at sentencing. This is a moment of real significance for many victims—the point at which they are able to explain, in their own words, the impact of the offending on their lives. Although special measures can already be used for this purpose, that entitlement is not explicitly set out in legislation.

As the Law Commission has explored, the lack of a clear statutory basis can create uncertainty about what victims may rely on, adding avoidable stress at a time when they are already managing the emotional weight of addressing the court. Clause 16 removes that uncertainty. It ensures that victims can rely on the same special measures at sentencing as they can when giving evidence, whether using screens, a live link or some other appropriate measure.

By placing the provisions on a clear statutory footing, clause 16 gives victims greater reassurance that their voice can be heard at sentencing and that they will have access to the support needed to participate effectively. It will enhance their overall experience of the justice system, and strengthen the quality of information available to the court when determining a sentence. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I have spent a lot of time working on the issue of victim personal statements, often referred to as victim impact statements, in work on other Bills. We are talking today about someone’s ability to give an effective statement, but the Opposition have also been concerned about restrictions on what people can actually say, and have tabled amendments to other Bills on that issue.

I have worked with a number of victims. The people who come to mind are the parents of Violet-Grace, a four-year-old girl who was hit and killed by a stolen car going 80 mph on a 30 mph road while she was crossing with her grandmother. The criminals involved fled the scene—they came back to step over her body as they grabbed the drugs they had left in the car—and then fled the country. Her grandmother suffered massive injuries and will never be physically the same. Violet-Grace’s parents, two amazing individuals who are part of the Justice for Victims campaign group, talked about their experience of what they wanted to say in their victim statement being interfered with.

I have also had the pleasure of meeting and working with Sarah Everard’s parents, who tell the same story of having wanted to say certain things. Of course, the Opposition do not think it should be a free-for-all, and people should say whatever they want in an impact statement, but surely the onus should be on allowing victims to have their say.

There is a need to reform what these statements are for. In statute, it is there purely as a way for victims to talk about the impact of the crime on them. That is helpful, but in other jurisdictions it is an opportunity for the victim to say what they want about what has happened—importantly, this is at the point of conviction, when someone has been found guilty. We will therefore continue to push for broader reforms to impact statements.

On screens, this one of those things we read and thinks, “Why wasn’t this thought of at the time?” It seems self-evident that everything is put in place for witnesses during a trial—before someone has even been convicted, when the state has not yet decided through the courts whether someone is guilty—but this is after the trial. Surely the protections for people taking part at that stage should have been included in the original envisaging of the use of screens. We wholly support the relevant measure. We have discussed physical infrastructure already, but I am sure there is something the Government can do on that.

I do not think the Minister is responsible for the content of statements—I think that lies with the Minister for Victims—but we would appreciate her lending support to her ministerial colleague in relation to further expanding what people can say in their statements. The clause seeks to ensure that they have their moment in court from a physical point of view, but that will be undermined somewhat if what they are allowed to say is not as expansive as we can possibly make it.

[Sarah Sackman]

I think we all agree that the victim impact statement, and that moment when victims read or speak aloud about the ways in which they have been impacted, is critical. Their ability to speak at all may depend on the consistent provision of the special measures in clause 16. All that can be done without compromising the fairness of what is to follow, which is the sentencing exercise in which a judge must engage in respect of the defendant. Clause 16 seeks to enable that, because there may be victims who simply cannot bring themselves to do it absent those special measures. That is why it is a really important clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Welfare of the child: repeal of presumption of parental involvement

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Amendment 14 would require the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. It would necessitate a report being laid by the Government on the impact of repealing the presumption of parental responsibility. We are in favour of clause 17, but the amendment focuses on the impact of the provisions on legal aid and the capacity of family courts, judicial training and investment in the family court estate. Repealing the presumption of parental responsibility will lead to a need for more legal advice, as well as changes in hearings and court practices. It is important that the Government report on those changes to the House. We hope that they accept the need for a report.

Clause 17 will repeal the presumption of parental involvement in the Children Act 1989. The presumption was originally introduced to ensure that both parents could maintain a relationship with their children after separation. However, there have been long-standing campaigns to repeal the presumption, with evidence emerging—I say emerging, but it is long-standing evidence—that children could be left at risk of harm. The change will mean that the courts will no longer start from the assumption that parental involvement is always in the child’s best interests.

A key campaigner for this change, working with Women’s Aid, is Claire Throssell, who the Committee had the opportunity to hear from during the evidence session. Claire’s children, Jack and Paul, were killed by their father, who locked them in the attic and set fire to the house. If there was any moment that we all will remember for a very long time, it was Claire holding the images of her children before the incident and afterwards. I commend her for her bravery and for the way that she was able to speak so clearly not just for herself, but for all the families who have experienced devastating bereavement in that way—fighting for the children who will come after.

A family court judge, guided by the presumption, decided to allow Claire’s ex-husband unsupervised access to their children, despite evidence that he had threatened to harm both her and them. Since Women’s Aid first reported on the issue in 2004, 67 children have been killed by perpetrators of domestic abuse through contact arrangements, with 19 further child deaths documented in the decade to September 2024 alone.

The Lib Dems are in favour of the shift in law away from the presumption of parental involvement. Although the Bill seeks to repeal the presumption, there is a pro-contact culture in the family courts, as described by Farah Nazeer of Women’s Aid, who we also heard from in the evidence session. Will the Minister lay out what will be done to support the cultural reform of the family courts to ensure that this is a pivotal moment for victims of domestic abuse, who for so long have had their concerns around their children’s safety dismissed?

Claire spoke to that point in the evidence session. When I asked her what she believed the next steps should be, she said:

“What I would like to see moving forward is an understanding of what it looks like without presumption of contact; what good practice looks like; understanding trauma; understanding what coercive control is; understanding emotional abuse. We all understand physical abuse—it is there; we see it. What we do not understand is the emotional abuse and the scars that we carry. We must always look from the position of actually seeing a child, hearing a child, believing a child, protecting a child, and we must go from this basis.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 58, Q110.]

New clause 16, which I also tabled, is a probing amendment that I will not press to a vote, but I wish to discuss it further. It would introduce a rebuttal presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child in the context of domestic abuse, undertaken in reliance on and with documented advice from authorities or support services, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is known.

New clause 16 would allow a parent to relocate with a child if they have evidence or advice from a domestic abuse support service or authority. It would require the court to assume that the move is reasonable and place the burden on the other parent to prove that the move is not in the child’s best interest.

The new clause is aimed at making it easier for victims of domestic abuse to leave their situations safely, and to prevent them from being forced to remain near their abusive ex-partners. Currently, the legal framework does not adequately distinguish between a parent who removes a child to protect them and a parent who removes a child to punish the other party. Our new clause would not remove safeguards in respect of alienation, but would instead shift the dial towards believing and protecting victims of domestic abuse.

The new clause is supported by Fair Hearing, which shared multiple examples of its work with courts that failed to give proper weight to the relevance of domestic abuse in relocation decisions. In one such case, a mother who had experienced severe physical, sexual and psychological abuse had been forced by her partner, during the relationship, to move with their children to an isolated rural area. After leaving him, she sought permission to return to her home town, where she had family support and greater safety. The court none the less required her to remain in an isolated cottage near her abuser, failing to give proper weight to the impact of the abuse, or to her need for safety and support. Cases of that kind illustrate the consequences of a framework that, in its operation, too often treats a survivor seeking to relocate for safety no differently from any other parent seeking to move for lifestyle or preference reasons.

I make the point to the Minister that this could happen to any of us. So often, abuse does not start on day one, when the partner suggests that we move somewhere lovely and will be really happy there. I am a very long way removed from the version of myself who made the decision to follow a boy three hours away from my family in my early 20s. He turned out not to be the great guy I thought he was when I made that decision. I escaped from that situation, but had I stayed and ended up having children, the idea that I would have been trapped in a city that was not mine, away from my family, who were my support network, is too scary to bear. I remind the Minister that it could happen to literally any one of us.

Wider campaigns from Women’s Aid, SafeLives and Refuge have focused on ensuring that survivors can relocate to escape abuse. As subsection 2 of the new clause outlines:

“Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.”

Under the new clause, the documented advice would include evidence from a police force, social services, a multi-agency risk assessment conference or an independent domestic violence adviser. We look to work closely with the Government on this issue, and I hope they recognise the need to go further, but I will not push new clause 16 to a vote.

I will speak briefly to new clause 20, also tabled in my name, which would introduce a statutory presumption that where domestic abuse is alleged, the court must make findings on the allegations before considering any claim that a parent has sought to undermine the child’s relationship with the other party. If one parent alleges domestic abuse and the other alleges alienating behaviour—that is, influencing the child against them—the court must decide the domestic abuse allegations first. The court cannot move on to contact issues until that is decided. If the court finds domestic abuse, a child’s reluctance to see that parent is presumed to be justified. That presumption can be overturned only with evidence. If abuse is proven, courts cannot consider claims of alienation until the alleged abusive parent proves the child’s resistance is not due to abuse.

Campaigners have long argued that the family courts have been used by abusers to retraumatise victims and have over-prioritised contact between parents and children. It is estimated that around 60% to 90% of child arrangement cases in the family court feature allegations of domestic abuse. In 2020, the report entitled “Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases” highlighted serious issues with how the family court system addresses domestic abuse in child arrangement cases. It said that those issues were underpinned by a pro-contact culture, silo working, an adversarial system and resource constraints.

A 2023 report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner stated:

“Victims and survivors and their advisors reported concerns that raising domestic abuse as an issue often risked the retaliatory use of so-called ‘parental’ alienation narratives by parties against whom domestic abuse had been alleged as a counter-claim, leading to worse outcomes for adult and child victims and survivors.”

Five years on from the harm report, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner found that despite overwhelming evidence of domestic abuse in most cases, a pro-contact culture and a failure to recognise abuse still contribute to decisions that may put children in harm’s way.

This can be considered a probing amendment; I will not press new clause 20 to a vote. We will be looking to work closely with the Government to make progress in this area. The new clause would tilt the dial slightly towards victims of domestic abuse by ensuring that courts properly examined cases before considering issues of alienation. It would prioritise the safety of victims of domestic abuse, whether partners or children, by requiring these allegations to be addressed first.

It is also sometimes argued that children resist contact with certain parents because of manipulation. Our proposal would ensure that courts did not assume that manipulation first, but it would also have safeguards. It would not allow domestic abuse organisations to submit evidence; instead, it would be the authorities, social services and an independent domestic violence adviser who would do that. A minimum evidential threshold would also have to be met.

[Dr Mullan]

I want to begin by acknowledging the gravity of what we heard in evidence in Committee. As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, pointed to, the evidence from Claire in relation to her children will stay with all of us. It was so moving and so upsetting for anyone thinking about how they would feel in that scenario. There was also the testimony of other parents who have lost children, and survivors of domestic abuse, who felt let down by a system that prioritised contact over their safety. That testimony matters. The Committee has a duty to take it incredibly seriously and give it the maximum possible weight.

We also have a duty to legislate carefully, however, and when it comes to legislating I do not think there are many areas of human frailty and human complexity that are more complicated than this. As anyone with any experience of the family court—and of life generally and the interactions between families who split up—will agree, all these things are incredibly complicated. When we seek to be prescriptive about how exactly a court should or should not seek to do things, that is fraught with risk and potential unintended consequences, just as today we are discussing the unintended consequences of a measure that may have been brought in for good reasons.

We must think very carefully, therefore, when it comes to the repeal of section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989, and particularly about whether we think that will achieve what it promises. I make no apologies for saying that I want to consider this in some detail and that we will want to follow the discussions on it in some detail as the Bill progresses. Although we are not seeking to oppose the repeal at this stage, it is certainly not something—as opposed to some other measures—that is without the need for further scrutiny.

I want to say plainly that the courts, social services and CAFCASS have made serious mistakes in the past—importantly, both before that provision was inserted in 2014 and since—and those serious mistakes have cost children their lives. However, the question before us today is whether repealing the presumption will fix the mistakes or whether it might distract from the need for much deeper reforms and more complex and difficult work than can be achieved by a simple measure in a Bill.

Let me deal with the most important point: the presumption introduced in 2014 does not give any parent an automatic right to contact. It is important that we recognise that. It does not override the paramount principle in the law. I think we probably all remember the evidence given by one of the barristers in Committee, who was clear that while they thought the presumption could be repealed, the law as it stands does not allow the desire for a parent to have contact to override the welfare of a child. It also does not override the welfare checklist, or require courts to make an order that places children at risk.

The presumption establishes a starting point that, where it is safe to do so, children should generally benefit from the involvement of both parents. That starting point can be rebutted, but it expressly does not apply where a parent’s involvement would put the child at risk. In its written evidence, Both Parents Matter describe it as a “statutory benchmark”, not a straitjacket.

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[Rebecca Paul]

I am sure people saw me during evidence. I get really upset about the loss of any child’s life. We have to remember that we all want to keep children safe—[Interruption.]

[Dr Mullan]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Rebecca Paul]

No, I’m okay.

I would gently say to the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire that I hope she has heard—and even seen—enough from me to know that I am here to protect children. Of course I am horrified by any loss of a child, but my point is that I am trying to step back, be objective and say, “What is the reason that those children lost their lives?”. I am not convinced that it was the parental presumption—I am not saying that I am right on that; I am just open-minded to it.

I have seen a particular case quite closely—I should declare that I am a serving county councillor in Surrey—and that is the case of Sara Sharif. I have gone through the safeguarding reviews in a huge amount of detail; it affected all of us councillors in Surrey greatly. It was an absolutely awful case. So many things went wrong throughout her life. From the family courts to social services, her GP and the school, there was just a barrage of failure that led to that poor little girl being murdered, and that absolutely could have been prevented.

People might argue, “Well, if we had removed the parental presumption, that would have saved her.” Having gone through all that, I can tell the hon. Member that, in that case, it would not have done anything. It was safeguarding failures. People just made mistakes. They got things wrong. They were too worried about offending people to take the right actions.

What I am saying today is just that it is really important, when we look at these things, that we diagnose what went wrong. We have to do that quite objectively. That is difficult when we are hearing from lots of different people who have gone through awful things, but our job is to try to not be emotional—I say that having got emotional myself—and to look at it logically. At the end of the day, we all just want to deliver the outcome that protects children. That is what all of us on this Committee want to do. But it is important that we can talk about that without the hon. Member suggesting that I somehow do not care about children, because what I am trying to do is to have that objectivity, because it matters to me so much that we do protect those children that I want us to have that proper debate and to say, “Is this really the right way or are there other things we can be doing? Do we need to do multiple things? Maybe this isn’t enough.” I am not saying that we should not do it; I am saying that we just need to make sure that we have thought this through.

I will be really keen to hear from the Minister; I know this really matters to her as well, and she will have done that thinking, so I look forward to hearing her thoughts on the challenges I have brought up today. But, as I say, I keep an open mind, and we all share the same objectives.

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As Claire observed in front of the Committee, and I think it is a view that is shared by all the members of this Committee, keeping children safe, and the improvements that we need to drive in the family court, do not end with the repeal of this presumption. We think it is important; we think it will send an important direction to the family judges about what we as parliamentarians want them to prioritise; but it cannot end there and it needs to be scaffolded with other measures.

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister was absolutely right to point to the enormous burden on those judges. I should have made a similar observation, and I am happy to do so now. Although I have been critical of some of their decisions, I cannot imagine the weight that sits with some of those people all the time, so I want to put on the record my thanks to those judges—on the whole, they do a very good job.

However, we still come back to the issue of accountability. We can preload the system to ensure that judges are more likely to make suitable decisions but, if there are no accountability mechanisms at the other end, we will not necessarily get the results that we want. What thought has the Minister given as to how we better ensure accountability for decision making? In my practice as a doctor, for example, there are so many mechanisms in place to ensure that the decisions I make are not just technically justifiable, but good. The point my constituent made when she visited me was that there are no such mechanisms for judges. If they make a strict error in law, that can be tackled through the Court of Appeal, but outside of that, how can the judiciary better hold itself to account for poor-quality, even if legally defendable, decision making? I am not talking about the Government interfering with the judiciary.

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Obviously, we have appeal systems and, in some family proceedings, the nature of them can be iterative; as family circumstances and the facts change, it might be that there are provisions in directions to come back and relitigate some of those child arrangements. In other cases, they are final. Accountability is really important to us as a ministerial team, and the Secretary of State does not shy away from it. While of course respecting separation of powers, the judicial complaints process must be important as well, not just in family courts, but right across the piece. Where judges fall short of the standards we require of them, they should be held accountable.

I want to make a point about transparency and the publication of family court judgments. That is happening more and more, and it is important because it holds it up and says, “That is what a good judgment looks like”. It also exposes where there is decision making that is either faulty, poorly reasoned or simply not justified, so that that cannot happen.

The other thing happening is not just the publication of those judgments, with all the support that transcription allows, but also opening up—again, where appropriate—to journalists and the public to come and see how those hearings operate.

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister has pointed to complaints, and that is an important element, but there is something in between complaints and legal appeal. Again, from my own experience, working extensively on trying to make quality improvements in healthcare, these are incredibly complex things that we expect experts to do. Someone might not have done the wrong thing but, when we look at their practice as a whole, it does not compare favourably with that of other clinicians. That is what we recognise as the manner in which we drive improvement.

Some of the high-profile statisticians who I have worked with in that regard and who speak publicly on these matters have looked at court decisions say that they can find similar patterns of what we might call outliers—for example, regarding how likely people are to grant parental custody. Any one of those decisions might not be a decision that would be legally wrong or warrant a complaint—but we might see that they are 10 times more likely than all the other judges to award custody. Again, that is not to say that they are wrong to do so; but, just as clinicians are forced to do, we should at the very least be forcing them to reflect on that internally within the judiciary, and say, “Why is it that you are awarding custody to both parents in so many more circumstances than all your peers?”. It is not about complaints or legally wrong actions, but someone’s practice as a whole.

As the Minister has said, there is a very important separation: it should not be the Minister responsible saying to that person, “I don’t like your rate of referral”, but there should be something else within the judiciary—something that is not complaints and is not legal challenge, but that just says, “You all have to be a bit more accountable for the decisions you take”. To give another example in sentencing, if we could consistently see that a judge’s sentencing was consistently very far away from their peers’, that is not something that we should just accept as a society. This is not a Government issue, but a society issue.

--- Later in debate ---

The amendments also make a range of consequential amendments to other legislation arising from these reforms. These are generally about deployments or the selection of adjudicators for a range of statutory purposes, such as the provision allowing the Lady Chief Justice to approve deployments to the mental health review tribunal for Wales from the first-tier tribunal or the upper tribunal, where judges operate wholly or mainly within England and Wales. There are further amendments that tidy up the statute book generally—for example, to repeal provisions that insert provision, or to amend tribunal-related statutes when the relevant inserted or amended provision is repealed by the Bill. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I had considered thinking of a question for every single amendment, but I elected against that. I speak in support of clause 18 and schedule 3. While the provisions may not generate the same level of public debate and scrutiny as the Bill’s earlier clauses regarding the restriction of jury trials, they carry significant institutional and constitutional weight within our judicial hierarchy.

The clause and schedule will bring the leadership of tribunals in England and Wales more firmly within the unified judicial structure, placing them under the overarching leadership of the Lady Chief Justice. In practical terms, this involves a title change for the Lady Chief Justice, who will become the president of the courts and tribunals of England and Wales. They also involve the transfer of specific leadership responsibilities that are currently vested in the Senior President of Tribunals.

The Government’s primary justification for the reform is administrative coherence and systemic flexibility. By reconfiguring the office of the Senior President of Tribunals, as the head of tribunals justice, the Bill attempts to create a more integrated and seamless judicial pyramid. In theory, such integration should allow for better co-ordination across different jurisdictions, ensuring that the tribunal judiciary is viewed not as a secondary or isolated branch of the law, but as an equal partner in the modern administration of justice.

The Opposition offer support for this move towards unity, acknowledging that a more cohesive leadership structure can streamline high-level decision making and improve the deployment of resources. However, that support must be tempered with a request for scrutiny. Unification should not be used as a tool for uniformity. Tribunals are substantially and culturally distinct from the traditional courts; they were designed specifically to be more accessible, specialist and often less formal in their proceedings. Their value to the public lies not only in their final adjudication of a dispute. Whether it is social security, immigration or employment, I am sure that we as MPs have all been contacted by constituents who have gone through, or expect to go through, a tribunal process.

Leadership arrangements are never merely technical; they shape the culture, training priorities and institutional identity of the body they lead. The Government have stated that practical leadership will continue to be exercised through a system of delegation back to the reconfigured office of the Senior President of Tribunals. While we recognise that this appears workable on paper, we must be satisfied that it will not allow creeping deprioritisation, a lack of focus, or a watering down of tribunals’ particular culture when they become part of this unified leadership. Will the Minister therefore assure us that thought has been given to ensuring an absence of uniformity, because we have specifically designed the courts not to be uniform, but different in their own way?

[Sarah Sackman]

That reflects the clause as drafted and the intention behind it, from speaking to our judicial leadership. In my experience, I have certainly found our judicial and tribunal leadership to be progressive, reforming and more open to cultural change, scrutiny and improvement than perhaps might previously have been the case. I welcome that, because it is as it should be. The hon. Member is right, of course: tribunals are different. They are meant to be informal and feel different from going to the High Court, which is all terribly alienating to the ordinary person who is untrained. A tribunal is supposed to involve a relatively cost-neutral and more relaxed process so that the individual can participate in it. Our proposals do not cut against that, but bring the judiciary across England and Wales into the notion of unity, with a lot of the benefits of being under a single leadership—sharing best practice and deploying judges across different jurisdictions—being enhanced, so that everyone can benefit without bleeding out the differences that rightly exist in our different courts and tribunals.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Leadership of tribunals

Amendments made: 72, in schedule 3, page 68, line 4, after “may” insert

“, subject to the following provisions of this section,”.

This amendment is intended to clarify that the Lord Chief Justice’s general power under section 7A(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (inserted by the Bill) to delegate functions relating to tribunals is qualified by subsequent subsections of that section.

Amendment 73, in schedule 3, page 68, leave out line 5.

This amendment would remove redundancy in the drafting of new section 7A(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (inserted by the Bill).

Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 68, line 9, at end insert—

“(1A) A function of the Lord Chief Justice may not be delegated under subsection (1) to a person who—

(a) is a judge, or other member, of the Upper Tribunal or First-tier Tribunal only by virtue of the person being a relevant Scottish office-holder or a relevant Northern Ireland office-holder, and

(b) is not a Chamber President, or a Deputy Chamber President, of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal or of a chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.”

This amendment, together with amendment 75, would prevent the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales delegating functions relating to tribunals to a person who is a judge of the Upper Tribunal or First-Tier Tribunal only because the person holds a particular judicial office in Scotland or Northern Ireland.

Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 69, line 6, at end insert—

“(8A) For the purposes of subsection (1A)—

(a) a person is a ‘relevant Scottish office-holder’ if the person is—

(i) a judge of the Court of Session,

(ii) a sheriff in Scotland,

(iii) the President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland),

(iv) the Vice President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland), or

(v) a member of a panel of members of employment tribunals (whether or not a panel of Employment Judges) established for Scotland;

(b) a person is a ‘relevant Northern Ireland office-holder’ if the person is—

(i) a Lord Justice of Appeal in Northern Ireland,

(ii) a puisne judge of the High Court in Northern Ireland,

(iii) a county court judge in Northern Ireland,

(iv) a district judge in Northern Ireland,

(v) the Chief Social Security Commissioner, or any other Social Security Commissioner, appointed under section 50(1) of the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act 1992, or

(vi) a Social Security Commissioner appointed under section 50(2) of that Act (deputy Commissioners).”

See the explanatory statement to amendment 74.

Amendment 76, in schedule 3, page 69, line 21, after “may” insert

“, subject to the following provisions of this section,”.

This amendment would make a change to the drafting of new section 7B of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (further delegation of functions of the Lord Chief Justice) corresponding to the change made by amendment 72 to the drafting of new section 7A of that Act.

Amendment 77, in schedule 3, page 69, line 25, at end insert—

“(1A) A function of the Lord Chief Justice may not be further delegated under subsection (1) to a person who—

(a) is a judge, or other member, of the Upper Tribunal or First-tier Tribunal only by virtue of the person being a relevant Scottish office-holder or a relevant Northern Ireland office-holder, and

(b) is not a Chamber President, or a Deputy Chamber President, of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal or of a chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.”

This amendment would impose a limitation on the power to further delegate a function of the Lord Chief Justice under new section 7B of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 corresponding to the limitation imposed in relation to new section 7A of that Act by amendment 74.

Amendment 78, in schedule 3, page 69, line 28, leave out from “to” to end of line and insert

“a person appointed as—

(a) Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice, or

(b) Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal.”

This amendment would enable functions of the Lord Chief Justice under paragraph 1(1) or 2(1) of Schedule 2 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 that are delegated to a senior judge to be further delegated to the Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice.

Amendment 79, in schedule 3, page 70, line 2, at end insert—

“‘relevant Scottish office-holder’ and ‘relevant Northern Ireland office-holder’ have the same meaning as in subsection (1A) of section 7A (see subsection (8A) of that section);”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 77.

Amendment 80, in schedule 3, page 70, line 7, leave out “(1)(b),” and insert

“(1)—

(a) in the words before paragraph (a), after ‘may’ insert ‘, subject to the following provisions of this section,’;

(b) in paragraph (b),”.

This amendment would make a change to the drafting of section 8 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Senior President of Tribunals: power to delegate) corresponding to the change made by amendment 72 to the drafting of new section 7A of that Act.

Amendment 81, in schedule 3, page 70, line 8, at end insert—

“(2A) In subsection (1A)—

(a) for ‘paragraph 1(1) or 2(1) of Schedule 2’ substitute ‘any of the provisions listed in subsection (1B)’;

(b) for ‘a Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal’ substitute ‘a person appointed as—

(a) Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice, or

(b) Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal’.

(2B) After subsection (1A) insert—

‘(1B) The provisions are—

section 7(7);

section 7(8B) and (9);

paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 2;

paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2;

paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 3;

paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 3;

paragraph 2 of Schedule 4;

paragraph 5(1) and (3) of Schedule 4;

paragraph 5(5) to (8) of Schedule 4;

paragraph 5A(3A) of Schedule 4.’”

This amendment would insert provision amending section 8 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to enable the Senior President of Tribunals to delegate to the Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice or an Upper Tribunal Chamber President certain functions to which subsection (1) of that section does not currently apply.

Amendment 82, in schedule 3, page 70, line 9, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—

“(3) For subsection (2) substitute—

‘(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to functions of the Senior President of Tribunals under any of the following—

section 29B;

section 29D;

section 46;

paragraph 3 of Schedule 5;

paragraph 2 of Schedule A1 to the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.’”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 81.

Amendment 83, in schedule 3, page 70, line 21, at end insert—

“18A After section 8 insert—

‘8A Delegation: supplementary

(1) Where a function is exercisable, in a particular case, by the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly—

(a) so far as the function is exercisable by the Lord Chief Justice, it is to be treated for the purposes of section 7A as a relevant tribunal function and may be delegated under that section, and further delegated under section 7B, accordingly (including to the Senior President of Tribunals);

(b) so far as the function is exercisable by the Senior President of Tribunals—

(i) it is to be treated for the purposes of section 8 as a function the Senior President of Tribunals has in that capacity and may be delegated under section 8 accordingly, but

(ii) it may not be delegated under that section to the Lord Chief Justice.

(2) Where a person (“the delegator”) has a power to delegate a function under section 7A, 7B or 8—

(a) any requirement that the delegator may exercise the function only with the concurrence of another person (“P”) does not prevent the delegator from delegating the function to P, and

(b) if the delegator delegates the function to P, any such requirement is to be disregarded so far as the function is exercised by P.

(3) In this section “the Lord Chief Justice” means the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’”

This amendment would insert provision intended to clarify the effect of delegation powers under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, inserted or amended by the Bill, in cases where the function being delegated is exercisable jointly with, or with the concurrence of, the person to whom it is delegated.

Amendment 84, in schedule 3, page 75, line 6, leave out “senior judge” and insert

“person who holds high judicial office”.

This amendment would enable functions of the Senior President of Tribunals to be exercised during any vacancy or incapacity by a holder of high judicial office in Scotland or Northern Ireland (as well as in England and Wales).

Amendment 85, in schedule 3, page 75, leave out lines 12 and 13 and insert—

“‘high judicial office’ has the same meaning as in Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (see section 60(2)(a)of that Act);”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 84.

Amendment 86, in schedule 3, page 88, line 9, at end insert—

“32A In Schedule 8 (tribunals and inquiries: consequential and other amendments), in paragraph 41, omit sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) (which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act).”

This amendment would repeal provisions of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by the Bill.

Amendment 87, in schedule 3, page 92, line 38, at end insert—

“Agriculture Act 1947

43A In Schedule 9 to the Agriculture Act 1947 (constitution etc. of tribunals etc.), in paragraph 15A (which provides for a member of the First-tier Tribunal to act as a member of the Agricultural Land Tribunal)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

‘(1ZA) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means—

(a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals;

(b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’

Lands Tribunal Act 1949

43B In section 1 of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 (which makes provision including provision about selecting a surveyor for the purposes of section 58 or 106 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845)—

(a) in subsection (6), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;

(b) after subsection (6) insert—

‘(6ZA) In subsection (6) “the appropriate office-holder” means—

(a) in relation to the determination of compensation to be paid in respect of land in England or Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales;

(b) in any other case, the Senior President of Tribunals.

(6ZB) Section 7A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Lord Chief Justice: power to delegate) applies to any function of the Lord Chief Justice under subsection (6) as it applies to a relevant tribunal function within the meaning of that section.

For provision enabling the delegation of any function of the Senior President of Tribunals, see section 8 of that Act.’

Rent Act 1977

43C In Schedule 10 to the Rent Act 1977 (rent assessment committees), in paragraph 5A (which provides for a member of the First-tier Tribunal to act as a member of a committee in Wales)—

(a) the existing text becomes sub-paragraph (1);

(b) in that sub-paragraph, for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;

(c) after that sub-paragraph insert—

‘(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means—

(a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals;

(b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’”

This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Agriculture Act 1947, the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 and the Rent Act 1977 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals.

Amendment 88, in schedule 3, page 93, line 12, leave out paragraph 46 and insert—

“46 In section 9 (assistance for transaction of judicial business)—

(a) in subsection (1), in the Table (judges deployable to certain courts), in column 1 of entry 4A (the Senior President of Tribunals), after ‘Senior President of Tribunals’ insert ‘, if not an ex-officio judge of the Court of Appeal’;

(b) omit subsection (1ZA).”

This amendment would enable a holder of the office of Senior President of Tribunals who is an ex-officio judge of the Court of Appeal to act on request as a judge of the Crown Court (like all other judges of the Court of Appeal).

Amendment 89, in schedule 3, page 93, line 29, at end insert—

“Mental Health Act 1983

48A In Schedule 2 to the Mental Health Act 1983 (Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales), in paragraph 5 (which provides for certain members of the First-tier Tribunal to act as members of the tribunal)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

‘(1ZA) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means—

(a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals;

(b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’

Landlord and Tenant Act 1987

48B In section 33 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (acquisition order where landlord cannot be found)—

(a) in subsection (2)(a), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales’;

(b) after subsection (3) insert—

‘(4) Section 7A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Lord Chief Justice: power to delegate) applies to the function of the Lord Chief Justice under subsection (2)(a) as it applies to a relevant tribunal function within the meaning of that section.’

Local Government Finance Act 1988

48C In Part 1 of Schedule 11 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 (the Valuation Tribunal for England), in paragraph A18A (power for member of First-tier Tribunal to act as member of the Tribunal)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (2)(a), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’;

(b) in sub-paragraph (9), after paragraph (a) insert—

‘(aa) “the appropriate office-holder” means—

(i) in relation to an FTT member who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals, and

(ii) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and’.

Social Security Act 1998

48D (1) Section 15A of the Social Security Act 1998 (functions of Senior President of Tribunals) is amended as follows.

(2) For the heading substitute ‘Confidentiality in the First-tier Tribunal’.

(3) In subsection (1), for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The appropriate office-holder’.

(4) After subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) In subsection (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means—

(a) in relation to the First-tier Tribunal in England and Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales;

(b) in relation to the First-tier Tribunal in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals.’”

This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, the Local Government Finance Act 1988 and the Social Security Act 1998 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals.

Amendment 90, in schedule 3, page 94, line 1, at end insert—

“49A The Crime and Courts Act 2013 is amended as follows.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 92.

Amendment 91, in schedule 3, page 94, line 2, leave out “the Crime and Courts Act 2013, in”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 90.

Amendment 92, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert—

“50A In Schedule 13 (judicial appointments), omit the following provisions (which insert into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act)—

(a) paragraph 30(3);

(b) paragraph 43;

(c) paragraph 44(2);

(d) paragraph 45(2) and (4);

(e) paragraph 46(2) and (6);

(f) paragraph 47(4) to (6), (8), (9), (11) and (12).

50B In Schedule 14 (deployment of the judiciary), in paragraph 12, omit sub-paragraph (2) (which inserts into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act).”

This amendment would repeal provisions of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 which insert into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by the Bill.

Amendment 93, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert—

“Wales Act 2017

50A (1) Section 63 of the Wales Act 2017 (cross-deployment of tribunal members and judges) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), for the words from ‘if’ to the end substitute ‘—

(a) in England and Wales, if the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales asks the member to do so and the President of Welsh Tribunals agrees to the request being made;

(b) in Scotland or Northern Ireland, if the Senior President of Tribunals asks the member to do so and the President of Welsh Tribunals agrees to the request being made.’

(3) In subsection (2), in the words after paragraph (b), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’.

(4) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) In subsection (2), “the appropriate office-holder” means—

(a) where the tribunal member exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals;

(b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’”

This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Wales Act 2017 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals.

Amendment 94, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert—

“Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018

50A In the Schedule to the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 (authorised court and tribunal staff: legal advice and judicial functions), omit paragraph 40 (which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act).”

This amendment would repeal provision of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by the Bill.

Amendment 95, in schedule 3, page 95, line 4, at end insert—

“Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022

54 The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 is amended as follows.

55 (1) Section 32 (judicial agreement to certain regulations) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)(a)—

(a) omit the ‘or’ at the end of sub-paragraph (i);

(b) at the end of sub-paragraph (ii) insert

‘, or

(iii) relevant tribunal proceedings in England and Wales;’.

(3) In subsection (1)(b)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (i), after ‘First-tier Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland or Northern Ireland’;

(b) in sub-paragraph (ii), after ‘Upper Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland or Northern Ireland’;

(c) in sub-paragraph (iii), after ‘employment tribunals’ insert ‘in Scotland’;

(d) in sub-paragraph (iv), after ‘Employment Appeal Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland’.

(4) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(3) In this section, “relevant tribunal proceedings” means proceedings in—

(a) the First-tier Tribunal,

(b) the Upper Tribunal,

(c) employment tribunals, or

(d) the Employment Appeal Tribunal.’

56 (1) Schedule 3 (practice directions for online proceedings) is amended as follows.

(2) In Part 2 (proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal), in paragraph 7 (giving practice directions)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly,’;

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

‘(1A) The Lord Chief Justice may give practice directions under paragraph 5 in relation to proceedings in a Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal whose business involves only the application of the law of England and Wales.

(1B) The Senior President of Tribunals may give practice directions under paragraph 5 in relation to proceedings in a Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal whose business involves only the application of the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland.’;

(c) in sub-paragraph (2), for ‘The Senior President may not give practice directions’ substitute ‘Practice directions may not be given under sub-paragraph (1), (1A) or (1B)’;

(d) in sub-paragraph (4)—

(i) omit the ‘and’ at the end of paragraph (a);

(ii) after paragraph (a) insert—

‘(aa) the Lord Chief Justice, if the business of the Chamber to which the directions relate involves the application of the law of England and Wales, and’;

(iii) in paragraph (b), after ‘Tribunals’ insert ‘, if the business of the Chamber to which the directions relate involves the application of the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland’;

(e) in sub-paragraph (6)—

(i) for ‘the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals if’ substitute ‘any approval’;

(ii) for ‘sub-paragraph (4)(b)’ insert ‘sub-paragraph (4)(aa) or (b)’.

(3) In Part 3 (proceedings in employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal), in paragraph 11 (giving practice directions)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1)—

(i) for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly,’;

(ii) for ‘any proceedings’ substitute ‘proceedings in the Employment Appeal Tribunal’;

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

‘(1A) The Lord Chief Justice may give practice directions under paragraph 9 in relation to proceedings in employment tribunals in England and Wales.

(1B) The Senior President of Tribunals may give practice directions under paragraph 9 in relation to proceedings in employment tribunals in Scotland.’;

(c) in sub-paragraph (2), for ‘The Senior President may not give practice directions’ substitute ‘Practice directions may not be given under sub-paragraph (1), (1A) or (1B)’;

(d) in sub-paragraph (5), for the words from ‘of—’ to’ the end substitute ‘of the Lord Chancellor’;

(e) after sub-paragraph (5) insert—

‘(5A) The President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal may not give practice directions without the approval of—

(a) the Lord Chief Justice, and

(b) the Senior President of Tribunals.

(5B) The President of Employment Tribunals (England and Wales) may not give practice directions without the approval of the Lord Chief Justice.

(5C) The President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland) may not give practice directions without the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals.’;

(f) in sub-paragraph (6), for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(a)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5)’;

(g) in sub-paragraph (7)—

(i) for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(a)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5)’;

(ii) for ‘the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals if’ substitute ‘any approval’;

(iii) for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(b)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5A), (5B) or (5C)’.”

This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals.

Amendment 96, in schedule 3, page 95, line 4, at end insert—

“57 In Schedule 5 (employment tribunal procedure rules: further provision)—

(a) in paragraph 3, omit sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) (which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act);

(b) omit paragraph 28 (which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act).”—(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment would repeal provisions of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 and the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by the Bill.

Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 19

Lay justices’ allowances

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I could not agree more. That is precisely why we are doing this, and it is why I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in enthusiastic support of the clause. If we were starting from scratch, would we deal with this issue in primary legislation? I expect not. I do not know the history of why the approach of the time was followed, but it seems that the matter should be addressed flexibly via regulations. Members will have heard us argue vociferously against the use of both positive and negative regulations in different contexts, but it seems appropriate in these circumstances. The proposal reflects the changing nature of how people work, interact and fulfil their role as magistrates. We want to support and accommodate that in a way that is not over-rigid.

Of course, there will be opportunities for scrutiny of the legislation to come. Even though we have talked about the significant limitations of the negative procedure, scrutiny is still an option in theory if something were proposed that that we really were not happy about. Considering the stakes of this issue, that is a proportionate approach.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.

I wanted to speak on this clause because, as the Minister said, while it is technical and feels dry, it is incredibly important. I appeared in front of many magistrates over my 21 years as a Crown prosecutor. They do an incredibly important job and provide a huge public service. During the course of this legislative process, it has been concerning to hear suggestions that magistrates are, in some respects, an inferior bench or forum for our criminal justice system. That is far from my experience over 21 years.

I put on record my thanks to all the magistrates who serve day in, day out, across this country. The clause recognises them and shows that we can be dynamic in rewarding them. The Minister mentioned the medal, which I welcome. I can think of many magistrates who deserve a medal for their work. It is important that we pass the clause today.

[Sarah Sackman]

I think that, for once, consensus reigns.

[Dr Mullan]

It has a few times.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of clause 20, which is a technical and geographic provision necessitated by the significant infrastructure developments currently under way in the City of London. As new law courts are developed, specifically at the Salisbury Square site—we mentioned the specialist fraud court earlier in the Committee, and I do not know if that is included in the site—the law must be updated to clarify how historical designations, sitting rights and traditional roles are to be maintained in a changing physical landscape. The clause is a matter of ensuring that our legal terminology catches up with the physical reality of the court estate.

The primary objective of the clause is clarity and the avoidance of ambiguity. It ensures that the prestigious and globally recognised designation of the Central Criminal Court remains attached exclusively to the historic Old Bailey site. “Old Bailey” is a phrase that many people will be familiar with, and it acts as a tourist draw for our visitor economy. It is important to ensure that the title is not diluted or confused as additional Crown court capacity is brought online at other locations within the City boundaries.

Simultaneously, the clause ensures that the historical sitting rights of the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London are maintained and extended to any Crown court site within the City. That is a respectful preservation of the unique judicial heritage of the City of London Corporation, ensuring that ceremonial traditions and historical roles are not inadvertently extinguished by modern building projects.

The Opposition support clause 20 as a necessary administrative measure. It is a fundamental principle of good lawmaking that technical clauses should be explained clearly to the Committee so that their practical effect is well understood. I thank the Minister for doing that today.

[Sarah Sackman]

There is only one Old Bailey, and as a result of clause 20, there will only ever be one Old Bailey. I invite all members of the Committee to join together on a group tour of the new facility in Salisbury Square when it opens, hopefully in a year’s time.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Stephen Morgan.)

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir John. New clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), would address cases in which the prosecutions need to start a second or third time. It would reclassify offences and move the threshold of offences that are in the Crown court to summary offences. It would increase the maximum possible sentence reduction on a guilty plea to two fifths, remove the restriction that means the highest reduction is available only for early-stage guilty pleas, allow the defendant to receive that reduction even if they plead guilty later in the process, and extend eligibility so that the reduction can also apply before a retrial.

The new clause would build on the huge successes of the Liverpool model and Operation Expedite—which was praised by Sir Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts—in bringing down court backlogs. Those successes were largely based on a focus on pre-trial negotiation or plea bargains to avoid cases going to a trial and taking up court time.

The new clause is in tune with the Government’s recent announcement following the review carried out by the former Lord Chancellor, David Gauke, which looked at trying to avoid giving people a sentence of less than one year because of the disruptive nature of those sentences. The Government could accept the new clause as part of the process of trying to prevent a backlog. It would also allow people to plead guilty, which would be better for victims, complainants, witnesses and the court system.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I wish to make some brief remarks. I am keen to see suggestions of alternative approaches, but we have to be careful when it comes to discounts for guilty pleas, because there is a balance to be struck from the perspective of victims and complainants. We do not want to be in a situation where they feel that justice is undermined, particularly given the many other things the Government are doing to reduce the punitive element of the justice system.

I am sure the Committee will know that thousands of serious violent sexual offenders will be getting reductions in their prison time. For example, two thirds of those sent to prison every year for rape will have their prison time reduced, and more than 90% of those sentenced for child grooming offences and similar offences will have their prison time reduced to one third. We are already seeing appalling erosions of the punitive element of the justice system by the Labour Government; I would be wary about doing anything that adds to that.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden for speaking to the new clause. As she knows, an early guilty plea avoids the need for a trial, shortens the gap between charge and sentence and, crucially, can save victims and witnesses from the concern of having to give evidence.

Sir Brian Leveson’s independent review of the criminal courts found that

“guilty pleas are being entered later and later”

in the process. It found that

“in 2016, approximately 25% of defendants who pleaded guilty to all counts prior to trial did so at or after their third pre-trial hearing”,

compared with 35% in 2024. That reflects the decline in the efficiency and the increase in delays in the criminal courts. Sir Brian made it clear that that was contributing to the backlog and, in turn, creating a “feedback loop” of perverse incentives for defendants. There are, then, clearly benefits to ensuring that those who intend to plead guilty do so at the earliest possible opportunity.

For those reasons, it has long been the practice of the criminal courts to give a reduction in sentence when an offender pleads guilty earlier in the process. The level of sentence reduction that the court can give on a guilty plea is currently set out in sentencing guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council. In his review, Sir Brian made a number of recommendations relating to early guilty pleas, including a recommendation to increase the maximum reduction in sentence for a guilty plea from 33% to 40%, which new clause 1 seeks to implement.

However, we must maintain the right balance between the benefits to the system obtained by the making of early guilty pleas and ensuring that offenders are appropriately punished for their crimes. Sir Brian also notes that increasing the maximum sentencing discount for early guilty pleas could increase the

“risk of pressure being brought to bear on defendants to plead guilty, who might not otherwise have done so.”

It is therefore important that we consider whether there are alternative ways to encourage early guilty pleas, as opposed to increasing the level of maximum sentence discount.

We are not convinced that a further discount will work to incentivise the behaviours that we desire in the system, not least because other matters play their part in incentivising an early guilty plea, or the opposite. They include the nature of the offence, whether a defendant is remanded or released on bail, and the level of early engagement by the prosecution and defence in advancing case progression. We consider all those things as alternative factors that drive defendant behaviour. Most importantly, the punishment must be appropriate to the offence in question, and we think the new clause would cut against that.

We are currently carefully reviewing Sir Brian’s remaining recommendations, alongside part 2 of his review, and we will set out our full detailed response to that review in due course. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I rise to speak in support of new clause 2, which was tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols). On Second Reading, my hon. Friend made one of the most powerful contributions the House has heard in recent memory. She spoke from her own experience as a victim of rape and made a point that deserves to be heard again in this Committee. She said that the experiences of victims are being “weaponised” and used as a rhetorical cover for reforms that do not deliver anything meaningful for those victims.

My hon. Friend also said something that goes to the heart of this debate: we promised specialist rape courts in our manifesto. The Bill does not deliver them. That observation raises a wider question for the Committee, as we consider new clause 2, about the manifesto commitment and what the Bill does instead. The Labour manifesto made a clear commitment to establish specialist courts for rape and sexual offences and for domestic abuse. That commitment existed because we recognised that the system was failing victims, not because of juries but because of how cases were being managed—the delays, lack of court capacity, the way evidence is handled and the limited support available to those giving evidence.

New clause 2 is the legislative delivery of that manifesto commitment. It would not require us to restrict jury trials or accept a reform the benefits of which may, according to the Institute for Government, amount to as little as a 1% to 2% reduction in delays—a reduction the Bar Council considers optimistic. Instead, it would require us to build something that is already proven to work.

What works and what does not work? On Second Reading, my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North pointed to the work already under way at Liverpool and Preston Crown courts. That work is reducing waiting times for complainants and defendants—we are talking about months, not years—without removing anyone’s right to be tried by a jury. That is the model, that is what we should be scaling, and that is what the new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to do.

Instead, the Government have brought forward reforms that will not take effect until 2028 or 2029. A victim who reports a rape today will wait through years under the existing system before a single one of the Bill’s provisions affects their case. We are being asked to accept a permanent reduction in defendants’ rights in exchange for a speculative and delayed improvement in victims’ experience. That is not a serious offer.

Let us be clear what the Bill does not do. It will not improve how evidence is handled, how cases are managed or how victims are supported through the process. It will not guarantee timely disclosure, it will not ensure fixed trial dates, it will not provide independent sexual violence advisers where they are needed, it will not reform the conduct of cross-examination, and it will not address wider support or compensation issues. All of those things, which the violence against women and girls sector and Rape Crisis England and Wales have consistently called for, remain untouched.

As my hon. Friend said on Second Reading, we should not claim that the Bill delivers justice for victims unless it actually does. The Bill will not do that. New clause 2 would take a different approach. It would preserve jury involvement in every case while introducing a specialist court designed to deal properly with sexual offences and domestic abuse. Each case would be heard by a jury and a specialist judge with training in coercive control, trauma responses, honour-based abuse and best practice in cases involving violence against women and girls. That combination matters. A specialist judge improves the management of proceedings. A jury brings the collective judgment and diversity of the public.

As the Lammy review found, juries are far more diverse than the judiciary, and there is no evidence that jury verdicts are affected by the ethnicity of the defendant. By contrast, the removal of juries risks undermining confidence, particularly among victims from minority backgrounds or people from poorer working-class backgrounds.

To address the real causes of delay, we ask that strict time limits for case preparation are set. We ask for fixed and reliable trial dates; the proper management of disclosure and third-party material; the prioritised listing of cases, including those of defendants who are on bail; specialist facilities for victims; and the adequate resourcing of judicial, administrative and legal support, including independent sexual violence advisers. These practical reforms would make a material difference to how cases are handled and to the experience of the victim, and they can be done quite quickly.

The Government have relied heavily on the experience of victims to justify the reforms, so they should support new clause 2, which would deliver on our manifesto commitment. It is based on a model that already works well. It would improve things for victims without removing fundamental safeguards and does not ask victims to wait until the end of the decade to see any benefit.

The Government have identified a real problem but, with respect, have chosen the wrong solution. If the Bill was truly about delivering justice for victims of rape and sexual violence, we would not be debating the restriction of jury trial; we would be implementing the specialist courts we promised. The Bill does not do that. I ask the Government to consider the new clause; otherwise, it will be a missed opportunity. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. We are all here because we recognise that the current state of our criminal courts is untenable. Complainants and defendants alike are facing unacceptable delays, and victims and innocent defendants are suffering as a result. The Government’s response, as set out in the Bill, is a radical restructuring of our trial processes, most notably in the removal of the right to a jury in a vast number of cases—around half, in fact. We believe there is a strong obligation on the Government to institute a more targeted, and potentially more effective, way to address the specific delays that they most frequently cite, through the establishment of specialist courts for rape and serious sexual offences.

The Minister herself raised this issue in the Chamber on 7 January. When talking about jury trial reforms, she said:

“Does it make sense that the queue of the victim of rape or of a homicide is shared with someone who has stolen a bottle of whisky”?—[Official Report, 7 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 278.]

In December, the Deputy Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor said:

“if someone is charged with an offence such as theft of a bicycle, theft from a vehicle or employee theft, they can opt for a trial that, by necessity, goes into the system and will delay a rape trial”.—[Official Report, 2 December 2025; Vol. 776, c. 807.]

That point has been made by a number of Labour MPs, including the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). The Opposition have been clear that that is an oversimplification of how the listing process works, and that some of those examples are extremely unlikely to be in the queue in the Crown court, except for in specific circumstances. Nevertheless, the Government have been advancing that case.

A commitment to introduce specialist courts was actually in the Government’s manifesto. By fulfilling the promises made to the electorate, the Government can deliver swifter justice for a group of victims they have centred in the debate, without dismantling the constitutional right to elect for jury trial. The Government’s proposals to halve the number of jury trials was not in the Labour party manifesto, but on page 67 there was a commitment to

“fast-track rape cases, with specialist courts at every Crown Court location in England and Wales.”

It could therefore be argued that—as much as we can debate what in an entire manifesto the public vote for—the public voted for a system that would prioritise these types of cases through specialisation and resourcing, and did not vote for a system that would instead prioritise administrative throughput by removing the right to elect to be judged by one’s peers.

Sometimes, Governments do things that were not in their manifesto one way or another, or were not touched on in any way, but it would be difficult for people to argue that the public had a specific idea that they were not going to get certain things. However, if a Government put in their manifesto a particular element of direct relevance, as they did in relation to specialist courts, the public would have every right to be aggrieved if something entirely different, and significantly so, appeared as Government policy instead of what was in the manifesto.

Opposition new clause 25 asks the Government to return to their original vision. It is similar to the other new clauses tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, and by the hon. Member for Warrington North. They are crafted in different ways—for example, new clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Warrington North, is more prescriptive about how the courts would operate—but the intention and outcome are essentially the same. Specialist courts equipped with trauma-informed training and access to independent sexual violence advisers would recognise the unique complexity of these cases in a way that a simple bench division cannot.

As I have said, the Government frequently refer to the experience of rape victims waiting years for justice as a significant justification for restricting jury trials. They argue that moving towards judge-led trials in 50% of cases will streamline the process and reduce the backlog, but the evidence for the broader claims of efficiency is highly contested.

Independent analysis by the Institute for Government suggests that judge-only trials in the Crown court might save as little as 1.5% to 2.5%—[Interruption.] The Minister is right to say, and I do not mind accepting, that the saving is higher for the broader package—that has never been a point of dispute—but we are less concerned about the broader package, and there are things in it that we agree with. We are concerned about the much smaller saving that the IFG has pointed out. The Criminal Bar Association has pointed out that the Government’s modelling assumes that the trials will be completed twice as fast as is realistic. We must ask whether the trade-off is proportionate, especially when there is another option.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I will make two points in response. First, the full extent of the crisis in our criminal justice system was not apparent. It was not apparent in prisons, when we opened the car bonnet on day one and essentially found prisons at breaking point. That obviously interacts with courts, because if we are sentencing people and there is simply nowhere to put violent criminals, we have a pretty serious problem on our hands. The full extent of the crisis in our courts was not apparent either, and we need to have a solution that meets the moment. That is what this Bill is.

Secondly, I strongly refute the suggestion that we have been sitting on our hands; rather, we have been putting in place the building blocks and ingredients of a specialist court. We are rolling out trauma-informed training not just for our specialist judges but for every member of the court staff—that is in train. We are changing the way that evidence is dealt with, as we debated on clauses 8 to 11. We are investing £6 million in the introduction of independent legal advisers for victims of rape as they go through that process. We are committing more than £500 million to victim support, some of which will cover victims of rape and sexual offences. I would argue that that is far from change denied. I would call that change in train, which will deliver a transformation for victims of rape in this country.

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister is in danger—there is a bit of a pattern here—of wanting to have things both ways. She is suggesting that waiting for Brian Leveson’s review, and the parliamentary time and effort going into the legislation, has had no impact or delay on the measures regarding specialist rape courts, which were in the Government’s manifesto and they could have just got on with from day one. That really stretches credibility.

The Government must accept the consequences of their decisions. If they have decided that the erosion of jury trials is the way forward, they should just say that and accept that there has been a negative consequence on their manifesto commitment to introduce rape courts. The Minister cannot say, “We’re pretty much doing what we would have done anyway, and this is all fantastic from both sides of the paper.” It is really not.

[Sarah Sackman]

Once again, I strongly reject that suggestion. The two things are not mutually exclusive: wanting to bring in measures that speed up justice for every victim in the criminal justice system and building the foundations for a specialist court.

Let us get back to basics. What is a specialist court? What are we talking about? I have discussed this with my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North. A specialist court prioritises a type of offence to address the timeliness issue. It guarantees special measures. Again, we have debated provisions in Committee about how we ensure the consistent guarantee of special measures in whichever Crown court in the country a rape trial occurs. Thirdly, it is a court in which not just those who are adjudicating and directing juries, but those who are supporting the participants, are trauma-informed, as that is how we now in contemporary society understand that evidence needs to be treated. That training is in train.

Those are the essential ingredients of a specialist court. Those are the building blocks. We guarantee them not just in this Bill but through the funding of training and the measures being implemented in our courts. That is really important, but it does not have a bearing on the overall backlog problem. It prioritises those cases, as we recognise them being among the most serious with some of the most acute trauma, but it does not deal with the huge backlog delays for other forms of violent crime and other types of crime.

[Sarah Sackman]

We are making those choices. The difference is that we do not need legislation to make those choices. We have made those choices, including the commitment of money to fund independent legal advisers, trauma-informed training and victim support. We have made those decisions. We have put those building blocks in place. We do not need legislation to deliver specialist courts. I had this discussion yesterday with the Victims’ Commissioner. We do not need legislation.

I wholeheartedly agree with the spirit of the new clause. How could I not? It is in our manifesto. We are taking action to deliver it. We do not need the new clause to deliver it—that is the point. I will come shortly to its unworkability, but I will not take from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion or anyone else the suggestion that we have not been making the choices to deliver on our commitment to halve violence against women and girls.

[Dr Mullan]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am going to make some progress.

As I said, and as I discussed with my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North, I assure the Committee that the principle behind this proposal is recognised by the Government. I agree with my hon. Friend on her assessment of what is needed: swifter justice and prioritisation so that victims do not wait years for their day in court; specialist staff and judges who are trained in these kinds of cases; and properly equipped courtrooms that support victims and witnesses to deliver their best evidence with dignity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

Thank you, Sir John. I just want to make a simple point. The Minister said that what the Government want to do does not require primary legislation, but in the same speech referred to primary legislation that we are considering today as part of introducing specialist rape courts. It is obvious to anybody that there is a requirement for primary legislation. We waited a year for Brian Leveson and we are two years into the Parliament. There are uncontroversial clauses that we have not opposed; the Government could have got on with those and passed them within six months, and they would be operating right now. I just do not think the Minister’s argument that nothing has been lost from progress on these issues because of the jury trial reforms stands up to scrutiny.

[The Chair]

Minister, do you want to respond? It is not necessary if you do not want to.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 15 in my name would make the publication of the Government’s response to part 2 of the independent review of the criminal courts a precondition of clauses 1 to 7 coming into force. At the moment, the Government have submitted only an interim response to Leveson 2, which was made in a written statement by the Lord Chancellor on 4 February. The measures that the Government will take forward include listing and AI-assisted listing, a case progression scheme, blitz courts, remote participation, and prisoner escort and custody contracts in bus lanes. The Liberal Democrats believe that the Government must prioritise efficiency methods before eroding jury trials. A full assessment of Leveson’s recommended measures must be taken so that the Government can be sure that they are maximising the improvements before depriving defendants of the right to trial by jury.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendments 59, 35 and 36 tabled in my name, and the amendments outlined by the hon. Member for Chichester, all of which enjoy our support.

Our amendments seek to ensure that efficiencies and improvements to the system are made, increasing the maximum of sitting days to 130,000 and, in a different way, addressing the issue of sitting hours. We are debating the fundamental restructuring of our criminal justice system, and the Government’s central argument—the Minister has admitted that it is not the sole argument; even though most of the rest of the Government talk about this as a necessity, she thinks it should be done anyway—is that the Crown court is in a state of emergency with the backlog that we all agree is causing much distress to victims and innocent defendants alike.

Amendment 59 asks the Government to take all reasonable steps to increase Crown court sitting days and address the other challenges in the system that are limiting our ability to tackle the backlog—the avoidable operational failures currently crippling our courts.

We must remember that Sir Brian Leveson acknowledged that jury trials are the gold standard of our justice system. The Minister herself accepted that there was something special about them. Juries are not just a step in a trial; they are a democratic barrier between the individual and the overreach of authority. They are an important way in which citizens participate in our justice system. The Deputy Prime Minister has been one of the biggest cheerleaders of the value and importance of jury trials, describing them as a “success story” and comparing them less favourably with the magistrates courts—although I am sure he respects and understands the benefit of magistrates courts—because of the ability of 12 citizens to look at a case uniquely and without prejudice.

Productivity in the Crown court has fallen significantly, and analysis shows that courts are hearing approximately 20% fewer hours per sitting day than they were less than a decade ago. In evidence to us, the Bar Council shared analysis showing that the average for which each Crown court judge sits in court each day has fallen to 3.2 hours. That is due to inefficiencies such as technological breakdown, prisoner transport delays and difficulties with interpreter services. Just getting back to the 2016-17 level of 3.8 hours would be an 18% improvement, far outstripping the much debated, but we think much fairer, figure of a 1% to 2% improvement in relation to the reforms to jury trials. If the Government were serious about efficiency, they would start by addressing the low-hanging fruit in respect of the logistical problems.

Members will remember the evidence from the HMCTS civil servant tasked with running the system, asking for it to operate efficiently. He talked about listing, prison transport and sitting days as his priorities, and none of the things that he felt would make a significant impact required any changes to jury trials.

Prisoner escort and custody services, as they are known, have been a strong theme of concern from a wide variety of witnesses. The figures that I have show that there were 713 ineffective trials in 2023 solely because the prison escort service failed to deliver a defendant to court on time. Reports from barristers indicate that, in a quarter of cases, their clients were brought to court more than five hours late, meaning that the trial day could not start on time or was lost entirely. That grit in the system causes thousands of hours of delays across our courts, yet the Government’s priority is to remove the jury trial rather than fix the transport contract.

Another major drain on efficiency is the timing of guilty pleas. Sir Brian Leveson noted that defendants used to plead guilty at their first or second appearance, but we now see many examples of guilty pleas occurring at the fifth or sixth occasion. The Minister is right to raise that, and we accept that one element is delays in the court system that reduce the incentive for a guilty plea. We have heard evidence that defendants would say, “I just want to hold off my guilty plea until I have a last Christmas,” but that has now become, “I want another two Christmases.” So we understand the delays, but they are not the only reason and are not an insurmountable problem.

Instead of removing the right to a jury, the Government should focus on improving access to early legal advice, which we know can make a big difference. We can also learn from courts such as Liverpool Crown court that have a laser focus on an approach to listing, which encourages early engagement by defendants and legal representatives alike. That has produced results with their Crown court backlogs that are nothing like the national figure. They are not alone in showing what can be done without the need to erode our jury trial rights. The Bar Council points to other successes in the system and says that blitz courts, established by Crown courts such as Preston, Liverpool, Nottingham and others, are effective.

Preston Crown court’s listing of domestic abuse cases from the autumn of 2024 until this year has reduced the time between plea and trial preparation hearing, listing and trial by 16%. Ipswich Crown court’s backlog is down 28% since January 2024, and Derby Crown court’s fast-track courts are being run with a specific focus on cases with allegations of domestic abuse. That scheme has been successful, with those cases now being listed for trial sooner than when they might have been otherwise. We also received evidence that the circuit in Wales does not have a backlog that is anything like the rest of the country, which shows what can be done.

The Government promise that judge-only trials will be 20% faster, but that figure is based on highly uncertain assumptions and anecdotal evidence. We have made the argument in Committee that there might be savings up front, but we could lose those savings in the time taken by judges to deliberate and provide their summation, which we should also weigh up.

Amendment 59 relates to all the things that could be done to improve efficiency without necessarily having an increase in sitting days, but we cannot support the removal of constitutional rights while we have not even hit the maximum sitting days target that Sir Brian Leveson recommended. Amendment 35 would require the Government to demonstrate that they have funded at least 130,000 Crown court sitting days before they can commence their reforms. That figure is the target number that Sir Brian says the Government should seek to achieve if they want to bring down the backlog. Our amendment would require HMCTS to assess that those sitting days have, as far as possible, been fully utilised, and that ties in with amendment 59. It is no good the Government funding, in theory, a maximum number of sitting days if they are not able to utilise them for various reasons, some of which I have covered. Amendment 35 would also require the Lord Chancellor to make a statement to the House confirming that, even after those steps have been taken, the number of cases pending trial has not been reduced compared with the start of the financial year.

We are essentially putting forward a litmus test. If the Government want to say that they have no other options and that there is no other way to do this, they should at least take the steps recommended by Sir Brian in terms of efficiencies, reforming how the system operates and having the maximum number of sitting days, which they have to get to at some point anyway if they want to argue in support of Sir Brian Leveson’s report as a litmus test for what is sufficient.

If the Government are confident in their analysis, they should have no difficulty meeting that test. I know the Minister will talk about the time it will take to reach that point, but the dial can be pushed both ways. I do not think the Government are seriously suggesting that the jury trial element of the reforms will make a drastic difference to the backlog in the next one or two years. As we have discussed, the time saving of the jury trial element on its own is not that significant.

Amendment 36 has a different approach, but seeks to make the same point as new clause 4, tabled the hon. Member for Chichester, which relates to having two court sittings a day. Our amendment 36 asks the Government to approach another possible alternative reform of the operating hours of our courts—specifically, the potential for extending court sitting hours and introducing weekend sittings. If we are in a state of emergency, as the Government claim, our response should focus on maximising the use of our existing infrastructure, rather than dismantling the rights of the citizen.

At present, our Crown courts often operate typically between 10 am and 4.30 pm. It is difficult to justify a policy that removes the right to a jury trial—a move estimated to save perhaps as little as 1.5% to 2.5% of court time—when we are leaving so many hours of the working day and the entirety of the weekend completely unutilised. Working normal business hours such as 9 to 5, or even utilising Saturdays for specific types of hearings, could provide a far more substantial reduction in the backlog than the structural reforms proposed in the Bill.

We recognise that a possible move towards extended or weekend hours must be handled with extreme care. That is why we proposed amendment 36, which would require the Lord Chancellor to undertake a comprehensive consultation on the potential introduction of extended sitting hours before the reforms can commence. Operational changes of this magnitude cannot be mandated from a desk in Whitehall without understanding the impact on the human beings who keep the system running.

The consultation would address the practical realities that will determine whether such a system is viable and sustainable, including the availability and wellbeing of HMCTS staff, who are already under significant pressure; the level of fees and remuneration required for legal professionals and court staff to work non-standard hours; and the impact on legal aid practitioners, many of whom, as we have discussed, find the challenges of working in criminal legal aid difficult. We must ensure that those who would be asked to work in this way—judges, barristers, solicitors and court staff—believe that any such plans are appropriate and supported by proper resourcing. To impose extended hours without their consent and without addressing the current crisis in retention and recruitment would potentially be counterproductive, rather than a benefit.

Where could we look for an example of how this can be done in a way that is welcomed by staff who want to increase their income in a fair way? I was glad that the Minister raised the example of the NHS, which has an equivalent issue with waiting lists as we do with Crown court waiting times. The NHS uses weekend operating as a core part of its elective recovery strategy. To be clear, the NHS has always been a 24 hours a day, seven days a week service for urgent and emergency care, but it specifically uses additional, elective, planned operations. By opening facilities 7 days a week, the health service aims to maximise the use of expensive equipment and theatre space that would otherwise sit idle. I am sure that every Committee member can see the direct read-across. The Crown court is an expensive space with expensive equipment that sits empty and unutilised in what the Government describes as a crisis.

A national programme in 50 hospitals runs what is called a weekend hitlist once a month. That approach focuses on one type of procedure a day, such as 24 endometriosis surgeries in a single weekend. It was pioneered by Guy’s and St Thomas’ foundation trust—the trust that looks after many of us when we are not well—and it is now being scaled up nationwide. The approach uses high staffing levels, rigorous pre-op assessment and enhanced theatre utilisation. Again, the read-across could not be more direct. We could have courts with trained staff to consider particular types of cases that had been assessed in advance as suitable for such sessions. Those courts could be set up to make the most of that, whether it is a Saturday or an evening.

It is not just in those approaches that we see the Government and the NHS thinking more innovatively about how to make use of resources. Many of us now have community diagnostic centres in our constituencies. I know from when I was a junior doctor that, previously, it was extremely difficult to organise certain types of scans out of hours. The NHS have reformed the whole approach so that such tests, which had typically been restricted to just the working day, can now take place seven days a week to maximise capacity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

A juryless system?

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister is correct. That is the only time I have referred to it more broadly; I have been consistent throughout in saying that it is a system with significantly less access to jury rights than there is at present. There is a third way: to take the path towards operational excellence and better placed resourcing. We should not trade a centuries-old right for a 1.5% efficiency gain on a Government spreadsheet.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I speak in support of amendments 59, 35 and 36 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, and the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. Those new clauses are constructive, and the Government should engage with them seriously. They seek to address the right question: how can we increase capacity, improve efficiency, preserve public trust and make better use of the system before cutting into long-standing criminal justice safeguards?

The Opposition amendments would ensure that before clauses 1 to 7 are commenced, the Government must show that they have exhausted the practical alternatives, such as more sitting capacity, better use of buildings, fewer lost sitting days from late guilty pleas and prisoner transport delays, proper funding for sitting days and a serious examination of extended sitting hours. That is the right order of operations. The Government’s approach too often appears to be about restricting rights first and hoping that savings arrive later. Our approach is to build capacity and fix operational failures first and contemplate introducing legislation only then, and if truly necessary.

Our approach is encapsulated perfectly in amendment 59 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. The amendment would prevent clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill from coming into force until reasonable steps have been taken

“to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—

(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and

(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.”

That is exactly the right approach, and it is at the heart of the argument we have made throughout proceedings. The Government say that the backlog is so bad that they must remove the right to elect a jury trial, create judge-alone trials, expand magistrates’ sentencing powers and restrict appeals. We say that before they do any of that, they should show us that they have used all the practical means already available to increase capacity and reduce wasted court time.

We are seeking to draw attention to the tangible, everyday causes of courtroom delay, which, as the Minister well knows, is often about the case not being ready, defendants not arriving, late pleas, poor listing, lack of courtrooms or staff, or failure to use the estate properly. If those are the root causes of inefficiency, it is extraordinary to reach first for the curtailment of our ancient right to jury trial rather than for more mundane operational fixes.

I would go as far as to suggest that the evidence that the Committee has received from the Bar Council could almost have been written in support of the amendment. It says that the current backlog was not caused by the availability of jury trials. It supports “opening all…courts so they can hear cases”,

“intense court listing” and “proactive” CPS “case ownership”, “revising” the PECS contract so that

“defendants are delivered to the dock on time”,

“better use of technology” and “proper resourcing”. It also specifically identifies PECS as a problem, and warns that the Government’s impact assessment does not contain enough modelling on the changes needed to make prisoner transport work under the new system.

Amendment 59 also references late guilty pleas. Late pleas waste enormous amounts of time. They consume preparation time, courtroom hours, witness time and judicial energy that is better spent elsewhere. If the Government can reduce late pleas by better case progression, better early engagement or stronger listing discipline, that should happen before constitutional rights are reduced. I am in danger of repeating myself, but this point is central to the Opposition’s position: it is far more sensible to make the existing system work properly than to redesign it around its current inefficiencies.

Another question we should ask is whether every possible physical capacity option has been explored. Are there hearings that do not require cells and could be heard in other suitable buildings? Are there underused spaces in the existing estate? Are there ways to free Crown courtrooms by moving appropriate administrative or preliminary business elsewhere? Those are practical questions to which I have not seen a satisfactory answer. It seems logical that the Government should be required to answer them before commencing clauses 1 to 7. In essence, if the Government are minded to oppose this amendment, they are effectively saying that they are content to shred legal rights before making the effort to prove that they have exhausted all possible operational reform first. That is the wrong way around.

That is also the crux of our case for amendment 35, which was also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. It would prevent clauses 1 to 7 from coming into force until three conditions have been met. First, the Lord Chancellor must have

“provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act”.

Secondly, HMCTS must have assessed that

“the Crown court has, so far as possible, used that allocation of sitting days”.

Thirdly, the Lord Chancellor must have

“made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided…has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared with the start of the financial year.”

Put as simply as possible, before the Government curtail fundamental safeguards in the criminal justice system, they should first fund and use the Crown court at maximum practical capacity. If that works, there is no need for clauses 1 to 7. If it does not, Ministers can come back to Parliament having at least proven that the obvious operational fix was seriously attempted.

One of the persistent weaknesses in the Government’s case thus far has been the “do nothing” comparison. Too often, the Government present the Bill in the context of a binary choice: do nothing, or accept the package as it is. But that is a false choice; there are other options. One of the most obvious is to run the Crown court at full sitting capacity and see what happens. The Bar Council has welcomed the removal of the cap on sitting days and has long argued that courts should sit at maximum capacity. If increased sitting days are now being funded, those additional days should be allowed to take effect before Ministers demand more controversial, and likely irreversible, changes.

The Institute for Government has also weighed in on this issue. It says:

“There is a lot of uncertainty attached to the potential benefits of the government’s proposed reforms.”

It also says that there is a serious risk that these reforms could backfire and actually cause a decline in court performance. It identifies productivity as central, noting that the assumptions behind the Government’s proposed savings are “uncertain”. If boosting productivity and increasing sitting capacity are critical, then amendment 35 is exactly the right kind of test. Let us see whether properly funded sitting days can reduce the backlog before proceeding with more radical measures.

Amendment 35 is therefore one of the strongest amendments we are considering today. It does not deny the reality of the backlog—the Opposition never have. Rather, it confronts it directly. It does not say, “Do nothing,” it says, “Do the obvious thing first—fund the Crown court, use the capacity, report back and only then consider whether more fundamental changes are genuinely necessary.”

I also support amendment 36, also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. It would prevent the Lord Chancellor from

“bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has…undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and…laid before Parliament a report on the outcome”.

The consultation would have to consider

“potential rates of fees and remuneration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours”

and the availability of HMCTS staff. The amendment is a reasonable one. It simply requires the Government to consult and report before commencing clauses 1 to 7. Given the scale of the changes the Government are asking us to approve, that is not an excessive demand, in my view.

The amendment also seeks to address one of the practical concerns around extended sitting hours. It recognises that extended hours may have benefits but also inherent costs. It explicitly requires consideration of remuneration and staff availability. We all understand that we cannot run a court system merely by wishing it to sit longer. Judges, advocates, court staff, legal professionals, witnesses and support services all have to be able to make the model work. If hours are to be extended, that must be properly resourced.

That is precisely why a consultation is needed. The Government should not be able to say on the one hand that extended hours are too complicated to consider, while on the other hand pressing ahead with sweeping reforms to jury trial and appeal rights. If their position is that extended hours are impractical, Ministers should set out the evidence. If extended hours are practical in some settings, Ministers should explain where and how. If remuneration is the problem, the Government should consult on it. If staffing is the problem, they should say so. What the Government should not do is ignore the question altogether, as they seem to have done here.

There is also a simple point of fairness. The Government are asking defendants, victims, witnesses, lawyers and the public to accept major changes to the criminal process. They should therefore be willing to accept a much smaller burden: to consult, report and explain why a less constitutionally disruptive capacity measure is or is not viable. Taken alongside amendments 59 and 35, amendment 36 offers a coherent and moderate alternative path forward: build capacity first, fund sitting days first, examine extended hours first, fix operational problems first and only then ask Parliament to consider whether the more drastic provisions in clauses 1 to 7 are necessary. That is a measured and responsible approach that the Government should consider accepting.

I will speak briefly to new clauses 3, 4, 5, 13, 17 and 22, which would improve the Bill. They focus on delivering capacity, efficiency, transparency, public trust and practical reform in line with what the Opposition also seek to achieve. New clause 3 would allow certain Crown court locations or courtrooms to operate as extended-capacity courts, with a morning session from 9 am to 1 pm and an afternoon session from 2 pm to 6 pm. The purpose of that is to allow two different cases to be heard in the same courtroom on the same day. That is clearly a significant operational proposal, and while the principle is sound, it raises serious questions about the availability of judges, court staff, interpreters, security and CPS staff. It also raises questions about remuneration, because the criminal Bar, solicitors and court staff are already under enormous strain. A justice system running on exhausted people will not produce better justice simply because the building stays open for longer. We need to consider all those things at the same time.

New clause 3 is aimed at the right problem: capacity. The Government are asking us to make very large changes to jury trials, allocation and appeals. Before they do that, they should be able to show that every realistic capacity option has been explored. If courtrooms can be used more intensively without compromising fairness, quality or the welfare of those involved, that should at least be examined. The Bar Council’s evidence is clear that the backlog has not been caused by jury trials but by under-investment, poor management of the estate, failures in prisoner transport, listing problems, technology issues and inadequate resourcing. New clause 3 seeks to address that; it asks how we increase throughput while keeping the basic architecture of justice intact.

New clause 4 takes a more cautious approach, and for that reason, it may be the more attractive version of the idea. It would require an independent report into the feasibility of holding two trials a day in designated courtrooms, followed by a Government response and proposals for a pilot, if appropriate. That seems to be a serious and reasonable way to proceed. It does not assume that the model will work: it asks for independent work; evidence; consideration of the effect on defendants, victims, witnesses, judges, practitioners and staff; and an assessment of cost and resource implications.

New clause 5 would require the Lord Chancellor to publish annual targets for reducing the Crown court backlog, both nationally and in each HMCTS region, and to report to Parliament on progress. Again, that appears useful and sensible. If backlog reduction is the central justification for the Bill, Ministers should be willing to define what success looks like and be judged against it.

The regional element is especially important. We know that the backlog is not the same everywhere, and it is undeniable that some court centres have done better than others, sometimes because of stronger local leadership, better listing or more effective case progression. Others face particular estate, staffing or operational problems, and a national figure alone can hide those differences. If the Government are relying on predicted reductions of sittings days and caseload, Parliament should be able to see whether those predicted benefits are actually being delivered, and where they are and are not being delivered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling new clauses 3 and 4, which seek to extend Crown court sitting hours, including the possibility of running two separate sessions per day, and enabling multiple cases to be heard in a single courtroom each day. In the same vein, amendments 59, 35 and 36, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, also call for a consultation on extending sitting hours in the Crown court, funding for 130,000 sitting days and a consultation on increased sitting days.

As colleagues know, the Government have funded Crown court sitting days to record levels, and we are funding unlimited sitting days in the new financial year. That means that there is no financial constraint on the hours that Crown courts can sit. They can sit for as many days as possible within capacity constraints. That offers complete flexibility in Crown court centres to hear as many cases as possible. That represents real progress, and has been welcomed by Members on both sides of the House, the Bar and judges.

But we cannot immediately increase capacity to 130,000 sitting days. That is not just a question of funding. Court capacity is not just about the rooms; it depends on judges, barristers, solicitors and court staff. We cannot 3D print those. We predict that sitting at unlimited levels next year will allow us to sit for 117,000 or 118,000 days, but we are not yet ready to ratchet up to 130,000 sitting days. That is the figure referred to in Sir Brian Leveson’s review, but he acknowledged that, even in the medium term, we will not get there. I say that because, although it is part of the Government’s ambition to grow capacity in the Crown court to meet the incoming demand and put the system on a sustainable level, the fact that we will not get there, even in the medium term, means that all those impacted by the cases sitting in the backlog—defendants on remand and potential victims—are left waiting.

The lifting of the cap on sitting days is highly significant and is part of the investment lever that we all agree is needed to get our Crown court back on its feet. However, the central insight of the independent review of criminal courts is that that investment alone will not be enough, because even when we remove the limit on sitting days we cannot get to 130,000 sitting days because of capacity constraints. Extending hours alone does not increase the underlying capacity. Extending sitting hours or attempting to run multiple trials per day risks, I would argue, reducing time for case preparation, potentially increasing ineffective and cracked trials, and then potentially worsening delays rather than improving them.

[Dr Mullan]

It is all very well for the Minister to make that statement. Why does she think that?

[Sarah Sackman]

Well, during covid courts did operate with extended and flexible arrangements, but those were temporary measures, under exceptional conditions, dealing with reduced volumes. By the way, to the point made by the hon. Member for Chichester, the reduction in the hearing time in a sitting day—now under four hours—concerns me greatly. That loss of time aggregated over the 117,000-odd sitting days adds up and is hugely significant. But where HMCTS conducted pilots of increased and flexible sitting hours, it found that increasing hours alone delivered limited gains. There was also, at the time, substantial opposition from the Bar, because although we are primarily concerned with the hearing time, because that is where progress is driven in a trial, all the case preparation—whether that is judicial, reading the papers, or the preparation time that is needed by the barristers and the prosecution—needs to be factored in. Extending sitting hours sounds like a good remedy to this problem, but we do not think it provides a solution, because time needs to be afforded to enable proper case preparation, so that when we do get on with a trial we can crack on with a hearing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I intervened when the Minister said she thought that extending sitting hours would make things worse. When I asked her to explain that, she then said that she thought the benefit would be minimal. That is a different point. Given that we have said there should be an extensive consultation to figure out all those things, so that it appeals to people, such that that they will want to take part in these extended sitting hours, why would it make things worse? If people are willing to do it, I just do not see the logic of that point.

[Sarah Sackman]

As I have said, we have precedent. The pilots showed that there was precious little improvement. Extending sitting hours might make things worse if, for example, one is stuck in extended hours on one trial, meaning that one is not available to be in other parts of the country.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I thank the Minister for her comprehensive response to this group of amendments. We have talked heavily about efficiencies: the shadow Opposition and the Liberal Democrats have put forward alternative measures to improve efficiencies that were not explored in Leveson’s report. I asked Sir Brian if he had explored the concept of doing two trials a day. He said, “No, that wasn’t really something that I looked at.” But he was quite open to it. We had the same conversation that it seems the Minister had with him, where he said, “I used to be able to get through two trials in a day.” We know that that world does not exist any more.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

Interestingly, we have been told all along that this is about the complexity of cases, yet the evidence is that the number of hours that things have been looked at has shrunk. To me, that is a much bigger issue. If we have fewer hours in a day to operate, of course it is going to take longer to get through complex cases.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It is a worrying trend that the number of hours that are being used efficiently in Crown courts every day seems to be decreasing year on year.

The Minister spoke about not wanting to necessarily set a target. I agree with her: sometimes putting an arbitrary number on something does not actually reflect the situation. The previous Government attempted to do that, setting a target in 2019 to get the backlog down to a certain number. That does not always reflect the fact that the backlog could be a caseload 30,000 of the most complex cases that will take an incredibly long time to get to. Instead, we should look at the average time that it takes to get from charge to trial, and monitor whether we can bring that number down.

When I have talked about bringing that report to Parliament in new clause 5, it is not necessarily to say, “It was 80,000 and now it is 79,500,” because that does not reflect how long people are going to actually wait to have their cases heard. It is far more about the experiences of all of those people going through the system.

With regard to having reports established every year, the Minister spoke passionately, as she always does, about wanting to make sure that the reforms genuinely make a difference. But the Deputy Prime Minister has said that, even with all the reforms coming in together, he does not expect to see the backlog fall before the end of the Parliament. We need to be able to look at where the data is taking us every year, track what the backlog is doing, track the sorts of cases that are getting stuck in the backlog, and then scrutinise that, so that if there are other levers that can be pulled—whether they are things that have been suggested by me or by the shadow Minister—we have the opportunity to come back and review those things.

I am glad that the Minister recognises that trust in the criminal justice system is low anyway. It is not where it should be. I have said it before: the justice system is inextricably linked with how people view democracy. When trust in democracy is low, there is distrust in institutions, policing and the way our courts work. As cross-party parliamentarians, we have a duty to improve trust in all those systems. I worry that the measures in clauses 1 to 7 will not do that, but will erode trust.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

The Government should also take the opportunity to look at measures that would improve victims’ experiences, such as the Victims’ Commissioner’s model of a victim care hub, where victims would go to one place to get all the necessary advice on how to proceed through the criminal justice system. Alternatively, it could be a victim unique identifier, which is another idea that has been floated by the Victims’ Commissioner. Both of those would help victims to navigate a complex and changing system.

[Dr Mullan]

I wish to speak briefly in support of the principle that different approaches to case management and ways of working are making a difference in a number of areas. The Committee has had extensive back and forth about the fact that backlogs are actually coming down in certain locations. There has been debate about whether that is just a seasonal trend that we see at some points in the year; we will have to wait to see whether that is the case.

We have also spoken about the approach to case management in Liverpool, and this morning I read out various statistics from other courts that are bringing the backlogs down. I think new clause 7 drives at the same point; other measures are already showing benefits before the passage of this legislation, and we should prioritise them.

[Sarah Sackman]

Let me begin, as we all have in this Committee, by acknowledging the challenges that victims face in accessing the information and support they need. We have talked about the Government’s drive to centre victims in the criminal justice process.

I have a couple of things to say in response to new clause 7. First, there is lots of work under way. For example, on 5 February this year we launched a consultation on a new victims code to ensure that we get the foundations right for victims. Through the connecting criminal justice data programme, we are aiming to strengthen data sharing by seeing how we can both track and share that data with victims, as appropriate. We have published statutory guidance on independent sexual violence advisers and independent domestic violence advisers, recommending best practice for those roles. Of course, we have also begun to roll out the independent legal adviser service for rape victims. We have also undertaken consistent engagement; I met the Victims’ Commissioner just yesterday to discuss some of the ways in which we can marshal the over £500 billion-worth of investment that the Government have made in victims services, so that we can ensure that we have a victim-centred approach.

Case management is ultimately a matter for the judiciary, but taking into account the impact that delays in processes have on victims will of course form an important part of that. I would say that a publication strategy is not a matter best addressed through primary legislation, but I understand the thrust behind the hon. Lady’s proposal, and it is one that we would agree with.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would give victims a right to receive, free of charge, court transcripts on judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to their case. It would require that transcripts be provided within 14 days of a request and clarify that this right would applies whether or not the victim gave evidence in the case.

We spoke earlier in Committee about the important role of court transcripts. I recognise the challenges that the Government have in rolling out large-scale reforms to the way that we currently do court transcripts. The new clause is slightly more limited in its scope, because it specifically calls for transcripts on judicial summings-up and bail decisions relevant to the victim’s case. I know that the Government are doing a great deal in trying to move the dial on making sure that we slowly get to the point where everybody has access to court transcripts. As a spokesperson for an opposition party, I will continue to put pressure on the Government wherever I can to try and push them to go further and faster in this regard. I will not press the new clause to a vote.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak briefly in support of the new clause. Whenever we talk about narrowed elements of a transcript, I always think to myself that, in giving these remarks, the judge will hopefully have written them down and not be doing these sorts of things off the top of their head. That is why I struggle to understand why these more limited elements are not more meaningful and easily available.

If a judge does not happen to write these sorts of things down, I do not think it will be much to ask them to do so and to make it so that the transcript can be quickly and easily checked. I appreciate that the hon. Member for Chichester will not press the new clause to a vote, but as she mentioned, in any opportunity we get we should push the issue of transcripts. It is particularly important in relation to, as we will come to talk about, the unduly lenient sentence scheme, because all these things would help somebody, in theory, to give an appeal a shot. If they do not have that sort of thing, it is much more difficult.

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Member for Chichester rightly acknowledges the significant amount of work that the Government are currently undertaking in this space, and we had an opportunity to debate that in Committee earlier.

In relation to the new clause, it might be worth briefly explaining why such an extension would not provide significant benefits compared with the systems already in place. In relation to bail decisions, a transcript of the hearing is rarely informative for victims. What victims need and want to know, and what the victims code already requires, is for victims to be informed of the outcome of the bail hearing and any conditions imposed. Those updates are already provided to victims by victim witness care units within five working days. We are currently exploring how responsibilities under the code are being met by the relevant service providers and how to better support them in the delivery of the code. To strengthen that further, once commenced, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 will introduce a compliance framework, requiring criminal justice bodies to keep their performance against the code under review.

Transcripts of judicial summings-up are unlikely to add significant value for many victims. Those remarks are given before the jury begins to deliberate and are intended to guide them by summarising the evidence and setting out the relevant law. They are not, and cannot be, a reflection of the jury’s decision. Without the full context of the trial, they may risk causing confusion rather than providing clarity. Before being released, summings-up must be manually reviewed to ensure that they are accurate. That, too, is resource intensive. In looking at where we can roll out making transcripts available at either low or no cost, we must target those areas that add value for the public and victims.

As I said when we discussed this last Thursday, we are focused on driving improvement for the longer term. That is why we are undertaking a study in the use of AI to transcribe court hearings. The findings will identify what is possible from AI transcription in a Crown court setting, in considering how to make the provision of transcripts more cost-effective. I think we are in a good place. As the hon. Member for Chichester says, there is more to do, and the Government would be grateful for work across the House to see how we can drive greater transparency in transcription in our Crown courts, but I urge her to withdraw her new clause.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The new clause is a sunset clause that would require a report on the effectiveness of certain provisions of the Bill. If the report found that the provisions were not effective, the Secretary of State would have to bring forward regulations to repeal them; if it found that they were effective, the Secretary of State would have to set a deadline for their repeal and a return to full jury trials.

The design of these reforms has not been tested in practice. There are many different estimations of their impact on the backlog, and if they are shown to not be effective, they must not continue. If they prove to be effective at reducing the backlog, full jury trials could be reinstated when the backlog is reduced and we are working at a level that the criminal justice system can cope with.

[Dr Mullan]

My new clause 24 and new clause 18 in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester seek to achieve a similar outcome. Although there is broad agreement that the backlog is a challenging issue that must be addressed, we believe that any measure that curtails jury trial rights in such a significant—and, I would say, unprecedented—way should be proportionate to the problem it seeks to solve and be used only for as long as absolutely necessary while we are presented with this problem. Therefore, we propose a sunset clause to ensure that the powers expire once the court backlog has returned to pre-pandemic levels for a sustained period.

A sunset clause is a measure in a statute that provides for a law or specific provisions to cease to be effective after a predetermined date, or once a specific condition is met, unless Parliament takes further action to renew them. Although they have experienced a resurgence in recent decades as a tool for managing extraordinary or controversial measures, sunset clauses have been employed by Parliament since at least 1500. Historically and in contemporary practice, they serve vital democratic functions. They are used to facilitate the passage of controversial legislation by assuring critics and the public that the measures are temporary, rather than a permanent erosion. They act as a safeguard for democracy, particularly when emergency legislation is required, by preventing the normalisation of extraordinary powers.

Furthermore, sunset clauses create a more formal trigger for post-legislative scrutiny, forcing both the Executive and the legislature to revisit their assumptions and evaluate whether a law has been effective before deciding whether to prolong its life. The Terrorism Act 2006 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 both utilise sunsetting or recurring renewal requirements to ensure ongoing parliamentary oversight. More recently, sunset clauses were used in covid-19 legislation to ensure that restrictive measures did not extend longer than necessary. The UK Coronavirus Act 2020 contained a two-year sunset clause and a requirement for six-monthly reviews to determine whether temporary provisions should expire early.

When considering radical changes to our trial system during a time of crisis, we should look to our history for a more direct precedent. During world war two, a period when our continued existence as a free nation was genuinely uncertain, the Government of the day did not choose to radically cut down the use of jury trials or erode the right of the citizen to elect to be judged by their peers. Instead, they reduced the number of jurors from 12 to seven. Importantly, that was a temporary adjustment. As soon as the Nazi threat was defeated, the Government of the day restored the number of jurors to 12. That demonstrates a principled understanding that emergency measures taken in response to a temporary crisis should be reversed once that crisis is resolved.

In contrast, the measures before us today regarding the erosion of jury trials and the abolition of the right to elect are drafted as permanent changes to our statute book, with no built-in mechanism for their reversal once the backlog is managed again. As I have said, that is a significant departure from the most closely related historical example of what we did during even the darkest days of the 1940s.

Our sunset clause would tie the duration of these reforms to the very problem they are intended to fix. The Government’s case is that these are necessary, backlog-driven measures, and it is entirely consistent to state that they should expire once that backlog is brought down to a more historically normal level, which we define as the pre-pandemic level—a level that the system was able to manage sufficiently, if not perfectly, without the need for structural erosion of the right to a jury.

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[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

If you will indulge me, Dr Huq, I want to congratulate the hon. Member for Rugby on the news that he has been appointed as a trade envoy. We can all recognise that he has put an enormous amount of work into that. The Opposition think that he is amazing at selling the unsellable; he does it all the time. If he has British products to sell, he will be amazing at it. He should just double check that he is going to the south of Korea, rather than the north.

As we have said before, we are debating a Bill that represents one of the most significant reconfigurations of our criminal justice system in modern history, and it is therefore unsurprising that we feel that other contingent parts of the system need to be considered in that light and adjusted accordingly. As we expand the reach and punitive power of the magistrates courts, we must ensure that our procedural safeguards in both directions keep pace with that expansion. That is the core purpose of new clause 26, which proposes to extend the unduly lenient sentence scheme to triable either-way offences, which will now be increasingly retained and sentenced at the summary level. If we can trust magistrates with the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, the public must have the assurance that there is a mechanism to correct sentencing decisions that fall in the other direction by being unduly lenient.

The Government have occasionally attempted to reframe their reforms as affecting only low-level or petty crimes such as shoplifting, but the reality of the triable either-way category is very different from that. As the Criminal Bar Association and JUSTICE have pointed out, some of the offences that will be almost exclusively in the jurisdiction of the magistrates courts include unlawful wounding, actual bodily harm and, as we have discussed, even some sexual assault cases. Those are offences where the impact on the victims can be very significant. For some time, I have been aware of dissatisfaction in many ways with the punitive element of our justice system, and whether it sufficiently punishes perpetrators in a way that victims and the wider public would consider to be justice. That is one of the reasons why the unduly lenient sentence scheme exists.

In the Crown court, sentencing outcomes are subject to the oversight of the Attorney General’s office through the unduly lenient sentences scheme. It is an essential safety valve that helps contribute to public confidence by allowing the public—it has always been open to the public—and, most importantly for me, victims and family members to refer unduly lenient sentences for consideration by the Court of Appeal. As I have talked about previously, I have made it use of it and so have other Members of the House, so it is important. It would be illogical to allow offences with the same potential gap in public confidence in the outcome to be without this equivalent safeguard, simply because the Government have decided to change the likely venue of trial in so many of these cases.

The need for the extension is further underscored by the evidence on the rate of appeal of sentences from the perspective of defendants. About 47% of appeals against sentences from the magistrates courts result in a change. Those figures are not marginal; they indicate that the lower courts fall into meaningful error in nearly half of the cases where they are challenged. That is from the perspective of the defendant—that is, the person found guilty—appealing the sentence. There is nothing to suggest that, if victims were given a similar opportunity to challenge sentences, no similar rate of error would be found from their perspective. That is, at the very least, of equal importance to someone who has campaigned significantly on behalf of victims in sentencing. For me, it is probably the more important of the two.

Historically, one of the primary arguments against extending the ULS scheme to magistrates courts was a practical one: there was no comprehensive record of the proceedings and sentencing decisions were often delivered without the detailed recorded remarks that characterised the Crown court. However, the Bill fundamentally changes that landscape. Schedule 2 introduces proposed reforms to introduce a mandatory requirement for audio recording and the provision of transcripts in the magistrates court. The Government are making this change to support their new appeal model, recognising that a fair system cannot function without an accurate record of what was said and decided. This move towards digital transparency is a game changer for sentencing accountability for victims as well.

As the Minister herself noted, sunshine is the best disinfectant. Once we have a reliable audio record of the sentencing remarks and the mitigations offered, the logistical barriers to reviewing a sentence for undue leniency from a victim’s perspective and that of the wider public falls away. We will, for the first time, have the infrastructure to allow the Office of the Attorney General to scrutinise sentences with the same precision applied to the Crown court. We should use this new capability to ensure that the sentencing code is applied fairly. Extended sentencing powers must be matched with extended accountability. If a magistrate is given power more akin to a judge, then they must be subject to the same oversight of their sentencing decisions. New clause 6 is not about creating more work for the Court of Appeal; it is about ensuring that, as we redraw the boundaries of our legal system, we do not leave victims of serious crime behind in a two-tier justice system where leniency cannot be corrected.

In summary, the proposals to extend the ULS scheme to either-way offences is a necessary and proportionate response to the Government’s radical restructuring of the trial process. Magistrates will soon be passing sentence on much more serious offences where the interest of victims will be of even greater concern. The record is improving to allow this to happen at the same time and it is common sense that there is consistency. I do not think there is a rational basis for excluding more serious offences from the ULS scheme simply because of the venue.

We should not wait for a high-profile case where a victim is concerned and able to seek redress in the way that they might in the Crown court. I ask the Minister to be proactive. I can understand that the Minister would perhaps argue for a more gradual approach—and perhaps not applying it to every single case might be a compromise that the Minister could bring forward. Perhaps it should be for the more serious of these less-serious, more-serious cases. However, I certainly think that we can have some kind of progress.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for this new clause on the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The ULS scheme is an exceptional power, reserved for the most serious cases, that applies only to offences passed in the Crown court. One of the things that we have seen—this is not an unwelcome development—is its expanded use. What started as an exceptional power used in a handful of exceptional cases has grown in usage as members of the public, their representatives and others who have either experienced crime, or have loved ones who have, take up the ULS scheme in greater numbers. In 2025, the Office of the Attorney General assessed around 1,500 cases.

It is important to focus on what the ULS scheme is and what it is not. It is a legal backstop that rightly sets a hard test. Someone simply not agreeing with or taking issue with the sentence handed down to a particular offender is not, of itself, a basis for challenging it. One needs to show that there has been a gross error in the application of the sentencing guidelines, and that the sentence is manifestly inadequate given the seriousness of the offence.

I understand the points that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle is making. I would, though, draw attention to the fact that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of criminal appeals, which includes looking at reforms to the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The Law Commission is due to publish its report in autumn 2026. I suggest that that is an appropriate moment to look at the operation of the scheme and at what is suggested in the new clause about its current operation as it applies in the Crown court, rather than pre-empting what that report might say and how the Government might think about the scheme’s potential extension to the magistrates court.

I cannot support the new clause at the moment, as it would in effect significantly alter the scope and operation of a power that is supposed to be exceptional. It would make the exceptional the norm. It would entail administrative burdens and goes against the grain of what was intended when the scheme was first conceived. However, I look forward to seeing the Law Commission’s work. That will be the appropriate moment to re-examine how the scheme operates and how it operates in a reformed system. I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw the new clause.

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister opened her remarks by saying that the scheme applies only to certain cases in the Crown court. The point that the Opposition make is that it will no longer apply to some of the cases to which it would apply now. The Minister has given figures. If the scheme is configured in the right way, and sufficiently constrained to just pick up those cases that are moving, it should not necessarily lead to any increase in the number of cases referred, so I do not accept her argument.

I would not expect the Minister to know this—she has given a single set of figures—but I would be interested in the historical trend, and the number of applications in the preceding few years. It would be helpful if she could give those figures. I also want to make clear—I have been quite clear about this with other stuff that we have done on the ULS scheme—I think it is unusual that the scheme is available to absolutely anybody. I would be open to any expansion or modification being constrained just to victims and family members. I think that I have made that clear in relation to other reforms.

That brings me to the Minister’s point about the Law Commission. That was the answer I was given repeatedly over very many months by the Victims Minister as to why the Government would not make reforms to the scheme, yet they accepted such reforms last week as a result of pressure. If the Minister insists that that is the route forward, I ask her to write to the commission. I point out the reforms that the Minister is making, which will not have been in the terms of reference for the Law Commission. At the point at which it started that work, the reforms were not even on the operating table, so it is important that the Government write to the commission and make clear that they would welcome it expanding the matters that it is considering to include this question, which would have been novel to them at the point of that undertaking.

I have learned from our experience with the other element of the ULS that, I am afraid, one should just keep pushing and pushing on such issues, so I will put the new clause to a vote. However, I have given some points on which I ask the Minister to go away and reflect to determine whether there is a way forward that can be satisfactory to both sides of the House at some point in future proceedings.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 35, which I tabled last week after a conversation with the Victims’ Commissioner, would reinstate an inspectorate body for the criminal courts in England and Wales. The Courts Act 2003 introduced His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration, which was established in 2005. The inspectorate was then closed in 2010, with the then Government arguing that audits of HMCTS, combined with the inspection regimes of the current justice inspectorates and the National Audit Office, negated the need for HMICA. However, a 2022 Justice Committee report found that that argument had not stood the test of time, and it called for the re-establishment of an inspectorate body. The report stated:

“A Courts’ Inspectorate, which is independent from Government, could make a substantial difference to the accountability and transparency of the justice system. It could use inspections and the promised improvements to the quality of the data to make recommendations that can inform policy and guidance in both criminal and civil justice. An inspectorate could also help to monitor the use of technology in the courts.”

This is a really important time to introduce the additional level of having a courts’ inspectorate, especially when the use of technology will play a much larger role in the criminal justice system, as well as the quality of the data coming out, which the Committee has debated various times. The proposal was backed by Andrew Cayley KC, then chief inspector for the Crown Prosecution Service. He favoured an even broader court inspection regime to scrutinise the operation of the disjointed parts of the system, particularly regarding the listing of cases. The re-establishment of a courts inspectorate was also recommended by Sir Brian Leveson in part 2 of his independent review of the criminal courts; it was recommendation 58. While there are four criminal justice inspectorates, Sir Brian notes:

“There is, however, no one body that is responsible for the inspection of the criminal courts in England and Wales.”

Due to limitations to the scope of this Bill, our new clause proposes a criminal courts inspectorate that would inspect and report on the administration and operation of the criminal courts. The new clause stipulates that that inspectorate must have

“particular regard to the experience of witnesses and victims”

when assessing

“the efficiency, effectiveness and accessibility of those courts”.

An inspectorate would identify inefficiencies and monitor victims’ experience in the system.

When debating an earlier group, the Minister mentioned what I think she called a public governance board that she is exploring. It would be helpful if she could outline whether she sees my new clause as different from that, or whether she is looking to create an additional level of inspection and scrutiny in the criminal courts system.

[Dr Mullan]

As I have alluded to several times, the Conservative party is considering more broadly how we tackle judicial accountability in all its different elements. It would be premature for us to settle on this new clause if, as the hon. Member for Chichester pointed out, it had to be necessarily narrow to fit in the Bill. On that basis we will not vote for it. We are not against it as an idea, but we need greater time to think about accountability and performance in the justice system in a more comprehensive way.

[Sarah Sackman]

I agree with the sentiment behind the new clause to ensure that we are monitoring efficiency, effectiveness and performance across our criminal courts system. However, as the shadow Justice Minister just said, the best mechanisms for holding the system to account in terms of performance and judicial accountability merit greater reflection. We are taking the time to consider the IRCC’s recommendations. The hon. Member for Chichester alluded to the history, and that there has previously been an inspectorate of court administration; that of course ceased operation under the coalition Government, who found it unnecessary at the time.

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[Sarah Sackman]

These clauses are in part 3 of the general provisions of the Bill. They provide the position on the commencement of measures in the Bill, the powers to make consequential, transitional and other provisions in connection with the coming into force of the provisions of the Bill, and the Bill’s territorial extent and short title.

Clause 21 is a technical clause that will allow the Secretary of State to make any further consequential amendments or legislative changes where required to implement the provisions in the Bill. Clause 22 creates a power to allow the Lord Chancellor to make “transitional or saving provisions” by regulation

“in connection with the coming into force of any provision of this Act.”

Clause 23 will allow the Secretary of State to, by regulation, amend the Sentencing Act 2020, so as to specify the cases or purpose for which the amendment or repeal made by the Bill has effect.

Clause 24 allows for regulations under statutory instrument to be made under the Bill once it becomes an Act. The Bill contains nine delegated powers; we have considered the scope and extent of those powers carefully and have taken the decision to include them only where it is necessary, in respect of particularly technical or detailed areas, or to allow flexibility for our legislation to remain up to date and be responsive to changes.

Clause 25 sets out the extent of the Bill. All measures apply to England and Wales only, save in respect of four areas: section 7; section 18(6) and subsection (7); sections 10(4) and 11(8); and part 3. Those four areas have UK-wide extent, except for sections 10(4) and 11(8), which have the same extent at the Armed Forces Act 2006, so that they extend to the UK, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories except Gibraltar.

Clause 26 states that the measures in the Bill will be commenced via regulations on the day that the Secretary of State appoints apart from clauses 21 to 25 and clause 27, which come into force on the day on which the Act is passed, and section 6 and section 20, which come into force at the end of a period of two months beginning with the day on which the Bill is passed. Finally, clause 27 states that the Bill

“may be cited as the Courts and Tribunals Act 2026”

once it becomes an Act of Parliament.

I thank all members of the Committee for the spirit in which they have engaged over the last five days. Some may know the famous line, “I fought the law and the law won.” Some may also know that I have been developing a Spotify soundtrack to get me through the Committee, inspired by some of the interventions. Everyone has not only made this stage constructive and engaging, but given the Government a lot of food for thought as we take the Bill through to the next stage. It will be all the stronger for the contributions that have been made, so I thank everyone for that.

[Dr Mullan]

I have just one remark to make. I draw the Committee’s attention to the submission we received from the circuit in Wales. Clause 25 is about the territorial extent of the Bill, and the circuit pointed out that it feels the Welsh system has been unfairly caught up in these reforms, which it does not think are applicable in terms of the need to reduce waiting times. It is important that the Committee makes note of the evidence that was submitted to us.

I join the Minister in thanking everybody for their time and deep concentration when listening to the exchanges throughout. I thank the Clerks who have assisted us over the many days, including during a late sitting. I thank the House staff in that regard, and I thank the Minister for the constructive manner in which she has engaged with feedback and proposals from this side of the House.

[Sarah Sackman]

I commend clauses 21 to 27 to the Committee. I did not specifically mention the House staff and all our wonderful Chairs. I add my thanks to everybody for their hard work. I also thank my team of officials—those watching at home and those in the room—who have worked very hard.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.