Mobile and Fixed Telecoms Modernisation Charters and Protocols

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2026 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I am repeating the following written ministerial statement made today in the other place by my noble Friend Baroness Lloyd of Effra, the Minister for Digital Economy.

The Government secured agreement yesterday from the telecoms industry to further protect customers and to prevent disruption to critical national infrastructure services during telecoms modernisation programmes via the 2G switch-off charter and the fixed telecoms modernisation charter. These charters and additional guidance for communication providers, network operators and wholesalers have been developed in response to and in anticipation of essential work led by industry to modernise the UK’s digital infrastructure.

Modernising the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure supports economic growth. Households and businesses will be able to benefit from much faster download and upload speeds, improved network security, greater reliability and resilience, better call quality, and lower latency (faster responsiveness). In addition, some telecoms companies are finding it difficult to source certain spare parts required to maintain or repair connections as the parts are no longer made. Decommissioned parts are being used to maintain the remaining networks.

Modernising mobile networks

All four 3G networks have now been safely switched off, with the last operator switching off in early 2026. Spectrum released from retiring 3G is now being re-purposed to improve 4G and 5G connectivity, which is now widely available across the UK. Mobile network operators are now turning to switching off 2G networks which was first announced in 2021. These 2G networks are used for a number of critical services and support customers who require additional support, including those with older 2G-only mobile phones—of which there are around two million—as well as personal telecare alarms, so it is imperative that their migration to 4G or 5G networks is done safely.

Mobile operators, as signatories of the new 2G switch-off charter, have therefore made significant commitments to ensure a safe and smooth switch-off of 2G migration for everyone. These include contacting affected customers well in advance of switching off a 2G network or service, using multiple and different means of communications, trialling switching-off 2G in different geographic areas before starting a nationwide switch-off, verifying that 4G and-or 5G coverage is present prior to switching off 2G, and maintaining access to all forms of emergency services. Mobile phones that are 2G only ceased to be sold at scale over a decade ago in the mid-2010s. The remaining 2G-only mobile phone users will receive multiple messages asking them to upgrade to a new device in advance of 2G being switched off by each network in 2029, 2030 and by 2033. Government have and continue to engage with local authorities and telecare providers about the closure of mobile networks.

Modernising fixed networks

Fixed networks are also being upgraded. This includes the upgrade of analogue copper landlines, the public switched telephone network, to the digital voice over internet protocol, also known as the PSTN migration. This is an essential upgrade as older networks are ageing and deteriorating, and people are missing out on the benefits of newer, better technologies. There are also expected to be significant closures of telephone exchanges in the coming years, as these will no longer be required for running modernised networks. Similar to the switch-off of the 2G mobile network, there are customers who are reliant on their landlines and old copper-based services, including those who use telecare devices.

In November 2024, the Government secured agreements from the telecoms industry to protect vulnerable people and critical services during the PSTN migration via the non-voluntary migration checklist and critical national infrastructure charter. These have ensured safety is at the forefront of the PSTN migration, protecting customers who require additional support—including during changes to their telecoms services—and critical infrastructure. As of 31 December 2025, only 3.6 million PSTN lines remained operational. This is down from 6.5 million at the end of 2024 and 35.2 million at the network’s peak in 2000.

Industry and Government are committed to learning the lessons from the PSTN migration for future fixed telecoms modernisations. Therefore, the industry commitments that previously only applied to the PSTN migration have been extended to all fixed modernisations. This includes the fixed telecoms modernisation charter, critical national infrastructure charter, and the non-voluntary migration checklist.

Supporting everyone through the migrations

In addition to these updated documents, signatories have agreed to two final engagement protocols. These protocols are a backstop to address situations where a small number of customers do not engage with communication providers despite repeated attempts to contact them in order to modernise their service. Communication providers, and, separately, network operators and wholesalers, have agreed additional safeguards to protect customers, while enabling networks and services to be modernised before they fail. This includes the commitment to contacting customers three times using at least two different channels that are suitable for their needs, using clear language about the proposed change to their service. The protocols provide a minimum time period for customers to respond of at least 30 days. There are also additional communications, time and safeguards for those needing additional support.

During the roundtable that I hosted yesterday, telecoms providers agreed that their first priority was always to protect customers. I also laid out the Government plan to work with industry to ensure the charter commitments are met and engage with sectors that rely on digital connectivity to ensure they upgrade their products and services.

[HCWS1437]

Financial Assistance to Industry

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Monday 23rd March 2026 General Committees

[The Chair]

It may help if I clarify from the Chair that we will debate for up to 90 minutes the content of the motion in the name of the Secretary of State, which is listed on the future business section of the Order Paper. The House will be asked to pass the motion without debate after the text has been reported from the Committee.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the motion, That this House authorises the Secretary of State to make payments, by way of financial assistance under section 8 of the Industrial Development Act 1982, in excess of £30 million to any successful applicant to the Life Sciences Large Investment Portfolio, launched on 15 November 2025, up to a cumulative total of £570 million.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Alec. The life sciences sector is a jewel in the crown of our economy, a national asset that plays a unique role in the health and wealth of the United Kingdom. The sector consistently drives skilled employment, attracts cutting-edge research and stimulates inward investment in communities across every nation and region of our United Kingdom. From pioneering new medical technologies to developing life-saving therapeutics, life sciences generate immense economic value and vital public health benefit.

The Government’s life sciences sector plan sets out a comprehensive, long-term strategy to ensure sustainable growth across all parts of the sector. It outlines our ambition for the UK to secure more life sciences foreign direct investment than any other European economy by 2030, and to position ourselves as the third largest global destination for such investment by 2035, behind only the United States and China. Meeting that ambition requires an internationally leading support package and a clear signal to global investors that Britain is open, competitive and committed to scientific excellence.

[Peter Fortune (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)]

Given that the individual grants can exceed £30 million and are monitored for only 10 years, if a company, say, relocates to another country or fails to deliver over that period, is there any mechanism for the Government to claw back some of that money?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I would not make claims about any individual-level investments we have made through the fund at the moment, but I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman about the provisions in the fund as a whole.

Central to our ambition is boosting manufacturing through the delivery of up to £520 million to the life sciences innovative manufacturing fund, one of six headline commitments in the sector plan. The covid pandemic demonstrated beyond doubt that we cannot take our critical supply chains for granted. The disruption of that period showed the risks of relying too heavily on overseas production for medicines, vaccines and essential medical supplies. Supporting the onshoring and expansion of life sciences manufacturing through the life sciences innovative manufacturing fund is therefore a vital part of strengthening our national resilience, improving preparedness for future health emergencies and ensuring that UK patients benefit quickly from innovation.

In the past six months alone, that Government support through the life sciences innovative manufacturing fund has unlocked more than £600 million in investment in our life sciences sector, which will create and safeguard more than 600 jobs. That includes a £500 million investment by global pharmaceutical company UCB in Surrey, alongside a £23 million investment to expand production of essential medicines at Norgine’s facility in Hengoed, Wales.

Those investments position the UK as a world leader in health and manufacturing innovation and boost regional economic growth. More than that, they restore a proud culture and heritage of innovation in so many of these places. Hengoed, for example, was the place that powered this country’s industrial development across the 20th century with coal from the Penallta colliery. Now, that heritage of coal leads into the future of essential medicine production as well. The life sciences innovative manufacturing fund is unlocking expanded warehouse capacity, expanding production capacity and creating 44 new local jobs. At the heart of it all, it restores that critical heritage of innovation in our communities.

Of course, if we are to maximise the full potential of UK life sciences, we must go further and faster in our support for the largest transformational projects. That is why the life sciences sector plan includes a commitment to develop a new, bespoke approach to supporting major life sciences investments of more than £250 million. Such large-scale and globally mobile investments are particularly critical to the ecosystem here in the UK. They attract further private capital, create clusters of expertise and bring significant economic and health resilience benefits to both the local areas that host them and the UK as a whole.

The life sciences large investment portfolio is designed to meet that need. It offers tailored Government support to attract the world’s largest and most strategically important life sciences investments to the UK. The scheme enables the Government to provide bespoke support for investment portfolios with investments in manufacturing and in research and development totalling at least £250 million over a three-year period. It will give confidence to companies and ensure that the UK remains an internationally competitive destination.

Crucially, the life sciences large investment portfolio brings together regional and devolved delivery partners with UK Government support, so that we can leverage the full UK offer for investors. That means aligning national incentives with place-based strengths in skills, infrastructure, clusters and planning, so that every part of the proposition works together, and the UK is as competitive as possible for the largest and most mobile life sciences investments.

The Government are clear that the life sciences large investment portfolio is a strategic investment in our future. It will strengthen our capabilities, support high-value jobs and reinforce the UK’s global reputation as a science superpower. Most importantly, it is a vital step in delivering the Government’s commitment to support the UK’s life sciences sector, and to ensuring that our country remains at the forefront of global innovation for decades to come.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank both hon. Members for their contributions. To respond to the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, the large investment portfolio part of the fund is of course focused on larger projects that materially move the needle for the sector as a whole. The life sciences innovative manufacturing fund as a whole is much more focused on singular sites, and as a result smaller firms are able to participate in it. That is alongside a series of measures that the Department has been taking to back the best of British start-ups in this space.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, asked what we are doing on longer-term stability to continue to attract large-scale investment into this country. The pharmaceutical agreement we have struck with the United States is a really important location for a series of commitments that support our commercial investment environment and provide the best care for patients within that.

We have committed to investing around 25% more in new medicines, with two key changes at the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence—an increase to the cost-effectiveness threshold, and the introduction of a new value for assessing health-related quality of life. We have also introduced a 15% cap on repayments made by industry as part of the voluntary scheme for branded medicines pricing, access and growth, with greater market predictability for investment as a consequence of that as well. Furthermore, colleagues across Government continue to work closely with industry, patient groups and the devolved Administrations on ideas to support the commercial environment, as well as on medicines pricing in a future voluntary scheme.

On the hon. Gentleman’s point around reforms to the tax system, he will be aware that discussions are ongoing across Government all the time, particularly in support of entrepreneurial investment decisions made in this country. That is true not least for early-stage founders in the life sciences and broader technology as well, where, as a consequence of decisions made by the Treasury, this country now has one of the most attractive regimes for employee equity participation.

The motion will ensure that the UK can compete for the largest and most impactful investments in life sciences manufacturing.

[Dr Spencer]

Will the Minister respond on the point about VAT on medicines and trials?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I am happy to look into the specific case study in the papers, which the hon. Gentleman referenced. I have to say that I have not seen the mention in The Times of the company he talked about, and I am reluctant to speculate on the context. However, if he is looking for an answer, I am happy to write to him about that case.

These investments will make a significant contribution to UK economic growth and outcomes for NHS patients. The life sciences large investment portfolio is a key tool that will support the Government’s missions to kick-start economic growth and build an NHS fit for the future. Working together with industry, the Government are delivering better patient outcomes and driving economic growth, and I look forward to continuing that work and building on that momentum. I commend the motion to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the motion, That this House authorises the Secretary of State to make payments, by way of financial assistance under section 8 of the Industrial Development Act 1982, in excess of £30 million to any successful applicant to the Life Sciences Large Investment Portfolio, launched on 15 November 2025, up to a cumulative total of £570 million.

Online Harms

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Thursday 19th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I thank the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire (Ian Sollom) for bringing this important debate to the House. A number of hon. Members have mentioned bereaved families, and I want to pay tribute to all those families. Ian Russell—with whom I have had a series of meetings, including this morning—Stuart and Amanda Stephens, Ellen Roome and so many others have gone through the most horrific of tragedies, and despite that, they have consistently fought for appropriate action for other families. I carry them in my heart and mind when I think about the prospect of online safety regulation doing justice to future generations of children in this country.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire and to the other Members who made contributions on this important topic. In the interest of time, I propose to prioritise responses to them individually before talking about the wider context. First and foremost, I thank the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire for doing a stocktake of progress on the child safety and illegal content duties so far. He will be aware that Ofcom is due to report on content harmful to children and progress on that question this year. I understand that will be due by October, and I look forward to its findings to assess where we can go further still.

The only other thing I will flag to the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire is that the national consultation we have launched on children’s wellbeing includes the question of functionality limitations. The functionalities that he talked about—algorithmic recommendations and the structural aspects that make parts of social media particularly harmful to children—will be in scope. I would very much welcome his submissions on that as well.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon and Consett (Liz Twist) for her consistent advocacy on this question, and for the roundtable she held with the Mental Health Foundation and the Molly Rose Foundation, which I was glad to attend. I thank her for not just shining a light and keeping a consistent focus across the House on the scale of the problem, but flagging the diversity of views on how we should tackle it most effectively. I have been in schools pretty much every week since the launch of the consultation. I was with young people just this morning, and I will be in a school next week. She is right to raise the diversity and depth of views held on how we act, not whether we act.

My hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon and Consett raised concerns about the suicide forum, which my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward) also mentioned. I share those concerns, and I have engaged with Ofcom to ensure that it is acting quickly and robustly. I had a meeting with one of the bereaved families just this morning. I will continue to ensure that Ofcom does everything it can with the powers it has, and that we continue to look at any further powers required to ensure we act robustly to prevent any such incidents happening again. I would, of course, be delighted to meet my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon and Consett to continue that conversation.

I have had the privilege of engaging with the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) on the illegal sale of drugs; I know that she has been, quite rightly, actively advocating on that question. She will be aware that it has been deemed a priority offence. Ofcom is closely monitoring compliance. I know there is more to do; she has made that point very firmly to me. I will also inform her that the National Crime Agency is looking to identify offenders operating online, both nationally and internationally. She made a very important point on covert filming, and we will take what she raised into consideration. Systems that are designed to remove such content will now have to do so within 48 hours of non-consensual intimate images being put up online. I will continue to look at the implementation of that measure once it comes into force.

My hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Dr Sullivan) raised very important points about the impact of social media usage on brain development, which is one motivating factor for our consultation. We are looking at not just acute harms, but the chronic impact over time of engagement on social media. I am grateful to her for raising the point that there is a suite of options that might be appropriate. I very much share her intent that, at the heart of it, the action we take will make platforms, not young people, responsible for the harms being conducted online.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Middleton North (Mrs Blundell) for advocating on the questions of misinformation and community cohesion, both in her community and nationally. On her point about misinformation and the erosion of public trust, which was also made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), there is a very clear foreign interference offence in the Online Safety Act. I will continue to look at the implementation of that. Alongside that, I serve on the defending democracy taskforce with the Security Minister. This is a priority question that we have been looking at. I will continue to ensure that we do more to press the enforcement of existing law and to look at where we can go further still.

Both my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Middleton North and my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Paul Waugh) raised important points about community cohesion, and how we must use online experiences not to divide but to unite our communities. In that context, we have taken a series of initiatives on media literacy to support the ability to sift fact from fiction across our communities. The foreign interference provisions in the Online Safety Act are also a key vector of enforcement against the causes described.

On antisocial behaviour, I would be interested, in the light of the consultation, to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy about where the headteachers and young people she has engaged with think we ought to go. I agree with her on the divisive impacts, and we will continue to look not just at illegal content but at how we empower users in relation to divisive content that, individually, might be legal but, collectively, ends up being deeply harmful to community cohesion, as well as to democratic integrity.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reading Central (Matt Rodda) reaffirmed the point that he has made to me in person about this issue. I pay tribute again to Stuart and Amanda Stephens, who have gone through the most horrific tragedy in their family. I am deeply grateful for their grit and resilience through it, and for my hon. Friend’s advocacy alongside them. He asked me for a sense of direction on where the consultation is going. I will not pre-empt its substantive content, but we have had almost 25,000 responses—I hope and expect that this will be the most engaged-with consultation in the history of British national consultations—including thousands of young people. We have designed a dedicated version of the consultation for young people as well as one for parents and carers. I am keen to hear my hon. Friend’s views from his engagement, as well as those of other Members.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale raised a very important point about the documentary “Inside The Manosphere”, the growing cause of misogyny in this country and this Government’s priority of tackling violence against women and girls. He will be aware that in December, we published our landmark cross-Government violence against women and girls strategy. That was the underpinning force for our making cyber-flashing and intimate image abuse priority offences in this country, banning the creation of nudification apps and banning people from creating and sharing that content, and it is why we are going further still in ensuring that such content is taken down robustly and quickly, within 48 hours. On the point that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Middleton North raised about the growing prevalence of antisemitism and division online, I look forward to an imminent meeting with the Antisemitism Policy Trust to figure out how we can go further not just in law but in terms of awareness of it across our communities.

I turn to the contribution from the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Winchester (Dr Chambers). I have met the Liberal Democrat Front-Bench team to talk about their suggestions on functionalities and age ratings. I would of course be happy to continue the conversation, and I encourage them to contribute to the consultation.

Finally, the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, raised a very important point about chatbots. I hope it is very clear that chatbots ought never to replace professional support. We will continue to look at that, and I will update the House when we have decided on specific steps. We announced just yesterday that we are looking at the issues of labelling and personality rights, and I hope to update the House on them soon.

Media Literacy Action Plan

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2026 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

Today I am laying before Parliament the Government’s media literacy action plan. It sets out our commitment to fostering a safe, informed and resilient digital society.

Media literacy is an essential everyday skill that supports people to understand and take part in modern life. It helps people of all ages to: make sense of the information they encounter online and assess whether it is reliable; communicate safely; and navigate the internet with confidence. It supports understanding of how platforms and new technologies, including artificial intelligence, shape what people see and share, and enables informed choices about personal information. It also supports participation in everyday activities, including exploring new interests, connecting with others and taking part in democratic life. It is central to digital inclusion and to ensuring that people can benefit from online services and opportunities.

The importance of media literacy, and the need for cross-Government co-ordination, was highlighted by the Lords Communications and Digital Committee in its 2025 inquiry. While the Online Safety Act 2023 provides the regulatory foundation for safer online experiences, regulation alone cannot address the challenges created by misleading information, harmful content and rapid technological change. Significant work on media literacy is already taking place, with Government Departments, Ofcom, charities, educators, libraries and industry partners delivering media literacy activity across the UK. Education and public empowerment are essential, and the Government’s wider programme of work, including the consultation, “Growing up in the online world: a national consultation”, will support skills development and help to build resilience across society.

This plan sets out a clear approach for a single, co-ordinated, cross-Government framework for the next three years, establishes shared principles and priority areas for action, and provides a clearer picture of the support available across the UK. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has provided funding for a pilot media literacy campaign, and the plan otherwise integrates media literacy into existing initiatives within departmental budgets.

Over the next three years, the Government will focus on priorities in building public awareness of media literacy and supporting access to trusted information; preparing children and young people for a digital future; boosting local initiatives to support people facing barriers to participation; and ensuring a coherent, co-ordinated approach across Government and with partners beyond it.

Through this work, the Government’s ambition is to ensure that everyone can take part in the online world with confidence and benefit fully from the opportunities it offers.

[HCWS1399]

UK-based Tech Companies

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Betts. I thank the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) for securing this important debate on Government support for UK-based tech companies. I am grateful to him and to all other hon. Members across the Chamber for their contributions. They did a sterling job of showing that the UK is truly a buzzing tech economy in every single part of the country—right across the constituencies represented here and beyond.

This Government are committed to supporting the UK’s thriving tech ecosystem. We are proud to be home to the largest tech sector in Europe, valued at nearly £1 trillion. The success of UK-based technology firms benefits us all. These are some of the fastest growing parts of the economy and are already employing millions of people. The innovations they bring are delivering major benefits to people and communities right across the country, transforming everything from the way we work to how we manage our health.

Given the luxury of time, I propose to respond to each of the points raised by hon. Members. First, I very much appreciate the points on competition policy made by the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill, and shared by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez). Of course, I am reluctant to mention any specifics about the interventions, investigations or engagements the CMA is pursuing as an independent regulator. As the shadow Minister acknowledged, the commitments that the CMA has looked at could be quicker than a full conduct requirement process.

The CMA assures the Government that it continues to monitor firm compliance. If Apple and Google fail to meet their commitments, the CMA will consider the use of statutory powers to take further action. I am conscious that it has just finished consulting, as the shadow Minister mentioned, on the first set of remedies and commitments in the light of the designations of Google, in search, and Apple and Google, in mobile platform markets. I expect very soon to hear greater detail, as well as firm timelines, on that particular point.

The virtue of the previous Government’s digital markets regime is that it is flexible and proportionate, and allows for some remedies that are quicker, and others, where this is due, that are more robust. The Government expect that the CMA will act in line with its growth and competition mandate. Those two issues overlap much more than we often give the CMA credit for.

I will briefly take the opportunity to address the shadow Minister’s history of the UK tech sector over the last 14 years. Having been in that sector through part of that time, although I very much value the growth seen in the period, I am also conscious of the particular fact that drove me into politics: over that entire period—one of the most productive periods in global technology markets—no one growing up in this country ever saw a company go from zero to the global top 10; in the United States, in that same period, people saw eight out of those top 10 companies do that. The levels of capital investment and IT in this country were materially below that of the United States. When the shadow Minister talks about the benchmark as being European growth, I fear I have to say, given that it is ambition season among Conservative Front Benchers, that she might consider joining that and raising the ambition to being a global first, not just a European-relative first.

In that period, as the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill and the shadow Minister noted, power concentrated in the cloud market in particular and right across US big tech. It was clear to me at the time that the Government were much more focused on engagement with US big tech and exactly the trend that the shadow Minister described—the power concentrated in the cloud market.

The shadow Minister’s points on agentic AI are very well made. I will make sure that we think about that deeply and engage with the CMA on the implications for agentic AI, the possibility of bundling and the limited competition that might result.

My hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Chris Evans) raised the virtues of the Welsh ecosystem. It is an ecosystem that I know and deeply value personally. I particularly value my hon. Friend’s advocacy for Academii, in his constituency. His point about clusters anchored by Welsh universities is really well made. As a Government, we have committed over £1.5 billion to the question of how research translates into commercialisation. I would be happy to engage further with him on any particular instances where the Government can do more, in his constituency and beyond.

My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards)—the AI MP—who is no longer in his place, made a similar and important point about Leeds’s Nexus hub. I have visited Leeds in this role, and I particularly value the contributions of Leeds’s tech sector to healthcare and financial services innovation.

The hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) made a deeply important point about procurement, which was shared by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins). I have a particular interest in defence procurement that I hope to come to more fully in my speech.

The hon. Member for Tiverton and Minehead (Rachel Gilmour), who is no longer in her place, has always been a strong champion for family businesses in the contexts of technology and agriculture. I share her ambition for UK tech businesses to start, scale and stay here.

My hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Dan Aldridge) has deep experience, and is also no longer in his place—despite that experience. I agree with him that although our policy is often in a good place, there is a lot more for us to do to spread awareness of that policy. I would be happy to visit him, and others, to be a small part of spreading that awareness.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Alison Taylor) for her strong advocacy for the innovation zone, both prior to and subsequent to coming to this House. She has won £38.7 million for travel support in particular and transport support more generally in that innovation zone. I will say how excited I am about the historic growth in AI investment in the wider region, which I hope will create a series of opportunities for investment, and opportunities for young people growing up in and around Glasgow to take part in it.

My hon. Friend’s mention of photonics is deeply important. Photonics is not just a British strength but an increasingly important vector for national security strength globally in the semiconductor context. I am grateful to her for championing that subsector.

In response to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), I note that Northern Ireland is indeed close to my heart. I grew up visiting Northern Ireland and Belfast for lots of debating competitions. He will be glad to hear that, in this role, I was back in Northern Ireland at the artificial intelligence collaboration centre at Ulster University, seeing not just the world-leading cyber capabilities in Belfast and Northern Ireland but the transformational effect that Ulster University’s investments have had on the city by creating opportunities for young people. He will also be glad to hear that just this morning, I spent time with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland talking about our shared ambition to do even more to support the cyber and AI sectors in Northern Ireland.

The points of the hon. Member for West Dorset (Edward Morello) about energy tech were well made. I feel very strongly that our plans on clean energy are best pursued if they make the most of AI and modern technology. I think that they are pursued with a deeper sense of building public consensus if we are able to show that our clean energy values align with our prosperity aspirations around AI and technology, not just domestically but through Britain’s ability to export lessons and technology to other places, and to move the needle on global climate change.

[Edward Morello]

Shortly before the debate, the Minister said he would like to visit Weston-super-Mare and other locations. I invite him to beautiful West Dorset to visit the fibre optics company Sintela, which is one of the UK’s biggest success stories.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I have a 100% record so far of committing to visits when asked. I do not want to set too much of a precedent, but given the numbers in the room, I would be happy to take the hon. Member up on his kind offer as well.

The hon. Member also made an important point about SME representation on trade missions; on the three international visits that I have been on—to the US, South Korea and India—we have been primarily focused on SMEs. If he has recommendations of firms that would benefit from such engagement, I would be keen to take him up on them—perhaps we can discuss that in West Dorset during my visit. On word clouds, which he mentioned—I know a thing or two about word clouds—he is right about the presence of the word “ecosystem”. I would add “deeply thriving” to that, because that is what Britain’s ecosystem is.

I am delighted to hear about the history of entrepreneurship in the family of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, and I am keen on any lessons from her mother about Twitter engagement. I also share and value her ambition for more entrepreneurship; that dream is shared across the House as well. I will come to her five points, which I think the Government are equally focused on.

I will now set out some of the things that the Government are doing. As I mentioned, we start from a position of considerable global strength. Four of the world’s top 10 universities are in the UK, and we have a proud history of technological innovation, but there is clearly more to be done. That is why, in our modern industrial strategy, we set out the first dedicated plan to support the UK’s digital and technologies sector, alongside a separate plan for life sciences. For digital and technologies, we have focused on six frontier technologies with the greatest potential to drive growth: advanced connectivity, AI, cyber-security, engineering biology, quantum and semiconductors. By 2035, we want the UK to be one of the world’s top three places to create, invest and scale up a fast-growing technology business.

Building on the industrial strategy, we went further still at the 2025 autumn Budget. We set out a package of additional support for founders and innovators to start and scale businesses here in the UK, including reforms to Government procurement, tax and our public finance institutions. As the Chancellor made clear, the Government are backing the next generation of UK tech start-ups and entrepreneurs. These plans are about making sure that we are supporting our tech companies at every stage of their development.

A great tech company starts with an idea. That is why we are making a record public investment in R&D, with spending rising to £22.6 billion by 2029-30. We have one of the most generous R&D tax credit relief systems in the entire world, and I have personally heard testament to that from a series of founders in the UK ecosystem, not least in AI, over the past few weeks.

Through our industrial strategy, we are also making sure that investment is targeted to bring innovation to market, with £7 billion for innovative companies to scale and commercialise technological and scientific breakthroughs. To ensure that the benefits are felt right across the country, we are backing high-potential innovation clusters throughout the UK through programmes such as the local innovation partnerships fund.

Brilliant ideas alone, of course, are not enough to grow a business, so we are taking a whole-of-government approach to ensure that the right conditions are in place for businesses to reach their full potential. We are expanding the British Business Bank to give high-growth tech firms access to long-term scale-up capital. We are upskilling private investors to invest in deep tech through our science and technology venture capital fellowship programme. We are ensuring that firms have access to the best skills and talent through our £187 million TechFirst skills programme and we are hoping to attract the very best minds in the world through the Government’s global talent taskforce, as well as the £54 million global talent fund.

We are not stopping there. Across the board, we are looking at how we can use the Government’s levers to support our technology ecosystem. Part of that is about infrastructure, whether that is connecting people, businesses and universities through initiatives like the Oxford-to-Cambridge growth corridor, or funding the specialist infrastructure that tech companies need through the AI research resource and engineering biology scale-up infrastructure programmes.

It is also about regulations that help, not hinder, new products to reach the market. That is why we have set up the Regulatory Innovation Office, which has invested over £12.5 million already in helping regulators to adopt new tools and approaches. Sometimes it is challenging to bring new technologies to market, so we are also reforming how the Government procure technologies to lead the way and back British SMEs.

In the autumn Budget, we announced an advance market commitment, backed with £100 million of Government funding, to buy products from novel and promising UK chip companies—an important economic as well as national security focus—once they reach a high-performance benchmark. I know that the Ministry of Defence has committed to a significant budget allocation to novel technology procurement and I am keen to ensure that the design and process for that are as compelling as the scale of that ambition.

This debate is about UK-based businesses, but we must also recognise that we are part of a global market, with the huge opportunities that that offers. We are working hard with our international partners to boost collaboration and open new markets for innovative firms globally. We have agreed industrial strategy partnerships with France and Japan, have a Saudi-UK strategic partnership and an India-UK technology security initiative, and are pursuing deeper connections still with other key markets. Last autumn, the top US tech firms, mentioned across this debate, committed to investing £31 billion in the UK.

We are right across the things that matter to start-ups here in relation to capital: the force that is the BBB investing more; the National Wealth Fund investing more; a sovereign AI unit investing earlier; and the Mansion House pension fund reforms that are spurring greater investment. We are bringing capital to the service of British start-ups.

In the context of compute—a critical input for AI—both our AI growth zones programme and our AI research resource programme are ensuring that British companies are at the front of the queue when it comes to adequate compute for AI. When it comes to Government as a customer, the advance market commitment and the reforms that I mentioned in relation to the MOD aspire to that and to ensuring that the Government are the best partner that UK start-ups can benefit from.

When it comes to building a sense of community for talent in this country, the global talent taskforce, the global talent fund and, crucially, the enterprise management incentives scheme—now one of the world’s best tax incentive schemes for early-stage employees to have deep equity participation in start-ups—mean that Britain is at the front of the queue in convening a compelling community of tech talent. When it comes to clarity on regulation, the AI growth lab, the Regulatory Innovation Office reforms that I mentioned and the growth mandates for regulators mean that Britain is regulating dynamically —moving regulation at the pace of technological progress.

At the heart of all this is a culture that prizes innovation and that says to entrepreneurs that their success is our national success, and that their companies are national champions when they create jobs and invest in frontier innovation here. We are radically shifting Britain’s culture to being a culture of agency and innovation.

In that context, I am grateful to all Members across the House for their partnership in that mission. The UK’s exceptional technology sector is a key national asset. The steps that the Government are taking will ensure that UK-based tech companies thrive at every stage of their growth.

Technology Sovereignty

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Tuesday 10th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

It is such a pleasure to serve under you in the Chair, Ms Vaz. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, for securing this debate and bringing to it her deep expertise across engineering, policymaking and leadership in the House on the question of tech sovereignty. I also thank all hon. Members for making very thoughtful points and bringing to the debate a range of experiences—as well as swiftness of speech, given the constraints imposed by time today.

I have long felt that the central question in our politics and for our country is the future of technology in this country. It will be the major driver of prosperity and dignity for people, and the central question is whether Britain gets to shape it or is shaped by it. In Westminster, we sometimes talk about technology sovereignty as an abstract geopolitical goal, but we have to keep in mind that, ultimately, it is the basis for our NHS radiologists to have access to the best tools for detecting cancer, with data here in the UK; for British founders and builders to be able to train and deploy models, rather than depending on foreign APIs and pricing; and for people in their homes and workplaces across the country to know that their everyday AI systems are governed transparently and democratically here in the UK.

My view is that technology sovereignty is a state’s ability to have strategic leverage when it comes to a technology, such that it can ensure ongoing access to critical inputs and ongoing assurance that its wider economic and national security objectives can be met more broadly. It is to take the best tools the world has to offer today, but also to shape the rest, and ultimately to make that which is critical here in Britain.

As I think of it, that strategic leverage is obtained by three steps on a ladder. The first is just to have enough of the critical inputs. Taking AI as an example, we have to have enough chips today to be able to do anything with AI in the first instance. With that in mind, the Government have always been very keen to secure the level of capital investment that means that Britain is at least at the table with critical inputs.

Once we are at the table, the second part of sovereignty is to make sure that we have some diversification in who we procure critical inputs from so that we can bargain effectively. We are the party of labour; we understand that who has power matters as much as what the powers are. In that context, one of the first things I did in my role was to engage with a series of companies in every part of the stack so that we were able to build more diversity into the landscape.

The third rung of the ladder is, ultimately, to build British in order to make sure that we have the full-fat version of sovereign capability here in critical parts of the stack.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for setting out his sovereignty stack. Just as an example, is an LLM a critical input or another level in the stack—and does it need to be British?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I valued my hon. Friend’s earlier point that sovereignty has to be seen in the round. We cannot make everything here; we have to look at the entire bundle that we have to offer. In the context of LLMs, there is some uncertainty as to whether all the capability will ultimately accrue in closed proprietary models, or whether open-source, open-weight models might be part of it. To me, as things stand today, it is a pretty important part of the stack. The question then is whether we have enough of it to be able to make the most of it by adopting it for economic and national security usage here, or whether there are aspects in which, at least from a distillation or small-model point of view, we need to develop some capabilities here as well. I do not think there is a binary answer to the overarching question; the answer is much more nuanced. I am happy to discuss that further if it is of interest.

As I said, the third rung of the ladder is, ultimately, to build British and focus on areas in which we can develop our strengths. I have to point out that we made sure that Nscale, one of our neocloud hyperscale providers, was an important part of the supply chain for AI growth zones. I noticed that yesterday Nscale raised the largest ever series-C funding in Europe, in part as a result of the Government’s support and convening in that context. Arm, the leading chip design company globally, is still headquartered in Cambridge, and we have fantastic companies in the AI inference chip part of the stack, Fractile and Olix being two of them. It is an area that I spend a lot of my time on.

When it comes to models, we have huge strengths, not just because a number of the Gemini teams and researchers continue to sit in King’s Cross at DeepMind, but because companies developing foundation models in AI for science and autonomous vehicles, embodied AI, and aspects of world models and computer vision reside here in the UK. Wayve raised £1.5 billion just this year, the largest funding round in Europe to date for that stage. It is a fantastic company that looks in particular at embodied AI and vision. I am proud of those companies. It is right that the Government are supporting them through the lens of tech sovereignty, as that is what both Britain’s and the companies’ best interests dictate.

The sovereign AI unit will be crucial to that. I am glad to see the level of interest in that across the House. It will concentrate efforts on priority areas. There was interest in my specifying those areas. The four areas that are of interest at the outset are novel compute, in particular focusing on the inference chip part of the stack; novel model architecture; AI for science—I point hon. Members to the AI for science strategy published by the Department three or four months ago, which set out particular areas of focus and priority—and embodied AI.

To give a concrete example of early action that the sovereign AI unit has taken, we have already invested £8 million in the OpenBind consortium to accelerate AI-driven drug discovery, and £5 million in the Encode: AI for Science fellowship to support the next generation of world-class talent. The focus of the unit will be on both capital and compute, to incrementally anchor more and more British companies here, but I know that the unit will only be part of the solution. We have a role to look at innovation and market support much more broadly across the tech landscape.

In November, we also announced a significant advance market commitment—a deeply innovative procurement shift—which meant that up to £100 million in Government funding was available to buy products from promising UK chip companies once they reach a high-performance benchmark. That presents UK start-ups with an exciting opportunity to grow and compete right here, building for the world.

AI is of course just one area of Britain’s flourishing tech ecosystem. I point out to my hon. Friends the Members for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington) and for Lichfield (Dave Robertson), who made important points about quantum, that the Government have doubled the rate of investment in quantum, with about £1 billion committed over the next four years. The points on helium made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield have very much been taken into account. The Government are looking at the developing situation on helium supply in the middle east, which is of concern.

Through our national programme, we broadly want to anchor development and access to technological capabilities that are most important to economic growth and national security. That means, in the context of quantum, more companies starting, growing and staying here and, in the context of AI, not just developing capabilities in particular parts of the stack, but in part looking upstream for skills as well.

In that context, I agree totally with my hon. Friends the Members for Cambridge (Daniel Zeichner) and for Southend East and Rochford (Mr Alaba) that the quality and scale of our talent and skills in our universities and schools is the single biggest determinant of where we end up. I am happy to write to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge about the UKRI changes that we are making. In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Southend East and Rochford, IP capitalisation is a deeply important part of what I focus on with the Intellectual Property Office, and I am happy to engage him on the question of Essex University in particular.

[Ben Lake (Ceredigion Preseli) (PC)]

The Minister knows that the Computer Misuse Act 1990 criminalises a lot of legitimate cyber-resilience and vulnerability research. I think that the Government are minded to introduce a statutory defence for such research, but can he share whether that defence will be introduced as part of the cyber Bill?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The hon. Member is absolutely right to raise that point about a defence for cyber-security purposes. The Computer Misuse Act is being reviewed at the moment—the Home Office is looking at it—but, as I mentioned in Committee on the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, that is not the appropriate vehicle, given its much narrower scope than the broad scope that we would like in the context of a defence. For those reasons, I am keen that we pursue the matter, but elsewhere.

I am conscious of time, so I will proceed at pace. Alongside quantum and AI, semiconductors are another technology that underpins the global economy and is fundamental to our way of life. As part of our industrial strategy, digital and technology sector plan, we are taking measures to foster the growth of that particular sector.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Steve Yemm) spoke very thoughtfully about the fact that we should not just rely on venture-focused companies in particular parts of the country, but look at our industrial heritage. That is exactly why I have focused on ensuring that the AI growth zones programme puts data centres in the north-east, alongside the headquarters of our largest listed tech company. A deep heritage of financial services technology innovation in Newcastle and the surrounding area is now able to benefit from good jobs anchored by that data centre.

In south Wales, the data centre planned for the site of the old Ford car manufacturing plant gives hope for jobs in the semiconductor cluster, anchored by that data centre. That is critical. In north Wales, data centres are pulling our nuclear small modular reactor into the future, which is critical to thousands of jobs in that community. In Lanarkshire, the old steelworking community, which lost thousands of jobs and never fully recovered, now has hope from half a billion pounds of community investment as a result of data centres. That is precisely what I believe in.

[Anneliese Dodds]

In one sentence, will the Minister say something about another geographical issue: collaboration with like-minded countries, especially in the EU?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I will simply give a note of total affirmation on the importance of that. Having met a series of Ministers from Europe, I know that we have a huge amount in common and a huge amount to do in the future.

I am being tested pretty intensively on time, so I will focus on one final point. Some Members rightly raised the question of mergers, acquisitions and investment controls. As my hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee will know from the time that I worked for her on the Bill as it was proceeding through the House, the National Security and Investment Act 2021 is an excellent example of where we are ensuring that investment and sensitive areas maintain the national security interests of Britain now and in the longer term.

In summary, the Government will continue to support our tech sectors as best they can. Only yesterday, Nscale raised the largest series-C funding round in all of Europe. Isambard-AI has raised a £50 million round for embodied AI—manufacturing AI—as well. Those are testaments to the approach that I have set out, which will ensure that British firms and people can seize every opportunity they can in tech-enabled Britain.

Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I thank the shadow Minister for getting those comments on the record. Would the Minister like to address those points?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I am happy to write to the hon. Member.

[The Chair]

The shadow Minister can keep us updated on whether that has happened.

New Clause 2

Register of foreign powers for the purposes of Part 4

“(1) For the purposes of informing action taken under Part 4 of this Act, the Secretary of State must, by regulations, establish and maintain a register of foreign powers that the Secretary of State believes present a risk to the United Kingdom’s critical network and information systems within six months of the passing of this Act.

(2) Foreign powers designated by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) must include states –

(a) which have been confirmed by GCHQ as having—

(i) perpetrated, or attempted to perpetrate, a cyber-attack in the UK in the preceding seven years,

(ii) targeted, or intended to target, that attack at the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers, or

(iii) carried out, or intended to carry out, that attack through a state department, agency or affiliate group,

(b) which GCHQ has warned pose a risk to the security or resilience of the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers.

(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.

(4) In this section, ‘foreign power’ means–

(a) the sovereign or other head of a foreign state in their public capacity;

(b) a foreign government, or part of a foreign government;

(c) an agency or authority of a foreign government, or of part of a foreign government;

(d) an authority responsible for administering the affairs of an area within a foreign country or territory, or persons exercising the functions of such an authority; or

(e) a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign government. A political party is a governing political party of a foreign government if persons holding political or official posts in the foreign government or part of the foreign government—

(i) hold those posts as a result of, or in the course of, their membership of the party, or

(ii) in exercising the functions of those posts, are subject to the direction or control of, or significantly influenced by, the party.”—(Dr Ben Spencer.)

This new clause would require the Government to maintain a register of state actors posing a threat to UK cyber security for the purposes of exercising the Secretary of State’s powers under Part 4 of the Act, which enable the giving of directions in the interests of national security.

Brought up, read the First time, and Question proposed (10 February), That the clause be read a Second time.

Question again proposed.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Chadwick (Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe) (LD)]

In our previous sitting, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge set out clearly the cyber-threat posed by China, and argued that, through new clause 2, China should be explicitly recognised as a foreign power presenting a significant risk to the United Kingdom. He rightly highlighted the precedent in UK legislation for maintaining registers of hostile or high-risk state actors to protect national security. I agree that Parliament should be unequivocal in recognising the Chinese Communist party as a strategic cyber-threat, particularly given evidence of state-linked cyber-espionage, infrastructure compromise and the targeting of critical national infrastructure.

We have seen data from the Cabinet Office last week indicating that the Government plan to drastically reduce the integrated security fund spending on domestic cyber and tech to counter cyber-attacks. It will be cut from £113.3 million to £95 million by 2028-29, which is a reduction of 16%. Domestic spending to counter Russian threats in the same period will incur a drop of more than 20%. Those reductions leave us dangerously exposed and are in direct opposition to the Government’s promises to support the UK’s national security priorities. New clause 2 offers the chance to identify and monitor state actors that pose a threat to UK cyber-security.

The register must also reflect the evolving nature of cyber-risk. Threats do not arise solely from formally hostile states, but also from jurisdictions where hostile cyber-actors operate at scale, using digital infrastructure to target UK systems and citizens. We have seen that in countries such as India and Nigeria, where organised cyber-criminal networks have run sophisticated international operations against the UK, exploiting cloud services and telecommunications infrastructure. In India, law enforcement has dismantled major cyber-crime hubs linked to international targeting, including operations specifically affecting large numbers of British victims.

In 2025, the National Crime Agency worked in partnership with India’s Central Bureau of Investigation to raid an organised crime group in Uttar Pradesh, which had targeted more than 100 UK citizens with pop-ups stating that their devices had been compromised, losing them more than £390,000. That is not only an unacceptable financial loss for our citizens, but a significant waste of resources. In Nigeria, long-established cyber-criminal networks continue to conduct large-scale digital fraud campaigns aimed at overseas targets including the United Kingdom. Interpol’s Operation Serengeti in 2025 tackled high-impact cyber-crimes in Nigeria and 17 other nations, arresting 1,209 suspects and recovering nearly $100 million that had been stolen through cyber-fraud.

Although these states might not be hostile in a geopolitical sense, hostile cyber-actors operating within their borders are none the less inflicting sustained harm and placing heavy burdens on our cyber-defence and law enforcement resources. I support the aims of new clause 2, but urge Ministers to ensure that the framework is flexible enough to capture not only hostile states but jurisdictions that consistently serve as bases for large-scale hostile cyber-activity. Data from the Cabinet Office shows that integrated security fund spending on Russia is set to fall over 20% between 2026 and 2029, which shows that the Government are not taking threats from Russia, or other hostile nations, seriously enough.

[Kanishka Narayan]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms McVey.

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, for the new clauses in his name, which would require the Secretary of State to create a register of foreign powers that pose a threat to UK cyber-security, to review that register, and to lay a report before Parliament. This is intended to inform the use of powers granted under part 4 of the Bill. I empathise with the shadow Minister’s concerns that hostile foreign actors could target the network and information systems of operators of essential services or critical supplies. That is a clear risk, and one that we are addressing through the Bill.

As drafted, the Bill grants the Secretary of State new powers to issue national security directions to regulated entities or regulators where their compromise poses a national security risk. So long as those tests are met, the powers may be used by the Secretary of State irrespective of the actor that is causing the national security incident or threat.

New clause 2 would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK based on GCHQ advice. I reassure the shadow Minister that regardless of the proposed new clause, any decision to use the powers in this part of the Bill will be informed by expert national security advice from GCHQ. As a result, it is unclear what additional support the proposed register would provide to the Secretary of State when, for example, deciding whether to issue a direction to a regulated entity.

Additionally, the report required by new clause 3 would effectively be a list of the vulnerabilities of the network and information systems of our essential services, and would therefore be an asset to malicious actors. That would be counterproductive to national security. The new clause would allow the Secretary of State not to publish part or all of the report, if publishing would be contrary to the interests of national security. However, it is unclear how even part of the report could be published without harming national security, given its intended content.

Drafting a report of vulnerabilities that cannot be disclosed to Parliament without harming national security would simply duplicate existing assessments, and run the risk of distracting Government from more effective measures to protect from hostile foreign actors. That is not to say that we shirk transparency about these kinds of risk. The Government are already able to communicate with Parliament and the public about such cyber-security risks where it is appropriate to do so, through things such as the National Cyber Security Centre’s annual report and advisories. I therefore kindly ask that the shadow Minister withdraw the new clause.

I thank the hon. Member for Henley and Thame for the Liberal Democrat new clauses in his name, which would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement of how the Government intend to address risks posed by foreign actors to UK network and information systems, and to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned in part or in full by foreign states.

Let me reassure the hon. Member that the Government take the risks posed by foreign interference seriously. The NCSC’s annual reviews continue to highlight cyber-risks to the UK from foreign actors, as well as measures to mitigate those risks. We have robust processes for assessing such threats, drawing on the expertise of the intelligence community, including the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority.

The measures introduced by the Bill will boost the security and resilience of network and information systems across essential services, managed services and relevant digital services, protecting them from the risks of foreign interference. Where that is not enough, the Bill provides a backstop: the new direction powers in the Bill will enable the Government to protect our critical services from exactly those kinds of national security risks. We will be able to require a regulated entity to undertake any action that is necessary and proportionate for national security in response to the threat of a compromise. Conducting assessments of the ownership structures of the many thousands of in-scope entities within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive, distracting Government from more effective measures to protect our services.

Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership, or assessing whether our powers are adequate, as the Opposition’s new clause 3 would require, would provide valuable insight to our adversaries. As I have previously set out, there is a clear pathway for Government to communicate with Parliament and the public about such cyber-risks where it is appropriate to do so, but where we identify specific concerns, it is right that we retain the ability to assess and respond without disclosing our conclusions to those who might exploit them.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that, as drafted, new clause 13 is not aligned with the intended scope of the Bill. The Bill is solely concerned with entities that are currently, or could one day be, regulated under the NIS regulations. This new clause would require a statement on the risks posed to all UK network and information systems, which is a significant broadening of the scope of NIS-regulated entities and sectors. Similarly, the focus on Government procurement seems outside that scope, given that Government network and information systems are not wholly regulated by the Bill. For those reasons, I ask that the hon. Member for Henley and Thame kindly consider not pressing his amendment.

[Dr Spencer]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but we have seen over the past six months, especially with the alleged spying incidents in Parliament, the Government’s resistance to recognising the Chinese Communist party as a threat. When it comes to our new clause 3 and concerns over transparency, we have also seen, in the last few weeks, that there are mechanisms—for example, the Intelligence and Security Committee—to ensure the disclosure of documents, while preserving national security. I would therefore like to press new clauses 2 and 3 to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Spencer]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, which is more for the Minister and the Government Whip’s benefit than mine.

Properly established ISACs will not only increase real-time awareness of cyber-risks and mitigations, but could also alleviate some of the burden on regulators in terms of sector-specific intelligence analysis. Industry feedback and experience from the adoption of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 indicate that sectoral regulators are unlikely to have the capacity to assist with intelligence sharing in relation to real-time cyber-risks.

We know from the sectoral regulators’ oral evidence that building sufficient capacity for effective regulatory oversight is a challenge. Where we have models for sector-led and market-led good practice in hardening cyber-resilience, we should look at how it can be rolled out further. Seeing more of these organisations emerge could even lead to broader adoption beyond NIS-regulated areas to other industries. ISACs have the potential to become integral nodes in improving whole-of-society cyber-resilience, and it is an approach called for by many cyber industry stakeholders. I therefore commend new clause 4.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the shadow Minister for this amendment, which would require the Secretary of State to review how information sharing and analysis centres support the functioning of the NIS regime and what steps the Government can take to improve them.

I recognise the intent of this new clause. These centres play a key role in promoting collaboration and co-ordination in the cyber-security space, allowing organisations to share information, intelligence and best practice. In fact, the UK already benefits from a range of such initiatives, many of which are facilitated by the National Cyber Security Centre. In its latest annual report, the NCSC noted that more than 200 companies now meet regularly in trust groups to exchange intelligence and best practice, and to support each other in incident response. NIS regulators also support organisations to share information with each other in sector-specific groups.

However, while I fully endorse the value of those initiatives, I do not believe it is the Government’s role to review how they operate or to mandate how or where they are established. Such centres are meant to be a forum in which organisations can voluntarily engage in the exchange of information. As such, they operate most effectively where the initiative for participation comes from the organisations themselves or from technical authorities such as the NCSC.

The Government are, of course, committed to ensuring that the information-sharing provisions within the Bill are effective, and that will be assessed through the formal review of the legislation already required under clause 40. I kindly ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the new clause.

[Dr Spencer]

In response to the Minister’s comments, clause 40 is about a review; it does not provide any direction, other than for the Secretary of State to do their job in reviewing this area. I will press new clause 4 to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Spencer]

I agree about the importance of putting things on the record. Since the hon. Member obviously has not been listening to my speech, he can check it out on the record. I acknowledged the challenges in this area—[Interruption.] Does the Government Whip want to intervene, or was she just chuntering? I will continue.

Given that the Bill puts quite a burden on the private sector, as we discussed over several sittings before the parliamentary recess, I think it is important that the Government recognise, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said, it would be pretty shameless not to vote for accountability for themselves while putting it on other people. Let us see how the vote goes. I commend new clause 5 to the Committee.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the shadow Minister for moving new clause 5, which seeks to require annual reporting on progress towards meeting the recommendations of the National Audit Office’s report on Government cyber-resilience and meeting the implementation milestones of the Government’s cyber action plan.

We recognise the value of accessing the expertise of Parliament to hold the Government accountable for the changes required for our cyber-resilience. That is why, notwithstanding the hon. Member for Spelthorne acknowledging the embarrassment of the Conservative party owning its hypocrisy, this Government have already strongly welcomed the recent reports from the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office on Government cyber-resilience.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

I declare an interest as a member of the Public Accounts Commission, which regularly scrutinises the National Audit Office. Can the Minister give some reassurance to Labour Members, who are being accused of hypocrisy, that we do make sure that the highest levels of cyber-security are met?

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend is right. Where the Conservative party did absolutely nothing and continues with its hypocrisy, I am glad to inform hon. Members that this Government have already adopted a duty to provide biannual reporting on progress against the recommendations of these two reports.

[Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)]

New clause 5 simply asks the Government to commit to reporting back on meeting the milestones they have set themselves for increasing cyber-security standards. Is the Minister confident in the Government’s ability to deliver on their cyber strategy, or is the document not worth the paper it is written on?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I simply repeat my prior sentence: this Government have already adopted a duty to provide biannual reporting on progress against the recommendations of these two reports.

In addition, the Government’s cyber action plan was published in January this year. It sets out how the Government will rapidly improve the cyber-security and resilience of public services to deliver a step change in cyber and digital resilience across the public sector. The plan sets out clear accountability structures to ensure that cyber-risks at all levels of Government are actively owned and effectively managed, with those responsible held to account.

[Alison Griffiths]

The continued use of legacy IT equipment is a particular vulnerability across the Government estate. That will take some time to address entirely, but is there a strategy in place to prioritise the upgrading of this legacy equipment, given that it is one of the greatest areas of exposure?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The hon. Member makes a very important point. We have heard of two major sources of risk from a cyber point of view: legacy technology and technology debt, and frontier AI attacks. The Government’s cyber action plan is not technology-specific, but both those sources of risk are very much on my mind, and I will make sure they are also on the mind of those implementing the Government’s cyber action plan.

I assure Members that we will continue to work with Parliament to support oversight of the plan’s implementation and to explore additional avenues for scrutiny of the Government’s cyber-resilience to guarantee the right level of accountability. I therefore kindly ask the shadow Minister to withdraw his new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Spencer]

This new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, would require the Secretary of State to consult and report within one year on whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have sufficient resources and capabilities to meet their statutory obligations. Historical levels of regulatory oversight and enforcement in relation to the NIS regulations 2018 have fallen short of what is necessary to achieve meaningful cyber-resilience across regulated sectors. The second post-implementation review of the NIS regs 2018, conducted in 2022, found that incident reporting on the part of regulated entities was very low, with only 13, 12 and 22 NIS incidents reported in 2019, 2020 and 2021 respectively.

A review conducted by the Worshipful Company of Information Technologists identified a near total absence of formal financial sanctions under the NIS regulations, with zero confirmed major penalties from 2021 to 2024. The model has not been conducive to effective discharge of regulatory responsibilities, with knock-on effects for cyber-resilience and regulated industries, yet regulators will be expected to oversee a far larger pool of regulated bodies and process a far larger number of incident reports under the Bill’s provisions. It is therefore right for us to scrutinise carefully whether regulators are in a position to meet these obligations.

In the evidence sessions, many of my questions to witnesses, including those from Ofgem, Ofcom and the Information Commissioner’s Office, focused on their preparations to meet the demands of their expanded roles. It was clear from feedback that although regulators understand what they need to do to prepare, the practical challenges associated with securing sufficient resource are far from resolved. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could clarify his plans to review regulators’ progress and what the key milestones will be to ensure that regulators can discharge their new duties alongside their existing ones when these provisions come into effect.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe for his new clause, which seeks to require a consultation on the resourcing and capabilities of regulators and regulated entities, assessment on whether additional Government support is needed, and a report on the findings. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that the Bill was developed in close collaboration with regulators and industry to ensure that regulators have the right information and tools to implement it.

The Bill already requires the Government to produce two regular reports to monitor the effectiveness of the legislation, and those would naturally include reviews of whether resourcing and capability were impacting on the effectiveness of the regime. The first of those is the annual report on regulator activities in relation to the statement of strategic priorities. The second is the report on the operation of the legislation, which must take place at least every five years.

[Lincoln Jopp]

While we are talking about resources and the application of the Bill, I raise with the Minister that, on page 102 of the impact assessment, it states that the going rate for a contract lawyer is £34 an hour. To my mind, that is out by a factor of probably 10. In the 10 days since our last sitting, has the Minister had a chance to re-examine the impact assessment and discover whether that was a genuine error? That number gets multiplied many times in the impact assessment. Has he had a chance to look into that?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The hon. Member has made that point a couple of times before. I am happy to write to him about the calculations, so that he is able to understand the survey and the significant uplift on which the figures are based.

In response to the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, given that the two reports can already include the topics addressed by his new clause, adding another report would risk confusing their purposes and increasing administrative burdens on those involved unnecessarily. The Government will not hesitate to adapt our support offering based on the findings of those reports. That will include using our flexible mechanisms—for example, updating our guidance to regulators, the statement of strategic priorities and the code of practice. Beyond that, we will continue to engage with regulators as the Bill is implemented, and consider whether any other means of improving regulators’ and regulated entities’ resourcing and capabilities are necessary and proportionate. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kanishka Narayan]

New clause 14 would require the Government to establish a dedicated support service for small and medium-sized enterprises that are operators of essential services, relevant digital service providers, relevant managed service providers or critical suppliers. That would include provision of advice, technical assistance and recovery guidance following a cyber-incident. It is worth noting that the Bill exempts small and micro enterprises from the regulations as relevant digital service providers or relevant managed service providers. Although regulators can designate a small or micro entity as a critical supplier, very few are expected to meet the threshold for criticality in practice. Similarly, there are limited examples of small or micro operators of essential services.

Improving the cyber-security of our nation’s small and medium-sized businesses is important for the resilience of our wider economy. That is why the Government have developed a wide range of free tools, guidance and training to help those businesses implement cyber-security measures. Such tools include the recently launched cyber action toolkit, which provides small and medium-sized businesses with tailored advice and the offer of free 30-minute consultations with NCSC-certified cyber advisers. Report Fraud, a reporting service for cyber-crime and fraud, runs a 24/7 cyber business incident reporting line, with regional cyber-resilience centres across England and Wales also providing support for small and medium-sized businesses, including incident response and business continuity advice in line with NCSC standards.

I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Henley and Thame that there is already considerable support available for small and medium-sized entities. Considering that, a new dedicated service is unnecessary, and it could divert resources from existing Government and NCSC schemes and impact our efficacy. For those reasons, I hope he will withdraw the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Spencer]

New clause 16 would require active board oversight of security and resilience measures and accountability for board members where they fail in those oversight duties, whereas new clause 17 would require regulated entities to carry out proportionate, periodic testing of the security and resilience of their network and information systems, and provide the results to regulatory bodies upon request.

On board accountability, as we have already discussed in this Committee, the existing regulatory model under NIS regulations has not been sufficiently effective in driving up cyber-resilience standards to meet emerging threats. Board engagement is a key part of that, but the stat I quoted previously in this Committee indicates that engagement is going in the wrong direction. What assessment has the Minister made of the potential advantages and disadvantages of direct accountability in the adoption of effective cyber-resilience measures, based on a roll-out of the NIS2 regulations?

Proportionate testing of systems may be a useful tool in detecting and managing cyber-security risk. What consideration has the Minister’s Department given to how that topic should be approached in the Secretary of State’s code of practice?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe for his new clauses. I will speak first to new clause 16, which seeks to require boards or equivalent management bodies of operators of essential services, relevant digital service providers, relevant managed service providers and critical suppliers to take specific measures to oversee the security and resilience of their network and information systems.

Board-level engagement is a necessary part of proactively and effectively managing cyber-risks. That is why we published the cyber governance code of practice last spring, as part of a wider package of action to support boards in more effectively governing digital risks to enhance their organisation’s cyber-resilience. More recently, the Secretary of State, together with the Chancellor, the Business Secretary, the Security Minister, and leaders of the NCSC and NSA, wrote to the CEOs and chairs of the UK’s leading organisations, asking them to make cyber-risk a board level priority.

I agree with the hon. Member that going further on board-level responsibility is necessary. That is why we will introduce security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation, following consultation. We will consult on proposals that are consistent with the NCSC’s cyber assessment framework, as we confirmed in our policy statement last year. The cyber assessment framework includes comprehensive measures on good cyber governance, including clear board level responsibility. It is important that industry is consulted on those measures, that they form part of a holistic package on security and resilience, and that they can be updated flexibly over time. We intend to consult on proposals for security and resilience requirements and wider implementation plans later this year.

New clause 17 seeks to require all organisations in scope of the Bill to test the security and resilience of their network and information systems. We agree that proportionate cyber-security testing is critical to identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities in systems and networks. Organisations in scope need to take appropriate and proportionate measures to manage risks to network and information systems on which they rely, and that can include testing of network and information systems. In particular, relevant digital service providers are already required to account for testing as part of their overarching security duty. Additionally, all regulators can use their powers to mandate testing by an inspector, or by the regulated entity, to verify compliance or investigate potential failures.

I reassure the hon. Member that we are going further. We will be updating and providing more detail on the measures that regulated entities need to take, as well as setting strategic objectives for regulators. As I have said before, our proposals for the security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation will be consistent with the NCSC’s cyber assessment framework, which includes measures on appropriate testing.

[David Chadwick]

Is the Minister aware that the financial services industry is required to conduct regular testing of its systems, and that sectors like aviation and nuclear have designated individuals in their security organisations who are responsible for overseeing those sorts of practices?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Member for his point. I am also aware that the National Cyber Security Centre’s cyber assessment framework has very specific measures on appropriate testing as well. It already exists, and we want to make sure that it is an important part of specific security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation.

It is crucial that industry is consulted on the nature of any requirements related to testing. As mentioned, we intend to consult on the proposals later in the year. We will also issue a statement of strategic priorities for regulators, and will explore whether that is an appropriate vehicle for driving consistency in the behaviours of regulators in respect of their approach to testing for their sector.

Overall, any approach to going further on proportionate and regular testing must be developed alongside the full set of security and resilience requirements, and co-ordinated and communicated with a wider package of implementing measures. That will allow the impact of options to be assessed, and provide the industry with clarity on the overall approach, including how the components fit together.

The shadow Minister asked about the consideration of NIS2 requirements. We have looked at NIS2 provisions, and variability in member states’ implementation of it, as part of a wider set of considerations on which we will be consulting regarding secondary legislation on governance.

My hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central made an incredibly important point about security by design, which I very much take into account. The Government Digital Service is already working on a secure by design standard. We want to make sure that it is as robust as possible, and extend it across not just the public sector but parts of the private sector. I will make sure that security by design remains at the heart of the Government’s cyber action plan, as well as that of the private sector.

[Emily Darlington]

I thank the Minister for that commitment. Would he consider setting up a meeting between GDS and those MPs who have expertise in this area, so that we can share our expertise and reassure ourselves that this is going in the right direction and at the speed that is necessary?

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend has extensive expertise, from which I benefit extensively. I will be keen to make sure that the Government Digital Service does so too.

In the light of those commitments, I kindly ask the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe not to press the new clauses.

[David Chadwick]

During the evidence sessions, numerous very knowledgeable witnesses called for these new clauses, so I will push them both to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Spencer]

I am a bit unclear about the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. The point I was making was that there is legitimate concern that people doing research into this area and doing threat assessments risk prosecution, so, across the whole of our society, that work is not being done. We have heard quite a lot of evidence from cyber campaigns about the benefits that changes to this law would make to the system, which is why we tabled the new clause. I commend new clause 19 to the Committee. I hope the Minister agrees that now is the time to address the issue.

I suspect that this will be my last, or penultimate, time speaking to the Committee, so I would like to finish by thanking Members on both sides of the Committee for a fun and, at times, robust debate over the past month. I thank the Chairs, the Clerks and all the teams working on the Bill—and Sophie Thorley from my office, who has done incredible research on the Bill.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank hon. Members for their new clauses; I recognise the strong feeling and thoughtful contributions about reforming the Computer Misuse Act.

I speak first to new clause 18, which seeks to place a duty on the Secretary of State to review whether amendments to the Computer Misuse Act could support the security and resilience of network and information systems used for carrying out essential activities. I assure the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge that the Government remain committed to ensuring that the Act remains up to date and effective.

The Home Office is already conducting a review of the Computer Misuse Act, and is developing proposals that arise from its findings. That includes careful consideration of proposals to introduce a statutory defence that would allow researchers to spot and share vulnerabilities. It will provide an update as soon as the proposals are finalised. However, limiting a defence to only the sectors covered by the NIS regime would be impractical. Any package of workable defence would need to be broad enough to apply economy-wide.

New clause 19 raises the introduction of a statutory defence to the Computer Misuse Act. I acknowledge the strong sentiment regarding reform of the CMA. There is no doubt that UK cyber-security professionals play a significant role in maintaining the country’s overall security and resilience. Supporting them is vital.

I agree with the principle behind the new clause: that a defence to section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act could strengthen the resilience of network and information systems by allowing researchers to spot and share vulnerabilities. The Government are already conducting a review of the Computer Misuse Act, and we have made significant progress in developing a proposal for a limited defence to the offence provided for in section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act.

[Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)]

Many of us, on both sides of the House, are sympathetic to both new clauses. We heard very clearly in evidence sessions that the Computer Misuse Act, as it is today, has a chilling effect on the operation of the cyber-security industry in this country and on whether such companies want to locate here as opposed to other countries.

I absolutely hear what the Minister says about the Home Office developing proposals. I wonder whether he can set out a timescale for when those proposals are likely to be brought forward—whether he expects that to be in this parliamentary Session or the next one. The issue is clearly holding back the cyber-security industry in this country, and we would all like to see it resolved.

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to recognise the shared sense on the principle of reforming the Computer Misuse Act. Although I am not in a position to give him a specific timeline, I absolutely take into account his recognition that the work needs to proceed at pace. Having held an industry engagement recently on specific proposals, with more than 75 attendees from a range of cyber-security organisations, the Home Office is now reviewing specific feedback as a particular proposal. The question is not whether we will reform the Computer Misuse Act, but simply how.

[Freddie van Mierlo]

I am grateful to the Minister for his reassurances on the ongoing review of the Computer Misuse Act. On that basis, I would like to say that I will withdraw the new clause.

[Kanishka Narayan]

Just—

[David Chadwick]

Will the Minister clarify what he thinks ethical vulnerability research actually constitutes?

[Kanishka Narayan]

Sure. I would not wish to define it technically, but my understanding is that it is research aimed at ethical hacking. It is effectively trying to find vulnerabilities through simulated attack systems, which can broaden our understanding of risks and vulnerabilities and allow us to mitigate them accordingly.

I return to new clause 19. Limiting a defence to just the sectors covered by the NIS regime would be impractical; any proposal for a workable defence needs to be broad enough to apply across the economy. That is why we are making sure that, through the Home Office, we are working as promptly as possible to ensure a proposal that is strong in its safeguards to prevent misuse. Engagement, including with the cyber-security industry, is already under way to refine our approach.

[Dr Spencer]

We are a responsible Opposition and we are pleased to hear about the work that the Minister and his Department have been doing and about the shared purpose in getting this done and getting it right. Would he give us a bit more detail of the timescales and plans for public consultation? I understand that he has been doing some personal consultation in private, but will there be a public consultation? Given that the reform crosses two Departments, which Department will be taking it forward? What I am really looking for from him is a confirmation at the Dispatch Box that he is personally committed to getting this piece of work over the line during this parliamentary term.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the shadow Minister for his recognition of our shared approach on this question. Reform of the Computer Misuse Act is led by the Home Office. I have given my personal commitment to ensuring that reform, but I will also write to him and members of the Committee with as much detail as possible on the timeline to ensure that we are moving fast on it.

In that spirit, I thank hon. Members for their work on this question of the amendment to the Computer Misuse Act and use this opportunity to thank you, Ms McVey, the entire Committee staff and hon. Members for their expertise and perhaps for their sense of fun as well. I thank all staff members, in particular the Bill team in the Department, which has been fabulous throughout the entire process.

[Freddie van Mierlo]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Online Harm: Child Protection

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Tuesday 24th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

It is a pleasure to respond to this debate, not least to further my education in my personal passion area of parliamentary procedure.

Let me begin by responding to the motion, and then I will turn to the substance of the debate. The hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) will accept that no Government could accept a motion such as that proposed by the Liberal Democrats. The motion goes against the Standing Orders of the House, which state that the Government as elected by the people control the Order Paper, apart from specific exemptions such as Opposition days. The motion would give the Liberal Democrats free rein to schedule the business on 9 March. Today they introduced a Bill. It is still not available to Members across the House, yet they are asking the House to hand them control of business to complete all stages of the Bill within a day. That is no way to make complex changes to the law in this area.

This is not just a procedural outrage; more than that I am sorry to see the Liberal Democrats join the Conservative party yet again in their usual coalition of putting political desperation on this question ahead of the interests of British children and families. I urge the Liberal Democrats to forget this approach, and to take part in the Government’s consultation, which is a true attempt at engaging across parties and across the country, so that we find the right solution for children and parents. This Government have already set out a way forward that considers those vital issues in a responsible way, and allows for swift action in response. That is how we will give children the childhood that they deserve and prepare them for the future.

[Wera Hobhouse]

I do not know where the Minister has been, but my inbox has been inundated by families and parents who are calling for action. We are responding to the request of our constituents to take action. Do the Government not see the urgency with which we need to take action?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The Government are seeing both urgency and responsibility in the correspondence that we are receiving and the consultation we are engaging with, not the desperate lurch to a specific answer that the Liberal Democrats are exemplifying in this instance. I want to take this opportunity to set out our approach.

[Victoria Collins (Harpenden and Berkhamsted) (LD)]

I say gently to the Minister that if he were to look at the Liberal Democrat’s track record over the past few years, he will see that we have worked really hard to put forward concrete proposals about putting online safety first.

[Kanishka Narayan]

But not today.

[Victoria Collins]

No, but we have tried to push that agenda. It is not as if social media came into existence yesterday—Facebook was launched 22 years ago—and the Government brought forward the consultation after pressure from across the House. So I say gently to the Minister that we are trying to work together and that we want to continue to work together in that vein.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I take the hon. Member’s point about wanting to work together. The Government are committed to doing exactly that. It is not a question of whether we act, but how we implement specific changes to secure our children’s future. I encourage her and the entire Liberal Democrat party to engage with the consultation.

[Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)]

On that point, will the Minister give way?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I will make a little progress having already given way twice to Liberal Democrat Members in short succession.

To be clear, it is crucial that we allow for a short, sharp consultation to allow the different parts of the debate to be heard, including crucially the voices of children themselves, who are too often under-represented in the debate. This is a complex area and it is vital that we get it right.

We have already announced that we will act both with speed and appropriate scrutiny to legislate based on the outcome of the consultation. Last month, the Secretary of State set out to the House that technology has huge potential for good: to create goods, to drive growth, to transform our public services and so much more. However, we have also been clear that in order to harness the potential benefits, parents need to have confidence that their children can benefit from the opportunities that the online world offers, ensuring that technology enriches, not harms, children’s lives.

Most children report benefits from being online, such as interacting with their peers, finding useful information or learning a new skill. But we also know that there are concerns about children’s online experience. This Government have always been clear that the protection of children online is our top priority. The Online Safety Act 2023 introduced one of the most robust systems globally for protecting children from harm online.

[Anna Dixon]

I thank the Minister for his remarks, and I hope that part of the consultation will involve looking at research. The Born in Bradford study is a huge cohort study that has recently looked at social media use by 12 to 15-year-olds in the Bradford district. It found that they are using social media for 3.36 hours per day and that there are associated increases in anxiety and depression. Will the Minister ensure that the harms from social media that we already know about, including that research, will be factored in as he makes decisions, following the consultation, to act swiftly to protect our children from harm?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I commend my hon. Friend on her consistent commitment to evidence-based policy making in this place, and beyond it too. I commit to her that both the Born in Bradford study, which she mentioned, and wider research will be in the front of the Government’s mind.

[Caroline Voaden]

Will the Minister tell the House when the consultation will be launched?

[Kanishka Narayan]

We will be very glad to come to the House as soon as the consultation is launched. It will be very soon indeed. As we have said, Members will expect not just a consultation—[Interruption.] I have not committed to debate the consultation today, prior to having published it. Perhaps the Liberal Democrats will take a lesson from that and follow appropriate procedure in this place.

The illegal content and child safety duties came into effect last year. Those duties represent a major milestone in protecting children from illegal and harmful content online, as well as helping them to have age-appropriate online experiences.

[Carla Lockhart (Upper Bann) (DUP)]

Consultation and timeframe is key, because while we procrastinate, online harm is continuing and our children are being put at risk. The statistics around online pornography show that up to 50% of boys aged 11 to 13 have already viewed pornography, and it is influencing their minds on a daily basis with regard to relationships and how they conduct their business. Will the Minister give the House an assurance that the consultation will come to this place very soon? Can he give timeframes thereafter, following the consultation, as to when we will see legislation brought before this House?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I can confirm to the hon. Member that the Government have committed to act robustly by the summer, which is about as short and sharp as a consultation can get. Instead of procrastinating on this question, I encourage her to engage intensively with the process of consultation and the national conversation.

I mentioned illegal content duties, as well as child safety duties. Under those duties, services must now conduct highly effective age assurance, precisely addressing the point raised by the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart), to prevent children in the UK from encountering pornography, as well as content that encourages, promotes or provides instructions for self-harm, suicide or eating disorders. Platforms are also now legally required to put in place measures to protect children from other types of harmful content. That includes abusive or hateful content, bullying content and violent content.

[Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for the decisive action that he took over the recent Grok incident. Given the scope of the consultation and the fact that we are talking about online harms, I want to flag the issue we have around content on YouTube, which is a video-sharing platform, not necessarily a social media platform. The type of content that our children are consuming on there is a quick succession of images, which is not very good for a child’s development, rather than the slow-paced stuff we get when we watch a broadcaster. Will the consultation look at the quality of content on these platforms? Not all screentime is equal; some screentime can be quite dangerous for a child’s development in general.

[Kanishka Narayan]

Both of my hon. Friend’s points—on the scope of how we look at particular platforms and at their functionalities—are not just considered by the consultation, but deeply important. I engaged with the Australian Minister on this issue just last week, trying to understand their experiences of this and the uncertainty of getting those two things right. That is exactly why the consultation has been an appropriate approach in this context.

Where services fail to comply with their duties in the Act, Ofcom’s enforcement powers include fines of up to £18 million or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue. Ofcom has indicated that it has issued financial penalties to six companies under the Online Safety Act amounting to more than £3 million. I can confirm to the House that just yesterday, Ofcom announced that it has fined a porn company £1.35 million for failing to introduce proper age verification on its websites—the largest fine levied so far under the Act. I welcome this strong action to protect children online.

We have always been clear that while the Online Safety Act provides the foundations, there is more to do to ensure that children live enriching online lives. Like all regulatory regimes, it must remain agile. That is all the more critical given that we are dealing with fast-moving technology. That is why this Government have already taken a number of decisive steps to build on these protections.

The first act of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was to make online content that promotes self-harm and suicide a priority offence under the Online Safety Act. That means that platforms must take proactive steps to stop users seeing this content in the first place. If it does appear, platforms must minimise the time that it is online. As well as that, both intimate image abuse and cyber-flashing are now priority offences under the Online Safety Act.

Last month, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State stood in this Chamber and made it clear that the creation of non-consensual deepfakes on X is shocking, despicable and abhorrent. She confirmed that we would expedite legislation to criminalise the creation of non-consensual intimate images, and I am pleased to confirm to the House that that came into effect earlier this month. That will also be designated as a priority offence under the Online Safety Act, and it complements the existing criminal offence of sharing or threatening to share a deepfake intimate image without consent.

Alongside that, it was announced that we will legislate to criminalise nudification tools to make it illegal for companies to supply tools to be used as generators of non-consensual intimate images. Last week, we went further still and announced that we will introduce a legal duty requiring tech companies to remove non-consensual intimate images within 48 hours of them being reported. These measures will provide real protection for women and girls online.

However, we recognise the strength of feeling up and down the country and right across this House—not least in this debate. We share the concern of many parents about the wider impact of social media and technology on children’s wellbeing. The rapid growth of grassroots campaigns such as Smartphone Free Childhood highlights how concerned parents are about the pull of these technologies and what it means for their children. That includes the potential impacts on mental health, sleep and self-esteem.

We have set out our commitment to supporting parents and children with these issues. We want to find solutions that genuinely support the wellbeing of our children and to give parents the help that they need as they guide children through online spaces safely.

[Dr Chowns]

I have received contact from hundreds of parents in my constituency and from some young people sharing their huge concern about online harm caused by engagement with social media, so I fully understand the sense of urgency in the Chamber and the desire for quick action. The Government said in January that they would consult. They reiterated that they would consult, and they reiterated that commitment 10 days ago. I understand that the consultation is due to start in March, and the Minister has talked about bringing measures through before the summer. Can he commit to acting with real urgency and bring that consultation forward? What is the delay? Will he commit to bringing legislation—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. The hon. Lady has repeatedly made very long interventions. It was always open to her to attend the opening of the debate and to speak in it.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I totally agree with the hon. Member’s call for urgency. I assure her that first, the Government will act by the summer in robustly responding to the consultation. Secondly, we have been focused on getting the consultation right, and not just for the wider public; we are ensuring that it is designed for young people’s engagement, which requires particular design features. Thirdly, we are not waiting for the launch of the consultation to have the national conversation. I have been in schools and met parents, as have the Secretary of State and Ministers from across Government, so the conversation has very much started, and I am sure that the consultation is also imminent.

While there is consensus that problems remain, there is not yet consensus on the best way to address them. That is why the Government announced last month that we will be launching our short, sharp consultation and national conversation on further measures. We recognise that while some people support age restrictions on social media for children, there are diverse views on both the “what” and the “how”. Prominent voices in this debate, including the Molly Rose Foundation and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, are concerned that blunt age limits might not be the right approach and risk doing more harm than good. Even among those who support age limits, there are differing views on how to apply them, including which services restrictions should apply to. Those views are worthy of consideration, but we need to consider them properly and responsibly—we owe that to our children.

That is why the consultation approach is the responsible path forward for looking at these issues, considering in a swift and evidence-based way the full range of implications and the most effective way of protecting children and enhancing their lives online. We will consult with parents, the organisations representing children and bereaved families, tech companies and—crucially—children and young people themselves. None of that would be allowed under the motion we are considering today. This consultation, backed by the national conversation, will identify the next steps in our plan to boost and protect children’s wellbeing online. The consultation will include exploring the option of banning social media for children below a certain age, as well as a range of other measures. This will include gathering views and evidence on options such as restricting access to addictive functionalities and understanding what we can do better to support parents in navigating their children’s digital lives. We will also explore whether we should raise the digital age of consent, to give parents more control over how their children’s data is used, and how existing laws on age verification could be better enforced.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

The Minister is making lots of observations about the consultation that is going to go ahead—what is going to be in it, and how long it is going to take. What we do not know is when he will commit to bringing legislation before this House to act against social media.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I am happy to repeat to the hon. Member this Government’s commitment, which is that we will act by the summer. That is about as short and sharp as a consultation period gets. The Online Safety Act took seven years; we are simply asking for one quarter to make sure that young people, parents and families across the country are properly heard from.

[John Milne]

I understand the consultation, but what about actual legislation?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I will simply repeat the point I have made, which is that we are going to act by the summer. We have already sought permissive powers to ensure that the Government are able to act on the outcome of the consultation through rapid legislation. I hope the combination of those two commitments gives the hon. Member some assurance.

The engagement and consultation will take place alongside work with counterparts. We will be monitoring developments in Australia on its social media ban for under-16s to share learnings and best practice. We are steadfast in our belief that the right way to deliver the next steps to protect our children online is to be led by the evidence through our short, sharp three-month consultation.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Minister has just said that the Government have already sought permissive powers. I understand that they are going to move an amendment in lieu to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, but I am not aware that that amendment has been published yet, much less agreement sought from the House. When will that be published, so that we can see what those permissive powers are supposed to be?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Member for that point, and commit to her that we are going to try to do that as soon as possible. She will be aware that the legislative process is already very tight, so I will come back to her and the House with the wording of the motion as soon as possible.

Last week, as I have mentioned, the Secretary of State confirmed that we will take new legal powers to allow us to act quickly on the outcomes of the consultation, delivering on our promises to parents. We will make sure that the wording is presented to the House at the earliest opportunity. We also recognise the importance of parliamentary scrutiny and the expertise that parliamentarians in both Houses provide, and have already committed that when regulations are brought forward, they will be debated on the Floor of the House and there will be a vote in both Houses, ensuring proper scrutiny. We are clear that the question is not whether we will act, but what type of action we will take. We will ensure that we do so effectively, in lockstep with our children and in the interests of British families.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

Rural Mobile Connectivity

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Thursday 12th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

First and foremost, can I start by thanking the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan) for securing this debate on mobile connectivity in rural areas? I thank all hon. Members for their insightful contributions.

While I am here speaking in place of my noble Friend in the other place, the Minister for Digital Economy, I feel the pain described by many hon. Members personally, as I too represent a rural constituency. In that context, I particularly thank my hon. Friends the Members for Stafford (Leigh Ingham) and for Truro and Falmouth (Jayne Kirkham) and the hon. Members for Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk (John Lamont) and for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies) for their representations on behalf of farmers and agricultural communities, whom I know face a particular challenge.

I also thank the hon. Members for Bromsgrove (Bradley Thomas), for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth) and for Lewes (James MacCleary) for talking about not only maintaining bucolic beauty but parity and economic opportunity. I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset (Anna Sabine), who raised a very concerning case about coercive control through the use of connectivity. I encourage her to write to the Department about that, as I would be keen to follow up on that particular issue. The constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth (Perran Moon) has features of rurality and remoteness, and has coastal communities, and from my constituency I personally understand those features too.

The all-party parliamentary group on digital communities, which the hon. Member for North Shropshire is a member of, along with the other Members, published in January a detailed report on this topic. It provided valuable insights and recommendations.

It is well understood across the House that access to high-quality, reliable and secure digital connectivity is essential to day-to-day life, with many services now requiring an online presence. It is important not only for consumers, but for the businesses in every sector of the UK economy that depend increasingly on fixed and mobile networks in some way. From taking card payments to managing businesses online, digital connectivity is central.

The focus of this debate is on mobile connectivity. The Government have an ambition for all populated areas, including rural communities, to have access to higher quality stand-alone 5G by 2030. Although stand-alone 5G is already available outside 83% of premises across the UK, I acknowledge that we need to go much further.

Operators are starting to align investment and delivery plans with the ambition that the Government have set out. VodafoneThree has committed to investing £11 billion in its 5G network over the 10-year period following completion of its merger; progress against that commitment will be monitored at regular intervals by Ofcom. BT and Virgin Media O2 have set out similarly significant investment plans into their networks, both aligning with the Government’s stand-alone 5G coverage ambition.

[John Lamont]

Does the Minister acknowledge that there are issues with the data that has been provided both by the telecoms companies and by Ofcom? We have all shared experiences across the Chamber today in which maps produced by Vodafone, EE or whoever appear to demonstrate good coverage in our constituencies, but the coverage on the ground is just not there. Is the Minister challenging the providers on their data?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Member for raising that point. I will come to that question, because I recognise the gap between the aggregate picture and the experience felt on the ground.

Let me return to aggregate investment. To ensure that investment delivers coverage improvements for communities right across the UK, including in rural areas, we continue working to identify and address barriers to deployment where it is practical to do so. I may not share the significant expertise and experience of my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Ms Minns) with matters of spectrum, but I certainly share her enthusiasm. When I was an undergraduate student, the global example of the last Labour Government on auction design and the 3G spectrum was very much a part of my curriculum. In that spirit, I hope to take her advice and continue the spirit of Labour, not that of the last Conservative Government or of the Liberal Democrats, who were complicit in the auction challenges of that Government.

The focus on investment includes implementing the remaining provisions of the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022. I can confirm to my hon. Friend that the Government are considering where planning rules could be relaxed to support the deployment of mobile infrastructure.

The shadow Minister mentioned the call for evidence, which is due to close on 26 February. In the usual spirit, I can confirm to him that we will make a prompt statement to the House, but I am afraid I cannot give him a specific date on this occasion.

On the reporting of mobile coverage, Members across the House are totally right to highlight the issues with its accuracy in some cases. I feel very personally the depth of their frustration; although I cannot condone the semi-kidnapping experience described by the hon. Member for East Grinstead and Uckfield (Mims Davies), she has my particular sympathies for her pre-Valentine’s break-up with Vodafone. Accurate coverage data is essential for consumers: it allows more informed decisions as to which operator provides the best level of service for life, work and travel.

[Mims Davies]

The way for someone to report poor signal in their area is to go to ofcom.org.uk, enter a postcode, select a provider and then provide coverage feedback—if they can get a signal. That is the irony for many of us who have to drive around rural areas trying to give feedback, hence Vodafone’s parliamentary affairs person very kindly allowing himself to be actively kidnapped to drive around and see the reality.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I confirm to the hon. Member that there is no sense of judgment on the Government Benches on the conduct of her cause.

The Government continue to work with Ofcom to improve the accuracy of reported mobile coverage, building on the launch of its Map Your Mobile tool in June last year. I am glad that hon. Members recognise that that is reflected in the draft statement of strategic priorities for telecoms, spectrum and post, which the Government laid before Parliament yesterday. It will remain a firm priority for the Government, and I will make sure to represent to my noble Friend the Minister for Digital Economy the concerns that have been raised today.

More accurate coverage data also allows us to understand coverage gaps. Addressing these gaps requires investment by the mobile network operators. The Government recognise that the investment climate has been difficult for the mobile sector over recent years. We are committed to working with industry to support its investment in our networks. That is why we are undertaking a mobile market review to understand the factors impacting the sector’s ability to invest, and I know that the recent digital communities APPG report calls for an independent review of the digital connectivity landscape. The mobile market review and the accompanying call for evidence, launched on Tuesday, will enable the Government to consider what we can do to support the sector too. Through the call for evidence, we are looking to gather views on the quality of mobile service and level of coverage required to harness the full benefits of stand-alone 5G, as well as where our ambitions on stand-alone 5G should go further still.

As Members will be aware, as part of our work with industry, the Chancellor and the Secretary of State chaired a roundtable yesterday with CEOs of major UK telecoms firms to discuss investment challenges, as well as agreeing to a telecoms consumer charter, which looks to strengthen transparency to empower consumers, as well as to improve support for those struggling to pay. On the provision of reliable 4G connectivity, I know it is essential to many. At the spending review in 2025, the Government committed to continuing to deliver 4G coverage in areas with little or no coverage. The shared rural network has helped to deliver 4G mobile coverage to 96% of the UK land mass from at least one operator and to 81% from all four. The publicly funded elements of the shared rural network will continue to deliver improved coverage up to January 2027, with over 100 masts already delivering new coverage across the UK.

Where there is no mobile coverage, we are starting to see some positive developments in the satellite direct-to-device market. To the point made by the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin, I also share her enthusiasm and hope for cost reductions as we have greater competition in that market. The UK is taking a pioneering step in enabling direct-to-device connectivity, moving ahead of European counterparts to unlock connectivity as well as growth across remote parts of the UK. Those developments have the potential to increase the resilience of our services and provide a back-up for crucial ones should territorial networks face disruption.

Having coverage alone is clearly not important enough by itself. As Members have raised very clearly, there needs to be confidence that mobile networks will be available in the most difficult of times and that they are secure against threats. Though the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 introduced a world-leading regime for the protection and security of such contexts, I know that there is more work to do. In particular, I appreciate the points made right across the House on the resilience of mobile services to power cuts. We welcome that Ofcom is completing a detailed regulatory review on that question. I will make sure that the points raised today are represented as part of Ofcom’s considerations, and in particular I will be sure to convey the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle around possible ways of ensuring duration of support as backstops. We will ensure that the guidance for public telecommunications providers reflects evolving technologies and emerging threats, taking into account input from industry and expert advice from the National Cyber Security Centre.

Before I finish, I will address specific points raised by Members. To the hon. Member for East Grinstead and Uckfield, I would be happy to make sure that the Minister for Digital Economy meets her as part of her recurring surgeries. To my hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth, I know that he is a strong cross-Government champion for Cornwall on all matters and I will continue to make sure that we play our part in supporting the strength of his advocacy. To the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin, there are three Home Office masts in her patch and two are already activated as part of the shared rural network. I will be happy to engage with her through correspondence on her particular concerns about those masts, should she wish to raise that. To the hon. Member for Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk who, with my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, raised the point on 2G and 3G switch-off, though the expectation is that operators will provide broadly equivalent levels of coverage after switching off 2G, I have heard his concerns and will make sure that both the Minister and, as a consequence, the regulator are focused on the complete delivery of that aspiration.

Finally, I am conscious that the hon. Member for Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk also asked about smart meters, as did the hon. Member for East Grinstead and Uckfield. The Data Communications Company is obligated, under the conditions of its licence, to provide smart meter network coverage to at least 99.25% of premises across Great Britain. One solution for those who do not currently have smart meter wider area network coverage, which the DCC and Government have decided to focus on, involves harnessing customers’ broadband connections to also carry out smart metering communications. We are looking at how we can use modified smart meter communications hubs, as well as additional devices, to plug the gap. That is not to say that we will not continue to focus on how we can ensure mobile connectivity plays its part in that context as well.

I am sure you wish for me to come to a prompt conclusion, Madam Deputy Speaker. First and foremost, I thank the hon. Member for North Shropshire, as I do all hon. Members for their contributions. I will continue, with them, to champion mobile connectivity across our rural communities.

Telecommunications, Radio Spectrum Management and Postal Services: Strategic Priorities

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Wednesday 11th February 2026 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I am repeating the following written ministerial statement made today in the other place by my noble Friend, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital Economy, Baroness Lloyd of EFFRA.

I am today laying before Parliament the Government’s draft statement of strategic priorities for telecommunications, the management of radio spectrum, and postal services.

Digital connectivity is at the foundation of our economy and society and underpins almost every part of daily life. The strength, security, and resilience of our digital infrastructure matters deeply to people, business and the economy in the UK.

This statement builds a vision for the UK’s digital future that is enabled by high- quality, secure, reliable and affordable connectivity. It outlines the Government’s strategic priorities and desired outcomes across a number of areas, including: fixed and mobile telecoms, digital inclusion through empowered and confident consumers, telecoms modernisation, the management of radio spectrum, telecoms security and resilience and the postal services.

The statement follows a statutory consultation that ran between 21 July 2025 and 18 September 2025. Around 70 stakeholders with interest and expertise across the policy areas covered by the statement responded to the consultation, including telecoms companies, trade bodies, local authorities and consumer groups. I would like to thank all respondents for taking the time and effort to respond.

These strategic priorities have been designed to support this Government’s ambitions for growth and for agile, responsive regulation that encourages innovation to support these growth goals. They have also been designed to deliver our vision for an inclusive digital society, where consumers are empowered and confident when engaging with the market.

As the independent regulator, Ofcom must have regard to the priorities set out within the statement when exercising its functions. We are committed to working with Ofcom and industry to drive forward progress against these priorities to build a UK that will have the connectivity it needs, whatever the future holds.

I intend to designate the statement for the purposes of section 2A of the Communications Act 2003 after the end of the statutory “40-day period”—as defined in section 2C of the Act—unless either House of Parliament resolves not to approve it within that period.

[HCWS1325]