(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising an issue of principle, which I perfectly understand, as something that I speak about in relation to the BBC, and how it must have editorial independence from the Government. As a principle, I would be concerned about Government ownership of any media institution, but as he will be aware, I can speak only of principles.
When the wonderful Taylor Swift discovered that her back catalogue had been bought by a purchaser of whom she disapproved, she began to render it worthless by re-recording all her previous hits. Is that an example that journalists at The Spectator and The Telegraph might do well to follow?
I thank my right hon. Friend for his mischievous suggestion. I could not possibly comment on it, but I am sure that it has been heard.
(1 year ago)
Commons ChamberAlong with the police. To cap it all, we now have a Minister warning that our investment security regime is out of date with the threats as we now understand them.
I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for bringing this debate before the House. I am here primarily to listen, rather than contribute, but it is overwhelmingly clear that the relatively new Investment Security Unit is tailor-made to consider a merger proposal such as this one.
However, does the right hon. Gentleman realise that, if he gets his wish and the Investment Security Unit does consider the merger proposal, the Intelligence and Security Committee would be blocked from scrutinising the work of that unit? The Government originally said that all its work should have been overseen and scrutinised by what was the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. The unit is now in the Cabinet Office, but even now, we are still not being allowed to scrutinise it. There is something very strange, if not sinister, going on. We have demanded the right to look at the classified elements of that unit’s work.
Finally, if the right hon. Gentleman were allowed into a secure room to look at the documentation that will come before the Investment Security Unit, if it is ever allowed to look at this deal, does he believe that his looking at that documentation without cleared staff, without being able to take notes and without being able to go away and discuss it with anybody else—as we on the Intelligence and Security Committee can do under our special regime—would amount to effective scrutiny of something with such clear security implications?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind intervention. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill made a lot of those points, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), and I agreed with them earlier in my speech. This area needs much greater scrutiny. I remember not long after first coming to this House a few years ago, we had considerable concern about the behaviour of companies that was taking place, or could take place, that would put our national security at risk. That is why I support the comments made earlier by both right hon. Gentlemen.
On that point, I recall that in 2021, while the National Security and Investment Bill was going through the House, the Government repeatedly said from the Dispatch Box that in any conflict between economic interest and national security their policy was that national security would come first. That was the whole point of bringing in the legislation. Now it appears that there is even a question mark on whether the structures set up in the legislation will examine this proposed questionable deal, let alone allow it to be effectively scrutinised by Parliament once they have done that examination.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He makes a very valid point. I recall the debates we had in the House several years ago and I think they were very meaningful. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister will respond to some of the genuine concerns that a number of us in this House have.
In its first line, the Vodafone and Three brief states that the current UK telecoms market—their own industry—is dysfunctional, and that consolidation is needed to remedy that. I regret to say to the House that, having gone through that and some of the excellent briefings received from other organisations, I am not convinced that the merger is the right thing to do. A number of points have been made on national security, competition and the consumer that indicate to me that it is not necessarily in the interests of the country or the consumer. The brief confirms that, talking about billions of pounds—or euros, on the website—which appear to be the only thing they are interested in. It is of huge concern to me that we are going from four operators to three, given the situation we face. I hope my right hon. Friend the Minister will consider what action to take so that the regulator not only has proper teeth to sort out the issues I have mentioned but that in any future decisions genuine consideration is given to whether a potential merger is in the interests of the country and our constituents. I am afraid that at the moment I am not convinced that it is the right thing to do.
The overall question of the efficacy of the investment security process is for the Cabinet Office. The right hon. Gentleman may well wish to pursue his inquiry with the Minister responsible. I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend, who chairs the Intelligence and Security Committee, will also have views about the process that the Government have put in place. All I can say to both Select Committee Chairs is that, in relation to this specific merger, we cannot comment on whether it is currently undergoing scrutiny through that process, but we believe that the process that is available for the examination of mergers of this kind on national security grounds is robust. Beyond that, I cannot really go.
I am not asking my right hon. Friend to say whether this particular proposed merger is being investigated. What I am asking him to say is whether the Government accept that there is a significant national security dimension to any proposal for a merger involving a major shareholding by a Chinese subservient company.
I hope that my right hon. Friend will forgive me; I am not sure that I can even go so far as to say that. It is on the record that the Government believe that foreign ownership of major critical infrastructure raises security concerns, which is precisely why the process was put in place and the Investment Security Unit was set up. We believe that we now have the ability to determine whether there are serious national security concerns, and if it is determined that there are, powers are available to the Government to take action to protect our national security. I think the answer is yes, but I do not want to be drawn into particular countries or companies. If he will forgive me, I will leave it at that.
Several Members raised wider questions. My hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Chris Loder) is right that we need to look at the context in which the merger is possibly being considered. His test of whether it is good for his constituents is a perfectly valid one. As he observed, this is the third time we have debated connectivity in 24 hours. That is a measure of how important it is to people. It is the Government’s very firm view that the roll-out of 5G connectivity has huge potential for such things as public services, industry, transport and education. There will be enormous benefits to obtaining the widespread adoption of 5G—benefits that might amount to £159 billion by 2035.
That is why the Prime Minister’s commitment to the UK becoming a science and technology superpower will deliver benefits for everybody in this country. Connectivity, and the availability of mobile telephony, lies at the heart of that. We are already beginning to see benefits from 5G, but the Government are clear that we wish to move beyond the current basic, or non-stand-alone 5G, towards stand-alone 5G. Considerable investment is taking place: something like nearly £2 billion is being invested by the mobile operators in enhancing and improving their networks, and 5G is now available from at least one operator outside 85% of premises.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Solihull (Julian Knight), although now I am really interested to know whether he prefers a curry or a pizza. When I came into the debate, I did not expect that to be the topic of discussion.
I am very conscious of time, and I know that a number of people on the Back Benches would like to make contributions to this incredibly important debate. However, I will take the opportunity to set out the SNP’s views on Lords amendments 4 and 5 and, importantly, briefly to reflect on why we are in the situation that we are in. Actually, that kind of ties in to Lords amendment 5: it is because of the mess that the Government have created in relation to Huawei.
When I first came into the House—pre-pandemic, of course—one of the biggest issues being discussed was the situation with Huawei and the flip-flopping that the Government were doing. I respectfully suggest that, in relation to Lords amendment 5, it is almost akin to the fact that they have learned nothing. There is an opportunity before them to ensure that they work with key intelligence partners, as the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said, to ascertain where the biggest threat sits. But rather than take cognisance of what has been said in the other place, they are simply saying that the plan, as they have it at this moment in time, is good enough. That, from my perspective, simply does not cut it, especially, as we have heard, when some £2 billion has already been wasted on this debacle, notwithstanding the economic impact of being so many years behind in the roll-out of 5G itself. That, in many senses, covers Lords amendment 5.
On Lords amendment 4 and diversification, I will not repeat the exact detail of the amendment because that was done so eloquently by the shadow Minister, but I was a little bit surprised at what the Minister said. If I got the scope of it correctly, she was saying that Lords amendment 4 is far too narrow and would make the Government’s life too difficult. However, the amendment did not seem to suggest that when I cast my eyes on it. In fact, if I read it correctly, in the other place the Government’s position was that the framework was already sufficient, so the Government do not even seem to have clarity between the other place and this place on their actual position. I do not think that that is necessarily a surprise, because they are just looking for a reason not to back an incredibly helpful amendment.
Those are the views of the SNP on the two more contentious amendments. I look forward to the Minister perhaps providing the clarity that the Government have not been able to provide so far. I also look forward to hearing what our esteemed Back Benchers have to say on these matters.
It is a pleasure to follow all the Back-Bench speeches so far.
I would like to blaze in capital letters what the Minister said:
“This is, first and foremost, a national security Bill.”
Something very similar was said when the National Security and Investment Bill—now the National Security and Investment Act 2021—was going through this House and the other place earlier this year. The Intelligence and Security Committee is, as it always has been, a non-partisan organisation. I will therefore be saying some things to please and, probably, to annoy both sides.
The Committee considered the five amendments at a recent meeting. We agreed that the entirety of Lords amendments 1 to 3 was broadly beneficial. We looked at Lords amendment 5 and we understood the temptation to flag up the importance of the Five Eyes relationship. We agreed—it is interesting how closely our deliberations, without consultation, conformed to the views of the Chairman of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull (Julian Knight)—that it was, as he put it, a case of gilding the lily, because whenever a serious objection is raised on security grounds by one of the Five Eyes partners, we take that with the utmost seriousness. That leaves us with Lords amendment 4. For the life of us, we cannot understand why the Government are opposing it. We believe it would strengthen parliamentary scrutiny and provide a valuable annual stocktake on the progress being made on the diversification strategy and how it is helping to improve national security. Therefore, like the Chairman of our parallel Committee, I will not be voting against Lords amendment 4 tonight.
Where does that leave us as a Committee in terms of the two Bills and the amendments thereto? You may recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, that there have been intense arguments both in this place and in the upper House about the failure of the Government to accept amendments that would allow the Intelligence and Security Committee to scrutinise closely the secret aspects that are inevitably involved in those two Bills. I will not digress on this both because I lack time and because you, Mr Deputy Speaker, would instantly call me to order. I will simply say, on ensuring that there is ISC scrutiny of the classified elements that follow from this legislation, that arguments have been advanced by the Government in the other place to say, “Well, the face of the Bill isn’t the place to do it.” We agree with that now; we are taking the Government at their word. Therefore, we have written to the National Security Adviser and asked him to take up the issue with the Prime Minister, so that the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC can be brought up to date to cater for the provisions of this Bill and the earlier Bill that should be part of our purview. That is what the Government promised in 2013 when the legislation was originally put through, for our Committee’s powers, and it is a promise that we expect them to keep.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe shadow Minister is a considerable specialist in this field; I particularly endorse what she says about the importance of a non-partisan approach to national security in this and other legislation. As noted on Second Reading, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has long been concerned about the security of the UK’s telecommunications networks. Our 2013 report “Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure” identified serious failings in the way that successive Governments had managed the entry of foreign telecommunications companies into the UK market—Huawei especially—and we urged the Government not to sacrifice security in the pursuit of investment when it came to our critical national infrastructure.
In support of what my right hon. Friend says, he will recall that one of the main reasons why the Government felt it so difficult to rid themselves of Huawei was that there would then be only two remaining possible suppliers, and if one of them got into difficulty, we would have total dependence on a single supplier. If we do not diversify, it really has knock-on effects: we sometimes have to improperly consider using suppliers that are really a risk to our security.
As my right hon. Friend knows, it is not only the Committee on which he and I serve that has highlighted that point; other Committees of this House have, too, and the Government themselves have acknowledged it. We really need to look at how, having accepted the thrust of his argument, the Government intend to respond. What is the action plan? I know that the Minister will have much to say about this, but my right hon. Friend is absolutely right.
This is part of a wider problem of the concentration of power in the hands of what I described earlier as a handful of unaccountable corporate monopolies. There is a curious assumption that somehow those organisations will be intrinsically virtuous, but that is simply not the case. Commercial organisations are just that: they are interested in commerce. They are not there to do what Governments and this Parliament exist for, which is protecting the interests of the whole of the people.
It is a great pleasure to follow my eminent right hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart)—if only I were as good.
As the final Back-Bench speaker this afternoon, it is incumbent on me to be supportive of the Government, which of course I am, and this excellent Bill. We are where we are today for two reasons. First, it shows that the Government do listen to Back Benchers. Secondly, the Bill is a pretty good bit of work and it ticks the box, as indeed it should. As defence and national security become ever more virtual and online, it has never been more important to secure our lines of communication, both domestically and internationally, with our allies. I urge all Members to consider the notion of strategic independence, which we have spoken a lot about during the covid crisis. As we go forward, it is really important that we aspire to be able to operate autonomously as a global nation alongside our allies.
I believe that the Bill is important for three reasons. First, it will allow for better security both domestically and internationally. It kicks out the high-risk vendors from our network—what’s not to like? Secondly, it placates our allies. New Zealand, Australia, the USA, Canada and others were quite noisy when Huawei was originally admitted to our network, so let us hope that this will placate them, cement that relationship and, perhaps in time, even enable us to admit Japan and other close allies. Thirdly, it opens the door for other 5G providers to come in, which is a good thing, and I support the UK’s diversification strategy.
Having sat on the Committee for this excellent Bill, it is a pleasure to see it back here on Report. The Bill takes forward the Government’s commitment to the UK telecoms supply chain review, introduces a new security framework, amends the Communications Act 2003, introduces new security duties, brings new powers to the Secretary of State and strengthens Ofcom’s regulatory powers, allowing it to enforce the new framework. That is all very positive. It also introduces new national security powers for the Government to impose, monitor and enforce controls. Again, that is a positive step.
I am pretty happy with the Bill as it stands, but in the interests of objectivity, I will talk to a number of the new clauses and amendments. On new clause 1, the Government are aware that the Bill gives Ofcom significant new responsibilities, and it will need to increase its resources and skills to meet those new demands. Ofcom’s budget is approved by its independent board, and the Minister has today confirmed that the budget limit set by the Government will be adjusted to allow Ofcom to carry out new functions effectively. Ofcom is already engaged in this space—we are already proactively looking over the horizon and scanning for future threats—so I am happy that the Government have got this about right.
New clause 2 would ensure that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is provided with information relating to a designated vendor direction. I am sympathetic to this, but the Government know what they are doing. As the Minister said, the ISC’s primary focus is to oversee the work of the security and intelligence agencies. Its remit is clearly defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013, so the Bill is not the appropriate place to achieve an overall enhanced role for the ISC.
I am sorry to have to reiterate this point. There are other ways in which our concerns could be addressed, such as by adjusting our memorandum of understanding, rather than putting it on the face of the Bill, so I am with my hon. Friend as far as that is concerned. However, it is very clearly within our remit to oversee not only the agencies but those parts of other Departments where highly classified information is concerned. That is just a matter of fact—it is in the agreement between us and the Prime Minister.
I empathise with my right hon. Friend’s view, and I agree that he has a point. My position is the same as the Government’s: I do not think that this Bill is necessarily the vehicle through which we should look at the future of how the ISC operates. I am a keen follower of the ISC and its output. Its work is eminent, and my right hon. Friend’s point is well made.
I thank all those Members who have contributed to the debate today. It is an important debate because digital connectivity is an integral part of all our lives. For countless people across the country, having fast and reliable broadband and a good mobile connection is vital to our way of life, but for us to truly reap the benefits of the gigabit-capable broadband and 5G, we need to have confidence that they are secure and that means securing the networks on which they are built, the supply chains on which they depend, and the equipment and services that support them. The Bill demonstrates clearly the Government’s commitment to ensuring the security and resilience of our telecoms networks.
Let me turn to the new clauses and amendments. I shall start by addressing new clause 1. As the UK’s communications regulator, Ofcom already plays an important role in ensuring the ongoing security and resilience of our networks by enforcing the current security duties under the Communications Act. This Bill will build on that experience, giving Ofcom new responsibilities and a range of new powers. What the new clause would do is require it to publish an additional statement as part of its annual report. Happily, I can reassure hon. Members that the Bill already has various reporting mechanisms included within it. Under the new and snappily named section 105Z, Ofcom will need to regularly report to the Secretary of State. Subsection (4)(a) makes it clear that that report must include information on the providers’ compliance with the duties imposed on them by the Bill.
Ofcom will also need to report on telecoms security in its annual infrastructure report, and clause 11 specifies that this should include information on the extent to which providers are complying with their security duties under new sections 105A to 105D. The Secretary of State will also need to regularly report to Parliament on the effectiveness and impact of the new telecoms security framework.
On the final point in the new clause of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) about publishing information on emerging and future security risks, that is not of itself necessarily the most productive way of handling security risks, but the principle that she is trying to get to is very much part of what the Government are seeking to do and, of course, it would be part of what we intend to make sure that we talk about as much as we can within the bounds of national security.
I turn specifically to budget and resources. The hon. Member has set out her concerns about Ofcom’s access to resources and capabilities. It is an issue that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) also touched on. I can tell the House today that Ofcom’s security budget for this financial year has been increased by £4.6 million on top of its current security budget. This funding will allow Ofcom to more than double its headcount of people working on telecoms security, ensuring that it has the necessary capability and capacity to deliver its new responsibilities under the Bill. The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central is aware that I have written to the Intelligence and Security Committee about that security resourcing. It was at a level that I cannot go into on the Floor of this House, but I hope that provides the kind of reassurance that she seeks.
Specifically on the future risks that I alluded to a moment ago, we have ensured that the Bill is looking to the future. For example, clause 12(3)(b) amends Ofcom’s information-gathering powers under section 135 of the Communications Act to ensure that it can request information from providers concerning future developments in their networks that could have an impact on security and, when reporting on security, Ofcom must include any information that assists the Secretary of State in the formulation of security policy, allowing him or her to make an informed decision about what should be published as well in due course.
New clause 2 has been the subject of the majority of this debate, and rightly so. One of the phrases used about the ISC was that it adds value; this Government do not dispute for a second that it adds huge value, and I welcome the tone with which the Chairman of the ISC, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), has approached this. I appeared before the ISC with some trepidation, as is probably appropriate for all Government Ministers, but it was a hugely productive part of this process and something that I am more than happy to do again. I do not think that my right hon. Friend necessarily thinks that piecemeal changes to the ISC’s role are the way to pursue what he seeks, but the annual report that he has mentioned will certainly be looked at closely by the Government.
I am very happy to agree with what the Minister has just said. It would not be necessary to keep trying to put these provisions on the face of each individual Bill every time a new unit is set up in a different Department, or a new duty laid on a different Department, if it could be agreed with the Government that the memorandum of understanding would be adjusted as it is meant to be adjusted when these changes occur. However, sadly, no Front Bencher has yet been able to give us an assurance that that is going to happen, and I know that the Minister will not be able to do so, either.
As I say, I am sure that my right hon. Friend will make that point in the annual report, and the Government will look closely at it. However, Members can take some comfort from the fact that much of the advice in relation to the more sensitive technical and national security matters within the scope of this Bill will be provided by the National Cyber Security Centre, and its activities already fall within the scope of the ISC, as my right hon. Friend knows. However, I welcome his approach to this, and I hope that his mechanism, rather than that of new clause 2, will be the one he will support today.
I turn to the last of the new clauses tabled by Opposition Members. New clause 3 aims to include the diversification strategy in the scope of the Bill. Diversification is crucial to the future of our UK networks, which is why the Government set out their plans to diversify those networks in the 5G diversification strategy in November 2020. That strategy includes steps to invest in research and development, to remove technical and commercial barriers to entry for new suppliers, and to increase our influence in standard- setting bodies—all issues that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings and others on the ISC are keenly aware of the importance of.
We are pursuing a huge range of different mechanisms to enable diversification, because the Government are fully committed to ensuring that their strategy comes to fruition. However, the diversification strategy moves the whole market forward by broadening the supplier base in many ways that are beyond the security measures that are the purview of this Bill, including increased innovation and competition and the overall growth of the telecoms supply mechanisms.
To give the House an idea of some of the non-legislative measures that we are already pursuing, they include the investment in R&D development facilities such as the National Telecoms Lab and the SONIC—SmartRAN Open Network Interoperability Centre—lab that is jointly at work with Ofcom. We are also working to remove barriers to entry for vendors such as by co-ordinating the sunsetting of legacy network technologies, working internationally to co-ordinate diversification objectives, and exploring the use of commercial incentives to address the cost of incorporating new suppliers into a network.
(4 years ago)
Commons ChamberIt is an absolute pleasure to follow such sensible speeches from those on both Front Benches. There is a history to today’s legislation which I shall set out and against which my Committee colleagues can develop the Intelligence and Security Committee’s current perspectives. As the hon. Member for Cardiff Central (Jo Stevens) mentioned, it was in June 2013 that the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which I served under Sir Malcolm Rifkind’s chairmanship, published a no-holds-barred report on foreign involvement in the critical national infrastructure. It focused on the casual and cavalier way in which contracts were signed between British Telecom and Huawei prior to any ministerial involvement, and it insisted that:
“The National Security Council should ensure that there are effective procedures and powers in place…when it comes to investment in the CNI.”
We demanded an effective process by which Government are alerted to potential foreign investment in the CNI; an established procedure for assessing the risks; a process for developing a strategy to manage these risks throughout the lifetime of the contract and beyond; clarity as to what powers the Government have or need to have; and clear lines of responsibility and accountability. The Committee was
“shocked that officials chose not to inform, let alone consult, Ministers on such an issue.”
That, we concluded, must never again be allowed to happen.
The Government’s July 2013 response to the report bordered on complacency. They conceded that
“with hindsight, we agree that Ministers should have been informed”
and put their faith in the relatively new National Security Council, in conjunction with “cross industry-government groups”, to provide better protection in future. Replying to our main finding that their
“duty to protect the safety and security of its citizens should not be compromised by fears of financial consequences”,
the Government observed that
“HMG’s approach balances economic prosperity…with national security…Boosting trade and investment is a key part of the Government’s plan for growth and we are working hard to develop our economic relationships with key trading partners, including China.”
As Huawei’s chief executive officer had been given the full red-carpet treatment at 10 Downing Street only the previous September, that response was all too predictable, and thus the courtship continued, despite growing anxiety among our Five Eyes partners, such as Australia and the United States.
There can be no doubt of the sincerity of the technical advice given by our experts at GCHQ and, more recently, in the National Cyber Security Centre, its public-facing arm. They recognise—as does the Bill—that the lack of diverse suppliers is a critical future vulnerability. For telecommunications to be resilient, their networks need more than two providers on which to depend. Otherwise, the collapse of one provider means total reliance on the other. Yet should that really override the danger of ever-closer involvement with a company legally in thrall to potentially hostile Chinese intelligence services?
In a statement in July last year, the ISC acknowledged the National Cyber Security Centre’s paradoxical point that three providers might be safer than two, even when the third comes from an adversarial state. Yet it rightly pointed out that
“the issue cannot be viewed solely through a technical lens—because it is not simply about telecommunications equipment. This is a geostrategic decision, the ramifications of which may be felt for decades to come… It is about perception as much as anything: our Five Eyes partners need to be able to trust the UK and we must not do anything which puts that at risk… And there is the question as to whether other countries might follow the UK’s decision”
when they are not as capable of protecting their networks as we are of protecting our own.
Some say that the Government’s perseverance with Huawei was justified on the basis of the technical advice they were given—right up to the point earlier this year when the United States brought in its fierce further sanctions. Yet the fact that the US would take such a step should have been anticipated. Our belated U-turn in July shows what happens when multifaceted problems are examined in a one-dimensional way.
Seven long years after our Huawei report, the Government have—in the space of a fortnight—introduced two important Bills: this one and the National Security and Investment Bill. Taken together, according to the National Cyber Security Centre, they should help to establish an
“appropriately secure and resilient telecoms infrastructure”
and
“effect the security transformation we”—
the NCSC—
“believe to be necessary”.
We are assured that
“operators adhering in totality to the new security regime will be among the most secure in the world”.
Hopefully, our US partners—currently promoting an international clean network initiative—will agree and Five Eyes harmony on those vital matters can now be reinstated.
Having waited so long for two such necessary Bills, the ISC must sadly record our concern that, in both cases, their Second Reading debates were held within just four working days of their introduction on First Reading. Normally, adequate notice of about two weeks would enable our hard-working staff to obtain relevant confidential material and advance sight of such legislation to allow proper prior consideration. The tiny window of opportunity afforded by the parliamentary timetabling has prevented this from happening, and our staff had to fall back purely on publicly available sources.
Proposals such as those in this Bill, which the Committee first recommended in 2013, are therefore to be welcomed, but the public rely on the ISC to assure them that we have asked those questions in private that cannot be discussed more openly. As that has not yet happened, our support for the Bill in principle cannot be as unqualified at this stage, as we should like it to be, though I welcome the Minister’s offer to speak to the Committee later this week.
Here are a few of the questions that can be asked on the Floor of the House. First, as the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport has not traditionally specialised in national security, on whom will the Secretary of State rely for advice when deciding whether to issue restrictions against high-risk vendors, or directions to telecoms providers?
Secondly, if the answer is the National Cyber Security Centre and our wider intelligence community, will there be procedures to guarantee that they will be consulted with adequate notice, and who will ensure that their advice is given sufficient weight? Thirdly, in view of the revolving door, via which too many businessmen and ex-civil servants effortlessly glide between their former roles and the Huawei boardroom, what assurance can we have that the Government will be immune from lobbying campaigns by those on the payroll of high-risk vendors?
Finally, I have a question that I was pleased, I think, to hear the Secretary of State answer 15 minutes into his opening speech, but it would be nice to have the Minister reiterate that answer: unlike in 2013, do the Government now fully accept that national security must always be their overriding consideration where critical national infrastructure is concerned?
I have to say that I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman on this. Although the Huawei cyber-security evaluation centre was installed, when I sat and listened to people from it making a presentation to us earlier in the year, it was almost as though we were watching people who were kind of squeezing their own genuine, real opinion, which would have been coming via GCHQ, about how the real threat was formed. Their arguments did not stand up, even in the face of people who were not every day working on security.
The truth is we need to be careful, and it should have been a tighter position from the word go. The very fact that the Government are bringing this measure forward now suggests that that was not the case. [Interruption.] Listen, I am critical of my own Government. I resigned from the damn thing at one point. I have to say that I therefore do believe it is possible for great Governments, like mine, to get things wrong.
In defence of the Huawei cyber-security evaluation centre, its sixth annual report, from September this year, is absolutely devastating in its criticisms of Huawei’s failures to be secure or to make improvements when insecurities have been highlighted.
I agree completely. The point is that when we were talking about this earlier on, it was clear that that was, underneath it all, the centre’s real opinion, but it was kind of moving and modifying. It was also used in a political way, by the way, which I did not think was right. An opinion is either there or it is not; do not get people in to brief Back Benchers about what they should be thinking. I thought that was wrong.
We are absolutely in the right place at this point and the Bill goes a long way towards achieving that. However, we need to do some other things that could be in the Bill. For example, the Bill is about security but it does say on the front that it goes slightly wider than security: the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman) signed the bit that says:
“In my view the provisions of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.”
That convention is the European convention on human rights. We need to ask ourselves whether that idea applies to many regimes—not just China—and companies that come from those regimes that may be guilty of human rights abuses.
I asked the Minister previously, in a private context, whether he would consider including in proposed new section 105Z8 of the Communications Act 2003, on designation notices, the inclusion of the ability, where it may arise, to do something in the area of genocide and the involvement of companies in that process. There is very strong evidence in a couple of cases—particularly in the Uyghur case—of the use of slave labour, which should result in those companies being outlawed. The Minister may argue that this Bill might not be the appropriate vehicle for that because it is specifically about security, but every Bill has on its face that we abide by human rights laws. I am not trying to widen the Bill’s scope; I am giving the Minister the opportunity to have that extra element as part of his possible designations. After all, we are dealing with countries and nations that have, particularly in China’s case, torn up much of the book on co-operation and diplomacy.
Let me raise a final point before I conclude. My hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) has gone, but he mentioned Australia. One of our Five Eyes partners, Australia, had the temerity to ask for an inquiry into the covid outbreak. Since then, the Chinese have attempted, in essence, massively to beat up Australia in a very undiplomatic and aggressive manner. It started with abuse of the individuals who asked for an inquiry and then went further into abuse of the Government. Subsequently, it has gone on to sanctions: the Chinese has now broken WTO rules, with sanctions of more than 200% on Australian wine.
In the past couple of days, the Chinese have produced what I think is called a meme—which is a mocked-up instrument on the internet—that shows something about an Australian soldier trying to kill a child. This is appalling behaviour and I want my Government, at some point, to be very clear that such behaviour is simply not to be borne. Although we have said that we stand with China, the key thing about this sort of thing and our co-operation with our Five Eyes partners is to do more than stand with China: we should condemn behaviour like that that deliberately targets and demeans a democratic nation that goes by the rule of law and human rights, which is something that China does not do. I do hope that the Minister will pass on to his colleagues that no matter what we do with this Bill, we need to make sure that we stand up with our Five Eyes partners, now that we have the National Security and Investment Bill and are moving in that direction, and never allow any one of them to be isolated and picked off one at a time. I commend the Bill to the House.
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (David Johnston). I noticed that he was speaking without notes, which was very impressive. Sadly, I still rely on mine. I thank the Minister for bringing forward the Bill, and I thank the ministerial team for talking to us and engaging with so many colleagues. It would be great if other Departments could do that. What can I say? Hint, hint!
When the Henry Jackson Society and I produced our “Defending our Data” document back in May 2019, many Members had yet to form an opinion on Huawei. I am therefore grateful to the 60-odd members of the Huawei interest group who took an interest in this subject, and to the 36 people who voted to show their concern to the Government back in early March on the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill. I am aware that that Bill was not necessarily the right place to express those concerns, but with hindsight I think it sent an important message to the Government from those 36 Members—plus two tellers, of whom I was one. The United States moving its position in subsequent months was also important. I think the change would have happened anyway, regardless of whether there was a Republican or a Democrat Administration. A combination of Back-Bench concern, quite rightly, and the United States’ understanding of the geopolitics being perhaps a little ahead of that of the United Kingdom and on a par with that of Australia helped to shape Ministers’ understanding of the problems.
I am slightly concerned that the situation came to this in the first place, because there were so many warning lights about Huawei’s deepening relationship with BT. My hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall) spoke about Nortel. We must remember that Huawei had a supply contract with Nortel, during which time it hacked its way into Nortel’s systems and stole everything, like a parasite within a body. Nortel was one of the great, spectacular Canadian bankruptcies of the early 21st century. Why? Because it went into partnership with a business that deliberately collapsed it after stealing its IP. If that is not a lesson for us, it is difficult to know what is. Huawei never was and never will be a private firm. It is 99% owned by the Chinese state via trade unions. When I heard Ministers—not this Minister, but others—using the line about Huawei being a private company, I felt that it was a deeply naive thing for the Department to say.
Just for the record, a former Prime Minister said that as well, repeatedly.
Those decisions, as I said, were taken in the context of the environment that people were already well aware of, and they are taken at a degree of commercial risk. However, we have worked closely with the networks to ensure that there will be no additional delays as a result of this decision. I think it is the right thing that puts national security at the absolute heart of our programme, but it also does that in the context of not jeopardising the clear economic benefits and the clear practical benefits of improving connectivity across the country that we would all like to see.
On the emergency services network, we anticipate that these announcements concerning Huawei will have a very low impact on the emergency services network. We do not anticipate any impact on the programme schedules. There is some Huawei equipment in the EE part of the emergency services dedicated core network that EE is already working towards removing.
Let me cover one other aspect raised by the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). I look forward—maybe that is not quite the right phrase—to appearing before the ISC in the next few days. We will always co-operate with it, and I am very happy to work with it on the best way to balance the obvious requirement between transparency and national security, although we would always seek to be as transparent as we possibly can be within those important bounds.
I did ask a few questions. If the Minister cannot answer them now, by all means he should write to me. However, I am concerned about a situation where, for example, a former leader of the Conservative party and former Prime Minister has a major role in the China belt and road funding operation. How secure will Government be against lobbying of people with that sort of connection and prominence?
I will simply say that the Government will always put our national security interests first, and of course we are always alive to the commercial interests of the companies that seek to engage with us in this matter or any other. I look forward to further engaging with my right hon. Friend and his Committee.
To conclude, this Bill does not simply produce a framework that will address one particular company or even one particular country. It sets up the futureproof regime that will allow us to deal with the company that we have spoken about so much this evening and also its successors in successor networks. The intention of this legislation is to persist well beyond the current challenges that we face. I am glad that it commands the support we have seen across the House. I am immensely grateful for what has been a genuinely well-informed debate and one that I look forward to carrying on in Committee. The Telecommunications (Security) Bill will create one of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world. It will enable us to protect our national telecoms infrastructure, and it is also a chance for the UK to become the world leader in the development of new 5G technology that we all know we can be.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Telecommunications (Security) Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 19 January 2021.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Question agreed to.
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Money)
Queen’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it is expedient to authorise any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Question agreed to.
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Ways and Means)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it is expedient to authorise provision requiring public communications providers to pay certain costs incurred by the Office of Communications.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Question agreed to.
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Carry-over)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 80A(1)(a)),
That if, at the conclusion of this Session of Parliament, proceedings on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill have not been completed, they shall be resumed in the next Session.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Question agreed to.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister hinted at a possible way out of this impasse for the Government when he referred to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am the only Conservative Member of the House to have taken part in the previous full-scale investigation of Huawei, and we reported in 2013. It is true that there was a statement in July 2019. I have just looked it up, and it was three pages long. Surely the Intelligence and Security Committee is the body that is tailor-made to represent the concerns of this Parliament through an in-depth study and report—both publicly and, in the classified version, privately, as we did before, to Parliament and the Prime Minister, respectively—so that we can come up with a robust, rigorous and resilient solution.
I pay tribute to the 2013 Malcolm Rifkind report; it was a thorough piece of work for that period. And of course my right hon. Friend is right that the ISC is one of many forums that could look at this issue. [Interruption.] For instance, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs has also looked at our relationship with China. He is right, too, to say that the ISC as an independent body could choose to look at this, and the Government would of course welcome and co-operate fully with any such inquiry.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman is right to talk about managed risk. He will recognise that we have been managing the risk presented by Huawei’s specific circumstances within the 4G network for some considerable time. He is also right, of course, that we have to consider the potential delay to the roll-out caused by any measures we decide are necessary. I repeat that the most important criterion is that we act in our national security interest. If that causes delay, it may well still be the appropriate course of action, but we will need to decide that when we are in possession of all the facts. He has my assurance that when we do that we will make the most balanced judgment we can. As I said to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood), all commercial operators will need to take account not just of what we have said today but of what they already know about the position in the United States and elsewhere.
Does the Secretary of State accept that the phrase “manageable risk” is almost a contradiction in terms, because if it were fully manageable, it would not be a risk? Is he not absolutely right not to be taking a decision with such profound security implications for our future in the dying few hours of an outgoing prime ministerial Administration? Finally, does he accept that unlike other suppliers, which, it is true, may have contaminated supply chains themselves, Huawei is unique in being subject to article 14 of China’s national intelligence law, passed in June 2017, which empowers the intelligence agencies of the Chinese state to
“request the relevant organs, organisations and civilians to provide necessary support, assistance and cooperation”
to those intelligence services? We would be mad to enter into a direct security relationship with the agencies of a totalitarian communist state.
I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s comments. Of course, he is right that we should take no risks that are not manageable. Once we are in possession of all the information we should have, we will have to judge whether we are capable of managing the appropriate risk effectively. If we are not, it is a risk that we should not take. On that I entirely agree, but that decision has not yet been taken.
My right hon. Friend is right to highlight the Chinese law—it is what makes Huawei different from many other suppliers in the network—but I repeat the point I made a moment ago: a process for managing that risk has been in place for some considerable time. So far as delay is concerned, I repeat that in my judgment the right way to proceed is to delay only until we are in possession of the facts and information necessary to make the right judgment. That is the process we will undertake.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman started his comments with the mandatory levy. He is right, of course, that it will take time to do this. If someone is interested in how quickly they can do things, the sooner they start, the sooner they finish. All of that is true. I said it would take at least a year; it may in fact take nearer to 18 months because any of these changes will need to begin at the start of a tax year.
A mandatory levy would deliver a return of 1% of gross gambling yield. What is being put forward today—except by only five companies, but that represents about half of the commercial gambling industry—is exactly for that: 1% of gross gambling yield. We would not derive any more income from a mandatory levy than we will from this process, but via this process we will derive it more quickly, and that is a real advantage for the problem gamblers whom I know he and I are both very concerned to help.
I do not accept that this is a piecemeal commitment. It is a four-year commitment, which we—all of us; not just the Government—will have the opportunity to monitor. If it is not being met in the way we all expect, we can and will take further action.
The hon. Gentleman is right that the Gambling Commission receives its funding from the industry; that is generally the case with regulators. If we had a mandatory levy, it would still fund the same activities. However, I believe the Gambling Commission is the right body, as the regulator, to be able to give us the assurance, which the Opposition spokesman properly raised, that the money is being spent on the right things, not simply ploughed back into the activities of the five companies.
The hon. Gentleman knows I take the view that there is more to do in relation to gambling on credit. He knows, too, that the Gambling Commission is in the process of looking at this in detail. I want to see what it concludes, but I believe a lot more can be done on gambling on credit to make sure that those who are particularly vulnerable do not find themselves more vulnerable by gambling on credit.
The Opposition spokesman mentioned an estimate of 55,000 children addicted to gambling. Do the Government accept that this terrifically large figure is accurate? If so, what proportion of it is a result of the advent of online gambling and what age verification measures are in place to supply at least part of the solution?
My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. It is difficult to be precise about the number of young people in particular who have problems with gambling, as my right hon. Friend will recognise, but it is a fair assumption that online gambling contributes significantly to that problem. As a result, we have already seen improvements in identification and age verification. We need to see further improvements to make sure that the trend decreases.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn anonymity, as the hon. Gentleman has heard me say and as he recognises, there are powers available; the issue is how quickly they can be used. When we come to consider a duty of care, it seems to me and my colleagues that one of the advantages of the duty of care approach is that it should bring about a change of attitude across a whole range of activities among the online companies. It will no longer be sufficient for online companies to say, “Well, we’ve met this rule or that rule.” Instead, they must demonstrate to a regulator that they are doing all they reasonably can to keep their users safe, and that includes being safe from some of the activities the hon. Gentleman has in mind. I do not promise that any of this will be a magic bullet or that things will be transformed overnight, but I do think that the approach we are setting out will start to change the culture of these companies and start to make them think about how they meet their responsibilities more effectively.
The briefing for this statement mentions, correctly, that all five terrorist attacks in the UK during 2017 had an online element, and online terrorist content remains a feature of contemporary radicalisation. Given that some of these companies have created applications with end-to-end encryption that they claim they cannot get into themselves, let alone the security services being able to get into them, what will these measures do to prevent online harm being done through these inaccessible applications?
My right hon. Friend identifies one of the most troublesome aspects of online harm—that encryption is extraordinarily difficult for us to wrestle with. That is of course because there are advantages to encryption, and we use it all the time in our daily lives, but he is right that those who choose to use it for criminal purposes must also be challenged. In relation to this White Paper, I would say to him that harms at the top end of the seriousness spectrum, including the promotion of terrorism, will receive the greatest possible attention from the regulator, and our expectations from the Government will also be higher, hence the Home Secretary’s close interest in the way in which codes of practice are developed, so that online companies are doing their utmost to ensure that this kind of behaviour is challenged.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberIt is truly an honour to follow two such humane and comprehensive opening speeches.
Seventy-nine men from the village of Brockenhurst in the heart of the New Forest lost their lives in the great war—21 of them in the last year of that war alone—so it is hardly surprising that the village of Brockenhurst should have been early in the process of commemorating this particularly poignant centenary. Only last Saturday, I attended an outstanding commemoration concert that was held in the village. Back on Trafalgar Day, 21 October, the Tile Barn Poppy Pod village was dedicated to the memory of Enda Ryan, Hampshire County Council’s greatly respected outdoor facilities manager who recently died, far too young, from cancer. Each unit in the village commemorates a first world war battle, and service families can have respite breaks in the poppy pods at weekends, free of charge. The Tile Barn where they are sited was one of three New Zealand general hospitals set up in 1916, during the first world war, to care for the wounded. Thousands of New Zealanders passed through it, and the 93 who did not survive are buried in nearby St Nicholas’ church.
I am sure that in this debate we will hear many tales of poignant recollection of the sacrifices made in villages such as Brockenhurst up and down the country, so I wish to list briefly what I regard as nine necessary lessons from the first world war. First, we must not think that we can successfully predict when a war will break out. I have often quoted in the House Sir Maurice Hankey—I shall not quote him again today—who in 1931 reviewed all the previous great conflicts in which the nation had been involved. He pointed out that, far from having 10 years’ warning—which is how far ahead people were saying in 1931 that we ought to be able to predict a great conflict—in the run-up to world war one, we had had barely 10 days’ warning of that war.
The second necessary lesson is not to sign up to multiple bilateral alliances rather than a single multilateral alliance. In the terrible connected development of circumstances that led to the catastrophe of 1914, we saw how individual separate alliances triggered one country after another in a process of what I suppose one could call falling dominoes, which meant that we ended up with a global conflict out of something that started on a relatively small scale. That is what explains the success of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation—the certain knowledge that any aggression against any one of its members will immediately trigger defence of that member by all the rest. I do not wish to be controversial in this debate of all debates, but that is why we have to be careful about other organisations, including the European Union, issuing security guarantees willy-nilly here and there, because we do not wish once again to get into a cross-cutting system of obligations and alliances that can lead to a chain reaction such as happened so disastrously in 1914.
The third lesson is this. Do not think that humanitarian restrictions on methods of warfare at the outbreak of a conflict will last very long. The idea, before the great war, that civilians would be deliberately targeted by the fighting services would probably have been scornfully rejected, yet as early as December 1914 we had the bombardment by the German navy of the seaside towns of Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby, when 137 people were killed in their own homes and 455 injured. That was followed by the Zeppelin airship raids, and the more lethal but less scary Gotha bomber raids—and who can forget that, in 1915, we saw the barbaric initiation of poison gas warfare?
The fourth lesson is, do not imagine that individual valour can overcome the mechanisation of warfare. We had the lethal combination of the machine gun and the barbed wire emplacements. Those defences could not be breached by hurling wave after wave of human bodies against them.
The fifth lesson is, do not repeat the failed methods of warfare time and again. My hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) said that the troops were well led in 1918. Well, they were, at the tail end of the war; it is just a great pity that they were not a lot earlier, because time and again it was shown beyond doubt that attrition did not work, and time and again—at the Somme and Passchendaele most outstandingly—it was tried long beyond the point where failure was an absolute certainty.
I am listening with great interest to my right hon. Friend and I recognise what he is saying about that issue. There is another feature, which is often not well reported; I think Keegan brought it out in his book on the first world war. The fact that communications had not advanced at the speed with which munitions had, meant that often news of what was actually happening on the front took nearly half a day to arrive back at divisional headquarters, so nothing could be changed. It is a really important issue. We tend to condemn the commanders, but we forget sometimes that they had no idea, quite often, what was happening for hours, let alone minutes.
I hesitate to disagree with my right hon. Friend, particularly because of his own gallant service and that of previous generations in his family, but I would refer to accounts at the time, such as that of such a considerable figure as Sholto Douglas, later Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, who became one of the most senior RAF officers in its history, who was flying over the battlefield of Passchendaele, and who observed in his memoirs, with all that retrospective knowledge, that it was still inconceivable that the troops were sent forward time and again into a sea of mud, when it was absolutely clear that the attack had failed and had no prospect of success. I know there is a revisionist view of history that says the lessons of the Somme and Passchendaele were needed so they could get it right for the 100 days campaign at the end of 1918, but frankly, with the greatest of respect, I do not buy it.
The sixth lesson is, do not underestimate the value of surprise. The decisive allied breakthrough on 8 August 1918, the so-called “black day of the German army”, depended crucially on the strictest operational secrecy and dominance of the airspace over the battlefield, just as the Normandy landings did a quarter of a century later.
The seventh lesson is, do not forget—we have heard a bit of this today—why the war was fought in the first place. The war was fought because Prussian militarism and sense of entitlement to invade, overrun and occupy Prussia’s neighbours proved to be something that could be stopped only by force. Again, there are revisionists who say it would have been better if we had just let Germany get on with it and done nothing about it. I would just briefly quote the former Cambridge professor of French history, Professor Robert Tombs, who wrote recently in The Daily Telegraph that
“democracy and liberal government would have faced a bleak future. Authoritarian regimes would have been in the driving seat.”
He concluded:
“If tomorrow the Russian army marched through Poland and we were faced with the prospect of hostile aircraft based just across the Channel, would we react any differently? Let us hope we never face such a choice as our great-grandparents did.”
The eighth lesson is, do not settle for anything less than unconditional surrender in a conflict of this sort. Germany did not accept that she had been fully and fairly beaten in the field. The myth of the “stab in the back” gave fuel to Hitler’s subsequent evil campaign to say that Germany had not been defeated but betrayed.
The final lesson speaks for itself and requires no elaboration because we have heard it time and again in the present day in this House: do not stint in peacetime on investment in our armed forces—or we will pay a cost thousands of times greater when we fight a war that we might otherwise have deterred and completely avoided.