Oral Answers to Questions

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

We have made huge progress in the European negotiations. We are seeing business confidence increasing and investment increasing, and by this autumn we should have agreed a clear framework with the EU so that businesses have certainty about future investment.

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

The UK’s economic growth in the final quarter of 2017 was the weakest of any economy in the G7, and the OBR is forecasting that the UK is on course for our worst period of economic growth since the end of the second world war. However, none of these already dire forecasts factors in a no-deal Brexit, which would have a severe impact on jobs, growth and tax revenues. We know the Chancellor knows this; indeed, he has said so publicly. The question is: why are his colleagues not listening to him?

[Elizabeth Truss]

It is very important that in the negotiations with the European Union we always keep the option of no deal on the table; otherwise, we will not get the best possible deal. But we are very confident of achieving a good deal. Why is the hon. Gentleman not welcoming the fantastic economic news we have had this morning: the lowest unemployment—again—since 1975, and wages up by 2.8%? It seems to me that there are an awful lot of Eeyores on the Opposition Benches.

The Economy

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Thursday 22nd March 2018 Commons Chamber

[John Redwood]

I think that the hon. Lady will agree that this is one area where even she must see that getting out of the EU is a big positive, because she and I will be able to unite on something for once, and shove the abolition of this much-hated tax through the House. Is it not a disgrace that the world’s fifth largest economy and an important country cannot even control its own taxes? Over all those years in the EU, we were assured by Governments of all persuasions that tax was a red line and that the House of Commons would always be able to decide what the tax rates would be and what was going to have to be taxed. That simply will not be true until we leave the EU.

That is the first bonus. The Brexit dividend is to take control of our money and to spend it on our priorities. It will have a double advantage: not only will it give a boost to growth the first time we do it, but it will cut our balance of payments deficit. I am more worried about our balance of payments deficit than our state deficit, because the Government have done a great job in getting the state deficit down to perfectly reasonable levels, whereas the balance of payments deficit needs working on. The simplest way of cutting it is to stop sending money to the EU, because that is like a load of imports.

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

I wish to ask a serious question. The right hon. Gentleman is very well remunerated for his views on finance and is very much sought after for advice in the City. He will know that, if we were to lose just 10% of, say, the financial services sector in the UK, as a result of market access ending through Brexit, that would constitute a loss of £8 billion to £9 billion in taxation to this country. Is he genuinely not worried at all that we need to retain some elements in our economic relationship with the European Union as part of those Brexit talks?

[John Redwood]

I am an optimist. We will have a perfectly good economic relationship even if we do not get a comprehensive formal deal of the kind that I know those on the Front Bench would really like to secure. The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. Well, let me give him the evidence. When I studied this subject before the referendum—I always like to ensure that I give good advice, so I try to find out what I am talking about and have some facts—I looked at the economic performance of the United Kingdom during the early 1970s, when we first entered the European Economic Community, and took great interest in the economic growth rate around 1992 when the single market was completed, which people say is so crucial to our growth rate. From that, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we cannot see any positive kick up in the graph of UK growth either when we first joined the EEC or when the single market was completed in the early 1990s. Indeed, the growth rate fell off on both occasions. I do not blame the EU for all of that, but it shows that there was no great benefit.

If there was no benefit going into the thing, why should there be something negative when we come out? It is not asymmetric. There will not be a hit. I promise him that when we look back on it all in five years’ time, he will not be able to see that—certainly on world growth graphs and, I suspect, on UK economic graphs—when we left the EU. It will not be a big economic event. It is a massively important political event, but it will not be a significant economic event, because joining it was not. Indeed, even worse, in the immediate aftermath of both joining the EEC and of completing the single market, there were very big recessions where our growth rate took a very big hit. I do not blame the EEC for the first one—that was more to do with international banking and the oil crisis—but I entirely blame the EU for the second one, because it was the European exchange rate mechanism that ripped the heart out of our companies and our economy and led to a boom and bust that was almost as big as Labour’s at the end of the last decade. That was why we did so badly.

Let me now go into a little more detail on some of the crucial sectors that have been badly damaged by our membership of the EEC, and then the EU and single market. We can do rather better in those areas once we are out of the legal entanglements.

Let us start with the most obvious and topical one this week—the fishing industry. When we first went into the EEC, we had a flourishing fishing industry, with a large number of trawlers and successful fishing ports in Scotland, England and Wales, and a net surplus of fish. We were an exporter of fish because we had access to one of the richest fishing grounds in the world in our own territorial waters and beyond. The common fisheries policy destroyed much of that. Many of our boats were lost, and much of our fishing capacity was lost. We are now a heavy net importer of fish, as a result of being part of the common fisheries policy. Our fishing grounds have been greatly damaged, because too many industrial trawlers have been allowed in from outside to do damage to the seabed and to the shoals of fish that we once had. The quota system has not really worked because of the discard policy.

It would be easy to design a UK fishing policy through which we would have both more fish to eat and we would take fewer fish out of the sea. We would do that by not having the discards. It would also be easy to design a policy in which the fish was landed in the UK, so that there would be more economic benefit for us in processing and selling it on, and in which we would have much more capacity in the English and the Scottish fleets so that we could capture more of the added value. I look forward to the Secretary of State publishing a detailed strategy and offering us draft legislation, and I look forward to the Scottish National party supporting that legislation, because it must know how important the recovery of our fishing industry is.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Redwood]

I trust that Northern Ireland, as part of the United Kingdom, will benefit from the economic policies I have been describing. It is the settled wish of a majority in Northern Ireland that they stay part of the United Kingdom, and they are very welcome. If the hon. Gentleman is referring to the alleged difficulties regarding the border, I simply do not think that that is a serious, real problem. It is obviously a political problem because the EU wishes to make it so, but the EU needs to understand that this border is already a complex one. When goods are being moved either way between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, there is a currency change to be effected, and there are different incidences in excise rates, VAT, income tax and corporation tax levels on each side of the border. Yet we do not have a man or a woman at the border stopping every truck and working out the sums on what has to be done on the excise tax or the currency, because that would be ridiculous. If we end up with World Trade Organisation-based trading so that there do have to be tariffs at the border, it is no more difficult to calculate the tariff electronically and charge it away from the border than it is to charge the excise and the VAT at the moment. We know how to do it; it is not that complicated: we live in the electronic age. I can see that Labour Members want to live in the pre-computer world and do not think that we can send data electronically, but I assure them that it is a magical development.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

The slogan of the leave campaign was “Take back control”. What does that mean if it does not mean taking back control of one’s borders? There are movements of people that need to be considered. There is still the common travel area between this country and the Republic of Ireland. One cannot simply introduce borders and then tell the British public that those borders will not be physical, or even exist, because there will somehow be a digital solution. It is not practical to say that those borders are going to be put in place and then they will not exist.

[John Redwood]

The hon. Gentleman has been here long enough to know that all parties have always agreed that we keep the common travel area with the Republic of Ireland. That has always been a given. It was not dependent on the EU in the first place, and everybody wants to keep it.

Let us deal with the question of our UK external border, wherever it may be, and the issue of migration. Yes, the British people voted to have more controls over the number of people who come to work and settle here. The Prime Minister has promised on several occasions that she will get the net migration total down to tens of thousands from the quarter of a million-plus we have been experiencing each year, and I wish her every success with that. We do not need new hard border checks because, as I understand the way that thinking is going in the Government—the way I encourage it to go—we just want to control two things. We want to control the right to work through a work permit system and we wish to control the entitlement to benefit by making sure that people are properly qualified for it. That does not require big controls at the border. Anybody is welcome to come as a tourist, to come and spend their own money, and to come and invest. That is not what we are trying to stop. We can control the things we wish to control through a work permit system and through a benefit system.

Draft Financial Services And Markets Act 2000 (Carrying On Regulated Activities By Way Of Business) (Amendment) Order 2018

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Wednesday 7th March 2018 General Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

As ever, it is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Sir David. I thank the Minister for his introduction. I agree that peer-to-peer lending is important. It is an exciting and fast-developing segment of our financial services industry. I am pleased that the UK plays host to some of the firms that lead the market, which provides a helpful alternative to companies for which traditional bank lending, for whatever reason, is not the right fit.

We are dealing with something quite new, and it is fair to say that the market has developed rapidly. The Financial Conduct Authority has worked hard to keep pace with innovation as far as possible, such as through the introduction of the acclaimed regulatory sandbox, which has helped to incubate new financial services while prioritising consumer protection.

The one thing that, to be frank, confuses me about the Government’s motivations is why they believe now is the time to bring forward this deregulatory measure. It makes sense that borrowers should not be treated or regulated as financial services organisations, but our research reveals that that is not happening. Indeed, the stakeholders I consulted in the peer-to-peer lending sphere said they had not yet seen any evidence of it. I think the Minister’s words were that the legislation “could be” read in that way, but I do not believe it has been to date. I therefore simply ask him to provide further detail and clarity about the rationale in bringing the order forward. In particular, some concrete examples of when borrowers have been believed to be at risk of becoming regulated entities would be useful for the Committee.

The Opposition are supportive of creating a transparent, well-regulated environment for alternative finance to flourish. However, if we are to legislate to deregulate, we must be sure that we are doing so for the right, evidence-led reasons. I would be happy to receive that detail from the Minister either in writing or in his response.

Draft Building Societies (Restricted Transactions) (Amendment To The Prohibition On Entering Into Derivatives Transactions) Order 2018 Draft Financial Services Act 2012 (Mutual Societies) Order 2018 Draft Co-Operative And Community Benefit Societies Act 2014 (Amendments To Audit Requirements) Order 2017

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Wednesday 28th February 2018 General Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

Thank you, Mr Robertson, for calling me to speak on behalf of the Opposition.

Building societies and other mutuals certainly perform a vital role within the UK financial services industry. As a Labour and Co-operative MP, as are a number of my colleagues on the Committee, I have always taken a strong personal interest in creating a well-regulated and supportive environment that is conducive to a strong mutuals sector. In fact, one of my formative political memories, having grown up in the north-east, is the demutualisation of Northern Rock in the late ’90s, when everyone was seemingly offered free money with no catches. However, 10 years later, the situation looked somewhat different.

I want the Committee to pay particular attention to the second draft order that the Minister described, on building societies, which I think will bring about the most substantive changes of all the draft orders. Mutuals need a level playing field between building societies and their retail banking counterparts. That has to include the ability to manage risk directly by hedging their activities using derivatives, which is clearly essential for any major financial institution. As the Minister said, that is not the case at present, given that building societies are obliged to use brokers given their inability to be a member of a clearing house themselves. It is reasonable to consider changing that asymmetry, which inhibits the ability of building societies to operate as independent market participants.

All efforts to improve the resilience of our financial systems since the catastrophic events of 2008 certainly have the Opposition’s full support. The establishment of clearing houses has been essential to creating a more robust derivatives infrastructure. It makes sense to us that building societies might want to hedge their risk, while complying with this new regime that will help make markets safer. As long as they cannot be members of clearing houses themselves, they will have to remain dependent on brokers for market access, which means that they are unable to manage risk in the same way as a retail bank. The legislative changes proposed today would enable building societies to compete on a level playing field, and we are certainly sympathetic to that.

I seek clarity from the Minister on one outstanding point. Will he provide a more detailed outline of how a building society would be impacted in the unlikely event that a central clearing house should collapse in its entirety? That issue was raised in the Lords debate earlier this month, and Lord Young committed to write to Baroness Kramer with further details. I request that copies of that letter be placed in the House of Commons Library and sent to me, so that we can all be better informed about how such a scenario would unfold in practice.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mel Stride]

I—or, indeed, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury—would of course be happy to meet my hon. Friend and the business colleagues from his constituency. We are potentially interested in free ports and will keep the idea under review.

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

Many Cabinet members have made their views clear about the single market and customs union. The Chancellor has said that he would like to see no tariffs with Europe after we leave the EU and no hard border in Northern Ireland. His exact words, which were in a letter to the Treasury Committee, were that he wants a deal

“that facilitates the freest and most frictionless trade possible in goods between the UK and the EU, and allows us to forge new trade relationships with our partners in Europe and around the world.”

Will the Financial Secretary therefore welcome the speech that the Leader of the Opposition gave yesterday in which he proposed a new UK-EU customs union that would, to quote the Chancellor directly, facilitate

“the freest and most frictionless trade possible in goods between the UK and the EU”

and allow us to

“forge new trade relationships with our partners in Europe and around the world”?

[Mel Stride]

I am here to speak about Government policy, as you have quite rightly indicated, Mr Speaker. However, if I may say so, Opposition Members’ zig-zagging in respect of their position on the customs union has been quite extraordinary. If I understand what is being suggested, it seems to me, at a first take, that the idea that we can be in the customs union yet go out and have a high level of control over deals and free trade arrangements with other countries just does not hang together.

Draft Enactment of Extra-Statutory Concessions Order 2018

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Thursday 22nd February 2018 General Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

As the Minister has said, provision for extra-statutory concessions is a well-established part of our legislative proceedings. Although it is always important that we review and discuss such concessions as we are doing today, particularly as they concern the tax process, cross-party support has always been a feature. That has been referred to in previous discussions, and we do not intend to depart from that broadly supportive approach today.

I note in the explanatory memorandum that the Government’s consultation, which was held in September 2017, drew no major objections from stakeholders and the draft order has been updated to reflect the contributions that were received. There are two points that I wish to raise with the Minister pursuant to that consultation. First, might he shed any light on the process for determining the impact of the order on national insurance contributions and the regulation of directors’ fees and professional remuneration? Secondly, what monitoring will be in place to ensure that the scope of the concessions remains as proposed? In particular, are the Government confident that the change in wording from “small” to “insubstantial”, as decided in the consultation, will be sufficient?

I have no further comments or objections to make on the remaining three concessions. I would be happy to receive clarity from the Minister either in his closing remarks or in writing at a later date.

Finance (No. 2) Bill

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 21st February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp]

As always, it is an enormous pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bootle (Peter Dowd), whose speeches are always entertaining and occasionally informative. He spent a great deal of time talking about the bank levy and the various new clauses standing in his name on that topic. I wish to start by addressing the central thesis of his comments on the bank levy: his suggestion that banks are not paying their fair share, particularly as two of them received state money from about 2009.

It is a matter of incontrovertible fact that banks, as organisations, are paying more tax proportionately than other kinds of corporates. It is of course right that they do, for the reason that the hon. Gentleman and my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) mentioned: they did receive taxpayer money. They pay this extra money, compared with other businesses, in two ways. The first is through the surplus profit tax of 8%—they pay about a third more corporation tax proportionately than a non-bank corporation does. The second is through the bank levy. Although the bank levy is being reduced, it will remain in force, so banks will continue to pay proportionately more tax than non-bank businesses after the implementation of this Budget. That is a vital point to get across.

The hon. Gentleman also tried to link funding for children’s services to the bank levy. In one of my interventions, I gave some figures on the total amount of tax that banks are paying. We can argue about why they are paying that extra tax. Clearly, it is at least in part due to the surplus profits rate and to the bank levy. It may also, in part, be due to the fact that the banks’ profits have increased. Whatever the cause, the bare fact is that they are paying £7 billion or £8 billion a year more in tax now than they were some time ago. So suggesting that children’s services have been deprived of money as a consequence of changes to bank taxation simply does not bear scrutiny, given that the financial services sector is paying significantly more tax than it was before, whatever the cause of that may be.

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

The hon. Gentleman is, as he knows, unfairly paraphrasing my hon. Friend the shadow Chief Secretary. What my hon. Friend has pointed out is that politics is about choices and that this Government have decided, through this set of proposals, to reduce the amount of tax the banks will pay, in a situation where many core services in this country—public services that are supported by Members on both sides of the House—are on their knees. So references to the background situation or attempts to paraphrase what my colleague said are not correct. He is simply making an analysis of the choices this Government have made, which do not bear scrutiny.

[Chris Philp]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention but, as I say, the central, key, cold, hard fact, which will not go away, is that financial services are paying £8 billion or £9 billion more in tax now than they were before. That is money that can be spent on children’s services in his constituency or in mine, on the NHS or on schools. We should welcome the fact that the sector is producing this extra taxation, partly because it has become more successful and partly because the rate of tax has progressively been increased over the past seven or eight years.

The hon. Gentleman made a point about choices and his intervention was unpinned by an assumption: that if we increase the rate of taxation, we invariably raise more revenue. I challenge that assertion, as the famous Laffer curve clearly does. It is clear to me that it is possible to reduce the rate of taxation and at the same time collect more tax, because we, thus, incentivise investment and growth. There is no better illustration of that than the trajectory of corporation tax, taken as a whole, over the past seven years: the rate of corporation tax has come down from 28% to 19%—it is heading down to 17% in a couple of years—yet the cash take from corporation tax over that same period has gone from about £35 billion to about £53 billion or £55 billion. That goes to show that we can cut the rate of tax and, by stimulating the economy and investment, actually collect more money. Similarly, it does not follow that putting up the rate of tax necessarily means that more money is collected, because that might disincentivise investment and job creation.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I feel that we have had this discussion in many of the debates on the many Finance Bills we have debated over the past 12 months. No one on the Opposition Benches denies the existence of the Laffer curve; we simply point out, as a point of fact, that the very large reductions in corporation tax that the Government have introduced have cost the country revenue. That is not in dispute. The analysis is clear that it is not the case that, had the corporation tax level remained as it was when the Conservatives came to power, more tax would not have been generated.

On new clause 3, as the hon. Gentleman knows, the bank levy is a levy on the risk-assessed capital that is on the big banks’ balance sheets. The Laffer curve would not apply to the calculation of what the return would be if the levy remained the same.

[Chris Philp]

Let me take each of those points in turn. The hon. Gentleman asserts that, had the corporation tax rate remained at 28%, we would now be collecting more than £53 billion. That is an assertion, and not one with which one can agree without contention. For example, because of the lower corporation tax rate, plenty of businesses have made investments that they would not have made otherwise. Several companies had located their corporate headquarters outside the UK—

[Chris Philp]

Just a moment; let me respond to these two points.

Those companies had located their corporate headquarters outside the UK and so paid corporation tax outside the UK, but in response to the Government’s cutting the rate of tax, they came back onshore and now pay corporation tax here. It does not follow at all that a higher corporation tax rate—28% in the case mentioned by the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde (Jonathan Reynolds)—would lead to a higher tax yield. The direction of travel shows that, as the rate has come down, the amount collected has gone up. I just do not agree with the suggestion that, if the corporation tax rate were 28%, we would be collecting £60 billion or £70 billion.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

rose—

[Chris Philp]

If the hon. Gentleman will let me answer his second point, I shall happily take an intervention. He suggested that, because the bank levy is a tax on a balance sheet, there is no Laffer curve effect. I dispute that. Banks are mostly international—for example, our largest bank, HSBC, is a very international bank—and they can choose where they deploy capital. Their finance director will sit and decide where to allocate capital around the world. If the taxation or regulatory regime in a particular jurisdiction leads to the returns in that jurisdiction being unattractive, they will rationally respond to that by allocating their resources—in this case, their bank equity—somewhere else. There is unquestionably a Laffer curve effect in relation to the bank levy.

Before I take the two interventions that I promised to take, and will, let me just say that all that links to a related point mentioned by the shadow Chief Secretary, the hon. Member for Bootle: the disapplication of the bank levy to the non-UK part of a UK-headquartered bank’s balance sheet. In these international times, a bank such as HSBC can choose where it is headquartered and domiciled. HSBC was famously thinking about moving two or three years ago. HSBC is a good example because I think the majority of its balance sheet is non-UK—it has huge operations in Africa and the far east. Were we to continue to levy the bank levy on HSBC’s non-UK balance sheet, there would be a powerful, perhaps even irresistible, temptation for it to change its arrangements such that those profits and that balance sheet were booked through some other centre, such as Shanghai, or probably more likely Hong Kong, or possibly Singapore.

It is beneficial to the UK to have those HSBC assets booked here, because, of course, we get the corporation tax, including the corporation tax surcharge, booked through London, and there are clearly jobs connected with that. If we leave the bank levy on the non-UK balance sheet—the business is done overseas but booked here—and drive the booking overseas, we will lose that corporation tax and those jobs. The change to the bank levy is a sensible measure that will protect London’s status as an international financial centre, because the relevant part of the balance sheet is very internationally mobile.

I think there are two, or perhaps even three, interventions stacking up, so I shall happily take them all.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. This argument is integral to the economic prosperity of the UK. On the point that he has just raised, I say clearly that we should wish to keep that substantial national asset, which is our financial services industry, in the UK, but it is Brexit that will drive it away. HSBC’s plans at the minute, in terms of relocating staff, are entirely linked to wholesale banking functions under Brexit. However, if there is one phrase that I would wish to etch on to the door of this Chamber, it is that causation and correlation are not the same thing, and that applies to his corporation tax argument. The average rate of corporation tax in OECD countries is 25%. There is a diminishing return from reducing it. When even Conservative councils are effectively going bankrupt, surely that requires greater reflection and self-analysis of the disastrous trajectory of some of the Government’s tax policies over the past eight years.

[Chris Philp]

A number of points have been raised there. On the point about correlation and causation, of course I understand that they are not the same thing. However, in my remarks about corporation tax reductions, I did point to some of the causal links. The two causal links that I cited were, first, encouraging investment and, secondly, companies choosing to move their domicile—for example, from Switzerland back to the UK. Therefore, there are two causal explanations as to why a reduction in the rate of tax might lead to an increase in the tax yield.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

There is no allegation; they were said publicly. I will of course convey the hon. Gentleman’s comments in a spirit of reciprocation, but I dispute the remarks about Brexit. We saw fantastic progress before Christmas and are moving on to the next stage. I look forward to the series of speeches by my Cabinet colleagues in the coming days and weeks that I appreciate are on a different topic to the one at hand.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I must defend the Leader of the Opposition. The comments that he made to the EEF national manufacturing conference were simply that finance must serve industry and that this country has to find ways to increase lending to businesses, to have more productive outcomes for the economy and to lower regional inequality—all things that were previously said by the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, who now finds work as the editor of the Evening Standard. I do not think that that is unreasonable in any sense. The feedback I have had from that conference is that the reception in the room was very favourable.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call Chris Philp—on new clause 3.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachel Maclean]

I am sorry, but I cannot take any more interventions, because time is short.

I hope that, when he winds up the debate, the Minister will touch on the important issues of cryptocurrencies and bitcoin which, I believe, are not currently covered by regulation. I think we would all like to be assured that the Treasury is ensuring that no loopholes can develop that might allow tax evasion and avoidance. There are some alarming reports of people being arrested for money-laundering billions of pounds by that means.

The hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) is very well informed. I recognise the hard work that she has done, and I share a number of her concerns about the private finance initiative. A hospital in Worcester serves my constituents in Redditch. It is in special measures, and it has a financial issue. All of us in Redditch are very worried about that. I do not think that the new clause is the right way of dealing with the situation, but I should like to know what action the Minister will take to reassure my constituents that no one is reaping profits that they should not be reaping.

May I ask the hon. Member for Walthamstow to clarify the position of Labour Front Benchers? Do they not intend to take all the PFI contracts back into public ownership? She said that it would cost £220 billion, but I believe that that is the official position of the Labour party. It is a little confusing. It is difficult to know what the Labour party supports—whether it is the proposals of the hon. Lady or those of the Leader of the Opposition—so some clarity would be welcome.

Coming to my final point, Brexit was mentioned earlier, and we heard remarks about Brexit and the Labour party’s position, with claims that somehow Brexit is damaging our economy. [Interruption.] Well, Brexit was mentioned in a sedentary intervention. In my experience, businesses fear the spectre of a Labour Government more than Brexit, as a Labour Government would damage jobs and business investment. That is what businesses are worried about.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

There must be an objective assessment, given the strength of the economic risk that we face from Brexit. In terms of financial services, Brexit could diminish market access; it could take it away and make a situation where there is not a legal right to do the kind of business that currently takes place within the United Kingdom. There is no comparison between that and differences of political opinion over policies, and the Government and Conservative Back Benchers must take the economic risks of Brexit seriously.

Draft Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (Consequential Amendments, Savings and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Monday 5th February 2018 General Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is lovely to see you in the Chair this evening, Mr Hosie. I thank the Minister for his introduction to the regulations. It is a sad fact that more and more individuals and businesses are dealing with problem debts, and the robustness of all our insolvency systems is of the utmost importance.

As I understand it, the regulations enable financial services firms to be covered within the provisions of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. Those provisions make insolvency proceedings more flexible by allowing, for example, for different approaches to creditors’ meetings and the receipt of notice by creditors about insolvency proceedings. The regulations either directly implement the requirements or disapply the 2015 Act to enable sufficient time to design appropriate mechanisms, as the Minister said, for financial sectors where it will be more complex to apply the requirements to existing insolvency provisions.

I completely understand the fairly reasonable points made by the Minister about holding a physical meeting, which is often neither practical nor appropriate given the modern methods of communication now available and given that insolvency proceedings are not now purely local matters as they would have been in Victorian times, when the insolvency regime was initially created. Furthermore, it is peculiar that office holders must produce and dispatch information to creditors even if they have no continuing interest in an insolvency and have already written off their debt. The opt-out regime allows for those with an interest to continue to receive notices regardless. The 2015 Act’s amending of the Insolvency Act 1986 to reflect that seems appropriate—we have no objections to that—as does the application of the 2015 Act’s requirements to financial firms.

My only request of the Minister is in relation to his point on disapplying the 2015 Act’s provisions while the Treasury strives to produce the new measures and the impact assessment as quickly as possible. If he could give us some sense of the timings that the Treasury has in mind, that would be particularly useful and appropriate.

Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Thursday 1st February 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 39, page 27, line 12, at end insert—

“(aa) the interests of manufacturers in the United Kingdom,”.

This amendment requires the Treasury to have regard to the interests of manufacturers in considering the rate of export duty.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 79, in clause 39, page 27, line 17, at end insert

“and

(e) the impacts on sustainable development.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to have regard to the impacts on sustainable development in considering the rate of export duty.

Amendment 119, in clause 39, page 27, line 17, at end insert

“and

(e) the public interest.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to have regard to the public interest in considering the rate of the export tariff.

Amendment 142, in clause 39, page 27, line 17, at end insert—

“(e) the interests of producers in the United Kingdom.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to have regard to the interests of producers in the United Kingdom in considering the rate of export duty.

Amendment 143, in clause 39, page 27, line 17, at end insert—

“(e) the desirability of maintaining United Kingdom standards of food safety.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to have regard to the desirability of maintaining United Kingdom standards of food safety in considering the rate of export duty.

Amendment 144, in clause 39, page 27, line 17, at end insert—

“(e) environmental protection.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to have regard to environmental protection in considering the rate of export duty.

Amendment 145, in clause 39, page 27, line 17, at end insert—

“(e) the welfare requirements of animals as sentient beings.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to have regard to the welfare requirements of animals as sentient beings in considering the rate of export duty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Reynolds]

Welcome to the Chair for the final sitting of the Committee, Mrs Main.

As is explained in the explanatory notes, the Bill does not establish the rate of export duty, but the power to do so is contained in it so that it can be introduced subsequently through regulations made by the Treasury. As we discussed when considering amendment 1 to clause 8 during my first speech in Committee, it is vital to pay careful attention to the needs of manufacturers for the future of our economy. The Committee will be pleased to hear that I will not repeat that speech in its entirety, although I am sure colleagues would like to hear parts of it.

The representatives of the manufacturing industry to whom we spoke in our helpful evidence sessions on Tuesday 23 January amply illustrated why such a consultative approach is important, by raising many legitimate considerations to which answers are required. Given the amount of detail in the Bill that is left to secondary legislation, all manufacturers seek is minimal reassurance that their interests will be taken into account. They are not asking for special measures, but pointing out that we are on the cusp of a complex post-Brexit world and that clarity is needed as soon as possible. It has been the Government’s choice not to include that in the Bill, as we have discussed, but we need some middle ground to address the resulting lack of certainty, given how it has inhibited the ability of UK industry to prepare for that future landscape.

As we draw towards the end of the Committee, I am only too aware that we are becoming increasingly committed to the process of adding detail by secondary legislation. That makes it even more important for the vital consultation with manufacturers to be enshrined in the Bill. We will not necessarily seek to press the amendment, but I hope that the Minister, through his comments, can provide reassurance for manufacturers at this stage.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mel Stride)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mrs Main.

The amendment would add the interests of manufacturers to the list of factors the Secretary of State and the Treasury respectively must have regard to when recommending or imposing a rate of export duty. The Government acknowledge the wide-ranging impact that any future imposition of export duty could have on the UK economy and that of our trading partners. We would consider imposing an export duty only in wholly exceptional circumstances. Of course, in practice the Secretary of State and the Treasury would have regard to many factors. The provision requiring the Secretary of State and the Treasury to have regard to productivity, trade, consumer interests and competition is sufficient and broad enough to encapsulate the economic and strategic interests of the whole of the United Kingdom.

Taking into account the interests of manufacturers will often form part of the Secretary of State and Treasury’s duty to consider how export duty will maintain and promote productivity in the UK, but it would be inappropriate to specify an exhaustive list of factors in the Bill. The Government believe that the scrutiny and procedure set out in the Bill are proportionate and enable us to respond quickly to exceptional circumstances to implement an export duty.

Amendment 79 would add the impacts on sustainable development to the list of factors the Secretary of State and Treasury must have regard to when respectively recommending a rate of export duty or considering whether to impose export duty, and the rate of duty applicable. Where relevant and possible, the Government will take into account the impact of export duty on sustainable development. However, it would be inappropriate to specify an exhaustive list in the Bill. Certain factors will be relevant in certain cases, and their importance may change over time.

Amendment 119 would add the public interest to the list of factors the Secretary of State and the Treasury must have regard to when respectively recommending a rate of export duty or considering whether to impose export duty, and the rate that should apply. The provision requiring the Treasury and the Secretary of State to have regard to productivity, trade, consumer interests and competition is sufficient to encapsulate the public interest by considering the economic and strategic interests of the whole of the UK.

Amendments 142 to 145 provide additional factors that the Treasury and Secretary of State must have regard to respectively when considering whether to impose export duty and the rate that should be applied. Clause 39(4) is broad enough to cover the economic and strategic interests of the UK. In particular, I question the necessity of considering food standards, environmental protection and the welfare of animals when setting a tax on goods leaving the United Kingdom. The amendments would not achieve the presumed aim of preserving standards in the UK. Lastly, the interests of producers are intrinsically linked with competition, productivity and the promotion of trade, which are already included in the Bill. I therefore urge hon. Members not to press the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Reynolds]

All the amendments relate, as ever, to the lack of detail in the Bill. The Minister has provided some words of reassurance, which are appreciated, but in the end it comes back to the point that very important details, which industry needs to plan, are missing from the Bill. However, I think that that point has been made, and for that reason I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 39, page 27, line 20, at end insert—

“() by a relevant select committee of the House of Commons, or

() contained in a resolution of the House of Commons.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to have regard to recommendations of any relevant select committee of the House of Commons or contained in a resolution of the House of Commons in considering whether to exercise the power to impose export duty.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendments 83 and 84 are all the more important given the unprecedented steps taken by the Government, in a shift of constitutional power that has been recognised right across the piece, including by many of the witnesses who came before us. I have repeated that issue already, and no doubt it will be repeated time and again. I may borrow the Minister’s cut and paste button to repeat it—

[Jonathan Reynolds]

Two buttons.

[Peter Dowd]

Yes, two buttons: control and whatever it is. As I have mentioned, we are not alone in this view, which is shared by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The Government ought to respond to our genuine concerns in this matter, and we will persist in asking them until they do respond to our genuine concerns and those of other agencies, bodies, organisations and people.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mel Stride]

I thank the hon. Lady for those well-made observations. We certainly want to ensure that whatever transition there is to the new regime for small parcels is handled correctly, for exactly the reasons that she has given. I am very close to that as a Minister; in fact, I will meet Royal Mail next week to discuss exactly those points. I will, of course, be happy to share that information and take any further questions that she might have.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

General regulation making power for excise duty purposes etc

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I beg to move amendment 85, in clause 45, page 31, line 24, at end insert—

‘(3A) The power to make regulations under this section—

(a) insofar as it is exercised to replicate or apply, with or without modifications, any EU regulations mentioned in section 47(1), ceases to have effect after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day; and

(b) insofar as it is exercised to make provision of the kind described in subsection (2)(k), ceases to have effect after the end of period of five years beginning with exit day.”

This amendment, together with Amendment 86, limits the duration of certain delegated powers under Clause 45 to periods aligned with other proposed limitations relating to withdrawal from the EU and to customs unions.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 86, in clause 45, page 31, line 25, at end insert—

““exit day” has the meaning given by section 14(1) (interpretation) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and subsections (2) to (5) of that section apply to the term under this section as they apply to the term in that Act.”

See explanatory statement for Amendment 85.

Clause 45 stand part.

Amendment 135, in clause 48, page 33, line 29, at end insert—

“(5A) No regulations may be made under section 47 unless a draft has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the House of Commons.”

This amendment requires regulations under Clause 47 to be subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 136, in clause 48, page 33, line 30, leave out “47” and insert “46”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 135.

Clause 48 stand part.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

The Member’s explanatory statement for amendment 85 states:

“This amendment, together with Amendment 86, limits the duration of certain delegated powers under Clause 45 to periods aligned with other proposed limitations relating to withdrawal from the EU and to customs unions”

in parallel legislation. In many ways, it continues the conversation we had during debate on the last group.

Effectively, the amendment would introduce a sunset clause to clause 45: a measure to prevent the indefinite extension of delegated powers by HMRC commissioners where they relate to excise duty. We have discussed many times—in some ways, we have discussed it in every debate—the democratic implications of the Bill. The addition of sunset clauses has been proposed by many partners as a solution to the need to safeguard against potential abuses of the powers in the Bill. As has been said many times, the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in its report, said clearly that the Bill transfers substantial powers to the Executive—that is not in doubt on any side of this Committee. The question is whether they are proportionate and whether appropriate safeguards are in place.

I listened carefully to the Minister during discussion of the last set of amendments about the differences between the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and this Bill, but I must say that I am not convinced that the differences are substantial enough to envisage a completely different set of amendments’ appropriateness in terms of the use of sunset clauses. As the Lords Committee said,

“the Treasury’s delegated powers memorandum acknowledges that the Bill has been drafted to cater for various contingencies that might never materialise, for example, if the UK leaves the EU without a negotiated agreement.”

I do not agree that the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and this Bill represent such wildly different circumstances that one set of amendments is appropriate for the other Bill but not for this one. The Opposition are firmly in agreement with the Lords Committee that a sunset clause is an appropriate manoeuvre to redress the balance of power. We must bear in mind that the use of delegated powers carries a risk of abuse by the Executive, which is not something the Opposition could ever support. Rather, it is our duty at this stage to check the powers of the Executive and ensure that we are not giving them carte blanche to change the balance of power permanently in their favour.

I also stress that the amendments offer generous provision in terms of timing. It varies for each item, with sunset clause terms of either two years or five years from EU exit day for the powers in question. That should give the Government ample opportunity to adapt, even if we face the nightmare “no deal” scenario. It makes little sense to the Opposition that such provisions are included in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, but that there are no corresponding provisions in this Bill. Adding these provisions to the Bill would be an important step in providing a much-needed check to delegated powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mel Stride]

Clause 45 provides powers to make changes to ensure the UK has a fully functioning excise regime after EU exit. The powers mean that the UK will be able to implement a range of negotiated outcomes. They also ensure that, after EU exit, we retain the same ability to legislate for excise that we have now.

EU legislation impacts on a number of areas of the excise regime. One example is the existing holding and movement regime for excise goods, which is based on a framework set up by the European Union. It allows the free movement of goods while ensuring excise duty is collected in the country of consumption. The UK needs the ability to make changes to the excise regime to reflect a range of negotiated or non-negotiated outcomes. The power will also ensure that, after EU exit and the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972, we maintain the same ability to legislate for excise as we have now.

The clause gives the Government a power to make regulations generally for the purposes of excise duty on alcohol, tobacco and fuels. It includes, among other matters, when the excise duty becomes due, who will be liable for excise duty, reliefs and the rules around the holding and movement of excise goods. It also ensures that, after EU exit, the Government have the same ability to legislate for excise as they have now. It does not, however, enable HMRC to set excise duty rates.

The excise regime is largely set out in secondary legislation made under various existing powers. However, we can anticipate that the primary legislation that underpins it may need to be amended. The clause allows any regulations made under this section to amend or repeal primary legislation using secondary legislation. It does not allow secondary legislation to amend or repeal provisions in the Bill.

Any negotiated outcome could include key administrative features such as the collection, control, management and enforcement of excise duties. Changes could also be needed in those areas if there is no negotiated agreement. The goods it could be applied to are alcohol, tobacco and fuels.

On repeal of the 1972 Act, we will retain the legislation made under it, but we will no longer have the power to amend that legislation. Clause 45 will ensure there are no gaps in HMRC’s powers to deliver the necessary changes to the excise regime as a consequence of EU exit. For example, the Government made consequential amendments to primary legislation in the last substantive overhaul of key excise secondary legislation in 2010. They relied on the powers provided for by the 1972 Act, which will not be available in future. The power could also be used to ensure that there are clear arrangements in place so that goods in transit between member states before EU exit are not subjected to additional controls or requirements after EU exit.

The power has, however, been limited in a number of ways. It does not allow any changes to duty rates. Clause 49 ensures that the power is no wider than necessary. It is limited to making provisions in respect of the excise duties on alcohol, tobacco and fuels. Those are the duties most impacted by EU legislation and EU exit. It is important that the Government can act quickly in case of changing circumstances, but it is also vital that Parliament is able to scrutinise the use of these powers. Clause 48 sets out the proposed scrutiny arrangements.

Amendments 85 and 86 seek to limit the duration of the power contained in clause 45 where it is exercised to replicate or apply EU regulations. They also intend to limit the duration of the power to make provision for excise duties in connection with the UK forming a customs union with other customs territories. The Government oppose the amendments. The Bill is drafted to cater for a range of long-term outcomes from negotiations on the future relationship with the EU. We do not yet know the outcome of negotiations with the EU or exactly when the final outcome will be confirmed. It would therefore not be prudent to include a sunsetting clause.

The clause provides the Government with the power to legislate for the excise regime to implement the outcome of negotiations. Just as importantly, it ensures that we can legislate for excise in the future—after exit—with the same flexibility we have now. It is essential that we have a fully functioning excise system on EU exit and the powers contained in the clause are necessary to achieve that.

If the amendments are accepted, after the relevant sunset period the Government’s ability to legislate quickly to respond to changing circumstances and future business processes will be limited. For example, the current excise duty suspension arrangements secure the movement of goods through a number of different countries, potentially over a large geographical area. On leaving the EU, the movement of excise duty suspended goods may be permitted only within the territory of the UK. The clause may allow further simplifications for compliant traders if the risks to revenue are considered to be lower in the United Kingdom.

Amendment 85, relating to subsection (2)(k), refers to clause 31, which allows for arrangements that establish a customs union, as we debated, between the UK and territories outside the UK to be given effect by Order in Council. If the UK forms a customs union with any other customs territory, the Government may need to adapt the excise regime accordingly to ensure that the UK can enforce and maintain the operability of the excise duty regime. For example, if an arrangement is made with any territory where free movement of goods is allowed now or in the future, the UK may wish to ensure that excise duties can be controlled and collected without customs formalities at the border, as is now the case. The requirement to make such arrangements may not be limited to the period following EU negotiations or the implementation period.

Clause 48 sets the procedure for making regulations under clauses 44 to 47. The powers in clauses 44 to 47 are necessary to ensure the alcohol, tobacco and oils excise duty regimes continue to function as required after EU exit. The clause ensures the use of those powers is subject to appropriate scrutiny. It also includes provision to streamline procedures where the new excise powers are combined with some existing powers. That gives the Government the flexibility to make the changes to the excise regime needed after EU withdrawal. A smaller number of statutory instruments will therefore be required and the legislation will remain accessible to users.

Clause 48 sets the procedure for exercising the powers in clauses 44 to 47 and gives further detail to their scope. On procedure, the clause sets out four scenarios in which regulations made using the powers will be subject to the made-affirmative procedure: first, where the changes amend or repeal any Act of Parliament; secondly, where changes extend the descriptions of goods on which excise duty is chargeable; thirdly, where changes extend the cases in which stamping or marking of goods is required; and fourthly, where changes restrict any relief or rebate. In all other cases, the negative procedure applies. That is in line with the existing approach to excise regulation-making powers.

A large number of changes need to be made to excise secondary legislation to maintain a functioning excise regime after exit. The Government plan to use existing powers as well as the new powers in the Bill. Clause 48(7) will streamline procedures to allow existing excise powers and the new powers to be combined in some cases. The streamlining applies only if regulations made under the existing powers would be subject to the negative resolution procedure—not where the affirmative procedure is to be used. Such streamlining gives Government the ability to maintain a functioning excise system after EU withdrawal. It reduces the number of statutory instruments to be laid on the same subject matter, making more efficient use of parliamentary time and limiting fragmented legislation, which is harder for business and its advisers to follow.

In some cases, that will have the effect that some provisions that are currently subject to the negative resolution in the Lords and Commons will be subject to the negative procedure in the Commons only. However, Commons-only scrutiny is in line with the convention that tax legislation is not subject to Lords scrutiny. The majority of excise regulation-making powers created in recent times are similarly subject to Commons scrutiny only. For example: the alcohol wholesaler registration scheme, introduced in 2015; the raw tobacco approval scheme, introduced in 2016; and the remote gaming duty, introduced in 2014. Members can be assured that, if the Government combine powers, they will not do so to make a trivial provision only to remove Lords’ scrutiny and bring this special procedure into play.

Amendments 135 and 136 seek to require that regulations made under clause 47 are subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Clause 47 gives the Government the power to exclude or modify EU rights, powers, liabilities and obligations relating to excise duty that continue to have effect in UK law after exit by operation of clause 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. Some of those rights and obligations will no longer be appropriate after exit. Some may need amendments to deal with the outcome of negotiations with the EU. Therefore, this power has a part to play in ensuring that we have a fully functioning excise regime.

The power in clause 47 is targeted and proportionate. It is specific to the areas saved by clause 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, and in addition, it may only be exercised in relation to excise duties on alcohol, tobacco and fuel. It is appropriate and proportionate that the power should be subject to the negative procedure and not the affirmative procedure. That reflects the specific nature of the power in the clause and the speed with which regulations may be required.

The Bill ensures that the scrutiny procedures that are applied to the exercise of each power are appropriate and proportionate. They take into account the technicality of the regulations and the frequency with which they are likely to be made.

Clause 48 ensures that the scrutiny procedures that apply to the exercise of the powers in part 4 are appropriate and proportionate. As far as is practical, the procedure that applies to excise regulations made under these powers is in line with the approach to procedures on existing excise powers.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

There is clearly a fundamental difference of opinion about these clauses. We absolutely support the right and ability of the Government to possess the requisite powers on exit to set the regime that is required. What is in dispute is whether those powers should remain on the statute book for a long time.

It seems entirely reasonable that the Government could come back to legislate for the power that they need in future, rather than giving themselves such a fundamental transfer that changes the balance of power between Parliament and the Government, but we may have to return to that question. Further groups of amendments are on the selection list that cover sunset clauses, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

EU law relating to excise duty

[Anneliese Dodds]

I beg to move amendment 134, in clause 47, page 33, line 7, at end insert—

“(5) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.

(6) In this section, “exit day” has the meaning given by section 14(1) (interpretation) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and subsections (2) to (5) of that section apply to the term under this section as they apply to the term in that Act.”

This amendment limits the duration of the delegated power under Clause 47 to the period ending two years after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I will speak to amendments 120 and 97 and skim over consequential amendments 98 and 99. I will also mention Labour amendments 87 and 88.

Amendment 120 is an old discussion that we had with the Minister earlier in the debate. We ask for the second “appropriate” to be left out and replaced with “necessary”. That would mean that the powers to make the provision in relation to VAT or customs or excise duties would be made as the appropriate Minister considered necessary in consequence of, or otherwise in connection with, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.

We have had the discussion before about whether it is best to have “appropriate” or “necessary” in these sections, but it would be sensible for Ministers to make a regulation that they thought was necessary rather than appropriate. The former is a stronger word—the Law Society of Scotland believes that it is a stronger word and has a more appropriate legal definition in this regard. It would be good if the Minister would consider making the change we are asking for in amendment 120.

On the first part of clause 51, I have heard concerns about some of the stuff that has not been written into UK law either through this Bill or possibly the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The shipwork end-use relief from customs duty is in EU law—it is a relief that people who bring things in for use offshore have from customs duty. It is written into EU law, but I have not been able to find in this Bill where it is written into UK law —perhaps it is in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The offshore industry rely on it heavily and it would make a big difference, specifically on charges.

The shipwork end-use relief is relied on only for imports coming from third countries, but given that imports from the EU would now be potentially subject to customs duty, if the Government do not manage to get a deal to be in a customs union, it will become more applicable and will apply to many more products and goods coming through. It will be necessary to write that into UK law at some point, and I would very much appreciate a commitment from the Minister on that. A lot of companies that transport goods offshore, which particularly affects my constituency, would appreciate knowing the direction of travel in relation to this relief.

Amendment 97—the Scottish National party amendment that would apply a sunset clause to clause 51—serves a dual purpose. It submits that there should be a sunset clause and makes the case that regulations may not be made under the clause after 29 March 2021, but it would also change the procedures for the making of regulations, asking that they are made using the draft affirmative procedure. As we have discussed at some length, the draft affirmative procedure would be better than either the negative procedure or the made affirmative procedure. It would mean that no changes are made before Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise them because they would be laid in draft rather than created and then consulted on with Members. That is why we are asking for both of those changes.

Although this is my first chance to talk about sunset clauses, we have had a fairly lengthy debate on them and they have been covered by various Members. Labour Front Benchers asked earlier why sunset clauses should be applicable to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill but not this Bill. Even though they are separate pieces of legislation, I actually believe that, in this Bill, it is reasonable for Ministers to have one process relating to the setting up of a customs or an excise regime, and for that process to be different ever after. That is why a sunset clause would be a good change in that regard.

If future Governments are to make such changes, they should be subject to more parliamentary scrutiny. I have said to the Minister previously but remind him that the Conservative party will not be in government forever—I hope not—and in that case they will be sitting in opposition, unable appropriately or extensively to scrutinise the measures. That is a major concern given that the delegated powers in the Bill allow for the Government to make radical changes without the need for much in the way of parliamentary scrutiny.

I am sure the Government do not intend to give a future Labour Government a free rein drastically to alter the customs regime, but unfortunately the way the Bill is written would give them that right. I get the impression that I would be more likely to favour the Labour party’s customs regime than the Conservative party’s, but none the less no Executive should have the power to do all those things by using such things as the negative procedure. The made affirmative procedure is not even strong enough in some cases.

Labour amendments 87 and 88 are grouped with other amendments on sunset clauses. If they put the amendments to the vote, I will support them, because I believe a sunset clause is appropriate for the provisions made in clause 51.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I wish to speak for what I will believe will be the final time in Committee. [Hon. Members: “Oh.”] There is always Report stage; we know the procedure here. I will speak to amendments 87 and 88, which relate to clauses 51 and 52. The explanatory statement for amendment 87 reads:

“This amendment limits the duration of the delegated power under Clause 51 to the period ending two years after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union.”

Amendment 88 would apply the same limits to the powers entitled under clause 52.

These are obviously a fairly similar set of arguments to those we have just heard relating to clause 45, but I think we have clearly established that there are strong reservations about the use of delegated powers under the Bill and its democratic implications. The famous House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said specifically in its report that clause 51, which relates to VAT or duties of customs or excise, is such that a sunset clause would be possible and welcome. As the Lords report said, clause 51 contains a very wide power that, in the words of the Treasury itself

“is necessary to ensure that the Treasury and Secretary of State have the ability to deal with the consequences of withdrawal from the EU and to maintain fully functioning and legally operable customs, VAT and excise regimes in a range of scenarios”.

It is about withdrawal from the EU, yet the powers would give considerable scope to the Executive to shape the regime for many years, perhaps decades, into the future. That is surely why a recommendation for a sunset clause relating to clause 51 is appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)]

Is it not important that the Government take account of the evidence we have had from the Hansard Society supporting protections from whoever happens to be in Government in the future?

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I firmly agree. Members on both sides of the Committee have referred to the testimony the Hansard Society gave in the evidence sessions. It is not just the Opposition who have concerns. I would very much like to be a real, not shadow, Treasury Minister one day. Even then, we would require the proper checks and balances to be in place. It still seems counter-intuitive to include time limits in the overall European Union (Withdrawal) Bill but not in today’s Bill, when the principles we have established apply similarly to both. As with our other arguments on sunset clauses, we do not see how the Government can justify the use of the powers in the clause in perpetuity. We have established that that should not happen, and the Government have not yet been able to refute that case.

I emphasise again that we all have a duty to check the powers of the Executive and to ensure that we do not allow them to change the balance of power permanently in their favour. The time period of two years should be generous enough to fill any gap in provisions that may come about from the end of delegated powers through other channels. Sunset clauses provide a vital check on delegated powers, and I urge members on both sides of the Committee to support the amendment to help to mitigate the constitutional risks introduced by the Bill.

[Peter Dowd]

It is important that we deal with the question raised by the amendment regarding sunset clauses. The Government originally did not want any of the sunset clauses in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, but they were required or forced—people can call it what they will—by hon. Members from across the parties to put in sunset clauses. We were told at the time that the inclusion of a sunset clause in that Bill would result in the end of civilisation as we know it. Of course, someone threw a bucket of water over the Government, and they freshened up and realised that they were not going to get away with not having sunset clauses.

The Government have persisted in Committee—they might be doing the same with the Trade Bill—to argue against sunset clauses. They would have us believe that sunset clauses are some foreign or alien concept in parliamentary democracies. Well, they are not. There were even sunset clauses in the nuclear deal with Iran. Sunset clauses exist in all sorts of legislation, including treaties—and we have some 3,000 treaties. They exist right across the piece in legislation. Indeed, the coalition Government, when introducing the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, basically insisted on sunset clauses to reduce the legislative burden. When it suits the Government to have a sunset clause, they will have a sunset clause; in fact, they introduced an Act to have sunset clauses. They are now telling us that sunset clauses are outrageous, and will somehow mess up the whole VAT regime.

Other countries have sunset clauses. For example, sunset clauses in Texas mean that, after 10 or 12 years, some agencies will cease to exist unless they can prove their appropriateness, consistency and status. They have to go through that process. Even organisations have sunset clauses applied to them and they have to show how relevant they are.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 had a sunset clause. In the past, sunset clauses have been applied to the effectiveness of legislation, and yet we are now being told today that they are somehow outrageous and that the whole Government will grind to a halt if we have them.

Some Canadian legislation—in fact, a whole range of Canadian legislation—has an automatic five-year sunset clause. The Canadians manage perfectly well with sunset clauses. The question is: are this Government so fearful of a sunset clause, so fearful of challenge and so fearful of scrutiny, particularly in relation to this amendment, that they do not want sunset clauses?

There are even sunset clauses in Australia, and they seem to manage. Australia has general sunset clauses; they are not even specific. They have sunset clauses for whole swathes of legislation and they manage perfectly well. South Korea also has sunset clauses. Perhaps that is why it has such a booming economy—because the sunset clauses mean that, time after time, they test and challenge. The only sunset clause in North Korea, no doubt, is the sunset on democracy. We do not want that; we want sunset clauses for the powers this Government have taken for themselves.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

My hon. Friend is making a fantastic speech about the applicability of sunset clauses around the world. Again, however, we have to get back to this point: if the Government still need these powers after the sunset clause is done and the powers no longer exist, they simply have to come back to Parliament. It is not the case that they do not have the power to deal with things; a strong, united Government, with a parliamentary majority, would quite easily be able to come back and put on the statute book anything they needed. That argument simply has not been addressed by the Government.

[The Chair]

Order. Before I call Mr Peter Dowd, I will say that we are all immensely interested in South Korea, Texas, Australia and all the other places he has listed, but could he get back to this particular amendment?

Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

Thursday 1st February 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is lovely to see you in the chair, Ms Buck. I would like to say a brief few words in support of amendments 89, 90 to 96 and new clause 12 tabled by colleagues from the Scottish National party.

There is no doubt that the most consistent area of discussion in this Committee has been the constitutional implications of the Bill and the concentration of too much power in the hands of the Executive as a result. We have discussed ways to try to make the Trade Remedies Authority more available to scrutiny, how to improve the scrutiny of secondary legislation and how to adjust the public notice procedure—all of which were intended to provide some basic safeguards against the abuse of power and, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North said, are an attempt to make better laws. We therefore support this package of amendments, which seek to achieve the same, and point out to the Government that it is not only opposition political parties that are concerned about the precedent being set here.

As the hon. Member for Aberdeen North said, the amendment would simply add an important layer of parliamentary scrutiny, by enforcing the super-affirmative resolution procedure where regulations have been created with regard to trade remedies. That would help to address some of the shortfalls of the secondary legislative process.

As the Committee well knows, statutory instruments when carried out under the negative procedure only permit Parliament to raise objections. We support the extensive stipulations in the amendments on presenting draft regulations to the House, which the Minister would be mandated to carry out. We believe that will prompt greater accountability and a better legislative process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anneliese Dodds]

I shall not return to what the witness did or did not say. I think there may be a difference of opinion there. I am afraid I do not agree with the Minister’s description of the made affirmative procedure. In practice, of course, that procedure means that measures are in place from the moment they are laid, so they are immediately enacted. There need be no effective scrutiny by way of discussion by the House or other bodies, to allow them to stay in place over time. We are talking about a mechanism very different from what would usually be applied.

I shall not push the point. I appreciate the Minister’s comments. I just hope that the Government will heed our call for them to restrict the use of the measure to exactly the kinds of areas that the Minister just described—only those where the procedure is necessary to protect public revenue, or for continuity in the administration of the tax system. If its use goes beyond that, we fear we shall be in tricky waters. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 32, page 20, line 8, leave out subsection (9).

This amendment limits the powers with respect to public notices.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 141, in clause 37, page 24, line 36, leave out “that provision” and insert

“ensuring that public notice is available in an accessible form to all people who are likely to be affected by or interested in the notice”.

This amendment makes specific provision about the accessibility of public notices.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Reynolds]

The amendments deal with public notices—one relates to powers and the other to accessibility. The Opposition have already raised concerns, by way of amendment 139, about the alarming concentration of power in the hands of the Executive that would come about if the conversion of public notices into regulations were to be allowed. It is a deeply troubling constitutional overstep, which must be challenged at every stage.

The amendments focus on limiting the powers of the Executive with regard to public notices, which the Opposition believe would be a fundamental over-reach of the Executive’s powers. We are not the only ones to argue that case. The House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee published its report after Second Reading in the Commons. That flagged up the constitutional difficulties that would arise from making law by public notice. It was scathing in its assessment of the provision.

Amendment 141 also addresses a pressing issue that arises from using the method in question as a tool for creating regulations. At no point does the Bill indicate what constitutes a public notice. As the House of Lords Committee highlighted, under clause 37(5), the only qualification at present is purely that the person issuing it has selected a channel that they consider appropriate. A definition of “appropriate” is absent from the Bill. We are told that that could even include a tweet or a message on Facebook. We can all agree that policy made by Twitter is not a good idea.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mel Stride]

Amendment 140 seeks to limit the powers in the Bill to use public notices. However, a notable effect of the amendment would be to remove the ability to use regulations to cover matters that are dealt with in a public notice, which may limit the Government’s ability to package delegated legislation in the most effective way.

The circumstances in which provision can be made by public notice are well defined in the Bill. There is no power in the Bill to allow for provision that may be made by regulations to be made alternatively by public notice. I reassure the Committee that it is not unusual for public notices to be used to make provision in relation to the administration of tax regimes. They are typically used, for example, to make provision that is purely technical or administrative in nature; that may be subject to regular updating, including to take account of external factors; that may need to be changed swiftly; that is based on external sources; or that is not otherwise required to be set out in secondary legislation, but is included to improve transparency. An example in the Bill is the provision enabling the form and content of a customs declaration to be set out in a public notice.

Another effect of the amendment would be to disapply subsections (6) to (8) of clause 32 in respect of public notices, although they would continue to apply in respect of regulations. Let me reassure the Committee that those subsections do not widen the subject matter that public notices can be used to address. As I have stated, that subject matter is set out clearly by the relevant clauses and schedules. On that basis, I urge the Opposition to withdraw amendment 140.

Amendment 141 aims to require public notices published under the Bill to be made in a form that is accessible to

“all people who are likely to be affected by or interested in”

them. I sympathise with the amendment’s general thrust. It is, of course, vital that any public notice published by HMRC is made available in an accessible format to everyone affected. However, I assure the Committee that including such an obligation in the Bill is unnecessary. HMRC has extensive experience of producing public notices to communicate changes in tax policy to affected parties, whether individuals or businesses, as part of its wider engagement with bodies that represent customers. That includes ensuring that any information set out in a public notice is clear and accessible. Indeed, the Government already make everything we publish on gov.uk accessible and available in a variety of formats. The public notices published under the Bill will be no different.

HMRC also has good working relationships with a range of business representative groups and uses those channels to reach the wider business community. For example, it is normal practice to share advance drafts with business groups to seek their views. HMRC will continue to follow the same approach with its public notices on the changes introduced by the Bill. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendments.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I have listened intently to the Minister’s reassurance, particularly about the modesty of public notices and the undesirability of making more specific recommendations about their accessibility. I also listened to his point that public notices cannot replace regulation. However, the Bill states that regulations can replace public notices, which suggests that the burden of what is being considered is wider than the Government have declared.

Even in my relatively short time as a shadow Treasury Minister, I have seen relatively arcane bits of our regulatory constitutional apparatus used on several occasions, for instance to limit the scope of debate on amendments to a Finance Bill. Once powers are in place, they can be used for ends for which they were not intended when they were put on the statute book.

I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I think that we may have to return to the issue on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 33 to 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(David Rutley.)