Australia and New Zealand Trade Deals

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Greg Hands]

I am delighted to respond, because I have had extensive interaction with all the five nations’ NFUs during this process. We have delivered a deal that phases in the changes. The right hon. Gentleman might reference the fact that the trade deal we have with the European Union, which he supported, gives the EU comprehensive access from day one. This deal phases in access for Australia and New Zealand for a period of up to 15, and in some cases 20, years. I think that is worth consideration, as is the extensive interaction we have had with the NFU and with farmers. I have met MPs and their constituency farmers at some length and we will continue to interact with the NFU and the NFUs in all the nations to ensure that we are in full listening mode when it comes to Britain’s essential farming community.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

Further to the intervention from the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), I have here a copy of “Y Tir”, the monthly publication of the Farmers Union of Wales, which states:

“There will always be winners and losers when it comes to negotiating liberalised free trade agreements, and it is clear from the UK Government’s impact assessments that UK agriculture will be one of the losers if these deals are ratified”.

Does the Minister acknowledge the widespread concern among our agricultural communities that the British Government are selling them down the river?

[Greg Hands]

I disagree with that. I am just checking my records and I have had extensive interactions with representatives of NFU Cymru during the negotiation process. I met them on 19 May 2021—I met the Farmers Union of Wales on 19 May as well—and on 26 May, 16 June and 13 September. It was important for us to get the confidence of the farming community in Wales and I also did various Zoom calls at the time—this was during one of the lockdowns—with MPs and their constituent farmers. The protections we have in the deal are very considerable. For example, the tariff rate quotas carry on for 10 years in some cases, and there are product-specific measures to protect sensitive agriculture produce from years 10 to 15 as well as bilateral safeguard mechanisms. There are a lot of protections there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

Today is a significant day, and I wish the Minister a happy birthday. What better present could the Secretary of State have given him than being absent and allowing him to open this debate in her place?

I welcome this general debate on the Australia and New Zealand trade deals. Yesterday, Remembrance Sunday, was a powerful reminder of our shared history and shared past sacrifice. The UK, Australia and New Zealand have deep enduring bonds, shared values and common goals. The Opposition support AUKUS; we recognise the key and central priorities that the UK, Australia and New Zealand share on the world stage, and we will continue to support the achievement of those goals.

I also put on record my desire to see a deepening of our trade links with our friends in Australia and New Zealand through trade agreements, and ever-closer relationships on all levels. I am especially pleased to say that both countries now have very fine Labour Governments in office.

Of course, we are having this debate after the deals have been signed, but they must now be honoured and worked with for the benefit of people here and of our friends in Australia and New Zealand. Specifically on negotiations, the high commissions of Australia and New Zealand have been remarkably helpful in briefing hon. Members across the House and briefing me as shadow Secretary of State, and I express my gratitude to them for all that they have done throughout the process.

To be clear, our debate today is not about the Opposition’s commitment to our deepening relationship with Australia and New Zealand. Rather, the question for this House is whether this Conservative Government secured the best possible deals on behalf of our constituents, and let us be frank: the best possible deals were not achieved.

The Australia deal is “one-sided”—not my words, but those of the current Prime Minister, who said so absolutely clearly over the summer. In fairness to him, we can see why he takes that view. The impact assessment for the Australia deal shows a £94 million hit to our farming, forestry and fishing sectors, and a £225 million hit to our semi-processed foods industry. On the New Zealand deal, the Government’s own impact assessment states that,

“part of the gains results from a reallocation of resources away from agriculture, forestry, and fishing”,

which will take a £48 million hit, while semi-processed foods will take a £97 million hit.

Ministers know the serious concerns about the agriculture elements of these two agreements and the precedents that they risk setting. We in the Opposition are very proud of our UK farmers and the standards of excellence they seek to uphold, and we believe that British produce can be a huge success in new markets, but we must also recognise the need for a level playing field for our farmers.

The Government claim that they are trying to mitigate the impact of the two deals, with tariff-free access being phased in. In the New Zealand deal there are tariff-rate quotas and product-specific safeguards for 15 years. Similarly, in the Australia deal the phasing-in period on beef and sheepmeat is of the same period, but the quotas that the Government have set for imports from Australia are far higher than the current levels.

We only need to see what other countries achieved in trade deals with Australia. When Japan negotiated a trade deal with Australia, it limited the tariff-free increase in the first year to 10% on the previous year. South Korea achieved something similar, limiting the increases to 7%. Yet this Government have negotiated a first-year tariff-free allowance with a 6,000% increase in the amount of beef the UK currently imports from Australia. On sheepmeat, it is a 67% increase. I have a simple question for the Government: why did they not achieve the same things that Japan and South Korea did, and why have our Ministers failed to ensure that the Australian agricultural corporations are held to the same high standards as our farmers?

It is good to see the right hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice) in his place. As I am sure he will recall, when he was Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, he said that he faced “challenges” in getting the former Prime Minister—it is quite confusing these days; I mean the most recent former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss)—and the International Trade Secretary to enshrine animal welfare in deals. It is no wonder that the National Farmers Union said that it saw

“almost nothing in the deal that will prevent an increase in imports of food produced well below the production standards required of UK farmers.”

It is perhaps no surprise that Australia’s former negotiator at the World Trade Organisation said:

“I don’t think we have ever done as well as this.”

They are called trade “negotiations” for a reason, and it is a shame that the Government failed to put forward the strongest possible case for the UK. At the very least, I ask Ministers to go away and work out what more they can do now to support our food producers in the face of these challenges.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Some farmers are very concerned about the procurement aspects of the deals, which will allow producers from Australia and New Zealand to compete for UK procurement deals. UK producers, however, are unable to compete in Australia and New Zealand, likely because of the economies of scale challenges.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

The hon. Gentleman raises a useful point. Our farmers are seeking a level playing field. We believe in our farmers and we want them to be able to compete on the same basis.

We also see in the Australian deal a lack of success on tackling climate change. The former COP26 President, the right hon. Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma), told the House last December that the Australia deal would reaffirm

“both parties’ commitments to upholding our obligations under the Paris agreement, including limiting global warming to 1.5°.”—[Official Report, 1 December 2021; Vol. 704, c. 903.]

However, the explicit commitment to limiting global warming to 1.5° was not in the deal, despite the fact that the Minister had said that only a matter of days before it was signed. What went wrong in those final days? Was it perhaps that Ministers simply gave way for the sake of getting a completed deal?

The current Secretary of State for International Trade, the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Kemi Badenoch), was sadly not here to open the debate. When she was standing to be Conservative party leader, she branded the net zero climate target “unilateral economic disarmament”. I think it is fair to say that there are worries about her commitment to delivering the progress needed on climate change, given that she has expressed that view publicly. Not only does that view misjudge the economic imperative of action to tackle climate change, but it fails to recognise the huge opportunities that the transition to net zero could provide. The question must also be asked: how broken can a party be when dabbling with climate change denial is a way to drum up support from its members?

On labour standards and workers’ rights, the Government did not push as hard as they might have done, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) said in an earlier intervention. On the Australia deal, the TUC said that the

“agreement does not contain commitments to ILO core conventions and an obligation for both parties to ratify and respect those agreements”

and that it provides

“a much weaker commitment to just the ILO declaration.”

That is a mistake. We should not set a precedent for new trade agreements across the globe to sell short our workers here or elsewhere.

Trade Deals: Parliamentary Scrutiny

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Wednesday 12th October 2022 Westminster Hall

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott, I believe for the first time. I congratulate the hon. Member for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall) on securing this debate.

Much of the political energy of this generation of politicians has been consumed by the fallout from the Brexit referendum in 2016. I remember visiting Washington with a cross-party delegation prior to the referendum. Ms Elliott, I believe that you were part of that delegation, so you may correct me if I am wrong, but nobody in that delegation believed that the UK would vote to terminate its relationship with the European Union. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that prior to the result of the referendum, not much serious thought had gone into what Brexit actually meant.

Following the vote, there was a political breakdown, as decision makers scrambled to interpret the result. Do people remember the period between the referendum and the 2019 general election? This place was consumed with debating different interpretations of the referendum result. I argued for the UK to stay within the European Union’s economic frameworks, for reasons that have become plain for all of us to see, as the dream of splendid economic isolationism from Europe in return for a mythical global Britain has turned to ash.

I suppose that if sensible voices had prevailed during that period, we would not be having this debate, because we would be safely within the single market and the customs union. However, the debate was won by the Brexit ultras, and the prize that they cherished above all was an independent trade policy.

We could have a long debate about how truly independent the UK’s trade policy has turned out to be. It seems to me that the British Government have been rolling over previous EU-negotiated trade deals. With the Prime Minister having admitted that there is no prospect of a trade deal with the US, I think that many of us will wonder what the point was of burning down those bridges with the European economic area.

Perhaps because we have been faced with these economic realities, we have seen the Prime Minister, in her first few weeks in power, endorse a strategy of thawing relations with the EU. To avoid being petulant in this debate, I welcome that. It is far from where the UK should be, but it might be the start of a journey back to reality.

May I therefore first associate myself with the comments of everyone who has spoken about the need for improved scrutiny of trade policy? The Great Brexit slogan of “taking back control” clearly did not mean bringing back power to Parliament. Instead, returning powers have been concentrated at an Executive level.

Each trade deal should be subject to a binding yes/no vote in the Commons; Parliament should agree the terms of negotiation before the British Government begin talks; and the International Trade Committee should—

[Julie Elliott (in the Chair)]

Order. The sitting is suspended for 15 minutes for a Division in the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julie Elliott (in the Chair)]

Order. The sitting is resumed. The debate will now continue until 5.45 pm. I remind Members to keep their contributions to around four minutes.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Diolch, Ms Elliott. I believe I was about to make the point that the International Trade Committee should have a stronger role during negotiations.

On another visit to Washington with an all-party group to investigate the transatlantic trade and investment partnership between the US and the EU, I recall a meeting with representatives of the US food industry. At the time, there was some dispute in relation to genetically modified organisms and hormones in food products. During that meeting, we were left in no doubt that nothing would make its way through Congress unless there was movement on the EU side in the negotiations on those specific points. The point I am trying to make is that increased scrutiny would actually strengthen the hand of UK negotiators, as opposed to weakening it.

What I really want to highlight is the need for Wales and Scotland to also be involved in that scrutiny. Trade policy will impact on devolved policy areas, so it is completely unacceptable and unsustainable that the Welsh and Scottish Governments and Parliaments are excluded from decision making. From my perspective in Carmarthenshire, agriculture is extremely important. Agriculture is a devolved matter. For coherent policy, therefore, surely the Welsh Government and Senedd Members should play a full role in trade policy, including through a binding vote on deals in the Welsh Senedd, full scrutiny by the relevant Senedd Committees and a formal role for the Welsh Government in the negotiating process.

Belgium provides a good example. Its central state cannot ratify European trade deals without the support of its so-called sub-national Parliaments. As it stands, therefore, Wallonia has more power over EU trade deals than Wales has over UK trade deals. That is not a very good look for the British Union.

Trade (Australia and New Zealand) Bill

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. A key element of the Australia and New Zealand trade deals is the improved mobility arrangements, which will not only give those under 35 much more flexibility, but will mean that those with professional skills can move much more easily between our countries, for exactly that reason: to help their skills as individuals, as he says, and as part of businesses to grow those economies mutually. Our trade deals are all about mutual benefit and picking countries with which we have strong ties and want to grow our economies together.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

In evidence to the Senedd’s Economy, Trade, and Rural Affairs Committee, the Welsh Government, the farming unions and the Welsh Local Government Association expressed concern that there was no published data about the impact on specific Welsh economic sectors and subsectors. Will the British Government publish that data—they must have it to have come up with the cumulative data that they have published—or are they guilty of hiding the impact of these trade deals on sectors such as Welsh hill farming?

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan]

We have done a great deal of economic assessment across any number of layers. I am very happy to share with the hon. Gentleman some of the detail in due course, and the team will pick that up with him.

It is important to remember that one key area, as we look beyond sectors and to the other side beyond business, is that the consumer will be able to enjoy many more Australian and New Zealand brands coming to the UK, in the same way as the UK will be able to share our brands with other countries. I was in Australia and New Zealand last week, and it was very charming to see which British products people were excited to have more of. I was also able to say that I would help personally to ensure that Australian wine is drunk more often at my own table as a result of this trade deal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan]

My right hon. Friend raises an important point, which is that we have done trade deals with two partner countries that are very much of the same view as us on food safety standards, and we will continue to work with them. One of the beauties of these new trade deals is that they are very broad-ranging and much more ambitious, but are also cross-cutting in many areas. They are not static but have built into them the opportunity for dialogues in any number of areas. Where any business sector here or in those countries either has anxieties or wants to work together to grow those markets, we have factored such dialogues into the trade deals so that they will be able to do that.

To get on, if I may, over the long run our UK-Australia agreement is expected to increase annual trade by over £10 billion. This means a £2.3 billion boost to our economy and a £900 million increase in household wages. Beyond this, the agreement supports the economy of the future thanks to the first ever innovation chapter of any trade deal in the world. In addition, professional workers and those under 35 will enjoy new opportunities to live and work in Australia.

Turning now to our agreement with New Zealand, it will increase overall bilateral trade by 60%, providing an £800 million uplift to the UK economy on top of the £2.5 billion a year in bilateral trade we already do with our Kiwi friends. UK services and tech firms will gain deeper access to New Zealand’s markets, sustaining jobs in this country while also growing the high-value businesses of the future. Our analysis shows that this deal will provide real economic rewards to the 6,000 UK small and medium-sized businesses that already export goods to New Zealand, while opening new opportunities for those that have not yet begun that journey. Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland will enjoy an annual economic boost worth over £50 million.

This Bill relates to a key element of our Australia and New Zealand deals: their measures to widen access to procurement opportunities for firms in both our countries. To give the House a sense of the possibilities on offer for UK businesses, the Australia deal will mean our companies can bid for Australian Government contracts worth around £10 billion a year, including major infrastructure projects such as road upgrades and railway constructions. The Railway Industry Association trade body recently praised the deal’s procurement aspects, saying that they will make it easier for our rail businesses to invest and operate in Australia. This Bill will ensure that our businesses can seize these opportunities as well as the free trade agreements’ broader benefits by putting us on the path to ratification.

Turning to the detail, this Bill is narrowly focused on enabling the Government to implement their obligations under the agreements’ procurement chapters. It will give the Government the specific powers they need to extend duties and remedies in domestic law to Australian and New Zealand suppliers for procurement covered by the free trade agreements and to amend our domestic procurement regulations so that they are in line with commitments in the Australia free trade agreement. The Bill will also give effect to potential changes over the free trade agreements’ lifetimes. They include implementing agreed modifications and rectifications to coverage and updating the names of Government entities

I assure the House that my Department has engaged constructively with the devolved Administrations throughout the Australia and New Zealand trade deal agreement negotiations, and I thank them for working so collaboratively with the Department. I am pleased that the devolved Administrations have indicated that they are satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations on the procurement chapters in both agreements. As procurement is a partially devolved matter, this Bill seeks a concurrent power. I remind the House that such powers are included in the Trade Act 2021, to allow the UK Government to make secondary legislation on behalf of Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland when it is practical to do so.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I am glad there has been some progress. My understanding is that the Welsh Government were calling for concurrent-plus powers; have those been conceded by the UK Government?

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan]

I can update the hon. Gentleman: those discussions are continuing and our officials are continuing to work out the best way forward, and I will make sure they give him an update in due course. I also stress that we are committed to not normally using the concurrent power in this Bill without the devolved Administrations’ consent, and never without consulting the Administrations first.

While technical and narrow in nature, the Bill’s measures will help our businesses and citizens enjoy the enormous benefits offered by our Australia and New Zealand trade deals. Without this Bill we cannot bring these two landmark agreements into force. We want to unlock new trade for our businesses, support thousands of jobs throughout the country and provide a boost to our economy worth billions of pounds as soon as possible, so that we can strengthen both the bonds of commerce between our businesses and Governments and the bonds of friendship our countries share.

The Australia and New Zealand free trade agreements demonstrate in the most practical way what global Britain means to this Government and what we know the UK can achieve as an independent trading nation. This Bill is an essential step towards turning these FTAs’ extraordinary promise into firm reality. I commend it to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

My right hon. Friend is right to raise what we should do domestically. He also illustrates another point. There is a history of trade negotiations, including on different standards of animal welfare, that Ministers could have taken heed of, sought to learn lessons from and put into these negotiations.

The now Prime Minister said that the Government had no intention of striking any deals that did not benefit our farmers, but the reality is that the vast majority of trade deals, which she trumpeted in her leadership campaign, were roll-over deals replicating existing EU agreements—not so much an exercise in driving a hard bargain as a national exercise in cut-and-paste with accompanying photographs on Instagram.

Perhaps it is no surprise that the Prime Minister’s own colleagues have been so critical of her approach to trade. The right hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice) as Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs said that he faced “challenges” in trying to get her to enshrine animal welfare in deals. No wonder the NFU said that it saw

“almost nothing in the deal that will prevent an increase in imports of food produced well below the production standards required of UK farmers”.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Is the right hon. Member aware of the article run by Politico in July indicating that the new Prime Minister was warned by her officials that the trade deals that she was negotiating with Australia and New Zealand would negatively impact on UK farmers?

Oral Answers to Questions

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Thursday 21st October 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mike Freer]

My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. As someone who has come from a financial services background, I have felt the regulator’s hand on my shoulder, so I do understand that regulation can be good, but equally our regulators need to be entirely in tune with our export policy. My colleagues in the Treasury who lead on regulation will be ensuring that our regulator works closely with our export strategy. Specifically, I refer my hon. Friend to some of the annexes particularly in our trade deal with Japan where the benefits of that work can already been seen.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

6. What recent discussions she has had with the Welsh Government on her Department’s ongoing trade negotiations.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Trade (Mr Ranil Jayawardena)]

The Department for International Trade has established structures to engage very constructively with devolved Administrations across the United Kingdom, including the Welsh Government. I and my fellow Ministers will be speaking with Welsh Government counterparts in due course, as we always have done.

[Jonathan Edwards]

The Welsh Government, Hybu Cig Cymru and the farmers unions have all expressed concerns about the direction of UK trade policy, especially with regard to food—fears, I suspect, that will be heightened by today’s announcement about the deal with New Zealand. On the eve of COP26, can the Minister explain the environmental sense of undercutting domestic food production with imports from the other side of the world?

[Mr Jayawardena]

I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman slightly misses the point about trade. The opportunity for trade is for us to be able to sell all over the world too. The Welsh farmers, along with British farmers across our country, I am sure, will be seeking these opportunities to trade not only with the 68 countries around the world with whom we have trade deals, plus the EU, but more to come—with the Gulf, with India, and much more in future. In respect of the opportunities regarding our friends in New Zealand and Australia, they sell much more of their products to Asia, where prices are higher, so our farmers need not be concerned.

Protecting Britain’s Steel Industry

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Monday 21st June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House believes the British steel industry, and the livelihoods and communities it supports, should not be undermined by unfair competition from overseas; regrets that the Trade Remedies Authority has not accounted for the interconnectedness of the British steel industry, nor the impact of safeguard tariffs being maintained in the US and EU, when recommending the abolition of nine of the 19 existing safeguards on steel products; accordingly requires the Government to take urgent action by legislating to allow Ministers to reject the Trade Remedies Authority’s recommendation and temporarily extend the current safeguards; and orders that, at the sitting on Monday 28 June, Standing Order No. 14(1) shall not apply, and that precedence at that sitting shall be given instead to any Business of the House motion in the name of the Leader of the Opposition which may be moved at the commencement of public business that day to make provision for urgent legislative action to protect the vital interests of the British steel industry.

The motion before us disagrees with the recommendations of the Trade Remedies Authority to revoke half the current safeguards protecting our nation’s steel industry against potential floods of cheap imports. It requires the Government to bring forward emergency legislation, allowing them to reject those recommendations and extend all the current safeguards before they expire on 30 June. Finally, it makes provision for the Leader of the Opposition to enable the emergency legislation to be considered next Monday if the Government fail to do so themselves.

It is a pleasure to open this debate. It is a testament to the urgency and importance of the issues before us that so many Members have registered to speak. For that reason, I will not be taking many interventions. I believe that there are 24 Labour Back Benchers alone who want to contribute.

We all recognise that the livelihoods and futures of steel communities across our country will be directly affected by the decisions taken in Westminster this week, but it is the motion before us tonight that creates the possibility that those decisions will be the right ones. That is a heavy responsibility on our shoulders and it is therefore incumbent on us all to treat this debate with the seriousness that it deserves. That is why it is a source of regret that the one person whose decisions will matter above all in Westminster this week—the Secretary of State for International Trade—has chosen not to be here this evening.

After all, it is the Secretary of State’s Trade Remedies Authority—appointed, empowered and inspired by her—that has made the misguided recommendations that have led to this crisis. It is her powers in relation to those recommendations and her freedom to take other issues into account which are the subject of the motion before us today. Most fundamentally of all, it is her general approach to trade policy and her specific attitude towards the future of the steel industry in Britain that is crucial in determining the final decision that is taken on the retention of these safeguards.

If it were me standing in the Secretary of State’s position, I would want to be here this evening to listen to what the representatives of Britain’s steel communities have to say, particularly as some of those representatives are sitting on her own Back Benches. In her absence, I am going to use my opening remarks to look through each of the three issues I mentioned in turn—first, the role of the Trade Remedies Authority; secondly, the powers of the Secretary of State; and, thirdly, the decisions she now has to take—and try to develop a consensus in this House not just in support of this vital motion, but on how the Secretary of State should approach the crucial days ahead.

Let me start with the role of the Trade Remedies Authority and the reason for its flawed recommendations. There is nothing worse, in life or politics, than people being wise after the event, but in respect of the Trade Remedies Authority it is very much a case of predictions coming to pass. Four years ago, my hon. Friends the Members for Brent North (Barry Gardiner) and for Sefton Central (Bill Esterson) warned the Government consistently during the first attempted passage of the Trade Bill that their vision for the new TRA was misguided. Exactly 13 months ago, when the Trade Bill returned for a second time, I stood at this Dispatch Box and followed their previous lead, describing the TRA as

“a vital body with a vital task”

but one that was not representative of the business and workers that it was being set up to defend. “No wonder”, I said 13 months ago,

“there are such concerns and suspicions that the Government’s true agenda for the TRA is not to defend Britain against underpriced imports, but somehow to balance the damage they do to domestic producers against the perceived benefits for domestic consumers.”

I said back then:

“That is not the job of the trade remedies authority.”—[Official Report, 20 May 2020; Vol. 676, c. 616.]

I stand by that statement, even more today now that we have seen this new body in action. If we were in any doubt about the misguided sense of mission that is driving the TRA, we had all the confirmation that we needed last week from the new chair and the new chief executive, who were personally selected by the Secretary of State from the senior ranks of the Department for International Trade. In their joint interview with the Financial Times, they explained that, under their leadership, the TRA would always seek to set the lowest safeguards possible, deliberately lower than any EU equivalent, and that this approach would be quite distinct from countries

“which impose swingeing tariffs to protect particular industries.”

They boasted that the TRA had already scrapped more than 50 of the safeguard tariffs carried over from the European Union, and that they intended to consider only around four cases per year where new safeguards might be required, which is a quarter of the amount being pursued each year by Brussels. They concluded that the TRA was

“suited to a buccaneering global Britain”

that would favour free trade over the protection of domestic industries. If anyone were wondering how the TRA can possibly have come to the conclusions that it has when it comes to maintaining Britain’s steel safeguards, the answer is that the men in charge are simply doing what they were appointed to do by the Secretary of State.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for taking my intervention and for the point that she is making; I agree fully with what she is saying. Does she agree that it is the complete opposite of taking back control that the Secretary of State cannot even amend the recommendations of this authority and that, basically, it is faceless bureaucrats who are determining Government policy?

[Emily Thornberry]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right, and I will be developing that point in a few minutes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Marion Fellows (Motherwell and Wishaw) (SNP)]

I was eager to take part in this debate, as steel is a subject close to my heart. I have a steel plant in my constituency: Dalzell Steelworks in Motherwell, which was saved by the Scottish Government in 2016 when it was sold on by Tata Steel. At that time, I was a member of two steel taskforces, one organised and led by the UK Conservative Government, and the second by the SNP Scottish Government. The UK steel taskforce talked a lot about the importance of steel and what it would like to do to help the industry. Despite that, Redcar steelworks and other locations closed, and approximately 20,000 steel jobs have been lost over the years.

We were told it was the fault of the EU, and there was nothing we could do about the high cost of energy or to stop the imports of cheap steel that were so dangerous to our industry in the UK. Well, here we are in 2021, and what has happened? A recent report from UK Steel shows the significant electricity price disparity the UK steel sector still faces compared with its European counterparts, paying an extra £54 million in energy costs compared with German steelmakers. Over the past five years, the price disparity has cost the sector £254 million, or 130% of annual capital investment.

The report, “Closing the Gap”, shows the huge structural barrier facing the UK steel sector as it faces the core challenges of adapting to a trading environment outside the EU and trying to recover in the aftermath of the pandemic, and embarks on the major challenge of decarbonisation. The report makes a powerful argument for the UK Government to put forward a bold programme of support for the sector, to level the playing field. Consistently higher UK electricity prices increase production costs, reduce available capital and deter inward investment, severely reducing the sector’s ability to invest. Gareth Stace, UK Steel’s director, said:

“Our new report plainly demonstrates UK steelmakers face systemic disadvantages in higher electricity prices than our competitors… Electricity is one of the biggest costs for the steel industry, it undermines our competitiveness and it damages our ability to invest… And the issue is becoming even more urgent with the growing need to rapidly decarbonise”.

UK Steel says the UK Government need to be “bold and decisive”. It would be hard to describe this Government as such in relation to steel.

Scotland did not vote for Brexit, yet the Tories are using it to remove vital protections from our steel industry. At the end of last year, the UK transitioned the EU’s steel safeguards, retaining vital protection against trade diversion and import surges for 19 steel products produced in the UK. Over the course of the past six months, as we have heard, the Trade Remedies Investigations Directorate has been reviewing the measures to see whether they should be extended. Now, the preliminary decision by the Department for International Trade is to remove a large number of products from so-called import safeguards designed to protect domestic producers from a flood of cheap imports. According to UK steel, this needs to be urgently rethought. Under Tory plans, the Trade Remedies Investigations Directorate —an arm’s length body of the Department for International Trade—recommended extending the measures on 10 categories of imports for three years from next month and suggested that measures on nine categories be revoked. The British steel industry has hit out at these plans—these are the folk who make steel, Minister—describing them as a “hammer blow” that risks damaging the sector long term. It said:

“The UK will become a magnet for huge volumes of steel imports, it is beyond worrying to consider the damage this could do to the UK steel sector and its long-term viability”.

Alasdair McDiarmid, operations director of the steelworkers’ union Community said:

“This is the first test of the government’s commitment to our steel industry post-Brexit and they’re failing it”.

UK Steel said that the removal of protections will have an adverse impact on the manufacture of steel sections across the country. It added that the measures were designed to protect the

“viability of an entire industry, not individual production lines”.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Once again, the hon. Lady is making a fantastic speech in defence of the steel industry. The key point seems to be that the US and the EU are maintaining their safeguards. We know that there is a massive oversupply of steel being produced around the world; I think the figure in 2019 was 514 million tonnes. If the British state removes our safeguards, it does not take a brain surgeon to work out where some of that steel is going to be arriving.

Trade Bill

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Ms Ghani]

I rise to speak in support of Lords amendment 3—the genocide amendment. It is the only vote on genocide on the table today. I regret that the compromise amendment that we tabled has been rejected.

Let us remember that we are talking about genocide: the systematic destruction of an entire people. It is a threshold that is so hard to reach because it is the most heinous of all crimes—the forced sterilisation of women, forced labour and re-education camps for hundreds of thousands of children. The Board of Deputies of British Jews stated that it is reminded of the holocaust when it thinks of the plight of the Uyghurs; it cannot get any worse than that.

Members across the House have a very simple choice to make today. We can, by voting in favour of Lord Alton’s amendment 3, empower the UK to fulfil its UN obligations under the genocide convention and ensure that we do not offer advantageous trade deals to genocidal states. It really is that simple. The UN continues to fail to recognise that genocides are happening until it is too late. The UN and the Security Council are in a state of frozen paralysis, held hostage by Russia and China and incapable of holding genocidal states to account.

Against the amendment, the Minister and some of my hon. Friends argue that we should not outsource trade policy to the UK courts, and that the proper place to make decisions about genocide is in international courts. In practice, that means that we have to accept that foreign states will always hold a veto over our determination of genocide. I do not accept that that is taking back control. I do not accept that our courts are not skilled enough to determine breaches of international law. I do not accept that the Bill as drafted gives Parliament sufficient say over whether states that we wish to strike trade deals with are committing genocide.

I understand the concerns about Executive power, and the role of Parliament versus the courts, which is why I tabled an amendment with colleagues in lieu of Lords amendment 3 to address those concerns. Courts will judge, Parliament will opine and Ministers will decide. Yet that amendment was rejected. If the Government believe that this is still an unacceptable derogation of power, what is the alternative and what are the Government’s objections? If we do not pass the amendment today, we will be outsourcing all future decisions on genocide to Russia and China. We now have an independent trade policy after leaving the EU, and Brexit was a vote of hope and optimism and for Britain to play its part in leading the world, so why would we want to use our new-found freedom to trade with states that commit and profit from genocide? Britain is surely better than that.

Tomorrow, Joe Biden becomes the President of the United States, our closest allies. Today is Britain’s moment to blaze a trail and showcase global leadership on trade and international law. We can all talk about our noblest values, but we cannot do so while allowing the vilest of crimes to continue. We have an amendment. We can make a stand against genocide. We can uphold our United Nations obligations and ensure that we do not trade with genocidal states, or we can do nothing, and to do nothing is a counsel of despair.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind) [V]]

It is a pleasure to speak briefly in this debate in support of the amendments made in the other place. It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Wealden (Ms Ghani) who made a very passionate and convincing case for supporting Lords amendment 3, to which I will refer later.

Lords amendment 1 would introduce vital democratic safeguards into international trade policy by ensuring that the Executive cannot operate unilaterally. It would strengthen the hand of Parliament without undermining the ability of the UK Government to conduct negotiations as they see fit. In reality, the negotiations with the European Union have clearly shown that trade agreements can have far-reaching consequences for people’s everyday lives, from food standards to workers’ rights, from environmental legislation to the impact on our public services. It is to be welcomed then that Lords amendment 1 would require the UK Government to outline their negotiating objectives to Parliament prior to the commencement of any trade negotiations and to secure the agreement of both Houses before a deal is ratified, giving Members of Parliament a meaningful role in setting trade policy.

There was much debate during earlier proceedings of the Bill about how domestic democratic empowerment would strengthen the hand of the UK Government when it comes to trade negotiations. That was certainly my experience during a brief visit to the United States many years ago to scrutinise the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the US, where we were reminded that there were certain matters, such as access to food markets, which were non-negotiable for Congress.

Although I support Lords amendment 1, I would have liked to see it go even further in respect of strengthening the role of the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish Governments and respective Parliaments. That would not be without precedence. In the EU, every single member state has a veto over its international trade deals as well as sub-national Governments such as Wallonia in Belgium. Although I accept that the UK Government have a direct responsibility for trade policy, I believe that a world of constitutional trouble awaits us unless there are statutory safeguards for the respective countries of the British state. I therefore urge the British Government not only to retain Lords amendment 1, but to go a step further by giving the devolved Parliaments a veto on trade agreements.

I wish briefly to pledge my support for Lords amendment 3—the so-called genocide amendment—which several right hon. and hon. Members have supported this afternoon. Effectively, it couples international trade policy with the promotion of human rights.

Lords amendment 4 would place protections for the NHS on a legislative basis. I also support Lords amendment 6, which sets out to protect a range of regulatory standards such as for food, animal welfare and workers’ rights. Given the increasing noises coming from the Government Benches about a bonfire of standards, acceptance of this amendment would go a long way to allaying fears that our trade policy would be used as a regressive Trojan horse.

I am disappointed to see that the Government are seeking to remove provisions from Lords amendment 9 that strengthen the Trade and Agriculture Commission. Again, I ask Ministers to include representatives from the devolved Governments on the commission and introduce scrutiny protocols for the commission with the Welsh Senedd, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con) [V]]

A lot in this Trade Bill is to be welcomed, including its reinforced commitments to an agricultural commission, which has been welcomed by the farming sector and the NFU, as well as more scrutiny by the International Trade Committee. In my 10th year as trade envoy for three Prime Ministers, I believe that the Bill is further evidence of our commitment to take forward UK trade and investment across the world as a key part of global Britain, and that is not just an idle slogan, for international trade and investment secures jobs across our country, funds our welfare and social justice, and requires engagement globally.

Today we face the so-called genocide amendment, which would propose to replicate the role of the UN and the International Criminal Court because of issues with how that process is currently functioning. The amendment would—as the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) clearly illustrated when she spoke about both Cameroon and Egypt—be used by many Members who wish to expand the creation of such a court to have a much wider role on human rights issues and their implications for our trade arrangements, including those already signed, as well as those proposed.

Earlier we heard another Opposition Member, the hon. Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel), refer to human rights abuses in Indonesia—a country that has moved further and faster in the development of an open democratic society over the last decade than almost anywhere else I can think of—so let us be in no doubt as to where some would take this amendment. We would find, in an imperfect world, that such a court would be used to limit and constrain our free trade severely, which neither the Labour party nor the SNP was ever in favour of anyway. These are issues that should be decided by our Government and, above all, this Parliament.

Let me briefly address the Uyghur question, for Lords amendment 3 in the first place is aimed squarely at the People’s Republic of China. Many years ago, I almost died in Xinjiang, crossing its great Taklamakan desert. What has happened there for many decades, but with greatly increased severity since 2009, cannot conceivably be supported by anyone in the United Kingdom, but I do not believe that this amendment, if implemented, would achieve anything at all for the Uyghurs or Xinjiang. We should not be asking judges to make political judgments. It is for this place to decide what our relationship with China should be. Over the last decade, we have veered from golden era to worst era in a short period of time. We have to find that balance, and the Trade Bill is not the place for it. It should be part of the integrated review on foreign policy and defence that we await shortly. Meanwhile, I support the Government strongly in opposing an amendment that would subcontract our scrutiny of human rights and of our trade relationships to a new court.

Global Britain

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Monday 11th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind) [V]]

Blwyddyn newydd dda to you, Mr Deputy Speaker. It is a pleasure to speak in this debate.

After the political rancour of the last four years, it is important that policy makers face the reality of where we are and start mapping a vision for the future. That challenge belongs to those on both sides of the European debate. False hope that the question of Europe can be parked by the next Westminster election seems naive, considering that the agreement contains provisions for periodic full-scale reviews, with the first expected right after the likely date of the next election.

The UK’s trade relationship with the EU will always—by far—be the most important one for Welsh businesses. I am glad that the agreement maintained tariff and quota-free access to the European economic area. However, any divergence in standards will in all probability lead to justified punitive action by the European Union. It is disconcerting, to say the least, that Brexiteers are already demanding a bonfire of environmental, consumer and workers’ protections. Those hoping that the Brexit culture war is over are living in the bizarre hope that the Tories are going to give up their main political weapon, and that the European Research Group obsessives are all of a sudden going to find a new political project to entertain themselves. This sets the scene for years of further Euro-bashing to make the case for the Singapore-on-Thames group or the “Britannia Unchained” gang.

I remain convinced that the Brexit that was chosen by the British Government will be politically, economically and culturally damaging to Wales. Of course, I hope that my concerns are misplaced. Looking for evidence of this, I find myself echoing the question asked by so many commentators: what will the British state do with this mythical sovereignty that was worth the price of a hard exit? After hearing the Secretary of State’s opening remarks, I am not entirely clear about what can be achieved now post Brexit that could not be accomplished before. Reminiscing about past imperial glory is not a vision for the future in a highly complex world. If we are to have any chance of making the best of the post-Brexit world, the Westminster elites need to be urgently inoculated with a reality vaccine. A renegade state in the north Atlantic with a reputation for undermining international law and the international rules-based order is likely to find itself located firmly on the inconsequential periphery.

I echo the comments of many speakers in this debate about the regrettable decision of the British Government to cut the international aid budget. My vision for Wales is for my country to be an international force for good in the world, placing itself at the centre of global issues such as climate change, economic justice, human rights, international aid and conflict resolution. I would like to think this would be a mantle taken up by the British state, but the aforementioned priorities are anathema to a Westminster elite intoxicated on its own propaganda, preferring to live in a fantasy of hubris.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Blwyddyn newydd dda i chi hefyd, Jonathan.

Trade (Disclosure of Information) Bill

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 16th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Trade Policy (Greg Hands)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

The UK will regain full control of its borders at the end of the transition period on 31 December. Irrespective of the ongoing negotiations with the European Union regarding a free trade agreement, the Government have been clear that there will be additional requirements for people and goods travelling to the EU. Since the Trade Bill is unlikely to pass and receive Royal Assent before the new year, we need to ensure that there is no gap in the Government’s ability to share the information that we already collect and hold in order to mitigate any temporary friction from the end of the transition period. That is what this Bill achieves, replicating the Government amendments made to the Trade Bill—clauses 8 to 10 —which is currently passing through the other place. These powers are critical to support the use and sharing of trade-related data between Government Departments and public bodies. They will ensure that there is no lapse in their ability to do this at the end of the transition period before the Trade Bill achieves Royal Assent.

In summary, the Bill will allow the effective use of Government data to ensure the smooth flow of people, goods and services after the end of the transition period. The Cabinet Office’s border and protocol delivery group—the BPDG—is leading work to ensure that our borders are robust and efficient, establishing a borders operations centre to monitor and manage flow through the border and support mitigation of any disruption.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

The Bill is relatively uncontroversial. However, the flow of information in itself will not be enough to deal with the situation we are likely to face in the new year. How concerned is the Minister by the Select Committee on Welsh Affairs’ report that the Welsh ports, in particular, are at an unacceptable risk of not being ready for whatever faces them at the beginning of next year?

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, which was well put. I appeared before the Welsh Affairs Committee as part of its inquiry, and I read its report in some detail at the weekend. We are working flat out across Government to ensure that all our borders and ports are ready. It is the purpose of the borders and protocol delivery group and of the borders operation centre to make sure that we are ready. We are confident that we have done everything we can to ensure that we are ready on our borders for 1 January, but I have read the report and I noted what it had to say. The Government will be responding in due course.

These powers are critical to support the use and sharing of data related to trade. As I mentioned, a border operations centre will monitor and manage flow through the border and support the mitigation of any disruption. To facilitate that, the Bill will ensure that the Government make the best use of the data they already collect and hold, and reduce inefficiencies and bureaucracy for business. It will support better services by permitting data on the flow of international trade to be shared and analysed, and by helping to identify and resolve the root cause of disruption. It will allow the Government to use data more effectively to plan new controls at the border, ensuring that security is maintained, that new requirements are introduced seamlessly and that any temporary friction is mitigated.

We recognise that the Bill has been proposed on an expedited schedule, and that hon. and right hon. Members attach great importance to data security, so I would like to reassure the House that the Bill contains measures to ensure that the permitted use of the data it facilitates is discretionary and specific. The Bill does not create any additional powers to collect data, and it applies only to the public bodies specified and only where those public bodies are satisfied that the data use would support a Ministers’ functions relating to trade. It creates an offence of unlawfully disclosing information, and ensures that data sharing remains subject to general data protection regulation and Data Protection Act protection. Regarding the expedited schedule, I should emphasise that all these measures have already been subject to substantive scrutiny in both Houses during the passage of the Trade Bill, through the relevant clauses, without further amendment. The Bill also contains a sunset clause, which will ensure consistency with the powers being delivered through the Trade Bill.

Clause 2(9) provides the power for a Minister of the Crown to add public authorities to the data-sharing gateway. As this power would include the ability to add devolved Ministers, it has the potential to alter the executive competence of devolved Administrations. In accordance with the Sewel convention, we are seeking consent from the devolved legislatures, and I have written to Ministers in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to begin this process.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I apologise for intervening on him once again. Is that the reason that the Welsh Government are not specifically included in clause 2? Are the Government waiting for the legislative consent motion to go through, after which the Welsh Government would be included as one of the groups that would be part of the data sharing? What is the reason for the Welsh Government not being included in clause 2?

[Greg Hands]

Actually, I will have breaking news. I think that the Welsh Government have given legislative consent to the Bill this morning. Secondly, we have very good and constructive engagement with the Welsh Government, particularly with Baroness Eluned Morgan in the other place. I might add that we did not have that constructive engagement actually in the other place, but via Zoom. We have had very constructive engagement with the Welsh Government to ensure that we have the ability to work together to manage these aspects. Trade is obviously a reserved power, but it has an impact on devolved competences. For example, the management of highways around ports is firmly in an area of devolved competence, so making sure that the two Governments can work together is extremely important.



During the passage of the Trade Bill, we have undertaken a significant programme of ministerial and official-level engagement with the devolved Administrations. That has enabled us to respond to requests, including those related to data-sharing gateways, to assist them with their devolved functions. As the Trade (Disclosure of Information) Bill replicates clauses in the Trade Bill, I will be making the same two commitments to the devolved Administrations on data sharing that we made during Committee of the Trade Bill in the other place.

First, the data shared under clause 2 will be used by the border operations centre being established by the Cabinet Office to develop strategic insights about the flow of trade and functioning of the border. The Cabinet Office is committed to sharing strategic analysis related to flow of trade where it will support the more effective management of flow through the border. The Cabinet Office will continue to work closely with devolved Administrations to ensure that relevant analysis and information can be shared to support devolved functions relating to trade and management of the border. Secondly, the UK Government commit to consulting the devolved Administrations before any devolved authorities are added to the list of specified authorities that can share data under clause 2.

Regarding the expedited schedule that we are using today, I should emphasise that all these measures have already been subject to substantive scrutiny in both Houses during the passage of the Trade Bill through the relevant clauses, without further amendment. As I said, the Bill contains a sunset clause, which will ensure consistency with the powers being delivered through the Trade Bill.

This Bill is necessary to ensure that Government can use this information properly to minimise disruption at the border following the end of the transition period. It is limited in scope and contains specific safeguards to prevent inappropriate or excessive use of data. It is a procedural but vital Bill to support readiness for the UK to take back control of its borders, minimise any temporary disruption to the flow of people and goods, and support the development of smart processes and frictionless trade that will support businesses and citizens alike. That will, in turn, underpin the delivery of a world- class border fit for the UK’s future as an independent trading nation, protecting our country, strengthening our economy and growing our international trade. I commend the Bill to the House.

Trade (Disclosure of Information) Bill

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 16th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Trade Policy (Greg Hands)]

Thank you, Dame Rosie, if I have the nomenclature correct. As we come to the end of the transition period, it is important that the Government make the best use of the information that they already hold to minimise any disruption that may result from the new border requirements that will apply irrespective of the nature of our trading relationship with the EU. More specifically, it is important that the Government use that information to develop a detailed picture of the flow of goods and people at key locations at the border. That will inform decision making right across Government, leading to better outcomes for businesses and citizens.

As Members will be aware, the clauses in the Bill have been scrutinised previously by the House during the passage of the Trade Bill. Members may recall that a key source of information within Government relating to both trade and border management is HMRC, which has significant responsibilities in relation to the movement of goods across the border. HMRC has specific statutory restrictions in relation to the sharing of information that it holds and, in the absence of an express legal gateway to permit sharing, the Government cannot make use of this data effectively.

The clause has therefore been introduced to allow HMRC to share the data that it holds with any other public or private body that carries out a public function related to trade for the purposes of that function. This power enables HMRC and bodies working with or on behalf of HMRC to share data with Departments, including, for example, the Cabinet Office, which, through the border and protocol delivery group, is leading Government preparedness for border readiness at the end of the transition period.

BPDG has established a border operations centre to monitor and manage flow at the end of the transition period and to support relevant authorities to better manage border controls and ensure that frictions to the flow of trade are minimised and negative impacts are mitigated. The border operations centre will use data provided by HMRC, alongside other Departments and public bodies, so that it can analyse and promote efficiencies in the flow of traffic in goods and services in and out of the United Kingdom. Access to HMRC data is crucial to developing this detailed commodity-level view of the flow of goods at the border.

Additionally, the clause will facilitate the sharing of information with other organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation and the World Customs Organisation, both of which the UK will be obligated to share data with as part of our international obligations for the purposes of trade. This is a necessary clause to ensure continuity as we come to the end of the transition period, as it will enable the efficient use of HMRC data to support the Cabinet Office’s role in minimising temporary disruption at the border that may result from our new trading relationship with the EU and enable the sharing of data with international organisations where necessary.

Measures have been included in the Bill to ensure the proper handling of the data and to safeguard and protect its use, with penalties for unauthorised disclosure, onward sharing or use. Moreover, Departments will comply with requirements of data protection legislation, including the general data protection regulation, when handling any personal data shared under this gateway, where it is deemed proportionate and necessary to do so. This clause is essential for the Cabinet Office and other bodies to ensure the continued smooth flow of goods.

Moving on to clause 2, alongside HMRC, to which clause 1 applies, more than 20 Departments and public bodies have either operational or policy responsibilities relating to the border, using over 100 IT systems between them. These Departments and public bodies collect and hold numerous types of information related to trade. However, as with HMRC, this information could typically be used only for very specific purposes, with statutory restrictions on the sharing of information with other Departments. These restrictions inhibit the Government identifying and utilising the full potential of their information to support trade policy and the flow of goods and services through the border. The restrictions also lead to inefficiencies, including duplicative requests to industry to share data.

The clause fixes that problem and will allow specified public bodies and Departments to share data where it supports the exercise of a Minister of the Crown’s functions relating to trade. By combining and analysing specific border data, the Government and the Cabinet Office, in particular, will be able to develop insights and analysis to support the Government as a whole to deliver better services. This will ensure that goods and trade to continue to flow when the UK becomes an independent trading nation at the end of the transition period. As with clause 1, this clause does not, however, grant any additional data collection powers to the Government. Instead, it seeks to create a discretionary gateway to enable more effective sharing of data that Departments and public bodies already hold.

Moving to clause 3, the Government rightly take the safeguarding of information and personally identifiable information, in particular, very seriously. As I hope I made clear in introducing clauses 1 and 2, the ability to share data under both gateways is discretionary. Individual Departments and public authorities providing data will need to be satisfied that data sharing is necessary to support functions relating to trade prior to sharing the data. Furthermore, as I mentioned when introducing clauses 1 and 2, any data shared by the data-sharing gateway that is being established will have to comply with data protection legislation, including the general data protection regulation and its principles, covering necessity, proportionality and minimisation to protect the rights of individuals.

Clause 3 provides an additional safeguard on top of all the others by creating a criminal offence if information relating to a person’s identity, or information from which a person’s identity might be deduced, is shared in contravention of clause 2. I hope that will provide further assurance, if it is required, that the data shared through the gateway will be handled appropriately.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

I am interested in clause 3. To whom are the Government concerned that the information might be shared inappropriately? Who would be the recipients of that information?

[Greg Hands]

I think the hon. Gentleman’s question was about what kind of people would be inappropriate; it would be people to whom the legislation will not apply. We are talking about a discretionary power to share data to assist a Minister in functions relating to trade. In addition, the criminal power, as I understand it, is in the Bill specifically to prevent any individual person’s identity from becoming either known directly or deduced through the data that has been produced. Clause 3 puts in place an additional power to prevent that data from becoming known. I do not really want to speculate, Dame Rosie, but I can imagine a whole series of people and bodies that might have inappropriate access to an individual’s data as they pass through a border. I think we can all imagine the sort of people who may not have either your, mine or the Government’s best interests, or the interests of international trade, at heart.

Clause 4 contains the sunset elements of this Bill. As the House will be aware, the Trade Bill is currently passing through the other place and is now unlikely to receive Royal Assent before the end of the transition period. As I hope I made clear in introducing clauses 1 and 2, it is essential that we are able to provide a gateway to enable the sharing of trade-related data that the Cabinet Office requires before the end of this period as it takes on border-monitoring functions. To ensure that we can do that in time, the Bill replicates clauses 8 to 10 of the Trade Bill, which has been referred to at least twice so far. Clause 4 is therefore required to facilitate the expiry of clauses 1 to 3 of this Bill if similar clauses are passed in the Trade Bill, and will thereby ensure that the UK statute book is kept in good working order.

Clause 5 sets out the interpretation of key terms for the purposes of the Bill. Specifically, it provides interpretation of the terms “the data protection legislation”, “enactment”, “the investigatory powers legislation” and “Minister of the Crown”. The interpretations are intended to ensure that the reader of the Bill has clarity in respect of and understands the use of those terms in the Bill.

Finally, Clause 6 sets out the territorial extent of the legislation, when it will come into force and its short title. Subsection (1) sets out the territorial extent of the provisions:

“This Act extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.”

This is a standard clause in any Bill to specify the extent of the its measures.

I note that the Government have worked closely with the devolved Administrations on these provisions as part of work on the Trade Bill, to ensure that the data- sharing gateways can also assist them with their devolved functions—I have already mentioned traffic management around ports as a classic case of where a devolved Administration have a legitimate and correct interest in ensuring that data will flow and therefore that trade flows. In that spirit of working closely together, the Government made two commitments to the devolved Administrations in relation to data sharing under clause 9 of the Trade Bill when it was in Committee in the Lords, and I will repeat them today. First, the data shared under clause 9 of that Bill will be used by the border operations centre and the Cabinet Office to develop strategic insights. The Cabinet Office is committed to sharing strategic analysis related to the flow of data where it will support the more effective management of flow through the border. Cabinet Office officials will continue to work closely with counterparts in the devolved Administrations to ensure that relevant analysis and information can be shared to support devolved functions relating to trade and management of the border. Secondly, the UK Government commit to consulting the devolved Administrations before any devolved authorities are added to or removed from the list of specified authorities that can share data under clause 9 of the Trade Bill.

I turn to the remaining subsections of clause 6. Clause 6(2) of the Trade (Disclosure of Information) Bill provides for the Bill to come into force on the day of Royal Assent. Clause 6(3) simply provides that the Bill, once enacted, will be cited as the Trade (Disclosure of Information) Act 2020. I hope that the House agrees that clause 6, and therefore all six clauses, should stand part of the Bill.

UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Wednesday 25th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

My hon. Friend is a doughty champion of English sparkling wine and knows that this will be one of the geographical indicators that goes through the domestic process early next year, to be registered in Japan and recognised in Japan, and who knows how long it would have taken under the EU, because under its deal, it has to negotiate every new indicator. We have got agreement on those 70 indicators through the process, and the only circumstance under which English sparkling wine would not qualify is if English sparkling wine were produced in Japan, and I do not believe that to be the case.

This deal aligns with our high environment, animal welfare, labour, data and food safety standards, and it helps to position the United Kingdom as the world’s hub for services in tech trade and establishes us as a major force in global trade. Following Japan’s economic push on womanomics, we have also signed an entire chapter on women’s economic empowerment to help female entrepreneurs in both our nations—another chapter that was not included in the EU deal.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

I do not want to rain too much on the Secretary of State’s parade, but she will be aware that, according to the British Government’s own figures, the Welsh economy will grow by only 0.05% over 15 years, based on a WTO baseline, as a result of this deal. Also, the British Government’s policy of leaving the single market and the customs union means we will need over 70 deals to make up for that loss, and if we have no deal that figure will be considerably worse.

[Elizabeth Truss]

This deal is worth at least £15 billion in extra trade, not including the trade that was already increasing between our two nations, and there are significant benefits for Wales, including the recognition of Welsh lamb as a protected geographical indicator as well as more opportunities for manufacturing industries.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I have to say that trade deals generally are better when we consult properly and extensively and put trust in Parliament, which unfortunately the Conservative party does not seem to have at this time.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Also missing from the Secretary of State’s comments were the Government’s own figures, which indicate that Japanese imports to the UK will benefit at a level four times greater than that for UK exports to Japan. Does that not indicate that it is actually a very good deal for Japan?

[Emily Thornberry]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; I am coming to that.

When it comes to the exaggeration of benefits and the misrepresentation of the Japanese trade deal, one crucial issue is left unresolved, and it is a vital precedent to get right. By my count, I have now asked the Secretary of State a very simple question three times on the Floor of the House, twice in letters and once in a written parliamentary question and—she knows what is coming— I ask it again now: in pounds and pence, what is the forecast increase in UK exports and growth resulting from the UK-Japan deal compared with the EU-Japan deal that it replaces?

I fail to see why the Secretary of State gets so indignant about this question; after all, she is the one who has repeatedly claimed over the past 75 days that the deal she has negotiated with Japan goes “beyond and above” the EU-Japan deal, goes “further and faster” than the EU-Japan deal and delivers “additional economic benefits” compared with the EU-Japan deal. Indeed, when I pressed her last week simply to confirm that the forecast for exports and growth was higher under her deal than under the EU-Japan deal, the Secretary of State told the House, “Yes, it is higher”, so why has she continually refused to quantify that difference? Why will she not provide the figures, in pounds and pence, to back her claims?

All is not lost, though: we might be able to make some progress on this point today. I went back to the Department’s original impact assessment, published in May 2018, of the effects of the EU-Japan deal. It is a detailed 51-page document, signed and authorised on the front cover by the Minister for Trade Policy, the right hon. Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Greg Hands). I have to say that I do not think it is the right hon. Gentleman’s best piece of work—the assumptions and baselines are pretty sketchy, and my hon. Friend the Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner) was pretty scathing about it during the debate in 2018—but, nevertheless, it is what we have to go on; we do not have anything else.

On page 2, after the Minister’s signature, it says in black and white:

“The analysis assumes that the UK continues to trade…after EU exit…with Japan on an equivalent preferential basis to the EPA.”

In other words, this is what we have been asking for and what the Secretary of State has repeatedly refused to provide—an analysis by her Department, authorised by her closest ministerial colleague, of what would happen if we had just stuck to the terms of the EU-Japan deal.

I remind colleagues—I wonder whether my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West (Gareth Thomas) wants to write this down, because it might be worth coming back to—that in the final assessment produced last month by the Department of the long-term impact of the UK-Japan deal, the forecast increase in UK exports to Japan was £2.6 billion, and the forecast increase in UK GDP was £1.5 billion. Let us compare those figures with the Department’s assessment of the long-term impact of the EU-Japan deal. Under that assessment, the forecast increase in UK exports to Japan was not £2.6 billion but £4.3 billion, and the forecast increase in UK GDP was not £1.5 billion but £2.6 billion. I do not know about you, Madam Deputy Speaker, but that does not sound like further and faster, above and beyond, additional or higher to me. It sounds like smaller, slower, lower and lamer.

I have no doubt that the Secretary of State will tell me that the 2018 forecasts were inaccurate, the methodology was flawed and the Minister for Trade Policy was having a bad hair day, although he did put his name on it. All those things may be true, but here is the problem: unless and until she can produce an assessment of how the UK-Japan deal compares with the EU-Japan deal in terms of the forecast for UK exports and growth, that is all we have to go on. The two assessments produced by her Department in 2018 and 2020 show that her historic, groundbreaking, British-shaped deal has left our country worse off than if we had simply rolled over the provisions in the EU-Japan agreement. My suggestion to the Secretary of State is that, until she can provide her own assessment of the difference between the two deals, she should stop making exaggerated claims about the “additional economic benefits” of her deal, because quite frankly, she does not have the figures to back them up.

That is why this issue really matters, and that is why it is important that we get this precedent right before the Secretary of State goes off to negotiate any more trade deals on our country’s behalf. It does not matter whether it is an issue as small as soy sauce imports from Japan or as big as car exports to Europe. We gain nothing in international credibility if we overstate what our trade deals have achieved. Indeed, we risk misleading the British people and undermining their confidence in the importance of trade if we claim benefits from the agreements we negotiate that are simply not borne out by the facts.

I welcome the trade agreement with Japan—all of us on the Opposition Benches do—but the Secretary of State has done herself no favours and done our country no service in the way in which she has presented this agreement and oversold its benefits. I hope she will learn the right lessons from this when it comes to negotiating our new trade deals with the US, Australia, New Zealand, the rest of CPTPP and the Mercosur countries in the coming years. More importantly, I hope that a renewed focus on substance over presentation and the chastening loss of our trade deals with Algeria, Bosnia and Serbia will encourage her to get her head down over the next five weeks and do the hard, unglamorous work of sorting out the other 11 continuity agreements worth £55 billion in trade with Mexico, Singapore, Ghana and others before the clock runs out and before any more of the free trade agreements we already have are carelessly and needlessly thrown away.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Sobel]

I do agree with my hon. Friend. I sat on the Environment Bill Committee many months ago, when the Bill first came in and before there was a huge pause, and this was also clear in relation to that Bill, so we are seeing a pattern across these Bills and these deals.

Moving on to the wider ambitions of the Government, I would like to ask—I see that the Secretary of State is leaving her place, but perhaps the Minister for Trade Policy will respond—whether this is the first step towards joining the regional comprehensive economic partnership, or just clearing the way to become a member of or a signatory to the CPTPP through the British overseas territory of the Pitcairn Islands.

[Jonathan Edwards]

From my understanding of the trans-Pacific partnership, it includes very strict provisions on state aid and an investor-state dispute resolution mechanism, both of which mean conceding a great deal of sovereignty. Does it not just go to show that the great Brexit slogans of “take back control” and “a global Britain” are inherently contradictory?

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Williams (Montgomeryshire) (Con)]

As a member of the Select Committee on International Trade, I will try to keep my comments brief. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] Thank you for that. My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) summed up the thanks the Committee wishes to give the Front-Bench team for the access given. It is interesting to see the CRaG—Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—process in action, given that this debate had been asked for. The fears we heard from Opposition Members about the inadequacy of the CRaG process are clearly not being met in this trade debate. The report was interesting; we looked at those documents and discussed this process with other members of the Committee. We have fed back to the Front-Bench team about areas of possible improvement, but I wish to reinforce our thanks for the openness we saw.

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar) and his talk about trade links and trade lines. I echo the tribute paid to both embassies for the work they put in behind the scenes and in front of the scenes on this trade deal. I was also reminiscing, as a Welsh Member, about how terrific the Japanese were in hosting the rugby world cup, and their match against England was one to remember.

As chair of the all-party group on international trade and investment, I completely agree with the comments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) on liberalisation. This is an important milestone as we emerge from the tentacles of the European Union and set out on to the open stage with our own trade deals. It sets again an independent trading story of this island nation, and I certainly want to see that greater liberalisation. He espoused it far better than I can, so I will move on.

The hon. Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel) is not in his place, but he accused us of plagiarising the EU treaty and of lowering standards. I say gently that we can either have copied the EU treaty or be doing something differently, but I am not sure that both lines of attack work in the same paragraph.

As a rural Member of Parliament, I wish to reflect on the agricultural nature of these trade deals. I know that my local farmers will particularly take heart from the tone of this continuity extra trade deal. They will be looking at what they can achieve through this sector. The hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) touched on the potential for Wales, and trade between Wales and Japan has been growing at a terrific rate. Two companies in my constituency, Nidec and Invertek, are thriving under new Japanese ownership, and I can only see these bonds strengthening.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Before the hon. Gentleman gets too excited, I am sure he will agree that most Welsh farmers this evening will be looking at the cut of nearly a third in agriculture support that they now face as a result of today’s comprehensive spending review. That is a far bigger issue than the Japan-UK trade deal.

[Craig Williams]

I would not want to be told off by you, Madam Deputy Speaker, as often happens to me in these debates. I will not make accusations about anything that will get me in trouble with you, but if Members look at the detail of the funding supplied by the UK Government and topped up from the EU to the Welsh Government direct, they will see that the Welsh Government and the Farmers Union of Wales need to be very careful with their accusations. We will take that aside after this debate. I wish to focus on the growth of that trade, which has been terrific. It was £250 million in 2018 and we are talking about a 25% increase year on year. Our relationship and that of our companies with Japan is growing. It is hugely welcome, and it is reinforced by this trade deal.



I will finish by commenting on the GIs. It is brilliant to see not just the greatest lamb product in the world, Welsh lamb, recognised in these trade deals, but also the Anglesey sea salt, the Conwy mussels, the west Wales salmon and, of course, the plums from the Vale of Clwyd. They will be going through the normal process, of course, but it is great to see this on the face of these agreements. It is incredibly encouraging. On deals such as these, Opposition Members were incredibly sceptical that we could ever get anything on a par with the EU deal. Their attacks have moved on, and we now have something that is superior. I have no doubt that these deals will continue.