Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Thursday 5th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Smith]

Clause 66 sets out who GBR must consult before issuing, revising or replacing the access and use policy under clause 59. The ORR and the Scottish and Welsh Ministers must be consulted as well as other persons GBR considers appropriate. Subsection (2) requires GBR to consult the persons it considers appropriate before issuing the infrastructure capacity planning document under clause 60, including any revisions and replacements; before issuing a working timetable under clause 61; and before making, altering or replacing a charging scheme under clause 64 or a performance scheme under clause 65.

Subsection (3) provides that a requirement in this clause for consultation may be satisfied by a consultation before or after the commencement of the clause. There is currently no express requirement to consult existing open access operators.

Clause 67, on appeals against access, charging and performance decisions, provides that a person who is aggrieved may appeal to the ORR against a GBR decision as to their train operations’ access to and use of the infrastructure, or a decision under the charging scheme or performance scheme. That sounds okay, until we realise that it is on judicial review terms, so there is no actual right of appeal at all.

Clause 68, on the appeals procedure, sets out that the ORR, when determining appeals under this chapter, must apply the principles that the High Court would apply on an application for a judicial review, or the principles that the Court of Session would apply in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction for appeals in Scotland.

Subsections (2) and (3) provide for the ORR to allow an appeal or dismiss it, and, if it allows an appeal, to use the following remedies. For appeals made against the GBR policies, plans, and schemes themselves—under clause 59(6), on access and use; clause 60(6), on infra-structure capacity; clause 64(8), on charging; or clause 65(7), on the performance scheme—the ORR can only require GBR to reconsider the decision.

For appeals made against a specific decision under clause 61(5) or clause 62(7), on the working timetable, or under clause 67, on GBR’s policies, plans and schemes, the ORR can quash the decision that is appealed against. Then, however, all it can do is to send it back to GBR to reconsider, or it may substitute the decision with its own if quashing the decision is on the basis of an error of law and without the error there is only one decision that GBR could have reached.

Clause 68(1) means that because appeals must be assessed using judicial review principles, operators can challenge GBR decisions only on procedural grounds and not on the substance or commercial merits. That means that GBR will be judge and jury in its decisions affecting its direct competition, which is obviously wildly unfair.

Clause 68(3)(a) sets out that even where an appeal succeeds, the ORR can only remit the matter back to GBR for reconsideration, which means that GBR can often reach the same outcome again without revising its reasoning. That offers little to no real corrective power.

Clause 68(4)(b) says that the ORR may substitute its own decision only where there is an error of law and where only one lawful outcome was possible. That is a very high bar and as a result this remedy will be rare.

These concerns have been echoed by the industry. During one of the oral evidence sessions for the Transport Committee, Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group said:

“There are a number of problems with that appeal function. First, it will be incredibly hard to ever get to it. We are told that the appeal will have to meet the standards of a judicial review—illegality, irrationality or procedural unfairness—so there will be a very high bar to meet to even get there. On top of that, the law allows the Secretary of State by regulation to set out some steps you would have to take in advance of going to the ORR. We do not know what those are. There is also a fee, and we do not know what that is. Even getting to the ORR will be very much more difficult than it is today.

If we do get up there, in most cases, the ORR will be able to ask GBR to have another look at its decision. It has another look, and it reaches the same view—so what? Only in a minority of cases can it quash a decision and only if there was an error of law…Passengers are going to get a very powerful watchdog when, conversely, we feel that in freight, we are having those rights of access watered down.”

Steve Montgomery from FirstRail said:

“Considering other large public sector organisations—like GBR is going to be—you have to ask, ‘Why would you not have an independent regulator of it?’ Why is rail going to be different from other large public sector organisations where there are regulators looking at them?”

Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said:

“A strong independent rail regulator has two roles. The ORR, by the way, is part of the European group of independent rail regulators called IRG. Ideally, those roles are to protect passengers and other parts of the sector from monopolistic behaviour, and to ensure the best use of taxpayer money. Their role is also, in other countries, to ensure competition and non-discriminatory behaviour. We are worried that that might be watered down in this country and needs to be improved still.”

That prompts some questions that I hope the Minister can answer. Why is GBR being set up in such contradiction to its European neighbours? Is there anything that we could have learned? Will the Government reconsider any element of GBR as a result?

These concerns were also set out in the Rail Freight Group’s written evidence to the Transport Committee:

“GBR will by nature be a very powerful monopoly of track and GBR trains, and the overarching changes in the Bill reduce significantly the independent oversight of ORR, leaving the Secretary of State holding GBR to account. By comparison, the ORR currently has a duty to promote the use of the rail network and thus has a track record”—

ha, ha—

“of creating growth by approving new access applications previously rejected by Network Rail. Although we welcome the provisions for freight outlined above, there is still a significant risk that GBR could act in a way which favours its own trains, restricting growth for freight. As such, we believe it is essential that non-GBR operators have an independent appeals function that is powerful, easy to use and able to take action effectively.”

It continued:

“In essence, the provisions in the Bill mean that freight operators and customers have a very limited right of independent appeal against GBR. It is also of note that GBR may replace the current Access Disputes Committee (also independent of Network Rail) who hear lower level timetabling disputes with their own internal process, albeit we do not yet have full details of this.”

I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that.

FirstGroup wrote in a similar vein, saying that it was concerned

“about the ORR’s responsibility for track access decisions being transferred to GBR…The Bill removes the ORR’s powers to independently adjudicate on whether applications for access best meet the needs of all railway users. Under Clause 68 the ORR is an appeals body but with no ability to uphold appeals if they are discriminatory or anticompetitive. There need to be more checks and balances to maintain confidence in fair access, independent regulatory oversight and to protect the interests of passengers…As a broader point, independent regulation is vital to all large comparable bodies—consider for example the CQC’s role in healthcare or the Civil Aviation Authority in airlines and airports.”

The pushback against this grossly unfair clause is overwhelming, and the Government can surely no longer turn a deaf ear.

Amendment 88 would remove the requirement that appeals may be made only under judicial review principles. We think that it is an obvious improvement. At the Transport Committee on 7 January, the Department for Transport’s official, Lucy Ryan, stated that the requirement is deliberate:

“The reasoning for the JR threshold is to be absolutely clear that GBR needs to remain the directing mind, able to take decisions about optimising the use of the network.”

That is an insufficient safeguard against monopolistic behaviour by GBR. Large monopolies with structural conflicts of interest need effective decision-making oversight. It cannot be done by the Secretary of State, because this is operational, so it has to be the ORR.

Amendment 89 would enable the ORR to determine appeals on the facts and the law. It builds on amendment 88, and we think it is the only way to create a fair and non-discriminatory process. Amendment 90 would allow the ORR, when agreeing an appeal, either to remit to GBR for reconsideration or to quash and/or substitute its own decision for all or part of the decision appealed against. An independent appellate body applying the rules to GBR and its decisions would not challenge the role of GBR, but make sure that it was applying its rules fairly and correctly.

Amendment 91, which I believe the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage supports, would allow the ORR to substitute its own decision for that of GBR when allowing appeals, without there needing to have been an error of law, resulting in only one possible outcome. It would remove a ridiculously closely drafted requirement, and it is obviously fair. It is a test to see if the Government actually want a fair and level playing field.

Amendment 92 would require the Secretary of State to consult open access operators before making regulations about steps that must be taken before an appeal can be brought, to make provision about the procedure and to set time limits and fees for the appeals brought under this chapter. Operators clearly have skin in the game, and should be consulted by right.

Amendment 93 would require the ORR to consult open access operators before publishing its document on the practice and procedure for appeals under this chapter. The argument for that is very similar to the one behind amendment 92, which I just set out. Will the Minister stand up for the open access and freight sector, and support our amendments to create a fair appeals process?

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. I have a short point to make. The Minister seems to be saying that it is important to restrict an appeals process to the judicial review principles, which is a more restrictive set of criteria by which a body or company can appeal. Otherwise, that might lead to “incoherent decision making”—I think those were his words.

That sentiment and assertion undermines the entire court system of the United Kingdom—save for judicial review applications—which is based on disputes being had in, for example, the county court or the High Court, or another court making a decision, and the possibility of an appeal going upwards all the way to the Supreme Court, depending on the issue. However, nobody would suggest that that leads to an incoherent society or to incoherent contracts, family law, employment law, decision making or anything else.

For some reason, Great British Railways has this special carve-out, such that it can be challenged only through judicial review, because of some notion of incoherence. It seems to me that the entire purpose of that restriction is to prop up Great British Railways and allow it to act in a way that is not really comparable to anything else in the way we deliver public transport in this country. It gives me considerable concern.

--- Later in debate ---

On clause 72 stand part, I will quote the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham; this is perhaps more blunt than what I would say. “This is a stupid clause, poorly drafted and with well documented unintended consequences”—I am not sure whether he meant me to say that out loud, but it is written down here and he has not said not to. We will not be supporting clause 72 stand part.

[Joe Robertson]

Channel your inner Jerome!

[Rebecca Smith]

I think he probably would have said it, to be perfectly honest.

Clause 73 marks the end of a very significant chapter in the Bill, with many poorly drafted or simply ill thought through clauses. I am sure the drafting has been done with the greatest attention to detail; it is just the “thought-through-ness” that we are struggling with. But we end on a positive note, with no objections to clause 73.

Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Thursday 5th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

“has been one of the great success stories of modern Britain’s railways…Lumo and Hull Trains have demonstrated how innovative, non-publicly subsidised services can complement conventionally operated services, broadening choice, increasing ridership…and delivering more affordable travel options for passengers…Open Access operators play a unique role in growing rail’s market share, connecting communities in underserved markets, and fostering innovation across the wider network.”

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

This question is possibly better directed at the Minister, but does my hon. Friend think that the clause might be so restrictive because, in truth, the Government do not really want open access, despite what they say?

[Rebecca Smith]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I alluded to that issue earlier in my comments, and my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham raised it on Tuesday. That is why we are concerned on behalf of not only open access, but first of all passengers, who are not going to get the best possible service because of the inbuilt assertion that open access can ultimately be discarded if the Government do not see it as palatable.

The written evidence from Lumo and Hull Trains also says:

“As the Government and GBR seek to deliver a thriving, growing railway, it is vital that the Railways Bill recognises and protects the contribution that Open Access makes to these shared goals. This will ensure that it will continue to deliver these benefits to the millions of passengers who rely on them, now and into the future…As the Government looks to modernise and centralise rail through GBR, it will be important that competition remains an embedded principle within this framework. Open Access provides a proven model of innovation and efficiency, which can help GBR achieve its statutory objectives. Recognising the role of competition as a driver of value and growth will ensure that passengers, the network, and the public purse all continue to benefit.”

FirstGroup’s written submission to the Transport Committee tells a similar story, saying that open access operators

“receive no government funding, take on full risk, and generate their own revenue— giving them very strong incentives to deliver a service which is endorsed by passengers…The way in which GBR structures its timetable will be critical. It should be obliged to carry out its functions fairly and without discrimination, so that if an open access train service can provide passenger benefit monopoly interests do not prevent that train from running.”

FirstGroup also says:

“Clause 63 must ensure that un-funded services which GBR ‘expects’ are not given train paths in advance of funded open access services, which will provide passenger benefit sooner.”

The Rail Freight Group is also concerned by the clause, telling the Transport Committee:

“We understand that the basis of the new approach will be via Infrastructure Capacity Plans (Clause 61) and, for GBR’s own trains, via the Capacity Duty (Clause 63). It is very difficult from these clauses to have a clear understanding of how the new process will operate, and how rail freight and rail freight growth will be facilitated, including in contractual rights for operators…For example, we understand from our discussions that there could be numerous infrastructure capacity plans across the network which a new freight service will have to navigate. We also understand that when an infrastructure capacity plan is reviewed, existing freight services could be stopped from operating if other services are considered to be higher value, as contractual commitments are expected to expire in line with the capacity plans.”

Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL told the Transport Committee:

“I think we would look for clarification, regarding clause 63, that GBR cannot reserve capacity for hypothetical future GBR long-distance services at the expense of privately funded open-access proposals or existing services that provide immediate benefits—and extra infrastructure income, of course, because open-access operators are paying track access fees too. For that, I think you need to prioritise funded open access over speculative GBR services ‘someday in the future.’”

It is very clear what the sector thinks: clause 63 needs substantial clarification. That is why, along with the Lib Dems, we have tabled a number of amendments, which I will briefly speak to. Amendment 81 would make it clear that capacity allocation should be based on a level playing field, without priority given to any particular operator. That would allow the best outcome for the passenger, and allows the public interest bit in clause 18 to take the lead. Proceeding on any other basis will leave us with a monopoly that is allowed to abuse its position.

Amendment 80 puts forward an alternative approach, based on key performance indicators, but it is clear the Government are not interested, so in the interests of time I will not pursue that further today—that will be one fewer Division, the Government will be pleased to hear.

Amendment 253, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, requires GBR “to retain sufficient capacity” to ensure that the rail freight target is met. To progress, there would need to be a mechanism to reach a decision if that conflicted with any planned GBR service.

Amendment 211 would require GBR

“to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.”

For an appeals process to have any meaning at all, that would need to be a pre-requisite.

Amendment 229 would ensure that

“capacity allocation decisions reflect both planning priorities and freight-increase ambitions”

and would require

“GBR to publish and maintain a list of strategic freight corridors and ensures that any material reduction in capacity must be approved by the ORR.”

The amendment would give a better balance to capacity considerations than the current wholly one-sided drafting. That is incredibly important because, ultimately, the Government are seeking to reduce climate change and achieve net zero. Freight plays a huge part in that, and if we do not have strategic freight corridors to ensure that we can make use of the freight system, we will fall short of what could be achieved.

Finally, new clause 56, in the name of the Libs Dems,

“requires GBR to explore and consider the potential benefits of centralised train planning and auctioning.”

That is an interesting concept and could have significant benefits for passengers and taxpayers by driving competitive pricing for certain routes, while avoiding the abstraction arguments in relation to competing open access applications.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

It is my pleasure to speak to this long-awaited group of amendment to what are arguably some of the most critical aspects of the legislation. Clause 60 will require GBR to set out its proposal for the best use of its infrastructure, while clause 63 will require GBR to retain sufficient capacity to run its own passenger services and carry out engineering work.

First, I will explain how the Government have reached that conclusion. We are here because the current system for allocating capacity is clearly not working; it is designed so that each part of the railway acts and takes decisions in isolation. There was a four-year delay to the implementation of the new east coast main line timetable that was finally achieved in December 2025. Meanwhile, there is no single body with a clear vision for the best use of the network, and therefore no clear statement of the capacity that can be made available for different users of the railway. As a result, open access operators have expended considerable effort and resources in developing proposals for access to the network, many of which have ultimately been rejected by the ORR.

Both freight and open access operators would benefit from a single body empowered to provide that clarity about future opportunities for them to grow their presence on the railway. The only possible answer to fixing that is GBR, which can take decisions strategically, making the very best use of the limited capacity that we have. Only GBR can review the network holistically with a view to creating more space, which will benefit open access operators where they can show that their new services constitute best use of the network. That will benefit every hon. Member’s constituents, because there will be more opportunity for connectivity and more co-ordination to avoid disruption and delays.

In our new system, the process of allocating capacity starts with clause 60. The infrastructure capacity plan will set out GBR’s view of the best use of the network, showing how capacity can best be allocated between GBR’s own services, freight services and open access services. In creating that plan, GBR must have regard to the need to accommodate all types of services. The clause is one of the most crucial in the Bill, because it is where GBR—having consulted carefully with existing and prospective operators and other interested parties, and taken account of its statutory duties—will set out its view of the best use of the network. Once established, the plan will provide much-needed certainty for operators contemplating investment in new services.

I will be crystal clear for the benefit of the Committee: the capacity duty mentioned in clause 63 does not apply to the creation of the infrastructure capacity plan. Under clause 60, GBR will make its best-use assessment on the basis of the duties in clause 18 and other general duties in the Bill only. At this stage, it will not have any basis to refer to the duty as described in clause 63. It will take the decision fairly and transparently, in line with its duties, with the need to allocate paths for freight, open access and itself in mind.

There is absolutely no intention for other operators to be unfairly pushed out or disadvantaged by GBR. We want the best service for passengers, freight users and the public on every part of the route, to enable the best possible connectivity, quality of service and overall economic benefit. That is the goal, regardless of who provides those services. Were GBR to mistakenly apply the capacity duty at the capacity plan stage as part of its determination of best use, that would be grounds for appeal to the ORR.

[Joe Robertson]

I note the Minister’s assertion that there is no intention to squeeze out other operators, but given the way in which the Bill and the clause are drafted, that surely is an inevitability regardless of whether he intends for that to happen. It is the outcome that matters. If it will not enable open access and competition, that is in itself a problem, notwithstanding he might not intend that to be the case.

Railways Bill (Tenth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

Thank you, Mrs Hobhouse, for agreeing to chair this afternoon’s deliberations.

Here we are at clause 36, on the general duties of the passengers’ council. The clause requires the passengers’ council to consider the interests and needs of disabled persons when it exercises its rail functions. It also places a duty on the council to consider costs and the efficient use of public funds when it exercises its functions. That updates the council’s duty on value for money, which we can see in section 76(7) of the Railways Act 1993, and is consistent with the duty the Secretary of State, the Office of Rail and Road, Scottish and Welsh Ministers and Great British Railways will have if clause 18(2)(f) makes it into the final Act.

Clause 36(a), however, is silent on the general travelling public; it only mentions having particular regard to disabled persons. It seems like an odd omission for a provision on a passengers’ council to not mention passengers in the round. For the rest of the public, the council only has to

“keep under review matters affecting the interests of the public”,

under clause 37(1)(a).

The current drafting risks the creation, inadvertent I am sure, of a skewed body, directed to focus on disabled passengers and silent on the rest. I know that would not be the intention of the Ministry or anybody else in this Committee, but that is what the draft text would require of the council under its statutory obligations. It sits uneasily alongside clause 18(2)(a) on the general duties of Ministers, GBR and the ORR, which we all remember, and which frames disabled people within a wider body of all users, stating that it is to

“promote the interests of users and potential users of railway passenger services including, in particular, the needs of disabled persons”.

Why is different language being used? There is a difference, within the same draft text, between clause 18 and clause 36. The effect is to leave the passengers’ council operating statutorily on a narrower basis than GBR. The Minister will need to explain the intention behind that, because I do not believe it is intentional. If it is, he needs to explain why he wishes to constrain artificially the application of the passengers’ council to an area which is less wide than that covered by GBR, which it is meant to be monitoring.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I do not wish to interrupt the shadow Minister mid-flow, but I hope the Government will take on board his amendments and new clause. If they do not, perhaps they might like to amend the name of the passengers’ council to the “disabled passengers’ council”, because, in effect, that is the work it will be doing, so why not name it appropriately?

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, although unfortunately he did interrupt my flow—though it was very kind of him to say that he did not want to in the process. He is quite right. Although I obviously love chucking half-bricks at the Government, I do not believe for a moment that there is a serious intention on the part of the Department for Transport to skew the passengers’ council in the way that the drafting currently requires. I am highlighting the provision in the best interests of improving the drafting of the Bill. I am sure the Minister will find a reason not to agree with me in a few minutes’ time, but I hope that he, or his officials, will go away and have a quiet look at it before the Bill reaches the House of Lords.

Subsection (b) provides only a duty to “take into account” the costs of recommendations. Surely, as legislators, we want the organisation to balance the public benefits against the likely costs—a cost-benefit analysis, essentially—and not just to consider costs to be met from public funds, because this also involves farebox income. Amendment 63 therefore

“ensures that the Passengers’ Council must have regard to the needs of all users, and potential users of the railway”,

preventing a skewed council with competing interests, borrowing the language used by the Government in clause 18.

Amendment 64 would require the passengers’ council to consider value for money through a cost-benefit analysis, rather than merely the “efficient use” of public funds, which is only half of the issue. There is a key difference here: value for money focuses on achieving the best balance of cost, quality and outcomes, whereas the good use of public funds also requires spending to be transparent, fair and aligned with the public interest and wider policy objectives. That makes this amendment important in achieving the lowest possible cost for the taxpayer.

New clause 7 would give the passengers’ council a statutory purpose to champion the interests of all railway users and potential users of the railway. The passengers’ council would advocate for the reliability of passenger services, for safety and security, and for passengers’ comfort and on-board experience, which we have discussed a number of times. It would also advocate for affordability and value for money, passenger growth and network expansion. It is important to have a clear set of directions for this new passengers’ council at its inception, and the new clause would help to provide that.

Railways Bill (Ninth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

These direction powers, as drafted, replicate those in many other pieces of legislation, which are fit for purpose in making sure there is democratic accountability for the functioning of institutions, while not being overly onerous and overbearing. We see them with the Oil and Gas Authority, Great British Energy and Great British Nuclear. Only one direction has been given to the Oil and Gas Authority in the 10 years the legislation has existed. In government, the Opposition included the precise same direction power for GBR in their draft Rail Reform Bill, so they clearly believed it was necessary at the time. I therefore believe that it strikes an adequate balance.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

The Minister says Great British Railways, not the Department for Transport, will run the railways. He says that is different from the set-up for the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England. Was that not exactly the reason NHS England was set up, albeit not by his Government: to run the NHS so that the Department did not have to? I do not see the conceptual difference here at all; what I do is see the inconsistency in the Government getting rid of NHS England because that model does not work and bringing in GBR in the context of transport.

[The Chair]

Order. Before I bring the Minister back in, I remind colleagues that we are not debating NHS England.

Railways Bill (Seventh sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

The Minister has heard me make this plea before, but what plans does he have for the GBR’s structure to ensure that seven-day-a-week services are the norm, rather than something that we almost have to be grateful for to be able to work? At the moment it is entirely down to the good will of train drivers, for which I am incredibly grateful, but without them we would be in a bit of a pickle. I thank those who tabled the amendments; they have given us a perfect opportunity to get those issues on the record. I look forward to the rest of the debate.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I want to speak in support of amendment 137, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, and amendment 261, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). The two amendments attempt to deliver the same thing: better integration between rail and other modes of transport. The hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage is a man of great attention to detail, but it was perhaps a little sloppy of him on this occasion not to include in his list of trains, buses, trams and cycling the word “ferries”. Of course, ferries are fundamental in my constituency; we cannot get off the Isle of Wight without using them.

[Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right to rebuke me, albeit very politely and gently. I should have worded the amendment in a non-exclusive manner, to make sure that I did not forget any other form of transport. He is right to highlight, as I know he is about to, the critical importance of the integrated transport terminal in Portsmouth harbour for access to and from his wonderful island. There are many other examples of such terminals, including the one in Ardrossan harbour for getting to and from the Isle of Arran in Scotland. I am sure that, if I had had the Government’s resources at my fingertips rather than having bashed away at this over Christmas, I would not have made that error.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the hon. Member for his apology, if that is what that was; it is accepted. My argument for integration between rail and all modes of transport, although I will use ferries as a particular example, is important. The Minister is also the Maritime Minister, and is well aware of the specific issues that my constituency faces.

The two amendments seek to deliver integration through strategy. If we think back to the evidence given to this Committee last week by the future Prime Minister who is currently apprenticing as the Mayor of Greater Manchester, he said that integration is essential—and he would know, being in charge of a combined mayoral authority. We are due to get a combined authority for Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, and the amendments can be viewed as mirroring the strategic responsibilities put on combined mayors, who have responsibility for travel and the interoperability of transport connections in their areas.

What the amendments—and particularly amendment 137 —seek to do is ensure that the Minister and the Government also have the responsibility to ensure co-operation. That is explicit in amendment 137, which calls for

“co-operation with relevant local and regional transport authorities”.

The amendments would end situations such as, for example, the one where, if I was to travel home on the 3.30 train from Waterloo down to Portsmouth Harbour station, the train would arrive five minutes after the ferry had departed. I imagine those are frustrations across pretty much every constituency in the land between trains and other forms of transport. If that situation is not addressed in the explicit way set out by the two amendments, it will continue to be a significant problem that will never get dealt with. Giving more attention and powers through the Bill will help to deliver improvements even for modes of transport, such as Isle of Wight ferries, that are not regulated by the Government and where they do not have explicit and express powers.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

The Transport Act 1981, which privatised British Rail’s ferry operations, including the Sea Link service to the Isle of Wight, contained no passenger interest provisions of the type contained in this Bill. Does the hon. Member agree that such an omission was an oversight and an historical missed opportunity?

[Joe Robertson]

I do. It is not difficult for me to agree and accept that the way Wightlink, which was part of British Rail, was dealt with was more than a missed opportunity; it was a bad decision. Locally, I work cross-party with the hon. Gentleman’s colleague, the hon. Member for Isle of Wight West (Mr Quigley) on that.

This Government have an opportunity. I thank the Minister for the work he is doing and I hope he will be prepared to intervene in a way no Government have done. There are clearly opportunities to make small improvements to the Bill, and accepting the amendments would do that not just in my constituency, but in others. I will leave the Minister with a question: if he does not support the amendments, how else might he use powers in the Bill, or would he be prepared to introduce amendments of his own, to improve connectivity for other modes of transport that do not have any formal regulation?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

Good morning, Mr Western. It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship.

I thank right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions and for the clarity and succinctness with which they delivered them. I am afraid I will not be able to follow in their footsteps when responding to what is a chunky group of amendments and new clauses, so they will have to bear with me for this section of our deliberations. Clause 15 has been of considerable interest to members of the Committee and to the rail industry more generally, as we heard during oral evidence. I am thrilled that so much enthusiasm is being expressed for the strategy both verbally and in amendments, each of which I will now address.

Amendments 134 and 25 relate to the timing of the strategy. Amendment 134 would require the strategy to be set for 30 years. The Government have already confirmed that the strategy will cover a 30-year period. Setting that in legislation, however, is inflexible and unnecessary. Although the Government’s ambition is for a 30-year-long strategy, we need to provide for the ability to make reasonable changes to that term when needed.

Amendment 25 would remove the ability for the strategy to be amended within a 15-year period. That would fundamentally limit the railway’s ability to respond to unforeseen circumstances such as the covid-19 global pandemic. I hope the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham agrees that such a circumstance, or any number of other possible events, would clearly require the strategy to be revisited within a timeframe of less than 15 years.

Railways Bill (Fifth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

It is just as pleasurable to have you in the Chair today as it was last week, Sir Alec.

I remind hon. Members that clause 7 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue and publish directions to Great British Railways relating to its railway activities. It also outlines how the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Welsh and Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to their devolved services, except where powers are used in relation to the access regime. The clause further outlines how GBR will be required to comply with directions, which are mandatory and binding, and intended to be used as a so-called

“responsive tool for necessary course correction, rather than as a proactive tool to set requirements on GBR,”

or, as further clarified in the explanatory notes, as “a last resort”.

Interestingly, although the explanatory notes state that a direction by the Secretary of State is a mechanism of last resort, the clause itself gives no indication to substantiate that. Instead, it suggests that the Secretary of State can act independently of their Welsh and Scottish counterparts’ views, especially as there is a reliance on non-legislative measures. My first question to the Minister is, therefore: why is this supposed last-resort requirement not on the face of the Bill?

When dealing with matters relating in particular to the interpretation of devolution, the risk is that any decision taken by the Secretary of State may be disputed by the devolved nations and end up as a political football, which only increases lawyers’ profits. Would it not therefore be prudent to set out in the legislation exactly what is meant? Without a clear breakdown of the procedures and directions, surely we run the risk of granting the Secretary of State a large degree of power with very limited oversight.

The clause gives the Secretary of State unrestricted power, other than for operations in Scotland and Wales, to intervene in the running of GBR. That is a step too far. While it is justifiable for the democratically elected Government of the day to set and agree GBR’s strategic objectives, key performance indicators and business plans, after those are set out, the Government’s role should be to hold GBR to account for the delivery of the targets, objectives and strategies, and not to tell it how to do so on a day-to-day basis.

A question arises on clause 8(4), and I would be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on the oversight system outlined in clauses 7 and 8. Subsection (4) states:

“Before giving, varying or revoking a direction under this section the Scottish Ministers must consult the Secretary of State.”

Presently, GBR must decide whether a decision directly affects devolved services, but the Bill provides no statutory test, which leaves a delivery body making politically sensitive judgments, further increasing the risk of challenge by devolved nations. Clarity for Members, especially those from the devolved nations, will be extremely helpful, so I would be grateful if the Minister would address that directly.

Under subsection (5) of both clauses 7 and 8, directions must be published, but there is no requirement for them to be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament—the old trap of creating transparency without consequence. A reporting or laying requirement, perhaps through the Select Committee, would turn publication into genuine accountability. However, I am interested to hear what rationale the Minister has not to allow greater scrutiny of GBR in Parliament. Again, perhaps he will address that directly in his response. That is the rationale behind our suggested amendments to require the Secretary of State to lay directions before Parliament, in order to allow us to scrutinise the decisions in greater detail.

There is a fundamental question about leadership and who is the key decision maker. We are told repeatedly by the Minister and others that GBR is the directing mind, but will that really be the case if the clause goes through unamended? If GBR really is the directing mind, what is the necessity for the clause? It is a recipe for decision paralysis, with GBR, given the decision-making structures, undermined by guidance—we will come on to that when we discuss clause 9—and by directions from the Department for Transport in the name of the Secretary of State.

Clause 7 really does risk creating the worst of both worlds. We will have the cost of GBR and its oversight structures—we are told in the recently published job application for the part-time chair that GBR will have more than 100,000 employees; it will be an enormous organisation, with its own senior management team—and then we will have the same again, with an overactive Department for Transport second-guessing GBR’s day-to-day working and being able to give guidance and directions as a result of clauses 7 and 8.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

As my hon. Friend describes the growing size of the Department for Transport and Great British Railways, I am slightly reminded of the Department of Health and Social Care, and NHS England. The Government talk of doubling up and so are winding back by abolishing NHS England, but here they are doubling up in the Department for Transport over Great British Railways. I wonder whether he has any reflections on that analogy.

[Jerome Mayhew]

It is not a perfect analogy, because GBR is at least intended to be more akin to a business—a nationalised business—but my hon. Friend is entirely right that where we have two organisations in competition, each one thinking that it runs the railways, that is a recipe for confusion at the least, and disaster at the worst.

This is not an idle concern, because it has happened before. We all remember the Virgin West Coast franchise debacle in 2012, when the slightly arm’s length process of franchising did not go well, causing a communal panic in the Department for Transport. The phrase, “Something must be done to prevent this from ever happening again,” was no doubt repeated many times. The result was that more and more micromanaging took place by the Department for Transport in the setting of franchises. The Department no longer talked only about outcomes that needed to be achieved, leaving how companies went about that entirely up to them, which is the appropriate way to draft a franchise agreement. Instead, that devolved into mechanisms of how a franchise should be operated.

We had that mission creep, and I fear that under the Bill we might get exactly the same approach with GBR. It will be set up with the best of intentions, and perhaps in the first two or three years all will run smoothly and the directing mind in practice might well be GBR, but then something will happen, because something always does happen in the real world, with lots of people doing their best but sometimes making mistakes, and there will be a collective gasp from the Department of Transport, because it will feel like it is on the hook, so “Something must be done to ensure that this doesn’t happen again.” We have designed into this mechanism a structure that allows the removal of GBR’s operational independence, and it does so without any reference to actions of last resort by the Government—the Bill is silent on that.

We talk about the Secretary of State, but we all know that officials in the Department for Transport will be advising the Secretary of State on what he or she should be doing in a particular circumstance, and there will be a power grab. Without amendment, the clause will absolutely allow for that. We should be alive to the real-world experience that we all have and take this opportunity to strengthen its wording in order to design out that issue and ensure that there is proper accountability—with GBR accountable to the Secretary of State and, through the Secretary of State, to Parliament—and that operational independence stays with what will be a nationalised business, rather than creating a railway version of NHS England, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East mentioned a moment ago.

I have tabled two amendments to address this issue. Amendment 12 would limit directions to circumstances in which the Office of Rail and Road assesses GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions. It could be argued that the Secretary of State should have an emergency lever; that is fair enough, because bad things happen. One of our great complaints before the election, although I am beginning to hear it from Labour Ministers as well, was, “We pull the levers but they’re not attached to anything—we have no power.” When we form the Government after the next election, we will want to have levers that are attached to something, and I accept that it is necessary to have an emergency lever to pull should a significant unforeseen event occur—another pandemic, perhaps—and an intervention be required.

However, amendment 12 would still allow the Secretary of State to intervene in emergency scenarios, as the ORR would deem that such events make it impossible for GBR to conform to its business plan targets. Clause 74 sets out the ORR’s power to monitor GBR’s performance. Elsewhere in the Bill, we shall argue that the ORR needs more teeth to hold GBR to account, and this provision limiting the potential for the Secretary of State to intervene until such time that an independent regulatory body has recognised that GBR has not been able to fulfil its functions will be an important safeguard.

Amendment 11 would put the words “last resort” on the face of the Bill, and would provide that a direction may be made only after the removal of GBR’s chief executive officer. The intention behind the amendment is to treat GBR as a business, which I think we all agree is what it is intended to be—albeit a nationalised one. Where there is a board of non-executive directors, they can question the executive team, and they can challenge decisions and require the chief executive to explain and defend the direction of the company. However, when push comes to shove, and the decision is made that the organisation is moving in the wrong direction, the weapon available to the chairman is the removal of the chief executive officer.

If GBR is operating on a day-to-day basis with oversight from the Department for Transport—the Secretary of State—and concerns arise as to its direction or performance, the sequence of severity of the response should not start with guidance from the Secretary of State and then mandatory directions. They might be the final requirement, because we all need those levers, but surely they should come only after the chief executive has been challenged and then removed, just as in the private sector with an arm’s length majority investment.

--- Later in debate ---

When we took through the Health and Care Act 2022 and the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, there were aspects that were not written into the legislation but were going to be in statutory guidance or something similar; they set out, for example, how independent domestic violence advisers and independent sexual violence advisers would operate. We did everything we could to bring forward even an outline draft so that members of the Committees considering the legislation had a chance to consider it and reflect on it. I am grateful to the Minister. He is very assiduous in correcting the record as he did, with his typical courtesy, but I gently encourage him to have further conversations with his officials about what might be within the art of the possible to publish, even on Report and Third Reading, to allow Members of our House to debate the Bill, and any amendments that have been made or could be made to it, with the knowledge of what might be in the licence.

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Alec. My right hon. and hon. Friends have already spoken at length and I agree with them, but I will add just a couple of short points to place my disappointment on the record that not even a draft of the licence has been presented.

It is good that the Minister has clarified that it will be coming forward sooner than he suggested previously, but the reality is that it is already too late, as we heard from stakeholders last week during evidence. I urge him not to delay any further. Even an outline draft of the licence as soon as possible, rather than a more detailed one, would be clearly better than nothing. He should also bring forward the other 19 documents identified by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon—again, in draft form as appropriate—as soon as possible. As I say, it is already too late for this Committee today, as we debate this very clause and schedule. I wish to place that on the record.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I echo all the comments made by my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also thank the Minister for facing up to it with a point of order. It was obvious last week that a point of order was on its way. None of us on the Opposition Benches will hold him to his initial, rather quick, response—no doubt I will do something similar during the passage of the Bill—but that does not let the Government off the hook.

This is not business as usual for a Department bringing through a Bill of this nature. My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston, an experienced former Minister, gave two examples of primary legislation that also relied on secondary documentation. In those circumstances, the departmental teams did provide skeleton outlines for Parliament, which is what we are, to consider and do our job properly. I do not want the Minister to rush out a quick affirmative like last week, so I ask him to take time to consider, perhaps discuss with his officials, and reply later today on whether he and his officials are able to commit to some form of briefing—some skeleton outline—on the nature of the licence, at a time when we can collectively discuss and debate it, and see whether it points in the right direction.

Clause 11 simply enables GBR’s licensing to be set out in schedule 1, which we will come on to in a moment. That schedule amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 and sets out the detailed process by which the GBR licence will be issued and maintained. Both the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will retain the ability to grant licences to railway bodies other than GBR—for example, open access operators, freight operators and other infrastructure managers such as the core valley lines in Wales. I know we will discuss the contents of schedule 1 and the detail of the licence extensively.

Railways Bill (Sixth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

I thank the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for West Dorset for their amendments, all of which look to amend the Secretary of State’s statement of objectives.

First, amendment 120 would require that the statement of objectives contains standards for GBR to meet when conducting its railway activities. I agree that we need to measure GBR’s performance against clear standards to ensure high-quality delivery. However, the statement of objectives, which is a document to set direction and inform the funding process, is not enforceable, and consequently it is not the right place to require standards.

The original drafting provides flexibility, letting the Secretary of State specify what standards should be achieved by GBR when delivering against the objectives in the statement. This allows for circumstances in which providing a standard helps to better articulate the strategic vision for GBR over the five-year funding period.

However, it may not always be appropriate for an objective in the statement of objectives to be accompanied by a standard, particularly when an objective is straightforward or high level, such as a requirement to have regard for security threats or to support economic growth. The Bill contains other mechanisms, including the business plan and the licence, to ensure that there are robust and enforceable measures against which to hold GBR to account.

There is a similar case to be made on amendment 121, which seeks to set a structure for the statement of objectives, and amendment 123, which proposes to expand the list of potential objectives to include a section on productivity and efficiencies. The amendments would change the list from illustrative objectives to a set of requirements. It would fundamentally not be appropriate to impose such a structure on the statement of objectives, which needs to be able to take a different approach each time it is made, in response to wider environmental concerns and socioeconomic circumstances. The intention is that the list serves as a guide to future drafters, and I believe that the flexibility to allow adaptation to circumstances that we cannot predict will ensure that this legislation remains fit for purpose into the future.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I understand, although I do not agree with, the argument the Minister is making on amending “may” to “must”—he says it would be unenforceable—but he seems, unless I have misunderstood, to have conflated that argument with his point about amendment 122, which seeks not to make a discretionary provision a mandatory one but to expand the considerations. The explanatory statement says:

“This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set the objective for…increasing passenger and freight journeys.”

Perhaps I have misunderstood.

[Keir Mather]

To my knowledge, I am not conflating the two amendments. My point is that setting objectives that are so closely tied to discernible and prescriptive standards would, in effect, contravene the original intention of the schedule, which is to provide flexibility in setting objectives over the five-year period. If, in the hon. Gentleman’s view, I continue not to meet that intention, I will happily give way again.

Railways Bill (Second sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Laurence Turner]

Q But for inter-city, something similar to franchising?

Steve Montgomery: Yes, you can put it out.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Q I have a question about GBR’s licence. What can we glean from the provisions for that licence in the Railways Bill, without having seen a draft of the document?

John Thomas: It is really difficult. As I said earlier, all we can glean is that, given the reduced powers that ORR will have, it will be a slimmed-down licence; ORR will not have the power that it currently has to enforce business performance. Until we see it, we cannot really comment on it.

I am a bit surprised that we have not seen a draft of the licence yet. We have seen the access and use policy discussion document, but not a draft of the licence. It has been a long time in the making, so I am surprised that we have not seen it yet. I was told that we might not see it for some time. It is a key part of the overall framework, so until we see it, we cannot really comment on that framework. We are having to—we are having to comment on the Bill—but until we see the licence it is difficult to determine what our position will be.

[Joe Robertson]

Q What role would industry expect to play in the production of that licence?

John Thomas: As a minimum, we want to be consulted and to help to shape the licence. Our ability to do that will be affected by what will ultimately be in the Act, but we certainly want to be consulted and help to shape the licence.

[The Chair]

I am afraid that the next question will probably be the last to this set of witnesses. I call Sarah Smith.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)]

Q Both mayors have touched on this point in some detail already. I just wondered what your view was on whether the Bill contains the right elements to ensure that we can get the simplest and most local improvements made. A frustration that so many of us in this place have is that the current rail network is deeply fragmented, so completing even the most minor changes, such as repairing a door or reopening a disabled toilet, takes months if not years. I certainly have that at my local train station in Weymouth.

How do we make sure that GBR is able to be as responsive as possible to those very local, very small-scale but otherwise very important improvements to stations and the wider rail infrastructure?

Andy Burnham: If we think about it this way, mayoral combined authorities and the transport authorities that Tracy and I lead will be able to add value to the railway by bringing resource to invest in our stations and adding more passengers to the railway, because the Bee Network cap covering all modes will encourage more people to travel by train. We have something to add to the railway to make it serve people and places better, and to make access improvements more quickly, so that passengers do not walk away from the railways because they see a problem that never gets fixed. That is the way to look at it.

However, if we are going to put our own resources and effort into improving the railway, we have to be a meaningful partner. We cannot have rail as a silo that may or may not listen to us—that would not be the right arrangement. We should have a Bill that really cements the partnership and requires joint decision making, as opposed to us being consulted but maybe not listened to. It is possible to do that.

We like everything that is here, the direction of travel is right and we support what the Government are trying to achieve, but if we always have in our heads that railways serve places rather than themselves, it follows that a properly balanced partnership between the two is needed. Sometimes it feels like the railway just serves its own purposes, and does not have enough regard for places. The Bill should leave no doubt that railways are there to serve places and the people who live in them.

Tracy Brabin: I concur with Andy. It is about accountability, and it is also about revenue, so that if you have built this great station and the toilets are not working, you have skin in the game, because you want it to work. Who actually owns that responsibility: Network Rail, GBR, or the mayor who knows the need and can get on and deliver?

[Joe Robertson]

Q In previous questions today, I have asked about the integration of railways and other public transport, which the Government say they want to improve. When I have talked about my constituency and the example of connecting rail and ferries, given that our ferry companies are unregulated, privatised and controlled by private equity, the answer has come back that mayoral combined authorities will have powers to improve connectivity and timetabling issues. Notwithstanding the fact that the Isle of Wight does not have a mayoral combined authority yet, I want to ask you as mayors how that can work in practice. Does the Bill give you any extra powers, particularly on integrating modes of transport, where you have little or no regulatory powers at the moment?

Andy Burnham: It is important to say that we are doing that without the Bill at the moment. Again, we thank the Department for coming with us on the Bee Network journey. We will bring the first two rail lines into that this year; and over the next three years, eight rail lines will come into the Bee Network system. It is complex, because some of the lines begin outside of our borders, such as in Glossop and Buxton in Derbyshire, or in Southport in the Liverpool city region, but because those lines are GM commuter lines, so are not going to Liverpool, it is right for them to be in the Bee Network. We have made that argument and the Government have supported us.

We have already created an integrated ticketing system for tram and bus travel in Greater Manchester: you can tap in on both now, and there is a London-style cap. We want to add rail to that as soon as possible. When the first lines come into the Bee Network in December, people will be able to buy a paper ticket that covers tram, train and bus, but in time we want that to be integrated.

There is absolutely no reason at all why you could not have that over train and ferry travel—I know that the Mayor of Liverpool wants Mersey Ferries to be a part of his integrated system. It is complicated, but it is absolutely possible. The Department has already shown a willingness to do it, and is putting the technology into the rail industry to support that.

[Joe Robertson]

Q In the best case, as mayors, would you like to see more powers in the Bill? I get that you support the Bill, but in the best world, would you like to see more powers for mayors to integrate in it?

Andy Burnham: I think there should be a presumption in favour of integration; you are absolutely right. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, have had that as their guiding star, but we went down a fragmentation route in public transport, and have suffered as a country as a result. Integration is the way to think. People are not just loyal to one mode; they want to use transport in as convenient a way as possible. The railways have not had an imperative to think that way for a long time, but you are absolutely right to think of integration as the watchword.

[Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q You have sort of answered one of my questions: I was going to ask about combined and integrated local transport offers and ticketing, and how that would work. I think you answered that you could consult. Will you say something about safeguards in terms of how that ticketing would work and how you would share the tickets with GBR? Can you foresee any issues with that?

Tracy Brabin: As Andy says, we are already doing it. We are sharing with the bus operators in our integrated Weaver network, where we have, for example, brought in the “mayor’s fare”. I think it is the only one in the country, and it is a day saver. It is capped and can be used on any bus, anywhere, for any number of journeys and on any operator. We work with the operators to divvy up the checks and balances of the passengers. I think you can see that it is possible.

To the previous point, devolution means that every region is different, so you do not always have to have one size fits all; you can have whatever works for you and your community. There are definitely ways to do it. Certainly, if it is done in London, that should give you comfort that it can be done elsewhere.

Oral Answers to Questions

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Heidi Alexander]

I am happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss that. I also assure her that I have raised the importance of public transport accessibility with the leadership of Luton airport, as well as the integration of the National Rail network and the Direct Air-Rail Transit link. I am happy to discuss that matter further with her.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

The Government talk about affordable transport for passengers in the UK, but on the Isle of Wight we are at the mercy of privatised, unregulated ferry companies that charge extortionate prices for unreliable services. If those companies refuse to lower prices and improve services, will the Minister intervene, given that he would not accept that for any other community in the United Kingdom?

Railways Bill

Joe Robertson Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I support some of the aims and intentions behind the Bill, and having listened to the Secretary of State’s opening speech, I certainly agree with her reasons for it, but I do not believe that what she is doing will deliver what she says.

Key parts of the Bill are taken from the previous Conservative Government’s 2023 plans to unite train and track, which were not realised due to the change of Government at the election. That does not inevitably have to be done by nationalisation; indeed, under the last Government’s detailed plans, it would have been done under a concessionary scheme. That is not ideology but pragmatism. It is using the state and the private sector to deliver better railways. That model is very similar to the model used by Transport for London, which was designed by Labour and is run by Labour in London.

It is unfathomable why the Government will not look at that sort of pragmatic scheme for the rest of the UK through this Bill. I suspect that the only answer is the inevitable one offered by the shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Holden): this is a matter of ideology. It is about satisfying Labour’s union paymasters and Back Benchers—those Back Benchers who fundamentally run this Government, who vetoed the Government’s attempt to cut the welfare bill last summer, and who ensured that the Budget two weeks ago increased taxes to allow more welfare spending. For the Secretary of State and the Government, this is about a politically prudent pay-off, but it is bad for passengers.

I did some market research earlier. I travelled on a publicly owned service on a publicly owned track from Portsmouth Harbour to London Waterloo, and it was delayed because of signal failure. In fact, I do market research on that route quite often. The track has been in the public sector for over a decade, and signal failure continues to be the most common reason for delays to the train. The issue is not the train company, which was historically private, but the publicly owned track. It is not inevitable that nationalisation will lead to improved services, and there are no guarantees in the Bill that prices will be held down long term, or that services will improve and more passengers will travel by rail. That is simply a matter of faith, driven by a belief in nationalisation.

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

Southeastern was nationalised under the previous Government, and it remains nationalised under this Government, but this year, it has been brought into one organisation with Network Rail, and there has been the best customer satisfaction for my constituents in Bexleyheath and Crayford, and the best journey times you could see. Southeastern is at the forefront of this programme, so does the hon. Member agree that the proof is in Southeastern’s statistics?

[Joe Robertson]

The hon. Member obviously was not listening to what I said at the beginning, which was that I absolutely believe in uniting the trains and the track; that was the 2023 plan of the previous Conservative Government. If he is right about the improvements in his part of the world, I suspect that the reason is not nationalisation, but bringing the two together, so that they are subject to similar decision-making processes.

The Secretary of State opened her speech by saying that she wanted a railway system that was greater than the sum of its parts. I agree. If she were to buy a National Rail ticket in Shanklin on the Isle of Wight, get on a train there, and travel to London Waterloo or Guildford, she would, like me, use the ferry service that connects parts of the railway. Fares are not being frozen for that part of the rail route, because the Secretary of State has no powers to do that, and is not creating those powers. In fact, the cost of rail travel from Sandown, Shanklin or Ryde on the Isle of Wight through to Guildford or Waterloo will go up if the unregulated ferry companies put their fares up. The Secretary of State is doing nothing to deal with that part of the railway for people who live in my constituency.

In fact, the situation is worse than that, because the Government are extending the emissions trading system levy to Solent travel. The ferry company Wightlink, which connects the railways, will pay £1 million a year in extra charges because of that levy being extended to it. The Government talk about freezing fares for mainland rail travellers, but they are in fact putting up the costs for Isle of Wight train travellers. The use of fossil fuels cannot be avoided in crossing the Solent, because there is not the electric grid capacity in the mainland ports or the Isle of Wight ports to allow the ferry companies to go fully electric, as the trains have done. That grid capacity will not be there until the mid-2030s. The Government are putting that cost on Isle of Wight rail and road users, but they have exempted Scottish ferry companies, because they say that those provide a lifeline service. Isle of Wight ferries are every bit as much a lifeline service for my constituents, who use them to access education, NHS, friends and family and all the things that everyone else enjoys.