Immigration and Asylum Bill (Third sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I thank all Members for the constructive debate we have had on the amendments to clause 1 of this Bill, particularly the hon. Members for Brighton Pavilion and for Stockton West, and the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, who tabled amendment 87.

I would like to say up front that it is very clear that consent for our asylum system in the public domain is fraying. The important part of this Bill is to seek to restore control, restore fairness and rebuild the public’s confidence. We have made huge progress on initial decision making; we have cut the backlog in initial decisions by 72% from the 2023 peak. However, as we have done so, the appeals backlog has grown substantially, now with waiting times of more than two years. Some appeals are absolutely genuine, and they of course must be heard fairly. However, it is clear that some claimants are lodging appeals to frustrate their legitimate removal from this country.

As of June 2026, the open caseload in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber was about 156,000. The average time taken to clear appeals across all categories is currently at 65 weeks: 72 weeks for asylum protection, 74 weeks for human rights and 48 weeks for European economic area free movement. The Government have substantially increased both capacity and productivity in the FTT IAC, but demand has risen considerably faster. Receipts increased from around 58,000 in 2023-24 to almost 118,000 in 2025-26, while the outstanding caseload rose from around 50,000 to more than 150,000. We have done our best to try to support the workforce within that existing system. We increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, including 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges who began sitting between January and March this year, and we are continuing further recruitment.

The structural constraint is just how quickly judicial capacity can scale. Judicial recruitment draws on a relatively limited pool of experienced lawyers, and it currently takes around 12 to 18 months from launching an exercise to a judge being able to sit, so that is not feasible. The IIAA therefore broadens the recruitment pool, providing greater flexibility and allowing us to increase capacity while maintaining robust safeguards around training, legal support, quality assurance and professional standards.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Is it not the case that the long backlog of cases for judges is largely driven by the poor quality of original decision making by Home Officials, as shown by the number of successful appeals? I was slightly concerned that senior officials at the evidence session seemed not to be willing to acknowledge that. Will the Minister acknowledge that the quality of some of those first Home Office decisions is not particularly good?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and all of us, as Members of Parliament, will have had our own cases that challenged some of the standards. However, what we have seen is that, while the number has increased, the decision making quality has not gone up or down. I would also say that, at the moment, the delays in the current system mean that decision making becomes poorer, because evidence is produced later in the system and some of it is not sustainable, and more and more different routes are being attempted to string out appeals. The longer the process goes on, the more complex and difficult the decision making becomes. This is about having swift and fair decision making, but we will always keep the quality of decision making in this process under review in the Department.

To create the swift and fair appeals system that we need, we are scrapping the judge-led asylum and immigration tribunal, which just cannot keep pace with demand, and we are replacing it with a new independent appeals authority to deliver swift and fair decision making. This authority will be staffed by independent adjudicators, who will be ordinary citizens trained like magistrates. To reduce abuse of the system, claimants will be allowed just a single route for appeal, which must be lodged as early as possible. That will remove the scope for bringing multiple appeals, as some claimants do, that are often vexatious and at the very last minute before removal. Late claims will be heard under an expedited process, ensuring that they cannot be used to frustrate a removal. There will be a right for a further appeal to a judge-led tribunal only on a point of law.

The new authority will be independent of Government, with a chair and chief executive officer who are accountable to the Home Secretary and Parliament for delivering an effective and efficient system. All appointments will be based on merit and subject to fair and open appointments principles. All Ministers, including the Home Secretary, will be under a statutory duty to uphold the IIAA’s independence and not to influence its decisions.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fourth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

I am going to start using the words “appeals authority”, because “IIAA” is doing my head in.

Clause 8 lets the Home Secretary set time periods for the appeals authority decisions, with extensions where compliance is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Opposition supports statutory deadlines; 67-week waits for an appeal are, frankly, indefensible.

Amendment 89, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, is a probing amendment. It would require the first regulation setting time periods to be made within six months of the appeals authority being established, and require the appeals authority’s annual report to say how often a deadline was extended. A power to set deadlines is, of course, not a deadline. What periods do the Government intend, and when will the first regulations be made? Extensions “in the interests of justice” could become routine. How often do the Government expect them, and will extension rates be published? There is also a puzzle in here: schedule 1 repeals the 24-week statutory timeframes in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 before they have even come into force, and I would like to know from the Minister why that is the case. Why are out-of-country appeals, including deportation appeals after certification, excluded? What happens if the appeals authority simply misses a deadline? Is there any consequence beyond a line in an annual report?

Amendment 83 would broaden the list of those the Home Secretary must consult before setting time periods to include people with protection status, those with lived experience of the asylum system and legal practitioners, as we have just heard from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Consultations of course have their place, but this list would turn every set of regulations into a lengthy exercise and delay the very deadlines we need, so we intend to oppose that amendment.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I should probably have directed my intervention to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. The point she was making is that decisions done too speedily are against the interests of justice and fairness. The argument the shadow Minister is making—a far more powerful one from my point of view—is that delays make the system unfair. Of course, that is the system we currently have, which is why I support the position that he has taken in support of the Government.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank my hon. Friend for those very kind words about how powerful my arguments are. I am sure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion will respond to that when she has the opportunity.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

I thank my hon. Friend for asking a really important question, because it is right that we clarify this matter. The clause does not make it easier for overseas family members to enter the UK. Sponsors will still need to meet a very high threshold to argue successfully that it would be a breach of their article 8 rights if the Home Office refused their family member entry to the UK. Strict requirements for the procedure sponsors must follow to make an application, which will be set out in the immigration rules.

The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 from becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK. Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate influence on the family life of the UK-based sponsor.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

As I understand it, the purpose of this new provision is to focus on the rights of the person in the UK, to ensure that their right to a family life is respected according to their circumstances. But their circumstances will be that their other family member is living abroad; that is their family life. I do not understand why that pre-existing situation would suddenly infringe their human rights and give them the right to bring in a family member. Their circumstance, by nature, is people living in two different countries.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Member makes a really important point. That is why we are trying to narrow the definition to those who are here in the UK, because for far too long it has been on the basis of a very tenuous link that family members can put in a claim from abroad to come to the UK. This measure narrows that definition while still ensuring that we maintain our obligations under article 8 rights.

The recent Court of Appeal judgment in IA and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department provided helpful clarification around the correct tests to determine where article 8 family life exists, especially between extended family members. However, the judgment addressed an issue with article 8 family life being applied to a broader set of circumstances and relationships, which risked undermining our systems and rules. Despite these helpful findings, there remains a risk of inconsistent decision making, where the primary focus is not on the article 8 rights of the family member in the UK—the person within the UK’s jurisdiction according to ECHR case law.

The clause will add greater weight to the findings of the Court of Appeal and bring more clarity to decision making for entry clearance cases that engage article 8 family life. In IA, the Court of Appeal also reaffirmed the importance of the Government’s immigration policy when striking the right balance between an individual’s rights and the public interest.

In combination with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, clause 17 makes it clear where the Government’s policy position lies in relation to the application of article 8 and where the Government expect the rules to be enforced. This will create a clearer, fairer and more controlled system. Details of the application process, including forms and evidential requirements, will be set out in immigration rules and supporting guidance.

Given the complexity of the clause, I will give Members an overview of each subsection. Subsection (1) creates a “sponsor human rights claim” in law by adding to the existing definition of a human rights claim at section 113 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This has the effect of permitting a UK-based sponsor to appeal against a decision to refuse a human rights claim for their overseas family member. That is the starting point for future changes to the rules, forms and guidance.

Subsection (2) explains that further amendments are required to the 2002 Act for the clause to operate properly. Those changes are set out in subsections (3) to (7). Subsection (3) makes changes so that a sponsor human rights claim cannot be deemed inadmissible or not suitable to be considered, which is necessary because reforms in the clause mean that the UK sponsor is the applicant, not the overseas individual requiring entry clearance. As I will cover in relation to amendment 95, it would be inappropriate simply to refuse to consider a human rights claim because the UK sponsor is a national of a safe country. Such safeguards are designed to prevent improper protection claims from nationals of those countries.

Subsection (4) makes further changes linked to the fact that the clause makes the sponsor the applicant, not the person overseas. In effect, at appeal, the courts will hear all matters relating to the family member seeking entry to the UK and not include any immigration matters related to the sponsor. Subsection (5) creates an exception so that sponsor human rights claims do not need to have their appeals considered within the timeframe set out in the statute. That is because an individual will not be able to act as a sponsor if they are liable to deportation action.

Subsection (6) prevents a sponsor human rights claim being certified and denied an appeal simply because the UK-based sponsor is entitled to live in a safe state, primarily European countries. That would not be a fair application of the power where a right to family life was being relied on. The clause does not prevent a claim being refused and denied an appeal where the matters under consideration are clearly unfounded, for example because the relationship was a sham. Subsection (7) ensures that sponsor human rights appeals are not treated as abandoned or cancelled because the UK sponsor holds permission to be in the UK. Instead, an appeal is abandoned if the overseas family member is granted leave to enter or remain in the UK.

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[Anna Turley]

I share my hon. Friend’s view. When I saw this amendment, I thought the principle was really important. When we come to write the immigration rules, we would absolutely want to make sure that it is at the heart of them. We would not ever want to see someone convicted of domestic violence, anything to do with child protection or any of the issues outlined in the amendment ever being a sponsor to bring anybody into this country. I hope that the Committee is reassured by my placing all of that on record: when the immigration rules come to be written I would hope and expect to see that at the heart of them, with those protections in there.

[Joe Robertson]

The Minister says that her provision on the core cohabiting family member has been restricted by this definition to tackle the issue of people coming into this country. Can she tell us how many people are currently in the UK with a core cohabiting family member outside the UK? What is that figure so we can understand at least the potential pool of applications?

[Anna Turley]

I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the figures that he asked for. I gave some initial examples at the start of my introduction about the volumes that we are dealing with. Some 77,000 applications were granted on article 8 grounds last year. We know that 71% of the first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered this country illegally and were overstaying. We are keen that this issue forms a core part of the reforms.

[Joe Robertson]

Could the Minister perhaps provide that figure, either later on this morning or this afternoon, for how many people are in the UK with a cohabiting family member overseas as of today?

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[Blake Stephenson]

I am going to close, because I think I have spoken enough and time is pressing on.

Clause 17 creates a new statutory claim for sponsors, and new rights of appeal, which will become the main route for refugee families. It exempts those claims from the safe country filter. Its detail is left to rules that we have not seen, and it commences by reference to provisions that are not yet in force or that the Bill would repeal. Amendment 84, which would have left out the clause, has not been selected, so the Committee will instead decide the matter by voting on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. For the reasons I have mentioned in this speech, which has gone on far too long, the Opposition will vote against it.

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I am speaking a little earlier than I had expected—I misunderstood the shadow Minister. I thought he was just getting started, but it turns out that he considers his speech on the long side. Just for the record, I do not.

I am going to address the wider issue of whether the Bill, the clause and this set of amendments really do address the issue that the Minister, and indeed the entire Government, want them to. Their intention, as I understand it—I do not think this is controversial, at least given what the Government say they want to do—is to reduce the number of claims, to ensure that claims are genuine and to create efficiencies in the system. Of course, we all have those aims. I think that the Government have made a genuine attempt with the Bill, but as far as I can see, it will fail substantially.

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[David Smith]

I understand the point the hon. Gentleman seeks to make about the potential pool of people, but is that not theoretical? The pool of people around the world who may be refugees is tens of millions. Ultimately, it is up to the Government of this country to determine the criteria for someone to be accepted as a refugee. It seems like a slightly philosophical point, if he does not mind me saying so.

[Joe Robertson]

I do not accept that it is philosophical. The pool of people in the world who could make an asylum claim runs to hundreds of millions, and possibly billions, because, tragically, a lot of the world is very unsafe and there is a lot of inhumane treatment and activity. As much as our hearts want us to try to improve the lives of those people, we would probably all agree that the UK cannot take in those vast numbers. However, I am addressing the more limited provision that the Government have put forward; I am talking not about the pool of people in the world who may be suffering inhumane or degrading treatment, but about the “core cohabiting” family members overseas who have a family member in the UK who might want to make an application on their behalf under the newly qualified right to a family life in proposed new section 117AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Let me turn to the new definition of a core cohabiting family member. Those words might prompt a debate of many hours or days, but the Bill helps us. It tells us that a “core cohabiting family” member of Person A is

“(a) A’s spouse, civil partner or partner;

(b) where A is a parent, A’s children who are under the age of 18;

(c) where A is under the age of 18, A’s parents.”

That makes sense: we are talking about children, parents, partners or civil partners. However, if we take the example of a civil partner, the provision would, as I understand it, allow someone in the UK—remember, that person may not be a British citizen, but someone who has a right to be here—to make an application to bring their civil partner, who is living outside the UK, into the UK, on the basis that to do anything else would be to infringe their right to a family life.

The Minister said pointedly that the focus is on the claim made by the person already here and their circumstances, rather than on the person outside the UK, but we know the circumstances of the person in the UK making such an application for their civil partner. Their family circumstances are that they are living a family life in two different countries; that is the pre-existing arrangement when they make the application. To most of us, though not everyone, that might seem unusual, but those are the circumstances. I do not understand why, if we have a system based on the circumstances of someone who has made an application, that application should seek to rearrange their family life and say, “We’re no longer happy to live in two different countries; we want to live in the same country—and, by the way, that same country must be the UK and not the other country.”

This provision does not seem to be person-focused at all; it seems to have been drafted in effect, almost as of right, to allow someone’s civil partner into the UK. If we run the argument the other way and say, “Of course two civil partners should be able to live together in the same country and, indeed, in the same household. Isn’t that what a right to a private family life means?”, the case will be won by the sponsor making the application, because they will say, “How can you possibly expect me to live in a separate country to my civil partner? That is inhumane and unfair. You wouldn’t expect it of an ordinary citizen in the UK, so why do you expect it of me? It is discriminatory. It is against the provisions in the Human Rights Act and the ECHR,” and so on. It seems to me that all those cases will be won on that basic assertion, and that what this provision really does is allow someone to bring in their civil partner in all circumstances, as of right.

Indeed, it may be worse than that. If that is in effect what is happening, we may as well say it, but what we have here is law that will be contested in court. If the Government contest each case, that will lead to a huge administrative process and a huge court backlog and appeals issues, just to end up with a set of decisions that all say the same thing: “Yes, of course, that overseas partner can come in.”

Setting that aside—and that is the most certain part of the provision, even though I argue that it is inherently uncertain and that it does not achieve its objectives—there are other circumstances set out in the provision in which someone does not need to be a core cohabiting family member. Proposed new section 117AA(1) says that the provision is “normally limited” to a core cohabiting family member, so there will be abnormal situations in which someone can come into this country even if they are not a core cohabiting family member. That, surely—obviously—is the gateway for Strasbourg jurisprudence. I acknowledge the Minister’s honesty when she said earlier that we—and by “we” I think she meant the British state rather than her Government particularly—as a country have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law, but that provision in her Government’s Bill is the gateway for Strasbourg law to be applied in the ordinary way that it has been over years, and that is the issue we are trying to tackle.

The Bill gives us some help on what constitutes an abnormal situation—a situation where a non-core cohabitant family member could come in. To quote proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) of the 2002 Act, that is where

“the circumstances are such that there is an additional element of dependency”

between two family members. But there could be an additional element of dependency between anyone residing in the UK and a family member overseas. Let us remember that we are not talking about core cohabitants now; we are talking about any family member. That could be a cousin, uncle, aunt, second cousin or third cousin—who knows?

Who will decide whether there is an additional element of dependency? Well, it will be based on the facts. The applicant will have to present a whole set of circumstances, including the family relationship that existed before anyone ever got to the UK and how much it meant to them emotionally or financially: “Yes, normally third cousins are not close and interdependent, but you must understand the culture where I am from. We had a relationship that was more like brother and sister or husband and wife, and therefore I should be successful.”

Who will decide that? It will be the bureaucratic infrastructure of the state, which is already overburdened, be it the Home Office, which typically makes a decision that gets overturned, a new system of judges appointed on the advice of the Home Office, or the existing appeal structure all the way up through the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the interpretation of Strasbourg jurisprudence, including the Human Rights Act and the fundamentals of the ECHR. All the things that currently challenge our ability to say no are brought in or retained by this provision. Even if a number of claims are unsuccessful—and I am sure a number will be—the number of cases that will go through the courts to establish their success or otherwise will continue to overburden the system and give everyone at least the hope that they might be successful, even in hopeless cases.

I say as a former lawyer—not a human rights lawyer or one who has been involved in this type of case—that this sort of provision is a gift to the world of ongoing litigation. Legal professionals try to construct a strong case with new legislation, as is their legitimate role. There is nothing like a bit of new legislation for the legal profession to get their teeth into. They try to create new case law to interpret it and find out what it is all about. Very often, litigation increases rather than decreases, at least in the short to medium term, when a novel provision like this one is introduced.

An abnormal, or not normal, family situation is not defined, but there are a few examples of an abnormal situation where an applicant would be successful. To paraphrase proposed new section 117AA(5)(b)(i) to (iii) of the 2002 Act—we can see just how complicated the Bill has become to try to achieve an aim that I do not think it will—one example is where there is mental illness in the person who is outside the UK, and care and support would need to be provided by the person in the UK. An application is therefore likely to be successful if the sponsor in the UK says: “My family member who is not in the UK”—they do not have to be a core cohabiting family member; they just have to be family, whatever that means—“has a mental illness.” Presumably whether they have a mental illness or not will be judged by a healthcare system outside the UK, which might be very different from our own, with a very different standard of what counts as a diagnosis. “That person has a mental illness and there is no care or support available to them other than me, a family member in the UK.” Again, they might be in a country with a health service that, almost universally, does not provide sufficient care and support to people with mental illness. That could, in reality, be quite an easy application to make.

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[Melanie Onn]

The hon. Member has spent a long time focusing on clause 18. I wonder whether he is going to repeat his comments when we come to the next group of amendments.

[Joe Robertson]

I shall speak to the next group when the time comes. I do not make any apology for focusing on what I see as a major flaw in the legislation. I do not have a political disagreement with the Government; I just think that what they are trying to do is not achieved by this provision. I am certainly not here to give an overall appraisal of the Bill or of this group. That is for the Minister and the shadow Minister. As a Back Bencher, I am here to try to examine, explore and understand what I see as a weakness in the Bill. That is my job in Committee.

[Melanie Onn]

The hon. Gentleman is clearly misunderstanding, because this is not what we are meant to be discussing right now.

[Joe Robertson]

I have it right in front of me. I think the wider points have been made. The hon. Member is obviously desperate to make the decisions that a Chair would ordinarily make. Maybe one day she will be elevated to the position of chairing a Committee. If she would like me to repeat everything I have said, I will be happy to do so in this afternoon’s sitting.

I am slightly reluctant to stop now, because it looks like I have wilted in the face of an intervention from the Government Benches, but I had come to the end of my contribution. I hope I have made my point, even if it is not agreed with.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Isle of Wight East for their very thorough comments. For me, this absolutely explains the benefit of line-by-line discussion of a Bill. There have been important challenges and critiques, and I will do my best to answer as many as I can—I think the shadow Minister must have had more than 20 or 25 questions; I will endeavour to write to him and the Committee on any that I accidentally overlook.

I really appreciated the statements from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East, but I think my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes was right: he did stray into clause 18, which we will come to this afternoon. I took note of his views and look forward to responding to some of those later.

There is a lot to cover, so I will do my best to race through it. We will have a longer conversation this afternoon about the ECHR, so I will not pre-empt my comments on that. I do want to push back on the accusation that the legislation will not make a difference. At the moment, we have a free-for-all. Courts are basically over-interpreting Strasbourg. There is no real codification in this country of what the right to a family life means, and we are seeing a huge number of cases, as we have discussed. The point of the Bill is to ensure that our provisions will be no different to the position under Strasbourg but will realign the domestic position, because we are currently being far more generous than our international obligations require. I think the Committee can agree that it is important that we do not over-interpret what Strasbourg suggests.

I appreciated the challenge from the shadow Minister about the 2014 Act and not reinforcing any previous errors, but the Government provisions reflect more up-to-date case law, which was not captured by that 2014 Act—for example, the weighting provisions, which will apply to all of family life. I hope, and am sure, that we will have more success than the 2014 Act had.

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[Joe Robertson]

If the Minister’s position ends up being that there is no data, I will take that. To be clear, I am asking for the data of people residing in the UK who have a family member who is not a British citizen and who has no right to be in the UK, be they a spouse, civil partner or child. If it is the case that we simply do not have that data, obviously I will accept that, but the question remains on the table.

[Anna Turley]

I completely appreciate where the hon. Gentleman is coming from, because I know he wants to get a sense of how many people could and would apply, but it would be impossible for us to know without knowing the family circumstances of everyone in the country. What we can do is best extrapolate from the applications that have been made as to whether they would fail or pass our new tests. I reassure him that it will be a high bar; the majority will be refused if they and their overseas family members do not meet the rules. Article 8 is a safeguard—that is what the Bill maintains—not a gateway.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, referenced the publishing of the modelling. He referred to the representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That is an internal sample that has not been published due to personal data sensitivities, but I commit to write to set out our data on article 8 for the Committee.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Too generous.

[Ben Goldsborough]

As the hon. Member very kindly name-checked my speech yesterday, I need to thank him first of all. He says there is no issue of “Lock, Stock and Two Smoking Barrels” when leaving the ECHR, but there is an issue concerning our colleagues and friends on the island of Ireland. What would be the result of leaving the ECHR when it comes to the Good Friday agreement? There is no question about it: Lord Wolfson may say that there may or may not be an issue with that, but the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission has noted that there would be an issue, and we have the history as well. Anything that comes back with this idea that, “Well, Australia and New Zealand don’t operate within these systems,” does not take into account the history of the island of Ireland.

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[Siân Berry]

Much appreciated, Mr Twigg.

I would say that the best way to stand up to toxic rhetoric is to stand up to it. We are familiar with the concept of the Overton window, and I am distressed that a Labour Government have been moving in this direction through their immigration policies. As I said at the beginning of my speech in the previous debate, the Government ought not to bring forward this Bill or row back on other civil liberties and human rights legislation—that would be the right thing to do. I am a lone voice on this Committee, but that cannot be right when we know that people around the country want migrants to be welcomed and want to see more unity, inclusion and social cohesion. The way to build that is not to hear the argument about how article 8 and the ECHR need to go and then do a little bit of that. The answer is to stand up to the rhetoric and build a better country.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Siân Berry]

One more time, then I will press on to the end of my speech.

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with the hon. Lady that there is some toxic rhetoric around this, although not from Members on this Committee. Does she not agree nevertheless that there is a problem with immigration and asylum in this country, and that part of the problem is that the numbers are too high?

[Siân Berry]

I do not concede that we are taking in too many refugees. As I said at the beginning, we have an international obligation to take our fair share of people seeking asylum, because of all the causes around the world that the hon. Gentleman mentioned earlier—he left out climate change, but I will forgive him that. There are many, many reasons why we ought to take a humane approach to asylum.

Some Government Back Benchers talked earlier about safe routes. There have been good schemes, aimed at particular conflicts in particular countries, and I hope the Government will continue to bring in more such schemes, but it is not good enough to cherry-pick particular conflicts or the kinds of refugees that we find acceptable. The volume of Ukrainian refugees has been absolutely huge, and has not caused social cohesion problems. We can make that work for many other countries as well, but the volumes in other schemes have always been too low. We need a universal framework of law that will work for all kinds of refugees.

[Siân Berry]

Off the top of my head, I cannot think of any. I really think that the current law needs to be administered better, and that we need better decision making, more humanity in all of this, and more support for people to get good decisions made the first time. I would be very happy to receive from the Government any clear evidence of abusive claims under the current law that does not rely on anecdote, but I am absolutely sure that, in clause 18, the Government are seeking to prevent people who would currently succeed from achieving asylum in this country and from being reunited with their families.

Let me move on to more things that the Government have said. The Government tell us that clause 18 is consistent with Strasbourg case law, and they even cite the cases, but, as other hon. Members have mentioned, they cannot have it both ways. If the clause simply restates the law, it is unnecessary. The Government’s impact assessment says that they expect grants to be cut by a third by those reforms. If the clause goes further, it risks putting the country in breach of the convention and inviting years of litigation. Either way, the clause does not deliver the clarity that Ministers promise, and I think that Opposition Members are united on that today.

I believe that a fair immigration system should tackle abuse while protecting genuine family life, and that it should put the best interests of children first and reflect the reality of modern families. Clause 18 does neither. It risks real hardship for genuine families, with little evidence that it will achieve anything else. I urge the Government to think again. We can maintain effective immigration control without using this clause to break up thousands of families. We can protect our borders without sacrificing the fundamental British values of compassion and fairness. For those reasons, I ask the Committee to agree that clause 18 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Twigg. I will address clause 18. I must confess that I have a slight tendency to stray, but I am comforted by the fact that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes will be on it and ensure that I stick to the grouping before us.

I made some comments on clause 18 in the morning sitting, so what I will say now is additional. I will focus on situations in which a right to family life can still be argued under the Bill, even though it seeks to restrict human rights applications based on family life. Those are not situations involving a core cohabiting family, but ones in which a sponsor in the UK who does not necessarily have a UK passport but nevertheless has a right to reside here applies for somebody—not necessarily a family member—who lives elsewhere with no right to come here, has a mental illness, needs the sponsor’s support and cannot find that support at home. That seems to me the widest part of the Bill, allowing a great range of claims to be made and increasing or maintaining the backlog at the Home Office and in the courts.

It seems that this mental illness provision could create a dodgy market of mental health clinics elsewhere in the world, set up specifically to provide paperwork for an application—that is not fanciful. We know the huge pressure from the black market abroad, involving people smugglers and all sorts of behaviour that is not just immoral but illegal and abhorrent, to get people into this country, because of course it is a great place to live and build a life. We know that the pressure is already there; that is why we have such high numbers coming. Setting out in law a mental illness route that seems to have such a low bar for evidence could lead, I think, to an entirely new dodgy avenue opening up.

Let us envisage a very real type of application. Someone in this country says that a family member or close friend living in another part of the world has a mental illness and a certificate to prove it. However, that certificate could very well come from a clinic that does not adhere to the standards of the NHS, the Care Quality Commission or anything that could be recognised in this country. That bit of paperwork—the bottom of which says, by the way, “Sorry, there is no support at home”—could give rise to an application. Without any evidence to the contrary, I do not see how the Home Office—or indeed a court—could deny that application.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid that I disagree. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, it does not mean that an individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. Instead, all cases where family life is found to exist will also be considered at the second stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I will just explain a little bit more, and I will hopefully answer the hon. Gentleman’s point. The word “normally” is deliberate and necessary. It allows us to establish a clear and deliberatively restrictive framework in which article 8 family life will ordinarily be confined to the core family while retaining the limited flexibility required for ECHR compliance.

Family relationships, as we have said, do not always fit neatly in formal categories or involve cohabitation. In exceptional cases, a relationship outside the core cohabiting family may, in substance, be akin to one within it. “Normally” enables a court to recognise genuine family life in those limited circumstances, based on the facts of the individual case. Removing it would turn a strong presumption into an inflexible rule, which would risk the exclusion of genuine family relationships and therefore be incompatible with the ECHR, potentially opening us up to even more litigation.

Crucially, this is only a threshold test. Establishing that family life exists does not mean that an article 8 claim succeeds, or that an individual has the right to remain. It simply means that the court moves on to the next stage to consider whether interference with that family life is justified and proportionate, taking account of public interest. Accordingly, the Government do not support the amendments.

Amendment 103, also tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, seeks to remove subsection (6) of this clause, on the basis that it undermines the effect of subsection (5). I do not, however, accept that that is the case. Those two provisions address different questions: subsection (5) clarifies what cannot independently establish family life between adult extended family members, while subsection (6) preserves the fact-sensitive assessment that is required once family life is engaged.

Subsection (5) makes it clear that financial support, emotional reliance, illness and concern for someone living amid war or instability do not, when taken independently, establish the necessary dependency. Those circumstances do not, however, cease to be relevant for every purpose. If family life is established, the court must then undertake the separate public interest and proportionality assessment.

Subsection (6) therefore provides an important safeguard to ensure that, at that stage, the full factual circumstances can be considered when balancing any interference with family life against the public interest. It also protects the Home Office’s freedom to consider those factors when arguing that the public interest requires a refusal of leave.

Turning to the Government amendments, it is right that children are given additional safeguards in article 8 decision making. Given those well-meaning protections, a tenuous relationship with a child can be used by an adult to remain in the UK. The first step to prevent people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 claims is to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under this clause operates as intended.

Government amendment 44 therefore makes it clear that a parent does not normally have family life with a child under the age of 18 for the purposes of article 8 unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. It broadens the application of the test so that it applies consistently to all parent-child relationships involving a child under 18, regardless of whether the parent and child live together. That clarifies what is relevant: the substance of the parental relationship, not simply the living arrangements. The amendment aims to reduce the scope for weak or limited parental relationships to be relied on in article 8 claims, including where cohabitation has been resumed opportunistically for immigration purposes; it does not remove protection for genuine parent-child relationships. Where there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, family life will continue to be recognised.

Government amendment 45 builds on amendment 44 to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under the clause will have its intended effect of preventing people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 applications. Government amendment 45 provides additional detail on how courts and tribunals should assess whether a parent has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child for the purposes of article 8. It sets out factors that may be relevant to that assessment, including the nature of the relationship, the duration and frequency of contact, and whether contact has recently been established or re-established. The amendment aims to promote greater consistency in the application of the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test, ensuring that courts and tribunals focus on the substance of the relationship; the amendment does not prevent genuine parent-child relationships from attracting article 8 protection. Courts and tribunals will continue to consider all relevant circumstances in each individual case.

[Joe Robertson]

What would happen if someone were living here, but their child was overseas with the other parent—they were cohabiting there, not with the parent here—but the parent overseas died? What happens to the child? I cannot see a provision by which the child can come here, because there was no core cohabiting family arrangement.

[Anna Turley]

Exactly such a circumstance is why we have provided flexibility within the Bill. The individual case will be assessed under article 8. In such a situation, there is space for that individual case to be assessed. Together with clause 19, Government amendments 44 and 45 provide a clearer and more consistent framework for determining whether removing an individual with a tenuous relationship to a child in the UK is compliant with article 8.

I will just add something on the key principles behind clause 18. The clause establishes clear boundaries for where family life exists, consistent with Strasbourg case law, providing the foundation on which clause 19’s strengthened public interest test is applied. Together, clauses 18 and 19 will ensure that article 8 is not used routinely to circumvent immigration rules, supporting a more ordered and controlled system where those who do not meet the rules are not routinely able to stay in the UK. Members have suggested that the clauses are too expansive and may widen where family life can be found to exist, but that is not correct. A recent Court of Appeal judgment reaffirmed the existing legal framework for assessing family life under article 8. Clause 18 provides greater clarity. The reforms will make clearer how family life and dependency should be assessed, promoting greater consistency in decision making and curtailing expansive interpretation of where family life can be found to exist. I had intended to talk more about the ECHR, but I shall not test the patience of the Committee.

Other points made during the debate included whether the clause was relevant or whether the courts would just ignore what we are trying to codify. Successive Governments have recognised concerns about how article 8 operates in the immigration system, but this Government are undertaking the hard work to understand the comprehensive reform required to restore order and control to the system. We are working within our international obligations to reset this balance, and to provide a more comprehensive and consistent framework to article 8 decision making. Clause 18 works alongside clause 19 by establishing the clear basis on which the Home Office can argue that family life does not exist before consideration of whether the public interest warrants a refusal of leave. Together, the clauses provide a clearer framework for how article 8 should be assessed to promote greater consistency in decision making and ensure that when considering article 8 immigration decisions, the courts place appropriate weight on what Parliament considers to be in the public interest.

In response to some of the other points made by hon. Members, the framing of proposed new section 117AA preserves the small degree of flexibility necessary for decision makers and the courts not to be constrained to determine claims made under article 8 that are inconsistent with the article. Reference was made to the definition of an eligible partner. That definition will be set out in rules and guidance; it is not appropriate to have that level of detail in primary legislation. We need to have flexibility to be able to change and respond to patterns of behaviour and abuse. One hon. Member spoke about young adults. The word “normally” in clause 18 is a caveat to preserve flexibility for young adults who have family life with parents.

I was asked for more evidential requirements; here some case studies might be helpful. The family immigration rules are intended to create a fair system that balances the important of protecting family and private life. When 71% of first-time grants are made to applicants who have arrived illegally or who have overstayed the time they are permitted to be here, it is clear that article 8 is not operating effectively. I was also asked about retrospective claims and whether the measures would impact people already in the UK. Clause 52(9) allows part 2 of the Bill to be commenced with retrospective effect; we will set out our plans for how the measures will be commenced in due course.

I was asked how the adjudicators would be able to interpret the complexity of clause 18 without legal training—something the Committee spoke about quite a lot in the first sitting of its scrutiny. Adjudicators will be properly trained, with all the safeguards that we talked about in the Committee sitting last Tuesday, to apply the new framework and immigration law. The authority will have legal support, underpinned by clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about interference. Clause 18 is not about whether interference is proportionate—that is assessed under clause 19. The grounds for interference, such as for the effectiveness of the immigration system, are consistent with ECHR case law.

Nothing in the Bill prevents individualised decision making; we have deliberately kept that ability, and that is a clear requirement of article 8 compliancy in decision making. Hon. Members also spoke about Home Office decision making. As I have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill, we will of course continue to work to improve decision making. The reforms in the clause clarify how family life should be assessed and strengthen the role of public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, which will help to improve decision making by providing the courts with greater clarity, consistency and predictability.

On mental illness and whether that is a route, it is correct that under proposed new section 117AA(4), family life can be engaged where a person suffers a mental illness or infirmity. However, they would need to be incapacitated to the extent that they need constant care and support, and there would have to be no other viable care options. Examples in established case law include where an adult or child becomes paraplegic after a serious illness, or where an adult or child suffers from Down syndrome and is fully incapacitated. It is worth remembering that the provision is only about establishing family life, and that the decision makers and the courts will go on to consider the public interest question. I hope I have answered all colleagues’ points, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

The Opposition supports clause 19 and will not oppose it. As I have just said, we will resist amendment 61. We should be clear that provisions that make the boldest promises about drafting, with key terms left undefined, are problematic. We will seek to press amendments 104 and 105 to a vote. We will not press amendment 106 today if the Minister can help define the word “serious”.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Dr Murrison. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire has dealt with this point eloquently, but I wish to speak briefly on clause 19 and the Opposition amendments.

Obviously, I support what the Government are trying to achieve here, but I think they could go a little further in the drafting. When we talk about public interest, that goes to the heart of the whole issue and problem we have in this country of trying to tackle immigration—in particular, legal immigration and asylum claims. What is in the public interest? The problem is that the system we have has strayed so far from the public interest. Although the clause gives a legal definition, it is also a meaningful way of translating and understanding a political, social, economic and public problem. It is in the public interest that we do all we can to tackle the current volume of asylum and immigration claims. It is not a unanimous position, but very few in Parliament, and very few in the public at large, would disagree with the fundamental point that we need to bring down the level of immigration, asylum claims and illegal boat crossings.

On the public interest consideration, the topic of the right to family life picks up from the Committee’s discussion last week. The right to family life stems from the European convention on human rights and is a qualified right, meaning that it does not stand towering above all other considerations. It is my view, and a commonly held view—in fact, a view that was given by the Minister—that the right has strayed too far. Over many years, jurisprudence has allowed an expansive interpretation that has taken the family life core protection to cover a far wider set of circumstances. It is now used as a routine tool by those who wish to remain in the UK when the threat to or infringement of their family life, as a fundamental human right, is not really an issue. Clause 19 is part of the framework that seeks to attack that use.

We are where we are partly because of a set of legislation—with a convention at its core—made by Parliament over the years, including the Human Rights Act 1998 and other Acts, that has sought to define and in some cases limit, in others not, what we mean by the right to family life and the public interest. Those laws have been unsuccessful in doing that. The intention was there, but the drafting was insufficiently certain—though to some extent that is inherent in all legislating in this place—to ensure that the courts interpret the legislation as narrowly as Parliament intended. The Government have gone some way to try to be restrictive, as they think they have been in this clause, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire points out, some changes to the wording can be made. His amendments 105 and 106 seek to deliver those. The clause states:

“No weight should be given”;

but stating that no weight must be given would get rid of a door that is ajar to the courts to interpret the clause more expansively. The amendment slams that door by inserting the word “must”, so that there is no leeway for a clever legal argument that “should” gives sufficient leeway for a court effectively to make a decision that runs against what the legislation is trying to deliver.

I do not take the view that judges or indeed lawyers—on the whole, as a profession, broadly speaking—should be demonised for making decisions that use loopholes in the law. If this place fails to make the law certain and fails to close those loopholes, the fault comes back to Parliament and the Government who brought the legislation through Parliament. Here is the opportunity to tighten it up—that is the purpose of a Bill Committee: to tighten up wording through the fair scrutiny process.

The Opposition’s amendment 106 relates to a measure where the Government were perhaps not trying to completely close the door. It may be something that they deliberately left open. Amendment 106 would change proposed new section 117B(4)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in clause 19(4) of the Bill. I will quote proposed new paragraph 117B(4)(b) for Hansard, though it may appear out of context:

“they are in serious breach of a condition attached to their leave to enter or remain.”

The Opposition amendment seeks to leave out the word “serious” so that the provision applies to someone simply in breach of a condition.

My suspicion is that the Government want to leave a set of breaches of a condition that would not affect someone’s leave to remain. The Opposition’s position is that, if someone has breached a condition, that should mean the fundamental failure of any claim to remain that cites a right to family life. To me, the amendment would provide the certainty needed and deliver on what the public expect of us to tackle a significant problem in this country—the large number of claims that go beyond the original intention behind the right to family life.

The problem with leaving the word “serious” in the legislation is that it will be open to the court to make a decision about whether a breach is serious enough. Without any specific guidance or checklist in the legislation, the court will consider seriousness as a relative word or concept in an appellant’s case to not be returned to another country. A case could be made based on circumstance that family life is fundamentally important to someone and that sending them home would split up a family. They may paint a picture of the environment at home that could be very alien to us as a free and democratic society. Suddenly, that “serious breach” question might lead a court to conclude that a serious breach in the abstract becomes quite a minimal one when compared with an applicant’s story of hardship.

My concern is that the word “serious” will become a flexible term to be interpreted by the court. It will always be measured against the relative hardship of the claimant, who will of course state their case at its strongest in order to leverage the flexibility of the word “serious”. I struggle to see why the Government would not want to add in certainty, unless they particularly want to create an avenue where people can still make the right to family life claim. It would be extraordinary if they did, given all the rationale they have provided for bringing forward this set of provisions and the Bill in the first place. The Minister should be very clear about whether she sees this as a disagreement around drafting, or whether she is seeking—I am sure that she would have a reason for it, though I would disagree with it—to have an avenue of flexibility in the Bill, and why.

There is provision in the clause, and rightfully so, for particular circumstances in relation to children. Children are in a very special category because of their dependency and vulnerability. There are a number of situations laid out, but subsection (6) in particular deals with situations where there would be

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child.”

We do not want to see people deported or removed when that would have a significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child. There are protections are built in here. Others may say that this is a particularly draconian provision, but I see some protections there and in paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new subsection (7) that are widely accepted and uncontroversial, and I wanted to draw attention to them.

--- Later in debate ---

On amendments 105 and 106, I agree with the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire that compliance with immigration conditions is important and that serious non-compliance should have clear consequences in the article 8 assessment. On amendment 105 specifically, although the wording of the clause provides decision makers with the flexibility to undertake an individualised assessment based on the facts of the case, as required in an article 8 assessment, it also makes it clear that “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s family or private life established at a time when they are in the UK without permission, are in breach of their permission or obtained that permission by deception. The amendment would therefore have no material effect. The addition of “must” in this part of the public interest test would not change the nature of courts and tribunals’ obligations to have regard to the statutory public interest considerations. “No weight” is the starting point.

[Joe Robertson]

Surely the Minister understands that while “no weight” may be the starting point, the end point is the decision, and that is the issue. A decision maker can have a starting point of “no weight”, but attach weight, and suddenly the decision is not where I think even she might intend in many cases.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but it is important for cases to be considered on a case-by-case basis. We can be as specific as possible, but the reality is that courts and tribunals have to maintain the flexibility to determine cases based on the individual facts and circumstances before them. It is important that our drafting enables that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I am asking the Minister these questions, so it would be marvellous if we could wait to see how she answers them.

Thirdly, does that approach not allow the Home Secretary to unilaterally stack the deck against an appellant in an appeal, on an arbitrary basis? Does that take away from the objective seriousness of the offence that they have committed? Does the approach therefore impermissibly limit the ability of the appellate body to decide an article 8 ECHR claim on its merits, as is required under the Human Rights Act 1998?

[Joe Robertson]

Clause 20 deals with cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation. The issues I have with the clause are broadly twofold. One issue is around the drafting, which has a number of serious deficiencies. That is not about whether the Government are getting it wrong or right on what they are trying to achieve, but about having certainty on what the legislation will do when it comes to people having to make decisions. My second issue is disagreement with what the Government are trying to achieve.

Under proposed new section 117C, which I will try to deal with as precisely as I can,

“(1) Where a person is liable to deportation, the public interest, and in particular the interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime, requires their deportation unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”

That deals with the public interest and its definition. Let us put aside the “unless”, which clearly opens an avenue for the court to examine whether the effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate, and deal with that public interest element. Proposed new subsection (1) says that “the public interest...requires” the deportation of those liable to it, which directs the court to define “public interest” as one thing. However, the Bill tries to define what that public interest is in proposed new subsection (2). It sets out “more serious” factors that point towards a greater public interest in a person’s deportation. It does not matter what those factors are, but they are in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c).

Why on earth does the court need direction in assessing the extent of the public interest when it is being directed to consider that public interest simply “requires their deportation”? It seems entirely meaningless to start directing the court as to what public interest might mean in terms of giving weighting to the factors in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c) when the court is being told to simply deport under the public interest. I fail to see how it has any relevance whatsoever, and it is potentially distracting from what the Government are trying to achieve.

I will now deal with the “unless” element, because that is entirely separate. Proposed new section 117C says that deportation is required

“unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”

The court decision makers are given some help on what “disproportionate” would mean, which is entirely sensible. I disagree with some of the elements that the court should consider, but it is sensible to give the decision makers some direction.

I will stick to the drafting of paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new section 117C(4). Paragraph (a) says that exceptional circumstances apply where a person

“has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life”.

Given that provisions in relation to children, not just in this Bill but generally in the way we do law in this country, are different from provisions in relation to adults, that provision needs to be clear about whether it means a person has been resident in the United Kingdom for most of their adult life or their entire life from birth. Although it may suggest entire life from birth, I can see a court assuming it means adult life because we deal with children separately. It would therefore be much easier for someone who is, say, aged 24 and has been in the country for only three or four years to say that they have been a resident for most of their life, because provisions for children are separate. That is an avenue that could be exploited through a lack of drafting, unless the Government mean adult life. I think they should mean entire life, and they should be specific about what they mean.

Secondly, paragraph (b) says that exceptional circumstances apply where

“the person is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom”.

How on earth is a decision maker or a court supposed to determine whether someone is or is not socially and culturally integrated into the UK? We could have an entire PhD thesis on the extent of somebody’s social and cultural integration. We may all have views on what it means to be socially and culturally integrated. There may be some common themes around our views, but there will be much disagreement about the specifics when trying to make a decision about an individual case.

Of course, the decision makers are not there to do some highly resourced, detailed investigative study into someone’s circumstances. They will basically be relying on assertions. Surely it is open to someone saying, “I’ve lived here for a number of years. I speak English to a degree and I can go about normal daily life without endlessly causing friction or hardship, and I am therefore sufficiently socially and culturally integrated into the UK.” Or is the court supposed to examine the way they dress or eat, who they mix with and how often, the cultural background of the people they mix with or their religious traditions? Not only is it opening a can of worms, but it is quite offensive to have the state investigating someone’s social and cultural integration in order to make a yes or no decision.

According to this provision, a court—the decision maker—is not to make a decision about someone being reasonably well integrated or showing signs of cultural integration; someone is either socially and culturally integrated, or they are not. I just cannot see how the Government can possibly expect a decision maker to open up such an investigation. And that would be only one part of the integration inquiry.

Proposed new subsection (4)(c) then talks about

“very significant obstacles to the person’s integration in the country to which they are proposed to be deported.”

Having run the analysis and come up with a view about an individual’s cultural and social integration into the UK, the decision maker has to run a similar test on their ability to integrate into the country to which they are supposed to be deported—a theoretical test, because it might be somewhere they have not been for some time—where it is even harder to make some sort of value judgment, because it is a country that the decision maker could have absolutely zero experience of living in, and so they will, again, be reliant on assertions.

The test in that case is not even the same as in proposed new subsection 4(b), where the person must be “socially and culturally integrated”; at subsection 4(c), it is the person’s “integration”—there is no qualification of cultural and social integration. In this country, they could be socially and culturally integrated, but not integrated in a wide range of other ways; yet in the country that they are proposed to go to, any integration issues, not just social and cultural ones, could be a “significant” obstacle to integration. I do not understand why the definition is narrower on the question of a person’s integration—albeit far too broad for a court to tackle—for assessing the situation in this country and much wider for the situation elsewhere.

There are serious drafting issues here. We cannot merely just see where it all comes out in the wash, saying Home Office officials are very capable and all that sort of stuff. We have seen the problem with the number of appeals. Some of these provisions will genuinely need the court to tackle the interpretation issues, in the normal way that we do common law in this country, through test cases. These provisions will require an unusual set of test cases, through to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, to get judicial interpretation and assistance for the courts to apply thereafter, but, as we have seen in test cases, it is rarely one case that sets a new environment for the lower courts and decision makers to adhere to, but a series of them.

This is not only going to require an extraordinary amount of time to understand terms that the Government just need to deal with at this stage through the legislation process, but it will take years; any individual case that goes all the way up to the Supreme Court on how the court interpreted “socially and culturally integrated” will take a long time in and of itself—months into years. Where we may have challenging cases that seek to overturn what, for example, the Court of Appeal has said, by using the Supreme Court, we are talking years on years.

The Government are creating massive scope for backlog and uncertainty, and a huge opportunity for the legal profession to run a high volume of case law—it would be genuinely interesting, but would completely undermine the Government’s intention, which is to tackle backlogs, speed up the system and stop the endless need for judicial interpretation. That is what has led us to where we are, which is broader and broader interpretation.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Tenth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. This group is about who should be exempt from the duty to repay asylum support and when a debt should be cancelled. Five of the grouped amendments—four in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion and one tabled by the Liberal Democrats in the name of the hon. Member for Wimbledon—would widen the exemptions or write off the debt. The Opposition take the opposite view, unsurprisingly. The exemptions in clause 23 are already too wide, which is why I tabled amendments 139 and 142.

Clause 23(6)(b) exempts anyone who

“started to receive asylum support before the day on which this section comes fully into force”.

That is not an exemption for support received before the law changes; it is an exemption for all the support that a person will ever receive before or after commencement. The Government tell us that about 97,500 people are receiving support and, as the Bill is drafted, every single one of them will be exempt for life. Between now and the commencement date, which the Government have not yet given us—with appeals taking over a year, the first charges under this clause may be many years away—how many people will be exempt under subsection (6)(b)? Why not exempt only the support received before commencement, so that people already in the system contribute to the support they receive once the law has changed? When do the Government intend to bring clause 23 fully into force and levy the first charges?

Clause 23(6)(c) will allow the Secretary of State to exempt “any other description” of a person by regulations. The explanatory notes tell us that victims of modern slavery will be exempt. Under clause 50, those regulations will be subject only to the negative procedure. The Government’s reasoning is that exemptions do not disadvantage the people affected. They may not disadvantage the people exempted, but they certainly affect the taxpayer. A series of negative instruments could hollow out the scheme without a debate in the House. Which further categories do the Government intend to exempt, and why do Ministers not think that Parliament should be able to approve those?

Amendment 139 would remove subsection (6)(b), which is the exemption for everyone who started to receive support before clause 23 is fully in force. As I said, that will exempt around 97,500 people for life for the support that they receive, as well as anyone who enters support before a commencement date that nobody has given us. The Opposition’s intention is simple: people already in the system should contribute for the support they receive once the scheme is in force.

Amendment 142 would make regulations creating further exemptions under subsection (6)(c) subject to the affirmative procedure. The Government say that the negative procedure is enough because exemptions do not disadvantage the people exempted. That may be the case, but it certainly is not the case for the taxpayer, who is burdened with the cost. A series of negative instruments could hollow out the scheme, as I mentioned earlier.

Amendments 77 and 50 would exempt anyone who was under 21 or 18, respectively, at any time while they were supported, rather than those who were children throughout. That would mean that someone who arrived at 17 and was supported for years as an adult would pay nothing. We will oppose both those amendments.

Amendment 82 would exempt anyone granted leave after a successful appeal. Mr Featonby of the Refugee Council made the point for us. He said that

“the majority of people who will ever be in a position to even start to pay back that money are people who are going to go on to get protection.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 32, Q53.]

Exempting those who win on appeal would remove a large share of the people who could pay, and would reward the cases that took the longest.

Amendment 78 would add exemptions for people over retirement age, recognised victims of trafficking, survivors of sexual or gender-based violence and domestic abuse, and victims of torture, rape or serious violence. Those are sensitive cases, and the Government have said that victims of modern slavery will be exempt. The right way to decide those exemptions is in regulations that the House has seen and approved, not by negative instruments that can hollow out the scheme, as I mentioned earlier. Which categories will the Government exempt, and will draft exemption regulations be provided before Report?

Amendment 80, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require the Home Secretary to cancel a person’s liability upon death or permanent incapacity, when they reach 65, or 10 years after their support ended. There is a fair question underneath that. Student loans, which are the basis for the model that we proposed, are written off after a set period, but a 10-year write-off that starts when support ends would allow anyone to wait out the debt and simply not pay. The amendment is far too wide, and we will oppose it. Do the Government intend to have any write-off period at all, and if so what?

Finally, the Opposition will oppose amendments 77, 50, 78, 82 and 80. The clause already exempts everyone now in the system for life and allows further exemptions by negative instrument. Amendment 139 would close the first gap and amendment 142 would close the second. I will press amendment 139 to a Division.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. I will speak briefly about two of the exemptions to requiring someone to make a payment for their asylum support. They have been referred to already; they are in clause 23(6)(a) and (b).

Subsection (6)(a) states a person is exempt for the purposes of this section if they

“were under 18 at all times at which they received asylum support”.

I accept that if someone was a child throughout the entire period they received asylum support, they would be fully exempt, but I think I disagree with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion on an interpretation point. That is the problem with the Bill; it is badly drafted and unclear in places. If someone under the age of 18 was receiving asylum support, then turned 18 and sought it afterwards, they would not be exempt—of course not, because they also received asylum support as an adult—but one would assume that they would not be charged for the portion of time that they had received asylum support while under 18. The Minister needs to clarify that point, but giving clarity in Committee is not sufficient when it is unclear in the legislation. She would do better to clarify it in the legislation.

The second exemption I want to briefly refer to, as the shadow Minister has, is subsection (6)(b). It gives an exemption to someone who

“started to receive asylum support before the day on which this section comes fully into force”.

As a counterpoint to what I just said, I do not understand why, if someone received asylum support for a year—let us say; typically it is a lot longer—and day one was before this section came into force, but day two and 364 of the 365 days were after it came into force, they would be exempt from making contributions for their asylum support. They would receive the vast majority of that support after the legislation comes into force, so I would have thought it a fairly obvious pro rata exercise to say that they do not pay for the portion of time they spent receiving support before the law was in place— I take the point that we do not have retrospective law in this country—but they do thereafter.

It makes me wonder whether my understanding of the child-becoming-an-adult element is wrong. The Government need to be clear about whether a pro rata approach is being taken when a child becomes an adult. If so, why is that not being applied when someone starts receiving support before the Bill comes into play and continues to receive support after? I hope the Minister can give us some clarity.

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members across the Committee for tabling the amendments in this group and for the explanations that they have given. The Committee will forgive me if I once again stress that clause 23 establishes an important and fair principle of contribution and reciprocity: where someone has received asylum support at public expense and later has the means to contribute to help to maintain that system and the public consent for that system, it is reasonable that they should do so. That ensures that those who have a right to support still receive it, but that comes with responsibilities and expectations.

--- Later in debate ---

I want also to make a clarification. There has been a lot of discussion around support for children. Clause 23(6)(a) already protects those who have received support entirely as children. Broadening that exemption to include support received in adulthood goes further than is necessary. As a further clarification about the time spent in childhood, there will be time between turning 18 and becoming liable for the charge, so there will be time for the individual to decide. That will be further discussed in the regulations. I look forward to setting out more detail for hon. Members to discuss, but that is again part of the regulations, rather than a measure in primary legislation.

[Joe Robertson]

It sounds like the Minister is saying that when a child becomes an adult and is still receiving support, they will then be liable to pay for the support they received as a child and it is their choice whether to continue with their asylum application.

[Anna Turley]

Apologies for any misconception. A person will not have to pay for the support they received entirely as a child. I will make sure that I clarify the wording of that for the Committee’s understanding.

The Bill also includes a power to establish further exemptions through secondary legislation. That is the appropriate mechanism. It provides flexibility, allows clear definitions aligned with wider frameworks, such as in relation to debt, and enables the approach to be kept under review. The amendments do not establish consistently how eligibility would be evidenced, when liability should cease or how particular circumstances should interact with an individual’s current means. Those details are critical to protect the policy’s aims and mitigate against abuse, so such exemptions should not be in the Bill.

In relation to amendment 82, which suggests an exemption for those granted status on appeal, the policy in the Bill seeks a contribution from all recipients of asylum support, regardless of the outcome of their claim. I note the wider areas of interest of hon. Members in terms of those exemptions. We will consider everything discussed and heard in Committee when preparing the secondary legislation to which the Government have committed during the passage of the Bill.

I will respond to some of the issues raised in the discussion. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned targeting those who are destitute. I want to be clear: we are still providing support to those who need it most. The repayment begins only later, when individuals have the means for it. There are clear safeguards, such as income thresholds and exemptions, to protect the most vulnerable. There will also be a grace period after support finishes but before repayment is required to allow individuals time to establish themselves. Far from being punitive, the policy reflects a principle that when someone can contribute, they should.

The hon. Member also mentioned exemptions for vulnerable groups. Those exemptions are not in the Bill because that is the wrong place for them, but we will make those regulations. Hon. Members’ contributions and concerns have been heard and will form part of that discussion. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Amendments 139 and 142 concern the scope, enforcement and parliamentary oversight of the asylum support contribution scheme. I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling them, but we cannot accept them. Amendment 139, which aims to allow liability to arise for support received before the scheme is fully commenced, goes against the principle of this legislation. The Government’s approach is deliberately prospective: liability should arise only once the detailed rules, notification arrangements and safeguards are in place. Applying the scheme retrospectively to earlier support would create uncertainty, move the goalposts and not provide people with sufficient clarity about the potential consequences of receiving support.

[Joe Robertson]

I take the point that the scheme should not be applied retrospectively, but let us take the example of student loans: students take out loans on terms that are then changed in the future. If UK students have to deal with that, why should it be any different for asylum provisions?

[Anna Turley]

That example is about changing the level of a loan that has been provided. I do not think we can expect people who may have fled war and persecution to come to this country on one understanding, only to have that changed while they are here. This is an entirely new system; it is not about changing the level of a loan or a return. It is important that we do it only going forward; trying to apply it retrospectively would be open to an extreme amount of legal challenge.

Amendment 142 would require any regulations that specify further exemptions under clause 23 to be subject to the affirmative procedure. We will reject the amendment, but again, with an emphasis on consensus, I say that I firmly believe in the principle of parliamentary debate and discussion, particularly on important regulations such as these. Although we are rejecting the amendment, I undertake to review the matter during the passage of the Bill, because such important exemptions need appropriate scrutiny, and these regulations will need the full scrutiny of Parliament. As I say, I am open-minded about considering that as the Bill progresses.

As we have already committed, the detailed scheme will be published in secondary legislation during the passage of the Bill, so I hope that will give hon. Members plenty to engage with during the process.

Question put, That the amendment be made.