Jeremy Quin
Main Page: Jeremy Quin (Conservative - Horsham)Department Debates - View all Jeremy Quin's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 8—Injunctions in Secretary of State proceedings: power of arrest and remand.
New clause 1—Guidance on locking on—
“The Secretary of State must by regulations issue guidance to police forces about the protest technique of locking on, which includes—
(a) examples of best practice, and
(b) detailed guidance on addressing new and developing forms of locking on.”
New clause 2—Consolidated protest guidance—
“(1) Within three months of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations issue guidance which consolidates into a single source—
(a) the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice for public order guidance,
(b) the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s operational advice for protest policing, and
(c) the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest aide memoire.
(2) The Secretary of State must regularly review the guidance and, if appropriate, must by regulations issue revised consolidated guidance.
(3) The consolidated guidance must include specific updated guidance about the protest technique of locking on.”
New clause 3—National monitoring tool—
“(1) The Secretary of State must develop a consistent national monitoring tool, accessible by all police forces, to monitor the use of or requests for specialist protest officers across England and Wales.
(2) Data collected under this section may be used to evaluate capacity and demand for specialist protest officers across England and Wales.
(3) The monitoring tool must be accessible on a national, regional and local basis.
(4) The monitoring tool must include—
(a) examples of best practice from policing protests across the United Kingdom, and
(b) data on how many trained officers have been required for any protests during the period in which monitoring took place.”
New clause 4—Injunction to prevent serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services—
“(1) Upon an application by a person under subsection (4), an injunction may be ordered by a Judge of the High Court against ‘persons unknown’ in order to prevent a serious disruption to the effective movement of any essential goods or any essential services occasioned by a public procession or public assembly.
(2) The “persons unknown” may be—
(a) anonymous persons taking part in a public process or public assembly who are identifiable at the time of the proceedings; and/or
(b) persons not presently taking part in a public procession or public assembly protest but who will in future join such a public procession or public assembly.
(3) The conditions under which such an injunction may be granted are as follows—
(a) there must be a real and imminent risk of a tort being committed which would result in a serious disruption to the effective movement of any essential goods or any essential services;
(b) a method of service must be set out in the order which may reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to the attention of the “persons unknown”;
(c) the “persons unknown” must be defined in the order by reference to their conduct which is alleged to be unlawful;
(d) the acts prohibited by the order must correspond with the threatened tort;
(e) the order may only prohibit lawful conduct if there is no other proportionate means of protecting the effective movement of essential goods or essential services;
(f) the terms of the order must set out what act(s) the persons potentially affected by the order must not do;
(g) the terms of the order must set out a defined geographical area to which the order relates; and
(h) the terms of the order must set out a temporal period to which the order relates, following which the order will lapse unless a further order is made upon a further application by the applicant.
(4) An applicant for an injunction to prevent serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services may be—
(a) a local authority with responsibility for all or part of the geographical area to which the proposed order relates;
(b) a chief constable with responsibility for all or part of the geographical area to which the proposed order relates; or
(c) a person resident in, or carrying on a business within, the geographical area to which the proposed order relates.
(5) A “serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services” includes a prolonged disruption to—
(a) the effective movement of the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel;
(b) a system of communication;
(c) access to a place of worship;
(d) access to a transport facility;
(e) access to an educational institution; and
(f) access to a service relating to health.”
New clause 5—Definition of “serious disruption”—
“(1) For the purposes of this Act, ‘serious disruption’ means—
(a) significant delay to the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers
of that product, or
(b) prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to—
(i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(ii) a system of communication,
(iii) a place of worship,
(iv) a place of worship,
(v) an educational institution, or
(vi) a service relating to health.
(2) In subsection (1)(a) a ‘time-sensitive product’ means a product whose value or use to its consumers may be significantly reduced by a delay in the supply of the product to them.”
New clause 6—Offences impeding emergency workers—
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) the court is considering for the purposes of sentencing the seriousness of an offence under sections 1 (Offence of locking on) or 3 (Obstruction etc of major transport works) of this Act, and
(b) the commission of the offence had the effect of impeding an emergency worker in exercising their functions, subject to the exception in subsection (2).
(2) The exception is that the emergency worker was exercising their functions in connection with the offence for which the person is being sentenced or in connection with any action which the court considers to be related to that offence.
(3) The court—
(a) must treat the fact mentioned in subsection (1)(b) as an aggravating factor (that is to say, a factor that increases the seriousness of the offence), and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(4) In this section, ‘emergency worker’ means—
(a) a constable;
(b) a person (other than a constable) who has the powers of a constable or is otherwise employed for police purposes or is engaged to provide services for police purposes;
(c) a National Crime Agency officer;
(d) a prison officer;
(e) a person (other than a prison officer) employed or engaged to carry out functions in a custodial institution of a corresponding kind to those carried out by a prison officer;
(f) a prisoner custody officer, so far as relating to the exercise of escort functions;
(g) a custody officer, so far as relating to the exercise of escort functions;
(h) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide, fire services or fire and rescue services;
(i) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide, search services or rescue services (or both);
(j) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide—
(i) NHS health services, or
(ii) services in the support of the provision of NHS health services, and whose general activities in doing so involve face to face interaction with individuals receiving the services or with other members of the public.
(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (4) whether the employment or engagement is paid or unpaid.
(6) In this section—
‘custodial institution’ means any of the following—
(a) a prison;
(b) a young offender institution, secure training centre, secure college or remand centre;
(c) services custody premises, as defined by section 300(7) of the Armed Forces Act 2006; “custody officer” has the meaning given by section 12(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994;
‘escort functions’—
(a) in the case of a prisoner custody officer, means the functions specified in section 80(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991;
(b) in the case of a custody officer, means the functions specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994;
‘NHS health services’ means any kind of health services provided as part of the health service continued under section 1(1) of the National Health Service Act 2006 and under section 1(1) of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006;
‘prisoner custody officer’ has the meaning given by section 89(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.”
New clause 9—Publication of data about use of stop and search powers—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish data about the use of the stop and search powers under sections 9 and 10 within three years of—
(a) if sections 9 and 10 come into force on the same date, the date on which they come into force, or
(b) if sections 9 and 10 come into force on different dates, the later of those two dates.
(2) The data published under this section must include—
(a) the total number of uses of stop and search powers by each police force in England and Wales, including whether the powers were used on suspicion or without suspicion,
(b) disaggregated data by age, disability, ethnicity/race, sex/gender and sexual orientation of the people who have been stopped and searched, and
(c) data relating to the outcomes of the use of stop and search powers.”
New clause 10—Review of the use of stop and search powers—
“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint an independent reviewer to assess and report annually on the use of the stop and search powers under sections 9 and 10.
(2) In carrying out their review, the person appointed under subsection (1) must—
(a) consider the impact of the use of stop and search powers on groups with protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, and
(b) consult such civil society organisations as appear to the person appointed under subsection (1) to be relevant.
(3) The person appointed under subsection (1) must ensure that a report on the outcome of the review is sent to the Secretary of State as soon as reasonably practicable after the completion of the review.
(4) On receiving a report under this section, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—
(a) a copy of the report, and
(b) the Government’s response to the findings.
(5) The first report under this section must be completed no later than one year after the date provided for under section [publication of data about use of stop and search powers](1).”
New clause 11—Offence of interference with access to or provision of abortion services—
“(1) A person who is within a buffer zone and who interferes with any person’s decision to access, provide, or facilitate the provision of abortion services in that buffer zone is guilty of an offence.
(2) A “buffer zone” means an area which is within a boundary which is 150 metres from any part of an abortion clinic or any access point to any building or site that contains an abortion clinic and is—
(a) on or adjacent to a public highway or public right of way,
(b) in an open space to which the public has access,
(c) within the curtilage of an abortion clinic, or
(d) in any location that is visible from a public highway, public right of way, open space to which the public have access, or the curtilage of an abortion clinic.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), ‘interferes with’ means—
(a) seeks to influence,
(b) persistently, continuously or repeatedly occupies,
(c) impedes or threatens,
(d) intimidates or harasses,
(e) advises or persuades, attempts to advise or persuade, or otherwise expresses opinion,
(f) informs or attempts to inform about abortion services by any means, including, without limitation, graphic, physical, verbal or written means, or
(g) sketches, photographs, records, stores, broadcasts, or transmits images, audio, likenesses or personal data of any person without express consent.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) in the first instance—
(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months,
(ii) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or
(iii) to both; and
(b) on further instances—
(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or to a fine, or to both, or
(ii) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or to both.
(5) Nothing in this section applies to—
(a) anything done in the course of providing, or facilitating the provision of, abortion services in an abortion clinic,
(b) anything done in the course of providing medical care within a GP practice, hospital or other healthcare facility,
(c) the operation of a camera if its coverage of persons accessing or attempting to access an abortion clinic is incidental and the camera or footage is not used for any of the purposes listed in subsection (3), and
(d) a police officer acting properly in the course of their duties.”
New clause 12—Justice impact assessments for Wales—
“(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any provision of this Act, or any regulations which have been made under this Act, which impact on matters which are devolved to Senedd Cymru.
(2) Within one month of the date on which they are made, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any regulations made under this Act which are not included in the assessment required under subsection (1) which impact on matters which are devolved to Senedd Cymru.
(3) The Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers must jointly prepare and publish guidance on the implementation of the provisions on which justice impact assessments have been issued under subsections (1) and (2).”
New clause 13—Intentional harassment, alarm or distress on account of sex—
“(1) A person (P) commits an offence under this section if—
(a) P commits an offence under section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (intentional harassment, alarm or distress), and
(b) P carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of that Act because of the relevant person’s sex In this subsection ‘the relevant person’ means the person to whom P intended to cause, harassment, alarm or distress.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) it does not matter whether or not P carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 for the purposes of sexual gratification.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) it does not matter whether or not P also carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 because of any other factor not mentioned in subsection (1)(b).
(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable–
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court, to a fine or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, to a fine, or to both.
(5) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence under subsection (1), the jury find the person not guilty of the offence charged, they may find the person guilty of the basic offence mentioned in that provision.
(6) References in this section to P carrying out conduct because of another person’s (B’s) sex include references to P doing so because of B’s presumed sex.”
New clause 14—Harassment, alarm or distress on account of sex—
“(1) A person (P) commits an offence under this section if—
(a) P commits an offence under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (harassment, alarm or distress), and
(b) P carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of that Act because of the relevant person’s sex.
In this subsection ‘the relevant person’ means the person to whom P intended to cause, or caused, harassment, alarm or distress.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) it does not matter whether or not P carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 for the purposes of sexual gratification.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) it does not matter whether or not P also carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 because of any other factor not mentioned in subsection (1).
(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;
(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment to a term not exceeding 6 months, or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.
(5) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence under subsection (1), the jury find the person not guilty of the offence charged, they may find the person guilty of the basic offence mentioned in that provision.
(6) References in this section to P carrying out conduct because of another person’s (B’s) sex include references to P doing so because of B’s presumed sex.
(7) It is not a defence under this section for P to claim that they could not reasonably have foreseen that their behaviour may constitute an offence.”
New clause 15—Public inquiry into the impact of policing of public order on Black, Asian and minority ethnic people—
“Within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must set up an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 into the impact of the policing of public order on Black, Asian and minority ethnic people.”
New clause 16—Equality Impact Analyses of provisions of this Act—
“(1) The Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this Act.
(2) A report of the review under this section must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act.
(3) A review under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of this Act on—
(a) households at different levels of income,
(b) people with protected characteristics (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010),
(c) the Government’s compliance with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, and
(d) equality in the different nations of the United Kingdom and different regions of England.
(4) A review under this section must include a separate analysis of each section of the Act, and must also consider the cumulative impact of the Act as a whole.”
New clause 17—Public inquiry into the policing of protests—
“Within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must set up an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 into the policing of public order and protests, including investigation of the use of—
(a) force,
(b) kettling,
(c) police horses,
(d) policing powers contained in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, and policing powers contained in this Act.”
Amendment 3, page 1, line 4, leave out clause 1.
Amendment 28, clause 1, page 1, line 6, after “they” insert
“, without reasonable excuse, and using a device or substance that impedes detachment”.
This amendment, together with Amendment 30, would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” away from the Defendant and make it an element of the offence. It would also narrow the meaning of “attach” to focus on the use of devices or substances that make removing the protester difficult.
Amendment 29, clause 1, page 1, line 10, leave out paragraph (1)(b) and insert
“that act causes, or is likely to cause, serious disruption to the life of the community, and”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by replacing the current threshold of serious disruption with a higher threshold based on serious disruption to the life of the community (defined in Amendment 32).
Amendment 30, clause 1, page 1, line 16, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 31, clause 1, page 1, line 20, leave out
“the maximum term for summary offences”
and insert “three months”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by reducing the maximum penalty for the offence of locking on.
Amendment 32, clause 1, page 2, line 1, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—
“(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest in a democracy by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
(5) For the purposes of subsection 1(b), “serious disruption to the life of the community” means a prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to—
(i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(ii) a system of communication,
(iii) a place of worship,
(iv) a transport facility,
(v) an educational institution, or
(vi) a service relating to health.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an express requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions when locking on. It also provides detail on the meaning of serious disruption to the life of the community.
Amendment 4, page 2, line 11, leave out clause 2.
Amendment 33, clause 2, page 2, line 13, leave out
“may be used in the course of or in connection with”
and insert “will be used in”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of this offence.
Amendment 5, page 2, line 20, leave out clause 3.
Amendment 6, page 3, line 23, leave out clause 4.
Amendment 7, page 4, line 19, leave out clause 5.
Amendment 8, page 4, line 35, leave out clause 6.
Amendment 34, clause 6, page 4, line 36, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person obstructs the undertaker or a person acting under the authority of the undertaker—
(i) in setting out the lines of any major transport works,
(ii) in constructing or maintaining any major transport works, or
(iii) in taking any steps that are reasonably necessary for the purposes of facilitating the construction or maintenance of any major transport works, or
(b) the person interferes with, moves or removes any apparatus which—
(i) relates to the construction or maintenance of any major transport works, and
(ii) belongs to a person within subsection (5), and
(c) that act causes, or is likely to cause, significant disruption to setting out the lines of, the construction of or the maintenance of the major transport works affected, and
(d) the person intends their act—
(i) to obstruct the undertaker or person acting under the authority of the undertaker as mentioned in paragraph (a) or to interfere with or remove the apparatus as mentioned in paragraph (b), and
(ii) to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (c) or are reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of this offence to ensure it criminalises only conduct that would cause or be likely to cause serious disruption to major transport works. It would also introduce a requirement of intention or recklessness.
Amendment 35, page 5, line 9, leave out
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that”
and insert
“A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” or that the act was part of a trade dispute away from the Defendant and making it an element of the offence.
Amendment 36, page 5, line 14, at end insert—
“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an explicit requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions.
Amendment 9, page 6, line 42, leave out clause 7.
Amendment 37, clause 7, page 7, line 5, leave out
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that”
and insert
“A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” or that the act was part of a trade dispute away from the Defendant and making it an element of the offence.
Amendment 38, page 7, line 10, at end insert—
“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an explicit requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions.
Amendment 39, page 7, line 18, leave out “to any extent” and insert “to a significant extent”.This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of the offence to prevent it sweeping up minor interference.
Amendment 40, page 7, line 22, after “means” insert “an essential element of”.This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the meaning of “key national infrastructure” to exclude inessential elements of infrastructure.
Amendment 51, page 7, line 31, at end insert—
“(j) farms and food production infrastructure.”
Amendment 10, page 8, line 17, leave out clause 8.
Amendment 41, clause 8, page 8, line 24, leave out “or B”.
Amendment 42, page 8, line 27, after “Act)” insert
“, but excludes infrastructure that is not essential for the purposes of transporting goods or passengers by railway”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “rail infrastructure” so as to ensure the offence does not extend to interference with inessential elements.
Amendment 43, page 8, line 39, after “Act)” insert—
“(c) but excludes infrastructure that is not essential for the purposes of transporting goods or passengers by air”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “air transport infrastructure” so as to ensure the offence does not extend to interference with inessential elements.
Amendment 44, page 8, line 41, leave out “or in connection with”.
This amendment, together with Amendments 45 to 48, would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence, and reduce uncertainty, by narrowing what amounts to key national infrastructure.
Amendment 45, page 9, line 5, leave out “or in connection with”.See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.
Amendment 46, page 9, line 20, leave out “or in connection with”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.
Amendment 47, page 9, line 35, leave out “or in connection with”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.
Amendment 48, page 10, line 1, , leave out “or in connection with”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.
Amendment 49, page 10, line 18, leave out
“‘newspaper’ includes a periodical or magazine.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “newspaper” so as to prevent it extending to any periodical or magazine.
Amendment 52, page 10, line 18, at end insert–—
“(16) “Farms and food production infrastructure” means—
(a) any infrastructure, used for the commercial growing of crops and horticultural produce or rearing of livestock for human consumption or as an ingredient in items for human consumption; or
(b) any premises on which items for human consumption are processed, produced, or manufactured for commercial purposes; or
(c) any abattoir.”
Amendment 11, page 10, line 20, leave out clause 9.
Amendment 12, page 11, line 1, leave out clause 10.
Amendment 13, page 12, line 29, leave out clause 11.
Amendment 14, page 13, line 9, leave out clause 12.
Amendment 15, page 13, line 33, leave out clause 13.
Amendment 16, page 14, line 6, leave out clause 14.
Amendment 17, page 14, line 15, leave out clause 15.
Amendment 1, page 18, line 7, leave out clause 16.
Amendment 2, page 20, line 15, leave out clause 17.
Amendment 20, page 22, line 11, leave out clause 18.
Amendment 21, page 23, line 12, leave out clause 19.
Amendment 22, page 24, line 12, leave out clause 20.
Amendment 23, page 25, line 20, leave out clause 21.
Amendment 24, page 26, line 9, leave out clause 22.
Amendment 25, page 27, line 1, leave out clause 23.
Amendment 26, page 27, line 8, leave out clause 24.
Amendment 27, page 27, line 26, leave out clause 25.
Amendment 53, page 29, line 33, leave out clause 26.
Amendment 54, page 30, line 28, leave out clause 27.
Amendment 55, page 31, line 8, leave out clause 28.
Amendment 56, page 31, line 23, leave out clause 29.
Amendment 57, page 31, line 30, leave out clause 30.
Amendment 58, page 32, line 10, leave out clause 31.
Government new schedule 1—Injunctions in Secretary of State proceedings: powers to remand.
Government amendment 50.
I thank hon. Members who have joined us for this important debate today and I look forward to the lively discussion that we are bound to have over the course of the afternoon. Although there will inevitably be differences of opinion, which I will come on to, I hope we can all agree on the fundamental point that should be underpinning this discussion—namely, that it is completely unacceptable for a selfish minority to wreak havoc on the lives of people going about their daily business. I would like to open the debate by speaking to the amendments in the Government’s name, and I will respond to other amendments in my closing remarks.
I will also touch on new clause 11, which covers abortion clinic buffer zones. We totally endorse the sentiment behind the new clause, but I look forward to setting out in my summing up why measures in existing legislation combined with the growing use of public space protection orders—PSPOs—can be used and are effective.
I think the hon. Lady will want to hear me out.
We recognise that this is a matter closely associated with issue of abortion, on which people have very strong views across the House. Therefore, as far as we are concerned, there will be a free vote on new clause 11. Members will hear the debate, and I will set out why the current legislation is proportionate and how PSPOs are increasingly being used and are increasingly effective, but this is a matter on which hon. Members will make their own judgment.
Before going further into the debate, it might be helpful if I briefly recap what the Bill does and does not do. This Bill does not criminalise the right to protest, as some hon. Members have said. The right to protest is a fundamental principle of our democracy, and that will never change. Any suggestion that we are intent on interfering with or watering down the right to protest peacefully is simply wrong.
What the Bill does is target acts that cause serious disruption, such as those that wreak havoc on our roads, disrupt thousands of journeys, cost the taxpayer millions and put lives in danger. It does this by giving the police the enhanced powers they need to respond to such disruption and better balance the rights of protesters with the right of the public to go about their daily lives.
I will now speak to Government new clauses 7 and 8, Government new schedule 1 and Government amendment 50. Some of the protest tactics we have seen in recent months have had significant consequences for the public. Protests such as those by Insulate Britain and Just Stop Oil have targeted fuel supply chains and created blockades. Indeed, hon. Members will be familiar with recent images of ambulances, fire services and cars carrying babies to hospital being blocked by the selfish actions of protesters in the name of Just Stop Oil. These tactics are not only seriously disruptive but dangerous.
We have heard the Opposition’s calls to ensure that injunctions are in place to prevent serious disruption, including through new clause 4 tabled by the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones). It is a pleasure to see her in her place, and I look forward to working with her across this Dispatch Box.
We have seen how effective injunctions can be, and we believe we can build on the current position in which only private persons and local authorities can pursue this legal remedy through the courts. That is why the Government tabled new clauses 7 and 8, new schedule 1 and amendment 50 to provide the Secretary of State with a specific mechanism to apply for an injunction where it is in the public interest to do so because the activity causes serious disruption to key national infrastructure, prevents access to essential goods or services, or has a serious adverse impact on the public. This will be accompanied by a power of arrest to support swifter enforcement action. This does not affect the right of local authorities or private landowners to apply for an injunction, but it gives the Secretary of State an additional way to act in the public interest where the potential impact is serious and widespread.
These measures will support better co-ordination between the Government, law enforcement, local authorities and private landowners in responding to serious disruptive behaviour. We know injunctions can play a major role in helping to constrain some of the tactics deployed and, as a result, can limit serious disruption. Although I understand the sentiment behind new clause 4, tabled by the hon. Member for Croydon Central, I do not think it achieves the change she seeks, as the law already enables private persons and local authorities to pursue an injunction where they can evidence harm to their rights or interests in civil law. The police already have a range of powers and avenues to manage protest and to act on criminal or antisocial behaviour.
I therefore encourage the hon. Lady not to press her new clause and to support Government new clauses 7 and 8, new schedule 1 and amendment 50.
I rise to support all the amendments in the name of the Labour Front Bench, and to speak to new clauses 11, 13 and 14.
I put on record my gratitude to the Minister for respecting the convention that issues around abortion are matters of conscience, and new clause 11 is about abortion because, let us be honest, nobody is praying outside the places where people go to have a hip operation. Nobody offers rosary beads or dead foetuses outside the places people go when they have an ankle injury. This is about women accessing a very specific form of healthcare.
This goes to the heart of the Bill. Whatever the Bill’s merits, it is about protest. At the point at which women are accessing an abortion, they have made a decision and they are not opening themselves up for a debate or further discussion. These women are often in a very vulnerable state, and they want to be able to access basic healthcare.
New clause 11 would not stop free speech on abortion, and it would not stop people protesting. I have regularly been subjected to protests, and new clause 11 would do nothing to stop the protests I have experienced from many of the people involved in this subject. New clause 11 simply says that people should not have a right to protest in another person’s face, and very often these protesters are right up in front of people, at a point when they have made a decision.
I rise to speak to the amendments in my name and the name of the hon. Member for Vauxhall (Florence Eshalomi), which arise from the legislative scrutiny of the Bill by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. They are amendments 28 to 31, 33, 34 to 36, 37 to 40 and 41 to 49, and also amendments 12 to 15, which appear first in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin), and 1 and 2.
I remind hon. Members that the Joint Committee is a cross-party Committee with half its members from the House of Commons and half from the House of Lords, and we undertake scrutiny of the human rights implications of all Bills. I speak here in my capacity as the Chair of the Committee rather than in my personal capacity. I have great sympathy for new clause 11—similar measures are being taken in the Scottish jurisdiction—but, as my Committee did not have the chance to consider it, I will not be speaking about that new clause.
The Public Order Bill contains further significant changes to the law on public order in England and Wales, following on from those introduced in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. It is obvious from my accent that I am a Scottish MP. Despite the fact that this law only applies in England and Wales, it is of interest to a lot of Scots, because they come to London to protest—I see the Minister laughing, but it is the truth, and many of us have been doing it for years, since before we were elected to this House.
I welcome that. I am a firm believer that we are stronger together and a firm believer in the Union. I always welcome hearing the views of Scots people in London, and indeed of English people who wish to protest in Edinburgh.
I suspect the Minister will still hear our views after we become independent, so I would not get too upset about that.
During the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, the Joint Committee looked very carefully at a large volume of responses and heard from two panels of witnesses about the issue of the public order provisions. The Minister has said the stated intention of the Bill is to strengthen police powers to tackle dangerous and highly disruptive protest, but we think the measures go beyond that, to the extent that we believe they pose an unacceptable threat to the fundamental right to engage in peaceful protest. That was the conclusion of the Committee’s report dated 17 June, in which we proposed the amendments that I am speaking to today.
I am grateful to have the opportunity to support new clause 11, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq). She has got into a bit of a scrape because she said something silly, but those of us who know her know that she is an extremely committed parliamentarian and very public spirited, and I hope that order will be restored in that department as soon as possible.
I also congratulate the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) on new clause 11 and I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes) for supporting it. I note that SNP Members support the new clause, although I am not sure whether they will vote on it—they might decide that it is an English measure—but it is interesting that similar measures are being considered in Scotland.
I am grateful to the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Jeremy Quin), who kindly saw me at short notice yesterday about this matter. The Government may well oppose this new clause. I hope they do not, but I know they are seized of the issue and are giving it consideration. I will listen very carefully to what he has to say about it later.
“Clinic harassment” is the term used to describe the presence outside abortion clinics of groups who seek to dissuade and deter women from accessing healthcare that is their right under our law. Many people would call them protests, but mere protest is not the purpose of the activity and the groups who organise them do not call them protests. It is not about politics or campaigning; it is about stopping individual women from accessing their legal rights. New clause 11 would simply introduce a statutory buffer zone around any location where abortion services or advice are provided, making it illegal to carry out such activities as those eloquently described by the hon. Member for Walthamstow.
We are told that the scale of the problem is small and does not require a national response. That is false. Every year, around 100,000 women are treated by a clinic targeted by these groups. In the last three weeks alone, at least 15 clinics across the country have had people outside, including clinics based in hospitals, GP surgeries and in residential areas. That has impacted hundreds of women’s care and psychological wellbeing.
We are also told that the police and councils already have powers to restrict harmful protests. If that is true, why are they still happening? The fact is that abortion providers have proactively tried to use all the laws suggested by the Home Office to stem the problem, but even where individual protesters and groups have been dealt with by the courts and local authorities, the presence outside clinics has not stopped.
Let us be absolutely clear: we are not debating the principle of whether these so-called protests should be banned; they already are banned in certain places, and the principle of that has been supported by the House. We are just asking whether the existing statutory arrangements—the public spaces protection orders—used by councils to introduce buffer zones around individual clinics are effective. Only five out of 50 targeted clinics are protected.
There are three issues relating to PSPOs: they create a random patchwork of protections, which is inadequate; they are expensive to introduce and very difficult to uphold in the courts; and crucially, they can be introduced only with evidence that harassment is taking place. I made this point to my hon. Friend the Minister last night, and it is a painful thing for him to have to accept, but it is the Government’s policy that women should be harassed outside abortion clinics before a PSPO can be issued. Can the House think of any other policy that requires women to be harassed before the Government or the local authority do something that is perfectly justified? That is an immoral basis for PSPOs.
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point, as indeed he did yesterday evening. I was concerned and looked into the matter. The antisocial behaviour statutory guidance states that a PSPO can be made by a council if it is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the activity or behaviour carried out, or likely to be carried out, in a public space has had, or is likely to have, a detrimental impact. I hope that gives him some reassurance that if activity is anticipated and people are concerned that it may take place, there is a means whereby a PSPO may be taken out. He might not consider that a perfect scenario, but where an activity is foreseeable, action can be taken in advance.
I say rather wryly to my hon. Friend, “Good try.” But it is not really adequate, is it? All our local authorities are under huge spending pressure and do not want to spend money on drafting orders and so on, so what local authority will be preoccupied with this problem unless there is a problem? The strength of the case for implementing a PSPO is supported by evidence of likelihood, which will only be evident if the activity has already happened. I am afraid that my hon. Friend the Minister has not really addressed the point, although I commend him for making a good attempt.
We are also told that these groups are only quietly praying and that there is no harassment involved. Well, the hon. Member for Walthamstow told us about what happens, and sometimes people attend in very large numbers.
My final comment on this may answer points that my hon. Friend the Minister will make later. I have been involved for years in discussions with the Home Office, and here I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins) for the assiduous attention she gave us as she wrestled with this problem, which I know has vexed her. Although she never persuaded the Government to accept a previous amendment, the sincerity of her engagement with us was wonderful, and I am grateful. So finally, we are also told that our amendment contravenes protesters’ human rights. Well, I note that the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), does not think that is the case—albeit that the Committee has not actually considered this amendment.
We have to recognise that rights have to be balanced, and the exercise of one person’s rights are very often to another person’s detriment. We have to strike a balance, and my argument is that new clause 11 strikes the right balance. The amendment would not stop people sharing their opinions about the vexed issue of abortion. It balances the rights of people who oppose abortion with the rights of women to access healthcare confidentially and free from harassment and intimidation. It does not ban protest; it simply moves it down the road to preserve the space immediately outside the clinic for women seeking care, and for nurses and doctors providing that care. In Committee, when asked about this directly by the Minister, rights groups did not oppose new clause 11. Canada, Australia, Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland and Scotland all have comparable laws in place or are in the process of introducing them.
I need not detain the House any longer. If the House does not support this amendment tonight, the argument will carry on until an acceptable means of protecting women exercising their legal rights is found. I am grateful to the Government for allowing a free vote on the matter, which is right and proper in the circumstances.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce), although I respectfully disagree with her position on this, and I will come to that shortly. I also welcome the Minister to his post.
I do not think anybody in this House was not deeply irritated by the sight of an ambulance having to turn around and go a different route because of protesters glued to the road, and I do not think there are many people in this House, when they saw protesters throwing soup at a van Gogh painting, who did not at least question whether that action had helped or hindered the cause of climate change. We all passionately believe in the right to protest, do we not? But we all understand that our fundamental freedoms are always balanced with the need to ensure business can carry on in its usual way.
That is why I thank the police for their response to the protesters who blocked the ambulance. They arrested 26 people for wilful obstruction of a highway and removed people glued to the road. Wilful obstruction is an offence that can carry a prison sentence. I also thank the police for the way in which they dealt with the incident in the National Gallery. Two people have been charged with criminal damage, which is an offence that can carry prison sentence.
Madam Deputy Speaker, you may ask yourself why, if the police were quick to respond, quick to arrest and quick to charge, we are debating a Public Order Bill to create a raft of new powers to tackle protest, after we have only just finished debating another Bill—the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022—which has introduced another raft of new provisions against protest.
Is the hon. Lady therefore fully satisfied that the powers that exist are fully complete and fully perfect in all respects? Is she satisfied that police officers will be taken from her constituency to police central London to guard the public from protests? Should we not be taking stronger action?
Over the past few days I have been accused of being tired, emotional, erratic, and, just to put the record straight, I am all of those things and more. I want to be clear: unlike some Members in this Chamber, I have no time for those people who block roads, throw soup, and make a general nuisance of themselves. They are agents against their own interests, as they repel normal ordinary people. Having said that, serious disruption prevention orders are not the answer. They leave me absolutely cold; in fact I would go so far as to say that they are absolutely appalling because there are plenty of existing laws that can be utilised to deal with people who specialise in making other people’s lives miserable.
I know there is a convention here that we do not read lists, but I hope, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I will be allowed to read a very short list just to set out the laws that already exist and have been covered by colleagues: obstructing a police officer, Police Act 1996; obstructing a highway, Highways Act 1980; obstruction of an engine, Malicious Damage Act 1861—we all remember that one —endangering road users, Road Traffic Act 1988; aggravated trespass, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; criminal damage, Criminal Damage Act 1971; and public nuisance, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. There are also other laws. There is the Public Order Act 1986 that allows police officers to ban or place conditions on protest.
So the Government’s attraction to SDPOs demonstrates our own impotence as legislators and the impotence of the police as law enforcers to get to grips with the laws already in place and to enforce them. This is what we do now in politics: we have these machismo laws where something must be done, so we go out and do it, and that makes a good headline in The Daily Telegraph and The Times, but we do it and then very little happens, or if it does happen it is way over the top.
My hon. Friend rightly compliments the police for routinely arresting and charging those who are responsible for wrongdoing. Does he agree that it is not an acceptable circumstance where 460 individuals have been arrested a total of 910 times for Just Stop Oil protests and that there is a difficult point of cumulation that we must accept?
I rise to speak in support of several amendments, including new clauses 1 to 5, tabled by the official Opposition, and new clauses 9 to 14. I agree that there should be a free vote on new clause 11, to which I am sympathetic and which I will support. The speeches on it so far have been very powerful. I also wish to speak to new clauses 15 to 17—the hon. Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), who is no longer in her place, spoke powerfully about them—and to the amendments tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) on behalf of the SNP, and by the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Sir Charles Walker).
I speak on behalf of my constituents who are concerned about what the Bill means for the right to protest. It might be argued that the Bill will not affect them directly, but like the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, I have constituents who will travel to England and Wales to protest. As I highlighted in my intervention about mutual aid policing arrangements, the Bill is likely to mean additional training requirements for Scottish officers deployed elsewhere, as at last year’s G7 meeting.
We have heard from many Members of this House with a legal background and training, but I believe I am the only former police officer in this debate; I do not see the other two hon. Members who I know were police officers. I am also the wife and daughter of former police officers—indeed, my husband was a senior public order commander—and I am the stepmother of serving police officers. I have policed demonstrations. It might have been some time ago, but I speak with some knowledge and direct experience.
Laws should be necessary, but as we heard in our Bill Committee evidence, the police already have the power to respond to protests; I am grateful to the hon. Member for Broxbourne for raising that point. Ideally, laws should not break our already stretched systems—that was an area of focus for me in Committee—but this law risks our police’s very ability to tackle day-to-day crime, which the Home Secretary says is a priority for the Government.
Regardless of rank, length of service or extent of training, the first officer to attend any incident—protest or otherwise—is the officer in charge until they are relieved of that duty. I say that not to denigrate, but to illustrate. That officer will have to determine whether there is a risk of serious disruption and, if so, whether an offence under the Bill or any other law is being committed. I am concerned that there is a risk of inconsistent application of the criminal law and a breach of the rule of law. I therefore support the official Opposition’s new clauses 1 to 5, which would ensure that the Bill’s provisions are applied appropriately.
It is not just me. The National Police Chiefs’ Council’s evidence to the Bill Committee suggested similar concerns, which would be at least partially addressed by some of the amendments, particularly those tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West to implement the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I remain concerned that the police, particularly those in junior roles, may end up ill-equipped to make the judgment calls that the Bill requires.
Let us be clear: the police do not need this Bill to respond when protests cross the line. Where there is criminal damage or trespass, they already have the power to respond. However, if the Bill is passed with no amendments but the Government’s, all protest will effectively be frozen for fear of being caught by the legislation. Importantly, the Bill is also likely—I refer to the comments that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones), made about policing in France and elsewhere—to freeze the police’s relationships with a wide range of activist groups, which involve constant dialogue to balance the facilitation of protests with the rights of others to go about their daily business. That dialogue happens all the time in all our communities and is something to be celebrated.
I deeply respect the hon. Lady’s policing experience and that of her family, but she has implied that the Bill will allow the freezing of protests and an inability to protest, which is not the case. I think that, as a former police officer, she would recognise serious disruption. We are absolutely clear about this: a protest constitutes something that is really interfering with people’s way of life, preventing them from getting to work and engaging in their normal business.
What I am trying to say is that the existing legislation already deals with those circumstances, and that, given that some of the Bill’s provisions mean that people need not even have done anything to be subject to them, there is a fear that it will prevent them from doing anything at all. I believe that the fact that our police service is grounded in policing by consent—unlike those in other countries whose police forces have evolved from more militaristic origins—is something to be celebrated.
If the police do not need the powers, if all that the Bill does is make it harder for legitimate protest to take place and if it restricts the right of citizens, I would argue that we do not need it at all. We should reflect on the fact that the Minister, in his opening remarks, claimed that the existing legislation was a reason for rejecting new clause 11.
Let me now raise another point, which I have touched on already. It is not about protecting the democratic rights of our citizens, but in many ways it is just as important, because it concerns the real impact on the capacity of the police service. In Committee I tabled a number of amendments, and although I have not tabled them again on Report, this is a key consideration.
When we pass poor legislation, we sometimes see the results in our constituency surgeries, but when it comes to legislation such as this, we will not be dealing with the outcomes directly. I believe that if the Government are confident that the Bill, in its current form, will do what it is intended to do, they should be comfortable with receiving reports from the College of Policing and from police forces about the capability and capacity of those forces to deliver the legislation—and that is before we even think about the huge backlogs in the criminal justice system. It will take some time for people to come before the courts in the context of this Bill.
The proposed new powers will require additional officer training. Sir Peter Fahy, the former chief constable of Greater Manchester Police, gave evidence to the Bill Committee. The simple fact is this:
“If there are not enough police officers trained to properly respond to protests and apply these new laws, that means that more people must be trained—training that costs thousands of pounds and means that officers are potentially in classrooms, not out on the street.”––[Official Report, Public Order Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2022; c. 191]
Chris Noble, the chief constable of Staffordshire Police, estimated that, under the current legislation, it takes an officer two or three weeks per year to keep up with necessary additional public order skills. The offences specified in the Bill will require significantly more training at the outset, at the least, and will mean even more days of actual policing lost at significant cost, with simply abstracts from core policing duties. Once the officers are trained, it is likely that deployment to protests will increase as a result of the Bill’s restrictions. Simply put, people cannot be in two places at once, and resources are limited. According to evidence given to the Committee, the arrest of a protester usually involves six officers. We will run out of police officers before we run out of protesters.
I know where I would rather the police were. I would rather see an officer making sure that the streets were safe for women and girls walking home at night, going after gangs and those working across county lines, stopping the scammers who target our elderly and vulnerable, working on counter-terrorism, and preventing organised crime. I ask colleagues to reflect on what they and their constituents really want when faced with the reality of these choices, which were made even more stark by the Chancellor when he stood at the Dispatch Box yesterday.
Policing by consent is one of the greatest attributes of our country, and it is something that I am passionate about. The Bill undermines that. Although we will support amendments that curb its worst excesses, I will continue to argue that the decision in the other place to remove these clauses when they were part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was correct. I cannot support the Bill in its current form.
Order. I am expecting four Divisions when the Minister resumes his seat.
I hope that we will have fewer, Mr Deputy Speaker, and that hon. Members will be withdrawing their amendments during my remarks.
I start by thanking the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) and all hon. Members who have contributed to this lively debate. I know that all hon. Members treat this debate and these issues with the great seriousness and concern that they deserve. With the leave of the House, I will respond to some of the points made throughout the debate and to some of the key amendments.
I will start with the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Sir Charles Walker) and the hon. Member for Glasgow North East—appropriately—which seek to remove the serious disruption prevention orders from the Bill. My hon. Friend said that he was cold when he turned up today. I think he misheard me from a sedentary position; I merely said that he had certainly warmed up during his speech.
Our experience of some of the recent protests has shown that the police are encountering the same individuals who are determined to repeatedly inflict disruption on the public. For example, as of July this year, 460 individuals had been arrested a total of 910 times at Just Stop Oil protests, while during Insulate Britain’s campaign, 268 individuals were arrested a total of 977 times. It cannot be right that a small group of individuals can repeatedly commit criminal offences against our roads and railways, to name only a few places, and not face appropriate restrictions.
The Minister is his usual charming self, but what we are talking about is putting ankle tags on people who have not been convicted of any crime. That just does seem way over the top.
That would be a decision made by a court in very specific circumstances, and I do trust our courts to take appropriate action. They can only do so on the weight of evidence, and they are very used to taking these decisions. After all, there is a tried and tested process whereby injunctions can be sought and obtained to prevent a future harm. I do not think this is as radical as my hon. Friend is suggesting. However, I congratulate him on the points he made, even though I disagree with him, and also my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner (David Simmonds) on his contribution to this point of the debate. I would love to prevail on my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne to withdraw his amendment, but I do not think that is going to happen, and I look forward to opposing it.
Turning to the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones), I spoke earlier in the debate about why we believe that injunctions are useful. We absolutely accept the point being made by the hon. Lady that they are appropriate when used properly, and that is why we have tabled our amendments. I think ours is a more competent and effective way of achieving our shared objectives.
On new clause 5, which seeks to define the meaning of “serious disruption” for the purposes of this Bill, I have to say that no two protests, nor the operational response required, are ever the same. Being too prescriptive risks the ability of the police to respond to fast-evolving protest tactics while also risking the exploitation of loopholes by those intent on causing as much disruption as possible. That is not to say that I dismiss the principle of this amendment. There is a balance to be struck between a definition that is broad and one that is prescriptive, so while I do not agree with the hon. Lady’s amendment, we will reflect further on its intent.
I turn now to perhaps the most vexed issue in today’s debate—namely, new clause 11, proposed by the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy). New clause 11 seeks to create 150-metre buffer zones outside abortion clinics in which all activity interfering with a person’s right to access abortion services would be prohibited. As the hon. Lady would accept, that is a blunt instrument. It is there to achieve an objective, but within those 150-metre buffer zones there could be houses and churches, and this would be a national decision covering the 150 metres around all clinics.
At the outset of the debate, I made it clear that, from the Government’s perspective, it is a free vote for members of our party. My good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), said that this is a difficult issue to grapple with, and it is indeed difficult. However, I would like to make it clear that it is entirely possible to support totally a woman’s right to an abortion and to view protests outside abortion clinics as abhorrent while still believing that the current legislative framework provides an appropriate response.
I think the Minister should now be persuaded, particularly as one of his predecessors, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), has now made it clear that she supports this amendment. It is time for the Government to say that we have to recognise that the present arrangements are not adequate, and we will be thinking about how to build on the arguments that have been presented in new clause 11. Just to rest on the status quo is not a sufficient response, however the Government vote today.
I sympathise with the sentiment behind new clause 11. I hope we all agree that it is wholly unacceptable for women to feel harassed or intimidated when accessing abortion services. However, bearing in mind the size, scale and frequency of those protests, it is still our view that placing a nationwide blanket ban on protests outside all abortion clinics in England and Wales would be a blunt approach and disproportionate given the existing powers that can and should be used.
I know that the Minister is listening both to the testimony of previous colleagues and the sentiment across the House, but might the answer to this lie in the great institutions of this place, in that we should accept this amendment today and seek to further refine how it could work in the other place? We could today send a message to the other place that we will grapple with the issue and resolve it. The testimony from the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), a former Home Office Minister, powerfully set out that this is a road to travel. The challenge in this place is that without those opportunities for scrutiny and further refinement, the status quo will remain, and what the Minister is hearing from across the House is that the status quo is not acceptable. Might that not be a way forward?
My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle mentioned the reviews that have been done: the review conducted in 2018 went into this in great depth and there has been further work since, and the hon. Lady referred to further work being done in relation to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. That maintained the Government position that the current arrangements are still proportionate. There is legislation; the Public Order Act 1986 and the PSPOs provide those routes, and we continue to believe that is proportionate, but this is ongoing work and we need to continue to ensure that it is still proportionate. I will be reviewing and making certain that I understand fully the pattern of protests and the effectiveness and indeed the cost of PSPOs, and I will certainly make sure that that work is constantly refreshed if the House agrees we should maintain the current legislative environment.
There are existing laws to protect people from harassment and intimidation outside abortion clinics. The police have robust powers to deal with protests that obstruct access to clinics, and cause alarm, harassment or distress, and where protests cause harm, we expect the police and local authorities to work together at the local level to respond in a way that takes into consideration the local facts, issues and circumstances. In addition, local authorities already have powers to implement PSPOs; these can be introduced when a local authority is satisfied that protests are having, or are likely to have, a detrimental effect. We have seen increased use of these in recent weeks, with five local authorities imposing an order outside abortion clinics.
Because some of our colleagues will not have been able to follow the whole debate, will the Minister confirm what I believe he is saying, which is that he personally will vote against new clause 11 this afternoon?
It is a free vote and I will be voting against the amendment. I believe the powers and legislative environment we have are appropriate at the current juncture, and that is the position the Government have taken in the past. It is also the case that we continue to do work on this; I will continue to ensure that we are reviewing the scale of protests, the adequacy of the current legislative framework, and the effectiveness and cost of PSPOs. We need to maintain that work although I will be voting against the amendment this afternoon.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) said that, if the new clause falls, he will not give up. I would have been surprised had he said anything else, and I would be surprised if the hon. Member for Walthamstow gave up if she lost the vote. As I said, we will continue to review and assess this area, but it is important to get it right. There are powerful arguments on both sides of the debate, as enunciated by my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce), the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), and, on the other side, the hon. Member for Walthamstow, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle and my right hon. Friends the Members for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes) and for Harwich and North Essex. I have set out how, through the current legislation and PSPOs, a lot can be done. The House will determine whether it believes that to be insufficient.
I turn to new clauses 13 and 14 tabled, again, by the hon. Member for Walthamstow, who is a passionate campaigner on these issues. In last year’s “Tackling violence against women and girls strategy”, we confirmed that we are looking carefully at where there may be gaps in existing law and how a specific offence of public sexual harassment could address them. In the light of that work, just before summer recess, we launched a targeted consultation on whether there should be a specific offence of public sexual harassment and, if so, what it should look like. The hon. Lady knows that. The consultation closed in September, and we are grateful to her for sending us her comments. We are working at pace to analyse the responses and to determine the best way forward. I reassure her that, for example, her comments on foreseeability of intent are absolutely part of that consultation. What I cannot do—I am sorry to disappoint her—is give a commitment today on our next steps. That would not be appropriate until we fully analyse the consultation. I look forward to sharing our views with the House as soon as possible.
I turn to the several amendments tabled on the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Again, I thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and the Committee for the vital work that they do in supporting parliamentary scrutiny, as was referred to by the hon. Member for North East Fife (Wendy Chamberlain) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner. Amendments 28, 30, 35 and 37 aim to move the burden of proof for a reasonable excuse from the defendant to the prosecution for the relevant offences. As we made clear in our formal response to the Committee’s report, whether or not someone has a reasonable excuse for their actions is specific to each incident, and we see it as entirely appropriate that the defendant who committed the offence in the first place and has personal knowledge of those facts is required to prove them. Beyond that, our courts are experts in assessing whether an individual has a reasonable excuse for a multitude of criminal offences. I do not see the value in placing that burden on the prosecution.
Amendments 32, 36 and 38 seek to require the courts to have particular regard to articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights when assessing whether someone has a reasonable excuse for offences. Courts and other public bodies are already obliged to act compatibly with ECHR, and we do not believe that it is necessary to repeat that obligation.
Finally, several amendments seek to narrow the Bill’s scope. I will not address each individual amendment. The Government believe that the scope of the offences is not only appropriate but proportionate to the serious disruption inflicted.
I turn to a couple of other amendments.
I was about to turn to my hon. Friend. She tabled amendments 51 and 52, which would add farms and food production infrastructure to the list of key national infrastructure. That would significantly increase the scope of the Bill. As she is aware, there are some 216,000 farm holdings and 13,560 food and drink manufacturers—it goes on. However, I understand and am sympathetic to the point she made about the importance of food and food manufacture. I will take up with my colleagues in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs whether we need to look further at that area in the Bill, and I will share with her the results of that at pace.
I thank my hon. Friend for recognising that the actions of vegan militias over the summer in disrupting milk supply chains were unacceptable. They hurt our farmers and our food security. When he tasks his officials and those of DEFRA to look at that, will he commit to meeting me in December and consider secondary legislation to protect our food producers and our food security?
I am delighted to confirm that I will meet my hon. Friend in December and talk through our view with her, having discussed it. I am sympathetic to how food is an important aspect of our national resilience.
On stop and search, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Battersea (Marsha De Cordova) for tabling new clauses 9 and 10, and to the hon. Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) for speaking to them so capably. The Home Office continues to publish extensive data on the use of stop and search to drive transparency. That will continue with the introduction of these new powers. As my predecessor did in Committee, I can assure the hon. Lady that data on the use of these powers will be collected and published. It will be broken down by age, gender and ethnicity and include the outcome of the search, as for existing stop-and-search powers. On the creation of an independent reviewer of the powers, I point the hon. Lady to the existing independent bodies, to which she referred, the IOPC and His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services, which will ensure that proper oversight of the powers is embedded in its inspections.