Fiona Bruce
Main Page: Fiona Bruce (Conservative - Congleton)Department Debates - View all Fiona Bruce's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI rise to oppose new clause 11 on the basis of its grave implications—indeed, threats—to freedom of thought, conscience, speech, belief and assembly. Let us be clear: new clause 11 flies directly in the face of those freedoms. It has far wider implications than on abortion alone; it potentially criminalises even those who simply stand peaceably near abortion clinics, and who do so mainly on the basis of their faith-based beliefs. I believe that the clause contravenes human rights. Notably, for example, article 18 of the universal declaration of human rights states:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
The broad wording of new clause 11 is open to such wide interpretation, particularly the words “seeks to influence”, that it could well catch virtually any activity. The proposed criminalisation of influencing is imprecise, unclear and unpredictable in its effect and potential impact, which contravenes the basic principle of certainty of the rule of law. Certainty is vital so that citizens can tailor their behaviour and remain within the law’s boundaries. Could a social worker advising a confused teenager going to an abortion clinic be seen as influencing within the meaning of this clause and therefore be at risk of criminal liability? This new clause fails the test of certainty and should be rejected for that reason alone.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way and I am listening carefully to what she is saying, which I know reflects beliefs of great sincerity. Does that mean, however, that she is against the existing law that allows local authorities to ban those same activities around abortion clinics, for example, on a selective basis? It seems to me that the House has already accepted that principle. If she cannot accept that principle, we really are on a different page.
I have spoken against that principle on a number of occasions in this place and I will come on to explain why.
The wording of new clause 11 could even catch those who are quietly praying, but when did it become against the law in this country to pray? Unfortunately, five councils have now defined protest as including the word “prayer”. During court proceedings, that has even been confirmed to include silent prayer. That is a grave development that we in this House, more than anyone, must stand against. Staggeringly, it would effectively mean criminalising the affairs going on within the privacy of an individual’s mind. Yet freedom of thought is an absolute, unqualified right. As the Minister for the Americas and the Overseas Territories said earlier today in response to the urgent question, peaceful protest is a “fundamental part” of UK society.
Whatever our individual views on abortion, we must stand against new clause 11. Otherwise, we risk opening the door to discrimination even more widely. Why not have buffer zones around political conferences? A young Hongkonger told me yesterday that when she attended the recent Conservative party conference, she was “scared” of accessing the conference centre because of the aggressive behaviour of political opponents around it, yet there is no suggestion of having buffer zones there, and nor should there be. As MPs, we would be aghast if we risked a fine and imprisonment simply for handing out a campaign leaflet containing our political views on the street and seeking to influence others at election time. No: new clause 11 is specifically targeted at those with faith-based views and we should be equally aghast at it.
Of course, harassment or intimidation around abortion clinics—or anywhere—has to be addressed, although in more than a quarter of a century of people quietly gathering around abortion clinics, there have been relatively few, if any, reports of that and there are already several pieces of legislation that could tackle it if needed. The Offences against the Person Act 1861, the Public Order Act 1986, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which was passed only this year, all provide sufficient powers to tackle harassment and intimidation. This addresses the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin): rather than creating new and unnecessary laws, the police’s and our efforts should be on ensuring that they and the prosecution use the powers that they already have.
This new clause goes further and potentially criminalises peaceable gatherings. Indeed, looking at the wording of the new clause, it is perfectly possible to see an argument being made that just one person standing alone quietly near a clinic could be guilty of the criminal offence proposed in it. Widely or poorly drafted legislation, as here, can have serious unintended consequences, as we have seen in recent years. During the pandemic, Rosa Lalor, a 76-year-old grandmother, was arrested, prosecuted and charged for nothing less than praying and walking outside an abortion centre. It took over a year before Merseyside police force dropped the charges, noting that her actions were completely within the law. For her, however, the punishment was the process, despite being completely innocent of any wrongdoing.
Too often, in recent years, the mere expression of unpopular viewpoints has been interpreted, or rather misinterpreted, as automatically being abusive or harassing under the Public Order Act 1986, due to the broad discretionary powers the police have. We must stand against this. We have seen numerous examples of street preachers and others arrested for nothing more than peacefully expressing traditional views in public. When arrested and prosecuted, it is very rare for this to lead to conviction, but by the time they are vindicated the damage is done to the individual subjected to a prolonged criminal process, to the public’s confidence in policing and, indeed, to freedom of speech. Such miscarriages of justice have an abiding chilling effect, leading many—indeed, many thousands of people—across our country today to self-censor deeply-held views, which is a problem far more widespread than is currently recognised and that will no doubt be exacerbated by new clause 11.
I am just about to conclude.
One of the main reasons freedom of speech and thought are treasured and rightly protected in law is so that they can be used precisely for the purposes of influence. The free and frank exchange of viewpoints is the lifeblood of a genuinely democratic society. Rather than seeking to erode this most precious principle, we should be seeking instead to strengthen the law, to put it beyond doubt that freedom of speech—and, indeed, of belief—when peaceably expressed should never be a criminal offence. We must stand against this here today. Our cherished freedoms of thought, conscience, belief, speech and assembly have been hard fought for, and our democracy depends on their robust protection.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce), although I respectfully disagree with her position on this, and I will come to that shortly. I also welcome the Minister to his post.
I do not think anybody in this House was not deeply irritated by the sight of an ambulance having to turn around and go a different route because of protesters glued to the road, and I do not think there are many people in this House, when they saw protesters throwing soup at a van Gogh painting, who did not at least question whether that action had helped or hindered the cause of climate change. We all passionately believe in the right to protest, do we not? But we all understand that our fundamental freedoms are always balanced with the need to ensure business can carry on in its usual way.
That is why I thank the police for their response to the protesters who blocked the ambulance. They arrested 26 people for wilful obstruction of a highway and removed people glued to the road. Wilful obstruction is an offence that can carry a prison sentence. I also thank the police for the way in which they dealt with the incident in the National Gallery. Two people have been charged with criminal damage, which is an offence that can carry prison sentence.
Madam Deputy Speaker, you may ask yourself why, if the police were quick to respond, quick to arrest and quick to charge, we are debating a Public Order Bill to create a raft of new powers to tackle protest, after we have only just finished debating another Bill—the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022—which has introduced another raft of new provisions against protest.
My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle mentioned the reviews that have been done: the review conducted in 2018 went into this in great depth and there has been further work since, and the hon. Lady referred to further work being done in relation to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. That maintained the Government position that the current arrangements are still proportionate. There is legislation; the Public Order Act 1986 and the PSPOs provide those routes, and we continue to believe that is proportionate, but this is ongoing work and we need to continue to ensure that it is still proportionate. I will be reviewing and making certain that I understand fully the pattern of protests and the effectiveness and indeed the cost of PSPOs, and I will certainly make sure that that work is constantly refreshed if the House agrees we should maintain the current legislative environment.
There are existing laws to protect people from harassment and intimidation outside abortion clinics. The police have robust powers to deal with protests that obstruct access to clinics, and cause alarm, harassment or distress, and where protests cause harm, we expect the police and local authorities to work together at the local level to respond in a way that takes into consideration the local facts, issues and circumstances. In addition, local authorities already have powers to implement PSPOs; these can be introduced when a local authority is satisfied that protests are having, or are likely to have, a detrimental effect. We have seen increased use of these in recent weeks, with five local authorities imposing an order outside abortion clinics.
Because some of our colleagues will not have been able to follow the whole debate, will the Minister confirm what I believe he is saying, which is that he personally will vote against new clause 11 this afternoon?
It is a free vote and I will be voting against the amendment. I believe the powers and legislative environment we have are appropriate at the current juncture, and that is the position the Government have taken in the past. It is also the case that we continue to do work on this; I will continue to ensure that we are reviewing the scale of protests, the adequacy of the current legislative framework, and the effectiveness and cost of PSPOs. We need to maintain that work although I will be voting against the amendment this afternoon.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) said that, if the new clause falls, he will not give up. I would have been surprised had he said anything else, and I would be surprised if the hon. Member for Walthamstow gave up if she lost the vote. As I said, we will continue to review and assess this area, but it is important to get it right. There are powerful arguments on both sides of the debate, as enunciated by my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce), the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), and, on the other side, the hon. Member for Walthamstow, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle and my right hon. Friends the Members for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes) and for Harwich and North Essex. I have set out how, through the current legislation and PSPOs, a lot can be done. The House will determine whether it believes that to be insufficient.
I turn to new clauses 13 and 14 tabled, again, by the hon. Member for Walthamstow, who is a passionate campaigner on these issues. In last year’s “Tackling violence against women and girls strategy”, we confirmed that we are looking carefully at where there may be gaps in existing law and how a specific offence of public sexual harassment could address them. In the light of that work, just before summer recess, we launched a targeted consultation on whether there should be a specific offence of public sexual harassment and, if so, what it should look like. The hon. Lady knows that. The consultation closed in September, and we are grateful to her for sending us her comments. We are working at pace to analyse the responses and to determine the best way forward. I reassure her that, for example, her comments on foreseeability of intent are absolutely part of that consultation. What I cannot do—I am sorry to disappoint her—is give a commitment today on our next steps. That would not be appropriate until we fully analyse the consultation. I look forward to sharing our views with the House as soon as possible.
I turn to the several amendments tabled on the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Again, I thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and the Committee for the vital work that they do in supporting parliamentary scrutiny, as was referred to by the hon. Member for North East Fife (Wendy Chamberlain) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner. Amendments 28, 30, 35 and 37 aim to move the burden of proof for a reasonable excuse from the defendant to the prosecution for the relevant offences. As we made clear in our formal response to the Committee’s report, whether or not someone has a reasonable excuse for their actions is specific to each incident, and we see it as entirely appropriate that the defendant who committed the offence in the first place and has personal knowledge of those facts is required to prove them. Beyond that, our courts are experts in assessing whether an individual has a reasonable excuse for a multitude of criminal offences. I do not see the value in placing that burden on the prosecution.
Amendments 32, 36 and 38 seek to require the courts to have particular regard to articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights when assessing whether someone has a reasonable excuse for offences. Courts and other public bodies are already obliged to act compatibly with ECHR, and we do not believe that it is necessary to repeat that obligation.
Finally, several amendments seek to narrow the Bill’s scope. I will not address each individual amendment. The Government believe that the scope of the offences is not only appropriate but proportionate to the serious disruption inflicted.
I turn to a couple of other amendments.