Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords]

Helen Goodman Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

I am speaking very narrowly to new clause 12. I am sure the Treasury Committee and other Committees will look at the issue again. I expect it to be part of the ongoing discussions between Parliament and the Executive. However, I am speaking to the very narrow characteristics of new clause 12.

Since we tabled our new clause, there have been further discussions with the Chair of the Treasury Committee over its role in the appointment of FCA chief executives. I am pleased to announce that we have found a means of reinforcing its scrutiny role that goes further than the context of this Bill. Indeed, today the Chancellor has written to the Chair of the Treasury Committee, agreeing that the Government will make appointments to the role of chief executive of the FCA in such a way as to ensure that the Committee is able to hold a hearing before the appointment is formalised.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

Is the letter in the Vote Office if it has already been penned?

[Harriett Baldwin]

The letter is in my binder and I would be happy to read it out, provided that the Chair of the Committee does not object. I will ensure that a copy is put in the House of Commons Library, if that has not already happened. I am sure that the Chair of the hon. Lady’s Committee will be more than happy to share it with her. Would she like me to read the letter out in full?

[Helen Goodman]

Read it out!

[Harriett Baldwin]

By popular demand, this is what the letter states:

“Dear Andrew,

During the passage of the Bank of England and Financial Services Bill, we have considered the role of the Treasury Select Committee (TSC) in scrutinising the appointment of the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

This scrutiny is important and welcome. I will therefore ensure that appointments to the Chief Executive of the FCA are made in such a way to ensure the TSC is able to hold a hearing, after the appointment is announced but before it is formalised. Should the TSC recommend”—

this is more exciting news—

“in its report that the appointment be put as a motion to the whole House, the government will make time for this motion and respect the decision of the House.

Additionally”—

it does not stop there—

“I will seek, in a future Bill, to make a change to the legislation governing appointments to the FCA CEO to make the appointee subject to a fixed, renewable 5-year term. This would not apply to Andrew Bailey, who I recently announced as the new head of the FCA, but would first apply to his successor.

I believe that these changes will reinforce the Treasury Committee’s important scrutiny role.”

[Harriett Baldwin]

I am sure that the shadow Chancellor welcomes Government new clause 12 and the news that we will carefully consider the earliest possible opportunity for doing that, following today’s debate.

As the letter states, should the Treasury Committee follow the pre-commencement hearing with a report recommending that the appointment be put as a motion to the whole House, the Government will make time for that motion and, should it result in a vote, they will respect the decision of the House. We will also seek an opportunity to alter the legislation governing appointments to the FCA chief executive officer, to make the appointee subject to a fixed, renewable, five-year term. I can confirm that Andrew Bailey, the new CEO of the FCA, has been appointed to a five-year term that can be renewed, so the agreed process will first apply to his successor. The agreement is the right way to reinforce the crucial scrutiny role of the Treasury Committee.

[Helen Goodman]

I am grateful to the Economic Secretary, who is being extremely generous with her time. What she has said is extremely welcome and a significant step forward. Will she explain why the Chancellor thought it better not to insert it in the Bill, but to make the arrangement through an exchange of letters?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tyrie]

I always like listening to my hon. Friend, who is a member of the Treasury Committee and, of course, a constitutional expert. It is certainly true in this place that a good deal of quasi-constitutional change, which is what we have here, tends to take place gradually and often due to the development of informal arrangements. I think that that is all to the good, which is what I think my hon. Friend is saying.

[Helen Goodman]

rose—

[Mr Tyrie]

Everyone is trying to pile in, whereas I am trying to get to the end of my speech. I was almost there a minute ago, but I give way.

[Helen Goodman]

Does the right hon. Gentleman not feel the slightest hint of disappointment in the intervention by the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) because it was surely a historic first that he signed a new clause to amend the British constitution?

[Mr Tyrie]

Of course my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), as a great and learned constitutional expert, will explain this apparent contradiction to the House in, I hope, a lengthy disquisition in a few minutes’ time.

I really am trying to conclude, but I have just one more point. It is essential in a 21st-century democracy that appointees to an increasing number of quango positions—this was the general point I said I would refer to earlier—should be forced to explain their actions before Parliament and also should feel accountable to Parliament. To achieve that, the means of their appointment and their protection from dismissal are relevant, and that is why a change such as this can offer us something.

Over decades, successive Governments have offloaded their responsibilities to quangos, leaving the public with the sense that nobody is ultimately democratically accountable for anything. I believe that accountability for decisions that were formerly taken directly by Ministers, but now sit with unelected appointees in quangos, needs thorough scrutiny and cross-examination, and that is what we have been trying to do in the Treasury Committee over the past few years.

The agreement with the Chancellor is a sizeable step in the right direction. Of course, in an ideal world, I would like access to the statute book to write exactly what, on behalf of the Treasury Committee, I feel should be on it. However, we live in the real world, and I am very happy with this exchange of letters and grateful to Ministers for their agreement. I shall not press new clause 1 to a Division today.

[George Kerevan]

I agree with the right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) that there is a lot to be commended in the Bill, although some of the good things, as with new clause 12, were pushed on the Government. I also think that there are still some negative aspects to the Bill, which brings me to a conclusion—[Interruption.] As usual, it will be quite a long conclusion!

The Bill began as a tidying-up operation, which is why it was launched in the House of Lords. It was seen to be about just tidying up a few things, making a few additions and changes to the Financial Services Act 2012. As the Bill proceeded through its various stages, however, the more it became apparent that it exposed a whole series of issues in the financial regulatory system that were not fit for purpose.

We have convinced ourselves—or at least the Government have convinced themselves—that bar a little tidying up, all has been done to resolve the crisis of 2007, but that is not true. What we discovered time and again as the Bill proceeded were issues with the operation of the Bank of England and issues with the functioning of the regulatory bodies and how fit for purpose they are. Furthermore, new issues have emerged only in the last few weeks regarding tax havens. All those problems have appeared. I do not see this Bill putting the problems away and putting the issues to bed. Rather, we are seeing the start of a whole series of pieces of legislation coming into force until we get it right. Far from it being a tidying-up operation, we have started something new.

I am speaking to new clauses 2 and 3, which stand in my name and those of my SNP colleagues. I believe they get to the nub of the issues we are facing as a result of what has been uncovered. In the last 20 years, and more particularly in the last 10, the Bank of England has acquired an extraordinary range of new powers. I do not mean just forecasting or supervising powers over banks, because fundamental policy levers for running the whole economy have been transferred from this House and the Executive to the Bank of England itself. This began with the transfer of powers over interest rates to the Bank of England in 1997, along with the power to set the exchange rates, which no one seemed to notice at the time. This gave the Bank de facto control over our external sector. More recently, of course, with quantitative easing, the Bank has forced interest rates down to the zero band. If monetary policy cannot be manipulated, what else can be done? Gradually, the Bank has been given powers over large swathes of fiscal policy.

Nowadays, the Bank of England even operates our housing policy, as housing determines the whole direction of economic growth. In recent weeks, the Bank has been deciding between buy for let or buy for homeowners. Micro-decisions have been transferred, and my worry is that we have crossed a line of accountability with respect to the Bank of England. This is not a criticism of individuals working for it or indeed of the Governor of the Bank of England, for whom I have high regard. Gradually, however, we have allowed it to take over from this House far too much of the operational policy that directs the economy.

That is why I am happy to support new clause 12 as a step forward in beginning to redress the balance of accountability. New clause 12 and the Government’s acceptance of the general line of march from the Treasury Select Committee means that we are beginning to move to the point where key members of the regulatory regime can be confirmed in their appointments by this House.

We now have two precedents in that direction, with the Treasury Committee as a servant of the House confirming the appointment of the director of the Office for Budget Responsibility and now the head of the Financial Conduct Authority. That is the line of march, but I want to put on record, however, that SNP Members view this as a down payment. We are moving in a direction where the Governor of the Bank of England and all the key members of the regulatory agencies have to be confirmed by this House. I know that will take a long time and that there is always a struggle—sometimes gentle, sometimes not—between the Executive and the House over who has the real say. What we are seeing is a move towards more democratic accountability being held by the House, which I welcome.

Let me move on briefly to new clause 2, which takes this process a little further. Given the policy direction and powers that now lie with the Bank of England, we have to make sure that its committees and, above all, its ruling court of directors are democratically accountable. That is why we tabled this simple new clause, stating:

“In making nominations to the Court of Directors of the Bank of England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have regard to the importance of ensuring a balanced representation from the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.”

That new clause was carefully written. There is no suggestion that the court should be a federal body. Our suggestion is that in the balance of its make-up, there should be representation for the whole nation. Rightly or wrongly—much more rightly than wrongly in my opinion—there is a perception that the City of London and its major banks and financial institutions have historically had too big a sway over the court and the Bank.

[Helen Goodman]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful point. Does he agree that it must be significant that the economic performance of the peripheral areas of these nations is also peripheral?

[George Kerevan]

I could not agree more. In fact, if we look at the long history of the regions and nations of the United Kingdom—Scotland, Wales, the north of England and Northern Ireland—we see that they have suffered a deflationary cycle since the second world war, because from 1945 onwards, by and large, interest rates were set to control inflation that was triggered by the City of London and over-lending by the City of London. As a result, the north-south divide became a deflationary line, with the nations of the north, and the regions of the north of England, suffering high interest rates. Although those rates were not germane to their economic problems, for most of the post-war period UK interest rates have, on average, been set at a higher level than those in the rest of Europe, simply in order to control and curb over-lending by the City of London, which has resulted in deflation in the industrial regions.

I consider that that might have been mitigated to some extent if there had been broader representation of the nations and their industries on the leading bodies of the Bank of England, and, although I know that the Executive will challenge my proposal, I think we need to move in that direction. I remind Members that the court of directors is not the institution of the Bank that actually makes monetary or fiscal policy. It has oversight over the whole of the Bank’s operations, in the sense of giving value for money, and, above all, ensuring that there is no group-think between the different committees that make operational policy. I therefore think that, at that level, we need to begin the process. At that level, we need wider representation on the court.

Surprisingly—and I raised this in Committee—such representation already exists to a small degree. Since world war 2, traditionally, there has always been a trade union representative on the court of the Bank of England, and there still is, to this day. Even the Government—indeed, successive Governments—have recognised that there can be wider representation on the court, including wider social representation. However, when I asked Ministers whether, if they were rejecting the notion of a court with a wider representation of the economy and the community, they were going to remove trade union representation, there was a deafening silence, and that is why I am putting the question again today. Those who accept the principle that there should be trade union representation—and there should—ought to widen that principle, and that is what I am asking for now.

We tabled the new clause carefully in order not to suggest that the court should be federal or too detailed, with someone representing this and someone else representing that, but simply to suggest that a balance was needed. As anyone who has sat on the board of a company will know, the first thing that one must do when creating a board is ensure that there is some representation of different skills and different interests, so that the board’s members can act as a collective. My point is that the court, and to some extent, I think, the new policy committees of the Bank of England, do not act as collectives. They are in danger of adopting silo thinking, and, ultimately—because of the power that we have given to the Bank of England—they are also in danger of beginning to act with the kind of hubris that central banks begin to wield when they are given too much power. They begin to think that they know everything when they do not. We need democratic accountability in the Bank of England, and we need it not in the sense in which the Bank understands it, but in the sense in which the nation, and the nations of the UK, understand it. That is why I will press the new clause to a vote later on.

We have made some progress with the Bill. I fear that that progress has consisted mostly of discovering more about what we need to do to improve the regulatory structures of the economy, but at least more is out in the open, and the debate is more open. Where do we go next? Where we go next is towards more accountability. The Bill makes a down payment on that accountability, but it does not finally deliver it. That is where we go next.

[Helen Goodman]

Obviously, in the new landscape of the City, the head of the Financial Conduct Authority holds an extremely important post, and the question of who fills that post is therefore vital. I am extremely pleased about the change that was agreed this afternoon and announced by the Minister at the Dispatch Box. It opens up the process, it gives the Treasury Committee a proper role, and it will, we hope, reinforce the independence of the person concerned.

Another person with considerable independence is, of course, the Comptroller and Auditor General. I am pleased, too, that we have moved away from the idea that the court should decide which part of the Bank’s homework the Comptroller and Auditor General should be allowed to mark. There is clearly a parallel with the CAG’s role in respect of the BBC. On Second Reading, we asked Treasury Ministers to publish the memorandum of understanding. They have now published it, and it is an extremely useful document, which sets out, in advance, an agreed framework for the CAG’s remit. That will prevent ad hockery, and will also prevent both the reality and the possible perception of political interference, or inappropriate avoidance of scrutiny of certain areas of the Bank’s work.

New clause 13, which stands in my name, would make the Bank of England subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It seems to me that, as the Bank is a public authority which is fulfilling public policy purposes, the case for covering it does not really need to be made; it is the case against its being covered that needs to be made. The Minister made some important points about why she was not minded to accept the new clause, and I want to respond to what she said. She singled out three areas in particular: monetary policy, financial operations, and private banking.

I am not entirely sure of all the details of the 2000 Act, but we all know that local authorities are FOI-able. Equally, we all know that when we submit freedom of information requests to local authorities, we are not able to see the personal reports on individual members of staff in those authorities. The Act does not give access to that kind of personal information, and I should have thought that the same approach would exempt the private banking work of the Bank of England.

As for monetary policy and financial operations, I do not believe that my new clause would run into those parts of the Bank’s work, because they would still be protected by section 29(1) of the Act. That section states:

“Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice…the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom, or…the financial interests of any administration in the United Kingdom, as defined”,

blah blah blah. I should have thought that as long as we were not amending section 29, we would be able to protect the areas about which the Minister was particularly concerned.

I was alerted to this matter by a letter from the Governor, which the Minister herself waved at us in the Chamber last June, about the sale of shares in the Royal Bank of Scotland. I am sure that the Minister remembers the occasion well. In his letter, the Governor said that

“it is in the public interest for the government to begin now to return RBS to private ownership”.

Writing that letter was not part of the Governor’s role on monetary policy, financial policy or prudential policy; it was an intervention in Government policy at the Chancellor’s request on the issue of a share sale.

When the Governor appeared before the Treasury Committee, I asked him whether he would share the analysis that underlay the letter that he had written. He refused point blank to do so. I am not going to read out the full exchange that I had with the Governor on that occasion, because I went into the matter in detail on Second Reading and it has now been placed on the record twice. However, I really feel that in refusing to provide that underlying analysis, the Governor is evading public scrutiny of what is a perfectly proper matter for the public to understand.

The Governor also said in his letter that

“a phased return of RBS to private ownership would promote financial stability, a more competitive banking sector, and the interests of the wider economy.”

In fact, none of that is true. It will not promote a more competitive banking sector. We are hoping that the Comptroller and Auditor General will, in his separate audit of the RBS share sale, secure that analysis. However, there should be a more straightforward way of dealing with this. The share sale is a particular issue and the Comptroller and Auditor General always looks into share sales, so we might get at the truth on this one occasion, but I am sure that there will be other similar loopholes.

The topicality of seeing this analysis was further underlined last week by the interview in the Financial Times given by Sir Nicholas Macpherson on the occasion of his retirement from the Treasury, in which he described the sale of more RBS shares as “tricky”. He went on to say that there was a judgment to be made over whether to sell further shares below the 2008 purchase price. These are not straightforward matters; they do not fall within the normal remit of the Bank of England and they are of public policy significance. They are but one example of why it is appropriate for the Bank of England to be subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I rise to speak to new clauses 5 to 8 in this group, which are in my name. Madam Deputy Speaker, you will be glad to hear that I will be as brief as possible, because I am desperate to get to the third grouping so that we can have a vote on those amendments.

My new clauses aim to achieve two things: first, to secure justice for my country in the formulation of monetary policy; secondly, to help monetary policy formulation better to reflect the fiscal reality of the evolving UK. They are probing amendments, and I wish to draw the Government’s attention to them again as these are important points that the Government should go away and look at before possibly coming back with their own proposals, given the relatively light legislative programme before the House these days. I was glad to hear that Labour was holding a review into these issues, and I look forward to reading its findings, although it would have been handy if the review had been prepared in advance. We could then have discussed those issues in this debate on the legislation.

The first of my new clauses proposes a change to the name of the central bank. We in Plaid Cymru believe that the Bank of England’s name should be changed. It is the UK’s central bank, and it is time that was reflected to a greater degree, not only in its name but in its structures and practices. It is an undoubtedly contentious issue for me as a proud Welshman that the central bank that decides monetary policy in Wales is named after another country. The Bank of England was created in 1694, before the present British state was constructed. Wales was annexed in 1536, Scotland in 1707 and Ireland in 1801. The central bank was therefore created to serve a political entity that consisted only of Wales and England. I suppose the fact that Wales was omitted from its title reflects the inferior status that my country enjoyed in 1694.

Many of those present will have heard my schoolboy hero Sir Ian Botham on “The Daily Politics” yesterday, saying of the EU referendum:

“England is an island and we should be proud”.

I was going to say “If only”, but I thought I might get into trouble. That dubious geographical knowledge reflects an error continually suffered by the other nations of the UK at the hands of those who use “England” to mean a larger entity. It is an injustice that persists in cricket, Wales being denied a national team in its own right. Similarly, the other nations of the UK are denied recognition when it comes to the central bank. If the British state is a partnership of equals, all its institutions must reflect that reality, including perhaps the most important institution underpinning its financial system: the central bank.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, I thank the Government for indicating that they will accept new clause 9. By doing so, they will reduce the chances of an Army officer who is serving their country somewhere hot and dangerous receiving a telephone call from his or her spouse saying, “Darling, while you’re being shot at, we’ve had our bank account closed and we’ve lost our mortgage.” I congratulate the Government on doing the right thing today.

[Helen Goodman]

I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) who made an excellent speech on an important subject. He showed his characteristic bravery and forcefulness in addressing an issue that many other hon. Members wanted to address, but were unenthusiastic about putting themselves in the firing line.

The Minister said earlier that everybody is happy with this Bill, but now that we are discussing the regulation of financial services, she may discover that Labour Members are not quite so happy with this part of the Bill. I wish to speak in support of amendments 8 and 9, and I am also sympathetic to amendment 2 tabled by the Scottish National party. Getting the senior management regime right is vital for reducing the risk of further irresponsible behaviour in financial institutions, particularly the banks. We all know the devastating impact that the behaviour of the banks had on rest of the economy—anyone who is in any doubt about that should see the film “The Big Short”, which wonderfully describes that episode, albeit from an American point of view.

The clauses on the senior management regime are a retreat from the sensible legislation introduced in 2012, following the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which recognised that one way of changing behaviour and culture is to make those people at the top of the banks accept their full responsibility. The clauses in the Bill no longer do that. It is completely sensible for people to be expected to have the same responsibility for the behaviour of those who work for them that other institutions have for health and safety.

We have heard a number of arguments for the Government’s decision to reverse the reversal of the burden of the proof—rather an awkward mouthful—and one of the main arguments is that the regulatory approach that was legislated for in 2012 is too burdensome. This, however, misses the whole point, which is that we want people to spend more time looking at how to reduce risk rather than spending a great deal of time on how to make lots and lots of money irrespective of the risks posed to the economy. The risk does not apply ultimately to themselves on their own account, but it infects all other financial institutions.

I attended a seminar in the City last week, and senior practitioners from law firms, accountancy firms and from some of the big asset managers were in attendance and proved to be supportive of the original parliamentary commission approach. I expressed my feeling that it was disappointing that the Chancellor was going back on this, and suggested that he was not doing it as a whim, but because he had been lobbied to do so. I asked why they thought he had been lobbied in this way. It was, of course, a naive question, and I had no idea what the answer would be. They all roared with laughter and said, “Well, it’s obvious. It’s a way to facilitate people making millions of pounds without facing any downside risks.”

We cannot put ourselves in that situation again. The cost of the bail-out in 2008 was £133 billion. We really must take seriously the lessons that can be learned from that, which is why the amendments tabled by my Front-Bench team and by the SNP should be taken seriously and accepted by the Government.

[Mr Gary Streeter (South West Devon) (Con)]

I should like to take this opportunity to introduce my new clause 10, which is aimed at safeguarding the free debt management sector. Let me reassure the Minister that this is very much a probing amendment; I know she is looking forward to responding to it.

There has been a long debate over the “fee versus free” principle in the provision of debt management plans for indebted consumers. It is not my intention to re-open that debate now, although my concern is about free providers that are facing a looming capacity crisis.

Organisations such as PayPlan and Christians Against Poverty operate the “fair share” model of free debt management that sees creditors covering the cost of customer plans on a polluter-pays basis—in other words, through schemes that are free to the debtor. These organisations are facing increasing pressure as a consequence of fee-charging firms leaving the marketplace after failing Financial Conduct Authority authorisation. In one recent case, this left 16,000 debt management clients unsupported, and these customers are now being are being signposted to free providers. The last thing people want to happen when they are caught up in the desperation of heavy debts and are trying to slog their way out of it is, of course, that the person advising them suddenly disappears so that they have to start again with new people.

The debt management sector is nearing a desperate point, and the market is becoming increasingly inefficient, with consumers treated badly in many cases. The fair-share operators I mentioned have seen their revenue reduce as a consequence of consumers’ disposable income falling. As more and more fee chargers leave the market, we will soon face a situation in which fair-share operators are unable to provide economically viable plans. Plainly, we now face a situation in which consumers will be charged higher fees and their options for free debt management services will be severely limited—again, we are going in the wrong direction.

There were considerable and commendable efforts over the course of the last Parliament aimed at safeguarding free debt management provision, most notably on the creation of a voluntary protocol. Members of all parties have tried to make similar long-term changes, reflecting the cross-party nature of this issue. More recent efforts have come from the parliamentary debt management working group, of which I am a member. I see in her place our chairman, the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue), who is poised to speak in, I hope, support of my new clause.

Recent efforts have been aimed at establishing an industry-wide offering of free consumer debt management services. I accept that, while desirable, such an approach may not be feasible at this time. The new clause provides for a small tweak to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, mandating all creditors, via an FCA rule change, to fund free-to-consumer debt management plans under the “fair share” model. Many large creditors—banks and credit card companies—do accept a reduction in the amount due in exchange for the establishment of a coherent plan, but some still do not, and the new clause is intended to tackle that. While it falls short of outlawing the provision of fee-charging plans, it provides a strong safeguard for the “fair share” model, ensuring that customers can continue to access free debt management plans.

I am certain that this is a robust mechanism for desperately needed reform in the debt management sector, and I hope that, subject to Members’ approval, it can be implemented without delay. I thank the Economic Secretary for her interest in the matter, and for her helpful guidance behind the scenes.

Every age has its challenges, and it may well be that historians will look back at our era and marvel at the levels of unsustainable personal debt that were carried by so many people. Such debt may arise from grave misfortune, poor choices or the actions of others, but whatever the reason, it is vital that the right help is at hand to help people to step their way out of debt, and the FCA can assist that process by making the rule changes I have proposed. I thank the Economic Secretary again for her patience and kindness, and commend the new clause to her and to the House.