Health Bill (Eighth sitting)

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Helen Morgan]

We cannot see the resources allocated, so we cannot confirm that, but it is clearly a concern. We are not yet discussing the part of the Bill that deals with Healthwatch, so I should keep my powder dry, but we know that local authorities will get some additional funding to deal with their elements of Healthwatch, while ICBs will not. There is a concern that that streamlining is, in fact, slimming down.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I want to pick up where the shadow Minister left off. Essentially, she said that the cart is being put before the horse in terms of mayoral authorities.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East outlined, many areas have no plans for a mayoral authority; our area of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight is some way down the track. As I expressed last week in Committee, we have a strange anomaly in the new Surrey and Sussex ICB, because Sussex will get a mayor and Surrey will not, so Sussex residents will have representation on the ICB whereas Surrey residents will not. I hope that the Minister has had a chance to reflect on that strange paradox over the weekend and that she will now be able to answer specifically, as she did not last week, how that lack of representation for Surrey residents will work locally.

The abolition of the integrated care partnerships and their allied strategies continues a theme whereby the Government, under the veneer of slimming down, are actually decoupling—or weakening or whatever terminology Members wish to use—health and social care. For many years, all parties have regarded the bringing together of health and social care as essential, but the Bill not only looks like it is not trying to encourage that bringing together, but in fact is doing the opposite of that—it seems to be looking to pull them apart and decouple them. That is strange, because it does not appear to be the expressed policy of the Government, but it is the only logical explanation for many parts of the Bill, including the abolition in clause 23.

The shadow Minister pointed out that a number of areas will keep the ICPs in some form or other. I ask the Minister, does the Government support that feature? Was it the Government’s intention to remove the statutory footing of the ICPs and strategies in the hope and expectation that they would continue on a non-statutory footing? If so, we come to the paradox: if the Government support local authorities and health services continuing to work together in informal ICPs, why is the Minister trying to get rid of them? If they do not support that, is it now stated Government policy to separate social care and health services?

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. There is a consensus—not just in this room, but within Parliament and going back several decades—that we want more integration and partnership working, particularly to bring together health and social care services, but this clause drives a coach and horses through that, and does so in a way that weakens rather than strengthens the Government’s plans to replace the system.

Local authorities bear responsibility for social care and public health in their areas, but they will no longer have a direct voice when it comes to integrated care boards. What we have seen to date is not an ideal system, or even a system that works particularly well, so I understand that the Government want to strengthen it, but we should not do that by removing the local government voice or making it indirect via a mayor who does not have the direct responsibility for delivering social care locally. Mayors may have some strategic oversight, but that is different.

Just last week, the Minister of State for Care appeared before the Health and Social Care Committee and was questioned on this very issue by me and others. His view was that the mayoral strategic partnership would be more than sufficient to make up for the local authorities losing their seat, but he faced particular scrutiny from the hon. Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Ben Coleman), who made some excellent points, which I will not repeat or paraphrase as they are on public record.

The gist of his argument was that local authorities have been ignored for too long when it comes to joining up health and social care services. This measure puts local authorities in an even weaker position and threatens what the Government are trying to achieve with social care, particularly for areas such as mine that have an older population and a relatively small unitary authority with so much responsibility to deliver on.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon has already said, the combined area of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight—or the Solent, as the Government like to call the Isle of Wight, despite the fact that fish cannot vote—is not set to get a mayor for a couple of years, but it will be at the vanguard of the Government’s plans. What about those areas for which there is no date, or even no plan for a mayor at all? It seems extraordinary that the Government would do away with the current set-up, imperfect as it is, and replace it with something that does not yet exist.

The Government have time deal with this problem. I am sure they quietly understand that there could be a problem. It is now on their shoulders to deal with it. I welcome the Minister’s reflections.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

We all have examples of decisions that are made in our constituencies that we do not like. Again, that is part of the democratic process, but I go back to my earlier point: either there is a centralised unaccountable body like NHS England making decisions, or the Secretary of State devolves those responsibilities.

It is incumbent on people and elected leaders locally, and the ICB, which is not elected, to work with local leaders on these decisions. ICBs will be held accountable through mechanisms in the Department of Health and Social Care. There will be decisions that people do not like—that is a consequence of some of these things—but the clause simplifies the landscape.

[Gregory Stafford]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I will not; we need to move on from this point. Of course, if people want to keep the partnerships, they are totally able to do so. That will be up to local leaders to decide.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Chambers]

The hon. Lady makes a good point. The purpose is to ensure that those who are deeply embedded in community care are consulted by the ICBs, so that they do not miss obvious localised issues in their demographics when developing care plans.

Just to give a brief example from a surgery I held recently, Joanne Cook is an occupational therapist who is campaigning for occupational therapists who have received specific training to be able to prescribe, and crucially de-prescribe, medications, in the same way that trained paramedics can. Often, occupational therapists see patients on a daily basis. They give them intimate and regular care, and are even better placed than GPs to notice small changes and adjust medications to keep people out of hospital.

If integrated care boards are not drawing on the experience, knowledge and data from primary care providers in all their forms, any healthcare plans they come up with will not be relevant to those demographics. We will not be keeping people out of hospital or treating them as effectively in the community, and the whole system will not be as efficient or as targeted as it could be. I would appreciate it if the Minister considered accepting the new clause.

[Gregory Stafford]

I am not convinced that clause 24 delivers the transformation that the Minister claims. At its core, it appears to be little more than a rebranding exercise. It replaces joint local health and wellbeing strategies with neighbourhood health plans, but does remarkably little to strengthen the underlying duties on local authorities or integrated care boards. Merely changing the name of a document does not improve patient outcomes, reduce waiting lists or deliver more integrated care.

The duty created by the clause is also remarkably weak. Local authorities and ICBs need only prepare a plan and then “have regard” to it when exercising their functions. That is one of the least demanding obligations available in legislation. It requires consideration, not compliance. An ICB could acknowledge the plan, but decide to depart from it and still satisfy the legal test. If neighbourhood plans are genuinely intended to drive local health policy, the Bill should do a lot more to require decision makers to act in accordance with them, or at the very least to explain publicly why they have chosen not to.

I am also concerned that the clause creates additional bureaucracy without any clear accountability. It requires the production of another planning document, another consultation exercise and another set of reporting expectations, but provides for no—for want of a better phrase—enforcement mechanism or measurable outcomes against which success can be judged. There is a risk that local systems will spend their time drafting plans rather than delivering services. Public involvement is of course essential, and indeed welcome, as we have heard, but the clause offers no detail about what meaningful involvement looks like and contains nothing to prevent a token consultation from satisfying the statutory requirement. If the objective is genuine neighbourhood-led healthcare, the legislation needs to be drafted much more tightly.

Moving on to new clause 70, I do my absolute best not to be flippant when it comes to Lib Dem amendments and new clauses, but once again we have an idea that is fine in principle—in fact, I think we would all support it in principle—yet the hon. Member for Winchester could hardly articulate how the new clause would work and whom it would involve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Morgan]

The hon. Member will be aware that the new clause is a probing amendment. It is designed to push the Minister to describe how we will ensure that this range of expertise is taken into account when the plans are put together. We will not press the new clause to a vote, but we want to use it as a discussion point to probe how the range of expertise in the health service will be fully utilised, so that the plans are the best they can be.

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank the hon. Lady for that clarification. It is helpful to understand that the Liberal Democrats will not press the new clause to a vote, but if we are to use probing amendments effectively, they need to be drawn much more tightly, so that a Minister does not have the opportunity—I am sure that today’s Minister would not do this—to wriggle out of it because it is so poorly drafted.

[Dr Chambers]

What we are desperately trying to do is ensure that we are drawing on the expertise of primary care providers. The hon. Member seems not to understand that talking about 40 new hospitals the whole time with no plan to deliver them is looking at the wrong end of the health service. We need to try to keep people healthy and in the community. The new clause is an attempt to refocus thoughts on keeping people healthy in the community, rather than talking about hospitals that never existed.

[Gregory Stafford]

We can go back to the record in Hansard, but I do not remember mentioning anything to do with hospitals in what I just said; I may have had some sort of amnesia at that point. If the hon. Member is referring to the plan of the last Government, which was fully costed, for 40 new hospitals, then I am afraid I did not mention that. On his wider point, Conservative Members want to understand how local authorities and deliverers of primary care—dental services and so on—will be included and can have influence over the plans and strategies that ICBs draw up. I fully support that ambition; I just feel that, if we are to have that ambition, we need to table amendments and new clauses that the Minister might actually accept, so that we can go forward.

[Karin Smyth]

I thank hon. Members for their comments. I accept those made by the hon. Members for Winchester and for North Shropshire. I offer the Liberal Democrats the assurance that the Government fully appreciate the important role that primary care plays in informing ICB decisions, which is why we have retained the requirement that ICBs engage with their system partners, including primary care services, in the exercise of their planning and commissioning activities.

It is universally recognised that full engagement with providers, including primary care, is fundamental to good commissioning, and this is reflected in the strategic commissioning framework. The neighbourhood health framework sets out how neighbourhood health plans should be developed through health and wellbeing boards and with the involvement of system partners. We expect primary care to be fully involved in the process.

In addition, ICBs will continue to engage local representative primary care committees, such as the local medical committees. ICBs must comply with their duty to obtain appropriate advice from persons who have broad professional expertise in prevention, diagnosis or treatment of illness and the protection or improvement of public health. Primary care practitioners will remain key sources of such advice. Although I agree that experience of general practice is fundamental—as a commissioner, I worked very closely with general practitioners, who deal with 90% of patient contacts—I do not believe that placing an additional requirement on ICBs to engage specifically with primary care providers is necessary.

I will take this opportunity to clarify matters. We are moving between the roles of ICBs and local authority health and wellbeing boards. I know this is a subject of great interest and will continue to be debated in relation to those bodies’ commissioning and providing functions. The planning structure will be improved under clause 24, reflecting our commitment to neighbourhood health and making it a reality.

Planning begins with a joint strategic needs assessment developed by health and wellbeing boards; that assessment informs the new neighbourhood health plan, replacing the joint local health and wellbeing strategy. Meanwhile, ICBs will produce population health improvement plans, aligning multiple joint strategic needs assessments, neighbourhood health plans and local priorities. Patient and local voices must, of course, be embedded in ICB decision making and in the planning process. ICBs are being supported to do that. The strategic commissioning framework published on 4 November 2025 clearly set out that user involvement is key to strategic commissioning.

Having proper plans that address the needs of neighbourhoods will help the NHS to deliver for every community in our country. That is where the patient focus is and where people experience healthcare the most, and it is why we have made these commitments in neighbourhood health plans. I commend clause 24 to the Committee as the means to make that a reality.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

NHS trust accounts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Johnson]

Special health authorities are, in essence, specialist health authorities set up by the Secretary of State, usually to provide an England-wide service of some form. Examples include NHS Blood and Transplant, and the NHS Business Services Authority, which provides NHS pensions—I should declare that I have an NHS pension—admin for prescription exemptions and other such business-type functions. We also have NHS Resolution, which deals with clinical negligence claims, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority.

In principle, special health authorities are useful in some cases, but they are effectively a form of quango. Can the Minister explain when she thinks the Government might want to set up a special health authority, rather than using a department within the DHSC to deliver the same thing? There are plenty of other nationally delivered services, and although the Government have suggested that some services, such as screening, will become localised as part of the Bill, some things will remain national. Can the Minister give some examples of what the new provision will be used for?

I can see there is provision for flexibility, but the special health authorities would require setting up, and there are set-up costs and costs associated with branding and those sorts of things. How does the Minister envisage those costs being provided for, and when will it be necessary for the Government to use them rather than just using the Department?

Special health authorities have been created, reconfigured and shelved many times. For example, the National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse became part of Public Health England in 2013, and the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement was closed in the same year. The functions of the National Patient Safety Agency went to the NHS Commissioning Board Special Health Authority, later known as NHS England, in 2012 and then to NHS Improvement in 2016. Widening the scope could leave us with more quangos than are necessary.

Which specific functions do the Government plan to move into special health authorities under this widened power? Have the Government just decided that they need this power and are increasing the scope because they are abolishing NHS England without a proper plan? Is this power just to cover themselves in the event that, as they start to make a plan, they find out they need it?

Clause 28 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations for the transfer of staff from one special health authority to another, or to an ICB. Paragraph 3(8) of schedule 6 to the National Health Service Act 2006 states:

“Regulations may provide for the transfer of officers from one Special Health Authority to another”,

or to NHS England,

“and for arrangements under which the services of an officer…are placed at the disposal of another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England, or a local authority. Paragraph 3(12)(a) states that the Secretary of State may give directions

“to place the services of any of its officers at the disposal of another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England. Paragraph 13 states:

“Provision may be made by regulations with respect to the recording of information by a Special Health Authority, and the furnishing of information by a Special Health Authority to the Secretary of State, another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England.

Clause 28 modifies that paragraph such that regulations can now provide for the transfer of an officer to an ICB—that is a new power—as well as a special health authority and a local health authority, but no longer to NHS England because NHS England is being abolished. Regulations can now provide for an officer’s services to be placed at the disposal of the ICB and the Secretary of State, which is a new power, as well as the special health authority or local authority, but no longer NHS England. The clause modifies paragraph 3(12)(a) of schedule 6, so that directions may be given about placing the services of officers at the disposal of the special health authority and, newly, the Secretary of State or an ICB, but not NHS England. As the Minister said, the clause also modifies paragraph 13 of schedule 6, so that a special health authority can be required by regulations to pass information to integrated care boards, which is a new power, but no longer to NHS England.

NHS England is to be abolished, so it is sensible to say that staff can no longer be placed there—that seems an entirely reasonable exercise—but the legislation providing for special health authorities essentially contains open-ended spending power. Remuneration of the special health authority chairman and staff can be determined by the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Treasury. Does the Minister foresee an upper limit to those sorts of salaries?

People will essentially be able to transfer from one special health authority to another, or to an ICB—or be placed at the disposal of another special health authority, an ICB, a local authority or the Secretary of State. Will the Minister talk about the location, pension and salary of those individuals? We heard yesterday that the future Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham), may want to move a whole load of civil servants from London up to Manchester. That will clearly be within his gift if he becomes Prime Minister, but for individuals who work in one location to be asked to move to another is disruptive to their family and social lives, and involves significant relocation costs. If people are moved in the way that clause 28 describes, particularly by transfer, what choice will they have? What will happen to their pension, salary and other terms and conditions, and will they have a choice of location or not?

[Gregory Stafford]

Very briefly, on clauses 27 and 28, I am sure the Committee is aware that special health authorities were initially established under the National Health Service Act 1977. Since then the number of special health authorities has expanded and contracted a number of times over the years to leave us with, currently, NHS Blood and Transplant, and the Business Services Authority, which covers pensions, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham mentioned—I should declare that I have an NHS pension, albeit a very small one—as well as the NHS Litigation Authority, also known as NHS Resolution, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority.

The mood music and the direction of travel, certainly since 2006, has been to reduce the number of special health authorities. On my reading, clauses 27 and 28 suggest that the Government are potentially looking to expand the number of special health authorities, given the Secretary of State’s direction under clause 27 and the practical steps for staff transfers in clause 28. Is the Minister looking at, for example, a special health authority to deal with artificial intelligence? Clearly that is something the NHS will have to embrace—or deal with, depending on which end of the AI argument one is on—rapidly over the coming years. Is that a potential area for a special health authority? Perhaps the Minister could outline where she sees the special health authorities acting and what their remits might be.

[Karin Smyth]

To be clear, in response to the comments of the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, it is not currently our intention to set up any new special authorities to deliver any specific functions. We are taking this opportunity to update the legislative framework and ensure that in future the functions that a special health authority could carry out are less limited. The current legislative framework limits the remit of such authorities to their functions under the NHS Act 2006, which is outdated and does not reflect changes since that time. There are functions of the Secretary of State under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 that we may want special authorities to carry out in future. I agree with the Opposition spokesperson that the situation is complex. We have had a lot of changes over many years, as both she and the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said. I agree that we need flexibility for future provision, and that is what the clauses provide.

We have no immediate intention to delegate specific functions of the Secretary of State. However, following the abolition of NHS England, a range of functions may need to be established, as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon outlined. Those functions could, as an example, include the data and information functions in part 9 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which currently sit with the Secretary of State.

I assure the Committee that the clauses do not change the existing processes or scrutiny that exist around setting up a special health authority. They are, as I think the Opposition spokesperson said, about future-proofing. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Constitution of NHS foundation trusts

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Morgan]

As I mentioned in my previous remarks, one imagines that a Secretary of State would set out criteria to ensure that the best people for the job are appointed. We are in a situation where a current Parliament cannot bind a future one, but we do need to set a precedent that political capture of these important leadership roles is not an unintentional consequence of this legislation. I accept that it is unintentional; I think the Secretary of State and the Minister have drafted this legislation with the best of intentions, but this is something we should guard against.

[Gregory Stafford]

On clause 29 and the relevant amendments, the membership model and the council of governors were originally introduced to give patients, staff and local communities a formal voice in the governance of NHS organisations. I worry that by removing them the clause concentrates power in the hands of the trust board at a local level and, potentially, the Secretary of State at a national level, while reducing opportunities for local scrutiny and public participation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said, there is a real danger that organisations will be independent in name only.

That brings us back to the never-ending tension in the Bill between the centralisation of power in the Secretary of State, through the abolition of NHS England and all the other bodies we have talked about, and the Government’s stated desire to have more accountability for decision making at a local level.

[Dr Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)]

I am aware of the role of governors in some of our NHS trusts and the way in which they are appointed, but governors have said to me that they are sometimes disappointed by the level of influence they can in fact have in their trust. Can the hon. Member think of examples of where governors have particularly influenced the activities of individual trusts? I have not found that to be the case in my experience.

[Gregory Stafford]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention neatly brings me to my next point. I have some sympathy for his viewpoint—and apparently the viewpoint expressed to him by governors—that in many cases, if not most, governors do not have the teeth, the influence or the ability to change things in the way they would like. My argument is very similar to the one we will expand on later regarding the abolition of the Healthcare Services Safety Investigations Branch and Healthwatch: the Government’s response to something not working as effectively as it could is to abolish it, but why not give those organisations the teeth—the powers—to achieve the things they were set up to do, unless the hon. Gentleman and the Government feel that there is no need, in Healthwatch’s case, for that level of independent scrutiny or, in governors’ case, that level of independent influence on boards?

There is a fundamental difference here: the Conservatives would take something imperfect and make it better; the Government’s response is to take something imperfect and abolish it. That is the wrong way round.

[Dr Johnson]

Does my hon. Friend think that this leaves a bit of a gap? The Secretary of State will not have the level of local oversight that the governors had, so how will that local oversight feed into the Secretary of State so that he or she can make the decisions instead?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is right that there will be a gap in local decision making on these issues. It goes back to that tension I described some moments ago: the Government’s stated intention is to devolve powers locally, but they seem to be pulling so much power up to the Secretary of State that we will lose the ability to make local decisions for the benefit of local populations where appropriate. We have a stated ambition for neighbourhood health, but those neighbourhoods are rapidly expanding in this legislation to become areas of millions of people. Local people who are interested in their local health delivery or local hospital trust would not see that as local decision making, and there is the gap that my hon. Friend describes.

I do not think that amendments 74 and 75 have been moved, so I will not talk about them. Government amendment 19 will require

“NHS foundation trusts to have at least one executive director who is a registered medical practitioner or a registered dentist and another who is a registered nurse or a registered midwife.”

As also stated in the explanatory note, and as the Minister mentioned, regulations may create exception—for example, for ambulance trusts. That is the right decision, and it is important that we have medical experience on foundation trust boards. I am interested in understanding from the Minister, first, why she has chosen a medical practitioner or registered dentist. Does she see some equivalence in their expertise that could be substituted? I have great respect for doctors and for dentists, but they have potentially different clinical expertise. If a foundation trust does no oral healthcare or maxillofacial reconstruction, and does no dentistry or allied specialties, would it really satisfy requirements to have a dentist on the board? Likewise, given that the amendment also refers to a registered nurse or midwife, if a trust has no maternity services, would having a midwife on the board really satisfy the requirement of that trust to have nursing care input? I ask those questions, and I would be interested in the answers.

Likewise, there is the exemption for ambulance trusts. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, I would be interested to understand from the Minister why she thinks ambulance trusts do not need a medical practitioner on their boards, given that they are doing medicine. Plenty of consultants work alongside paramedics and in ambulances, so again I am not quite sure why she is making that exemption. I would be interested to hear from her on that.

I understand the intention behind Liberal Democrat amendment 36. Once again, it is trying to soften the Secretary of State’s power grab over decision making—like the hon. Member for North Shropshire, I am not saying anything against the current Secretary of State, but a future Secretary of State could be different. The aim is to try to temper that in some way. Unfortunately for the hon. Member—I have sympathy for the amendment—the stated intention of the Bill is to pull more power to the Secretary of State. The Minister may surprise me, but I fear that the amendment will not find favour with the Government, because the whole Bill is about pulling more power to the centre, certainly when it comes to appointments, and to the Secretary of State.

However, the Minister should think about how future Secretaries of State may have to go through some process whereby their decisions are checked and justified, especially at local level. If we want local people to have influence and say over their local health systems and trusts, there needs to be some sort of bridging legislation or bridging process to ensure that whatever a Secretary of State decides, it has the confidence and support of local people and local service providers.

[Karin Smyth]

I think I am almost going to agree with the hon. Gentleman on his final point. It is important that local people have confidence in how their local systems are run and managed and, clearly, in the outcomes.

I will come first to the issue of governors and boards and then move to the amendments. I think we have all had emails, as is quite right, from local board members. Let me say, as I did earlier, that that is with good intent; they are very good people, who have given public service to be part of their local health system. As I said, this provision is no judgment on them; it is, as we heard, about effectively making the really important patient voice and patient experience central to the functions of the organisations delivering our healthcare. As I said in previous sittings, a debate will continue to be had about where we most effectively have that, but our intention throughout the 10-year health plan and this Bill is about devolution to providers and to ICBs and about making boards, as I also said in a previous sitting, responsible and accountable for the outcomes.

Let me outline broadly, because I think this is of interest to people, the impact on governance and the role that governors had. Just to be clear, since the creation of foundation trusts in 2004, NHS England—and, before it, NHS Improvement and Monitor—has had a statutory role to oversee the governance of NHS foundation trusts, including holding the whole board to account and taking steps where it identifies weaknesses in how foundation trusts are being run. The regulatory function is underpinned by the NHS provider licence, which will continue when NHS England’s functions pass to the Secretary of State. That is why we do not consider that the removal of the council of governors will have a negative impact on the governance of FTs, as some hon. Members have suggested.